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Welcome back everyone, we have a
jam packed episode. 2026 has 

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been off to a rocky start for 
many of us that are tech 

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investors and invested in lots 
of great software companies. 

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But as in every case, when there
is a sell off, when stocks are 

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going down, there's also 
opportunities. 

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There's companies that trade 
down that shouldn't, and 

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frankly, they're buying 
opportunities. 

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In this episode, I'll be making 
the case for three companies, 

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three that you've already heard 
about, three that everybody's 

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heard about, but three of the 
Max 7 that I believe are the 

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best buys today, I'll be going 
over why mathematically, I 

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believe that is the case. 
Now, of course, we also have a 

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lot of other news to get to. 
For example, we have Chris Hohn 

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who gave his portfolio update, 
the 13 F filing. 

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This gives us an inside look 
into what he was doing at least 

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from 2025, and it shows us how 
he values his stock before this 

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sell off. 
So we'll be looking at that. 

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We have some breaking news that 
Warner Brothers is now talking 

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with Paramount. 
Netflix allowed for a 7 day 

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grace period for them to talk 
and potentially have a best and 

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final offer. 
We'll be looking at the strategy

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of Netflix behind this. 
We also have news that Goldman 

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Sachs released a list of AI 
losers companies that they 

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consider a sell. 
Amongst them was Duolingo. 

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Duolingo is a stock that's been 
eviscerated. 

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It's down dramatically. 
It's one of my holdings and I 

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made a comparison that Goldman 
SX has done this very same thing

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with Netflix. 
They also rated Netflix. 

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They sell very close to the 
absolute bottom in 2022. 

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Now this is a post that I made 
on X and we had Jeremy Lafaye 

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from Financial Education respond
to this directly. 

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So I'll be going over his 
response. 

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I'll be giving some thoughts on 
Duolingo and some of the 

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arguments that Jeremy makes. 
And of course, we have the fail 

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of the week, which in this case 
I am forced to address Jemoth 

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Polyhypatia who in a recent All 
In episode suggested that the 

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only reason that Warren Buffett 
has out performed over his 

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lifetime was because of Fair 
disclosure laws suggesting that 

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Warren Buffett had inside 
information. 

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That that inside information is 
why Berkshire did so well up 

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until around 2000. 
We'll be looking over this claim

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that Schmoth is making in the 
fail of the week. 

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So we have a ton to get to in 
this episode. 

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Now as we start off today, I 
can't help but notice that the 

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sell off is continuing, but only
for part of the market. 

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If you look at the S&P 500, it's
actually flat this year, which 

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of course is discouraging. 
If you're looking at your 

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portfolio and noticing that it's
down 10 to 15%. 

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Many investors that are in tech 
companies, data companies, big 

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tech software companies, their 
portfolios are going down while 

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the rest of the market remains 
flat. 

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And that is because money's not 
leaving the market. 

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It's just repositioning from 
some companies to others. 

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We can see that happen in 
Lifetime. 

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For example, here's a chart 
showing S&P Global against 

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Walmart. 
Both of these are great 

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companies. 
Walmart's everywhere, very 

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reliable. 
S&P Global is a strong data 

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company. 
It has the credit rating agency.

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Most people would argue that S&P
Global has a bigger Moat, but 

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when we look at the data here, 
it shows a different story. 

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This is Walmart versus S&P 
Global. 

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Walmart is in blue, S&P Global 
is in red. 

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And this shows the trailing PE 
ratio over the past couple of 

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years. 
Notice that back in 2021, S&P 

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Global demanded a higher PE 
ratio than Walmart. 

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It was considered a much higher 
quality. 

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It was growing faster, growing 
earnings faster, and it had a 

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considerably wider Moat. 
Retails and Notorious are being 

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incredibly competitive, but we 
look at the PE ratios over time.

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That blue line, which is 
Walmart, continued to grow 

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upwards while S&P Global 
plummeted downwards right in the

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tail end of 2025. 
In the beginning of 2026, we see

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this massive Divergent. 
We're now Walmart for the first 

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time in years trades at a 54 
trailing PE ratio and S&P Global

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trades at a 28. 
Even on a forward basis, if 

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we're looking over the next 12 
months, Walmart trades at over 

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double the PE ratio of S&P 
Global, 21 for S&P Global, 43 

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for Walmart. 
Investors are liquidating 

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companies like S&P Global and 
putting that capital in the 

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companies like Walmart. 
And I see this the same thing 

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with My Portfolio. 
My Portfolio is down around 10%,

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maybe more now. 
We see that over the past just a

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couple of months, we've lost 
nearly $100,000, maybe 70 to 

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$80,000 in this portfolio. 
And while that can seem painful,

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I also look at the companies 
that I hold and they're still in

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great condition. 
When we look in the tech 

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category, Meta continues to 
trade down after reporting 

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blockbuster earnings. 
Their earnings report was 

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incredible. 
They'll grow 25% plus revenue in

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2026. 
Meta trades near A20 Ford PE 

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ratio, again half the price of a
Walmart. 

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We have ASML, this is one of the
few companies it's held its own 

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during the sell off. 
Investors haven't been scared of

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this one. 
We have Google that's also 

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trading down a little bit. 
This one was a bit higher 

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valuation, but even Google's 
getting hit. 

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We also have Microsoft, which is
also been selling off. 

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We have MasterCard, now in a 
downtrend, going down seemingly 

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every day. 
We have S&P Global. 

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This one again has had a massive
sell off in just the past couple

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of weeks. 
We have Intuit. 

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This one is trading at below its
10 year valuation on every 

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single valuation metric. 
You name it, price to free cash 

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flow, price to operating cash 
flow, PE ratios, every single 

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one. 
It's at the cheapest valuation 

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it's been in a decade. 
And it's important to understand

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why this is happening. 
Why are investors so quick to 

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sell these companies? 
Why are they selling US ME, 

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Global and Moody's? 
Why are they selling big tech? 

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Why are they selling every 
software company and racing to 

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slow growing retailers? 
Well, the reason why is because 

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investors are scared. 
This is a panic. 

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Investors are selling these 
companies because they're scared

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of AI and there's no lack of 
fodder to fuel these concerns, 

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to fuel these fares. 
Investors are scared and they 

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have reason to be. 
Every single day there's another

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hyper viral article that 
concerns investors that tells 

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you about how all these software
companies are going to 0, how 

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every one of them is going to be
disintermediated with AI. 

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They're all going to be 
destroyed. 

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The world as you know it, all 
the tools that you use, they're 

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not needed anymore. 
We're getting these every single

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day. 
We recently had one that said a 

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big thing is happening, 
basically going over how 

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everything's going to change. 
All these software companies are

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going to be disrupted and you 
better just hang on or sell out 

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of them. 
That one went hyper viral, was 

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millions of views. 
It was shared across every 

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single community, investing 
community, hedge fund manager, 

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everyone saw it. 
And we have another one that was

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just recently shared. 
Yesterday, we had another 

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article by a different author 
that fanned the flames once 

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again of AI concerns of 
software. 

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This one was by Nicholas and 
it's called vertical software. 

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Are we cooked? 
This article has 2 million 

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views, thousands of likes. 
It was spread across the entire 

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social media sphere. 
And it's difficult for me to 

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believe that these articles, 
which are hyper viral, they're 

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spread to millions of investors,
many of them hedge fund 

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managers, people with Bloomberg 
terminals, people that control 

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immense amounts of money. 
They're reading these articles. 

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And I believe it has an impact 
on stock prices. 

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It is changing sentiment across 
the board. 

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When you look at the reality 
with many of these companies 

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that are being obliterated in 
the stock market today, many of 

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them, their fundamentals appear 
to be fine. 

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Their margins are going higher. 
They're acquiring customers. 

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They still have pricing power. 
Many of the fundamentals do not 

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represent the concerns that are 
being founded today, and I 

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believe that there hasn't been 
strong rebuttals, but I think 

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we're starting to get them. 
One that I've read is from 

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Unemployed Capital Allocator. 
He wrote a rebuttal to Nicholas,

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and I believe it's worth 
mentioning a few things here. 

