Welcome to Judaism Demystified, a podcast for the perplexed.
Join us as we explore some of the most fascinating Jewish and
Torah related topics with our esteemed guests.
By tackling some of the biggest questions you likely won't find
addressed elsewhere, we aim to shed light on important issues
and inspire a return to the fundamentals.
Enjoy the show. Thank you for joining the
Judaism Demystified podcast. We are joined by Rabbi Heim
Eisen. Again, thank you for joining us
and for the first time, Rabbi Yitzhak Adlerstein.
Today we are discussing panentheism or the topic that we
called it is does God need us? This is a very popular slogan
these days, so the first thing we want to introduce our
audience to is clarifying what is God's oneness?
Can you explain why God's oneness implies he is beyond the
world rather than including it? What does His uniqueness,
oneness and wholeness mean, especially when the term in
odmilvador implies there's nothing other than him including
any physical existence? Who goes first?
I'll go first because I'm probably going to be briefer.
You guys are editing this later, right?
So yeah, OK, let's have a recap on that question.
What was did it include the ideas?
Why is panentheism impossible? We.
We didn't get into panentheism, we.
Didn't get into panentheism. It was just like why does we
want to? Why does the oneness of
akadaswarafu particularly as as implied by the phrase anal
movado? Why does that preclude?
Anything in the physical realm, let's just say.
Anything in the physical? In the physical.
That's a lot of a lot of a lot of times you'll hear that
response. What do you mean?
Hashem is imbued in all things because he is, you know, and
odmelvado. That's that's that's a response
you often hear. Right.
And God's oneness today, at least what has really become of
this terminology is in a sense instead of one being 1 notion,
oneness has become a terminology of he's everything oneness
instead of oneness. That's really the the counter
that we're discussing. OK, I'm going to rich.
That's not good shouldn't have done this after lunch, but
within a few hours of lunch. Oh, that's really bad.
You know, the, the, the idea of, of, of God being the oneness of
the of, of everything being one rather than God is everything is
lahavdil what some of our Christian friends have to deal
with in what they call agape that since they have discovered
that God means more than means more than implies, but means
love. Therefore love is God.
It's a kind of reversal of the definitional elements.
The the, the, the limit, the boundary of what is acceptable
and we'll push the boundary a little bit later is that when
you link God to any physical element of the world, you are
doing two things. One, you are implying that God
can become physical can become physical, and that is just an
impossibility. The IT it's akin to what the
Rambam writes about someplace in Marnev Ukhimal deferred over by
Eisen for that that the the Torah does not demand of us that
we believe in contradictions and terms.
It is not a violation of God's greatness to say that God no, he
cannot create a triangle with four internal angles, that such
a critter just doesn't exist. God being what he is, cannot be
physical. Physical means being limited,
being bounded, being restricted. There is no other kind of
physicality and the oneness of God completely banishes that
that I that idea. On the other hand, on the other
hand, to think that there can be sort of a because of that, that
God is is limited to some ethereal realm where sometimes
interacts with us or maybe his will sustains it, but he's not
part of it, I find to be equally objectionable.
And I think everyone in the world of Hasidis and Kabbalah
found it equally unacceptable. EN ode Movado implies fully that
nothing but nothing but nothing can have any existence outside
of the rutz on the basha. So there has to be a way you can
say I'll, I'll, I'll just table the question and we'll come back
to it some other time. Refuse to deal with it, but to
to exclude God from this activity puts you in the camp of
dualism. And we, we, we can brook no
compromise with that. So somehow you have to find a
way in which God is responsible for everything and that a
mechanism, as it were, for God's will to be part of everything.
So the way I think Kabbalah dealt with that is that that
there is a a neat salts of Hashem or some kind of shefa of
Hashem. These are terms I know I'm
making my hosts wince by listening to, but those if you
think of it, what those terms do is to say, no, God does not
become part of this world. This world is not part of God.
If the world, the universe, would to cease to exist, there
would be nothing missing from Hakotashvaraku, from his, from
his schlammers. If Hakotashvaraku, as it were,
would cease to exist, there would be nothing to talk about,
nothing would be here. We wouldn't be around to, to to
analyze it. But there has to be some way of
describing how it is that the Rutzen of Hashem is part of this
world, but not in a way that takes away from Hashem's
shrineless. I turned it over to my esteemed
colleague. OK, you've certainly given me a
lot with which to grapple. I think I'm going to violate the
principle of Al Rishon Rishon and start out with the end this
idea of neat thoughts and I respectfully dissent with the
ascription with provenance to Kabbalah because it's they're
front and center in severa Kosare, in severa kosare, in the
second mahamar in Simanim Zain the the the the king asks the
cavair to exploit the idea of Qvod Hashem and the caviar in
his response has hakavod mitzvot or El oki ET El Amo UV al ritzo,
which of course wants to listen to a whole discussion of varam
Mitra and eritreal have in common in this manifestation of
quavo dashem, but without launching into a whole
exposition of severe Cos array. The reason that I'm citing it
here is I definitely agree there has to be a middle point
someplace between some rarifying Khalila of Agatha sparkle that
drives them out of any connectedness with us.
And I don't know if I would describe that as dualism or
deism, but certainly it would be a heresy.
And correspondingly dragging Agatha Sparkle into this world,
which is another kind of heresy. That is, if we equate with the
totality of the world, that's pantheism.
If we equate with some element in this world, that's paganism.
But they're both heretical. And what I feel compelled to
stress here, specifically returning to the starting point,
which was the question of what we mean by Hashem Akkad and how
to parse Einod Milvado in these terms, is the idea that is of
course, most famously announced by Rambam at the beginning of
Hilhodi Zodiya Torah, where he explicitly cites in odd milvado
in Halakhad Dalid. And it's important for us to
consider the context that is, that's not the first possible in
that halakhad. The first possible is Bashem
Elokim Ahmed. And before I give the context,
it's important for us to take maybe a couple of steps backward
in considering why this business of divine oneness is so
foundational, that it's foundation I think is axiomatic
for everyone. I mean everyone who was saying
Shmai Israel at least twice daily is affirming something,
some content to Hashem Mahad, and we need to consider what
that is. And moreover, why it is so
foundational. Now I'll note in this regard it
is significant that both Rabih Dahalebi and Rambam, and of
course many in their footsteps, regard the attribute of oneness
as essentially to be technical here, a negative attribute,
meaning that oneness as we conceive of oneness in this
world cannot be ascribed because oneness in this world either
means a unity of component parts or one as opposed to multiple.
And when we speak of oneness in the realm of Hakkadosh Prokhu,
we categorically mean neither. And if we ask ourselves why
neither? So this is an A crucial point
for us to appreciate both based upon arguments from Sekhel, from
the intellect and arguments based upon Amar Sarath.
When we consider first and foremost that aspect of Sekhel.
