Welcome to Judaism Demystified, a podcast for the perplexed.
Join us as we explore some of the most fascinating Jewish and
Torah related topics with our esteemed guests.
By tackling some of the biggest questions you likely won't find
addressed elsewhere, we aim to shed light on important issues
and inspire or return to the fundamentals.
Enjoy the show. Thank you Rabbi Eisen for
rejoining the Judaism Demystified podcast.
We're so honored to have you back everything you do and we,
we really just like we're sorry that we're constantly badging
you to come on, but there's so many requests to have you on
again. So thank you so much.
Blessing for me. So I'm very grateful to you for
the invitation. Thank you for your hospitality.
So we have a series of questions and follow up questions, but I'm
gonna just start with the first one which is Maimonides.
Theological system in the Guide for the Perplexed relies on a
medieval geocentric cosmology where Providence, revelation,
and miracles are mediated through the heavenly spheres and
separate intellects. With modern science disproving
the geocentric model, a theological challenge arises.
A. Must the categories of
Providence, revelation, and miracles be abandoned because
the mechanism Maimonides positive no longer exists?
B. Alternatively, should a new
metaphysical system such as that of Kabbalah be adopted to
preserve these categories despite the serious theological
problems Kabbalah introduces, namely its depiction of divine
multiplicity and metaphysical complexity, in contrast to
Maimonides strict emphasis on divine unity and simplicity.
OK, so I think the first place we should begin is indeed, the
question pertains directly to Rambam.
While it's critical for us to appreciate we're not just going
to be talking about Rambam. But with respect to Rambam, is
it true that Rambam presents to us a system that weds physics
and metaphysics? Yes, it is.
Is it true that Rambam introduces arguments that
pertain to the cosmology that was accepted at the time in the
context of his sparring with Aristotle?
It definitely is. However, is it true therefore,
that the whole system goes out the window, lock, stock, and
barrel because we no longer subscribe to the cosmology?
Of course not. There's I grant there is a far
more subtle and sophisticated endeavor that is incumbent upon
us. I like to liken it to
microsurgery because we tease apart the components that are
based upon an obsolete physics and cosmology to which we
unequivocally do not subscribe. Broadly speaking, we can note in
much of Prakim, Gimel and Dalid, chapters 3 and 4 fall into that
category. But does that necessarily mean
that we jettisoned the metaphysics?
No. And the metaphysics, of course,
is primarily what Rama presents in Peric Bed chapter 2, which is
of course intended to address the fundamental theological
issues that need to be addressed.
And guide the perplexed. R.E.M. does so as well.
But ultimately, when we consider the implications with respect to
theology, the theology is not dependent upon the physics and
the cosmology and theology can certainly stand even if the
physics and cosmology are discarded.
And it's of course important for us to appreciate this is
something that pertains by no means to Rambam alone.
We certainly see it enunciated by the gamut of the Richonim, in
the sense of the need to define a theology that is sound and
categorically monotheistic, and simultaneously the extent to
which in varying degrees, and indeed among the recent
inventories, in varying degrees, in varying reasons, except to
which this is on some level wedded to an Aristotelian
natural philosophy. Natural philosophy is what has
morphed into science. What we mean by science at what
was intended by natural philosophy in the medieval
period are two very, very different Belton Schengen.
I think a good way of expressing the difference is This is, after
all, long before Galileo drummed into the scientific mind the
need for empiricism. But again, this is a That, of
course, is a far broader issue than what we're addressing right
now. It's critical for me to
emphasize this is something that is enunciated not only by
Rambam. Certainly we see this in Ravi
Dalevi and Sever Kuzari in varying degrees.
We see it in Bramban. We see another reshunting as
well. Ultimately, we see it in Kazal.
And it's important for us to appreciate this point because on
the one hand, if you're going to ask me, to what extent do we
derive A coherent theological system from Kazal?
My response inevitably is to invoke 3 words in one of the
most famous Hassagot critiques of Ravad with respect to what
Rambam states in Yohot Shuva in chapter 3, Halakhah 7.
The halakhah being where Rambam lists the various categories of
sectarians, those who are considered me name and thereby
forfeit their share in the world to come.
And the third list is the one who believes in supposedly one
God, but one God that is corporeal.
And Rambam consider such an individual a mean who has 400 in
the world to come. Ravad descents referring to
Dolin de Tobin Mimena, which we could either render as greater
and better than he, or greater and better than we.
But certainly presume we're talking about some very holy
people who embrace this view. The the critical problem in the
manner in which this comment of the Ravad is unfortunately
almost ubiquitously misquoted is is the Ravad coming to justify
that view categorically? Not because we when he goes on
to state is they came to this conclusion based on what they
saw in Scripture and even more So what they saw in Agadot.
Hamishab shot it at the OTT and those last three words are
critical Agadot that confuse corrupt the mind and we should
take Ravad's warning very much to heart.
Obviously, Rambam appreciates precisely the same point and has
designated a book to address the the Rashot of the Khabim and
explain how to understand them correctly in his missionary
commentary. Unfortunately, that book becomes
one of the most important books in all of history that was never
written. So we don't have Rambam's
guidance in telling us how to read Ghazal.
But the the essential principle Rambam explicitly enunciates
that is to read what Khazal telling us literally is a
pathway that leads to the utter diminution of Torah and of us by
completely misunderstanding what they're saying and what their
gender wasn't saying it. That is these Agathot that Ravad
rather ruthlessly describes as corrupting the mind.
We're clearly not intended to teach theology.
And if they were just there for corruption, then we would ask
why they're they're all together.
They're there to engender emotions, to enthuse us in our
divine service, but certainly not to learn theology from them.
And anyone who tends to learn theology from them is completely
misconstruing their agenda and coming to conclusions that will
be categorically heretical. It's important for us to
appreciate that, and that's why we have the guidance of the
racial name. And I can't emphasize this point
enough. That's why we have the guidance
of the visual name. The visual name were essentially
the first person, precisely because they were acting,
flourishing, writing in a period in which Greek philosophy was
already relatively accessible. In particular, of course, we're
Speaking of Rishanis Vavad, where Arabic was the lingua
franca and the works of the Greek philosophers had been
translated into Arabic roughly between the 8th and 10th
centuries. And as a result, they
appreciated the critical need to rigorously enunciate a theology
of Judaism to combat that threat.
To combat that threat, on the one hand, to not allow that
threat to undermine our belief in revelation, and
simultaneously, no less critically, to not allow the
retort to that threat to produce some monstrosity in lieu of
Torah that would indeed embrace views that are categorically
unacceptable because they are theologically unsound.
So again, do summarize the way we need to relate to Rambam, and
not just Rambam, but the gamut of the ritual name is, of
course, they express themselves in the terms of their time.
By the way, we do the same, just our time is different.
But we give them the tremendous credit that they deserve for
having mastered the science of their time, having mastered also
the philosophy that was the antagonist to their faith, in
order to be able to enunciate an understanding of toga that would
be timely in their time and cogent in responding to the
challenges of philosophy. And of course, we need to do the
same. And what we need to do is reach
your name. And of course, I, I, I reiterate
this point over and over again because it's something that my
life very much revolves around. We need to translate.
I don't mean linguistic translation, I mean conceptual
translation. Obviously they couched their
terms in terms that were relevant in their time.
We don't live in the same time. But there is no period with
which we bear a closer intellectual affinity than
Rishanis Farhad. Because our principal challenge
today is the challenge of a rationalist system that purports
to do away with the need for and even justification of belief in
revelation. And they did too.
