1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:01,720 Welcome back everyone. Today is going to be a 2 00:00:01,720 --> 00:00:05,920 continuation of last episode where we reviewed the portfolios 3 00:00:05,920 --> 00:00:09,120 of super investors. Only this time I think we even 4 00:00:09,120 --> 00:00:11,320 have a better slate. I honestly believe that this is 5 00:00:11,320 --> 00:00:12,800 a better group of super investors. 6 00:00:13,080 --> 00:00:15,960 First of all, we have the full portfolio changes of Bill 7 00:00:15,960 --> 00:00:18,240 Ackman. So last time we had a preview, 8 00:00:18,240 --> 00:00:21,400 we got to see that he bought a lot of Uber and I went over the 9 00:00:21,400 --> 00:00:24,080 investment case of Uber. But this time we can see a lot 10 00:00:24,080 --> 00:00:27,400 of different trades he's making, trimming off Chipotle, trimming 11 00:00:27,400 --> 00:00:30,080 off Hilton. He is doing some interesting 12 00:00:30,080 --> 00:00:31,760 things with Nike. We're going to be looking at 13 00:00:31,760 --> 00:00:34,120 that. Then of course, we have Valley 14 00:00:34,120 --> 00:00:37,160 Forge Capital with none other than Dev Kantasaria. 15 00:00:37,440 --> 00:00:41,160 He's personally my favorite. Dev, I believe is I think he's 16 00:00:41,160 --> 00:00:42,400 the best. He's my favorite. 17 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:44,800 I'm a little biased, but I love his portfolio. 18 00:00:44,800 --> 00:00:47,440 I love his frame of thought. We're going to be at what he's 19 00:00:47,440 --> 00:00:49,080 doing, the trades that he's making. 20 00:00:49,240 --> 00:00:51,000 We have the Chuck Auchre portfolio. 21 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:54,080 They bought a new company that I find really interesting and I've 22 00:00:54,080 --> 00:00:57,640 seen this company show up across a couple other super investors. 23 00:00:57,920 --> 00:01:00,480 As I've looked into it. I'm really impressed by this 24 00:01:00,480 --> 00:01:01,640 one. So we're going to be looking 25 00:01:01,640 --> 00:01:04,360 through Chuck Auchre's trades. Then we have Warren Buffett in 26 00:01:04,360 --> 00:01:07,680 the Berkshire portfolio, we have Mark Massey with Alterock 27 00:01:07,680 --> 00:01:09,640 Partners, and we have Michael Bury. 28 00:01:09,640 --> 00:01:12,400 And we're going to be looking at all of these giving some context 29 00:01:12,400 --> 00:01:14,040 and insight. Now, we'll first kick things off 30 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:16,040 with Bill Ackman. We already went over his 31 00:01:16,040 --> 00:01:19,240 publicly released at least news that he bought Uber and I think 32 00:01:19,240 --> 00:01:21,520 that's a great one. Like I've said many times, I 33 00:01:21,520 --> 00:01:24,680 think 9 out of 10 situations investors will make money on 34 00:01:24,680 --> 00:01:27,280 Uber here. So I like the Uber buy, but Bill 35 00:01:27,280 --> 00:01:31,000 Ackman has a lot more going on with his portfolio in his 13 F 36 00:01:31,000 --> 00:01:32,800 filing. We get to see all the other 37 00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:35,400 companies that he's trading, he's buying and he's selling. 38 00:01:35,840 --> 00:01:38,520 Now one thing I'll point out that's important is that this 39 00:01:38,520 --> 00:01:43,240 website Data Roma only shows the US listed equities, so you don't 40 00:01:43,240 --> 00:01:46,640 see the international stocks, one of them being Universal 41 00:01:46,640 --> 00:01:49,760 Music Group. He owns the largest position in 42 00:01:49,760 --> 00:01:53,600 his portfolio as UMG. Blackman loves the licensing 43 00:01:53,600 --> 00:01:56,000 style of business. Universal Music Group is like 44 00:01:56,000 --> 00:01:58,480 the landlord of the music industry. 45 00:01:58,720 --> 00:02:01,920 They charge licensing fees for anybody that uses their music 46 00:02:01,920 --> 00:02:05,480 and videos and movies and of course on companies like Spotify 47 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:08,880 or Apple Music. Now in terms of his largest 48 00:02:08,880 --> 00:02:12,320 holding, which again, if it was here, it would be UMG right at 49 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:14,480 the top here. So you can just imagine that. 50 00:02:15,040 --> 00:02:18,520 But in terms of his largest holding, I personally like 51 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:22,080 Spotify more than UMGI, think it's more compelling and 52 00:02:22,080 --> 00:02:24,560 interesting story. Spotify is often looked down on 53 00:02:24,560 --> 00:02:27,160 by investors because of the low margins and the questionable 54 00:02:27,160 --> 00:02:29,480 profitability. But what they've proven over the 55 00:02:29,480 --> 00:02:32,440 past year is that they can push up margins. 56 00:02:32,720 --> 00:02:35,480 They've done so the gross margins of the company, the 57 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:37,920 operating margins have gone up over the past year. 58 00:02:38,200 --> 00:02:41,000 For example, if we look at the ratios of Spotify, the gross 59 00:02:41,000 --> 00:02:43,760 margins of only 30% are super low. 60 00:02:44,080 --> 00:02:47,120 To put that in perspective, Booking Holdings has higher 61 00:02:47,120 --> 00:02:50,440 operating margins then Spotify has gross margins. 62 00:02:50,680 --> 00:02:53,120 So this is very low gross margins, but you can see them 63 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:55,560 starting to take up a little bit year over year. 64 00:02:55,800 --> 00:03:00,040 In 2023, it was 25.6%. So they're actually increasing 65 00:03:00,040 --> 00:03:02,360 their gross margins, they're increasing their operating 66 00:03:02,360 --> 00:03:05,160 margins like crazy and of course their profit margins are 67 00:03:05,160 --> 00:03:07,440 following. So this company is getting a 68 00:03:07,440 --> 00:03:10,480 nice return on capital employed. The numbers are moving in the 69 00:03:10,480 --> 00:03:13,040 right direction and the cash flows are following. 70 00:03:13,320 --> 00:03:16,320 If we look at Spotify's quarterly trailing free cash 71 00:03:16,320 --> 00:03:18,720 flow, you can see the nice story here. 72 00:03:19,000 --> 00:03:22,320 Explosive free cash flow growth as they're reducing their budget 73 00:03:22,320 --> 00:03:25,240 on things like podcasts. On top of that, one of the most 74 00:03:25,240 --> 00:03:28,440 compelling parts of Spotify is just the sheer number of people 75 00:03:28,440 --> 00:03:30,960 using this application. When we look at the monthly 76 00:03:30,960 --> 00:03:34,800 active users, it's climbed up from 300 million, in fact below 77 00:03:34,800 --> 00:03:39,120 300 million in only 2020. Fast forward five years, now 78 00:03:39,120 --> 00:03:42,760 there are 675,000,000 monthly active users. 