If the most foundational premise that we enunciate with respect
to Akhilesh Barkhou is self mandated existence, not
contingent existence, not dependence upon anything else.
You know the reason that I think every child goes to some stage
of asking, well, if I got this problem, who makes everything,
then who made him and and trying to conceive of.
So what would it been like if Khalila There wasn't?
But there isn't any possibility of there wasn't.
When we enunciate that Hagadash Procol self mandated existence,
what we're stating is that Hagadash Procol alone is
absolute and nothing else is an absolute.
Now, the moment that you say absolute, that necessarily
rejects out of hand, for example, the possibility of
divine corporeality, because anything corporeal is
necessarily in need of something that compounded it.
So there's a compounder that's more foundational than the
entity itself. And it is indeed for this reason
that, as rebelliously noted, Rambam in the mover in both the
second Kelek in Pekka Giman, the third Keleka Pekka Dah talks
about that which we categorically reject, ascribing
Takash Brahu. No, Takash Brahu cannot make
another being like himself. No, Takash Brahu cannot be
mortal. But don't we believe that Takash
Brahu is perfect, so doesn't mean he can do everything?
No, it means that categorically no deficiency is possible in the
realm of the divine. And the description of any
deficiency is therefore categorically false.
Why? Because Rahu is real, that's
really all there is to it. Saying daco sparkle is real
means that would that would would be negated in reality
cannot be described Daco das sparkle.
So making another thing like himself, that doesn't compute
because obviously anything that would be made is not absolute
existence, it's contingent existence.
So it can't be like becoming mortal.
Mortal is invested with all the limitations and deficiencies of
proporiality. So no, we cannot ascribe that
Dakota sparkle. We can't describe ascribe Dakota
sparkle that which is absurd because Dakota sparkle is real.
I will note, I'll put this in parenthetically because I don't
want to get lost off of a deep end here.
That Rabbio Dalivi Ansaniates this slightly differently in
several Kuzari in the first Myanmar in section 67 and 89
where he has this exclamation of Khalila.
God forbid that the torch to the man that loves believing in
something illogical. And I quibble here.
It could be that what Rabbi Daliby said is what Rambam said.
It could be that Rabbi Daliby is saying something slightly more
nuanced in that he might be saying maybe we don't have the
way withhold to be able to establish categorical absolute
bounds on what reality is. But if the Torah is intent upon
our believing in Pagodasarov was consonant with reality, we're
not transcendentalists after all, then, so it would never
demand us to believe in something that is categorically
irreconcilable with our conception of reality.
But the bottom line is that we don't believe in anything that
is irreconciled with our conception of reality.
And therefore when we speak of divine oneness, it is cognizant
of the inexorable implications, at least in our minds, of
believing that it goes wrong. Whose absolute existence?
That's what we mean by oneness. And it becomes so foundational,
moreover, for us to enunciate that belief in Divine Oneness at
least twice daily, Hashem and Hashem, because even though what
in our minds we think of when we say 1 is not what applies to
each other. And again I reiterate the idea
that is enunciated by Rabi Udalevi in several Kuzari in the
second mahamar in Siman death and by Rambam in the first
character Abdul Mahreh in even though these are negative
attributes. In other words, it's simply
negating the opposite. So you could say, well, if we
could negate from our but both oneness and multiplicity, so why
are we negating oneness? It is categorically important
for our Avodah to regard everything as having one source.
If I could express this a little bit metaphorically, if you take
out your metaphysical shovel and start digging anywhere in the
universe, eventually you will impinge upon Kivya Hull, that
impenetrable boundary between you and El Lokut.
But it will be going to El Lokut and not anything else because
there is one source and we are not dualists and everything
ultimately is traced. Akhileshwar.
Now getting back to Rambam the 4th Talaqa, who shall now be
Omer Bashemel Kim Mehmet who Levado ha Ahmed the Emmett can't
meet at all. Uncontingent existence, absolute
reality is something we ascribe only Takhileshwar, the hota
shataram merit in odd Mila badao, Kumar Encha Matsui and
met Mila Badao Kimoto. That is, we don't positive there
can be anything that is existent in the same manner that is
existent in odd Mila badao. Because everything else that
exists in the world is contingent existence.
Contingent on what? Excuse me, the contingent on
contingent on absolutely nothing.
So what is it going to say with respect to the world?
Getting back to Nisotz, we unequivocally see everything in
the universe as one gets existence.
That, after all, is precisely the second.
If you can imagine that this existent hacker sparkle would
not be, then nothing else could exist.
And it's a continuous dependence because we aren't theists.
And moreover, what that means is that everything on a constant
ongoing basis owes it's ongoing existence to something we can
call, we can invoke a whole array of expressions.
They're all anthropomorphic terms.
It's not that Khalila was in that world, it is that that
world is entirely contingent on Hakashburg.
So the oneness is absolutely inviolable, but it doesn't mean
that we're not going to be received, manifest as it were in
this world. The whole gamut of attributes of
action, such as the Yudhimami daughter, Al Kamim, the 13
attributes of divine compassion that we enunciate depending upon
the Nusak a few times a year or every day, but those are all of
April. That's describing the manner in
which we proceed like there's bravo benefits in this world
through action. They don't imply that there's
bravos in this world. They do enunciate the Verity
that nothing in this world is divorced from Akhilesh Prakhu,
but there's a huge, indeed unbridgeable gap between saying
that and saying Elokut is in this world.
So I hope that more or less addresses the issue of totally
knowing this. That was great.
Probably Adlerstein. A a quick response, just the 33
small items. One, I'm very indebted now to
Rabbi Eisen for informing us that review Huda Levi was in
Bakuba. I'm very pleased to find that
out Number number #2 I I am indebted to him for clarifying
something that I've pointed out when I when I have on several
occasions tried to teach Ram Kao, particularly Der Hashem to
to tell me them and made the made the observation that here
in this one volume philosophy of of of Yiddish Gite of Judaism,
of Yadud, that it tends to encompass more than what the
view to Halevi did in Kazari. There's a lot more topics.
The absolute shortest parrot in the whole safer is what is God
and and he sort of like gets it down to a couple of statements,
not principles. There's a heck of a lot of
Rambam in the Ram Pal, far more than I think people are willing
to own up to. And what Rabbi Eisen did is help
me with a, a hunch I always had. And I was conveyed to students
that of the, I think 5 or 6 statements that the rampal
makes, they ultimately all boil down to the oneness of, of
bhakadershwaraku. And from there all of the others
can be understood. And without them, they cannot be
understood. So Rabbi Eisen gets the positive
Reductionist of the Year award for that one.