Just the rationalist system in their time was near our
civilian. The rationalist system today is
what we could probably describe as scientism.
It's a different challenge and requires, of course, a different
enunciation of the principles of Torah.
But we ignore the guidance that we shown him at our peril.
Thank you SO. Much.
Thank you so much for the guidance.
Unfortunately, ignoring them in most quarters we do.
Thank you so much for that, for that explanation.
I wouldn't even call it for that.
Thank you so much for for bringing shedding light onto the
importance of understanding that the Shanim were were were
responding to their own to their to their own challenges of their
time, just like we respond and or should be responding to the
challenges of our time. I do want to.
Because it becomes a lot easier because we have their guidance
if we pay attention. OK.
And if we pay attention, we can model off of them into how we
would model into how we would respond to today's challenges.
That's fantastic. I do want to ask at the very
beginning, you, you mentioned that Rambam's theology does not
necessarily need the Aristotelian system in order to,
to, to, to, to, to stand. It doesn't need to stand on an
Aristotelian system. I just wanted to know if you can
demonstrate that a little. Let me.
Clarify that a bit further, because that's not precisely
what I said. What I said was it doesn't tinge
upon Aristotelian physics and cosmology.
There are definitely components of Aristotelian metaphysics that
realm in regards as sound. The question that we need to ask
ourselves, and again, this is precisely why I speak of
microsurgery, is to what extent does the metaphysics go out the
window together with the physics and cosmology.
So as a particularly significant case in point, we speak not only
from my mind and in perspective, but certainly from my mind and
in perspective of the active intellect.
I'm emphasizing this point because I think there's a point
of profound misunderstanding among many students around them
today. It is inevitably a challenge for
us to recast the concept of the active intellect in terms to
which we can relate to be perfectly rigorous.
In the Aristotelian cosmological system, there is an incorporeal
intellect associated with each of the cosmological spheres, and
there is to that extent a series of spheres, if we can consider
them concentrically moving in from the outermost
all-encompassing sphere. That is the sphere associated
with the second 'cause that is the first derivative cause, from
the first cause, which is the deity.
So that's the first level, if you will, of incorporeal
intellects that are derivative of the deity.
And that's the sort of all-encompassing sphere.
And the next concentric sphere is the sphere of the fixed
stars, then Saturn, then Jupiter, then Mars.
There's a little bit of a an ambiguity with respect to the
order of the next ones, but the dominant view is the next one is
the Sun and then Venus and then Mercury and then the Moon.
And then there is the sub lunary realm.
So if you've been keeping track of the numbers, here we are up
to the 10th derivative cause, which is the active intellect.
Now, if you ask me, is this part of Brahman system?
Just looking here like that, Rahman gives you a list of 10
levels of malachim that is precisely intended to be
correspondent to the system. If you ask me, do we subscribe
therefore to the concentrous spheres of Palmic cosmology?
Of course not. Does this metaphysical system
necessarily go out the window because Palmic cosmology goes
out the window? Of course not as well.
That is, the system ultimately is one that we can regard as
sound, irrespective of the extent to which the fusion, the
uneasy marriage to cosmology, has been sundered and utterly
annulled by the metaphysics, and still persist.
And what of course is critical for our purposes, talking about
the act of intellect, the 10th level of Malachim Ramam tells us
at the end of Halakhazain, again, chapter 2, Holocaust 7 is
Ishim, Ishim so-called, because that is the level that communes
with man. Now, we're not going to talk
about subliminary realm here. The way I'll describe it is that
there is the intellectual slash spiritual content of our
universe. That's the accidental.
Is that a concept that can be cogent without the physics and
cosmology unequivocally does rhyme subscribe to it and would
he subscribe to it today? I have no doubt with respect to
the affirmative answer to both of those questions.
And then it's important for us what we treat what it gives
roundabout now with respect to how we relate the active
intellect. This is a very complex question,
understanding that we show named.
Ultimately, the argument over the extent to which the active
intellect serves in a mediating role is the subject of one of
the most important foundational dissensions between Rambam and
Rambam, in particular revolving around the beginning of Parashat
Vaiera Ramban in his commentary at the beginning of Bereshit
chapter 18. This is a very long comment of
Ramban and it's important for us to appreciate the domains in
which he a sense with Rambam in the domain she differs.
On the one hand, the principle that if someone sees a Mohach, I
hesitate to use the translation Angel simply because we already
have in our mind's eye something of a an idea of what angels are
based upon the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.
No, they are not fat naked babies with wings, they're
incorporeal intellects. So, says Rambam, it's impossible
to see an Angel with physical eyes because they are in
corporeal beings, just as Rambam says.
And yet there's a critical aspect of divergent Rambam says
that anyone who is described as seeing a mouache is necessarily
in the state of Nevada prophecy. Ramban says there is a lower
level of vision that is adequate for being able to see a Mouache,
to commune with Mouache that is not identical with prophecy.
And if you ask me what this dissension revolves around,
there are other aspects of what they're discussing.
Rambam in Myrna Bakim in the second unit in chapters 41 and
42, and Rambam again in the beginning of Pasha Bahia in his
commentary on Bahishi chapter 18, verse one.
Again, there's a lot going on there.
What I'm going to note for our purposes is what they have in
common, and this is critical for us to appreciate this point.
They both agree that there it is a categorical divergent between
the level of Moshe's prophecy and the level of everyone else.
Moreover, we also both agree that prophecy is categorically
distinct from what we describe. One could say in the parlance of
if you will, Mismar Nun Aleph Psalm 51, but more critically in
the parlance of the Gemara as Guaqa Kodesh.
I'd rather leave that untranslated rather than say
Holy Spirit because again, we have associations with the
English translation that would definitely be distracting.
So they both agree that Raka Kodesh and Nivvoir are
categorically distinct, indeed both Rambam.
Rambam in the second unit of the Moab in chapter 45 where he
gives us a typology of levels of Nivvoir, and Rambam in this
comment utilize the example of Danielle as an exemplar of the
level of Raja Pradesh. Is the thing from devoir?
I'll note that Rabbi Hudalevi in Severa Kusari in the first Amar
in section 87 does the same. Is this something that is a
unanimous consensus among to be shown in?
NO, because there's still room to argue as to whether Raja
Kodesh and Devoir are separate categories in ghazal.
There's definitely room to argue about it simply because in the
overwhelming majority of instances, Khazal used these two
terms interchangeably. Tosetha Masekhat sota says we
should make nevim acronym so you see the same statement so
referring to the same thing. So what the Rafa Kodesh is thing
from the Bois is a Mahlocat vision him as a conspicuous case
in point, the military in his introduction to severity Lin
this in descents with regarding them as separate and distinct
levels. You know we tend to think of the
area as a Maimanadia and here he critically descents with Rambam.
The reason I'm stressing this point is Rocha Kodesh.
I think according to all those Vishonim who regarded as a
separate level from the Bois would cast Rocha Kodesh as a
level of, shall we say, hypersensitivity to the
spiritual intellectual content of our universe as opposed to a
message from God. Nivua is a message from God.
I mentioned Rabiudalevi, Rambam, and Rambam.
I've no doubt that all three would completely agree with that
statement. There's the additional dimension
besides the bifurcation between Nivua and Rafa Kodesh that we
need to ask with respect to the Nivua of Moshe.
Is that something that is categorically distinct from all
of them being? And again, I'm going to state,
according to Alderishuddin, unequivocally, how do I know?
