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Yo Bitcoin has seen one of its 
most volatile weeks in history 

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after we saw a record-breaking 
$1.4 billion heist that occurred

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last week. 
This massive buy bit hack from 

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an infamous nation nation state 
hacker group has forced many 

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people to reconsider how they 
hold their Bitcoin. 

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Today we reached out to a 
Bitcoin OG with a / a. 

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What is happening? 
There we go. 

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Sorry about that guys. 
I have I have my Echo in the 

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background. 
Today we reached out to a 

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Bitcoin OG with a decorate 
decade of experience in 

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cybersecurity to breakdown 
everything that happened with 

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this hack. 
And also this morning it was 

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Opti and I had to put a fire 
out, which was absolutely crazy.

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We had some trouble getting the 
live stream up and going, which 

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we managed to fix 10 minutes 
before the show went live. 

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And of course, what Bitcoin OG 
am I talking about? 

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We have the one, the only 
legendary Jamison Lop in the 

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house. 
Thank you so much for joining 

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us, Lop. 
I know we've had you on Simply 

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Bitcoin IRL, but we've never had
you on Simply Bitcoin Live, so 

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welcome to the show. 
Always glad to talk about 

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Bitcoin. 
It's so crazy because every time

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we have a big guest coming and 
joining us, those are the days 

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that something goes wrong. 
So we're rolling with the 

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punches. 
Anyways, let's jump straight 

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into today's article. 
Let me pull it up. 

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FBI accuses North Korean backed 
hackers of stealing $1.5 billion

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in crypto from Dubai based firm 
It goes on to say the FBI has 

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accused North Korean linked 
hackers of conducting one of the

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largest thefts of cryptocurrency
publicly known using some $1.5 

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billion worth of etherium from a
Dubai based firm. 

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The theft earlier this month 
targeting by bit one of the 

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world's largest crypto exchanges
represents yet another another 

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involving a team of hackers 
identified by the US government 

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by the names of Trader, Trader 
and the Lazarus group. 

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The hackers steal cryptocurrency
through the disseminate the 

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dissemination of cryptocurrency 
trading applications that were 

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modified to include malware that
facilitates theft of 

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cryptocurrency. 
It goes on to say in an online 

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public service announcement late
Wednesday, the FBI said it 

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believed the North Korean backed
hackers were, quote, responsible

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for the the theft. 
Quote, trader, trader actors are

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proceeding rapidly and have 
converted some of that stolen 

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assets, the Bitcoin. 
I think that's the signal there,

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right? 
They're getting rid, you know, 

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of, of whatever and they're 
they're buying Bitcoin. 

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Other virtual asset dispersed 
across thousands of addresses on

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multiple black block chains. 
The FBI said in its 

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announcement, quote, it is 
expected these assets will be 

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further laundered and eventually
converted to Fiat currency. 

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It goes on to say North Korean 
state media has not acknowledged

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either the theft or the FBI 
accusation. 

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Pyongyang's mission to the 
United Nations and Geneva did 

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not respond to a request for 
comment from The Associated 

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Press. 
Now here is a post from I 

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believe the Buy Bit CEO Ben Zu 
and he said buy BIC hack 

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forensic reports. 
As promised, here are the 

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preliminary reports of the hack 
conducted by Singa Labs and Vera

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Chains. 
Screenshot of the conclusion. 

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Here is the link to the full 
report. 

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And Lop, we were talking about 
it earlier before we went on air

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about this report that came out.
So Lop, what happened? 

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How did this happen? 
How can an exchange of this size

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with this many customers, how 
are exchange, how are exchange 

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hacks still happening in 2025? 
You know, after the industry has

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been around for, you know, 
almost 16 years now. 

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We all remember Mount G Ox, You 
know, I think bit Fenix got 

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hacked a couple times, Finance 
got hacked. 

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How's this stuff still 
happening? 

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Well, these are complex systems 
and, you know, complexity can be

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the enemy of security. 
I think that's the short version

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of how this happened. 
There's complexity at many 

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different layers and it really 
starts at the very lowest layer.

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There's a lot of complexity on, 
you know, these EVM Turing 

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complete protocols. 
And that level of complexity 

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means that you can't have the 
same trustless verification that

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we do on Bitcoin if you're 
using, you know, one of these 

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tiny low powered hardware key 
management devices. 

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So you know, if you've ever used
treasure Ledger, cold car and it

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really any of those hardware 
devices, then you know that when

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you're making a Bitcoin 
transaction, it explicitly tells

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you on the screen, hey, you're 
ascending this many SAT's and 

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you're sending it to this 
address and you can confirm it 

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all on what is essentially a 
totally self-contained computer.

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And that's possible to do 
because Bitcoin is simple and 

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the partially or fully signed 
transaction that you are sending

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to that device is usually only a
few 100 bytes, maybe a few 

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kilobytes, and it's capable of 
parsing it and telling you 

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exactly what the resulting 
change to the blockchain is 

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going to be. 
But with these more complex EVM 

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type of protocols, you're not 
signing a transaction that has 

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all of that context inside of 
it. 

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You may be signing a more 
complex transaction that's 

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basically sending a command to 
the EVM, and the only way to 

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know what the result of 
executing that command is, is to

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actually execute the command. 
So you have to have your own 

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full node basically, where you 
do a test and you then check the

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state's change of what actually 
happened from executing the 

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transaction. 
So the short version is that you

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can't sign these complex 
transactions on secure air gap 

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hardware because the hardware 
itself simply does not have all 

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of the contextual information 
necessary to know what the final

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outcome is of that transaction. 
And then beyond that, there's 

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just multiple other layers of of
problems that happened in this 

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one particular case, 
particularly that they were 

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using a web app, you know, a 
JavaScript front end to actually

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drive the creation and the 
coordination of this multi sig 

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setup. 
And anyone who is familiar with 

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JavaScript and web apps know 
that they are just incredibly 

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difficult to secure because you 
can't have integrity checks for 

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the code itself. 
You know, if you're running a 

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mobile app or in many cases a 
desktop app, those applications 

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can be cryptographically signed,
like the final build of the app 

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can be cryptographically signed 
by the developers of that app. 

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And that provides a strong 
attestation and integrity check 

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that the code that you're 
running is the code that was 

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actually written by those 
developers. 

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But with JavaScript, that's just
not a thing. 

