1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:02,960 Welcome back everyone. This is Part 2 of the Super 2 00:00:02,960 --> 00:00:06,040 Investor portfolio update. If you've missed it, I would 3 00:00:06,040 --> 00:00:09,280 recommend going back one day on this channel and looking at part 4 00:00:09,280 --> 00:00:12,080 one of the Super investors portfolio update. 5 00:00:12,080 --> 00:00:14,960 It's where we look at a lot of great investors, ones that have 6 00:00:14,960 --> 00:00:17,520 beat the market for a long period of time, investors that 7 00:00:17,520 --> 00:00:20,400 manage hundreds if not billions of dollars in assets under 8 00:00:20,400 --> 00:00:23,640 management and we get to see an inside look of what their 9 00:00:23,640 --> 00:00:26,410 portfolios look like. And I think this is one of the 10 00:00:26,410 --> 00:00:29,810 best ways to learn about investing because when you study 11 00:00:29,810 --> 00:00:33,250 anything, whether it's sports or any type of event, you want to 12 00:00:33,250 --> 00:00:36,530 learn from the best. And in most cases, these type of 13 00:00:36,530 --> 00:00:39,650 people are the best of what they do, especially the ones that 14 00:00:39,650 --> 00:00:41,930 have beaten the market for a long period of time. 15 00:00:42,410 --> 00:00:46,810 So in this video we have Part 2, a brand new slate of super 16 00:00:46,810 --> 00:00:49,880 investors to go through and this is a very strong slate. 17 00:00:49,880 --> 00:00:52,600 We have Warren Buffett, the big man himself. 18 00:00:52,760 --> 00:00:54,720 We're going to be seeing what he's been doing with his 19 00:00:54,720 --> 00:00:57,280 portfolio. But then we also have a lot of 20 00:00:57,280 --> 00:00:59,680 other great investors. One of them is named Dev 21 00:00:59,680 --> 00:01:01,920 Cantasaria from Valley Forge Capital. 22 00:01:02,440 --> 00:01:07,320 And Dev has quickly become one of, if not my favorite investor 23 00:01:07,320 --> 00:01:10,120 to follow right now. I think he's phenomenally 24 00:01:10,120 --> 00:01:12,440 intelligent. I think that his decisions are 25 00:01:12,440 --> 00:01:15,920 so well grounded in reality. His results have been market 26 00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:17,360 beating for a long period of time. 27 00:01:17,750 --> 00:01:21,230 And so I am very excited to see his update on what he's doing 28 00:01:21,230 --> 00:01:23,310 with his very concentrated portfolio. 29 00:01:23,910 --> 00:01:26,950 Then we also have Bill Ackman. I really like looking at what 30 00:01:26,950 --> 00:01:29,430 Bill Ackman's doing. He's always making some big 31 00:01:29,430 --> 00:01:31,870 significant bets all the time. So we're going to be checking 32 00:01:31,870 --> 00:01:34,470 out his portfolio. We have Carl Icahn. 33 00:01:34,830 --> 00:01:37,950 This is someone that has come under a lot of scrutiny, a lot 34 00:01:37,950 --> 00:01:42,110 of criticism and the Hindenburg report has done a lot of damage 35 00:01:42,110 --> 00:01:43,910 to his company. So we'll be looking at that as 36 00:01:43,910 --> 00:01:46,190 well. We have Chase Coleman. 37 00:01:46,770 --> 00:01:50,410 Chase Coleman in my mind is very similar to Kathy Wood, someone 38 00:01:50,410 --> 00:01:53,370 that invests in a lot of hyper growth companies, ones that 39 00:01:53,370 --> 00:01:56,450 aren't really profitable right now, but they might be someday. 40 00:01:56,690 --> 00:01:59,810 His portfolio has a tremendous amount of volatility, but we'll 41 00:01:59,810 --> 00:02:02,050 be looking at the positioning that he's doing right now. 42 00:02:02,130 --> 00:02:05,130 Then we have Nelson Peltz, who's an activist investor that bought 43 00:02:05,130 --> 00:02:08,009 a large stake in Disney. He's the one that was highly 44 00:02:08,009 --> 00:02:09,690 critical of the Disney leadership. 45 00:02:09,970 --> 00:02:12,410 He wrote a letter to them outlining all of this stuff 46 00:02:12,410 --> 00:02:14,770 they're doing wrong. He told them to reinstate the 47 00:02:14,770 --> 00:02:17,910 dividend to get cash flow back and all of this great stuff for 48 00:02:17,910 --> 00:02:19,670 Disney. Well, we get to see what he's 49 00:02:19,670 --> 00:02:22,350 been doing with his portfolio and his Disney position. 50 00:02:22,710 --> 00:02:25,190 Then we have David Einhorn of Green Light Capital. 51 00:02:25,430 --> 00:02:27,790 He's one that's a lot more cynical, a lot more 52 00:02:27,790 --> 00:02:30,270 conservative. He's sometimes even bearish on 53 00:02:30,270 --> 00:02:32,630 the market, so be looking at his positioning. 54 00:02:33,070 --> 00:02:35,830 We have Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Trust. 55 00:02:36,070 --> 00:02:41,670 This is a massive portfolio, $42 billion and they do not joke 56 00:02:41,670 --> 00:02:45,530 around with this money. Bill Gates has a very well 57 00:02:45,530 --> 00:02:48,170 constructed portfolio. So I'm excited to look at an 58 00:02:48,170 --> 00:02:50,450 update on that. We have Daniel Loeb of Third 59 00:02:50,450 --> 00:02:52,810 Point. He's a really smart investor, an 60 00:02:52,810 --> 00:02:55,690 actives investor that has a lot of different companies. 61 00:02:55,690 --> 00:02:58,530 He's usually trading around a lot and he manages around $6 62 00:02:58,530 --> 00:03:00,850 billion. And then finally we have 63 00:03:00,850 --> 00:03:04,650 Christopher Bloomstrand, who I think has a comprehensive 64 00:03:04,690 --> 00:03:06,410 understanding of Berkshire Hathaway. 65 00:03:06,770 --> 00:03:09,990 He has a very good understanding of insurance companies and I 66 00:03:09,990 --> 00:03:12,430 think overall he's a great analysts when it comes to 67 00:03:12,830 --> 00:03:15,950 indepth company analysis. So we'll be looking at what 68 00:03:15,950 --> 00:03:17,710 Christopher Bloomstrand is doing as well. 69 00:03:18,230 --> 00:03:21,230 So we have a very strong slate of investors to look at. 70 00:03:21,470 --> 00:03:23,670 Obviously a lot to dive into in this episode. 71 00:03:23,790 --> 00:03:25,590 So grab yourself a drink, get settled. 72 00:03:25,670 --> 00:03:26,990 Let's go ahead and get started now. 73 00:03:26,990 --> 00:03:29,110 We'll kick things off by starting with Warren Buffett, 74 00:03:29,110 --> 00:03:31,910 the big man himself, who I consider to be the king of 75 00:03:31,910 --> 00:03:35,470 investing the best investor to ever live by a pretty 76 00:03:35,470 --> 00:03:38,280 significant margin. Now, a lot of people focus on 77 00:03:38,280 --> 00:03:41,280 investors that have compounded for a shorter duration of time, 78 00:03:41,320 --> 00:03:42,960 but at a higher speed than Warren Buffett. 79 00:03:43,440 --> 00:03:46,200 And although that's very impressive, I think the real 80 00:03:46,200 --> 00:03:50,320 skill set of Warren Buffett that's highly underrated is not 81 00:03:50,320 --> 00:03:53,840 only his incredible gains over a long period of time, but the 82 00:03:53,840 --> 00:03:57,360 fact that he did so meticulously, without taking any 83 00:03:57,360 --> 00:04:01,720 type of significant risk that could ever destroy his fund, his 84 00:04:01,920 --> 00:04:05,080 company, and hurt his shareholders in the long term. 85 00:04:05,520 --> 00:04:10,320 He never overextended his bets. He never went too far with risk, 86 00:04:10,600 --> 00:04:13,640 and that's so underrated. It's so difficult for investors 87 00:04:13,640 --> 00:04:16,000 to do that. The history of investors that 88 00:04:16,000 --> 00:04:19,120 once had good returns but then they overextended risk. 89 00:04:19,480 --> 00:04:21,800 That's a long list. We have Tiger Global going down 90 00:04:21,800 --> 00:04:25,840 70% in one year, destroying enormous amounts of value, 10 91 00:04:25,840 --> 00:04:28,040 years plus of value destroyed in a single year. 92 00:04:28,320 --> 00:04:30,840 We have the same thing with Kathy Wood and Ark Innovation 93 00:04:31,080 --> 00:04:33,960 dropping 75% / a two year period. 94 00:04:34,420 --> 00:04:37,220 That is value destruction that Warren Buffett never had to go 95 00:04:37,220 --> 00:04:39,820 through. So not only does he have good 96 00:04:39,820 --> 00:04:43,620 returns, but he had good returns sustainably without taking 97 00:04:43,620 --> 00:04:46,700 enormous amounts of risk for 40 plus years. 98 00:04:47,020 --> 00:04:51,580 And that record is it's unbeaten, it's the best record 99 00:04:51,580 --> 00:04:54,260 in the market today. So Warren Buffett I believe sits 100 00:04:54,260 --> 00:04:56,300 there with the throne. I think he's the best value 101 00:04:56,300 --> 00:04:59,340 investor and overall just the best investor to ever live. 102 00:04:59,700 --> 00:05:01,740 And I think it's going to be very difficult for someone to 103 00:05:01,740 --> 00:05:03,580 beat that record. Now let's go ahead and take a 104 00:05:03,580 --> 00:05:06,980 look at his portfolio today. One thing about Buffett is 105 00:05:06,980 --> 00:05:10,820 although he doesn't overextend risk, he's also not afraid of 106 00:05:10,820 --> 00:05:14,140 concentration. And he said repeatedly that if 107 00:05:14,140 --> 00:05:18,020 you know what you're doing, then concentration is not a risky 108 00:05:18,020 --> 00:05:20,300 endeavor. Concentration is really only 109 00:05:20,300 --> 00:05:22,140 risky if you're not sure of what you're doing. 