Because it's an explicit Gamara, Because the Gamara in track to
give them up. Page 49 B tells us all the
prophets gaze through uncleared glass and Moshe glazed through
cleared glass. And then we need to quantify
what the nature of the distinction between these two
levels is. So Rambam is far more focused on
the critical importance of our appreciating that Nuvoir is not
actually bringing God into this world, but ultimately everyone
would agree with it. Ramban, as a case in point, is
far more concerned with emphasizing that not only Moshe
but also all other Naveen are getting a message from God.
So he diminishes the importance of speaking about what is
unequivocally the qualitative difference between the level of
nivua and the level of nivua of all the prophets.
But he certainly subscribes to subscribes to the premise that
such a qualitative distinction exists.
Just as unequivocally. Rambam also maintains that nivua
is, as opposed to rakat is getting a direct message from
God direct. Direct, not necessarily as in
God being revealed directly in this world, but it is the
content of the message is a message from God, even if it
operates via intermediaries such as the active intellect.
They're going to ask me, do we have to subscribe to the being
exactly 10 levels of malachim the way ramen presents it, Maybe
yes, maybe no. But the the idea of again, there
being such a thing as receiving a divine message, there being a
distinction between the level at which God communes with Moshe
and he communes with other Naveen, and there being a lower
level of revelation that is being resonant with the
spiritual content of our universe as opposed to getting
an actual divine message. All those distinctions, again,
we mentioned Rabi, UDA, Levi, Rambam and Ramban.
I'm happy to, with very great elaboration, prove that each one
of them subscribes to all the premises that I just enunciated.
But you you made a point to say not direct a few seconds ago,
right? Right.
And again, that that is all of them would also agree that the
level of revelation to all other prophets is qualitatively
distinct from the level of revelation to Moshe.
But they're still getting a message.
It's not simply Rafael Kodesh. Indeed, that's precisely the
point that all three in different ways stress that
Rafael Kodesh is this thing from the VOIS.
Well, I'll add additionally, this is a point that of the
three reviewed, Ali makes most explicit, although again, I'm
still going to argue that all three subscribe to it.
That what we mean when we talk about Rafael Kodesh is what the
Neo Aristotelians mean when they talk about prophecy.
If you want the excellent specimen of the idea of a
prophetic voice among the philosophers, candidly, I have a
very lengthy dissertation to present on the subject of the
prophetic voice to which Socrates refers twice in his
trial. But again, I think I would take
us too far afield. What I'm stressing is the Greek
philosophers had no idea of an affirmative message that comes
from God. Zachary speaks of a voice, he
calls it a voice, but a voice that dissuades him from doing
what he shouldn't be doing. You know, there's a
hypersensitivity to going out of bounds, but there's no
affirmative message. There was an affirmative
message. Everyone, everyone who's
faithful to Torah believes that unequivocally.
Rambam as well. Anyone who claims otherwise
isn't really Rambam. Yeah, unfortunately you, you may
have just alluded to this, but there are, you know, I, I
appreciate you, you mentioning the Rachel name because there's
a tendency to say that Rambam is like a you know, dat yahir He
he's a singular thinker. And you know, like as if to say
that he doesn't see eye to eye with a Rachel name and they
don't see eye to eye with him. And I think that's.
Copy, show name. It's important for us to
appreciate you. You don't believe Mahalkit.
That is, there are disagreements, but it's
important for us to appreciate the disagreements are far more
subtle then I I suspect is generally conceived.
If I may just interject the very recent citation, Ruff Cook
decried the superficiality of people who draw facile
distinctions and cubbyhole different rishonim in different
categories without appreciating the nuances that on the one hand
distinguish between them and of course on the other hand, in
large measure unite them. But of course you only get a
sense of that when you study them seriously.
What he was decrying was the fact that in Ishibot nowadays
almost no one does, and the ones who do study them seriously
don't have an agenda of abode audition.
Because as I think we've noted, in other contexts, The Academy
Is academic. Academic is an adjective that
has two meanings that might seem unrelated but are inexorably
conjoint pertaining to the Academy and divorced from the
realities of life. So the reason we never wrote
academic works? Their philosophy was all means
to avodah tashem, and they need to be studied that way.
And that applies absolutely to all the reasoning whom we've
cited. Absolutely.
So there's just one thing I want to get some clarity on because
the second part of the the first question, which was about
Rambam's strict emphasis on divine unity and simplicity.
The question is whether a system of Kabbalah could be useful,
because if you ask most, you know, experts in Kabala, they'll
say all this is metaphoric and so on.
So what would be the issue? What where is it?
Is there a distinction still? Well, I'll note with respect to
Kabbalah, I don't by any means pretend to be an expert on the
subject, but first and foremost, it's critical for us to
appreciate that Kabbalah is enunciated, formulated as means
to Avodah. Certainly taking it literally,
it can by no means be the basis of a system of theology, but
simultaneously, I'm not going to say that it is irreconcilable
with the system of theology. It's only when you take it
literally that it is that. So as a case in point, I'm going
to note in particular, and I believe I've cited him in
previous meetings of ours, one of the greatest Jewish
philosophers of all time, who no one recognizes was a Jewish
philosopher, Rabbi Mosa Isilish, the Rama in Sepia Tarata Allah,
which is one of those profound works of philosophy I've ever
read. And one of the agendas of the
Rama, they didn't call him the Rambam of Poland for nothing.
One of his agendas was not by any means, I'll even say that's
the Khalila to read Rambam, Rambam as if Rambam is in Kabal.
Rambam is not written in Kabal, but simultaneously on the
premise that Jewish philosophy is cogent and the Rama certainly
regarded as being so, and that the Kabbalistic system can also
be cogent. There needs to be some way of
bridging what seemed like an unbridgeable gap between them.
And of course, inevitably one of the most thorny issues is what
do we mean by spirit? Obviously, if they are construed
in any literal sense as pertaining to the realm of the
divine, that's polytheism and what their map proposes.
An approach that I personally wholeheartedly embrace is that
we relate to this field as Tariq Ulot.
That's the concept, of course, that Rabiudalevi addresses in
the second Mamar Sava Kuzuri in Siman bed that Rambam addresses
in the 50s in the first unit of the guide beginning in chapter
52. Tariq Ulot, as all the reason I
recognize will be multiple. It's describing God in terms of
the manner in which we perceive His actions manifest in this
world. That doesn't, of course, in any
way imply multiplicity in the realm of the divine.
They're simply recognizing that we believe God acts from our
perspective in a manner that we perceive in this world.
And we describe the manner in which which we perceive with
those manifestations using various adjectives, various
divine attributes. Here we are very much the time
of year of focusing upon the Yudh Gilami, Dota Rahami, and
they are perhaps even in all, certainly the best majority
tolerate a lot. You're describing Goddess
compassionate, forgiving. What do those words mean?
That mean that we observe manifestations in this world of
what we would describe were we to ascribe those manifestations
to a human agent as being compassionate and being
forgiving and so on and so forth.
But we aren't in any way implying that this is an
identification of Khasa Khalila, some component part in the realm
of the divine. That's a critical point for us
to appreciate and and of course to that extent it's important
for us to relate to whatever one chooses to appropriate from the
Kabbalistic system in a manner that will indeed cohere with
theology. So I guess I certainly present
the Ramada's perspective as one that to me is not just
compelling, but as a lifesaver. There could be other systems as
well, but certainly to understand Kabbalah in a manner
that contravenes the essential principles of irreducible
absolute divine unity and simplicity is something that we
regard as heretical. So I would say that most people,
I, I don't want to spend too much time on Kabbalah because
the bulk of this really is we want to, we, we want to focus
on, on Harman that is shown in but just on your .2 points,
actually, most people that have a superficial or cursory or sort
of, you know, not not fully informed or, you know, just a
casual, let's say, acquaintance with Kabbalah.