79 00:03:43,360 --> 00:03:46,200 This is incredible worldwide organic growth. 80 00:03:46,520 --> 00:03:49,600 And you see this across the Premium and AD Tair, both of 81 00:03:49,600 --> 00:03:53,440 them growing like crazy. The AD Tair Works is a freemium 82 00:03:53,440 --> 00:03:56,000 version. People join on, they use the AD 83 00:03:56,000 --> 00:03:58,600 Tair for a while, they fall in love with the product, then they 84 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:00,960 upgrade to the Premium. Now again, Bill Ackman likes 85 00:04:00,960 --> 00:04:04,040 that licensing business of UMG, the company that owns all the 86 00:04:04,040 --> 00:04:07,040 rights to all of this music. So there's two different stories 87 00:04:07,040 --> 00:04:09,120 here of the different relationships these companies 88 00:04:09,120 --> 00:04:12,360 have, but I'm on the side where I think Spotify will be a more 89 00:04:12,360 --> 00:04:14,320 compelling investment and I believe it's going to have 90 00:04:14,320 --> 00:04:17,760 better returns over the next 10 years than UMG, but we'll have 91 00:04:17,760 --> 00:04:19,640 to wait and see. Now, in terms of Bill Ackman's 92 00:04:19,640 --> 00:04:22,240 other investments, he holds Brookfield Corpus's largest 93 00:04:22,240 --> 00:04:24,080 position. He added a little bit to that 94 00:04:24,080 --> 00:04:25,560 one. I think it's great. 95 00:04:25,560 --> 00:04:27,840 I like Bruce Flatt, I like Brookfield, I like what they're 96 00:04:27,840 --> 00:04:30,480 doing. He has one company that I, I 97 00:04:30,480 --> 00:04:32,720 can't get behind. I don't understand this one. 98 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:35,000 It's Restaurant Brands International. 99 00:04:35,160 --> 00:04:36,720 This is the owner of Burger King. 100 00:04:37,360 --> 00:04:41,640 Burger King is a middle of the road fast food restaurant. 101 00:04:41,920 --> 00:04:44,920 It's right there with like Wendy's and a couple other fast 102 00:04:44,920 --> 00:04:47,120 food places. It's nothing exceptional. 103 00:04:47,200 --> 00:04:50,400 It's certainly no Chick-fil-A. It's not a nice sit down 104 00:04:50,400 --> 00:04:52,920 experience like Texas Roadhouse or Chili's. 105 00:04:53,240 --> 00:04:55,520 It's just a fast food restaurant and I don't think it's even 106 00:04:55,520 --> 00:04:58,720 compelling as Chipotle, so I don't know why he owns it. 107 00:04:59,040 --> 00:05:02,680 On top of that, it's also ironic to me that Bill Ackman owns 108 00:05:02,680 --> 00:05:05,840 Restaurant Brands International as a huge concentrated position, 109 00:05:06,240 --> 00:05:09,560 a company that serves burgers and fries, while he also 110 00:05:09,560 --> 00:05:12,920 criticizes Coca-Cola and Pepsi for having addictive and 111 00:05:12,920 --> 00:05:15,920 unhealthy products. He's continually on the RFK 112 00:05:15,920 --> 00:05:19,440 Junior train, saying that these companies have used advertising 113 00:05:19,440 --> 00:05:21,360 to get people to buy unhealthy foods. 114 00:05:21,640 --> 00:05:23,960 But then he owns Restaurant Brands International. 115 00:05:24,240 --> 00:05:26,520 So I don't understand this investment both from just an 116 00:05:26,520 --> 00:05:29,560 investment standpoint or from even his own philosophical 117 00:05:29,560 --> 00:05:32,880 standpoint of owning a company that goes contrary to his own 118 00:05:32,880 --> 00:05:35,360 personal beliefs. I just don't believe this 119 00:05:35,360 --> 00:05:39,000 company fits in his portfolio and I'm waiting for Bill Ackman 120 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:41,000 to dump it. So I think it both makes sense 121 00:05:41,000 --> 00:05:44,040 from an investment standpoint and from Bill Ackman's own moral 122 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:47,560 objective against unhealthy foods to dump this company. 123 00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:49,680 And I think it's only a matter of time until he does it. 124 00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:52,360 The next one up is Chipotle. What you can defend is being 125 00:05:52,360 --> 00:05:53,960 quite a bit more healthy than Burger King. 126 00:05:54,520 --> 00:05:58,000 Either way, Chipotle is a large position, but he's continually 127 00:05:58,000 --> 00:06:00,520 reducing this one. If we look over Chipotle since 128 00:06:00,520 --> 00:06:03,800 2018, he's been overall a net seller. 129 00:06:04,000 --> 00:06:07,800 He has as in fact 1/4 where he added slightly to the position 130 00:06:08,040 --> 00:06:10,520 amongst dozens of quarters of selling it. 131 00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:12,560 So overall he's dumping this position. 132 00:06:12,800 --> 00:06:14,400 It makes sense why he's selling this one. 133 00:06:14,400 --> 00:06:16,800 There's simply better opportunities when Chipotle 134 00:06:16,800 --> 00:06:19,360 stock has pulled forward so much of its earnings. 135 00:06:19,600 --> 00:06:22,040 It trades at such a high valuation now that you have to 136 00:06:22,040 --> 00:06:25,000 grow substantially to justify today's valuation. 137 00:06:25,200 --> 00:06:28,040 No changes on Howard Hughes Corp, no changes on Google. 138 00:06:28,320 --> 00:06:31,440 We have him adding a little bit to Nike and this needs some 139 00:06:31,440 --> 00:06:34,120 explanation. You see that he added to Nike 140 00:06:34,120 --> 00:06:36,960 last quarter, but that's not an accurate reflection of what's 141 00:06:36,960 --> 00:06:38,880 going on. Bill Ackman gave us an update in 142 00:06:38,880 --> 00:06:41,080 his most recent investor presentation that he actually 143 00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:45,120 sold all the equity in his Nike position, so he doesn't own any 144 00:06:45,120 --> 00:06:48,680 more Nike stock. Instead, he converted it to deep 145 00:06:48,680 --> 00:06:52,680 in the money call options. So he took all the equity, sold 146 00:06:52,680 --> 00:06:55,320 it all, converted it to this position, and then he probably 147 00:06:55,320 --> 00:06:58,240 used a lot of that equity to enter into the Uber position. 148 00:06:58,600 --> 00:07:00,200 I believe that's the trade he's making. 