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And So what happened in this 
case is it appears that Lazarus 

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Group, which is these, you know,
North Korean state backed 

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actors, somehow compromised the 
AWS like S3 bucket or Cloudflare

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bucket. 
Like wherever this JavaScript 

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was actually hosted. 
They managed to insert a few 

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lines of malicious code that 
basically said, hey, if this is 

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the buy bit wallet that is being
used to construct and sign this 

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transaction, then do this 
malicious contract call that 

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completely changes the ownership
of the contract. 

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And they were able to do that 
because, you know, whatever code

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they put up there just 
immediately gets sucked down 

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into the browser and run and 
there's no integrity checks to 

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make sure that the code was 
actually written by the NOSA 

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safe developers. 
So they basically they were able

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to completely bypass any of the 
security mechanisms that's the 

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safe team may have had around, 
you know, code review, peer 

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review, the build and deploy 
process. 

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And it appears that this 
happened because a developer 

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developer had some sort of 
production access API key on 

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their machine and that machine 
got compromised. 

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That we don't know all of the 
details at this time. 

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So and, and it's, it's a couple 
things, so many things to unpack

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there, right? 
So the first, the first question

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that I have for you, Lop and you
know, of course we recommend, 

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you know, Bitcoin only hardware 
wallets, but I'm sure that a lot

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of our listeners still use 
Ledger. 

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It it was the Ledger device 
itself. 

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It it's not compromised, it's 
the fact that it can't lay out 

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all the data effectively on on 
the constraints of the hardware 

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itself and on the screen size. 
So you can't really actually 

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confirm what it is you're 
signing. 

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And if you compare and contrast 
that with Bitcoin, it's pretty 

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straightforward. 
It's like, look, here's your 

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Bitcoin address, here's the 
change address. 

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A lot of good hardware wallets 
actually lay that out for you. 

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Bitcoin only hardware wallets. 
So it's not the actual Ledger 

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device itself that was 
compromised. 

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It was something that was 
compromised on the software 

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level. 
How how were they able to do 

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that? 
Was is it so essentially did did

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a developer download like a, a 
malicious software? 

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Is that what happened? 
Probably it's too early to say 

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because I think the only 
forensic report that has been 

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released was performed by by bit
or at by Bit's request. 

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I don't know that they actually 
had access to this supposed 

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developer's machine. 
Over the long term, you would 

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expect that if that's what 
happened, then a full forensic 

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analysis of any compromised 
endpoints, you know, employee 

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laptops and other machines 
should occur and they should 

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then be able to figure out what 
is the actual root cause of how 

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it got compromised. 
But generally what happens in 

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these cases, especially with 
Lazarus Group, you know, they 

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are considered very advanced 
persistent threat actors, and 

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they will spend weeks, if not 
months poking and prodding and 

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trying to social engineer and 
compromise various employees at 

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a company in order to eventually
get your production 

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infrastructure access. 
So that usually does involve 

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some sort of social engineering 
to trick an employee into 

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installing some sort of software
that has a malicious payload. 

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What we've seen pretty often is 
that they will go after 

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developers and in some cases 
they will, it will try to get 

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the developers to download and 
run, you know, some sort of code

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from GitHub, usually under the 
auspice of helping them debug 

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something or helping them do 
some sort of, you know, academic

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project. 
And that code in that GitHub 

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project will have a malicious 0 
day like exploit that basically 

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allows them to get, you know, 
full access to the machine. 

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Gotcha gotcha you know it's it's
it's very interesting by the way

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we're about to break 1000 live 
viewers on the live show. 

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If you guys are enjoying simply 
Bitcoin live so far, make sure 

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to smash that like button help 
us break 100 likes within the 

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1st 15 minutes of the show on 
YouTube. 

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We're already at 80 likes. 
If you guys are enjoying the 

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show smash the like button 
consider subscribing opti crazy 

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00:11:29,800 --> 00:11:33,600
morning man the day that Jamison
lop is joining us on the show. 

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We had to put out some fires in 
a very short amount of time, but

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I'm happy that we we got the 
show up and running for you 

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guys. 
What are your thoughts on this? 

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Man? 
It was a pretty big deal. 

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It, it tanked the price as well,
man. 

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Like, I think it, it severely 
affected the price. 

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We were at like 99.5. 
I totally bought the top. 

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I always do no shame, don't 
care. 

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But but it, it like it, it, it 
affected the price, right? 

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It, it dumped the price. 
I think a lot of people had a 

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lot of questions. 
A lot of people are like wait a 

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second, hold on, this dude is 
using a Ledger to sign a 

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transaction for a $1.4 billion 
transaction? 

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Like what is going on here? 
What were your thoughts, Opti? 

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Yeah, well, obviously when I saw
that video of the Ledger, it was

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like, wait, it's almost like the
joke you've been saying for a 

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long time that Bryan Armstrong 
just has a Ledger in his sock 

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drawer and that's how he secures
the transaction. 

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It like literally happened with 
Bibit. 

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So that that was just hilarious.
And then just kind of in 

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context, you know, this is 1.4. 
That article said about 1.5. 

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I think it's like $1.45 billion 
hack. 

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Obviously it's an Ethereum, but 
in context, this is what about 

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three times the size of the Mt, 
you know, Mt Gox going down. 

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So this is a huge, huge hack 
here. 

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The Lazarus Group obviously came
up huge on this hack, whether it

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was social engineering or what 
have you. 

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It's a huge hack. 
And then before I actually have 

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a question for a lot before, but
it's kind of what you pointed 

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out, Nico. 
Like it's funny. 

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And I was joking about this 
earlier. 

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Why we're kind of setting up the
show. 

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It's funny that even the real 
scammers out there don't even 

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want Ethereum or any shit coin. 
And they just flip it into 

228
00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:11,160
Bitcoin instantly and try to get
it into Bitcoin. 

229
00:13:11,360 --> 00:13:13,640
You know, a signal for everyone 
out there that might be Bitcoin 

230
00:13:13,640 --> 00:13:15,920
to Jason. 
It's like even the real scammers

231
00:13:15,920 --> 00:13:18,200
don't want the the the shit coin
scams. 

232
00:13:18,200 --> 00:13:19,400
They're like, let's put it in 
the Bitcoin. 

233
00:13:19,680 --> 00:13:23,840
But lot for, you know, for the 
not so advanced people in the 

234
00:13:23,840 --> 00:13:29,840
audience with this hack, just to
be completely clear, is this an 

235
00:13:29,840 --> 00:13:34,120
Ethereum issue or Ledger issue? 
Can this happen on Bitcoin? 