110 00:05:22,380 --> 00:05:24,620 The risk comes in with ignorance. 111 00:05:25,120 --> 00:05:30,200 So Buffett has an astounding 51% of his public portfolio in 112 00:05:30,200 --> 00:05:32,760 Apple. Now, I do have to give a little 113 00:05:32,760 --> 00:05:36,760 bit of a context here. This is Buffett's public 114 00:05:36,760 --> 00:05:39,960 portfolio, the tradable portfolio on the market. 115 00:05:40,480 --> 00:05:44,520 Berkshire owns an enormous amount, like 90 plus businesses 116 00:05:44,520 --> 00:05:47,440 that they wholly own, meaning they're not publicly traded. 117 00:05:47,680 --> 00:05:51,600 That's not part of this 51%. So if you put Apple in context 118 00:05:51,600 --> 00:05:55,190 of the entire Berkshire conglomerate, the entire empire 119 00:05:55,190 --> 00:05:57,670 that he started, it's a smaller portion. 120 00:05:57,910 --> 00:06:01,350 It make up much less than 50%. Then if you put it with the cash 121 00:06:01,350 --> 00:06:05,390 balance, it's even smaller. So I would not go to the extent 122 00:06:05,390 --> 00:06:10,270 of believing that Buffett would put 51% of his total assets into 123 00:06:10,270 --> 00:06:12,150 Apple. That's not what he's done right 124 00:06:12,150 --> 00:06:16,470 now, but this is still a very significant bet in one company. 125 00:06:16,470 --> 00:06:18,390 Now let's go ahead and take a look at the activity and see 126 00:06:18,390 --> 00:06:20,630 what he's been up to in the past quarter. 127 00:06:20,630 --> 00:06:23,670 We can filter by the percent changes here and we can see that 128 00:06:24,190 --> 00:06:26,910 not that much change. If you added up these total 129 00:06:26,910 --> 00:06:29,550 percentages of what they actually traded in the quarter, 130 00:06:29,990 --> 00:06:35,750 what is this like 2%, maybe upwards of 2 1/2%, not a lot of 131 00:06:35,750 --> 00:06:37,350 trading for a three month period. 132 00:06:37,670 --> 00:06:41,550 And one of the trades was them basically taking the gains from 133 00:06:41,550 --> 00:06:45,190 a merger arbitrage play. Microsoft was buying Activision 134 00:06:45,190 --> 00:06:47,390 Blizzard. Buffett has a long history of 135 00:06:47,390 --> 00:06:51,090 doing arbitrage and what he did was buy a bit of Activision 136 00:06:51,090 --> 00:06:52,770 because he thought the deal would go through. 137 00:06:53,130 --> 00:06:55,530 It looks like the deal went through, Activision stock is 138 00:06:55,530 --> 00:06:59,650 going up and he sold at what I assumed to be a decent profit. 139 00:07:00,050 --> 00:07:01,770 So that was a good trade by Buffett. 140 00:07:02,330 --> 00:07:06,170 Then we have Chevron Corp, He sold a little bit of that .42% 141 00:07:06,170 --> 00:07:09,810 of the portfolio. Mckenzen Corp, they sold 100% of 142 00:07:09,810 --> 00:07:12,650 that, That's .25% of the portfolio. 143 00:07:13,090 --> 00:07:16,170 Then they bought a little bit of Dr. Horton and Occidental 144 00:07:16,170 --> 00:07:20,180 Petroleum added to the energy companies Buffett loves having 145 00:07:20,180 --> 00:07:23,780 his big energy empire. Buffett notably did not sell a 146 00:07:23,780 --> 00:07:27,820 single share of Apple, even after the rising price of Apple. 147 00:07:28,100 --> 00:07:32,340 Apple's up something like 45% year to date, and he didn't take 148 00:07:32,420 --> 00:07:35,260 any gains in the company. A lot of people believe that 149 00:07:35,260 --> 00:07:38,380 Apple right now is overvalued because it's not growing. 150 00:07:38,700 --> 00:07:41,940 Apple's a slow growing company. Last quarter it didn't really 151 00:07:41,940 --> 00:07:44,180 grow its earnings per share all that much and it didn't grow 152 00:07:44,180 --> 00:07:46,660 revenue all that much. So a lot of people are saying 153 00:07:47,290 --> 00:07:50,970 it's foolish to own Apple. It trades at a high P/E and it's 154 00:07:50,970 --> 00:07:54,290 super slow growing. I want to address this claim of 155 00:07:54,290 --> 00:07:57,130 the slow growing Apple. So let's go ahead and take a 156 00:07:57,130 --> 00:08:00,010 look at Apple. Here using Qual Trim insights is 157 00:08:00,010 --> 00:08:02,370 the page that we're going to be looking at, which is a stock 158 00:08:02,370 --> 00:08:04,490 analysis tool that I developed. It's part of the Patreon 159 00:08:04,490 --> 00:08:07,090 membership. Let's bring up Apple here and 160 00:08:07,090 --> 00:08:09,290 we'll look at how slow growing Apple is. 161 00:08:09,970 --> 00:08:13,450 We can look at it annually and look at a bigger timeline. 162 00:08:13,930 --> 00:08:17,810 Here's the slow growing Apple. The revenue for Apple has grown 163 00:08:17,890 --> 00:08:22,330 at 19% over the past two years, and over the past five years the 164 00:08:22,330 --> 00:08:26,970 revenue has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 11.46%. 165 00:08:27,530 --> 00:08:30,090 That's much faster than the S&P 500 as a whole. 166 00:08:30,650 --> 00:08:32,250 So the revenue is not growing slowly. 167 00:08:32,650 --> 00:08:35,770 Another thing that I'd mention is that this is entirely organic 168 00:08:35,770 --> 00:08:39,330 growth, meaning the Apple didn't do any big acquisitions that 169 00:08:39,490 --> 00:08:42,770 added on revenue. This growth is just from selling 170 00:08:42,770 --> 00:08:45,650 more products, increasing prices and having more services. 171 00:08:46,000 --> 00:08:50,080 Completely organic, almost 12% growth over the past five years. 172 00:08:50,280 --> 00:08:53,440 Let's go ahead and take a look at the not growing apple when it 173 00:08:53,440 --> 00:08:57,200 comes to earnings per share. The earnings per share over the 174 00:08:57,200 --> 00:09:02,960 past five years have grown at 21.58% on a compound annual 175 00:09:02,960 --> 00:09:06,560 growth rate. Look at the substantial leap in 176 00:09:06,560 --> 00:09:10,040 the earnings per share. Even last year when it slowed 177 00:09:10,040 --> 00:09:14,650 down after the massive year from 2020 to 2021, they still manage 178 00:09:14,650 --> 00:09:18,650 growth of almost 9%. We can look at the not growing 179 00:09:18,650 --> 00:09:23,290 apples free cash flow. The free cash flow grew at 17% 180 00:09:23,370 --> 00:09:26,810 over the past five years. That's a pretty substantial free 181 00:09:26,810 --> 00:09:29,010 cash flow growth for a company that's supposed to not be 182 00:09:29,010 --> 00:09:31,450 growing. And keep in mind the average 183 00:09:31,450 --> 00:09:36,370 growth rate of the S&P 500 with free cash flow per share is 184 00:09:36,370 --> 00:09:40,570 around 8% per year. That's what the average of the 185 00:09:40,570 --> 00:09:44,180 S&P 500 is. Over the past five years, Apple 186 00:09:44,180 --> 00:09:49,980 grew their free cash flow per share at 23 percent, 23% versus 187 00:09:49,980 --> 00:09:53,740 the S&P 5 hundreds, 8%. This is the not growing Apple. 188 00:09:53,940 --> 00:09:56,420 The reason that people have said that it's not growing is because 189 00:09:56,420 --> 00:09:58,500 of the slowdown in the previous quarter. 190 00:09:58,820 --> 00:10:02,660 But when you zoom out just ever so slightly past one year, you 191 00:10:02,660 --> 00:10:05,700 see the longer term trends of Apple and the company has had a 192 00:10:05,700 --> 00:10:10,050 very strong growth history. My assumption is that Apple will 193 00:10:10,050 --> 00:10:12,770 continue to outperform the majority of other companies in 194 00:10:12,770 --> 00:10:15,290 the market and I believe it will continue to outperform the 195 00:10:15,290 --> 00:10:17,250 market at large. That's part of the reason that I 196 00:10:17,250 --> 00:10:20,250 remain invested in the company and I believe that that 197 00:10:20,250 --> 00:10:22,490 Berkshire is going to do really well with this being a key 198 00:10:22,490 --> 00:10:24,490 holding. So I think it makes sense for 199 00:10:24,490 --> 00:10:27,370 Buffett to continue holding this company when it has such a 200 00:10:27,370 --> 00:10:32,090 substantial mode, a grasp on so many consumers and it has over 2 201 00:10:32,090 --> 00:10:34,650 billion installed devices as of last quarter. 202 00:10:35,050 --> 00:10:37,810 The amount of pricing power that Apple has, the levers they can 203 00:10:37,810 --> 00:10:40,170 pull are virtually endless at this point. 