149 00:07:00,280 --> 00:07:02,840 But the way that this works is because this website doesn't 150 00:07:02,840 --> 00:07:05,480 track any type of over the counter call options. 151 00:07:05,760 --> 00:07:08,120 It's going to show next quarter that he dumped his Nike 152 00:07:08,120 --> 00:07:09,920 position. So you're going to see that in 153 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:12,600 the 13 FS next quarter. It'll look like Bill Ackman 154 00:07:12,600 --> 00:07:14,680 completely sold out of his Nike stake. 155 00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:17,640 That's not really what happened. He's simply converting it to 156 00:07:17,640 --> 00:07:20,040 call options in his investor presentation. 157 00:07:20,040 --> 00:07:23,080 He says the new structure allows us to preserve the upside 158 00:07:23,080 --> 00:07:26,960 potential of owning the stock outright while unlocking capital 159 00:07:26,960 --> 00:07:30,160 to make new investments. Those new investments he made I 160 00:07:30,160 --> 00:07:32,440 believe was Uber. He also reduced his Hilton 161 00:07:32,440 --> 00:07:35,080 position and he added to Seaport Entertainment Group. 162 00:07:35,160 --> 00:07:38,560 That's a very small 1% position. Overall, a very strong 163 00:07:38,560 --> 00:07:41,280 concentrated portfolio from Bill Ackman and I like the trades 164 00:07:41,280 --> 00:07:43,040 he's doing now. Next up we have my personal 165 00:07:43,040 --> 00:07:45,640 favorite, which is Dev Kantasari with Valley Forge Capital 166 00:07:45,640 --> 00:07:47,960 Management. He now manages over 4 1/2 167 00:07:47,960 --> 00:07:50,320 billion dollars. He's grown his portfolio 168 00:07:50,320 --> 00:07:53,640 dramatically over the past 15 years and he's attracted more 169 00:07:53,640 --> 00:07:57,200 asset center management as he's shown incredible market being 170 00:07:57,200 --> 00:07:59,480 performance. Now he's accomplished this 171 00:07:59,880 --> 00:08:03,000 through a group of highly concentrated investments into 172 00:08:03,000 --> 00:08:05,840 incredibly powerful monopolistic companies. 173 00:08:06,120 --> 00:08:08,400 In most cases, you'll see the commonalities here. 174 00:08:08,680 --> 00:08:10,480 They're monopolies or they're duopolies. 175 00:08:10,640 --> 00:08:13,800 They're tollbooth companies, meaning that they earn money off 176 00:08:13,800 --> 00:08:16,560 of the transactions or commerce of other businesses. 177 00:08:16,840 --> 00:08:19,400 He loves companies that have very high margins. 178 00:08:19,640 --> 00:08:21,520 They have high returns on tangible assets. 179 00:08:21,800 --> 00:08:25,360 They don't require a great deal of capital expenditure or even 180 00:08:25,360 --> 00:08:28,880 marketing budget to grow. They have natural organic 181 00:08:28,880 --> 00:08:30,800 growth. They have a ton of operating 182 00:08:30,800 --> 00:08:33,880 leverage and scalability. All of these characteristics 183 00:08:33,960 --> 00:08:37,720 boil down to a very high quality company of which he makes these 184 00:08:37,720 --> 00:08:40,760 super concentrated bets in. And some of them have been 185 00:08:40,760 --> 00:08:44,240 phenomenal bets over the past decade, the most recent one 186 00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:46,520 being FICO. This one has dramatically 187 00:08:46,520 --> 00:08:50,320 outperformed the market and it's now a 34% position. 188 00:08:50,800 --> 00:08:53,040 O Fico's by far his largest holding still. 189 00:08:53,480 --> 00:08:56,400 And even though he's had this incredible outperformance with 190 00:08:56,400 --> 00:09:00,600 FICO trading at a super high valuation, he has the discipline 191 00:09:00,600 --> 00:09:03,920 to continue holding and that's a very rare thing to see. 192 00:09:04,120 --> 00:09:07,200 Most investors would dump this position entirely if they had 193 00:09:07,200 --> 00:09:10,200 this type of out performance. He's doing these slight trims, 194 00:09:10,200 --> 00:09:13,040 just taking a little bit of gains to funnel into different 195 00:09:13,040 --> 00:09:16,280 companies, but he's not slashing the position down in size. 196 00:09:16,480 --> 00:09:19,320 He's not reducing it as a huge percentage of his portfolio. 197 00:09:19,560 --> 00:09:24,360 He still likes FICO today, and in a recent podcast interview, 198 00:09:24,800 --> 00:09:26,840 he said that FICO deserved to trade up. 199 00:09:27,120 --> 00:09:28,920 It's now where it deserves to be. 200 00:09:28,920 --> 00:09:31,640 It got there rather quick, but it's a company that wholly 201 00:09:31,640 --> 00:09:33,680 deserves this momentum and trading. 202 00:09:34,000 --> 00:09:36,520 So I suspect he's going to continue to keep FICO as a large 203 00:09:36,520 --> 00:09:38,680 position in his portfolio in the future. 204 00:09:38,760 --> 00:09:41,560 Now I can see that two of the companies he's added to are very 205 00:09:41,560 --> 00:09:44,320 similar here, S&P Global and Moody's. 206 00:09:44,840 --> 00:09:47,360 Both of these are talked about online as being overvalued 207 00:09:47,360 --> 00:09:49,520 companies. They trade at a high multiple. 208 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:52,600 But here we have Dev Kantasaria adding to both of these 209 00:09:52,600 --> 00:09:55,880 positions. He increased S&P Global by 3%, 210 00:09:56,240 --> 00:09:59,440 even though it's already a 20% position. 211 00:10:00,080 --> 00:10:04,160 So it's a massive outsized position and he's adding a bit 212 00:10:04,160 --> 00:10:07,480 more to it. Then we have Moody's, a 14% 213 00:10:07,480 --> 00:10:10,880 position and he added 2% to it. This is the complete 214 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:14,800 counterintuitive thing to do. Instead of taking gains and 215 00:10:14,800 --> 00:10:18,440 using slogans like you can't go broke taking gains, Dev 216 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:21,320 Cantosaria further concentrates into the winners. 217 00:10:21,640 --> 00:10:24,720 He feeds the flowers, he lets them grow even more. 218 00:10:24,880 --> 00:10:27,600 He adds more to these positions when they dip down. 219 00:10:28,000 --> 00:10:31,160 So I see a very disciplined investor here that continues to 220 00:10:31,160 --> 00:10:34,920 follow his investing philosophy. Now one of the concerns here 221 00:10:34,920 --> 00:10:38,400 that I have and this is for a holding that I I currently own 222 00:10:38,760 --> 00:10:43,840 is right here with ASML. This is only a 2% position and 223 00:10:43,840 --> 00:10:47,640 he didn't add any to FML, even though FML has gone through a 224 00:10:47,640 --> 00:10:49,800 sell off. If we look at the trade history 225 00:10:49,800 --> 00:10:54,520 from Devcantasaria, he added to FML doubling his position in Q3 226 00:10:54,520 --> 00:10:57,520 of 2024. So two quarters ago that was at 227 00:10:57,520 --> 00:11:01,600 around $850. The quarter ended at 8:33. 