236
00:13:34,240 --> 00:13:36,840
For someone watching the show 
right now, you know, maybe 

237
00:13:36,840 --> 00:13:39,640
they're getting a little a 
little scared if their Bitcoin 

238
00:13:39,640 --> 00:13:43,200
is secured correctly, what would
be your advice to them? 

239
00:13:45,400 --> 00:13:48,840
I mean, it's a combination of 
the complexity of some of these 

240
00:13:48,840 --> 00:13:53,720
protocols and just the way that 
these hardware devices operate. 

241
00:13:53,720 --> 00:13:58,280
So, you know, I think the take 
away here is, you know, multi 

242
00:13:58,280 --> 00:14:02,480
sig is not panacea. 
You know, having your keys 

243
00:14:02,480 --> 00:14:08,000
offline obviously is a good 
start, but the real question is,

244
00:14:08,000 --> 00:14:11,160
you know, when you are actually 
cryptographically signing a 

245
00:14:11,160 --> 00:14:15,840
transaction to move funds, how 
strongly are you verifying 

246
00:14:15,840 --> 00:14:20,240
exactly what you're signing? 
And so the problem here is that 

247
00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:25,760
in most cases when people are 
doing multi sig transactions on 

248
00:14:25,800 --> 00:14:31,640
these EVM networks, they're 
blind signing because as I said,

249
00:14:31,640 --> 00:14:35,480
the the hardware simply doesn't 
have enough information to know 

250
00:14:35,480 --> 00:14:40,520
exactly what the result of the 
command that you are signing is,

251
00:14:40,520 --> 00:14:43,720
is going to do to, you know that
network to that blockchain. 

252
00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:47,240
So you have to have more 
safeguards in place. 

253
00:14:47,240 --> 00:14:51,960
You have to have more levels of 
verification if you are using a 

254
00:14:54,000 --> 00:14:57,640
we could call it a non-native 
multi sig contract. 

255
00:14:57,840 --> 00:15:00,760
Like the nice thing about 
Bitcoin is that multi sig is 

256
00:15:00,760 --> 00:15:03,760
baked into the protocol. 
It is it's very simple. 

257
00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:08,400
The the downside to these, you 
know, more generic smart 

258
00:15:08,400 --> 00:15:11,280
contracting networks is they 
don't have multi sig baked into 

259
00:15:11,280 --> 00:15:13,960
the protocol. 
It ends up being a, you know, 

260
00:15:13,960 --> 00:15:18,560
much more complicated, you know,
app, if you will, that is 

261
00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:20,920
written and deployed onto these 
networks. 

262
00:15:21,360 --> 00:15:25,080
And as a result, those hardware 
devices simply just don't know 

263
00:15:25,080 --> 00:15:28,320
what to do with it. 
The one thing that we're seeing 

264
00:15:28,320 --> 00:15:31,480
your Ledger is talking about, 
well, no one should be doing 

265
00:15:31,480 --> 00:15:33,280
blind signing. 
They should be doing clear 

266
00:15:33,280 --> 00:15:34,560
signing. 
And what does that actually 

267
00:15:34,560 --> 00:15:36,480
mean? 
Well, it basically means Ledger 

268
00:15:36,480 --> 00:15:40,640
wants you to be using their 
enterprise product where they 

269
00:15:40,640 --> 00:15:44,480
have, you know, a very specific 
set of smart contracts that 

270
00:15:44,480 --> 00:15:47,640
their servers are aware of. 
And then they have additional 

271
00:15:47,640 --> 00:15:52,680
sets of interactions between 
your like Ledger live app 

272
00:15:53,160 --> 00:15:55,560
software that you're running. 
And then the servers on their 

273
00:15:55,560 --> 00:15:57,760
back end where it's doing just 
additional levels of 

274
00:15:57,760 --> 00:16:01,160
verification back and forth and 
sending data to your Ledger 

275
00:16:01,160 --> 00:16:05,240
device so that the Ledger can 
display exactly what it expects 

276
00:16:05,240 --> 00:16:08,200
the result to be. 
So, you know, this is still 

277
00:16:08,200 --> 00:16:11,320
additional complexity, but I 
think it's really it's the best 

278
00:16:11,680 --> 00:16:14,240
that we have to offer at this 
point in time. 

279
00:16:14,600 --> 00:16:18,480
And you know, we've done similar
things at Casa where it's it's, 

280
00:16:18,680 --> 00:16:22,480
you know, a client and server 
validation basically checking 

281
00:16:22,480 --> 00:16:26,120
each other's work. 
The problem that occurred here 

282
00:16:26,120 --> 00:16:30,600
with this NOSA safe front end is
that everything was happening in

283
00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:33,240
the browser. 
Like there was no other machine,

284
00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:37,800
you know, no other node that was
running somewhere that was 

285
00:16:37,800 --> 00:16:41,360
basically being checked against 
to see exactly what the result 

286
00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:42,920
of the transaction was going to 
be. 

287
00:16:44,200 --> 00:16:45,240
Got it. 
Interesting. 

288
00:16:45,240 --> 00:16:48,880
So essentially and and that's 
that's actually so multi sig is 

289
00:16:48,880 --> 00:16:53,480
built natively into Bitcoin, but
with the alternative with the 

290
00:16:53,480 --> 00:16:56,400
altcoins, it's not built 
natively into them. 

291
00:16:56,640 --> 00:16:58,840
So they have to do it via smart 
contract. 

292
00:16:59,240 --> 00:17:03,920
And essentially, that's where 
it, it opens the attack vector, 

293
00:17:03,920 --> 00:17:07,880
so to speak, right? 
And someone in the chat, I think

294
00:17:07,880 --> 00:17:09,960
the complexity and I just want 
to share this. 

295
00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:16,800
I just want to share this screen
from, from the by bit fitter by 

296
00:17:16,800 --> 00:17:20,920
bit CEO. 
And it exactly says what, what 

297
00:17:20,920 --> 00:17:24,680
Lop was saying. 
So the benign JavaScript file of

298
00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:28,400
app dot safe dot global appears 
to have been replaced with 

299
00:17:28,400 --> 00:17:33,480
malicious code on February 19, 
2025, specifically targeting 

300
00:17:33,480 --> 00:17:36,320
Ethereum multi sig cold wallet 
of BI bit. 

301
00:17:36,680 --> 00:17:39,960
The attack was designed to 
activate during the next BI bit 

302
00:17:39,960 --> 00:17:44,040
transaction which occurred on 
February 21st, 2025. 