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One of the major points he makes
is addressing this claim that 

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you're not going to need user 
interfaces. 

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That's one of the biggest claims
from the AI is going to destroy 

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software bears. 
They're saying that software is 

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dead because you don't need a 
user interface. 

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You can just do everything 
through a text box. 

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You can do it all through a 
chat, you can go to your job and

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you'll just have a text prompt 
and you can ask it whatever you 

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want and get all the information
you need. 

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Sounds very easy. 
Easier than messing with a a 

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bunch of user interfaces, right?
Well, that's not necessarily the

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case, he says here. 
No, a text box isn't going to 

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replace learned UI. 
Where does learned UI really 

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matter? 
Which is user interfaces, tools 

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with tons of degrees of freedom,
and where actions per minute 

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actually does matter? 
Professional workflows, modeling

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software, video editing tools? 
Ones where knowing the shortcut 

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is a decent part of the job. 
A text box is not replacing 

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this. 
The idea is quite alluring to 

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those that don't know the UI. 
Look, you can just tell it to do

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something and it does it until 
you need to do it multiple 

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times, then you start to go. 
Man, I wish there was a quick 

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way for me to send this prompt 
to do this exact thing I want it

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to do. 
Oh, and remember all the info 

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I'm supposed to provide so that 
I can get back exactly what I 

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want. 
Maybe I can map it to a button 

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and a keyboard short. 
Oh wait, that's the user 

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interface. 
Text is amazing because it's 

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universal. 
Text is also absolutely horrible

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because it has infinite degrees 
of freedom and introduces 

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another level of abstraction. 
This is not what you want when 

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you need to do a lot of specific
things quickly. 

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This is exactly right. 
Just think of the role that user

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interfaces and software actually
play. 

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For example, if you want to 
check all of your stocks on your

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watch list and see how they're 
trading today, you want to open 

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up an empty chat and have to 
type in, hey, can you get me all

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of the stocks in My Portfolio 
and what they're trading today, 

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enter and then have it surface 
that information seems like a 

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bit of a hassle. 
Wouldn't it be a little easier 

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to just open up an app and 
already have all of your watch 

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list organized in the way that 
you want, presenting the 

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information in the way that 
you've already organized it, 

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remembering what you've done 
previously? 

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Are we really going to replace 
every user interface that 

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already has information 
standardized and organized and 

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the way that we want to see it 
for an empty text chat that will

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have to prompt it every time we 
want to do something? 

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Many of the arguments that these
software bearers are making make

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sense. 
On the surface they sound kind 

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of cool till you really think 
about it. 

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Once you realize what you 
actually want to accomplish and 

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the fastest way to do that. 
Software is needed, user 

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interfaces are needed, and 
open-ended text chats aren't 

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without their downsides. 
One of the arguments that's 

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being made right now is also 
that software companies with all

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the business logic that they do,
all the things that they 

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systematically figure out, well 
that's basically worthless 

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because AI can simply do that in
a markdown file. 

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There is zero chance that a 
complex web of markdown file is 

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going to replace business logic 
entirely. 

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The reason is quite simple. 
You do not want to introduce a 

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00:10:47,440 --> 00:10:51,280
layer of unpredictability and 
degrees of freedom of your core 

229
00:10:51,280 --> 00:10:53,840
business logic. 
This is the stuff of nightmares 

230
00:10:53,840 --> 00:10:56,920
even for simple levels. 
When you introduce complexity 

231
00:10:56,920 --> 00:11:00,160
and interdependency, it is a 
straight line to system failure 

232
00:11:00,160 --> 00:11:02,960
in bankruptcy. 
This is of course 100% correct. 

233
00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:06,040
Imagine for example that you 
don't have any set business 

234
00:11:06,040 --> 00:11:07,600
logic and you're not using 
software. 

235
00:11:07,880 --> 00:11:10,320
Instead you have AI bill all of 
your customers. 

236
00:11:10,960 --> 00:11:13,600
Well the AI hallucinates and 
gets 1 calculation wrong. 

237
00:11:13,680 --> 00:11:16,480
All of a sudden you build your 
customers all the wrong amount 

238
00:11:16,600 --> 00:11:18,120
and now you have to make up for 
it. 

239
00:11:18,160 --> 00:11:20,360
Any type of mistake with core 
business logic would have 

240
00:11:20,360 --> 00:11:22,840
critical failures. 
And we've seen what AI does. 

241
00:11:22,840 --> 00:11:25,440
In many cases it changes its 
mind with the same prompt given 

242
00:11:25,440 --> 00:11:27,760
two times. 
In many cases it can't read 

243
00:11:27,760 --> 00:11:30,720
simple instructions. 
Nailing it down to do the same 

244
00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:32,840
thing routinely is incredibly 
difficult. 

245
00:11:33,120 --> 00:11:36,440
After all, every time the AI 
does something, it re analyzes 

246
00:11:36,440 --> 00:11:37,960
it and does it in a different 
way. 

247
00:11:38,200 --> 00:11:40,880
That's why if you ask it to 
generate an image, then you ask 

248
00:11:40,880 --> 00:11:43,840
it to generate the same image 
again, it will look different 

249
00:11:43,880 --> 00:11:47,000
every single time. 
Trying to replace core business 

250
00:11:47,000 --> 00:11:50,320
logic of a company that's ran by
years of tested software is not 

251
00:11:50,320 --> 00:11:52,720
going to be replaced by AI. 
These arguments have become very

252
00:11:52,720 --> 00:11:55,400
pervasive, and they spread 
throughout X and Reddit and 

253
00:11:55,400 --> 00:11:57,440
other investment circles, all 
throughout Discords. 

254
00:11:57,960 --> 00:12:00,440
When you really look through a 
business and what it needs to 

255
00:12:00,440 --> 00:12:04,040
run, these companies are not 
going to trust AI to run core 

256
00:12:04,040 --> 00:12:06,120
business logic. 
They're not going to replace all

257
00:12:06,120 --> 00:12:08,040
user interfaces with text 
prompts. 

258
00:12:08,120 --> 00:12:11,000
Most of the core arguments 
behind the death of software are

259
00:12:11,000 --> 00:12:13,040
unfounded. 
They're not practical in real 

260
00:12:13,040 --> 00:12:15,120
conditions. 
So as I look at this, I try to 

261
00:12:15,120 --> 00:12:18,280
make sense of what's true and 
what's not true with the AI 

262
00:12:18,280 --> 00:12:20,560
concern. 
And from what I can tell, many 

263
00:12:20,560 --> 00:12:22,800
of these companies are being way
oversold. 

264
00:12:22,880 --> 00:12:25,200
The fares are frankly just 
incredible. 

265
00:12:25,200 --> 00:12:28,080
At this point, investors don't 
want any software company for 

266
00:12:28,120 --> 00:12:31,480
any reason, no matter how 
resistant they are to AI. 

267
00:12:31,760 --> 00:12:34,080
In some cases, these companies 
are going to be beneficiaries 

268
00:12:34,080 --> 00:12:36,120
from AI. 
I'll just highlight a couple 

269
00:12:36,120 --> 00:12:38,640
examples here. 
Again, we're looking at S&P 

270
00:12:38,640 --> 00:12:41,480
Global, which has been crushed 
over just the past couple of 

271
00:12:41,480 --> 00:12:43,360
months. 
We look at it and it's trading 

272
00:12:43,360 --> 00:12:47,080
at a 21 Ford PE ratio. 
Why is the market so concerned 

273
00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:49,240
about S&P Global's market Intel 
business? 

274
00:12:49,600 --> 00:12:52,960
Well, because they sell a lot of
data, and apparently AI is going

275
00:12:52,960 --> 00:12:55,800
to make all that data freely 
available and easy to consume 

276
00:12:55,800 --> 00:12:58,280
for everyone, which of course is
not the case. 

277
00:12:58,320 --> 00:13:00,360
A lot of their data's 
proprietary to begin with. 

278
00:13:00,680 --> 00:13:03,800
AI doesn't have access to it. 
And the breadth of data that S&P

279
00:13:03,800 --> 00:13:06,800
Global has with private markets 
and commodities, physical 

280
00:13:06,800 --> 00:13:10,120
assets, things that are hard to 
collect and organize, is going 

281
00:13:10,120 --> 00:13:11,960
to give them immense pricing 
power. 