228 00:11:02,040 --> 00:11:06,120 So he was adding to the position when it was 850, but here we 229 00:11:06,120 --> 00:11:10,080 have ASML today trading at 7:50. And even in last quarter when he 230 00:11:10,080 --> 00:11:13,520 could have added to it, it was trading at 6:50 and he didn't 231 00:11:13,520 --> 00:11:16,600 add any more to the position. The fact that he did not add to 232 00:11:16,600 --> 00:11:19,440 that position when it dipped down as much as it did makes me 233 00:11:19,440 --> 00:11:22,000 believe that he has his reservations about the company. 234 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:25,560 He has some concerns about it. I believe that Dev Kantasaria is 235 00:11:25,560 --> 00:11:28,720 holding ASML as a smaller position because he believes 236 00:11:28,720 --> 00:11:32,320 it's not quite as predictable as required to become a larger 237 00:11:32,320 --> 00:11:35,280 position. He puts a massive emphasis on 238 00:11:35,280 --> 00:11:38,760 predictability, and even though FML has a large Moat, it's a 239 00:11:38,760 --> 00:11:42,000 very wide Moat company. There are some concerns, 240 00:11:42,000 --> 00:11:44,720 specifically with international politics, with relationships 241 00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:48,200 with China, that could cause Dev to become a little bit less 242 00:11:48,200 --> 00:11:50,480 certain about the future predictability of the company. 243 00:11:50,800 --> 00:11:53,800 Now that's just speculation, but I believe that's the case 244 00:11:54,000 --> 00:11:57,600 because otherwise, if he was 100% certain about the future 245 00:11:57,600 --> 00:12:00,680 predictability, he would have added more to this position. 246 00:12:01,160 --> 00:12:04,880 Instead, he chose to add to S&P Global and Moody's, which are 247 00:12:04,880 --> 00:12:08,960 not on as big of a dip as ASML. So this is one that I wouldn't 248 00:12:08,960 --> 00:12:11,800 be surprised. I'm not going to be shocked if 249 00:12:11,800 --> 00:12:14,520 he ends up selling out of ASML. If he becomes convinced that 250 00:12:14,520 --> 00:12:17,120 it's less predictable and it doesn't meet his high standards, 251 00:12:17,320 --> 00:12:20,440 he'll dump the company. And if that's the case, I plan 252 00:12:20,440 --> 00:12:23,200 on doing my own assessment of the company and coming to my own 253 00:12:23,200 --> 00:12:25,120 conclusions. Even though I think 254 00:12:25,120 --> 00:12:28,840 Devcantasaria is incredibly smart, I really like what he 255 00:12:28,840 --> 00:12:31,600 does with his portfolio. That doesn't mean that they're 256 00:12:31,600 --> 00:12:34,880 always right, and sometimes super investors get things 257 00:12:34,880 --> 00:12:36,720 wrong. They get things wrong that I 258 00:12:36,720 --> 00:12:39,720 think are even somewhat obvious things in certain cases. 259 00:12:39,760 --> 00:12:42,920 One example of a disagreement I had with Dev Kantasaria was his 260 00:12:42,920 --> 00:12:45,480 sell of Amazon. I thought he should have doubled 261 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:48,400 down on the company, bought more of it, but he ended up selling 262 00:12:48,400 --> 00:12:50,960 out. He bought the company back in Q3 263 00:12:50,960 --> 00:12:54,920 of 2021 when Amazon was trading for around 160. 264 00:12:55,040 --> 00:12:56,880 That was the reported price at the time. 265 00:12:57,440 --> 00:13:01,280 Then he ended up reducing the position in 2022 and selling 266 00:13:01,280 --> 00:13:04,000 completely out of it in Q1 of 2023. 267 00:13:04,440 --> 00:13:07,520 At the time, Amazon was below $100.00. 268 00:13:07,960 --> 00:13:12,040 So he bought Amazon at a rather full price and then he sold it 269 00:13:12,040 --> 00:13:15,360 when it was off 50%. The company he bought with this 270 00:13:15,360 --> 00:13:18,360 money was Intuit. Since then, Intuit is up around 271 00:13:18,360 --> 00:13:20,560 50%. So Intuit made a little bit of 272 00:13:20,560 --> 00:13:24,920 gains, but Amazon is up 150% from the sell price. 273 00:13:24,920 --> 00:13:27,920 What I ended up doing during the same time period, the very same 274 00:13:27,920 --> 00:13:30,760 quarter that he dumped his position in Amazon, is I bought 275 00:13:30,760 --> 00:13:34,160 more of the company. I bought it January 3rd of 2023 276 00:13:34,160 --> 00:13:36,040 and I bought it again and again and again. 277 00:13:36,280 --> 00:13:39,800 I bought over $15,000 of the stock doing a series of buys. 278 00:13:40,040 --> 00:13:42,640 This is at a share price of $85 per share. 279 00:13:43,160 --> 00:13:45,600 Now, I'm not pointing this out to say that that I'm better than 280 00:13:45,600 --> 00:13:47,880 Dev Kantasaria. I don't believe that's the case. 281 00:13:48,200 --> 00:13:50,440 But it's to say that you don't have to agree with everything 282 00:13:50,440 --> 00:13:53,760 these super investors do. In some cases, you can disagree 283 00:13:53,760 --> 00:13:56,160 and still be right. They make good decisions 284 00:13:56,160 --> 00:13:58,720 frequently, but they're not always right and they're not 285 00:13:58,720 --> 00:14:00,960 infallible. So if Dev does end up dumping 286 00:14:00,960 --> 00:14:03,960 his ASML position in the future, I'll be making my own 287 00:14:03,960 --> 00:14:06,760 independent analysis on that. I won't just be following him 288 00:14:06,960 --> 00:14:09,640 with whatever he does now, as other trades he did here were 289 00:14:09,640 --> 00:14:11,680 interesting. He trimmed his into IT position 290 00:14:11,680 --> 00:14:16,400 by 10%, so minor trade there and then he bought Equifax and MSCI. 291 00:14:16,720 --> 00:14:19,960 These two companies both fit well within the Valley Forge 292 00:14:19,960 --> 00:14:23,120 Capital portfolio. We can start off with Equifax. 