And lastly, at the at the risk of throwing in a name which is
probably as welcome to our hosts as a double dose of gefilte
fish, when we speak about Ms., about the truth being the
ultimate, the ultimate value and the ultimate reality and the
only thing that really is true is the non contingent existence
of a Kadeshbaraku. I'm reminded of an observation
at review Ruhm Levovitz made certainly not a Maimonidean
rationalist, but but with far more deeply probing and
philosophical areas than many of this generation.
He said we're all acquainted with the fact that Uncleus in a
number of many different places when it comes to things that
sound anthropomorphic, he addresses them as
anthropomorphism. So he doesn't talk about speech.
He talks about about something about the D board that came
from. He finds ways of dealing with
things like Yad Hashem. So if you Ruhum said that, we
know why he doesn't want to just translate Yad Hashem is the hand
of God because God doesn't have a hand, not at least in the
sense that we think of a hand. But he said the ultimate reality
is that only God has a hand, and what we think is a hand is not
really a hand. And and clearly what he meant is
that our idea of hand is limited and very much contingent.
And whatever it is that the Torah refers to as Hashem's hand
is not limited and not contingent.
If I could just put in two repo scripts and again I'm going to
violate the principle of first with respect to the last point,
I think that is a fundamental bone of contention in the
Rishonian between the philosopher's and Mukubalin
miracle. We discussed this once with
respect to an idea expressed by Rabi Itzhaka Ramaa in Sharkhet
of Aki Dakitzhak, with respect to the two versions of the
mitrash of Gadol Kokhanshal Naveen.
Is it Shehem Meddamin Suraliotska or shamdamim dmut
guruchelmala, the basavadam? So the, you know, the whether we
see the hand as essentially a physical organ that we are
allegorically ascribing in the realm of the divine as an
anthropomorphism, or we see it rather as a kind of symbolism on
the level of MIBE besaviya kheze eloka.
But I know I'd rather not get into that.
I just wanted to know with respect to the second, the
second point, As for what the foundation is of the ideas
enunciated in Ram Khal. So I'm going to say that oneness
is in itself a derivative of self mandated existence.
That's the axiom. That's the axiom and that's the
definition. The moment that we speak about
Akashbroko, if we're not talking about absolute self mandated
existence, we're on a different page.
We're not talking about Akashbroko and everything that
we say then derives from that. That's why this principle of
oneness. I don't think I sufficiently
clarified what I intended at the outset when I said Derek Hasehl
and Derek Hasehl is simply that in others that the moment we
speak of self mandated existence, the this concept of
oneness. It is purely corollary of saying
self mandated existence. Derek Haseh the very reality
that this is clearly the premise enunciated by the gamut of the
rich your name. This isn't something my mind at
the end nor something unique to rebuild Olivi and I'm just note
that the Avad in addressing the question of divine corporeality
indicts Agadot hamishabushot ETA de OTT agadic passages that
confuse or corrupt the mind, depending on how you want to
chance that Michelle Schulte. You know, there's certainly the
premise of anything that would contravene categorical
incorporeality is false. And even more stridently, where
Ramban weighed in really throughout his writings, but
especially in the GERD Aluka with respect to the my Mana Dean
controversy that was erupting in his time.
And the position that he takes with respect to the essential
theology is we are completely beholden to Ramba.
So I don't know if I would go along with saying that Rabbi is
a Mukuba, but Ramba certainly was and he definitely goes along
with this theology in Ramba. So just pointing out that we
definitely have Masoret that makes it clear.
And you know, someone wants to descend with nearly all the
Rishonim. Well, you know, we're familiar
with phenomena like that. We usually call them reform.
All right, OK, on to round two, Round 2, the topic of does God
need us? There is a popular campaign
promulgated by certain rabbis today which teaches that God
needs us, while there's another popular campaign which asserts
that God is actually jealous and has regrets just as the Torah
says. A perspective that is critical
to viewing the Torah with Greek eyes is the Neo Kabbalist of the
Hasidic belief and panentheism that both God, that both that
God is both transcendent and imminent, imbued in all things.
Just another form of paganism which seems like a kind of
spiritual polytheism. Both systems involve a hierarchy
of divine powers, potentially leading to idolatry of the mind.
What is problematic about God permeating the world if we
acknowledged he's infused in everything, yet his essence is
not that thing? Or the idea that the human soul
is a literal piece of God and more revealed in specific
people? Or that the Shrinath is God's
physical presence in the world? How does one determine when to
take the tour, literally or metaphorically, regarding God I?
Think we we both feel the same thing It takes.
Me a little while to recover from that the the idea that
there's certain rabbis who who who contend that God needs us
reminds me of the time that I think we're Zev Cone in Chicago.
So it was a, it was a major halacha figure.
They're called or of Schwabs or of Racha.
Ask him for guidance about how to relate to, from people in the
community who were convicted of certain monetary offenses.
And, and Bershwab said, what did you say?
And he said, well, I'm dealing with the issue of, from people
in the community who are, you know, been been caught on major
scandals. What did you say?
And it went a few, few rounds like that before Rabbi Cohen
realized that what Schwab was saying was how can you call such
a person from, I don't know how you could use the word rabbi in
reference to such an abhorrent, abhorrent statement.
Need, God, need can. Can you say that God needs
anything? The idea of need has been
totally rejected. It's we just our literature is
saturated with the idea that a cut of article was lamella from
all of those things. He has no restrictions.
He is perfect. A perfect being cannot need
anything. Need always implies deficiency.
That's not Greek. Or if it is shared by some
people in the Greek world, more power to them.
But that is that is part and parcel of Hakodesh Burkhu's
perfection, which Rabbi Eisen will show us how it also comes
from God's self mandated existence.
But I'm not gonna I'm not gonna go there.
I'll leave that for him. But yes, that is the single most
objectionable form of what you of of what you mentioned in the
question. On some of the others, I think
there's less objection. One of the one of the things
that you posited was that that that that Hashem is somehow
connected to the world without such connection, implying that
this is a necessary part of his existence.
I Koeshbroka's existence would be nonetheless if that
connection disappeared and if the world disappeared.
I think that round one we pretty much covered that.
Rabbi Eisen, of course, did a much better job than I did of
showing the tale why we reject the extremes of God being
unconnected on the one hand, and the other extreme of God being
in it in a physical in a physical sense, when you talk
about things being the most sublime manifestation of
something of a gulbargu, depending on which group of
heretical group within Rasid as you're talking about, I think
we'd have to go through them one by one to to to say that that
Sadiqim or the Merkova of the Shrina is not a heretical idea.
That's straight out of the Gemara.
How, how does it, where do you cross the line?
You practically speaking, you know when you've crossed the
line, after you've done as as much thinking about the issues
as Rebei Eisenhower, minimally by listening to everything that
he has to say. And then if you're still
confused, call him and ask him, right?
That's typically what we do in this religion.
No, I mean, in all seriousness, when things are confusing, this
is a confusing area. And people have to have Rebei.