282
00:13:12,280 --> 00:13:15,720
That segment continues to grow 
even though the stock is getting

283
00:13:15,720 --> 00:13:17,880
crushed specifically because of 
that segment. 

284
00:13:17,880 --> 00:13:20,760
But even if you were to assume 
that S&P Global's market Intel 

285
00:13:20,760 --> 00:13:25,480
business went to 0, it was 
literally 100% disrupted. 

286
00:13:25,480 --> 00:13:28,760
S&P Global would trade at a 27 
Ford PE. 

287
00:13:28,840 --> 00:13:31,040
It's still a company that would 
be reasonably priced. 

288
00:13:31,040 --> 00:13:33,440
In fact, it would be cheaper 
than its long term average. 

289
00:13:33,600 --> 00:13:36,360
That's much bearish sentiments 
being priced in today for 

290
00:13:36,360 --> 00:13:38,440
companies like this. 
We look at other companies that 

291
00:13:38,440 --> 00:13:42,080
are trading down today, ones 
like Big Tech, the Mag 7. 

292
00:13:42,480 --> 00:13:45,200
The Mag 7 has traded down 
dramatically over just the past 

293
00:13:45,200 --> 00:13:47,240
couple of months with many of 
the same fares. 

294
00:13:47,680 --> 00:13:49,800
In this case, it's not that 
they're going to be disrupted by

295
00:13:49,920 --> 00:13:52,760
AI to some extent, that's the 
concern, but it's also that 

296
00:13:52,760 --> 00:13:54,400
they're spending a lot of money 
on CapEx. 

297
00:13:54,760 --> 00:13:57,320
The market's finding a reason to
sell out of all of these growth 

298
00:13:57,320 --> 00:14:00,400
companies, whether it be 
software or the Max 7. 

299
00:14:00,920 --> 00:14:03,360
When we look at the Max seven 
overall, here's how the 

300
00:14:03,360 --> 00:14:05,880
valuations breakdown. 
First of all, if we look at them

301
00:14:05,880 --> 00:14:09,320
all together, all combined, and 
we average out the PE ratio, 

302
00:14:09,680 --> 00:14:13,720
they're trading at an 80 
trailing PE and a Ford PE ratio 

303
00:14:13,720 --> 00:14:16,680
of 52. 
That seems a little expensive. 

304
00:14:16,840 --> 00:14:18,920
A Ford PE of 52 is kind of 
pricey. 

305
00:14:19,240 --> 00:14:22,080
But there's one big outlier in 
the mag seven. 

306
00:14:22,360 --> 00:14:25,880
That is Tesla. 
Tesla's trading at above a 200 

307
00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:28,440
PE. 
If we remove Tesla from the 

308
00:14:28,440 --> 00:14:32,760
calculation, the Ford PE ratio 
goes from 50 to 27. 

309
00:14:33,160 --> 00:14:36,040
So it's dramatically reduced 
just by removing that one 

310
00:14:36,040 --> 00:14:37,720
company. 
The valuations look a lot more 

311
00:14:37,720 --> 00:14:40,760
sensible then we look at 
removing other companies. 

312
00:14:40,760 --> 00:14:44,840
For example, if we remove Apple,
NVIDIA and Tesla and we just 

313
00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:48,760
have the big four tech companies
left, the PE ratios look even 

314
00:14:48,760 --> 00:14:50,600
better. 
In fact, when we look at this 

315
00:14:50,600 --> 00:14:52,080
over time, this is what it looks
like. 

316
00:14:52,360 --> 00:14:54,960
We have the PE ratios of these 
four companies, Amazon, 

317
00:14:54,960 --> 00:14:57,200
Microsoft, Google and Meta over 
time. 

318
00:14:57,760 --> 00:15:00,160
And this is also a little bit 
misleading because we have 

319
00:15:00,160 --> 00:15:03,600
trailing PE ratios and for 
example Meta is actually more 

320
00:15:03,600 --> 00:15:06,320
expensive on a trailing PE 
because of a one time tax hit. 

321
00:15:06,560 --> 00:15:09,440
It would look even cheaper today
and it's at the lowest point in 

322
00:15:09,440 --> 00:15:12,640
a multi year timeline. 
We look at the big four growth 

323
00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:16,040
by comparison, even though the 
PE ratio of these companies is 

324
00:15:16,040 --> 00:15:18,840
declining dramatically. 
We have earnings per share 

325
00:15:18,840 --> 00:15:20,560
growth that's also growing 
dramatically. 

326
00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:24,600
And again, this chart also isn't
even as high as it would 

327
00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:27,720
normally be because of the major
tax hit that Meta recently had. 

328
00:15:27,960 --> 00:15:29,640
We also had Microsoft with a tax
hit. 

329
00:15:29,720 --> 00:15:31,720
We can even look at these 
companies on an operating cash 

330
00:15:31,720 --> 00:15:34,640
flow basis. 
They are racing up to all time 

331
00:15:34,640 --> 00:15:36,520
high. 
The core business, if you 

332
00:15:36,520 --> 00:15:39,640
measure it on an organic basis, 
meaning how much cash they're 

333
00:15:39,640 --> 00:15:43,280
generating without the 
reinvested CapEx, it is growing 

334
00:15:43,280 --> 00:15:44,920
substantially. 
Every single one of them. 

335
00:15:45,000 --> 00:15:47,640
Google's the only company that's
trading at a reasonably high 

336
00:15:47,640 --> 00:15:51,640
valuation as a big tech company.
If we were to remove Google from

337
00:15:51,640 --> 00:15:55,600
the equation, meaning we only 
have Meta, Amazon and Microsoft,

338
00:15:55,600 --> 00:16:00,560
those three companies, the 
forward PE ratio is a 24 for 

339
00:16:00,560 --> 00:16:04,160
those three of the MAG 7, 24 
Ford PE. 

340
00:16:04,640 --> 00:16:08,120
To put that in comparison, when 
we look at the S&P 500 right 

341
00:16:08,120 --> 00:16:13,440
now, the S&P 500 is trading at 
an estimated 22 Ford PE. 

342
00:16:13,440 --> 00:16:17,760
So you're paying almost the same
price for Amazon, Microsoft and 

343
00:16:17,760 --> 00:16:20,720
Meta that you are for the entire
S&P 500. 

344
00:16:20,880 --> 00:16:23,440
Are these companies average 
companies that should trade 

345
00:16:23,440 --> 00:16:25,600
within the average of the S&P 
500? 

346
00:16:25,960 --> 00:16:27,960
Should they be priced with the 
same level of growth 

347
00:16:27,960 --> 00:16:29,480
expectations? 
And Mote? 

348
00:16:30,080 --> 00:16:31,800
Well, I don't think so. 
I think these companies are 

349
00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:33,840
substantially better than the 
S&P 500. 

350
00:16:34,240 --> 00:16:37,040
The historical analysis proves 
that they're growing earnings 

351
00:16:37,040 --> 00:16:38,920
much faster. 
These are the companies that are

352
00:16:38,920 --> 00:16:41,640
pushing the indices higher. 
They're growing their cash flows

353
00:16:41,640 --> 00:16:43,480
much faster. 
These companies are generating 

354
00:16:43,480 --> 00:16:47,000
record net income, record 
earnings and record cash flows. 

355
00:16:47,080 --> 00:16:50,040
So I understand if you're afraid
of software companies, if you're

356
00:16:50,040 --> 00:16:52,120
afraid of big tech and their 
CapEx investment. 

357
00:16:52,440 --> 00:16:55,440
But just keep in mind that every
time there's a rotation, there's

358
00:16:55,440 --> 00:16:57,080
a sell off. 
There's a big narrative out 

359
00:16:57,080 --> 00:17:00,480
there that tells you, you need 
to avoid these companies even 

360
00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:04,319
when they're at 52 week lows, 
when they're at multi year low 

361
00:17:04,319 --> 00:17:07,040
valuations, when they're 
fundamentals still look very 

362
00:17:07,040 --> 00:17:10,040
sound in most cases. 
Those are buying opportunities 

363
00:17:10,079 --> 00:17:12,720
and I believe for many of the 
companies today, they have once 

364
00:17:12,720 --> 00:17:14,680
again become buying 
opportunities. 