293 00:14:23,240 --> 00:14:25,800 Most people understand Equifax is one of the credit bureaus 294 00:14:25,800 --> 00:14:28,040 where they collect your information and they sell that 295 00:14:28,040 --> 00:14:30,160 credit information for a small fee. 296 00:14:30,160 --> 00:14:34,600 So it fits within the portfolio of Devcantesario where he loves 297 00:14:34,600 --> 00:14:38,040 these type of credit companies. Think about it, he owns Moody's 298 00:14:38,040 --> 00:14:39,920 and S&P Global. They're both credit rating 299 00:14:39,920 --> 00:14:43,000 agencies. He owns FICO, which is a loan 300 00:14:43,160 --> 00:14:46,840 origination rating system, and then Equifax is now a credit 301 00:14:46,840 --> 00:14:49,720 Bureau, so he's investing all across the credit system. 302 00:14:50,120 --> 00:14:52,520 But with Equifax, there's something that most people don't 303 00:14:52,520 --> 00:14:55,840 realize when first looking at this company is that the credit 304 00:14:55,840 --> 00:14:59,760 rating portion of the business is only around 40% of their 305 00:14:59,760 --> 00:15:02,520 total revenue. So it's less than half of the 306 00:15:02,520 --> 00:15:05,880 company. What is that other 5060%? 307 00:15:05,880 --> 00:15:08,720 That is the identity business. It's called the Workforce 308 00:15:08,720 --> 00:15:10,960 Solutions. The Workforce Solutions segment 309 00:15:10,960 --> 00:15:14,280 offers employment, income, criminal history, Social 310 00:15:14,280 --> 00:15:16,360 Security number verification services. 311 00:15:16,800 --> 00:15:19,680 So it's basically know your customer information. 312 00:15:19,960 --> 00:15:22,640 When a business wants to be sure of who their customers are or 313 00:15:22,640 --> 00:15:26,000 who these people are. If they want to verify income, 314 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:28,240 if they want to verify employment, if they want to know 315 00:15:28,240 --> 00:15:31,520 about this person for certain, they use this workforce 316 00:15:31,520 --> 00:15:34,640 solution. So most of Equifax is not a 317 00:15:34,640 --> 00:15:37,280 credit rating business, it's this workforce solution 318 00:15:37,280 --> 00:15:38,920 business. But what they're doing here is 319 00:15:38,920 --> 00:15:41,280 more of the same in selling data and analytics. 320 00:15:41,680 --> 00:15:43,880 We have a number of different transitions going on with the 321 00:15:43,880 --> 00:15:46,320 company right now that's powering it for the future. 322 00:15:46,680 --> 00:15:49,480 The cloud transformation, Equifax has completed a 323 00:15:49,520 --> 00:15:52,000 significant transformation to cloud native environment. 324 00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:54,040 They're moving from on Prem to cloud. 325 00:15:54,120 --> 00:15:56,240 This is something that I've highlighted as a bull case for 326 00:15:56,240 --> 00:15:58,960 companies like AWS, Google Cloud and Azure. 327 00:15:59,120 --> 00:16:00,960 So you see Equifax doing this right now. 328 00:16:01,320 --> 00:16:03,200 We have data and analytics capabilities. 329 00:16:03,280 --> 00:16:05,560 There's strong record growth. The company has shown 330 00:16:05,560 --> 00:16:08,960 significant record growth, adding 20 million active records 331 00:16:08,960 --> 00:16:11,600 in 2024. So the number of people that 332 00:16:11,680 --> 00:16:14,760 they're verifying is growing new strategic partnerships. 333 00:16:15,080 --> 00:16:18,680 They've signed 15 new strategic partnerships in 2024, including 334 00:16:18,680 --> 00:16:20,400 a notable partnership with Work Day. 335 00:16:20,400 --> 00:16:22,360 And then they're also rolling out a bunch of different 336 00:16:22,360 --> 00:16:24,160 products. So even though this is a small 337 00:16:24,160 --> 00:16:27,400 position, you get an idea of why it fits within his portfolio. 338 00:16:27,400 --> 00:16:29,680 It goes right along with the other companies he owns. 339 00:16:30,000 --> 00:16:33,240 The other one that he recently introduced as a new position is 340 00:16:33,240 --> 00:16:35,600 the index business, which is MSCI. 341 00:16:36,000 --> 00:16:40,320 Now, MSCI is very similar to S&P Global's indices business. 342 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:43,960 S&P Global owns the Dow Jones indices, which has indices like 343 00:16:43,960 --> 00:16:48,160 the S&P 500, the Dow Jones, it has things like SCHD. 344 00:16:48,280 --> 00:16:52,520 Those are all from the Dow Jones indices, but MSCI owns the world 345 00:16:52,520 --> 00:16:54,920 indices. They're mostly outside of the US 346 00:16:54,920 --> 00:16:58,240 and as the rest of the world grows, this company naturally 347 00:16:58,240 --> 00:17:00,360 makes more money through their licensing agreement. 348 00:17:00,640 --> 00:17:04,079 This is another company that in terms of the finances, the way 349 00:17:04,079 --> 00:17:07,400 that this company set up, it fits well within the portfolio. 350 00:17:07,720 --> 00:17:10,520 They have very low expenses relative to the revenue of this 351 00:17:10,520 --> 00:17:12,920 company. It has almost no CapEx 352 00:17:12,920 --> 00:17:15,440 expenditure. There's some sales and marketing 353 00:17:15,440 --> 00:17:18,720 and R&D, but that's been relatively flat as the company 354 00:17:18,720 --> 00:17:21,800 continues to grow revenue, which means they're sizing operating 355 00:17:21,800 --> 00:17:24,680 leverage, they're buying back shares, reducing the share 356 00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:26,839 count. The free cash flow consistently 357 00:17:26,839 --> 00:17:29,080 grows. In fact, it looks crazy 358 00:17:29,080 --> 00:17:31,120 consistent when you look at this free cash flow. 359 00:17:31,680 --> 00:17:34,840 Look at this trend over time. This is on a trailing 12 month 360 00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:38,520 basis, but that's 24% free cash flow growth. 361 00:17:38,640 --> 00:17:42,280 Year over year, 24% free cash flow growth is impressive, but 362 00:17:42,280 --> 00:17:45,760 on a per share growth, it's growing 26% because remember 363 00:17:45,760 --> 00:17:48,080 they're buying back shares, increasing their per share 364 00:17:48,080 --> 00:17:49,840 growth. And in terms of dilution with 365 00:17:49,840 --> 00:17:52,120 stock based comp, you can see the purple bars there. 366 00:17:52,360 --> 00:17:55,040 It's almost nothing. It's a tiny fractional 367 00:17:55,040 --> 00:17:57,280 percentage, not enough to really factor in. 368 00:17:57,560 --> 00:18:00,920 So this is an undilutive fast growing, organically growing 369 00:18:00,920 --> 00:18:03,160 company. When we look at the revenue, the 370 00:18:03,160 --> 00:18:05,520 top line revenue grows at around 13%. 