For the most part, people will employ that type of terminology
and understanding. You ask, you know, an average
person who doesn't, you know, study Kabbalah, but like, you
know, you know, but has like a, you know, it's in his tongue,
but it's not something he's really delved into.
Let's say these are the medot that we, you know that we that
we see from from OK. But it's again the critical
question to ask. Is what No, they mean that
actions, which yeah, what I'm saying is is that a, a casual, a
casual person for the most part would would hopefully likely not
go beyond that because divine simplicity is something that is,
you know thrown in our thrown in people's they're they're told
about divine simplicity all the time right so I.
Would hope so. I'm not.
Well, no. The.
Capitalists do that, though to be fair, the capitalists always
try to differentiate between, you know, you know, they do,
they do. There, there is those
differentiations that are that are put on the table.
What I was going to say was, was that there's really two ways to
go about Kabbalah. You can either try to discredit
Kabbalah or like you just suggested, you can actually just
repackage Kabbalah like like Dharma did right into a way
which will not not go into a heretical position and and
purport that understanding. What would you suggest?
How would some of the best way to go about it to go?
So on some level, however pedestrian and cliche this
answer might appear, different strokes for different folks.
By which I mean there are those who feel a tremendous resonance
with Kabbalah and they're certainly not going to come to
negate it. In particular, once we
appreciate that Kabbalah unequivocally has a venerable
tradition. That is Saifabahir is a work
rather than where we can cast cast aspersions on it's
description to Rabina Khanna. But it certainly is a very
venerable, very old work. And we appreciate that the
tradition of Kabbalah that Ramban as a case in point
possessed certainly don't begin with Ramban.
On some level presumptively trace it back from Ramban to he
himself being a Tamit of his father, he himself being a Tammi
of his father-in-law. It's a little bit difficult for
us to identify specific names with the couple of tradition
earlier than that. But unequivocally, there's some.
There is a venerable tradition here which I certainly am not
going to come to belittle simultaneously.
What I don't know is the manner in which the Ritva, the Ritva
being one of the foremost heirs of the baby Joshua Ramban, being
one of the foremost Tamil name of the Rashba, was one of the
foremost Tamil name of Ramban. The Ritva famously, maybe not
sufficiently famously but should be famously, wrote a slim volume
called Sefirazi Karon for the express purpose of responding to
all of Ramban's critiques of Mohim in Ramban's commentary on
the Torah. And even says to himself, you
could say, if I can render it in an English idiom, I'm sticking
my neck out for something I don't even embrace, because the
Ritva is definitely party to believe in Kabbalah.
Simultaneously, the Ritva in defending Rambam says we still
need to appreciate that Rambam has a consistent system and was
justified in half. I guess whether and Aretha
admits 2 possibilities here, whether the tradition of
Kabbalah is something that Rambam never heard or that he
heard it and rejected it, and the regard was both of those
possibilities are completely acceptable.
The read about regards both of those possibilities as
acceptable in as much as he does not by any means consider only
the Kabbalistic system to be a coach for that's the whole
purpose of Seth Razi Karam. So again, there can certainly be
a gamut of views on this score, as long as it is subordinate to
the Verity that we are beholden to enunciating a theology that's
consistent with Torah. The problem, the problem is, is
if you go and if if you try to repackage like what Dorama tries
to do, which is very honorable and to repackage it as you know,
actions which we, which we in our own mental framework
interpret as certain type of qualities.
The problem here and doesn't relate to anything within God.
The problem here is at least the problem as I see it is, is that
that could work and should work and probably would work if we're
talking about 50 years ago, 100 years ago, 150 years ago, even
as far back and maybe even 20-30 years ago when people didn't
have much access to a lot of works like we do today.
You go right now into a farm store.
Every Hasidic book is not just printed, but it's printed with
like with commentaries and annotations and footnotes.
And So what happens is, is you have like the Ram Khal who who I
tremendously have respected Ram Khal.
But you, you go into his works, you will see that there's a
discussion about, right, the spirit as it pertains to God,
right. So what I'm trying to say is, is
that as a as a standalone, the Rama is a wonderful, wonderful
way to repackage and to put Kabbalah into a, let's just say,
quote UN quote, kosher light. But I worry that there's too
much out there right now that get into get into Kabbalah too
deeply meant for the average man to read for that to really
stand. I can't disagree with your fear.
That is, I think it's critical for students first to be well
grounded in directioning, in particular in the theology that
we learn from them. I could say through them from
Khazal in order to ensure that the Kabbalistic perspective is
not going to in any way draw them in heterodox directions.
Yeah, I think I also need to stress here, there certainly is
a critical line of demarcation that needs to be drawn between
Kabbalah to be shown in Kabbalah Akharoni.
Absolutely, yeah. I'd rather not elaborate upon
that, but what I certainly do feel compelled to stress is, you
know, we have no further to go then the Mishnah of of Talion in
the first Paracle of Piuqueta. Now if on some level not
already, I want to say this, but on some level we could ascribe
that warning. Sages, be careful with what you
say even to Antigonus Isocho for having bidden us to serve the
Master without thinking of reward, and that was
misconstrued by Sadok and Baitos his students to imply there is
no reward and there's no such thing as the world to come.
Then I think it's safe to state as a Kalbachammer all the more
so, so many authors over the last centuries who wrote works
maybe very much along the lines of what you're proposing.
Maybe they never expected these works to be broadly
disseminated, and if they would never been disseminated, they
wouldn't have been this danger. Not even disseminated, but
analyzed and and and built upon and and made made readable to
the To a layman person, it's like.
Yeah, I, I, I don't know if I can.
I don't know if I can justify all of these works by blaming it
on the contemporary editors. I think there are works that
already were very much when they were written in.
Violation, but I was just I was just pointing towards the fact
that today you can look, you can pretty much take any kabbalistic
safer and get a a commentary on it.
That will, that will, that will, that will explain it to you.
Almost like an art squirrel on a Gomara.
So who's failure? So who's failure is that?
That is the failure of UCP, of education that does not provide
students with a firm, thorough, cogent grounding in theology, in
what we're supposed to believe. Yeah, based upon the ritual.
Name great point because they had it great point so much focus
on Mara Moussa, which is all important Mara Moussa, but
there's no the fundamentals aren't they don't if you.
Don't on the ritual name. Then how are you supposed to be?
There's a there's a little mitzvah, a little mitzvah.
That's a great point. And several mitzvah is the first
one, which is idiyatashem. If you don't study this a
little, point little. No, but yeah, I didn't want to.
We didn't want to. People can.
Construct a vision of Judaism that is categorically
antithetical to the Torah. And unfortunately it's not.
They can, they do. This is a terrible danger that
we encounter today because people aren't grounded in
understanding Torah through the prism of our masarat.
That's really what it goes down to.
How is it that people understand very well that when it comes to
halakha, there has to be some concept of masarat and you don't
come up with some newfangled idea that has no grounded in in
our early sources. But when it comes to theology,
when it comes to Idiatashem, they have no qualms about
completely discounting our mentors, the Rishonim and
ultimately Khazao, because the original explaining Khazao.
It's a fairpoint. That's a fairpoint.
It's a point that we we belabored here a lot.