303
00:17:44,160 --> 00:17:47,480
So this is extremely 
sophisticated lop like these 

304
00:17:47,560 --> 00:17:50,080
guys. 
This is not child's play. 

305
00:17:50,080 --> 00:17:52,120
Like they knew exactly what they
were doing. 

306
00:17:52,680 --> 00:17:56,480
Well, they did because if they 
had wanted to, they could have 

307
00:17:56,640 --> 00:18:00,360
been sweeping basically 
everybody's wallets who were 

308
00:18:00,360 --> 00:18:05,880
using the NOSA safe web app. 
But you know, they were smart 

309
00:18:05,960 --> 00:18:10,000
and they put in that conditional
that basically only listed a 

310
00:18:10,000 --> 00:18:13,960
couple of contract addresses 
because they they didn't want to

311
00:18:13,960 --> 00:18:17,160
tip their hand. 
Like this is sort of classic 

312
00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:20,600
game theory of a zero day 
exploit. 

313
00:18:20,600 --> 00:18:23,600
When you have some sort of 
massive vulnerability that 

314
00:18:23,600 --> 00:18:27,600
you're trying to monetize, do 
you immediately start, you know,

315
00:18:27,600 --> 00:18:29,760
trying to sweep up money from 
everybody? 

316
00:18:30,160 --> 00:18:34,920
Or do you have a little bit of 
patience and you basically lie 

317
00:18:34,920 --> 00:18:37,040
in wait until the big whale 
comes along? 

318
00:18:37,040 --> 00:18:40,160
And so that's what happened here
is like they knew that like that

319
00:18:40,160 --> 00:18:43,880
was the biggest possible wallet 
that was going to be interacting

320
00:18:43,880 --> 00:18:46,360
with this code. 
And so they only had to wait a 

321
00:18:46,360 --> 00:18:50,520
couple of days to basically get 
the the fish on the hook, so to 

322
00:18:50,520 --> 00:18:52,520
speak. 
If they had deployed it without 

323
00:18:52,520 --> 00:18:54,920
those conditionals, then, you 
know, you probably would have 

324
00:18:54,920 --> 00:18:59,120
had people losing a few E here 
and there and they would have 

325
00:18:59,120 --> 00:19:02,280
raised the alarm because they 
wouldn't have understood what 

326
00:19:02,280 --> 00:19:03,720
happened. 
And then, you know, that would 

327
00:19:03,720 --> 00:19:07,600
have resulted in the Gnosis team
looking into it and finding the 

328
00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:10,880
problem before they were able to
get the 1.4 billion. 

329
00:19:11,720 --> 00:19:14,240
Yeah, well, it's so wow, wow, 
wow. 

330
00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:20,960
Very is the the the Lazarus 
group very sophisticated target,

331
00:19:21,880 --> 00:19:24,680
you know, just lying in wait 
until they get the big pot. 

332
00:19:24,680 --> 00:19:27,320
Now my question to you, Lop, and
I think a lot of people are 

333
00:19:27,320 --> 00:19:31,040
watching this. 
How do people protect themselves

334
00:19:31,040 --> 00:19:34,600
from this? 
Like, I mean, from my vantage 

335
00:19:34,600 --> 00:19:38,840
point, it's like, OK, obviously 
take self custody Bitcoin, you 

336
00:19:38,840 --> 00:19:43,560
know, the simpler the better, 
right? 

337
00:19:43,560 --> 00:19:46,640
In my opinion. 
So what would your professional 

338
00:19:46,640 --> 00:19:48,280
advice? 
You've been around for a very 

339
00:19:48,280 --> 00:19:52,160
long time in the space. 
You're obviously, you know, this

340
00:19:52,160 --> 00:19:54,080
is up your alley, right? 
You're a security. 

341
00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:55,920
I would consider you a security 
expert. 

342
00:19:56,480 --> 00:20:00,640
How could people protect 
themselves from this type of 

343
00:20:00,640 --> 00:20:03,680
attack? 
Well, yeah, I mean, if you stick

344
00:20:03,680 --> 00:20:08,440
to Bitcoin and you are using 
these air gapped hardware 

345
00:20:08,440 --> 00:20:11,520
devices to verify the 
transaction details on the 

346
00:20:11,520 --> 00:20:14,280
device, then you're gonna be 
good to go. 

347
00:20:14,760 --> 00:20:17,960
It's not until you start dealing
with these more complex 

348
00:20:17,960 --> 00:20:21,720
protocols where you're basically
doing, you know, smart contract 

349
00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:25,800
commands where you need to have 
a more sophisticated setup. 

350
00:20:26,280 --> 00:20:30,200
So you know, if you are gonna go
down the route where you're 

351
00:20:30,200 --> 00:20:35,440
using EVM stuff, you can you can
simply avoid using these smart 

352
00:20:35,440 --> 00:20:38,200
contracts and you can just use 
the native, you know, single 

353
00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:41,360
signature on chain 
functionality. 

354
00:20:41,360 --> 00:20:44,960
And in those cases, your 
hardware devices will be able to

355
00:20:45,000 --> 00:20:49,320
display exactly, you know, what 
the amounts and destination 

356
00:20:49,320 --> 00:20:51,200
addresses of your transactions 
will be. 

357
00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:55,360
But you know, if you have 
millions or 10s of millions or 

358
00:20:55,360 --> 00:20:59,080
hundreds of millions of dollars,
you basically need to have a 

359
00:20:59,080 --> 00:21:02,200
much more sophisticated set up 
that's managed by a team. 

360
00:21:02,320 --> 00:21:05,200
And you know, you really need to
be paying a number of different 

361
00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:08,200
security professionals to try to
break your set up and find the 

362
00:21:08,200 --> 00:21:12,320
weaknesses in it. 
It needs to be a lot more 

363
00:21:12,320 --> 00:21:14,680
sophisticated than just using a 
web app. 

364
00:21:15,640 --> 00:21:18,920
Yeah, 100% agree. 
And I think that's where you 

365
00:21:18,920 --> 00:21:22,320
know, it, it it perhaps it gives
it gave them a false sense of 

366
00:21:22,320 --> 00:21:24,280
security, right. 
They're like, oh, we're using 

367
00:21:24,280 --> 00:21:27,040
multi sig. 
This is fine, you know, Oh, I, 

368
00:21:27,040 --> 00:21:29,720
I'm, I'm looking at I'd like 
this is something that I've done

369
00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:33,040
over and over and over again. 
But that's exactly what the 

370
00:21:33,040 --> 00:21:35,240
social engineering. 
It's like this is what they they

371
00:21:35,240 --> 00:21:40,200
rely, they they hope that you 
kind of fall into this 

372
00:21:40,200 --> 00:21:42,520
convenience trap. 
This oh, I'm safe. 