371 00:18:05,640 --> 00:18:08,120 I like MSCI a lot. It's a company that I wouldn't 372 00:18:08,120 --> 00:18:10,560 mind owning. The only issue is every time I 373 00:18:10,560 --> 00:18:14,120 look to buy this company, I just believe I'd rather own a little 374 00:18:14,120 --> 00:18:16,480 bit more of S&P Global. So for me, it's one of those 375 00:18:16,480 --> 00:18:19,440 difficult positions. I could buy into MSCI, but I 376 00:18:19,440 --> 00:18:22,800 already feel like I got a good deal with S&P Global with a very 377 00:18:22,800 --> 00:18:25,200 similar business model. So overall, the Valley Forge 378 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:28,680 Capital portfolio continues to be consistent, methodical. 379 00:18:28,800 --> 00:18:31,680 They're executing their strategy exactly as they lay out. 380 00:18:31,880 --> 00:18:33,880 Next up, we have the Chuck Auchry portfolio. 381 00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:36,200 Chuck Auchry himself is a living legend. 382 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:38,920 The guy's incredible. Unfortunately, he's not running 383 00:18:38,920 --> 00:18:41,720 this portfolio anymore. So we have we have the new 384 00:18:41,720 --> 00:18:44,160 leaders of the portfolio and they're trying their best to 385 00:18:44,160 --> 00:18:46,800 follow the same methodology and thought process. 386 00:18:47,120 --> 00:18:48,840 Overall, I think they're doing an OK job. 387 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:51,800 I don't like to see them sell out as some of their most iconic 388 00:18:51,800 --> 00:18:53,960 holdings that continue to be in a very good position. 389 00:18:54,320 --> 00:18:56,320 So I don't like the constant trimming of Moody's, a 390 00:18:56,320 --> 00:18:57,920 MasterCard. I just don't think it's 391 00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:00,200 necessary. These companies should just 392 00:19:00,200 --> 00:19:02,440 continue to compound for a very long period of time. 393 00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:06,200 But putting that aside, I do like and I at least I think it's 394 00:19:06,240 --> 00:19:08,960 interesting, some of the companies are buying, one of 395 00:19:08,960 --> 00:19:11,640 them being Costar Group Poland Capital bought. 396 00:19:11,640 --> 00:19:14,680 This is a new position and we also have Chuck Ockery's 397 00:19:14,680 --> 00:19:17,880 portfolio adding to this position, one of the few 398 00:19:17,880 --> 00:19:20,640 companies they've added to well, what is Costar Group and why are 399 00:19:20,640 --> 00:19:23,440 these super investors buying it? Costar Group provides 400 00:19:23,440 --> 00:19:27,160 information, analytics and online marketplace services to 401 00:19:27,160 --> 00:19:30,720 commercial real estate, hospitality, residential and 402 00:19:30,720 --> 00:19:33,920 other related professional industries across the world. 403 00:19:33,960 --> 00:19:37,120 They also own a handful of websites that are very popular 404 00:19:37,120 --> 00:19:38,520 amongst the real estate industry. 405 00:19:38,880 --> 00:19:42,080 All these different renter websites, all these different 406 00:19:42,080 --> 00:19:44,360 ones that connect different people to agents, they're in 407 00:19:44,360 --> 00:19:46,800 that business of owning and distributing data about the real 408 00:19:46,800 --> 00:19:48,760 estate industry. They also have a lot of 409 00:19:48,760 --> 00:19:50,960 compelling things moving forward with this company. 410 00:19:51,600 --> 00:19:55,040 We note here from Qualtrm that Costar holds a robust position 411 00:19:55,040 --> 00:19:58,880 in the commercial real estate sector with a noteworthy 93% 412 00:19:58,880 --> 00:20:04,240 renewal rate in subscriptions. 93 percent is insanely high. 413 00:20:04,560 --> 00:20:06,880 That is the same retention that Costco has. 414 00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:09,320 That's higher than most subscriptions in the world. 415 00:20:09,880 --> 00:20:11,680 So this shows that this is almost like a business 416 00:20:11,680 --> 00:20:13,320 subscription. When somebody signs up, they 417 00:20:13,320 --> 00:20:16,240 view it as part of their industry, something that they 418 00:20:16,240 --> 00:20:19,040 need to have. When you're only losing 7% of 419 00:20:19,040 --> 00:20:21,520 customers per year, that's all you have to replace. 420 00:20:21,960 --> 00:20:24,360 That is a very, very sticky subscription. 421 00:20:24,920 --> 00:20:27,560 Diverse revenue streams. The company manages a diverse 422 00:20:27,560 --> 00:20:30,160 set of product offerings across commercial, multi family 423 00:20:30,360 --> 00:20:32,920 residential markets and including successful platforms 424 00:20:33,200 --> 00:20:36,920 like apartments.com, Loopnet, which help mitigate risks 425 00:20:36,920 --> 00:20:39,560 associated with any single segment of their business. 426 00:20:39,680 --> 00:20:42,760 So even if real estate's doing poorly, they're going to be 427 00:20:42,760 --> 00:20:45,520 affected by that, but to a lesser extent than the real 428 00:20:45,520 --> 00:20:47,160 estate industry in and of itself. 429 00:20:47,600 --> 00:20:52,000 It's a bit how like S&P Global has Commodity Insights where 430 00:20:52,000 --> 00:20:55,200 they price out commodities. That business in and of itself 431 00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:57,800 is not as volatile as the commodities themselves. 432 00:20:57,880 --> 00:21:00,200 So they're a little bit detached from the real estate industry 433 00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:02,160 themselves. They have proven growth. 434 00:21:02,160 --> 00:21:06,160 Costar has displayed consistent growth, achieving 54 consecutive 435 00:21:06,160 --> 00:21:08,280 quarters of double digit revenue growth. 436 00:21:08,680 --> 00:21:11,720 This trajectory speaks volumes about their ability to adapt, 437 00:21:11,760 --> 00:21:14,520 innovate and secure market leadership across various 438 00:21:14,520 --> 00:21:17,800 segments. Now Qualtrum highlights that as 439 00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:20,880 one of the the benefits of this company and it truly is one of 440 00:21:20,880 --> 00:21:22,840 the most incredible things about this company. 441 00:21:23,120 --> 00:21:26,560 Let me bring up a chart here. This is the quarterly trailing 442 00:21:26,560 --> 00:21:29,080 12 months, which smooths out the revenue over time. 443 00:21:29,880 --> 00:21:33,160 That looks pretty smooth, right? You don't see too many revenue 444 00:21:33,160 --> 00:21:36,640 charts that look like this. It almost looks fake, but these 445 00:21:36,640 --> 00:21:39,400 numbers are real. That is one of the the smoothest 446 00:21:39,400 --> 00:21:42,560 trajectories ever, but that's on a trailing 12 month basis. 