They have to have people who they trust, who are thoroughly
immersed in the world of, of, of proper Tora hash, Kapha.
And you you can ask questions like that.
And they make they, they can, they tend to find clarity out of
the murkiness. But the, the idea that that
Shrina is in this world. Sure, the Rishonimo grappled
with the idea, but you know, and, and they, they put huge
limitation about what that means.
Does God become part of the world?
Does he, you know, does he find the, the Kurdish Kardashian as
his home where he takes all of his essence and put it there?
No, but even even in the world, look, I see this, you have this,
this, this vast difference between about what Simpson meant
to create the a room for finity within Infinity, which is a just
absolute conundrum, which the Kabbalah very, very wisely said,
we're just going to call it Simpson and don't ask me
anything like that. But it allows us to move the
question and talk about to talk about things afterwards.
Did it mean that Hashem contracted his essence, whatever
that means, or just the aura of his essence?
But nobody, nobody talked about God becoming physical in this
world. You do that and you've become a
member of a different religion, another monotheistic religion
maybe going to happen that you've shown him according to
happen that you've shown him and maybe even more than half, but
but nonetheless a belief that we are high of Nisa for believing.
Robert Adlerstein 2 points before before Rabbi Eisen
responds 1 So I just found it somewhat interesting that the
the first part with the does God need us?
You categorically rejected it. However, you're, you sort of
have you've you from what I can tell you accept to some extent
the Kabbalistic positions to some extent, but does God need
us is actually one of the the highlights of Kabbalistical
thought for the whole point of mitzvot and the whole point of
everything is to essentially reunify the spirit so that God
can become one again. I was just wondering how you
square that with with those notions because even more than
if we just say penentiism or throughout terms, really the
whole point of the Czar is essentially the God needs our
mitzvot. That's like that's literally the
whole, the whole point. That was one thing and another
thing, which I'm, I apologize if I'm, if I'm thinking, but so
you've been so you're saying you've you've said it.
If we can go back and listen, but I remember you said so it's
not that God puts all his essence.
It's only a aura just from my my studies in these things.
And I, Rob Eisen, I'm sure will be able to to help clear it up
for me as well. I think part of the problem is,
is that the concept of having hara from A1 of from from
essence or a part of essence. Those are contradictory terms
because God's essence, if it's one is, is indivisible into
parts. Hey, arot NIT sot sot that was
that would imply that his that would imply that God's essence
has multiple functionalities, right, Or that it is it is
multiplexed in its in what it can do.
Whereas when we say a simple unity, that kind of detracts and
I understand the need for it. I understand what you mean that
we're trying to somehow we're trying to somehow keep God's
essence away, but at the same time to fix certain empirical
issues that we have that we need to, you know, connect God with
the world. So we're trying to find this
middle bridge, but I think part of the problem is, is that when
you have a notion of simple unity, it automatically detracts
from a middle ground that in a positive way they might be
trying to find. Those are just two points I
wanted to bring up. I'm sorry if I if I no problem.
I, I will respond. I will respond to briefly.
The first one's the easier one to to respond to the.
I just lost my thought. That God needs us I think you're
referring to. Yeah, how did you phrase the
question? Well, the the entire zor is
essentially how to. Yes, yeah, yeah.
I think this is a a crucial error that people make.
Resolvatri puts it very pithily. You simply cannot talk about
purpose when it comes to that. Cutter's powerful purpose in
creating the world, purpose in giving us mitzvos, purpose in
caring about man. What you can talk about is
function. We don't know why and we can't
even ask why. And the very question why is
asking for you to understand God in completely human terms of
well, something wasn't here and and it had to be done.
So you know, this is this is the way.
This is the way he did it, but I could his brother who did create
a world and in that world he has he has a a script for the world
he has he has a plan for the way world is going to progress to
fulfill that mission as it were the mission that he gave to man.
Yes, man is necessary for the furtherance of that program.
The program was designed to incorporate man Again, I can't
tell you why, but man is part of it and he gave he assigned that
mission to man. Now, how do you how do you
square this with your second, your second point, How do we
square this with with the the the annoying all right, neat
sauce and things like that are are just semantic things trying
to take away from. So I would I would point you to
Das Unos of the Ranghao. The whole safer deals with that.
And it starts with the recognition that of course
that's true and that everything that Akashbar who created in
this world was. Was was sort of anthrocentric.
It was there for man and for what man is supposed to do.
But the goal of the whole thing is to show that there is no
division of the world. There is no turning the world
into into particles. The world is 1, and the way that
the world becomes one is for human beings to live in it with
the contradictions, with the questions.
And keep on saying, ain't ode milvado.
Nothing out there can take away from the oneness of Hakurajbaru.
This is the Sode Hayekud, which ultimately is the way he
describes the mission statement from a human standpoint of the
world. We gradually by doing mitzvos,
by listening to Khadushbar who, by looking evil straight in the
face and saying you can, you can, you can hide, but we're
still going to find you. And ultimately we're going to
assert. Right now, like Rashi says, we
can only assert it, but in the end of time we will be able to
understand how everything that Akoteshwaraku created, including
these seeming pockets of non existence of of of Hashem's
presence, don't contradict the oneness of Hashem.
He's there in in everything. About Ayton.
Yeah. So again, I'm going to start up,
I keep on doing this from the end just with respect to the
impossibility of understanding Hakadashvaraku's act of
creation. And this, of course, is the
principal thrust of Rambam in the third unit of the MOVA in
precisely to enunciate that Verity.
And of course simultaneously, while we don't have the
werewithal to understand the reason of creation, one of the
most foundational principles that Rambam enunciates in the
Pyrrhic. And he does it in the context of
a scathing rejection of Aristotelianism.
The progression in the mohair is from the first Catholic that
that is essentially consonant with Aristotle.
The second, which begins to cast aspersions and certain aspects
of Astelianism, saying that Aristotle can only be relied
upon in the sublunary realm. The third, where Aristotle flies
out the window in the critical critique in this chapter, in
chapter 13, what Rama essentially says is the premise
of telos of some ultimate purpose is something that is
irreconcilable with a primeval universe, which is of course
foundational in Aristotelian philosophy that the universe is
primeval. And this is a more complex
issue, and as much as Aristotle attempts to eat his cake and
have it too, because he does presume that Telos exists in a
primeval universe, ironically I think that was one of the
principal motivations of Spinoza in rejecting the idea of Telos
because he realized it was an insurmountable obstacle to a
pantheistic worldview. Because then there has to be
some divine Meridian purpose. So he took the air stealing
system through, tell us out the window, and of course
established what is on deep contemplation and utter
absurdity. Because everyone intuitively
senses that the universe has some underlying purpose.
Great scientists have that presumption.
It's ironic in that vein that Einstein is a case in point,
describes himself as tracing the lines that flow from God.
No, he describes himself as being Spinoza.