373
00:21:42,520 --> 00:21:46,880
My, my, my setup is safe. 
And you know, they, they pounce 

374
00:21:46,880 --> 00:21:49,720
on the, the opportunity. 
Not to mention it was a massive 

375
00:21:49,720 --> 00:21:54,320
honey pot because, you know, if,
if the, if the reward wasn't so 

376
00:21:54,320 --> 00:21:57,080
great, you know, I don't think 
they would have gone through the

377
00:21:57,080 --> 00:21:59,800
amount of effort. 
Like I'm just reading this 

378
00:21:59,800 --> 00:22:03,160
report and in my mind I'm 
telling, I'm thinking to myself,

379
00:22:03,160 --> 00:22:07,880
I'm like, this must have taken 
months and months and months of 

380
00:22:07,880 --> 00:22:12,800
planning and just checking and 
seeing until, you know, they 

381
00:22:12,800 --> 00:22:15,600
found a vulnerability. 
This was not something simple. 

382
00:22:15,720 --> 00:22:19,800
It wasn't like the the Bit Fenix
hack, which was a total social, 

383
00:22:19,800 --> 00:22:24,280
social engineering hack attack. 
This was like a sophisticated 

384
00:22:24,520 --> 00:22:29,480
like Black Hat hacker type of, 
you know, operation. 

385
00:22:30,760 --> 00:22:33,080
Though we still really don't 
know the details of the Bit 

386
00:22:33,080 --> 00:22:34,880
Fenix hack. 
And that's always been 

387
00:22:34,880 --> 00:22:36,800
disconcerting. 
Like, they never really 

388
00:22:36,800 --> 00:22:41,040
revealed, you know, how the 
machines got compromised. 

389
00:22:41,040 --> 00:22:45,880
Like how how did Ilya get 
production infrastructure access

390
00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:47,920
to the Bit Fenix? 
There's still so many open 

391
00:22:47,920 --> 00:22:50,120
questions, and I'm afraid at 
this point we're never going to 

392
00:22:50,120 --> 00:22:55,280
get all of the answers to that. 
But yeah, so you know, some of 

393
00:22:55,280 --> 00:22:59,000
the people that have been 
concerned about this have 

394
00:22:59,000 --> 00:23:02,360
basically been saying, well, you
know, if a if a multi billion 

395
00:23:02,360 --> 00:23:06,920
dollar exchange can't do self 
custody correctly, then how do I

396
00:23:06,920 --> 00:23:09,800
know that I can? 
Well, you know, first of all, 

397
00:23:10,280 --> 00:23:12,680
you probably don't have a 
billion dollars that you're 

398
00:23:12,680 --> 00:23:15,000
trying to custody. 
Like you're not at the same 

399
00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:18,960
level of of threats that you 
have against you. 

400
00:23:19,320 --> 00:23:23,120
So you know, North Korea isn't 
going to be sending their hacker

401
00:23:23,120 --> 00:23:27,120
squad after you for your, you 
know, few $1000 or, or even 

402
00:23:27,120 --> 00:23:31,600
probably for $1,000,000. 
They are going after those multi

403
00:23:31,600 --> 00:23:33,600
100 million and billion dollar 
targets. 

404
00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:36,280
You know, their time and 
resources are precious. 

405
00:23:36,280 --> 00:23:38,080
So they're going to go after the
big boys. 

406
00:23:39,840 --> 00:23:44,560
Beyond that, you know, part of 
part of the just Mile High 

407
00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:49,560
aspect of security in this 
ecosystem is we need to stop 

408
00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:53,640
creating such huge targets. 
And the way that you do that is 

409
00:23:53,640 --> 00:23:56,680
you get as many people as 
possible to take their Bitcoin 

410
00:23:56,680 --> 00:24:03,320
into self custody. 
If the culture is not pushing 

411
00:24:03,320 --> 00:24:06,920
people to educate themselves and
to learn and take the 

412
00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:12,800
responsibility of self custody, 
then the inevitable outcome is 

413
00:24:13,000 --> 00:24:17,080
the vast majority of people have
all of their money in just a 

414
00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:19,720
handful of trusted third 
parties. 

415
00:24:20,000 --> 00:24:24,040
And those are going to be the 
targets for these state level 

416
00:24:24,040 --> 00:24:28,680
actors who, as you said, are 
very advanced and persistent. 

417
00:24:28,680 --> 00:24:32,800
And they will spend months and 
huge amounts of resources 

418
00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:35,040
because they are backed by a 
nation state. 

419
00:24:35,360 --> 00:24:38,760
And they only have to find, you 
know, one weakness. 

420
00:24:38,760 --> 00:24:43,640
They only have to win and only 
have to like, succeed one time 

421
00:24:43,960 --> 00:24:47,680
in order to have massive 
catastrophic consequences for 

422
00:24:47,680 --> 00:24:50,280
many people. 
And and as as we've seen, you 

423
00:24:50,280 --> 00:24:53,840
know, the consequences here 
actually affect everyone in a 

424
00:24:53,840 --> 00:24:58,800
way, even the self custody 
folks, because whenever a 

425
00:24:59,480 --> 00:25:05,640
attacker manages to get their 
hands on millions or billions of

426
00:25:05,640 --> 00:25:08,840
dollars worth of crypto assets, 
what are they going to do? 

427
00:25:08,840 --> 00:25:11,680
They're going to try to dump it 
as quickly as possible. 

428
00:25:11,680 --> 00:25:14,280
And, you know, first they're 
going to try to, you know, move 

429
00:25:14,280 --> 00:25:17,440
it around to make it harder for 
anyone to try to confiscate. 

430
00:25:18,040 --> 00:25:19,760
You know, I think one of the 
reasons that they started 

431
00:25:19,760 --> 00:25:22,360
hopping to other chains was 
because there was a little bit 

432
00:25:22,360 --> 00:25:25,520
of rumbling about, well, maybe 
we could, you know, rollback 

433
00:25:25,520 --> 00:25:28,280
Ethereum or, you know, make a 
state change to Ethereum. 