447 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:46,240 Check out when I move it to quarterly, which typically is 448 00:21:46,240 --> 00:21:49,960 much more volatile across different companies, it's almost 449 00:21:49,960 --> 00:21:51,680 indistinguishable from quarterly. 450 00:21:51,680 --> 00:21:54,960 It looks almost just as smooth, not quite, but it's still 451 00:21:54,960 --> 00:21:57,440 incredible. I don't see charts like this 452 00:21:57,440 --> 00:22:00,160 hardly ever. So it really is incredible what 453 00:22:00,160 --> 00:22:01,680 they're able to do. They just grow revenue 454 00:22:01,680 --> 00:22:05,840 consistently 10% year over year almost every single quarter 455 00:22:05,880 --> 00:22:08,560 without fail. And the reason that they can do 456 00:22:08,560 --> 00:22:12,360 that all comes back to this incredible metric here, I 457 00:22:12,360 --> 00:22:15,760 believe the most important one. They're 93% renewal rate. 458 00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:19,120 Again, it's hard for me to overemphasize how incredible of 459 00:22:19,120 --> 00:22:21,560 a retention that is. If there's a company that has 460 00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:25,160 figured that out, whether it's Netflix or Duolingo or Costco, 461 00:22:25,440 --> 00:22:30,040 Spotify, if you can retain 93% of customers year over year, you 462 00:22:30,040 --> 00:22:33,840 only have to replace 7%, you have yourself an incredible 463 00:22:33,840 --> 00:22:36,800 business, hands down. That's enough right there for me 464 00:22:36,800 --> 00:22:38,520 to know it's an incredible business. 465 00:22:38,640 --> 00:22:40,600 The company is also widely popular. 466 00:22:40,840 --> 00:22:43,160 So even though you probably haven't heard about this company 467 00:22:43,160 --> 00:22:46,920 in and of itself, the services they offer are super popular. 468 00:22:47,200 --> 00:22:49,240 The company's platforms including Costar and 469 00:22:49,240 --> 00:22:52,840 apartments.com, both strong user engagement metrics with average 470 00:22:52,840 --> 00:22:56,560 monthly unique visitors reaching 163 million. 471 00:22:56,920 --> 00:22:59,720 These figures are indicative of an effective brand awareness 472 00:22:59,720 --> 00:23:01,880 campaign and successfully marketing. 473 00:23:02,040 --> 00:23:04,440 Overall, Costar is an intriguing investment. 474 00:23:04,440 --> 00:23:06,600 I like what I see here. When I look at the 475 00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:09,800 profitability, it's certainly gone down over the past year. 476 00:23:10,120 --> 00:23:12,160 And I think the reason that investors are now buying into 477 00:23:12,160 --> 00:23:14,560 the stock is they believe that if there's any type of 478 00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:17,960 resurgence in the real estate market, in the home market, that 479 00:23:17,960 --> 00:23:19,680 those numbers Will Rock it back up. 480 00:23:19,760 --> 00:23:21,320 And I think that's what they're planning on. 481 00:23:21,320 --> 00:23:24,120 FICO looks expensive today because home originations have 482 00:23:24,120 --> 00:23:26,000 slowed down. People aren't buying and selling 483 00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:27,440 as much as they did 10 years ago. 484 00:23:27,800 --> 00:23:30,560 But if that picks back up because interest rates go down, 485 00:23:31,000 --> 00:23:34,040 Fico's going to do really well. And the same case can be made 486 00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:36,480 for Costar. It's another company that should 487 00:23:36,480 --> 00:23:39,840 benefit meaningfully if the real estate market heats back up. 488 00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:42,000 Overall, the Aqua portfolio's good. 489 00:23:42,080 --> 00:23:45,120 I like their new buys, but I wish they held on to their most 490 00:23:45,120 --> 00:23:47,800 powerful, dominant companies that they already own. 491 00:23:47,920 --> 00:23:50,560 Now moving on, we have the king himself, the best investor to 492 00:23:50,560 --> 00:23:53,240 ever live, Warren Buffett. We can take a look at what's 493 00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:54,640 going on with Berkshire Hathaway. 494 00:23:54,640 --> 00:23:56,680 Let's go ahead and take a look at the biggest trades here. 495 00:23:56,920 --> 00:23:59,960 They reduce their position by 2% in Bank of America. 496 00:24:00,280 --> 00:24:02,800 This comes at surprise. They've been doing this for a 497 00:24:02,800 --> 00:24:05,040 few quarters. I think it's a good move. 498 00:24:05,040 --> 00:24:06,800 I think that they owned a lot of these banks. 499 00:24:06,800 --> 00:24:08,920 I don't think they're the best companies in the market. 500 00:24:09,120 --> 00:24:11,200 So it makes sense that they're trimming their positions. 501 00:24:11,400 --> 00:24:14,080 They bought into Constellation Brands, that's the new holding. 502 00:24:14,320 --> 00:24:17,040 They increase their stake in the Domino's and Occidental 503 00:24:17,040 --> 00:24:19,160 Petroleum. We have them increasing 504 00:24:19,160 --> 00:24:23,080 SiriusXM, Verisign and Pool Corp over the last quarter as well. 505 00:24:23,240 --> 00:24:26,640 And then there's some cells and one of these could sting for 506 00:24:26,640 --> 00:24:30,080 some investors that went into this company, Ulta Beauty, they 507 00:24:30,080 --> 00:24:31,960 eliminated their position entirely. 508 00:24:32,120 --> 00:24:35,120 This is not a lot of trading. Warren Buffett has mostly done 509 00:24:35,120 --> 00:24:38,960 nothing over the past year. And I think that in and of 510 00:24:38,960 --> 00:24:42,200 itself is instructive. It speaks a little bit to the 511 00:24:42,200 --> 00:24:44,840 market we're in. They do not believe that there's 512 00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:46,960 any dramatic deals in the market right now. 513 00:24:47,320 --> 00:24:50,120 So while you see people on social media, people across the 514 00:24:50,120 --> 00:24:53,680 Internet buying stocks left and right, pushing prices up, 515 00:24:53,920 --> 00:24:57,280 pushing up PE ratios, now comparing stuff not even based 516 00:24:57,280 --> 00:25:01,800 on PE but on price to sales, they are justifying even more 517 00:25:01,800 --> 00:25:04,840 grossly overvalued companies, justifying narratives that are 518 00:25:04,840 --> 00:25:06,840 even more extreme and unpredictable. 