But the moment that you talk about lines that flow, that flow
from God, in that sense, you really aren't the Spinoza.
I, if I may have that admonishment on Einstein's
premise of being a Spinoza. But but consider, though,
Einstein was coming from a completely, completely atheistic
background, given his home environment, and his conception
of there being a re bonochel olam in some sense of the term
was a consequence of if you're a great scientist, you do believe
that you're tracing lines that flow from God, as Einstein saw
aptly expressed it. Me Yorker scientists, by the
way, don't have that problem, which explains a lot of the the
morons who, based upon their very petty misunderstanding of
philosophy of science, think that their science has somehow
proven atheism. But again, this is something
that would be aside every We'll leave it on the side.
Returning to the essential question of pantheism, as I
already commented to you, I have a major problem trying to figure
out what pantheism, what pantheism is going to be as
distinct from pantheism or as the same from monotheism.
That is, once we appreciate it all goes back to that bedrock
definition that self mandated existence.
And self mandated existence does not broker any room for
multiplicity whatsoever. So we aren't going to be able to
whip out our metaphysical knife and start chopping
Akadarshbaraho Khalilah into parts they don't exist.
So if when we speak of the accessibility Kivyakol of
Akadarshbaraho in this world, we speak of some manifestation,
again on the level of observing action and ascribing it to its
divine stores, 100%. And indeed, in this regard it
will note the correspondence famously enunciated in the
Gemara in Masek Braho da Feud between what we say about the
Mishima, the soul with respect to the microcosm of man, and
what we say about Hakadosh Paraho Kibiaho with respect to
the universe, an idea that is far more elaborated upon in the
Madras, in particular by Ikaraba Parashadal Piskahet.
This idea of kivyako agosproko being the Nishima of the
universe is by no means pantheistic or even pan
entheistic. It's purely monotheistic.
It is recognizing that just as the Nishima is transcendent, but
it still animates the microcosm, the goof, the person.
So Agospracho is utterly transcendent, but animates the
universe. And and of course, it's in this
vein that we likewise appreciate the idea enunciated manifold
places in The Mirage. Well, note in particular
Brashita Gabba in Parshasa Machet Biscartet about referring
to as Rahu as Hamakom. Why do we refer to as Rahu as
Hamakom? Hakadosh rahum mikomochalam, the
en olamo Mikomo? Now what does that mean?
Because the place of this world, the world is not his place, that
Agosroko transcends, the world that is not subsumed within it.
Now, someone could come along and say, oh, that's panantheism.
And maybe it is. I I just have no idea what
Panantheism means in this regard.
What The Mirage prima facie is enunciating is the realization
that Agosroko's utterly transcended, and then yet the
entire world is animated through Agosroko's divinity.
We're going to call that pantheism.
We call it monotheism. That's exactly what antheism
presumes. Monotheism as opposed to daism.
Hakush prokhu, is kibiyakho in that vein involved?
Now, Rabbi, I understand, expressed it very well.
If you ask me to parse out exactly how that works, I'll
tell you. I don't know.
We're mortal, we don't understand these things.
But I can enunciate my lack of understanding.
Not in the sense of enunciating some logical contradiction and
saying that's what it's got to be.
There are things that I simply don't understand, right.
After all, Lawyer Rani Ha Dan Bakai, that means mankind, while
live in this world cannot see meaning grasp.
So there are a lot of things we don't understand, but it's not
going to justify our engaging in some facile and absurd division
in the realm of the divine or making khalilah Khalilah dahas.
I feel like I need to, you know, even say the sentence part of
this world, because saying that means either of two things.
Either it's an equation with the totality of this world, we call
it pantheism, or an association with some XM something in this
world. We call it paganism.
They're both here radical and we certainly are not going to
subscribe to either one. As for speaking, that means I'm
just the absurdity of it boggles the mind.
How could something that Haggis Raku creates even means for
addressing a need that otherwise he wouldn't be able to?
I can't even say the sentence. It's just utterly absurd to
espouse absurdities and say, oh, well, that's the enigma of
divinity. We have a name for that.
And actually it's it's a doctrine.
It's called feedeism, the presumption that faith is
antagonistic to reasoning. Jews are not feedeistic.
Pityism is something that arose as an explanation of various
statements of the Church Fathers.
We're not going to go into it, but I'm not saying it as an
indictment, saying it as the realization that in as much as
Christianity from the outset was transcendentalistic, it could
accommodate not only a bifurcation, but an antagonism
between one's conception of this world and one's conception of
theology. Because if you're a
transcendentalist, then you're not focusing on this world,
you're focusing someplace else. Jews are not transcendentalists.
The Torah is all about reality, the reality of spirituality in
this world. So you got to be able to deal
with this world. So making all sorts of absurd
PDistic statements is just not going to cut it in Torah, even
if some people would like to do so.
It's not a matter of that the Rishonima Khalila were were
Greek. It's that anyone who makes a
statement like that does manifestly pay.
It's not. Doris So Rabbi Eisen, if I'm
just trying to make sure I'm understanding you and how that
goes with Rabbi Adlerstein's. So I think for you, even if you
were to agree with Rabbi Adlerstein's idea that Nitsoto
Ara is not necessarily trying to bring God in, it's it's our way
of expressing the this, this dichotomy of God's oneness.
But his animation, you're saying that to put any sort of word to
create any sort of confuse, we, we just simply have to recognize
the fact that we cannot understand transcendence with
animation, instead of trying to put fancy words or fancy ideas
that can now just lead and spiral into many strange ideas.
Am I understanding you correctly?
I I don't think I'm saying anything different from what
Rabi Everstein said. In other words.
We. Use this nomenclature.
If I can cite an example from somewhat far afield, you know,
the premise of the company Diversification of Quantum
Mechanics is that we use classical terms in describing
phenomenon that simply cannot be understood in the terms of
classical Newtonian physics. But we still use the
nomenclature because we already have nomenclature.
So in the same vein here, we're not going to make up a new
language that wouldn't really help very well because we'll be
just speaking in terms that no one else will understand.
So we use the terms that we have.
Indeed, again, we speak of Nisaltz, we can speak of
Khrotashem, we speak of Shrina. These are terms that didn't even
arise in the regional name. They arrived in Kazao.
We see them explicitly. One could very well argue that
because I weren't in of any of them either.
We we we see them in the words of the Naveen right and
simultaneously going to ask me to give a rigorous
understanding. I have to be humble enough to
recognize that I am Basar Vadam and the flesh and blood creature
is not going to be able to understand divinity as both
dharan and Rashotaran and raviol savabo and sephirahim
expressively. If I, if I would know Hashem, I
would be Hashem, right? It's as simple as that.
We're not there, we're not going to be there.
My thoughts are your thoughts. You always are my ways.