204 00:10:40,570 --> 00:10:46,010 So trading at what it does right now, A25, 4PE, I do not believe 205 00:10:46,010 --> 00:10:49,450 it's too expensive for this company and I was not surprised 206 00:10:49,450 --> 00:10:51,690 at all to see Buffett hold on to this one. 207 00:10:51,770 --> 00:10:54,530 And as we go through the portfolio, it looks mostly the 208 00:10:54,530 --> 00:10:56,730 same. And this is typically what good 209 00:10:56,730 --> 00:10:59,490 investors do. They buy good enough companies 210 00:10:59,650 --> 00:11:02,530 that they don't have urgency to sell them quarter by quarter. 211 00:11:02,920 --> 00:11:05,720 So in most cases when we're looking at big portfolios of 212 00:11:05,720 --> 00:11:08,560 good investors, a lot of them like to hold on to their key 213 00:11:08,560 --> 00:11:11,480 holdings for a multiyear basis. Now Next up we have an investor 214 00:11:11,480 --> 00:11:14,040 that's a little bit lesser known, but my goal is to make 215 00:11:14,040 --> 00:11:17,080 him more known because I think that he needs to be known. 216 00:11:17,080 --> 00:11:20,960 His name is Dev Cantasaria of Valley Forge Capital Management. 217 00:11:21,320 --> 00:11:25,400 Now if I had a tear ranking, in fact I plan on doing a tear 218 00:11:25,400 --> 00:11:27,800 ranking list of super investors in the future. 219 00:11:28,310 --> 00:11:31,150 But spoiler alert, Dev is going to be at the very top of that 220 00:11:31,150 --> 00:11:34,430 list He is asked here. He's right there with the top 221 00:11:34,470 --> 00:11:38,150 elite investors and I believe that he deserves to be there. 222 00:11:38,430 --> 00:11:40,670 His investing acumen I think is incredible. 223 00:11:40,950 --> 00:11:43,670 I think that he does deeper dives on companies and 224 00:11:43,670 --> 00:11:46,230 understands them as fundamentals and the future growth of the 225 00:11:46,230 --> 00:11:49,310 company far more extensively than most investors. 226 00:11:49,590 --> 00:11:52,190 One of the most impressive pieces of research was the 227 00:11:52,190 --> 00:11:54,430 business breakdown he did on FICO. 228 00:11:54,590 --> 00:11:57,310 I've never seen a business breakdown like that before. 229 00:11:57,620 --> 00:11:59,900 His understanding and comprehensive knowledge of 230 00:11:59,900 --> 00:12:03,260 companies and doing analysis on them I think is second to none. 231 00:12:03,340 --> 00:12:06,020 His portfolio is highly concentrated in the companies 232 00:12:06,020 --> 00:12:07,860 that I think are the top of the list. 233 00:12:07,860 --> 00:12:10,700 I think these companies are the best of the best and I like 234 00:12:10,700 --> 00:12:13,220 seeing his trades because we share a lot of the same 235 00:12:13,220 --> 00:12:14,940 holdings. So let's go ahead and take a 236 00:12:14,940 --> 00:12:17,260 look at what Dev has been up to recently. 237 00:12:17,380 --> 00:12:19,700 Now consider this. The number of stocks that Dev 238 00:12:19,700 --> 00:12:24,740 holds is 8-8 different positions for a portfolio that's nearly $3 239 00:12:24,820 --> 00:12:28,130 billion. I hear investors saying they 240 00:12:28,130 --> 00:12:31,610 feel a little uneasy with their $50,000 that they have invested, 241 00:12:31,810 --> 00:12:35,570 only investing in 15 companies. Deb here has eight different 242 00:12:35,570 --> 00:12:38,290 positions, and he's managing $3 billion. 243 00:12:38,530 --> 00:12:40,850 That is an immense amount of concentration. 244 00:12:41,370 --> 00:12:44,570 But again, he agrees heavily with Warren Buffett. 245 00:12:44,970 --> 00:12:47,450 Deb's favorite investor is Warren Buffett. 246 00:12:47,690 --> 00:12:51,050 And Buffett says that concentration is not risky if 247 00:12:51,050 --> 00:12:53,050 you know what you're doing. It is risky. 248 00:12:53,050 --> 00:12:57,070 To the investor that is buying things based off of unknowns and 249 00:12:57,070 --> 00:12:58,310 things that they haven't studied. 250 00:12:58,710 --> 00:13:02,870 So Dev has a very good knowledge of every position that he holds 251 00:13:03,270 --> 00:13:05,630 and he concentrates in the companies that have a reduced 252 00:13:05,630 --> 00:13:08,230 amount of operational risk. If we look at his holdings 253 00:13:08,230 --> 00:13:13,990 today, the top one right now is FICO and this company, it has 254 00:13:13,990 --> 00:13:16,350 something special. I've been following this company 255 00:13:16,350 --> 00:13:19,430 for over a year now and every time I look at investing in 256 00:13:19,430 --> 00:13:22,600 FICO, I think I'm going to wait around for a dip in this 257 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:24,200 company. I'm going to wait around for it 258 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:27,480 to to just trade down a little bit and this is what the price 259 00:13:27,480 --> 00:13:30,400 chart looks like. Can you spot the dip on this 260 00:13:30,400 --> 00:13:34,240 company? It's up 47% year to date, then 261 00:13:34,240 --> 00:13:36,840 we go past one year and it's up 73%. 262 00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:39,800 We go past five years and it's up 303%. 263 00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:43,400 There's not many time periods where it seems like it's okay to 264 00:13:43,400 --> 00:13:46,640 buy this company because the valuation always trades a little 265 00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:49,600 bit lofty. But FICO has everything that Dev 266 00:13:49,600 --> 00:13:52,880 looks for in a company. Strong organic revenue growth, 267 00:13:52,880 --> 00:13:56,840 strong organic free cash flow growth, strong organic earnings 268 00:13:56,840 --> 00:13:59,760 per share growth. And they do this while having a 269 00:13:59,800 --> 00:14:04,000 very desirable monopolistic position in the credit rating of 270 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:07,280 individuals. FICO in many ways is the S&P 271 00:14:07,280 --> 00:14:10,600 Global and the Moody's of the individual. 272 00:14:10,720 --> 00:14:13,320 Dev loves these rating businesses where you rate the 273 00:14:13,320 --> 00:14:15,960 creditworthiness of a business or an individual. 274 00:14:16,440 --> 00:14:20,200 So he has a huge investment in the S&P Global, a huge 275 00:14:20,200 --> 00:14:23,560 investment in the Moody's, and a huge investment in the FICO. 276 00:14:23,880 --> 00:14:26,640 Each one of these are creditworthiness rating 277 00:14:26,640 --> 00:14:29,120 businesses. FICO does it for individuals 278 00:14:29,120 --> 00:14:32,080 with your FICO score. Anytime you get a mortgage loan 279 00:14:32,080 --> 00:14:35,520 or you get a auto loan, they're going to run your FICO score. 280 00:14:35,800 --> 00:14:39,760 FICO makes 95% profits when they run that score. 281 00:14:40,000 --> 00:14:43,720 So even though it's like $0.80 or a dollar, almost all of that 282 00:14:43,720 --> 00:14:47,800 is pure profit for FICO. SP Global makes money anytime 283 00:14:47,800 --> 00:14:50,680 they do ratings for major business, any of the debt they 284 00:14:50,680 --> 00:14:54,880 issue and Moody's does the same. So he has really concentrated 285 00:14:54,880 --> 00:14:58,560 his portfolio into all these different rating companies and 286 00:14:58,560 --> 00:15:01,280 the ones that are growing in volume and pricing power. 287 00:15:01,520 --> 00:15:03,800 We look at the next group of companies that he's concentrated 288 00:15:03,800 --> 00:15:06,120 in, which is the duopoly of MasterCard and Visa. 289 00:15:06,600 --> 00:15:09,640 Now MasterCard and Visa are not a duopoly on all payments. 290 00:15:09,640 --> 00:15:11,240 There's lots of different forms of payments. 291 00:15:11,240 --> 00:15:15,760 You can do a Ch transfers, you can do Venmo and PayPal, and 292 00:15:15,960 --> 00:15:17,720 there's lots of ways to move money around. 293 00:15:18,040 --> 00:15:21,360 But MasterCard and Visa have a very favorable desirable spot 294 00:15:21,560 --> 00:15:25,160 and what most people have regard for as the safest payment form, 295 00:15:25,400 --> 00:15:29,640 which is swiping a credit card, having that payment insured and 296 00:15:29,640 --> 00:15:32,400 ran by MasterCard or Visa through their strong network 297 00:15:32,640 --> 00:15:35,880 with all of their protections. You know that your payment can 298 00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:37,800 be disputed if there's anything wrong. 299 00:15:38,120 --> 00:15:40,880 And that security makes it so that they have a very strong 300 00:15:40,880 --> 00:15:44,860 Moat in their business. So MasterCard and Visa combined 301 00:15:45,180 --> 00:15:48,020 make up around 29% of the portfolio. 302 00:15:48,460 --> 00:15:53,060 Moody's, S&P Global and FICO combined make up 60% of the 303 00:15:53,060 --> 00:15:55,140 portfolio. So between those two groups of 304 00:15:55,140 --> 00:15:57,740 companies, you have the huge majority of his portfolio. 