519 00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:09,920 During all this market hysteria and speculation, Warren Buffett 520 00:25:09,920 --> 00:25:12,680 remains completely still. And this is what he does. 521 00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:16,000 He waits until he sees value in the market that's so clear. 522 00:25:16,320 --> 00:25:19,760 There's such clear value that he's getting that he describes 523 00:25:19,760 --> 00:25:23,000 it as a caveman hitting him over the head with a club. 524 00:25:23,320 --> 00:25:25,440 You can't mistake it. You don't need to try to 525 00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:27,240 rationalize it with complex formulas. 526 00:25:27,440 --> 00:25:29,880 It's just such great value that it's unmistakable. 527 00:25:30,120 --> 00:25:31,600 And that's when he'll start buying again. 528 00:25:31,960 --> 00:25:35,200 But as of right now, you see what the Berkshire portfolio is 529 00:25:35,200 --> 00:25:37,840 and it's not changing that much. Now moving on, we get to Mark 530 00:25:37,840 --> 00:25:41,520 Massey of Altarock Partners. They have $5 billion into a very 531 00:25:41,520 --> 00:25:45,000 concentrated portfolio of only four or five meaningful 532 00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:48,560 positions. Now, I'll be honest here, I do 533 00:25:48,560 --> 00:25:50,560 not like the trades that they made this quarter. 534 00:25:50,840 --> 00:25:52,200 I think they're counterproductive. 535 00:25:52,520 --> 00:25:54,360 I think that many of them will come back to bite them. 536 00:25:54,360 --> 00:25:56,800 For example, one of the companies that they sold the 537 00:25:56,800 --> 00:26:00,800 most of was FICO, which looking at their holdings, is one of 538 00:26:00,800 --> 00:26:03,720 their strongest companies. So they're dumping their 539 00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:06,360 strongest companies because of valuation concerns. 540 00:26:06,600 --> 00:26:08,680 FICO traded up to a high PE ratio. 541 00:26:08,960 --> 00:26:11,760 They sold out of the stock, and hopefully they can buy something 542 00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:14,200 that will do better. But in most cases, I think 543 00:26:14,200 --> 00:26:16,640 that's counterproductive if you're already in the green by a 544 00:26:16,640 --> 00:26:19,760 large extent on a great company and the fundamentals remain 545 00:26:19,760 --> 00:26:23,560 intact as a very bright future. There's multiple tailwinds for 546 00:26:23,560 --> 00:26:26,520 FICO in the future. It'd be one that I would just 547 00:26:26,520 --> 00:26:28,920 hang onto. I would maybe trim some of it 548 00:26:29,000 --> 00:26:31,960 like Dev Cantisario did, but still have it as a meaningful 549 00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:34,640 position. Instead, they sold out of it, 550 00:26:34,680 --> 00:26:37,480 and they also sold out of a lot of other companies, or at least 551 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:39,800 they reduced their stake. They reduced their stake in 552 00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:43,400 Transdyme and Amazon and Microsoft and Moody's and 553 00:26:43,400 --> 00:26:46,480 MasterCard and Visa. It's fine to add to Google here. 554 00:26:46,480 --> 00:26:49,200 I think that's a great one. But overall, I think these 555 00:26:49,200 --> 00:26:50,840 trades are somewhat counterproductive. 556 00:26:51,120 --> 00:26:53,520 They'd probably be better off just holding their positions. 557 00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:55,880 Now, finally, we got to see what Michael Bury has been up to. 558 00:26:56,320 --> 00:26:59,000 This is one that I always give of the disclaimer that I don't 559 00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:02,280 think he's a great investor to follow, to buy into his 560 00:27:02,280 --> 00:27:05,520 positions or sell out of them because he does things so 561 00:27:05,520 --> 00:27:07,440 rapidly. He changes his portfolio 562 00:27:07,440 --> 00:27:09,800 overnight. For example, in just the last 563 00:27:09,800 --> 00:27:11,600 quarter, here are the trades he made. 564 00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:15,440 He sold 100% of shift 4. So he was in that company as a 565 00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:20,200 huge concentrated position, 16% of his portfolio, it's gone in a 566 00:27:20,200 --> 00:27:21,760 single quarter. It's just gone. 567 00:27:22,240 --> 00:27:24,800 So if you created a thesis around this company and you were 568 00:27:24,800 --> 00:27:27,840 invested in it because you saw Michael Bury buy it, now all of 569 00:27:27,840 --> 00:27:30,200 a sudden he's out of the company and you don't know exactly when 570 00:27:30,200 --> 00:27:32,040 he sold. You just know it was during last 571 00:27:32,040 --> 00:27:33,880 quarter. You'll see the same thing. 572 00:27:33,880 --> 00:27:37,080 He bought into Estee Lauder, Pinduoduo, he bought into 573 00:27:37,080 --> 00:27:38,800 Chinese stock. So he's betting heavily on a 574 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:40,760 Chinese stock recovery right now. 575 00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:44,840 Alibaba is his largest position. Baidu is his second largest, JD 576 00:27:44,840 --> 00:27:47,040 is his third. Those are three Chinese 577 00:27:47,040 --> 00:27:51,080 companies that makes up around 35 to 40% of his portfolio. 578 00:27:51,400 --> 00:27:54,440 But then we also have Estee Lauder, which has a bunch of 579 00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:57,160 exposure to China. It's heavily reliant on the 580 00:27:57,160 --> 00:27:59,960 Chinese market recovering. So we can know directionally 581 00:27:59,960 --> 00:28:02,960 what Michael Bury's betting on. He's betting on the Chinese 582 00:28:02,960 --> 00:28:04,840 equities to recover over the next year. 583 00:28:05,120 --> 00:28:07,640 We don't know how long he'll stay in this trade, but that's 584 00:28:07,640 --> 00:28:10,120 how he's positioned right now. So there we had a look overall 585 00:28:10,120 --> 00:28:12,280 at the Super investors. And if you enjoyed this series, 586 00:28:12,280 --> 00:28:13,640 make sure you subscribe to the channel. 587 00:28:13,800 --> 00:28:16,000 I'll have more content out soon. That's all for now. 588 00:28:16,120 --> 00:28:16,800 See you in the next one.