434
00:25:28,520 --> 00:25:30,680
But of course, once they start 
moving to other chains, that 

435
00:25:30,680 --> 00:25:34,840
becomes, you know, practically 
impossible, infeasible to get 

436
00:25:34,840 --> 00:25:39,360
consensus to do. 
But the ultimate medium term 

437
00:25:39,360 --> 00:25:42,760
goal, of course, is for them to 
get out of the entire crypto 

438
00:25:42,800 --> 00:25:45,880
ecosystem and and basically 
convert it into Fiat so that 

439
00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:48,160
they can fund, you know, 
whatever their nation state 

440
00:25:48,160 --> 00:25:50,160
programs are. 
You know, some some people 

441
00:25:50,160 --> 00:25:53,360
speculate that this is going to 
funding like North Korean 

442
00:25:53,360 --> 00:25:55,600
military programs. 
I don't know how much evidence 

443
00:25:55,600 --> 00:25:58,560
we have of exactly where the 
money is going, but you know, 

444
00:25:58,560 --> 00:26:01,400
it's probably nothing good. 
Yeah, absolutely. 

445
00:26:01,400 --> 00:26:06,280
And, and one of the thing I 
found it interesting that they 

446
00:26:06,280 --> 00:26:08,560
converted the ETH to Bitcoin, 
right? 

447
00:26:08,960 --> 00:26:13,200
I found that interesting. 
And then, you know, it's, it's, 

448
00:26:13,360 --> 00:26:15,720
let's see what happens. 
Cause a lot of, I saw, I saw a 

449
00:26:15,720 --> 00:26:18,600
lot of people were talking about
it how like they weren't, 

450
00:26:18,600 --> 00:26:21,360
because all these addresses were
being followed. 

451
00:26:21,360 --> 00:26:24,160
They weren't going to be able to
do anything with that stuff. 

452
00:26:24,160 --> 00:26:26,320
But apparently that's not the 
case. 

453
00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:29,960
It doesn't look like the Lazarus
Group or any of these, you know,

454
00:26:29,960 --> 00:26:32,520
any of these hackers have any 
intention of giving that money 

455
00:26:32,520 --> 00:26:36,160
back. 
So yeah, but that's, that's the 

456
00:26:36,160 --> 00:26:37,880
way it is. 
Anyhow. 

457
00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:40,760
Anyways, guys, before we move on
to the next segment of the show,

458
00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:42,600
we're going to talk. 
We're going to be talking about 

459
00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:47,040
the rise of $5.00 wrench attacks
all over the world and what you 

460
00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:51,880
can do to protect yourself. 
Also, Lop wrote an article that 

461
00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:54,840
Jack Dorsey is not Satoshi 
Nakamoto. 

462
00:26:55,480 --> 00:26:59,880
Apparently that has been making 
the rounds on X, that Jack 

463
00:26:59,880 --> 00:27:02,240
Dorsey is Satoshi Nakamoto. 
I mean, I could have told you 

464
00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:03,640
that. 
I could have said, you know, 

465
00:27:03,640 --> 00:27:06,160
like that. 
You know, I have my suspicions. 

466
00:27:06,160 --> 00:27:09,120
I'll never say them publicly, 
but Jack Dorsey is not wasn't is

467
00:27:09,120 --> 00:27:12,000
not on that list. 
But yeah. 

468
00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:13,920
So we're going to be talking 
about that, of course. 

469
00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:15,800
And then during the culture 
segment, we're going to be 

470
00:27:15,800 --> 00:27:20,120
talking about Casa. 
Casa makes self custody easy. 

471
00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:25,200
It lets you take all the 
advantages of multi sig, but the

472
00:27:25,200 --> 00:27:28,760
UI makes it incredibly easy for 
anyone who doesn't have 

473
00:27:28,760 --> 00:27:31,760
experience with Bitcoin multi 
sig. 

474
00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:35,840
It allows allows it for anyone 
to just pick it up and get all 

475
00:27:35,840 --> 00:27:39,200
the benefits of security without
the complexity of very 

476
00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:43,960
sophisticated, you know, apps 
and UI and all that stuff. 

477
00:27:43,960 --> 00:27:46,840
Casa makes it incredibly easy to
to do all that. 

478
00:27:46,840 --> 00:27:48,760
So we're going to be talking 
about that during the culture 

479
00:27:48,760 --> 00:27:50,720
segment. 
It's going to be an incredible 

480
00:27:50,720 --> 00:27:53,240
show guys, if you guys are 
enjoying it so far, we already 

481
00:27:53,240 --> 00:27:56,600
broke 100 likes on YouTube. 
Help us break 200 likes. 

482
00:27:56,600 --> 00:27:59,000
We're almost on four. 
We're almost at 400 live viewers

483
00:27:59,000 --> 00:28:03,160
on YouTube alone and 1500 live 
viewers across all platforms. 

484
00:28:03,160 --> 00:28:06,920
And of course, shout out to the 
Rumble audience, which has by 

485
00:28:06,920 --> 00:28:11,720
far the most savage chat 
everyone, the rebel audience, I 

486
00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:15,480
feel like hits us with the 
metaphoric 2 by 4 every single 

487
00:28:15,480 --> 00:28:18,400
day non-stop. 
So guys, it's going to be a 

488
00:28:18,400 --> 00:28:20,760
great show. 
Before we jump into it, I do 

489
00:28:20,760 --> 00:28:23,680
want to give a very special 
shout out, of course, to simply 

490
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491
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500
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They don't even allow you the 

503
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504
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505
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of money and state because self 
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506
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or sell Bitcoin, you have a real
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512
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interact with. 
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520
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521
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522
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Wishing well guys, we're going 

523
00:30:03,120 --> 00:30:05,120
to hit the numbers. 
Will be right back. 

524
00:30:13,480 --> 00:30:16,520
I want to tell you guys about 
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530
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531
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537
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541
00:31:16,400 --> 00:31:21,040
I mean, here is the plate that 
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542
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543
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546
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547
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imagine that conversation? 
Many generations, I mean like 50

548
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years from now and your 
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549
00:31:47,280 --> 00:31:49,240
and they're saying, grandpapa, 
are you going to, are you going 

550
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to give me your Bitcoin? 
And you look at them and their 

551
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eyes and you say no because I 
wrote down my seed phrase on 

552
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paper. 
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555
00:32:02,720 --> 00:32:06,640
At the time of recording, the 
Bitcoin price is 84,750 block 

556
00:32:06,640 --> 00:32:09,120
height. 
That's at a discount, 22% 

557
00:32:09,120 --> 00:32:10,800
discount. 
Specifically block height 

558
00:32:10,800 --> 00:32:18,680
885,590 SAT's per dollar, 1180 
market cap 1.68 trillion Bitcoin

559
00:32:18,680 --> 00:32:24,600
versus gold market cap 8.3% 
Percentage issued 94.42% decline

560
00:32:24,600 --> 00:32:29,560
from all time high -22.4% 
realized monetary inflation 

561
00:32:29,560 --> 00:32:32,960
.97%. 
In the grand scheme of things, 

562
00:32:32,960 --> 00:32:35,280
we're just getting started. 
I love this number. 