Period. That's an inviolable barrier to
our being able to understand. But at the very least, it's
important for us to be able to enunciate why we don't
understand. That is, if I was just going to
say we don't understand, then hey, I could have done that a
lot more tersely than I did. So you could say I'm just saying
I don't understand in an extraordinarily verbose manner.
I I think the verbosity has justification here because it's
important for us to be able to enunciate why this is something
that I cannot understand and simultaneously why I am still
going to abide by these two premises that divine unity is
not going to be violated under any circumstance whatsoever.
Self mandated existence is the definition and that necessarily
has unity and lack of dependence of contingency as the most
obvious corollaries. And simultaneously we look at a
world and we see manifest. To us, the most essential
deadrock of our belief in Agathas Prakhu is we experience
Hashem. That doesn't mean we are
encountering literal elokut. We experience Hashem because
Agathas Prakhu has made his presence manifest in this world.
So I've said presence, I've said manifest.
Of course, I could express this in terms of Shrinath and Giloi
and kavod and mitzvot and use a whole arsenal of vocabulary.
We're not going to understand it.
But to take that inability to understand that which transcends
human can and get out our metaphysical broom and wipe it
off the table and say, oh, we understand that.
Again, I'm not going to repeat the heresy.
We don't do that sort of thing. But I'm going to get that that
heretical statement that that you made at the outset that
that's just doesn't compute. So I don't understand me.
It's not a license for spouting absurdities.
Very well said, but. Especially absurdities that go
against our masarat. So that's the thing that one of
the issues that I feel is happening is that people are
like you mentioned, a lot of these terms were were brought
down by Hazal Tatikim. What is, what is all that?
What is, what is, you know, whatever, whatever concepts came
out, all these concepts, the problem is with the revelatory
nature of Kabbalah and Khasidut is that these ideas become more
and more defined over time with new meaning.
So now a Sadiq, does it mean something completely different
than it meant maybe 100 years ago, 1000 years ago?
That's really the issue. Because now there are certain,
let's say, groups that will see that, you know, the, the, the
Tadiq is atmos Sumehous Melubash, but goof or they'll
see that, you know, only through the Tadiq.
Can you? Because what happens is, is that
yes, we, we all agree that tadiqim are, are unbelievable
And, and we, we really admire them and we want to be like them
and so on. But the, the idea of Hasidut
tends to, tends to have a different meaning.
Now it tends to be like it's the vertical society where the where
the Sadiq is basically above all.
He is an ulama at salute. He is beyond, you know.
Yeah, I know. I see.
Let me abbreviate the heresy. I'm sorry.
I just I I I. I know.
My my constitution is is somewhat delicate, I must admit.
I. I think we should be no.
I think, I think it is sufficient for us to appreciate
in this regard, even if someone is a completely ignorant,
blithering idiot with respect to any matters of the intellect and
can't comprehend them. The arguments that we just
enunciated, we have something called the masoret.
The moment someone says no, it's something that is developing in
brand new directions that have no earlier antecedent.
So there is a locus of movements of Jews that do that sort of
thing. We call them reform, but we're
not reformed. Yeah, I think very easy to make
the mistake we. Believe We believe it is a
masoret. Of of seeing good ideas, which
happens right and left, good ideas that turn into
monstrosities by people taking them beyond where they were
supposed to go. But but to indict Kabola because
Kabola led to Shoptite's fee. Yes, Kabola did lead to
Shoptite's fee, but it was a it was a misstatement of Kabbalah.
And maybe it took Aerchencholum's fattest volume
to at least suggest where it went wrong, but it but it did go
wrong. I I don't think that Rove minion
and Rove Binion of people today who who have an appreciation of,
of Kabbalah have any stomach for thinking for for phrases like
the Optimus of Akersburg who Muluvash and the yeah, yeah, I,
I, I, but. By Adler saying one thing I
would tell you though, is I understand what you're saying
and I'm in agreement with you earlier Kabbalah, especially
Kabbalah by the by the Rashonim by the Rashonim.
Of course it's not on the same they they, they spent a large
amount of time trying to preserve fundamentals, right of
God's unity and all that. I understand.
I think where though the problem is, is that when you create an
entire doctrine, there's a problem when when the entire
language of Kabbalah, even when you're even at the most careful
point, even when you go back to the Ramban and the Ramchal who
have made great, great, great strides to make sure language
doesn't get jumbled and mixed up and confused and and spiraling
into something else. At the end of the day, when you
introduce an anthropomorphic doctrine again, not that they
meant to be anthropomorphic here, obviously I'm I'm I'm in
agreement with you up until those points, right?
They didn't necessarily mean for it.
But when you introduce an A doctrine which points towards an
anthropomorphic language, the end result is most likely always
going to be what the result actually happened, at least from
how I'm instead now the as a as a as an example, though, see the
Rambam, Maimonides and and delusion and actually, we should
say overshone him in that from that perspective, they spoke the
language is always negative, negative theology wise, right.
We're trying to negate, negate, negate because when you point
the arrow that way, you're safe. There's nowhere where that's
really going to go wrong. You might not get it perfect,
but you're not going to go wrong here with Kabbalah with the best
of intentions. And I'm, I promise I'm in full
agreement with you, best of intentions.
But you see, because of the nature of its language, it's
almost like it's a matter of time until it goes in the
direction it went. That's all I wanted to say and I
apologize. I don't mean to offend her in
any way. I These things are important to
me, you know. That's the job we got to clarify
it. But but, but it just reminds me
of the Gemara of the, the Kofair who came to one of the, I don't
remember Tanner and Amora and said, you know, but Kurzberg who
hates Avodah Zara so much, you know, why doesn't he just cancel
it? And, and, and he and he said,
look, people worship the sun and moon, but the sun in particular
for good reason. Should I, Kurzberg, who
destroyed the sun and destroyed the world because of those
fools? I don't think that I I fiercely
resist what you're what you're the implication of what you're
saying that well, the early Mukilbolom got it right and then
it it it just went off the tracks.
I think that some people went off the tracks.
I don't think it defines the majority of people by by any
means. Look, I'm not a Bucky in in in
this, but I would be surprised if you find found the vocabulary
that you're rightfully pushing back against in any of the
descendants of the Itakadash of of of that's I can.
There's simple, there's simple. Bunim in particular.
OK, talking about the the gear and you know the ones that are
that are. Warmer the, the ones, the ones,
the ones who are still into thinking through issues.
There's a fascinating paper which I would recommend to
people written by my friend and neighbor, Professor Benny Brown
on the what happened in certain parts of Glacedus.
I, I think you'll be very happy with the, with the paper.
And he, he made the very cogent observation that up until fairly
recent times, you have sort of two different views of the
universe, but they'd be both systematic.
You had a rationalist way of looking at the, at the, at the
world and you had a kabbalistic way, but they were both
systematized. They asked questions that were
theorems, they were axioms. And then a kind of negative
theology, a different kind of negative theology than what you
were referring to, took over in which all questions became us
and we just made statements. And that left room.