365
00:17:14,680 --> 00:17:16,200
Now let's go ahead and move on 
to some news. 

366
00:17:16,319 --> 00:17:17,200
Now. 
The first piece of news that 

367
00:17:17,200 --> 00:17:20,160
we'll discuss today is Chris 
Holmes 13 F filing. 

368
00:17:20,599 --> 00:17:23,560
Many of these super investor 13F
filings are being reported. 

369
00:17:23,560 --> 00:17:25,920
They're coming in every single 
day and we finally got Chris 

370
00:17:25,920 --> 00:17:28,079
Holmes. 
Now when we look at the the 

371
00:17:28,079 --> 00:17:30,640
changes that Chris Hohn did, 
let's go ahead and just look at 

372
00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:32,800
the activity here and we can 
discuss them. 

373
00:17:33,280 --> 00:17:37,680
We have right here the the buys 
and sells what he did and this 

374
00:17:37,680 --> 00:17:43,520
is as of Q4 of 2025 S the most 
recent that we know this data is

375
00:17:43,520 --> 00:17:47,400
as of December of 2025. 
During that time period, he 

376
00:17:47,400 --> 00:17:52,080
added to Microsoft, he added to 
S&P Global, he trimmed Visa, he 

377
00:17:52,080 --> 00:17:55,160
trimmed Canadian Pacific, and he
trimmed Canadian National 

378
00:17:55,160 --> 00:17:57,400
Railway. 
Now all of these are relatively 

379
00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:00,440
small changes, but I think that 
there's a couple things that are

380
00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:03,520
notable here. 
Chris Hoehn determined that it 

381
00:18:03,520 --> 00:18:09,240
was worth adding to S&P Global 
and Microsoft as of Q42025. 

382
00:18:09,240 --> 00:18:11,640
Now, if we look at the price of 
these companies that he was 

383
00:18:11,640 --> 00:18:15,320
adding to again Q4 of 2025, we 
can look at them right here. 

384
00:18:15,800 --> 00:18:18,960
We have the prices all across 
this quarter from beginning to 

385
00:18:18,960 --> 00:18:22,800
end for both S&P Global and 
Microsoft, meaning that he was 

386
00:18:22,800 --> 00:18:28,040
buying Microsoft and buying S&P 
Global at prices around $480 to 

387
00:18:28,040 --> 00:18:31,560
540. 
S&P Global was right around that

388
00:18:31,560 --> 00:18:33,560
same price and he was adding to 
both of them. 

389
00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:36,960
Where do they trade today? 
S&P Global's fallen around $80 

390
00:18:36,960 --> 00:18:39,520
since Chris Holm's last buy of 
the company, so it is 

391
00:18:39,520 --> 00:18:41,920
substantially cheaper. 
Microsoft today is trading at a 

392
00:18:41,920 --> 00:18:46,360
price below $400.00 per share, 
so the stock is a full $100 

393
00:18:46,360 --> 00:18:47,840
cheaper than his last purchase 
of it. 

394
00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:50,560
What this tells me is that Chris
Holm believed these companies 

395
00:18:50,560 --> 00:18:54,920
were undervalued last quarter at
80 or $100 more expensive than 

396
00:18:54,920 --> 00:18:57,120
they are today. 
And unless something has 

397
00:18:57,120 --> 00:18:59,800
fundamentally changed, unless 
he's changed his mind after 

398
00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:02,960
reading the things online and 
seeing some of the data, he 

399
00:19:02,960 --> 00:19:05,320
probably thinks that they're 
substantially undervalued today.

400
00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:09,800
My guess is when we see the 
reports for Q1 of 2026, we're 

401
00:19:09,800 --> 00:19:12,240
going to have seen a lot of 
super investors pie this dip. 

402
00:19:12,560 --> 00:19:14,040
I think there's going to be a 
lot of them that buy it 

403
00:19:14,040 --> 00:19:16,520
aggressively. 
Now moving on, we get to news 

404
00:19:16,520 --> 00:19:20,720
that Netflix has worked with 
Warner Bros to allow seven days 

405
00:19:20,840 --> 00:19:23,600
of Warner Bros to consider 
Paramount's offer. 

406
00:19:23,880 --> 00:19:25,920
Sounds a little bit complicated,
but let's go ahead and just read

407
00:19:25,920 --> 00:19:28,240
what's going on here. 
Netflix has said in a statement 

408
00:19:28,240 --> 00:19:30,800
that it believes that software 
remains superior, but has 

409
00:19:30,800 --> 00:19:34,280
granted Warner the seven day 
waiver of certain obligations of

410
00:19:34,280 --> 00:19:37,640
their merger agreement to engage
with Paramount to fully and 

411
00:19:37,640 --> 00:19:41,080
finally resolve this matter. 
So Netflix doesn't need to do 

412
00:19:41,080 --> 00:19:42,680
this. 
They have in their agreement 

413
00:19:42,720 --> 00:19:45,640
that Warner Bros can't shop 
alternative agreements. 

414
00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:48,040
Like they basically are tied 
into Netflix. 

415
00:19:48,400 --> 00:19:51,600
But then it says here that 
Netflix wavered their agreement.

416
00:19:51,600 --> 00:19:53,960
They said, hey, you know what, 
go ahead and just listen to 

417
00:19:53,960 --> 00:19:57,160
Paramount go get their final and
best offer, even though it's in 

418
00:19:57,160 --> 00:19:59,880
our contract to not allow that, 
we're going to make a special 

419
00:19:59,880 --> 00:20:02,120
exemption. 
So you have 7 days to talk to 

420
00:20:02,120 --> 00:20:04,280
Paramount and get their best 
offer. 

421
00:20:04,840 --> 00:20:06,840
Now, it's interesting why 
Netflix is doing this. 

422
00:20:06,840 --> 00:20:09,200
When I've looked at this news, 
I've tried to analyze it, but 

423
00:20:09,520 --> 00:20:12,600
from what I can tell, my best 
guess is that Netflix is 

424
00:20:12,600 --> 00:20:14,120
basically just calling their 
bluff. 

425
00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:18,120
They're telling Paramount to put
up or shut up, to do something, 

426
00:20:18,520 --> 00:20:21,640
to just give your best offer and
then leave us alone. 

427
00:20:21,760 --> 00:20:25,080
If Paramount puts up a low 
offer, if they don't put up 

428
00:20:25,080 --> 00:20:28,760
something attractive after this 
seven days, then Netflix can 

429
00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:31,720
finally argue that it's done, 
that it's over with. 

430
00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:34,640
They don't have to deal with 
activist investors and with 

431
00:20:34,880 --> 00:20:38,520
Paramount constantly nipping at 
their heels, wanting to to be 

432
00:20:38,520 --> 00:20:41,880
part of this deal. 
If they have one week to finally

433
00:20:41,880 --> 00:20:45,760
conclude this, maybe the drama 
can be put aside and Netflix 

434
00:20:45,760 --> 00:20:47,760
always has the option to counter
an offer. 

435
00:20:47,760 --> 00:20:50,680
They have the first call on it. 
If Paramount puts up a billion 

436
00:20:50,680 --> 00:20:54,280
dollars more or $5 billion more,
Netflix can decide if that's 

437
00:20:54,280 --> 00:20:56,600
still worth it. 
They can model it out and they 

438
00:20:56,600 --> 00:20:59,640
can see if it makes sense. 
Netflix is going to pay more 

439
00:20:59,640 --> 00:21:01,840
than what they believe is worth 
it for their shareholders. 

440
00:21:02,080 --> 00:21:05,400
They're very long term focused. 
So I see this as a strategic 

441
00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:09,000
move from Netflix telling Warner
Bros that they have time to act,

442
00:21:09,440 --> 00:21:12,360
exposing their weaknesses, 
putting it back on them. 

443
00:21:12,360 --> 00:21:15,440
The ball's now in their court 
and finally seeing what they do.