563
00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:37,560
When me and Opti started 
covering this, I believe it was 

564
00:32:37,560 --> 00:32:40,760
at like the 2% level. 
It's now below 1%. 

565
00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:43,760
Bitcoins realized monetary 
inflation, continuing to take 

566
00:32:43,760 --> 00:32:45,480
Fiat currencies to absolute 
school. 

567
00:32:45,640 --> 00:32:48,040
And if you buy Bitcoin right 
now, you're getting it at a 

568
00:32:48,520 --> 00:32:53,080
22.4% discount. 
Big of a bit of a dip. 

569
00:32:53,360 --> 00:32:56,880
Anyways, I do want to focus on 
this because I think our friends

570
00:32:56,880 --> 00:33:02,760
over at at Casa do such a great 
job making multi sig easy, 

571
00:33:02,760 --> 00:33:07,600
making your Bitcoin self custody
set up extremely secure. 

572
00:33:08,280 --> 00:33:13,040
And a lot of people think that, 
you know, maybe the wrong 

573
00:33:13,040 --> 00:33:15,200
episode to say this, but I'm 
going to say this anyways. 

574
00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:19,480
But a lot of people think that 
the the biggest vulnerability is

575
00:33:19,480 --> 00:33:21,600
their Bitcoin being hacked, 
right? 

576
00:33:21,600 --> 00:33:23,520
And there's a Bitcoin being 
hacked like that's their biggest

577
00:33:23,520 --> 00:33:24,960
vulnerability. 
That's what they think. 

578
00:33:27,080 --> 00:33:31,000
But in reality, the biggest 
vulnerabilities to your Bitcoin 

579
00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:35,240
are two things. 
You either losing the ability to

580
00:33:35,280 --> 00:33:38,240
access your Bitcoin because you 
made your set up way too 

581
00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:41,200
sophisticated and you just don't
have the technical know how, so 

582
00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:44,280
you lose your Bitcoin yourself. 
And then the other, which is the

583
00:33:44,280 --> 00:33:48,000
more physical type of attack, 
which is the infamous $5 wrench 

584
00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:50,320
attack. 
And it seems like those types of

585
00:33:50,320 --> 00:33:54,640
attacks have been escalating 
over time and perfect we have 

586
00:33:54,680 --> 00:33:58,080
the the what I consider the 
master of Bitcoin security on 

587
00:33:58,080 --> 00:34:00,760
the show today. 
Jamison Lop to talk about all of

588
00:34:00,760 --> 00:34:02,760
this. 
So first, starting off with this

589
00:34:02,760 --> 00:34:06,480
article article, A Chinese man 
has been, I can't say that on 

590
00:34:06,480 --> 00:34:12,639
YouTube, a Chinese man has been 
taken out on the southern South 

591
00:34:12,639 --> 00:34:17,920
Korean island of Jeju and what 
appears to be a cryptocurrency 

592
00:34:18,120 --> 00:34:20,280
robbery. 
Here's another one. 

593
00:34:20,320 --> 00:34:24,760
An in depth news report on one 
of the attackers evolved in the 

594
00:34:24,760 --> 00:34:29,480
Danbury kidnapping attempt last 
year that was linked to a 

595
00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:33,360
several $100 million Bitcoin 
heist. 

596
00:34:33,960 --> 00:34:37,360
Here is the next one. 
Six men are accused of 

597
00:34:37,360 --> 00:34:41,760
kidnapping 3 family members and 
a nanny from a Chicago townhouse

598
00:34:41,760 --> 00:34:46,000
in October and forcing them to 
transfer $15 million in 

599
00:34:46,000 --> 00:34:51,120
cryptocurrency before releasing 
them five days later. 

600
00:34:51,360 --> 00:34:55,239
And last but not least, a 
specific type of worker named 

601
00:34:55,239 --> 00:34:59,400
Zapry Outlaw is charged with 
kidnapping a man she met at a 

602
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:03,880
Las Vegas nightclub, taking 
nearly 300,000 in crypto 

603
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:08,240
currency from him. 
The victim might have been under

604
00:35:08,240 --> 00:35:12,840
the influence of something. 
So anyways, lop, this seems to 

605
00:35:12,840 --> 00:35:14,920
be happening seems to be 
escalating. 

606
00:35:15,080 --> 00:35:18,560
I think a lot of things there's 
trade-offs obviously with self 

607
00:35:18,560 --> 00:35:21,920
custody. 
Self custody comes with personal

608
00:35:21,920 --> 00:35:24,440
responsibility comes with 
responsibility, complete 

609
00:35:24,440 --> 00:35:26,560
responsibility. 
There is no one 800 number to 

610
00:35:26,560 --> 00:35:29,280
call if you've lost your keys, 
right? 

611
00:35:29,960 --> 00:35:34,040
And it also, I think, 
potentially opens you up to a, 

612
00:35:35,280 --> 00:35:37,760
you know, the infamous $5 wrench
attack, right? 

613
00:35:38,400 --> 00:35:40,720
You know, like, everyone's 
thinking like, oh, it's going to

614
00:35:40,720 --> 00:35:42,760
be the sophisticated Lazarus 
group. 

615
00:35:42,760 --> 00:35:46,080
But in reality, you buy a $5 
wrench and you show up at 

616
00:35:46,080 --> 00:35:48,200
someone's house and you say, I'm
not going to leave until you 

617
00:35:48,200 --> 00:35:51,640
give me your Bitcoin. 
And if not, I'm going to use 

618
00:35:51,640 --> 00:35:54,720
this $5 wrench in ways that you 
don't like, right? 

619
00:35:54,960 --> 00:35:58,240
So lot like, obviously, you 
know, you've been doing a great 

620
00:35:58,240 --> 00:36:00,760
job covering all these events 
that have been happening 

621
00:36:00,760 --> 00:36:02,960
worldwide. 
But first thing that sticks out 

622
00:36:02,960 --> 00:36:06,800
to me is one happened in 
Chicago. 