If I can just stress one particular idea that is really
enunciated repeatedly in the mitrash, but it is of such
critical importance and unfortunately so roundly
ignored. The mitrash in the Rashid Rabba,
which of course is one of the earliest mitrashi, worked in
parasha 68 in paragraph 9 on Vaif Gabba Macomb.
This is on the Rashid chapter 2028, verse 11, whom Ikomo shel
olam the EN olamo MI como, that we refer to God as Macomb as the
place, usually translated as the omnipresent one, but literally
the place because he's the place of the world and the world isn't
his place. Meaning he is absolutely
transcendent of the world and the world that is the entire
universe. Everything is entirely subsumed
within him. When I say everything, I don't
mean planet Earth. I don't even just mean the
physical universe. I mean all of the realms that we
would describe as spiritual. Everything is subsumed within
Kibyaho. God and God transcends it all.
And that absolute categorical transcendence, of course it's my
mind at the end. It's not just my mind at the
end. It's kazal.
And everyone subscribes to this.
There's no white way that anyone can be faithful to Torah belief
as the sages of the Madras taught us, as the Rishonim
taught us, and not appreciate this point.
And this midrash has has a huge number of cognates in other
midrashic works. I'm not going to start listening
to them all because I realized that would take us too far
afield. But the the principle that he is
the place of the world Olamot Philalov enhu TA fell olamo in
the formulation in Midrash Tilim on Psalm 90.
So I I I feel anything. Else is accessory.
God is transcendent. Yeah, I think the the whole idea
of God being transcendent is something that people struggle
to understand when it comes to like how miracles were.
And we discussed this on the podcast as well.
But also like the the messaging that I met Moshe got at Harcini,
the experience at Harcini, like what what exactly happened
there? If it's not direct, how, how do
we explain in in on one foot, obviously what it is that's
going on because obviously there's no direct interaction.
So you know what? What comes to mind perhaps most
immediately with respect to that question is a discussion between
the Kazakh king and the Javert and separate Kuzeri.
That is already noted that Rabbi Levy speaks of the uniqueness of
Nivois versus the concept of prophecy that is invoked by the
Greek philosophers in the first treaty specific rosary in
section 87 where he speaks at length about Mohammad Har Sinai.
The Theophonic Sinai is what drummed into AMI Israel the
realization that prophecies on a completely different level of
ontology and not at all incidentally by consequence of
this, the manner in which Rebuttalibi casts the king.
Of course, Rebuttalibi is the author of the whole shebang.
He wrote both sides of the dialogue.
The manner in which he casts the king responding to this
description of the Revelation at Sinai is anyone who hears your
words will inevitably ascribe to you belief in divine corporal
reality. But you can't blame you either
because after all, you saw these astounding visions that were
palpable and the resounding response of the Javert.
I suspect we'll be returning to this response later on in this
discussion. But the the first line Khalila
la El mihasheke omashekhal Malik otovi simihal sheke.
God forbid that we should believe in something that is
false or the intellect rejects in regards as false.
We don't believe in anything that is categorically illogical.
What he goes on to emphasize is that we aren't speaking about
divinity being manifest, but rather again the the manner in
which we connect with these derivatives that God has
established. Whether it is that God creates
an, an acoustical vibration in the air that we hear as the
words of the Decalogue or some other mechanism.
He doesn't limit the explanation to one particular course of
events, but that obviously we, we maintain our categorical
belief in divine transcendence. And what we're affirming is that
this manifest through this process, if you will, of
emanations. So what does that mean?
On some level, I'll say, well, whether we take the approach of
the philosophers or we take the approach from Qalim, we're going
to speak in some sense in these terms.
The, the transcendence is maintained.
The Qalim also speak about the insof.
There's this dimension of transcendence and simultaneously
there's something that we will experience in this world.
So, so just just to end this segment, I want to just get some
clarity on one, one point, which is, and I, and I've asked this
question, I think to Len Goodman, but this is a question
that has come up before on the podcast, which is Moshe, He
writes the, the first four books of the, of the, of the Torah, As
you know, from is God's dictation, right?
And it's the same person with the same mind getting the same
level of nuvoir. But then what does it mean that
he wrote the varim from his own mind, from his own words?
Like what? How do we make?
How do we square that circle? What I well state as a two word
synopsis of the answer is the way the Torah describes Moshev
in Parasha Ish Elokim. Meaning what?
No, that doesn't mean the concept of a man God.
That's not Judaism. But what it does signify is that
there is the potentiality for human being to become so
rarefied by his connection to Hagar Daswarako that he indeed
becomes a faithful conduit for what Hagar Daswarako wants to
instruct us evenly, speaking in his own voice.
And some of us, Shrinamida, bear with me, talk to you.
Or not. Which is also causal, so that
there is some nuance of distinction between dictation,
which if anything mandates of Moshe, the utmost level of
passivity receive, and the dimension that is manifest in
mishnetogra with Moshe as Ishaiah Hakim, that he as his
persona is faithfully conveying to us Dwar Hashem.
Now ultimately this is a singularity in Moshe, but not
entirely singularity. I say not entirely singularity,
because, you know, ultimately I'll say that's precisely the
point that the dimara makes on the second pasuk of the Helium
in Maseka Daudazara, page 19 A, The pasuk reads his desires in
the Torah of God and his Torah. He articulates their night.
And of course, inevitably the question which grammatically is
ambiguous, is his Torah. Whose Torah?
What's the antecedent? You could of course, proposed at
the end to say that this is going to be God and we're
talking about God's Torah. But the Gemara's proposition is
it starts out being described as torat Hashem, and becomes
torato, the Torah of the student who is articulating it.
This ultimately is the whole dynamism of Kenyan Torah.
You don't really study Torah, you acquire Torah, you
internalize Torah, you integrate Torah, you become transformed by
toga. This is also the same principle
that the Gemara enunciates in asking the question famously in
Kedushin page 40 at the end of the first chapter, Talmud Gadola
Mahse Gadol. And the answer that ultimately
the Gemara provides is Talmud Gadol Shah, Talmud Mehbili de
Masah. Talmud is greater than deed
because it leads to deed. Not if it leads to deed, not to
the extent that leads to need. Not insofar as it leads to deed.
If it doesn't lead to deed, it's not tumbled.
What does that mean? That the only part of Torah that
I should be studying is of course not.
But that shutara is transformative.
If you become a different person, obviously everything you
do is going to be different because you are different.
That's the quest in the integration of Torah into
ourselves. So we each do it in varying
degrees. Ultimately, we each pray.
We pray every day, every time we say the amida the 10th.
The one who achieved this to the utmost degree is Moshe, and to
that extent he can give us torad Hashem.
We talk Grono, which is Saifa Mishnah Torad.
Just to go back when we finished the the the the original
question. So if I understood you
correctly, what you were trying to say was you accept the fact
that, that there has to be some sort of mechanism that it cannot
be direct because that would be an impossibility.
But we meaning so whereas the Lambam using the, the, the
philosophy of his time and it worked for him to to create that
mechanism. That's what he did.
But now that the mechanism doesn't work, OK, so we don't
use that mechanism. We just accept the fact that
there's a mechanism which we won't understand or know of, but
but because of the logical impossibility of there not being
a mechanism, we just accept there's a mechanism without
fully understanding it. And then?
We're not going to go that way. First of all, I have.
I have. I wanted to get it clear.
OK, so I have two, if I will. If I May 2 critical critiques of
the formulation. First of all, it's not only
logic, it's also masarat. Again, I reiterate the mitraash
God transcends the world and is not consumed within it.