305 00:15:57,980 --> 00:16:01,060 It's comprised by the credit rating businesses and the 306 00:16:01,060 --> 00:16:03,740 payment processors. Every one of these companies has 307 00:16:03,740 --> 00:16:07,460 desirable operating trades. They have low amounts of CapEx, 308 00:16:07,460 --> 00:16:09,780 low amounts of research and development, low amounts of 309 00:16:09,780 --> 00:16:11,460 stock based compensation expense. 310 00:16:11,930 --> 00:16:14,370 They are tollbooth companies. They have incredibly good 311 00:16:14,370 --> 00:16:16,450 network effects. They're incredibly difficult to 312 00:16:16,450 --> 00:16:20,010 compete with and they sit on these busy roads running this 313 00:16:20,010 --> 00:16:23,810 tollbooth between all the credit markets and between all the 314 00:16:23,810 --> 00:16:27,570 payment processing market. So these companies have very 315 00:16:27,570 --> 00:16:31,730 desirable positions and great economics wide motes and they 316 00:16:31,730 --> 00:16:35,250 attract investors that seek quality investments which is 317 00:16:35,250 --> 00:16:38,210 what DEV does. Now another company that I own 318 00:16:38,250 --> 00:16:44,300 that DEV has as well is into it. He has this as a 7% position and 319 00:16:44,300 --> 00:16:47,580 I believe that Intuit is highly underrated from retail 320 00:16:47,580 --> 00:16:50,020 investors. Most retail investors I think 321 00:16:50,020 --> 00:16:53,460 don't like Intuit because of negative association into it's 322 00:16:53,460 --> 00:16:56,140 the TurboTax company and I hate taxes. 323 00:16:56,140 --> 00:16:58,860 I don't like TurboTax, I don't like dealing with it because of 324 00:16:58,860 --> 00:17:01,220 that negative association. I don't like into it. 325 00:17:01,260 --> 00:17:03,660 Into it is QuickBooks the accounting software. 326 00:17:04,180 --> 00:17:07,500 Nobody really loves accounting. Accounting software is not 327 00:17:07,500 --> 00:17:10,480 exciting, and the only people that really have much to say 328 00:17:10,480 --> 00:17:13,520 about quick books are the people complaining about the different 329 00:17:13,520 --> 00:17:16,720 problems they have with it. So the problem with Intuit, I 330 00:17:16,720 --> 00:17:19,760 believe, is many investors look at this and they look at the 331 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:21,880 products. They're not exciting, they're 332 00:17:21,880 --> 00:17:24,680 not sexy. They turn investors off from the 333 00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:28,160 company when really what you have is a dominant company in 334 00:17:28,160 --> 00:17:31,160 the market with the franchise of products that have incredibly 335 00:17:31,160 --> 00:17:34,700 long runways of growth and into its free cash flow per share 336 00:17:34,700 --> 00:17:37,980 growth has been astounding. So I think that into it is 337 00:17:37,980 --> 00:17:39,820 underrated. I don't think it will ever be a 338 00:17:39,820 --> 00:17:43,140 very popular stock online, but it's one that I feel very 339 00:17:43,140 --> 00:17:45,620 comfortable holding right now. Now I can filter by the biggest 340 00:17:45,620 --> 00:17:49,460 changes to his portfolio in Q2. The first one here is he sold 341 00:17:49,460 --> 00:17:53,140 entirely out of Adobe. This was a 3.6% position. 342 00:17:53,460 --> 00:17:57,460 So it was a meaningful position as portfolio and Adobe does fit 343 00:17:57,460 --> 00:18:00,840 a lot of the characteristics that Dev looks at, organic 344 00:18:00,840 --> 00:18:04,280 growth, pricing power, very efficiently made products. 345 00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:08,040 But I believe there is one thing Adobe did to probably make him 346 00:18:08,040 --> 00:18:11,640 sell out of it and I believe that was the Figma acquisition. 347 00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:15,160 Adobe paid a lot to buy a company called Figma. 348 00:18:15,440 --> 00:18:18,400 It's around four years worth of free cash flows to pay for it. 349 00:18:18,920 --> 00:18:23,080 And I know that investors like Dev do not like these type of 350 00:18:23,080 --> 00:18:25,720 defensive acquisitions. If they're going to buy a 351 00:18:25,720 --> 00:18:28,840 company and they're going to do an acquisition, they want it to 352 00:18:28,840 --> 00:18:31,240 be an offensive acquisition, something that they're doing 353 00:18:31,240 --> 00:18:33,240 because they want to grow the company, but they don't 354 00:18:33,240 --> 00:18:37,360 necessarily have to be doing. Adobe felt pressured into buying 355 00:18:37,360 --> 00:18:41,360 Figma as defense to protect their Moat from a potential 356 00:18:41,520 --> 00:18:43,680 invader. That is a very defensive 357 00:18:43,680 --> 00:18:45,840 acquisition. And I think that Dev looked at 358 00:18:45,840 --> 00:18:49,960 that very negatively. The next big change that Dev did 359 00:18:50,320 --> 00:18:55,380 was he really bumped up his S&P Global Stake, adding another 18% 360 00:18:55,380 --> 00:18:59,100 to it, which is 3.57% of his total portfolio. 361 00:18:59,380 --> 00:19:02,100 So S&P Global is already a second largest holding. 362 00:19:02,460 --> 00:19:05,820 He's up on this company hundreds and hundreds of percentages, but 363 00:19:05,820 --> 00:19:09,220 he added another 18%. And I think this is a great 364 00:19:09,220 --> 00:19:11,460 lesson and avoiding anchoring bias. 365 00:19:11,860 --> 00:19:15,140 Even though Deb is up substantially in S&P Global and 366 00:19:15,140 --> 00:19:18,180 he's owned the company for around 10 years, he's still 367 00:19:18,180 --> 00:19:19,830 buying more. He doesn't care. 368 00:19:19,830 --> 00:19:22,190 He still thinks it's a good value, so he doesn't have the 369 00:19:22,190 --> 00:19:24,470 price anchored to his previous buy in price. 370 00:19:24,750 --> 00:19:27,830 Now another company that he sold completely out of is Autodesk. 371 00:19:28,150 --> 00:19:29,910 I'm not as familiar on this company. 372 00:19:29,910 --> 00:19:33,190 I know that it's basically ubiquitous with many careers 373 00:19:33,510 --> 00:19:36,030 unavoidable. In my opinion, it feels a little 374 00:19:36,030 --> 00:19:38,950 bit familiar. Or similar to Adobe. 375 00:19:39,350 --> 00:19:42,390 They both are required for certain types of careers, but it 376 00:19:42,390 --> 00:19:45,350 looks like he dumped that one as well, sold his entire position. 377 00:19:45,630 --> 00:19:48,310 Now the next one is a new entry to his portfolio. 378 00:19:48,390 --> 00:19:51,430 He bought a new position which I know this one is going to make 379 00:19:51,430 --> 00:19:54,270 many retail investors happy because a lot of people are 380 00:19:54,270 --> 00:19:58,350 already in this company, which is a SML, the semiconductor 381 00:19:58,350 --> 00:20:00,470 company. Now I've heard about this one 382 00:20:00,470 --> 00:20:03,430 for a long period of time, people have told me, Joseph, you 383 00:20:03,430 --> 00:20:05,310 need to add a SML to your portfolio. 384 00:20:05,310 --> 00:20:08,030 It's the perfect fit, it's monopolistic, it has pricing 385 00:20:08,030 --> 00:20:10,830 power, it sits at the very top of the food chain. 386 00:20:11,030 --> 00:20:14,390 It has all the structural power and position in the market. 387 00:20:14,960 --> 00:20:18,440 And so far I haven't, I haven't been close enough to buying this 388 00:20:18,440 --> 00:20:21,600 company, but the fact that Dev can't Assaria added this one to 389 00:20:21,600 --> 00:20:24,960 the portfolio, I think is a big validating factor that this one 390 00:20:24,960 --> 00:20:27,920 must have passed all of his screeners, all of his research 391 00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:30,480 to be added even as a small position. 392 00:20:30,960 --> 00:20:34,200 So right now this one is a very small position compared to his 393 00:20:34,200 --> 00:20:37,240 other ones, but I think it's very positive and meaningful 394 00:20:37,320 --> 00:20:39,120 that this one was added to the portfolio. 395 00:20:39,600 --> 00:20:42,320 Another one that he added to was a ZPN. 396 00:20:42,640 --> 00:20:45,970 This was an existing holding, but he added slightly to it, 397 00:20:45,970 --> 00:20:49,890 just .68% of the portfolio. So it's still a very small 398 00:20:49,890 --> 00:20:52,890 position. I think overall this portfolio 399 00:20:52,930 --> 00:20:55,490 is strong. I think it's 10 out of 10 now. 400 00:20:55,490 --> 00:20:58,210 Next up we have Bill Ackman. He's another super investor that 401 00:20:58,210 --> 00:21:01,450 runs a very concentrated portfolio, only holding 8 402 00:21:01,450 --> 00:21:05,930 positions and he has a $10 billion assets under management. 403 00:21:06,330 --> 00:21:09,130 So this is a lot of money into a small amount of positions. 