Sort of like, you know, one of the reasons people enjoy
learning Rambam is because you can say whatever you want and
you know, like. Who's there to tell you that
you're? Wrong is such in in places such
a tabula rasa, but that that doesn't mean that we shouldn't
continue to to figure out what the Rambam meant.
So I I don't think that it's a question of early Kabbala versus
late Kabbala. I think it's early Kabbalah
certainly didn't have the problem, although I could point
to a couple of places that will raise your hair.
But but the the the the idea of of, you know, couldn't they see
where it was going is no more of an indictment to them than
Takotos Berkle for using anthropomorphic language
throughout Tanakh. Didn't people realize or
voracious Barohelo Kim. What's that floral doing there
in that first pusuk in the Torah.
We're on to something. No, I I I I don't accept that
two other two other points. If I can, if I can remember
them. One of them is that, at the risk
of turning this wonderful theoretical conversation into
something pragmatic, I would just point out that what Rabbi
Eisen offered us a few minutes ago is one of the most important
tools for facing a whole bunch of issues.
What do I mean? That it's not only the question
of God's presence and pantheism and pantheism, but the existence
of evil. I remember in Los Angeles the
great earthquake and all of the and all of the the, the, the,
the, the death, the destruction. The ground had barely ceased
moving before a Reconstructionist rabbi in the
valley wrote an article for the world saying God does not do
earthquakes. God is not responsible for
earthquakes. God is only responsible for the
good things, the things that we like, but anything that we don't
like that comes from some other place entirely.
So of course he was a duelist. And what, what people, what
people should realize is that what Rabbi Eisen was suggesting
is one of the triumphs of Yahadut that we would rather say
full faced. This is a question.
The reason we can't understand it is because we are not
Hakodesh Baraku and you have to be Hakodesh Baraku.
As I said, you said, to understand him.
We would rather say I don't understand.
I have no hope of understanding, at least not in this life.
It cannot be understood to say that rather than to pick at
facile arguments, which are corruptions and denials of what
Hakodesh Baraku is. It's not just in this issue,
it's certainly in the existence of of evil where people will
still say that. You know, last week or whenever
it was after the assassination and Trump was saying, even Trump
said this was this was God working.
And the amount of mockery you found in some of the media.
Oh yeah, God saved him. So where was God when my
mother-in-law was in the way of an oncoming bus and he didn't
run her over? You know, if, if God's really
out there, why didn't he take care of business there?
Or why does God allow evil? There is no God.
Stop it. You know, that kind of of of
equally contemptible thinking. At least it wasn't coming from
from what people close they, they wouldn't, you know, the,
the statements you dealt with were not coming from the
Orthodox world. They were clearly beyond the
pale of the Orthodox world, but they were coming from people who
called themselves rabbis and scholars.
One other point, the idea of how Arora and Nitzevitz and all of
those terms is, are those terms are not just there to describe
the connection of a Kurdishburg in the world.
They're there for one for at least one of the purpose as
well, which we have avoided entirely in this broadcast,
probably for good reason. And that is that there's another
essential paradox that we live with, and that is the existence
of limit limitedness in with within Hakoto's bark, who is
limitless. Again, the idea that spawned
Simpson as an answer, but Kabbalah wasn't wasn't content
with just saying Simpson. It then had the task of
understanding as much as possible of how you could go
from the purely spiritual to a world of material.
Ultimately you're confounded with a Jewish form of Zeno's
paradox. The whole idea of Ishthal
Shalhos through the Olamos and then the Spheros transmuting
Hakushburg who is spiritual Shephat, till at some magical
point which we can never describe, somehow the this
becomes manifest in a material world.
That's another reason for this whole structure that was that we
find in the world in the in in the world of Kabala.
I'll let Rabbi eyes. And say that's what that's one
and the same. You know, that's essentially the
conundrum of evil, the conundrum of divinity not being in this
world that are being able to perceive, to experience this
divine imminence. The the conflict all together,
divine transcendence and divine imminence is all really one and
the same. I, I, I, I must admit that that
someone could purport in the name of Judaism to make a
statement that is so radically dualistic.
I mean, I guess maybe he didn't regard himself as beholden to
anything Jewish altogether with respect to the conundrum of the
existence of evil. The the supposed clergyman whom
you cited after the earthquake in Los Angeles, I would have
thought on some level would at the very least be beholden, if
not to Talmudic or rabbinical teachings, at the very least to
Tanakh. That is, when we read in Isaiah
Yoshiyahu chapter 45 verse 7, the God is Yosef O overeek oseh
Shalom ovorega, God explicitly identifies himself as the
creator of evil, and we may augment that also with Amos in
the era ABBA irbashem LO Siva that the the source of
everything that happens, the negative as well is necessarily
going to be the divine command. What we read in Aha the P
Eliondo, also a rhetorical question.
Obviously everything. I'm sorry for Hashem, but with
respect to the Pasukin Yeshaya, which if anything is the most
explicit boure, the comment of Rambam in Myrna Bokim in the
third Kelek in Perekyod, where Rambam very prosaically notes an
exegetical conundrum. There are three verbs that are
employed in the pasuk, Yosser, Beauvais and Oser.
What's the distinction among them?
In particular, we invoke Beauvais before we even get to
the subject of evil. With respect to darkness, how do
you create darkness? Darkness isn't a presence,
darkness is an absence. And Rambam notes, even though it
is a subject of a dissension among the commentators, the well
established tradition that Bara is the verb that we knew used to
describe creation X nilo, creating from nothing, says
Rambam. It's amazing to the Force that
this tells us that Bara is a verse, is a verb that is
associated with nothingness. So in the story of creation, it
is of course creating from nothing, and in this enigmatic
verse in yeshayao, it is creating a nothing.
You've said, oh, God forms light, but creates the
potentiality to the light being withdrawn.
That is tantamount to creating this absence, creating darkness,
and likewise creating evil, because evil is always an
absence rather than a presence. Which of course further
amplifies the absurdity of ascription of anything like evil
as an actuality in the rumble of the divine.
Because after all, God is presence, not absence.
But at the same time, because we are a duelist and everything has
its source in Hakadosh Barako, then the potentiality for evil
that necessarily is in the rumble of the divine.
And of course, we see this as the most concrete terms.
Where's the 1st place that evil appears in Tanakh?
The tree, it's Haddad Tovara, the tree of knowing good and
evil, the potentiality of evil. What makes the evil not merely a
potential, but something actual man taking of the tree of the
fruit of the tree and eating it. And and that really summarizes
our attitude with respect to evil, that ultimately everything
has its sorts in the realm of the divine.
Simultaneously, the whole challenge of creation is God
gives us potentiality and then summons us to make the right
choice. And is that statement rife with
conundrums? Of course it is.