That is integral to our belief in Torah, and anyone who claims
some conception of divine imminence that violates that is
enunciating some ISM. But it isn't Judaism.
It's not Torah that unequivocally.
Additionally, I'm going to again stress that what Rama is
providing us is a metaphysics that can still be cogent even if
the physics and the cosmology go out the window.
So when Rahman I read it, when Rahman talks about the active
intellect, I have no problem enunciating the possibility.
I'll say possibility because as a case in point, Rabiu da Lebi
is not so big on the active intellect for a number of
reasons. But nonetheless, the Mahmana,
the perspective of enunciating this concept of an intellectual
slash spiritual content of our world, that is the active
intellect and the services of the mediation of spirituality
coming into this world, it's still a caution possibility.
I can understand what that means and I could give a whole
dissertation on what means by it.
And the fact that the cosmology and the physics are obsolete
doesn't make the metaphysics obsolete.
Does that mean that I have to understand things in this
manner? Again, I'm going to reiterate
no, because indeed we find other reasoning enunciating other
formulations, but it's important for us to emphasize we aren't
taking some kind of, I'm not quite sure how to describe it,
but some kind of phytistic proposition that there's
something enigmatic going on here and we don't know what's
going on. But we just, we have to have
some cogent way of, of explaining to ourselves what
we're talking about. If we don't have any cogent way
of explaining to ourselves what we're talking about, then we're
not talking about anything that can be described as Jewish
belief. This is categorical,
foundational in Gangnam in particular, stress in the first
unit of the guide in Chapter 50 that being able to formulate
something in words is of no avail whatsoever if you don't
understand what it means. And I think I should stress here
in particular that what Rambam employs as the most obvious
illustration of the violation of this principle is Speaking of
some equation of three and one Trinitarian belief.
Now, I can understand where Christians are coming from from
their perspective, but it's definitely not going to be
admissible in Judaism. Judaism is not fedeistic.
The concept of belief in Judaism necessarily is something that I
can explain and understand. And if I can't, if it does not
make sense for me, then it's not an Annunciation of belief at
all. This random states again in the
first unit in chapter 50, but I should stress here as perhaps
one of the most important, implicit, admittedly not
explicit, but implicit citations of this formulation in Rambam
what Ramban presents at the end of the vikoch, that is, at the
end of the Barcelona disputation.
Ramban describes in his Ma Mahavikoch that the following
Shabbat, Shabbat Mahamu 1263, Public Christianity, Demach
Shimabazukro and his entourage come into the main synagogue in
Barcelona, and he starts delivering a dissertation.
The darash Binyan has shilush. And Ramban cannot keep silent
here, of course, And he challenges what this conception
of the Trinity is. And after the whole barrage of
Ramban's critique, which is enunciated in exquisitely
rational terms, public Christianity gets up and he says
he believes in Yehud Gamora, complete monotheism.
And nevertheless, yes, Boshilouche, there is a Trinity,
the Hudaver, A mock and something that's so deep that
the malachim and the the heavenly officers as the divine
entourage don't understand gets up Rabban and without missing a
beat, it is manifestly clear that a person cannot believe,
but he doesn't know. So according to you then the
malakim don't believe in the Trinity either.
And two word postscript Ushtakuhu Kavirov and his his
Dominican colleagues shut him up because they realized he was
just making more of a more and more of a fool of himself.
But that's critical. Rabban manifestly in this line,
even though he doesn't the context didn't allow his saying
I'm getting this from that was the point.
The point is manifestly clear, but clearly he's appropriating
the formulation around them. You cannot believe something you
don't understand, so one way or another, you have to be able to
enunciate your beliefs in a manner that makes sense to you.
Does that mean proving it? Of course not.
But it means sense. It means you know what you're
saying. Not at all.
Incidentally, and this is a critical point to appreciate,
Unit 1, Chapter 50 is a critically important piece of
real estate in Types of perplexed because chapters one
through 49 are on the subject of divine incorporeality and
chapters 51 could say 51 that is the next chapter through 70 on
the subject of divine unity. Chapter 50 is the introduction
to the section of divine unity. Rama did not feel a need to
insert chapter 50 before chapter 1, because people, at least in
Rama's time, I hope that's still the case, have enough of an
intuitive sense of what incorporeality means to not
adulterated with ideas that are manifestly irreconcilable with
incorporeality. So he's enunciating the
principle of doing incorporeality and applying it,
of course, and understanding how to read and so on and so forth.
But he doesn't need this introduction for the chapters on
divine unity. He does.
Because let's just say Christian transparent belief is not the
only example of a statement that is manifestly in violation of
what we mean by divine unity, but could be erroneously
portrayed as divine unity as long as you avoid the critical
condition of understanding what you're talking about.
So you need to understand what you're talking about.
You always need to understand what you're talking about.
And if you don't understand what you're talking about, you are
not talking about anything and you don't believe anything.
So we need to make sure we know what we're talking about.
Very well said and OK so I just want to get more clarity on what
feedeism is and why Judaism for our Christian listeners and we
have Noah head listeners as well to understand why Judaism
rejects the idea of incarnationalism.
OK, so first a question of definitions.
If I can share a dictionary definition of feedeism, reliance
on faith alone rather than scientific reasoning or
philosophy in questions of religion, and till exacerbate
that somewhat further if I can share another definition of
phidias in the cast. In more in philosophical terms,
it is an epistemological theory which maintains that faith is
independent of reason, or that reason and faith are hostile to
each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular
truths. That's a Wikipedia definition of
Phidias, and it's important for us to appreciate why it is
wholly reasonable for classic Christianity to be fedeoistic
and not Judaism, not Torah. And perhaps the best way to
present this is by going back to one of the early church fathers,
Tertullian. Now I must note that there is a
line that is commonly ascribed to Tertullian that is of
uncertain origin and that he probably never said, which is, I
believe, because it is absurd. So that's not going to be now
we're evidence because I'm not convinced that the line is in
any way authentic. Simultaneously, if I may quote
from on the flesh of which is a composition of Tertullian, the
Son of God was born or crucified, depending on the
version of the text. There is no shame because it is
shameful the Son of God died. It is wholly credible because it
is unsound and buried heroes. Again, it is certain because
impossible. So it's not exactly the same as
I believe because it is absurd, but there certainly is a thread
here of antagonism between faith and reasoning, and embracing
faith over and in opposition to reasoning.
To cite one additional statement from the same composition by
Tertullian, in as much as you suppose that it was within your
competence to decide, it can only have been that your idea
was that the God nativity is either impossible or unseemly.
I answer that the God nothing is impossible except, but it's
against His will. So then we have to consider
whether it was His will to be born, because if it was, he both
would be, could be, and was born.
OK, This is again a classic review enunciated by
Christianity. We'll still need to consider why
we regard this as so categorically unacceptable from
the purpose, from the perspective of Judaism.
But what it is perhaps most directly germane for us to note
here, and I say this respectfully, and I've also
shared these thoughts with many Christian theologian friends, I
think they've agreed with me, is that there is in this regard a
critical difference between Torah, Judaism, and Christianity
in that Christianity from its inception always had very much
of A transcendentalist focus. Transcendentalist meaning that
this world was really not of any great significance.
The focus was on the world to come.
If the focus is on the world to come and you don't really take
this world too seriously, then having a set of beliefs that is
incompatible with your conception of the reality of
this world arguably isn't such a big problem.
Because after all, the focus of your attention is on this world.