404 00:21:09,470 --> 00:21:12,510 Now, one thing I'll mention is that this shows his US holdings 405 00:21:12,710 --> 00:21:15,110 and he does have some international holdings as well, 406 00:21:15,350 --> 00:21:18,150 like a Universal Music Group. So this doesn't represent his 407 00:21:18,150 --> 00:21:21,070 entire portfolio, but this is the majority of it. 408 00:21:21,510 --> 00:21:23,670 Now when you look at what Bill Ackman has been doing over the 409 00:21:23,670 --> 00:21:25,990 past quarter, we can see the changes right here. 410 00:21:26,310 --> 00:21:29,470 The biggest one is a reduction in Lowe's. 411 00:21:29,550 --> 00:21:32,950 Now Lowe's has been a holding that he's held for over 10 years 412 00:21:32,950 --> 00:21:34,470 now. It's a company that he's been 413 00:21:34,470 --> 00:21:37,470 very bullish on for a long period of time and his thesis 414 00:21:37,470 --> 00:21:40,480 has played out. Lowe's has beat Home Depot over 415 00:21:40,480 --> 00:21:42,640 the past decade in total returns. 416 00:21:43,040 --> 00:21:44,760 So he's done really well on this company. 417 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:46,560 It's been an outperformer of the market. 418 00:21:47,000 --> 00:21:51,040 But what we're seeing now is a lot of weakness in new home 419 00:21:51,040 --> 00:21:53,320 projects. Home Depot just reported their 420 00:21:53,320 --> 00:21:57,160 earnings report and Lowe's and they both say that people are 421 00:21:57,160 --> 00:22:00,680 starting to cut back a little bit on home renovations and 422 00:22:00,680 --> 00:22:02,640 backyard projects and different things like that. 423 00:22:02,680 --> 00:22:05,160 A lot of them say that it's higher interest rates impacting 424 00:22:05,160 --> 00:22:06,990 that. So these companies have been 425 00:22:06,990 --> 00:22:09,390 going through a little bit tougher of a time this year. 426 00:22:09,790 --> 00:22:13,070 So it doesn't surprise me to see him pull back on Lowe's a bit. 427 00:22:13,390 --> 00:22:18,670 This was a 25% reduction, which is 5.36% of the portfolio. 428 00:22:18,990 --> 00:22:22,190 He also reduced Chipotle ever so slightly. 429 00:22:22,630 --> 00:22:25,750 Now, I don't know exactly when he sold this position, when it 430 00:22:25,750 --> 00:22:29,750 was above $2000 per share or around $1900 per share. 431 00:22:30,070 --> 00:22:35,230 He reduced it ever so slightly, 7%, which is 1.49% of the 432 00:22:35,230 --> 00:22:39,310 portfolio. After that, he has Alphabet as a 433 00:22:39,310 --> 00:22:41,910 major holding. He increased the position size 434 00:22:41,910 --> 00:22:44,990 by 1.46. Now after that, the trades are 435 00:22:44,990 --> 00:22:47,070 so small that I don't think they're meaningful. 436 00:22:47,350 --> 00:22:50,310 Now we look overall at his US portfolio, we have as his 437 00:22:50,310 --> 00:22:53,790 largest position Chipotle. And this is a company that I've 438 00:22:53,790 --> 00:22:57,070 recently been buying in a small stake in because I believe 439 00:22:57,070 --> 00:22:58,910 Chipotle is a really great company. 440 00:22:58,910 --> 00:23:02,150 Looking at the fundamentals, the unit economics, the growth plans 441 00:23:02,600 --> 00:23:06,320 and overall how much cash flow this company generates quarter 442 00:23:06,320 --> 00:23:08,800 after quarter. I think it's a highly scalable 443 00:23:08,800 --> 00:23:10,880 company, has great operating leverage. 444 00:23:11,120 --> 00:23:14,360 It has a very long runway of growth and I think the story is 445 00:23:14,360 --> 00:23:17,640 still on for Chipotle. I assume a lot of future growth 446 00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:19,640 in the company over a long period of time. 447 00:23:20,120 --> 00:23:22,900 I think there could be some weakness in the upcoming 448 00:23:22,900 --> 00:23:26,900 quarters going into 2024 with the slowdown of the economy. 449 00:23:26,980 --> 00:23:29,100 But if you're looking at a longer timetable, that's usually 450 00:23:29,100 --> 00:23:31,460 not a huge concern. And then his second largest 451 00:23:31,460 --> 00:23:34,060 holding is Restaurant Brands International, which is the 452 00:23:34,060 --> 00:23:36,900 parent company of Burger King and Tim horton's and a number of 453 00:23:36,900 --> 00:23:39,860 other brands. So he really has a concentration 454 00:23:40,140 --> 00:23:42,460 into the quick service restaurant category. 455 00:23:42,900 --> 00:23:45,660 And he previously made a lot of money in Starbucks. 456 00:23:45,660 --> 00:23:48,780 So that was another restaurant company that he did really well 457 00:23:48,780 --> 00:23:51,300 in. Bill Ackman is really good with 458 00:23:51,300 --> 00:23:53,660 restaurants. He has a very high success rate 459 00:23:53,660 --> 00:23:55,780 with them. Almost every restaurant that he 460 00:23:55,780 --> 00:23:59,020 invests in is not only a money maker, but it's one where he 461 00:23:59,020 --> 00:24:00,980 typically beats the S&P 500 with. 462 00:24:01,500 --> 00:24:02,780 So these companies have been great. 463 00:24:02,780 --> 00:24:05,900 Overall, in my opinion, I think that Chipotle is a much better 464 00:24:05,900 --> 00:24:09,340 brand quality than Burger King. I like the positioning a lot 465 00:24:09,340 --> 00:24:12,670 more, but regardless, he has a high concentration into these 466 00:24:12,670 --> 00:24:14,150 quick service restaurant companies. 467 00:24:14,190 --> 00:24:17,910 Then in 3rd place, we have Lowe's, The reduction of 25% 468 00:24:18,110 --> 00:24:21,030 takes the position of the portfolio down to 15%. 469 00:24:21,470 --> 00:24:23,870 After that, we have Hilton Worldwide, which I think is 470 00:24:23,870 --> 00:24:28,310 another great company, very good economics, very good brand value 471 00:24:28,310 --> 00:24:30,230 and it's kind of a licensing company. 472 00:24:30,470 --> 00:24:32,190 So that one seems like a really strong one. 473 00:24:32,190 --> 00:24:35,230 In his portfolio, we have the Howard Hughes holding. 474 00:24:35,780 --> 00:24:38,940 This is 1 where he has a lot of special deals and things that he 475 00:24:38,940 --> 00:24:42,300 can do by the size of his fund that retail investors can't 476 00:24:42,300 --> 00:24:44,620 mimic. But Howard Hughes Corporation is 477 00:24:44,620 --> 00:24:47,260 always a significant position in his portfolio. 478 00:24:47,740 --> 00:24:51,020 Then we get to Canadian Pacific. He's owned this one previously 479 00:24:51,220 --> 00:24:54,260 and he bought it again. It's now an 11% position. 480 00:24:54,620 --> 00:24:57,260 He's very bullish on the acquisition they did, the big 481 00:24:57,260 --> 00:24:59,540 merger and the leadership of the company. 482 00:24:59,780 --> 00:25:02,340 He believes it will generate growing free cash flows and I 483 00:25:02,340 --> 00:25:03,900 agree with him on that assessment. 484 00:25:04,400 --> 00:25:07,240 And then after that, we have the combined Google and Google, the 485 00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:10,120 different types of shares. That's a combined 12%. 486 00:25:10,520 --> 00:25:14,960 So Google Now is actually around his fourth largest US position, 487 00:25:15,280 --> 00:25:18,360 very meaningful position. And of course, I think Google's 488 00:25:18,360 --> 00:25:20,360 a great buy right here. So I think that Bill Ackman is 489 00:25:20,360 --> 00:25:24,120 taking a very conservative but good bet with Google right now. 490 00:25:24,280 --> 00:25:26,720 Overall, I really like Bill Ackman's portfolio. 491 00:25:26,720 --> 00:25:29,920 It's concentrated into a group of great companies that I think 492 00:25:29,960 --> 00:25:33,080 overall have low downside risk. They generate growing free cash 493 00:25:33,080 --> 00:25:34,790 flows. They have very strong business 494 00:25:34,790 --> 00:25:37,110 models. So I can see why he would want 495 00:25:37,110 --> 00:25:39,550 to own each of these companies and many of them. 496 00:25:39,550 --> 00:25:43,230 He's had stellar returns in which Chipotle, for example, 497 00:25:43,230 --> 00:25:45,350 he's up over 5X on this position. 498 00:25:45,750 --> 00:25:47,470 So I think that he's doing a great job. 499 00:25:47,630 --> 00:25:50,150 I think that he's likely going to have market beating returns. 500 00:25:50,230 --> 00:25:52,670 Now Next up, we have some controversy with an investor 501 00:25:52,670 --> 00:25:55,590 that I both love and hate called Carl Icahn. 502 00:25:56,110 --> 00:25:59,430 Now Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman, who he just went over. 503 00:25:59,870 --> 00:26:02,710 They're not buddies, they're not friends, and they've had some 504 00:26:03,140 --> 00:26:06,660 incredibly explosive drama on CNBC in the past. 505 00:26:06,660 --> 00:26:08,860 If you haven't seen that, you'll just have to look up the old 506 00:26:08,860 --> 00:26:10,820 clips. But they've had calls and 507 00:26:10,820 --> 00:26:12,860 different things where they bet against each other. 508 00:26:13,180 --> 00:26:16,780 Carl Icahn short squeezed Bill Ackman's investment into 509 00:26:16,780 --> 00:26:19,220 Herbalife, and it's a whole long story. 