444
00:21:15,480 --> 00:21:18,320
If they are going to provide a 
higher offer, we'll find out 

445
00:21:18,320 --> 00:21:21,200
within one week and moving on, 
we have some more Duolingo 

446
00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:23,120
drama. 
It's a stock that always has a 

447
00:21:23,120 --> 00:21:26,080
lot of opinions, but in this 
case, this is part of a viral 

448
00:21:26,080 --> 00:21:30,480
post on XI posted about the cell
rating that Goldman Sachs 

449
00:21:30,480 --> 00:21:33,640
recently gave Duolingo. 
They said that Duolingo was an 

450
00:21:33,800 --> 00:21:39,280
AI loser, rated it as a cell. 
And I noted in my ex post that 

451
00:21:39,440 --> 00:21:41,040
Goldman Sachs has done this 
before. 

452
00:21:41,200 --> 00:21:43,560
They've also done this in the 
past where they wait for a stock

453
00:21:43,560 --> 00:21:47,000
to drop a huge amount like 70 
plus percent and once it's at a 

454
00:21:47,000 --> 00:21:49,280
very low price they give it a 
sell rating. 

455
00:21:49,680 --> 00:21:51,560
They did the same thing with 
Netflix. 

456
00:21:51,720 --> 00:21:56,160
Goldman Sachs gave a sell rating
on Netflix June 10/20/22. 

457
00:21:56,160 --> 00:21:59,240
And if we look at the math of 
the performance of Netflix 

458
00:21:59,240 --> 00:22:05,200
versus the QQQ or the S&P 500, 
it is up 320% since then. 

459
00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:08,520
So Netflix's performance since 
Goldman Sachs gave it that sell 

460
00:22:08,520 --> 00:22:11,440
rating is now about triple the 
QQQ. 

461
00:22:11,480 --> 00:22:14,160
Another fun fact worth 
mentioning is that Goldman Sachs

462
00:22:14,160 --> 00:22:17,440
sell rating on Netflix almost 
exactly time the bottom. 

463
00:22:17,880 --> 00:22:20,600
They gave the down rating and it
occurred when the stock was only

464
00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:25,640
5 to 10% away from the absolute 
bottom of the 2022 sell off. 

465
00:22:25,680 --> 00:22:28,400
Now I put this on X and a lot of
people had a lot of feedback and

466
00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:31,920
opinions on it and one of them 
was Jeremy Lafave from Financial

467
00:22:31,920 --> 00:22:34,600
Education. 
He responded to this tweet and 

468
00:22:34,640 --> 00:22:36,840
reacted to it in one of his 
recent videos. 

469
00:22:37,360 --> 00:22:40,160
I just want to play the video so
we can go through it and kind of

470
00:22:40,160 --> 00:22:41,640
discuss his comments here 
together. 

471
00:22:41,800 --> 00:22:46,320
This one Joseph Carlson posted 
this said Goldman just said that

472
00:22:46,320 --> 00:22:50,200
Duolingo little Dingo is an AI 
loser and said it's a cell. 

473
00:22:50,240 --> 00:22:52,680
Here's a performance from when 
they called Netflix a cell right

474
00:22:52,960 --> 00:22:53,800
now. 
I thought this was worth 

475
00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:57,680
mentioning here. 
And the reason being is just 

476
00:22:57,680 --> 00:23:01,640
because 1 stock has done well in
the past and somebody said it 

477
00:23:01,640 --> 00:23:03,800
was a sell, doesn't mean the 
next stock's going to do that, 

478
00:23:03,840 --> 00:23:07,160
right? 
And so let's be honest, there's 

479
00:23:07,160 --> 00:23:09,600
a big difference between 
somebody like a Duolingo and 

480
00:23:09,600 --> 00:23:13,120
somebody like a Netflix, right? 
A Duolingo is like a niche 

481
00:23:13,120 --> 00:23:19,000
product that, you know, how many
people are really going to stay 

482
00:23:19,000 --> 00:23:22,400
signed up for Duolingo for the 
next 5-10, fifteen, 20 years? 

483
00:23:22,480 --> 00:23:26,040
I don't think there's very many,
you know, I, I, and I don't 

484
00:23:26,040 --> 00:23:28,240
think that's AI, don't think 
that's a big statement. 

485
00:23:29,000 --> 00:23:30,760
Like, sure, there's a lot of 
people that might try out a 

486
00:23:30,760 --> 00:23:32,920
product like that and like, oh, 
I think it would be fun to learn

487
00:23:32,920 --> 00:23:34,400
Italian. 
Oh, I think it would be fun to 

488
00:23:34,400 --> 00:23:36,520
learn Spanish or, you know, 
whatever, right? 

489
00:23:36,920 --> 00:23:39,480
I'm gonna learn French. 
OK, You know, and they sign up 

490
00:23:39,480 --> 00:23:41,440
for a bit and they kind of mess 
around with it and they pay a 

491
00:23:41,440 --> 00:23:43,600
little bit or maybe they don't 
pay and they just see ads or 

492
00:23:43,600 --> 00:23:46,560
whatever, right. 
And then eventually they stop 

493
00:23:46,560 --> 00:23:48,520
using it. 
Netflix is not that sort of 

494
00:23:48,520 --> 00:23:50,160
company. 
There's a huge difference here. 

495
00:23:50,920 --> 00:23:54,160
Like Netflix, the type of 
company that when somebody signs

496
00:23:54,160 --> 00:23:56,480
up, like they're going to stay 
signed up five years out, 10 

497
00:23:56,480 --> 00:23:58,280
years out, 20 years from now, 
right? 

498
00:23:59,120 --> 00:24:02,000
Unless somebody comes and 
replicates Netflix whole 

499
00:24:02,000 --> 00:24:03,720
business model, which isn't 
super realistic. 

500
00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:05,440
Duolingo's not that sort of 
company. 

501
00:24:05,920 --> 00:24:08,400
People might sign up for the 
product and try it out and then 

502
00:24:08,400 --> 00:24:11,960
not use it anymore and they 
might start paying and then, you

503
00:24:11,960 --> 00:24:14,560
know, six months later they're 
going to stop paying, or a year 

504
00:24:14,560 --> 00:24:16,320
later or two years later or 
something like that, right? 

505
00:24:16,640 --> 00:24:19,160
Netflix, that's a hard one. 
Like once people sign up for 

506
00:24:19,160 --> 00:24:22,880
Netflix to get them off that 
Netflix account, it was 

507
00:24:22,880 --> 00:24:25,360
difficult. 
Like Netflix would have to go up

508
00:24:25,480 --> 00:24:28,360
dramatically in price. 
And so Netflix, when they 

509
00:24:28,360 --> 00:24:30,400
capture a customer, they 
probably have a customer for the

510
00:24:30,400 --> 00:24:32,360
next 20 years, next 10 years, 
right? 

511
00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:34,200
Duolingo's not that same 
company. 

512
00:24:34,560 --> 00:24:38,800
So I think that's very, very 
important to keep in mind here. 

513
00:24:39,040 --> 00:24:41,440
But I think it's natural 
sometimes for investors to say, 

514
00:24:41,440 --> 00:24:44,640
well, this analyst or this 
company, they said this was a a 

515
00:24:44,640 --> 00:24:46,520
cell in the past and look at it 
did so well. 

516
00:24:46,520 --> 00:24:48,480
So this kind of the company and 
and things like that. 

517
00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:53,520
But you know, I just see massive
fundamental differences between 

518
00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:56,280
a certain company like that and 
somebody like a Netflix, right? 

519
00:24:56,640 --> 00:24:59,480
So that's his comments on 
Duolingo and I actually really 

520
00:24:59,480 --> 00:25:03,240
like them because I I think it 
represents the other side. 

521
00:25:03,360 --> 00:25:05,640
Every stock there's, there's two
trains of thoughts. 

522
00:25:05,720 --> 00:25:08,200
There's two different stories 
behind it, narratives behind it,

523
00:25:08,760 --> 00:25:11,600
and I think that Jeremy really 
does represent the bearish 

524
00:25:11,600 --> 00:25:13,080
narrative on Duolingo really 
well. 