And on some level you could even say, And it's definitely a view
that is enunciated elsewhere by Turtilian and also by others,
that they order. The vehemence of your faith is
tested at the Crucible of your embracing beliefs that you
regard as absurd. Because this world really
doesn't matter, and all that matters is the set of beliefs,
and the set of beliefs needs to be consonant with an other
worldly realm, not this one. Again, in classic Christianity,
to whatever extent Christianity is transcendentalist in its
orientation, that has varied over the course of time.
But nonetheless, to the extent that that is from the inception
of Christianity, a critical component to the deadrock of
Christianity, it works. It's not going to work for the
Torah. The Torah is so categorically
focused upon this world. Even though I can and have given
a full sure on why it is impossible to read the Torah
without the presumption of everlasting life, how many
places does the Torah explicitly invoke it?
Zero. Why not?
Maybe the most cognitive answer there are several is the one
that implicitly arises in Cephora Kwosuri.
It doesn't because talking about another world would be a
distraction. All that matters as long as you
are in this world is what you are doing in this world, and
otherworldly spirituality is a distraction from spirituality of
this world that needs to be coherent with this world.
So what can fly in Christianity? Again, we can respect as within
the rubric of Christianity. I'll note that Rabiu da Levi
does not in any way, anywhere it's ever, because I read,
explicitly come out antagonistically with respect to
Christian beliefs, and presents them fairly fairly coherently in
the statement of the Christian in the beginning of Sephir
Coseri. That's not going to be our set
of beliefs because that's not what terrorists teach.
Us So being that you just explained that Judaism is not a
phidistic religion, how would that play into the philosophical
ideas of can God do the impossible?
OK, of course, an excellent question, and undoubtedly the
first place that we should begin here is with Rambam.
This is an idea that Rambam enunciates at great length in
the guide. I'll stress in particular unit 2
chapter 13, but even more so Unit 3 chapter 15, where Rambam
unequivocally annunciates that that which is a logical
impossibility is impossible, meaning it's not real.
So if you believe that God is real, then you believe that he
can't be unreal in doing that which is excluded from reality
because it is a logical fallacy, a logical falsity.
Another one quickly states this again in these two chapters,
especially in unit 3 chapter 15, when I'm going to stress, and
this is an idea that is particularly enunciated by
Rambam in the latter in unit 3 chapter 15, Islam himself leaves
something of a domain of ambiguity open, gaping.
I wonder whether this gate of research is open so that all may
freely enter. And whilst 1 imagines a thing
and considers it possible, another is at liberty to assert
that such a thing is impossible by its very nature.
Or whether the gate is closed and guarded by certain rules so
that we are able to decide with certainty whether a thing is
physically impossible. Let's see Friedland translation,
which I I think is apartment. Just understanding what Rambam
is getting at here, and the the thrust of the distinction that
Rambam attempts to draw but still is admittedly uncertain
with respect to the exact placement of the line of
demarcation, is that a logical impossibility is unequivocally
impossible for God as well. It is impossible that God should
produce a being like himself. Well, it's impossible because
God is unconditional reality, self mandated existence.
Anything created is not. So by definition God cannot do
something like himself or an I like to purify or change himself
because that which is self mandated existence cannot be any
of those. The power of God is not assumed
to extend to any of these impossibilities.
So logical impossibilities unequivocally bound reality
simultaneously physical impossibilities, if you will, a
violation of the law of conservation of energy, we don't
regard as categorical impossibilities because we don't
believe in the possibility of miracles.
There's an author of of nature. He is a sovereign over nature
and therefore miracles can take place.
Exactly what the what the dynamism of miracles is is a
more complex question. I've already intimated that
Rebbutalevi considers more than one possibility in the first
mammoths ever, because already in section 89 Rambam likewise
has something of a complex view of matters.
We touched on this in our previous session together,
great, back in Rambam in the second unit of the guide in
chapter 29. We obviously aren't going to
rehash that territory at present, but what we'll note,
certainly as presumptive in this arena is that which is to our
minds of physical impossibility, simply betrays our limitedness
in that to which we are or are not accustomed and doesn't
necessarily constitute A categorical impossibility.
A logical impossibility functions on a different plane.
Rama unequivocally argues that logical impossibilities are
categorically impossible for God as well.
And this definitely is a view that we see enunciated among the
Richonim. Simultaneously, I'd like to
share proposition. I'm sharing it tenuously.
I can't state unequivocally that what I'm about to say is indeed
the meaning of the passages I'm about to cite, even though I
inclined in this direction in the two passages in Sepfrakosari
in which Rabiu da Lebi most directly addresses this .1 we
already mentioned in the first treatise in section 89, the
other in the first section in section 67.
In I should let me let me recast that in the first treatise in
Section 67. In both of them there is a turn
of phrase that Rabiudalevi employs as vindicated in all the
translations, even if they're not being the Arabic itself.
That I think we need to consider at greater length in the
formulation in the first treatise in Section 67, when
Rabiudalevi is addressing the question of the extent to which
we need to feel beholden to Aristotle.
What he states is khalila la El shtava torabenashi de hege ayah.
O Moffett, God forbid we should believe that the Torah should
include encompass that which ayah reasonable evidence Moffett
logical syllogism dictates. He goes on to employ precisely
the same distinction that Rahman does, that with respect to
miracles and transmutation of physical nature.
That's not a problem because it's simply betrays our own
limitedness in that to which we are accustomed.
But there won't be anything in the Torah that flies in the face
of logic. And in very similar terms we
already noted in the first treatise in Section 89, Khalila
El miyasheke, Masha sekhal Mihasheke.
God forbid that we believe in that which is false or that
which the intellect rejects in regards as false.
And of course, inevitably, the turn of phrase I'm going to
stress in both of these citations is God forbid, a turn
of phrase that, needless to know, is conspicuously lacking
in Rambam's formulation as well. In Rambam's formulation, it
should be lacking. After all, would you ever say
God forbid, 1 + 1 should equal 3?
No, 1 + 1 doesn't equal 3. There's not God forbid about it.
It's something that is categorically false, remains
false, and you're not saying God forbid about it.
And the fact that Rbidoli does invite this possibility, that
Rbidoli may be giving us a more nuanced perspective with respect
to impossibilities and conceivably even including
logical impossibilities, because Khalil applies to the both.
Namely, we don't have the way with all to be able to clearly
enunciate what is or is not within the realm of divine Ken
because God is beyond our Ken. And to that extent, can we
categorically state that our understanding of logic limits
God? No, we certainly can't ascribe
to God. What we understand is logically
an impossibility. But we can't state that this is
something that necessarily circumscribes the realm of the
divine in the same categorical terms that Rahman would use.
But what we can state is the Torah would never ask us to
believe such a thing. And this, if anything, is an
even more critical statement because what essentially is what
we believe is stating. I'll argue what he's stating is
precisely what we said just a few moments ago.
That in as much as the whole orientation of Torah is
spirituality in this world, God, the Torah would never place us
in the intolerable position of having to live in a tension of
our conception of reality and our conception of our faith
being mutually exclusive. That won't work in Judaism.
Again, it could work in Christianity.
It can't work in Judaism. You can't work on the Torah.
The Torah is all about how we live in this world, and you
can't have a belief system that is going to serve as your guide
for how to live in this world that is excluded by being in
this world. So no, nothing in Torah is a
logical impossibility, either because as Rama imposite,
because that which is logical impossibility is patently unreal
and our beliefs are real, or because God would never demand
of us believing in something that could not confort with our
conception of reality. But then why?