510 00:26:19,220 --> 00:26:24,060 But recently, after all of that drama of Carl Icahn sticking it 511 00:26:24,060 --> 00:26:28,420 to Bill Ackman, Bill Ackman is having the last laugh because a 512 00:26:28,420 --> 00:26:31,220 research company called Hindenburg Research, which is a 513 00:26:31,220 --> 00:26:36,000 short seller, did this extensive research on Icon Enterprises, 514 00:26:36,360 --> 00:26:39,440 the corporate Raider throwing stones from his own glass house. 515 00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:43,520 The claims that he makes in this research analysis are extremely 516 00:26:43,520 --> 00:26:46,200 damning. Icon Enterprises is an $18 517 00:26:46,200 --> 00:26:49,280 billion market cap holding company run by a corporate 518 00:26:49,280 --> 00:26:52,760 Raider and an activist investor, Carl Icahn, who along with his 519 00:26:52,760 --> 00:26:56,000 son Brett on approximately 85% of the company. 520 00:26:56,400 --> 00:26:59,920 Our research has found that I EP, which is a ticker symbol of 521 00:26:59,920 --> 00:27:05,630 IT units, are inflated by 75% plus due to three key reasons. 522 00:27:05,910 --> 00:27:11,070 I EP trades at a 218% premium to its last reported net asset 523 00:27:11,070 --> 00:27:14,150 value, vastly higher than all comparables. 524 00:27:14,350 --> 00:27:17,390 We've undercovered clear evidence of inflated valuation 525 00:27:17,390 --> 00:27:20,710 marks for I EP's less liquid and private assets. 526 00:27:21,110 --> 00:27:24,070 And then three, the company has suffered additional performance 527 00:27:24,070 --> 00:27:27,150 losses this year to date following its last disclosure. 528 00:27:27,790 --> 00:27:31,370 That's just the premise of it. This research by Hindenburg is 529 00:27:31,370 --> 00:27:33,450 so extensive. Just look at the bullet points. 530 00:27:33,650 --> 00:27:37,090 This is the summary of the research and it goes on for 531 00:27:37,090 --> 00:27:41,250 dozens of dozens of pages of damning evidence about what 532 00:27:41,250 --> 00:27:43,410 they've been doing, the way that they've been conducting their 533 00:27:43,410 --> 00:27:46,570 business, the valuation of it, and so on and so forth. 534 00:27:46,770 --> 00:27:50,250 If we look up IEP and the stock price performance, we can see 535 00:27:50,250 --> 00:27:52,890 that they've ran into some trouble after this report. 536 00:27:53,130 --> 00:27:57,850 It went from $50 per share down to $30 per share, then from $30 537 00:27:57,850 --> 00:28:01,350 per share all the way down to $23 per share. 538 00:28:01,390 --> 00:28:05,630 So year to date, his company has lost 54% of its value. 539 00:28:05,950 --> 00:28:09,750 That is damaging, damaging when you make a lot of money by 540 00:28:09,750 --> 00:28:12,190 diluting shareholders and selling off those shares. 541 00:28:12,190 --> 00:28:15,550 At Inflated Values, we can see the massive amount of shares 542 00:28:15,550 --> 00:28:18,830 outstanding increase, the massive amount of dilution the 543 00:28:18,830 --> 00:28:21,790 IEP was doing. So the fact that the share price 544 00:28:21,790 --> 00:28:25,050 is down 50% means that when they sell these shares, they're 545 00:28:25,050 --> 00:28:27,730 getting half as much money. Now this has obviously been a 546 00:28:27,730 --> 00:28:30,890 tough year for Carl Icahn, but Bill Ackman, on the other hand, 547 00:28:30,890 --> 00:28:34,090 I believe is thoroughly enjoying himself watching the destruction 548 00:28:34,090 --> 00:28:36,770 of IEP. He tweeted out right as this was 549 00:28:36,770 --> 00:28:40,250 happening, a quote from Wall Street, which says quote on Wall 550 00:28:40,250 --> 00:28:42,490 Street, if you want a friend, buy a doc. 551 00:28:42,570 --> 00:28:44,810 So Bill Ackman is getting the last laugh here. 552 00:28:45,330 --> 00:28:48,410 Now, even though I disagree fully with a lot of the ways 553 00:28:48,410 --> 00:28:51,580 that Carl Icahn conducts himself, and I agree that in 554 00:28:51,580 --> 00:28:55,260 many cases he is a corporate Raider, he comes in and he just 555 00:28:55,260 --> 00:28:58,100 destroys companies to extract value out of them. 556 00:28:58,220 --> 00:29:01,660 So in some cases, he has a very adverse effect on the long term 557 00:29:01,660 --> 00:29:04,140 of a company, and I think that that's dangerous. 558 00:29:04,500 --> 00:29:07,860 But in other cases, I do like activist investors that will go 559 00:29:07,860 --> 00:29:11,500 in and they will get executives that are lazy and not doing 560 00:29:11,500 --> 00:29:13,700 their job to actually start doing their job. 561 00:29:14,100 --> 00:29:16,220 And I've seen some examples where I think that he's had a 562 00:29:16,220 --> 00:29:18,220 net positive effect on companies. 563 00:29:18,800 --> 00:29:20,960 So it's neither all good nor all bad. 564 00:29:20,960 --> 00:29:23,960 I think some of the stuff Carl Icahn does is positive, but I 565 00:29:23,960 --> 00:29:25,880 think some of what he does is largely negative. 566 00:29:26,240 --> 00:29:29,200 And I think that the valuation of his company dropping by half 567 00:29:29,480 --> 00:29:31,400 is more than warranted. When I looked at the 568 00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:34,600 fundamentals of this company, I agreed with Hindenburg Research. 569 00:29:34,800 --> 00:29:37,960 Overall, I like some of the drama that comes from Icahn and 570 00:29:37,960 --> 00:29:40,200 some of the things that he says. I like some of the stories he 571 00:29:40,200 --> 00:29:43,580 tells, but I would never recommend investing in his fund 572 00:29:43,780 --> 00:29:45,820 or IEP. I look at the company's 573 00:29:45,820 --> 00:29:48,020 fundamentals and I think it has a substantial amount of 574 00:29:48,020 --> 00:29:50,260 problems. So this is one that I would stay 575 00:29:50,260 --> 00:29:52,820 far away from now. Next up we have Chase Coleman of 576 00:29:52,820 --> 00:29:55,180 Tiger Global. Chase Coleman has been known to 577 00:29:55,180 --> 00:29:57,580 be one of the most aggressive tech investors. 578 00:29:57,860 --> 00:30:01,500 Entire Global has had phenomenal performance since the inception 579 00:30:01,500 --> 00:30:06,420 of its fund all the way up to 2021 and we know what happened 580 00:30:06,420 --> 00:30:09,860 at 2021. Interest rates going up rapidly 581 00:30:09,860 --> 00:30:13,020 more than we've seen in the past decade, caused a cascading 582 00:30:13,020 --> 00:30:16,140 effect of massive devaluation and multiple contraction. 583 00:30:16,380 --> 00:30:19,980 For lots of tech companies, Chase Coleman like Ark Invest 584 00:30:19,980 --> 00:30:22,700 was one of the funds that had utter devastation caused to 585 00:30:22,700 --> 00:30:24,980 their fund During this time period, it dropped 586 00:30:25,060 --> 00:30:27,940 substantially, 70% in a matter of months. 587 00:30:28,260 --> 00:30:31,900 So 10 years of Alpha were wiped out in a matter of months. 588 00:30:32,020 --> 00:30:34,340 And This is why I say there's a lot of fund managers that are 589 00:30:34,340 --> 00:30:37,900 good for a short amount of time, five years or 10 years, but the 590 00:30:37,900 --> 00:30:40,820 real test is going past entire economic cycles. 591 00:30:40,900 --> 00:30:43,740 All different environments, being able to weather, all 592 00:30:43,740 --> 00:30:46,260 different interest rate environments and recessions and 593 00:30:46,540 --> 00:30:49,660 different factors in the market really proves how good an 594 00:30:49,660 --> 00:30:52,260 investing strategy is. Now when we look at his trades 595 00:30:52,260 --> 00:30:56,060 overall, this is one of the firms that trades a lot based 596 00:30:56,060 --> 00:31:00,020 off of technicals and valuation and momentum and lots of 597 00:31:00,020 --> 00:31:02,500 different factors. So when I look at this, I don't 598 00:31:02,500 --> 00:31:05,260 take any of these buys and sells ersonally. 599 00:31:05,300 --> 00:31:07,940 I don't look at them as assessing the intrinsic value of 600 00:31:07,940 --> 00:31:10,020 the company over the next 5 to 10 years. 601 00:31:10,380 --> 00:31:14,300 I look at this as largely algorithmic or momentumbased 602 00:31:14,300 --> 00:31:17,260 trading. For example, he sold a lot of 603 00:31:17,260 --> 00:31:20,700 Amazon, a lot of Google. He sold a lot of MasterCard, the 604 00:31:20,700 --> 00:31:22,780 entire position. But then he also bought more 605 00:31:22,780 --> 00:31:25,300 NVIDIA. He's buying NVIDIA at today's 606 00:31:25,300 --> 00:31:27,180 price. So you could try to dissect 607 00:31:27,180 --> 00:31:29,700 everyone of these trades, but I think a lot of them are based 608 00:31:29,700 --> 00:31:31,500 off of momentum of these companies. 