525
00:25:13,120 --> 00:25:16,560
The first argument that he says 
is that Netflix is not like 

526
00:25:16,560 --> 00:25:19,680
Duolingo. 
And he refers to Netflix as a 

527
00:25:19,680 --> 00:25:22,720
product that everybody wants. 
They want to be entertained. 

528
00:25:23,280 --> 00:25:25,560
You know, when you sign up for 
Netflix, you never really cancel

529
00:25:25,560 --> 00:25:27,560
it. 
And Duolingo, by contrast, is a 

530
00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:29,800
niche product. 
You may sign up for it, try to 

531
00:25:29,800 --> 00:25:32,400
learn a language for a while, 
get bored of it and move on. 

532
00:25:32,760 --> 00:25:34,360
So that's the way that it's 
described. 

533
00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:38,960
But when we zoom back to 2022, 
when Goldman Sachs gave that 

534
00:25:38,960 --> 00:25:43,440
cell rating on Netflix, Netflix 
had just lost subscribers for 

535
00:25:43,440 --> 00:25:45,920
six months in a row. 
Netflix was shrinking. 

536
00:25:46,720 --> 00:25:49,120
So Netflix wasn't viewed as a 
product that people signed up 

537
00:25:49,120 --> 00:25:51,600
for and kept forever. 
It was viewed as a product that 

538
00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:54,360
was shrinking subscribers 
returning. 

539
00:25:54,440 --> 00:25:56,000
Netflix is a subscription 
business. 

540
00:25:56,000 --> 00:25:58,880
If they're not constantly 
gaining subscribers at a rate 

541
00:25:58,880 --> 00:26:01,200
exceeding their churn, then 
they're going to lose 

542
00:26:01,200 --> 00:26:02,640
subscribers. 
Their business is going to 

543
00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:04,840
shrink. 
That was the exact narrative 

544
00:26:04,840 --> 00:26:06,360
that was happening during that 
time period. 

545
00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:09,280
In fact, if you go back to 2022,
the narrative at that time was 

546
00:26:09,280 --> 00:26:12,520
that Netflix was basically dead.
They weren't one-of-a-kind. 

547
00:26:12,600 --> 00:26:13,960
They didn't have market 
dominance. 

548
00:26:14,440 --> 00:26:16,040
They're a company competing with
Paramount. 

549
00:26:16,040 --> 00:26:18,880
They're competing with Disney 
Plus and HBO and YouTube. 

550
00:26:19,080 --> 00:26:21,760
They're being crowded out by 
many of the free streamers, user

551
00:26:21,760 --> 00:26:24,600
generated content. 
Instagram and Netflix was just 

552
00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:28,080
this saturated streaming company
that couldn't compete and was 

553
00:26:28,080 --> 00:26:30,600
losing subscribers. 
Now it looks like a company 

554
00:26:30,600 --> 00:26:32,960
that's undefeatable. 
It looks a lot different. 

555
00:26:32,960 --> 00:26:35,840
It's more cash generative, but 
the exact same thought process 

556
00:26:35,840 --> 00:26:39,320
existed back then with Netflix. 
The difference is Duolingos 

557
00:26:39,320 --> 00:26:43,080
actually never lost subscribers.
Duolingo's never had six months 

558
00:26:43,080 --> 00:26:45,520
of shrinking. 
Duolingo's always grown. 

559
00:26:45,880 --> 00:26:48,120
The subscriber numbers are 
growing quarter over quarter 

560
00:26:48,120 --> 00:26:50,360
incredibly fast. 
Another thing that Jeremy says 

561
00:26:50,360 --> 00:26:52,840
here that I think is a common 
description of Duolingo is that 

562
00:26:52,840 --> 00:26:55,360
it's niche. 
It's a niche product. 

563
00:26:56,200 --> 00:26:59,960
Right now there are over 1.5 
billion people learning English,

564
00:27:00,320 --> 00:27:03,120
1 1/2 billion. 
That's not what I define as 

565
00:27:03,120 --> 00:27:05,800
niche. 
When a huge chunk of the world 

566
00:27:05,800 --> 00:27:09,480
is actively trying to learn a 
subject, and there's one company

567
00:27:09,480 --> 00:27:12,520
that offers a very good product 
at teaching that subject, 

568
00:27:12,840 --> 00:27:15,800
keeping people motivated, making
it fun to learn that subject, 

569
00:27:16,360 --> 00:27:18,200
that's not a niche product. 
That is something that's 

570
00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:20,000
appealing to a massive amount of
people. 

571
00:27:20,400 --> 00:27:22,440
There's huge network effects 
with English. 

572
00:27:23,080 --> 00:27:25,920
English is not something people 
learn just for vacation. 

573
00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:28,320
It's not something that they 
learn because they don't have 

574
00:27:28,320 --> 00:27:31,160
Airpods that can translate. 
English is the language of 

575
00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:34,840
business, of aviation, of 
mathematics, of coding. 

576
00:27:34,920 --> 00:27:37,880
It has massive network effects. 
For many people, learning a 

577
00:27:37,880 --> 00:27:39,920
language is not something 
they're just doing for fun. 

578
00:27:40,080 --> 00:27:42,560
It's not a flavor of the month. 
They have real motivations 

579
00:27:42,560 --> 00:27:45,280
behind doing it. 
Duolingo has capitalized on that

580
00:27:45,280 --> 00:27:46,840
market. 
And of course, that's not the 

581
00:27:46,840 --> 00:27:49,200
only language that they teach. 
They cover hundreds of different

582
00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:51,640
languages back and forth in 
different directions, better 

583
00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:54,880
than any other application. 
In the edtech language learning 

584
00:27:54,880 --> 00:27:56,520
category, they're by far the 
biggest. 

585
00:27:56,880 --> 00:28:00,120
They have a bigger market share 
than Netflix does of media or 

586
00:28:00,120 --> 00:28:01,720
YouTube does of content 
creation. 

587
00:28:02,320 --> 00:28:05,960
Duolingo is enormous in this 
category of learning languages 

588
00:28:05,960 --> 00:28:08,160
in different subjects. 
Another subject that they've 

589
00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:11,680
advanced into is chess. 
Chess has 600 million people 

590
00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:15,120
that are active players of this 
game. 600 million is not niche. 

591
00:28:15,120 --> 00:28:16,760
That's quite a big market to 
grow into. 

592
00:28:17,240 --> 00:28:20,160
Even if Duolingo captures a tiny
fraction of that market, they'll

593
00:28:20,160 --> 00:28:23,440
be substantially bigger. 
And of course, chess players are

594
00:28:23,440 --> 00:28:25,920
growing in numbers as well. 
The sport overall is growing. 

595
00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:28,880
Chess is one of those games 
where you don't really learn it 

596
00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:31,080
for a short amount of time. 
People play it their entire 

597
00:28:31,080 --> 00:28:32,480
lives. 
It's like a culture. 

598
00:28:32,720 --> 00:28:34,760
It's considered a a learning 
exercise. 

599
00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:37,520
There's so many people across 
the world that play that one 

600
00:28:37,520 --> 00:28:40,240
common game. 
Then Duolingos, also in math and

601
00:28:40,240 --> 00:28:42,160
music, which of course are not 
niche as well. 

602
00:28:42,360 --> 00:28:44,800
These are basic fundamentals 
that everybody on planet earth 

603
00:28:44,840 --> 00:28:47,760
needs to learn. 
Every kid in school is learning 

604
00:28:47,760 --> 00:28:50,200
these things. 
They're pivoting into categories

605
00:28:50,200 --> 00:28:53,120
that are the opposite of niche. 
They go into categories that 

606
00:28:53,120 --> 00:28:55,360
billions of people are actively 
trying to learn. 

607
00:28:55,400 --> 00:28:58,240
The thought process that 
Duolingo users just to use the 

608
00:28:58,240 --> 00:29:00,240
app for a couple months and then
they quit. 

609
00:29:00,800 --> 00:29:02,800
That can happen. 
And in fact, that's the story of

610
00:29:02,800 --> 00:29:05,320
many people when they share a 
bearish view on the company, 

611
00:29:05,720 --> 00:29:07,000
they'll say, well, I tried it 
out. 