But then some might say, then
why does the Torah employee like, for instance, Al Ramsingh
the angels? Yes, it needs to be
interpretation and we do that, but if the Torah doesn't want
that, then why give room for it? No, because again, we can
unequivocally understand that that's precisely what Rampan
stresses at the end of that very long comment at the beginning of
we have an alternative way of looking at things.
That alternative way of looking at things is one that Rambam
definitely rejects. But what Ramban proposes is that
even as malachim are categorically incorporeal
intellects, there is this concept that exists in Kabbalah
and unequivocally does not exist in Rambam, that an incorporeal
intellect can take on a physical garb, if you will, in the same
sense that the puppeteer operates the puppet, so you
don't. See the Puppeteer.
Because the puppeteer is Bond, then it doesn't become
impossible in the realm of exactly exactly.
And, and it's important for us to stress this point because
Ramban is not going to say, well, we're not going to have a
problem because we can believe in nonsense.
No, Ramban has to give you a cogent formulation.
Even if it's not going to be a formulation that's acceptable to
Rambam, it's a cogent formulation to say this such a
thing as Lavouche. Excellent.
So if you. Couldn't have that formulation,
You have a problem because then again, Rambani, after all, is
the one who appropriates Ramban's formulation in the
first unit, Chapter 50, lock, stock and barrel, in going to
battle against Pablo Christiani and his band of Dominicans.
And it's important for us to appreciate what Ramban's agenda
there is and the extent to which we necessarily must resonate
with that agenda today. On the one hand, from Ramban's
perspective, do we necessarily have the wherewithal to
understand everything in the rambles of the divine?
No, and according to Rambam, we do.
Of course not. Rambam emphasizes this point in
the lesson Ramban. Just consider Rambam in the
first unit of the guide in chapter 32 in warning the reader
against the fallacy of thinking you have not prove you have
proven what you have not proven and what you are unable to
prove, or thinking you have disproven what you cannot
disprove. Recognizing the limitations and
not exceeding them, recognizing that their ideas that are beyond
their can random understands that full well.
But simultaneously, there are beliefs that we can coherently
articulate as nonsensical and those we will never be summoned
by the Torah to believe. And that is categorical.
And that indeed summarizes in a nutshell the distinction between
beliefs that in Christian transcendentalism are possible
and beliefs that in torrid Judaism are not and will never
be. So the miracles in in and of
itself is not doesn't play intent.
Miracles aren't the problem. If the miracle a miracle is a
miracle, there's no issue here. Again, the the the realization
that a physical impossibility ultimately is not an
impossibility is a reflection of that to which we are accustomed,
that and and that to which we are unaccustomed.
In the same vein altogether that obviously science undergoes
revolutions when there is an accumulation of body of evidence
that does not jive with the existing paradigm for
understanding the science. And it's the whole foundation of
Thomas Kuhns The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Yes, we recognize that there there are a phenomena that we
don't understand and that will defy our faceted understanding.
Obviously the case of the supplanting of one scientific
paradigm by another is a purely natural process.
Natural in the sense that we aren't talking about something
miraculous taking place. A miracle is a different story,
as we noted. We discussed this, of course, in
our last segment, A Miracles from M's perspective, can be
subsumed within the rules of nature, but they still are, from
our perspective, categorically anomalous.
We don't understand how they are natural phenomena, even if on
some level they are Physical impossibilities are not really
impossibilities from R.E.M.'s perspective.
We will state that if we can understand something to be
illogical, it remains illogical because that bounds reality.
Period. From Rabbi Delhi's perspective.
Again, I'm saying this conjecturally because I have no
basis for definitively stating that this is Rabbi Delhi's
perspective as opposed to that of Rambam.
But again, the the turn of phrase khaliwala El leads me to
this proposition that Rabbi Eli would would say, yeah, holy oath
could be, but the Torah would still never ask us to believe in
such a thing because it is irreconcilable with our
conception of reality. And our conception of reality is
the critical, undergirding the critical basis of our Abu
Dhatashem. And again, it's of course
critical for us to remember Avodah Tashan serving God.
That connection. Through our lives is the goal of
all this. We aren't armchair philosophers
engaging in abstract cogitation, and the avodah necessarily
entails having a belief system that is coherent with that
realm, which is this world in which we are engaging in that
avodah. Right.
So, so I think that the point that you've been making and we
appreciate so much all the time that you've put into elaborating
all this, I think that the approach that you have been
giving here is instead of trying to answer questions technically
or via, you know, pound for pound, logic for logic, yes, no,
maybe the approach that you've been giving today is, is that
it's a matter of the focus and, and what our religion focuses
on, right. So when it comes to can God do
the impossible? Maybe, maybe not.
But what I think you've been saying is it's irrelevant
because the Torah has a a, a, a, a wants us to be able to use
Sehel in order to connect to God, not to erase our sehel in
order to connect to God. And therefore trying to answer
this question is sort of not the point, which is what you're
trying to get at. I believe it's not the point to
try to get into that tick for tat on a, on a academic level of
whether it's possible or not possible, but rather what does
Torah want of us? And then how should we approach
it regardless of, of, of where the academics plays out or
doesn't play out? And I think that's a, it's a
very important approach. It's a very important point.
I hope that the listeners understood that.
And, and for sure we, this, this, everything needs to be
continued in a sense. And, and I'm sure we'll get to
it. But but I wanted to just just to
just to wrap it up with that in terms of to try to put into a
few sentences what I consider to be the main ideas that you were
giving out from if. If I if I may just this this
eval any credit for that, to whatever extent I have, I hope,
succeeded in conveying that point of emphasis.
It is solidly simply as a humble student of the Rishonim is we
always have to keep our eyes on the ball and they did.
I'm going to reiterate what to me is just such a foundational
point that the Rishonim never wrote works of abstract
philosophy. All the works of philosophy are
as means to advancing us in our Abu Dhatashan.
That Sehel necessarily plays a critical role is something that
none of the regional name at all would reject.
That's just a case in point. Rabi Hudalevi in the third Namar
of Sephirozari in section 19 and considering the order of the
supplications of the Amidah, notes the first supplication
pertains to say hell and understanding in our service of
God, because through them a person is able to come closer to
God. Obviously that that perspective
is axiomatic and fundamental in Rambam is a point that is so
clear it would almost be an insult to elaborate upon it.
Because it's so obvious it's also joined Rambam.
There's the emphasis in unsafe in Rambam, clearly foundational,
has a lot to do also with his whole veltenchong and has an
understanding of the Torah the the role that even Ezra's
commentary plays for him as the second most frequently quoted
commentator in his parish of the Torah.
Obviously there's something upon which we can elaborate at far,
far greater length, but certainly for our purposes, the
critical bottom line is to keep the eye on the ball, to
recognize that we are coming into Arabo dadashem as the Bali
Sekhal that God has created us to be.
That's not to say that we're only Bali circle.
That's not to say that intellect is the beyond end all of
existence. There may be different views,
legitimate different views on that subject, but but we never
ever toss out circle like the the trash.
It's something that will always signify, from our perspective,
on the lapse of the Rishonim critical bedrock upon which we
stand in our Abu Dah, in our divine service.
Thank you so much. Thank you.
This was amazing. This was amazing.
Rabbi Eisen, really you're, you're unbelievable.
We really just we hope that we can have you on again.
And we want to urge our viewers to check out your channel.
If you could just quickly plug your your YouTube channel.
Jewish Philosophy matters. YouTube channel Jewish
Philosophy Matters. And of course, that's a double
entendre, and I hope we are able to to actualize matters as both
a noun and a verb. Amen.
Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Thank you.