609 00:31:31,580 --> 00:31:34,340 When I look at Chase Coleman's portfolio, I think that it's a 610 00:31:34,340 --> 00:31:37,580 little too unpredictable and I would never want to invest in a 611 00:31:37,580 --> 00:31:41,260 method that has 70% drawdowns when the rest of the market goes 612 00:31:41,260 --> 00:31:43,900 down 16%. I think largely that's 613 00:31:44,020 --> 00:31:47,380 indicative that what you're doing is too risk prone and you 614 00:31:47,380 --> 00:31:50,260 should rethink your strategy. Now Next up we have Nelson Pelts 615 00:31:50,260 --> 00:31:53,980 who is another investor that runs a large fund, $3.8 billion 616 00:31:53,980 --> 00:31:57,180 in assets under management and he also has a concentrated 617 00:31:57,180 --> 00:31:59,980 portfolio until only eight positions. 618 00:32:00,260 --> 00:32:03,740 You'll notice that many of these investors that do ample research 619 00:32:03,740 --> 00:32:06,580 and understand the risks associated with their companies, 620 00:32:06,860 --> 00:32:09,300 they're willing to concentrate into a small amount of holdings. 621 00:32:09,780 --> 00:32:14,680 That level of confidence comes from studying the history and 622 00:32:14,680 --> 00:32:16,160 the risk factors of the business. 623 00:32:16,760 --> 00:32:20,040 So when I look at Nelson Peltz, I really appreciate a few things 624 00:32:20,040 --> 00:32:22,160 that he does. One of the things that he did 625 00:32:22,160 --> 00:32:25,600 that I really enjoyed was his involvement in Disney. 626 00:32:25,920 --> 00:32:29,080 If you recall Disney going through their terrible string of 627 00:32:29,080 --> 00:32:33,360 decisions by hiring Bob Chapeck and then firing him and then 628 00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:36,960 blaming him after they picked him to be the CEO bringing back 629 00:32:36,960 --> 00:32:40,760 Bob Iger and the company just seemed to lose its way over the 630 00:32:40,760 --> 00:32:44,360 past couple of years. Nelson Peltz came in and he was 631 00:32:44,360 --> 00:32:47,520 a voice for the shareholder to tell the board that they're 632 00:32:47,520 --> 00:32:49,360 screwing up. They don't have things figured 633 00:32:49,360 --> 00:32:51,000 out. They need to reduce their pay 634 00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:53,200 until they get this company back on track. 635 00:32:53,480 --> 00:32:55,320 They need to start paying a dividend again. 636 00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:59,290 They need to really get Disney back into profit mode and to 637 00:32:59,290 --> 00:33:03,090 have a vocal activist, someone that comes in and can speak on 638 00:33:03,090 --> 00:33:06,050 behalf of the shareholder, I think was very necessary. 639 00:33:06,250 --> 00:33:09,530 Now if we look at his portfolio, we can see the changes he's made 640 00:33:10,090 --> 00:33:13,690 and there's not many 2 to 3% turnover for the quarter. 641 00:33:13,770 --> 00:33:15,970 He reduced his Ferguson position by 6%. 642 00:33:16,290 --> 00:33:20,370 He added to Disney a 9% addition to Disney and then he sold a 643 00:33:20,370 --> 00:33:23,950 tiny amount of Wendy's. So there's the trades. 644 00:33:24,030 --> 00:33:27,070 Mostly what he did was reduced Ferguson and bought a bit more 645 00:33:27,070 --> 00:33:28,790 Disney. If we look at his portfolio 646 00:33:28,790 --> 00:33:32,030 construction, it's concentrated into four different companies. 647 00:33:32,230 --> 00:33:34,510 The first one is Janice Henderson Group, which is a 648 00:33:34,710 --> 00:33:37,510 asset management company. Then we have Ferguson, which 649 00:33:37,510 --> 00:33:39,510 we've seen before in a couple other super investors 650 00:33:39,510 --> 00:33:42,390 portfolios. They are a plumbing and heating 651 00:33:42,390 --> 00:33:45,590 supply company and from what I've seen, they're described to 652 00:33:45,590 --> 00:33:49,230 be the monopoly of that company. They control the distribution. 653 00:33:49,350 --> 00:33:53,350 They have the most products. They really have a good superior 654 00:33:53,350 --> 00:33:56,710 position in that market. So it's interesting that he has 655 00:33:56,710 --> 00:33:59,910 such a huge concentration in that company, but it shows that 656 00:33:59,910 --> 00:34:02,730 he sees something special there. The next company is Disney. 657 00:34:02,970 --> 00:34:05,570 We know his thesis on that because he outlined it in his 658 00:34:05,570 --> 00:34:09,170 activist investor letter. Then we have Invesco, which is 659 00:34:09,170 --> 00:34:10,810 another asset management company. 660 00:34:10,850 --> 00:34:13,610 So not much change for a highly concentrated portfolio. 661 00:34:13,730 --> 00:34:16,370 As far as Nelson Peltz is concerned, he likes the stuff 662 00:34:16,370 --> 00:34:17,929 that he owns and he continues to own it. 663 00:34:17,969 --> 00:34:20,810 Now Next up we have David Einhorn, who is an interesting 664 00:34:20,810 --> 00:34:23,050 investor. He recently came out with an 665 00:34:23,050 --> 00:34:26,050 interview that made a lot of headlines because he basically 666 00:34:26,050 --> 00:34:29,889 said that things are so bad that value investors or investors in 667 00:34:29,889 --> 00:34:32,570 general may never recover from what's coming. 668 00:34:32,889 --> 00:34:35,090 So he's predicting a lot of doom and gloom. 669 00:34:35,489 --> 00:34:39,610 Now, of course, that impacts your psychology and the way that 670 00:34:39,610 --> 00:34:42,050 you invest. If you have a very bearish view 671 00:34:42,050 --> 00:34:45,370 on the economy or the overall trajectory of the world, then 672 00:34:45,370 --> 00:34:47,170 that does factor into your investments. 673 00:34:47,170 --> 00:34:48,889 And you can see that with his portfolio. 674 00:34:49,050 --> 00:34:51,610 Now looking at his overall portfolio, he holds a lot of 675 00:34:51,610 --> 00:34:53,170 companies that I'm not familiar with. 676 00:34:53,570 --> 00:34:56,650 This is a long list of smaller companies, but they have a 677 00:34:56,650 --> 00:34:59,530 common theme. Many of them are in energy and 678 00:34:59,530 --> 00:35:01,890 they're in home building or related categories. 679 00:35:02,250 --> 00:35:05,330 And if I had to guess what he's trying to do here, I think it 680 00:35:05,330 --> 00:35:09,610 would be very defensively related to low valuations and a 681 00:35:09,610 --> 00:35:12,450 shield from inflation. He's trying to protect his 682 00:35:12,450 --> 00:35:15,490 investors from inflation that he's probably predicting. 683 00:35:15,930 --> 00:35:18,330 So that would be my assumption with the portfolio. 684 00:35:18,570 --> 00:35:20,850 But granted, I don't know his overall strategy. 685 00:35:20,970 --> 00:35:24,130 So this is just my guess. Now Next up, we have Bill Gates. 686 00:35:24,210 --> 00:35:27,170 Now Bill Gates, I believe, is an underrated investor. 687 00:35:27,600 --> 00:35:30,320 A lot of people consider him brilliant for starting Microsoft 688 00:35:30,320 --> 00:35:33,600 and how difficult that business was to start and run and grow to 689 00:35:33,600 --> 00:35:36,640 the behemoth that is today. But you have to give him credit 690 00:35:36,640 --> 00:35:40,240 for his investing acumen. Bill Gates is just smart all 691 00:35:40,240 --> 00:35:43,640 around and he's very smart with protecting his assets that he's 692 00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:46,160 worked really hard to acquire. When we look at the holdings 693 00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:50,650 here, he has 31% in Microsoft. Now you might say there's a 694 00:35:50,650 --> 00:35:53,490 little bit of bias there, but I think that that makes sense. 695 00:35:53,530 --> 00:35:57,370 Bill knows Microsoft more than probably anyone, so he knows the 696 00:35:57,370 --> 00:36:00,530 quality of this company. And plus, even from an unbiased 697 00:36:00,530 --> 00:36:03,170 third party perspective, Microsoft is one of the most 698 00:36:03,170 --> 00:36:06,130 stable cash producing companies in the world with a credit 699 00:36:06,130 --> 00:36:07,650 rating better than the US government. 700 00:36:08,050 --> 00:36:11,250 So when I look at Microsoft, it makes sense that 31% of the 701 00:36:11,530 --> 00:36:14,290 value of this portfolio is in that company. 702 00:36:14,890 --> 00:36:18,820 The next one we have is Berkshire. 20% right there. 703 00:36:18,820 --> 00:36:21,700 We have over 50% of the portfolio concentrated into 704 00:36:21,700 --> 00:36:24,340 these two companies. And then he added to this 705 00:36:24,340 --> 00:36:27,180 position last quarter. So the top two companies are 706 00:36:27,180 --> 00:36:28,860 what I consider to be bulletproof. 707 00:36:29,180 --> 00:36:32,460 And then Company #3, I also consider to be bulletproof. 708 00:36:32,780 --> 00:36:36,340 Canadian National Railway, I believe any Class 1 railroad 709 00:36:36,340 --> 00:36:40,300 within the US and Canada is an incredibly resilient business. 