612
00:29:07,000 --> 00:29:09,760
I tried to learn something for a
month or two, and then I just 

613
00:29:09,760 --> 00:29:11,320
broke my streak and never used 
it again. 

614
00:29:11,800 --> 00:29:13,200
That's not what the numbers 
show. 

615
00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:17,480
When we look at the numbers, 
Duolingo is a stock that is down

616
00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:20,040
80%. 
It is getting crushed. 

617
00:29:20,160 --> 00:29:22,920
While all the numbers, all the 
charts look like this. 

618
00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:25,480
This is what every single one of
them looks like. 

619
00:29:25,880 --> 00:29:28,760
The numbers are all going up and
to the right at a fast pace. 

620
00:29:29,160 --> 00:29:31,880
Millions upon millions of people
using it every single day. 

621
00:29:32,280 --> 00:29:36,760
Duolingo has over 50 million 
daily active users, people that 

622
00:29:36,760 --> 00:29:38,760
are logging on and using it at 
least once a day. 

623
00:29:39,200 --> 00:29:41,880
When we look at Duolingo and the
amount of people that are paying

624
00:29:41,880 --> 00:29:44,080
subscribers, that's what this 
chart is. 

625
00:29:44,640 --> 00:29:47,080
It continues to just climb up 
and to the right. 

626
00:29:47,400 --> 00:29:54,000
Since 2020, it's up 945% from 
1.1 million to now 11.5 million.

627
00:29:54,080 --> 00:29:58,400
At the end of 2023, Duolingo had
5 million people that were on a 

628
00:29:58,400 --> 00:30:01,400
year or longer streak. 
So 5 million people that I've 

629
00:30:01,400 --> 00:30:04,320
used the service every single 
day for over a year now, that 

630
00:30:04,320 --> 00:30:06,720
number is 10 million. 
The amount of users that are 

631
00:30:06,720 --> 00:30:09,720
dedicated users using the 
application every single day for

632
00:30:09,720 --> 00:30:13,000
over a year has literally 
doubled in just the past couple 

633
00:30:13,000 --> 00:30:14,720
of years. 
And we see this trend 

634
00:30:14,720 --> 00:30:16,200
continuing. 
And then finally, I'll just 

635
00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:19,080
mention one last thing. 
Jeremy mentioned that Goldman 

636
00:30:19,080 --> 00:30:22,280
Sachs, just because they said 
Netflix was a sell right at the 

637
00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:26,720
bottom 5% from the absolute 
bottom in 2022, they got that 

638
00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:29,160
call completely wrong. 
That doesn't mean they're wrong 

639
00:30:29,160 --> 00:30:30,680
with Duolingo. 
And that's true. 

640
00:30:30,800 --> 00:30:33,480
Maybe they're right with it. 
Maybe Duolingo will continue to 

641
00:30:33,480 --> 00:30:35,560
go down and be a bad investment.
That could be the case. 

642
00:30:36,200 --> 00:30:39,840
But I'll I'll mention that my my
point in bringing up Netflix is 

643
00:30:39,840 --> 00:30:43,640
not to say that Netflix is 
similar or the same as Duolingo.

644
00:30:44,160 --> 00:30:46,320
I'm not arguing that those 
businesses are fundamentally the

645
00:30:46,320 --> 00:30:47,680
same. 
They're very different, like 

646
00:30:47,680 --> 00:30:51,640
anybody can point out. 
But what is the same is Goldman 

647
00:30:51,640 --> 00:30:55,240
Sachs and many of these analyst 
firms have a long history of 

648
00:30:55,240 --> 00:30:57,520
giving sell calls right at the 
bottom. 

649
00:30:57,880 --> 00:31:00,080
They'll have buy calls when the 
stock is going up. 

650
00:31:00,560 --> 00:31:02,720
They'll hold it as a buy for 
years and years and years. 

651
00:31:02,880 --> 00:31:06,600
And then after stocks get 
crushed when they're down 70%, 

652
00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:09,960
then the professional analysts 
will say now it's a sell. 

653
00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:12,480
They'll give this sell call at 
the exact wrong time. 

654
00:31:12,480 --> 00:31:14,560
And they've done this 
continually within their sell 

655
00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:17,120
list, the companies that they're
calling software losers and that

656
00:31:17,120 --> 00:31:19,000
investors should get out of and 
sell today. 

657
00:31:19,280 --> 00:31:22,360
They also have Salesforce, one 
of your own holdings, Jeremy. 

658
00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:25,240
They call this one a sell. 
They're telling you to get out 

659
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:27,000
of it now. 
Now that Salesforce is 

660
00:31:27,000 --> 00:31:29,040
completely crushed. 
Now it's being priced for 

661
00:31:29,040 --> 00:31:31,920
complete doom. 
Goldman Sachs says it's a sell. 

662
00:31:32,000 --> 00:31:34,520
They also just recently called 
Adobe a sell. 

663
00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:36,160
They said that that one's not 
worth holding. 

664
00:31:36,160 --> 00:31:37,880
It's going to be disrupted by 
AI. 

665
00:31:38,400 --> 00:31:41,160
And this is, again, not 
something that's uncommon. 

666
00:31:41,320 --> 00:31:44,160
These companies and analysts 
wait until stocks drop 

667
00:31:44,160 --> 00:31:47,560
dramatically and then they tell 
investors at the very bottom to 

668
00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:50,440
get out exactly like they did 
with Netflix. 

669
00:31:50,840 --> 00:31:52,840
Now moving on, we get to the 
fail of the week, which we have 

670
00:31:52,840 --> 00:31:55,720
to highlight Chamath Polyhypatia
for a recent take that he 

671
00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:58,720
expressed on his podcast, the 
All In podcast. 

672
00:31:58,720 --> 00:32:02,200
Now, Chamath has had an 
obsession for some time with 

673
00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:05,040
comparing himself to Warren 
Buffett, but we'll look at the 

674
00:32:05,040 --> 00:32:08,360
most recent example here. 
Here is Chamath Polyhypatia 

675
00:32:08,360 --> 00:32:12,160
talking about fair disclosure 
laws and how Warren Buffett 

676
00:32:12,240 --> 00:32:15,320
presumably benefited from that, 
and that's how you explain his 

677
00:32:15,320 --> 00:32:19,240
out performance. 
In 2000, we introduced the law 

678
00:32:19,720 --> 00:32:22,360
called Reg FD. 
And what was the point of Reg 

679
00:32:22,360 --> 00:32:25,640
FD? 
It was basically that if you're 

680
00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:30,560
ACFO, you cannot talk to an 
individual stock manager and 

681
00:32:30,560 --> 00:32:33,160
tell him something that you then
don't tell everybody else 

682
00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:38,320
essentially inside information 
that used to be not illegal. 

683
00:32:38,320 --> 00:32:40,720
I won't say that it was legal. 
I would just say that used to be

684
00:32:40,720 --> 00:32:43,800
not illegal. 
You call your buddy, he says, 

685
00:32:43,800 --> 00:32:45,440
hey, how you doing? 
He goes, man, quarter was a 

686
00:32:45,440 --> 00:32:48,040
blockbuster. 
You would go and buy the stock 

687
00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:51,840
and starting in the 2000s, it 
became illegal. 

688
00:32:51,840 --> 00:32:53,920
And there used to be these 
networks of information 

689
00:32:53,920 --> 00:32:56,080
arbitrage that that took 
advantage of this. 

690
00:32:56,120 --> 00:32:59,640
Now this is an example of Warren
Buffett's returns pre and post 

691
00:32:59,640 --> 00:33:01,400
Reg FD. 
Now what do you see? 

692
00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:08,520
His returns were double the 
market returns when this kind of

693
00:33:08,520 --> 00:33:12,760
information sharing was legal. 
And the minute that he became 

694
00:33:12,840 --> 00:33:16,760
illegal and you had to basically
act on the same edge as 

695
00:33:16,760 --> 00:33:20,880
everybody else, his returns went
to the market return. 