As we've discussed previously, free will itself is a conundrum,
like the Trump will create something that is entirely
contingent on him for its existence, but it exists
independent of him. That doesn't make any sense.
We understand, we're again, we're our minds come up against
an impenetrable wall. It's not going to justify our
making absurd statements and ascribing them, excuse me, in
the same way that we as children at a juvenile birthday party go
about trying to pin a tail on a donkey.
I remember going to say a lot of the other because they're both
criminal absurdities. We're not coming to do either
one of them. There is a locus of movements
among Jews. I'm conspicuously not referring
to them as Jewish movements that have as their premise that we
can come up with completely new ideas.
We may use a traditional vocabulary, but completely
divorced from traditional meanings.
And that locus of movements we call reform in, ironically in
the Protestant church, the Reformation reform was based
upon the premise there was something that had become
utterly corrupt in the church, and therefore we were going to
go back to something earlier, more original.
And it it really is breathtaking how fraudulent the implication
of the term reform is then by those Jews who weren't going
back to anything original. They were simply pulling in
fabrication of thin air because they weren't interested in
tradition. Well, anyone who does that
essential activity, even if, excuse me, he does it wearing a
strimel and a bekaa, is reform. We have a tradition.
The the premise that is most essential in Torah is we have a
massara. Which is precisely why, as
Rambam so famously expresses it, those who are Mahishay Magideha,
those who deny that there is a transmission of a masoret of
Torah, forfeit their share in the world to come.
But the difficulty is with, you know, they all say that they
have the Masoret. They they all say that the
masoret is, is was revealed to a certain small group of people or
revealed in certain periods that that's a separate issue.
But it is something that it's not that they deny that there's
a masoret. They just have new definitions.
And it's hard to really, you know, how do we respond to these
things without sounding like we're criticizing the whole
system? I'm.
Sorry, we we respond through going back to the services.
That is as a case in point when we consider Rambam's repudiation
of literalism in Agada. It wasn't saying that Rambam
came up with it's written in the early writings of the Ghonim.
We've seen it explicitly Rasadhya Ravshira Ravshwa
Barhofni Ravhai, the Ghonim as well as the earlier Rishonim,
Rabino Khananel, Rabino Nissim Gaon Raviudalevi and certainly
by the gamut of later Rishonim, including the Ladakh Rabin,
Rambam, Ramban Verona, Rashba and again, as we noted, even
among the but he still talks about the Agadoth
Hamishabhshotta. They ought Ramban Ramban
certainly had a children of Kabbalah and in the Garrett
Aruka, he completely affirms theology of Rambam.
And, and while we will note, yes, if if you ask me, is there
any dissenting voice, there is a dissenting voice certainly on
the subject of literalism in Agadah, which has profound
implications with respect to much of this discussion among
the Richonim. We can cite two in particular,
Roshan Shams and Rabbi Moshe Tako of Regensburg, who
definitely seem to advocate and uncompromising literalism in
Agatha. But you know, it's noteworthy,
the premier exponent of this literalism, Rabbi Moshe Tako.
I must admit, on a personal plane, the subject of the very
first line that I had the privilege of hearing from
Rabatleston when we first met, He asked me what do I have to
say about Rabbosh attack and, and, and from there it was great
sailing, and it's been great sailing since.
And while his composition on this subject was quoted in
contemporaneous Ashkenazi literature, it's noteworthy that
only one fabric fragment survived.
And it was first published in a scholarly compendium in Kukhmat,
Israel in the mid 19th century, Ottarn Ahmad by Rafael Kershaw.
And what is noteworthy, besides the extraordinary rarity of the
statement, is the extent to which he clearly appreciated
himself, how he needed to descend with everyone that came
before him. That is, his primary target
isn't Rambam. His primary target is Ramsadhya.
And besides his targeting Ramsadhya, there's also an
assault on Ibn Ezra, Rambam, Rabudah, Hasid.
It's it's difficult to see that there was any long term effect
of Ravi Moshe of tacos polemics. But we will note that there was
one other singular individual who lived much later, Raviosa
Ashkenazi. He lived in the mid 16th century
Laminianam and he expressed a similar outlook.
He mainly attacked Rabbi Abram Ezra, Rambam Al Bag Rabbi
yourself Albo also railing predictably again.
So Sajigaon, Rabbi Bakhi Ibn Pakoda, Rabbi Azrael Girana, who
was one of the great Kubali, Radak, Ramban, also Kubal
Gabbiona, Rabbiona Rashba Pabbien Bachi Benasche Abbisaki,
Sraeli, Tamil de Rosh. He was also one of the great
Kubalin period, the period adjacent to the expulsion, you
know. So they themselves recognized
that they were the ones who are going not against the
mainstream, against everyone. So yeah.
So if I may recall this conversation that you and I had
almost 20 years ago, I distinguish between saying that
a viewpoint is unacceptable and illegitimate based upon the
position, which admittedly is a dissension among the Rishanim as
well, that if something does not explicitly contravene a Gemara,
I can't say it's illegitimate, but it's definitely unacceptable
because it goes against everyone.
We haven't saw it. That's a good point.
So, so it's not simply a matter of saying, well, I claim that I
have my sources. You claim you have your sources.
No, that doesn't make everything into a game of relativism.
There's a clear massage that I'm Israel.
So aside from the starting point of this discussion, which was
that Sehel mandates these conclusions, we have a clear
massage that dictates the conclusions that we've reached.
Anyone who wants to fly in the face of that massage, excuse me,
has chosen a path of reform. Not reform in the in the
positive sense that the Protestants invoked it, the
reform in the most objectionable manner that Jews invoked it in
the 19th century. In invoking this label to excuse
the fact that they were completely ignoring the
traditions of Torah. And again, it's no less reform.
It becomes wearing a straw man, a Becker shot.
If it goes against MSR, it is to be categorically rejected, plain
and simple. So first of all, we want to
thank you both for making the time to do this.
I know it's a difficult time and being in Israel also because of
the war and everything. So we really appreciate your
time. We wish we could do this for
even longer, but unfortunately we'll have to wrap it up now.
But hopefully we can continue this conversation in the future.
Thank you so much. Really, really thank you.
This was amazing. You want to.
And we, we appreciate both, both Rabbi Eisen and Rabbi
Adlerstein, really, truly like we need more, we need more
voices like both of yours running in the Jewish world
because regardless agreement or disagreements versus certain
things, you both have, you are both committed to the traditions
of Judaism. And that is all that we as a
podcast want to make sure is being projected really that that
is, that is the whole point. And we appreciate both of you
and thank you so much for making time.
And Bizarat Hashem will be able to continue doing it in the
future. My pleasure.
Thank you to you and Kazakh Bahu.
Is Sarah Tovat. Thank you Shavatov, stay safe.