710 00:36:40,300 --> 00:36:42,300 It's going to have a very difficult time losing 711 00:36:42,300 --> 00:36:45,460 substantial amounts of money. The risk return on these are 712 00:36:45,460 --> 00:36:48,090 very high. And then after that you have 713 00:36:48,090 --> 00:36:51,090 another company that's considered largely to be another 714 00:36:51,090 --> 00:36:53,490 bulletproof company, Waste Management. 715 00:36:53,890 --> 00:36:57,490 This is a basically necessary utility company that people 716 00:36:57,490 --> 00:37:00,690 cannot survive without. His portfolio, by and large are 717 00:37:00,690 --> 00:37:05,370 these four companies, and Bill Gates once again does the same 718 00:37:05,370 --> 00:37:08,330 common theme. He shows that the huge majority 719 00:37:08,410 --> 00:37:12,290 of his invested capital, all of this money which he's carefully 720 00:37:12,290 --> 00:37:15,570 accumulated over decades of time, and that he considers to 721 00:37:15,570 --> 00:37:18,320 be incredibly important, that he wants to protect. 722 00:37:18,600 --> 00:37:21,800 He feels good about putting it into four different positions, a 723 00:37:21,800 --> 00:37:23,560 huge level of concentration. Now. 724 00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:27,240 Next up we have Daniel Loeb of Third Point, another activist 725 00:37:27,240 --> 00:37:29,480 investor. Now, they started off with a 726 00:37:29,520 --> 00:37:32,400 very strong start, beating the market for a long period of 727 00:37:32,400 --> 00:37:35,540 time. But then after around 2010, 728 00:37:35,540 --> 00:37:39,380 2011, the returns have mostly been around the S&P 500. 729 00:37:39,380 --> 00:37:42,980 So we're looking to see a recovery and outperformance from 730 00:37:42,980 --> 00:37:44,940 Daniel Loeb. Now if we look at his trades of 731 00:37:44,940 --> 00:37:47,340 the most recent quarter, I can see a lot of cells here. 732 00:37:47,340 --> 00:37:50,780 Right off the bat. He sold his largest holding, the 733 00:37:50,780 --> 00:37:53,380 whole thing, Colgate, the toothpaste company. 734 00:37:53,700 --> 00:37:57,740 This is a very defensive company that he bought into with 14% of 735 00:37:57,740 --> 00:38:00,960 the funds assets and that one's gone now. 736 00:38:00,960 --> 00:38:04,800 This was a company that's gone nowhere since he bought it. 737 00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:08,360 The stock price is essentially flat, so no gains being made 738 00:38:08,360 --> 00:38:10,120 there. I think it was a bit of a waste 739 00:38:10,120 --> 00:38:13,160 of a position. Now he also reduced Google, so 740 00:38:13,160 --> 00:38:16,600 we reduced that one by 70%, which I think is interesting and 741 00:38:16,600 --> 00:38:18,600 confusing. I think that Google still 742 00:38:18,600 --> 00:38:22,280 maintains a decent valuation, so obviously he had better things 743 00:38:22,280 --> 00:38:25,520 to do with that cash he sold entirely out of Salesforce. 744 00:38:25,840 --> 00:38:28,520 That one doesn't surprise me because Salesforce has raced up 745 00:38:28,800 --> 00:38:32,230 60% year to date. And then he also sold United 746 00:38:32,230 --> 00:38:34,630 Healthcare Group. That's another one that he 747 00:38:34,630 --> 00:38:38,110 completely exited the position. Now what did he buy? 748 00:38:38,510 --> 00:38:42,030 He bought a lot of Amazon, increase that one by 8%. 749 00:38:42,150 --> 00:38:44,310 Then we have TSM. He bought into that. 750 00:38:44,550 --> 00:38:47,590 He bought more NVIDIA. When I see people buying NVIDIA 751 00:38:47,590 --> 00:38:50,230 at these prices, I have to believe that they're part 752 00:38:50,230 --> 00:38:53,030 momentum trader. This follows the theme of Daniel 753 00:38:53,030 --> 00:38:54,550 Loeb. He's another one where I 754 00:38:54,550 --> 00:38:57,270 wouldn't take it too personally if he buys a company that you 755 00:38:57,270 --> 00:39:00,570 own or he sells a company that you own because he trades in and 756 00:39:00,570 --> 00:39:03,690 out of position so quickly. I don't think that he's looking 757 00:39:03,690 --> 00:39:07,090 at the longterm intrinsic value of every company as much as 758 00:39:07,090 --> 00:39:10,770 doing a lot of value trades, quick run ups and companies and 759 00:39:10,770 --> 00:39:13,450 some momentum trading. His portfolio is more 760 00:39:13,450 --> 00:39:15,410 diversified than most super investors. 761 00:39:15,650 --> 00:39:18,570 He holds a lot of these smaller watcher positions and he has a 762 00:39:18,570 --> 00:39:21,650 lot of two and 3% position. So he's on the other side of 763 00:39:21,650 --> 00:39:23,010 things. He does like the level of 764 00:39:23,010 --> 00:39:25,170 diversification. Now finally, we have Christopher 765 00:39:25,170 --> 00:39:27,210 Bloomstrand with Semper Augustus. 766 00:39:27,670 --> 00:39:30,350 Now Christopher Bloomstrand I think is a great follow on 767 00:39:30,350 --> 00:39:31,950 Twitter. You should find his account and 768 00:39:31,950 --> 00:39:34,990 follow him because he does these tweet storms where he breaks 769 00:39:34,990 --> 00:39:37,550 down the financials and different aspects of a company 770 00:39:37,830 --> 00:39:39,390 and he has a great way of looking at them. 771 00:39:39,390 --> 00:39:41,630 He has a lot of insights on different businesses. 772 00:39:42,150 --> 00:39:45,190 Now when we look at his portfolio, you'll notice that he 773 00:39:45,190 --> 00:39:48,990 holds Berkshire as around 30% of his total portfolio. 774 00:39:49,510 --> 00:39:51,750 A lot of people are critical because they say why don't you 775 00:39:51,750 --> 00:39:53,510 just invest in Berkshire directly. 776 00:39:53,990 --> 00:39:57,100 I think that's a valid criticism, but what Christopher 777 00:39:57,100 --> 00:39:59,420 does is he knows Berkshire so well. 778 00:39:59,500 --> 00:40:02,620 He's able to read the report really indepth and understand 779 00:40:02,620 --> 00:40:05,220 the valuation of it. And he's always trying to add to 780 00:40:05,220 --> 00:40:08,500 this position at a 20% or greater discount. 781 00:40:08,740 --> 00:40:11,500 That's when he likes to get new investors funds into Berkshire, 782 00:40:11,780 --> 00:40:14,940 so he'll hold cash or he'll invest in different companies. 783 00:40:15,220 --> 00:40:18,860 Once Berkshire goes 20% under intrinsic value, then he adds to 784 00:40:18,860 --> 00:40:20,820 that position. Now if we look at the amount of 785 00:40:20,820 --> 00:40:23,780 activity over the past quarter, there's a lot of small trade, 786 00:40:23,780 --> 00:40:25,420 some rebalancing in the portfolio. 787 00:40:25,840 --> 00:40:28,600 If we look at the biggest ones here, he added to Dollar 788 00:40:28,600 --> 00:40:31,640 General, that one is in a decline right now, so he's 789 00:40:31,640 --> 00:40:34,360 adding to that one. Then he also added to Mercury 790 00:40:34,360 --> 00:40:37,800 General Group 4.31%. Now looking overall at the 791 00:40:37,800 --> 00:40:40,320 portfolio, I would say that there's a lot of high quality 792 00:40:40,320 --> 00:40:42,520 companies. They trade at usually low 793 00:40:42,520 --> 00:40:44,680 valuations. He likes to buy companies that 794 00:40:44,680 --> 00:40:47,000 are cheap. They have good cash flows and 795 00:40:47,000 --> 00:40:49,880 high free cash flow yields. So you'll notice that throughout 796 00:40:50,000 --> 00:40:53,640 the portfolio, but I'd also say that it's very conservative. 797 00:40:54,190 --> 00:40:56,470 And I think that if you're investing in a portfolio like 798 00:40:56,470 --> 00:40:59,670 this, you're likely not going to have dramatic outperformance of 799 00:40:59,670 --> 00:41:02,910 the S&P 500. It'll more be in line with the 800 00:41:02,910 --> 00:41:06,630 S&P 500, maybe marginal outperformance, but relatively 801 00:41:06,630 --> 00:41:08,310 low downside. So I believe overall the 802 00:41:08,310 --> 00:41:10,830 portfolio construction is very conservative. 803 00:41:10,870 --> 00:41:13,510 But I really do like looking at Christopher's letters, his write 804 00:41:13,510 --> 00:41:16,430 ups, his tweets, because I think he has a ton of knowledge to 805 00:41:16,430 --> 00:41:19,870 share with others. Now that wraps up Part 2 of the 806 00:41:19,870 --> 00:41:22,710 Super Investor update. I'm going to be doing an update 807 00:41:22,790 --> 00:41:25,710 on My Portfolio in similar fashion to these super 808 00:41:25,710 --> 00:41:27,510 investors. So if you want to see that, make 809 00:41:27,510 --> 00:41:30,350 sure you subscribe to this channel and the other channel, 810 00:41:30,510 --> 00:41:33,190 my main channel under my name. If you haven't subscribed to 811 00:41:33,190 --> 00:41:35,470 that one, make sure you are because I believe that's where 812 00:41:35,470 --> 00:41:37,470 I'll be doing the update on My Portfolio. 813 00:41:37,870 --> 00:41:39,750 That's all for now. I hope you enjoyed and I'll see 814 00:41:39,750 --> 00:41:40,430 you in the next one.