696
00:33:21,440 --> 00:33:24,440
He generated 0A. 
In fact, he probably on the 

697
00:33:24,440 --> 00:33:27,400
margins lost a little bit. 
So this is the single best 

698
00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:29,760
investor in the world. 
This is what happens when you 

699
00:33:29,760 --> 00:33:32,840
have information symmetry. 
Now the problem with Chamas 

700
00:33:32,840 --> 00:33:35,560
theory here that Warren Buffett 
only outperformed because of 

701
00:33:35,600 --> 00:33:38,400
asymmetry and information is 
that as soon as you put that 

702
00:33:38,400 --> 00:33:40,320
under any type of scrutiny, it 
falls apart. 

703
00:33:40,640 --> 00:33:42,960
For example, we can just look at
the best investments that Warren

704
00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:45,800
Buffett has ever made, where he 
really made his money, the 

705
00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:48,280
overall best performing 
investments he's done throughout

706
00:33:48,280 --> 00:33:51,200
his career. 
By far the best investment 

707
00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:53,120
Warren Buffett has ever made was
Apple. 

708
00:33:53,640 --> 00:33:58,200
That came after these disclosure
laws that came presumably when 

709
00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:01,520
Warren Buffett didn't have an 
edge, but he bought Apple at the

710
00:34:01,520 --> 00:34:04,840
cheapest price you possibly 
could back in 2016. 

711
00:34:05,360 --> 00:34:07,160
Apple's outperformed everything 
since then. 

712
00:34:07,400 --> 00:34:09,239
It's outperformed all of big 
tech. 

713
00:34:09,239 --> 00:34:11,920
It's compounded faster than the 
market by multiples. 

714
00:34:12,159 --> 00:34:16,800
He turned $30 billion into $100 
billion in less than 7 years. 

715
00:34:16,840 --> 00:34:19,400
This was an incredible 
investment by Buffett, and this 

716
00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:21,679
came with the added limitations 
that he had to invest in 

717
00:34:21,679 --> 00:34:24,639
something that was massive, so 
his pool of investments was even

718
00:34:24,639 --> 00:34:26,840
smaller. 
The reason that Berkshire hasn't

719
00:34:26,840 --> 00:34:29,159
outperformed the market for the 
past 10 years is because 

720
00:34:29,159 --> 00:34:32,239
Berkshire is huge. 
So even when Warren Buffett is 

721
00:34:32,239 --> 00:34:35,679
doing the same playbook, buying 
companies like Apple at extreme 

722
00:34:35,679 --> 00:34:37,719
discounts with the same 
knowledge everybody else has 

723
00:34:37,719 --> 00:34:41,199
about the company, but a better 
aptitude for investing, a better

724
00:34:41,199 --> 00:34:44,560
long term understanding, even 
though he did that, improved it 

725
00:34:44,560 --> 00:34:47,840
once again with Apple, it just 
doesn't have the same impact. 

726
00:34:48,080 --> 00:34:51,159
Berkshire's already too big. 
He already owns so many energy 

727
00:34:51,159 --> 00:34:53,719
companies and railroad companies
and so many different companies 

728
00:34:54,040 --> 00:34:57,440
that the new investments and the
good ideas can't lift the weight

729
00:34:57,440 --> 00:35:00,160
of this massive company. 
The reason that he's not 

730
00:35:00,160 --> 00:35:03,160
outperforming today is because 
Berkshire is too huge. 

731
00:35:03,480 --> 00:35:06,240
It's a problem that Warren 
Buffett created by being too 

732
00:35:06,240 --> 00:35:08,960
good at investing. 
And that explains the difference

733
00:35:08,960 --> 00:35:12,640
in performance pre 2000. 
Then post 2000, almost every 

734
00:35:12,640 --> 00:35:15,320
investment that moved the needle
for Berkshire were ones that he 

735
00:35:15,320 --> 00:35:18,640
held for literal decades. 
Coca-Cola, Moody's Corporation, 

736
00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:21,760
American Express, Bank of 
America, large companies 

737
00:35:21,760 --> 00:35:25,000
publicly visible to any investor
that Warren Buffett bought at 

738
00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:29,480
discounts and held for decades. 
There's no inside information. 

739
00:35:29,480 --> 00:35:31,640
It wasn't because he knew 
something about the upcoming 

740
00:35:31,640 --> 00:35:33,920
quarter. 
It's because he bought companies

741
00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:36,040
at discounted prices and held 
them long term. 

742
00:35:36,280 --> 00:35:37,440
Now this is what I don't 
understand. 

743
00:35:37,440 --> 00:35:40,960
Chamoth, I don't get why you 
seem obsessed with discrediting 

744
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:43,200
Buffett. 
You're trying to do so here by 

745
00:35:43,200 --> 00:35:46,000
suggesting that the only reason 
that he was a good investor 

746
00:35:46,040 --> 00:35:49,400
above normal was because of 
information asymmetry, which 

747
00:35:49,400 --> 00:35:51,160
again, is ridiculous on the 
surface. 

748
00:35:51,160 --> 00:35:54,040
He held companies for decades. 
It's not from information 

749
00:35:54,040 --> 00:35:56,200
asymmetry. 
The other thing that you've done

750
00:35:56,200 --> 00:36:00,880
before is you've compared your 
returns, your firm to Buffett's.

751
00:36:01,280 --> 00:36:04,680
You compared them at a year one 
against year one, like you're 

752
00:36:04,680 --> 00:36:07,680
going to outperform Buffett. 
But once the SPAC bubble 

753
00:36:07,680 --> 00:36:10,880
collapsed in 2021, that 
comparison quickly vanished. 

754
00:36:11,360 --> 00:36:12,560
No more. 
You didn't want to show 

755
00:36:12,560 --> 00:36:15,400
investors how you compared 
against Buffett because he 

756
00:36:15,400 --> 00:36:18,160
outperformed you, because he's a
better investor. 

757
00:36:18,760 --> 00:36:20,840
And that's not an insult. 
He's a better investor than me 

758
00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:23,560
or anyone else here, but he's a 
better investor than you as 

759
00:36:23,560 --> 00:36:26,080
well. 
Your information that you shared

760
00:36:26,080 --> 00:36:29,800
with investors was that Virgin 
Galactic was a great investment.

761
00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:33,200
It's down 95%. 
You shared the Open Door was a 

762
00:36:33,200 --> 00:36:36,000
great investment. 
It's down 70% all time You 

763
00:36:36,000 --> 00:36:38,400
pumped Clover stock, another one
down 90%. 

764
00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:40,640
Then Achillea, another one 
that's down huge. 

765
00:36:41,080 --> 00:36:43,360
Pro Kidney, another one that's 
down 80%. 

766
00:36:43,360 --> 00:36:46,200
Sofi is one of your only SPACS 
that's in the green and it's 

767
00:36:46,200 --> 00:36:48,400
underperformed the market 
overall. 

768
00:36:48,400 --> 00:36:50,640
The information that you've 
provided investors, that you've 

769
00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:53,520
said that you have the inside 
tract that you understand is a 

770
00:36:53,520 --> 00:36:56,920
great company, they have been 
crushed over the past five 

771
00:36:56,920 --> 00:36:58,720
years. 
Investors have been continually 

772
00:36:58,720 --> 00:37:01,560
burned following your advice and
instead of just admitting that 

773
00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:04,520
Buffett is a better investor, an
honest investor, one that had a 

774
00:37:04,520 --> 00:37:08,200
very transparent and forthcoming
career, one that allowed other 

775
00:37:08,200 --> 00:37:10,800
retail investors to join 
alongside the success of 

776
00:37:10,800 --> 00:37:14,000
Berkshire, to reap in the same 
rewards as Buffett, to have the 

777
00:37:14,000 --> 00:37:17,200
exact same incentive. 
You try to incorrectly discredit

778
00:37:17,200 --> 00:37:19,880
him, play his success. 
And that is the reason that 

779
00:37:19,880 --> 00:37:22,080
today you are the fail of the 
week that's going to be for this

780
00:37:22,080 --> 00:37:23,800
episode. 
Hope you enjoyed seeing the next

781
00:37:23,800 --> 00:37:24,040
one.