623
00:36:06,800 --> 00:36:10,720
So one happened actually in the 
United States, which you would 

624
00:36:10,720 --> 00:36:13,440
think in the United States that 
these types of things weren't 

625
00:36:13,440 --> 00:36:17,000
happening you that you've been 
covering this for so long. 

626
00:36:17,200 --> 00:36:22,000
Is this surprising at all? 
I think what we're seeing is 

627
00:36:22,000 --> 00:36:27,800
that just because you live in a 
safe area doesn't mean that 

628
00:36:27,800 --> 00:36:32,600
you're safe from being targeted.
Like these are highly specific, 

629
00:36:32,840 --> 00:36:35,760
highly targeted attacks. 
Well, some of them are, right. 

630
00:36:36,040 --> 00:36:39,000
So I guess we we need to break 
down the different types of 

631
00:36:39,000 --> 00:36:40,880
attacks, right? 
So first of all, there's the 

632
00:36:40,880 --> 00:36:46,200
like the crime of opportunity. 
And so I think the the one with 

633
00:36:46,360 --> 00:36:51,440
the, as you said, specific type 
of worker, you know, that that 

634
00:36:51,440 --> 00:36:53,920
sounded more like a crime of 
opportunity. 

635
00:36:54,240 --> 00:36:57,080
This guy was probably going out,
putting himself in a risky 

636
00:36:57,080 --> 00:36:59,360
situation. 
He was probably flaunting as 

637
00:36:59,360 --> 00:37:02,320
well through talking about how 
he was doing a lot of crypto 

638
00:37:02,320 --> 00:37:05,160
trading stuff. 
And so that got him targeted 

639
00:37:05,160 --> 00:37:09,600
just in the moment. 
Now, I think The thing is that 

640
00:37:10,080 --> 00:37:13,880
people should be more worried 
about because they're harder to 

641
00:37:13,880 --> 00:37:17,200
protect against are the ones 
where it's a home invasion type 

642
00:37:17,200 --> 00:37:20,000
thing where you're getting 
targeted ahead of time. 

643
00:37:20,400 --> 00:37:23,960
And, you know, these people, 
these attackers are putting a 

644
00:37:23,960 --> 00:37:27,640
lot of effort into, you know, 
surveilling you and figuring out

645
00:37:27,640 --> 00:37:31,080
what your sort of day-to-day 
activities are and then 

646
00:37:31,160 --> 00:37:35,600
essentially taking you hostage. 
And maybe they do that at your 

647
00:37:35,600 --> 00:37:38,640
house if they feel like your 
house is not a hard target. 

648
00:37:38,960 --> 00:37:44,080
Or in other cases, like last 
year, we saw Aceo of Wonderfi in

649
00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:48,520
Toronto. 
They just waited for him to exit

650
00:37:48,520 --> 00:37:52,280
his office at the end of the 
day, and they threw him into a 

651
00:37:52,280 --> 00:37:57,240
van when he came out into the 
parking garage going home from 

652
00:37:57,240 --> 00:37:59,440
work. 
So they were likely surveilling 

653
00:37:59,440 --> 00:38:03,480
him and figured, hey, that's the
most vulnerable time for us to 

654
00:38:03,480 --> 00:38:06,720
pick him up. 
So, you know, I would say in 

655
00:38:06,720 --> 00:38:11,400
general, these are still rare, 
like in in the greater context 

656
00:38:11,400 --> 00:38:16,160
of how many million people 
obviously are owners of Bitcoin.

657
00:38:16,520 --> 00:38:21,160
But we also see the trends and 
the trend is that there seems to

658
00:38:21,160 --> 00:38:24,240
be a rough correlation between 
the exchange rates, you know, 

659
00:38:24,240 --> 00:38:29,840
the general adoption and 
understanding or awareness of 

660
00:38:29,840 --> 00:38:33,560
Bitcoin and the number of 
criminals who are then trying to

661
00:38:33,560 --> 00:38:38,120
apply their own skill sets in 
extracting these valuable assets

662
00:38:38,320 --> 00:38:42,960
from targets that are probably 
not nearly as hard as, you know,

663
00:38:42,960 --> 00:38:46,000
trying to hit like an armored 
car or a bank or, you know, 

664
00:38:46,240 --> 00:38:53,440
traditional high value target. 
Sorry about that. 

665
00:38:53,480 --> 00:38:55,600
And let me ask you something 
else, Lop, right. 

666
00:38:55,600 --> 00:38:57,840
So you broke it down in the 
specific types of attacks. 

667
00:38:57,840 --> 00:39:00,560
There's the opportunistic 
attack, right, with that 

668
00:39:00,560 --> 00:39:02,720
specific type of worker that I 
said YouTube. 

669
00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:06,920
And then there is the there's 
the planned attack. 

670
00:39:06,920 --> 00:39:10,400
It seems like that Chicago 
attack that that seems like a 

671
00:39:10,400 --> 00:39:13,360
pretty big heist 15,000,000. 
That seems like a planned 

672
00:39:13,360 --> 00:39:15,360
attack. 
That seems like they they 

673
00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:18,240
scouted that person out. 
Now my question to you, Lop. 

674
00:39:18,240 --> 00:39:21,320
And you've written amazing 
articles on this, by the way. 

675
00:39:22,560 --> 00:39:24,720
How do you protect yourself 
against this? 

676
00:39:24,720 --> 00:39:28,240
Like, you know, how do you how 
do you go about your life, you 

677
00:39:28,240 --> 00:39:32,320
know, rethinking your your 
safety and your family safety, 

678
00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:34,200
right? 
Because us bitcoiners, we have 

679
00:39:34,200 --> 00:39:38,200
this joke of like, look, I love 
the Second Amendment and I'm 

680
00:39:38,200 --> 00:39:40,360
going to make my house into an 
effing castle. 

681
00:39:41,240 --> 00:39:46,200
So, you know, like what, what 
would be the, the, the, what 

682
00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:49,440
would be the advice to someone 
that potentially is, you know, 

683
00:39:49,680 --> 00:39:52,160
they've been in Bitcoin for a 
while, they had they take self 

684
00:39:52,160 --> 00:39:55,640
custody, but they they haven't 
really thought about this 

685
00:39:55,640 --> 00:39:58,360
potential attack vector. 
What would your advice be to 

686
00:39:58,360 --> 00:40:01,400
them? 
Yeah, I mean, the first thing is

687
00:40:01,400 --> 00:40:04,520
don't be an idiot. 
Don't put yourself into risky 

688
00:40:04,520 --> 00:40:08,800
situations, you know, don't go 
conducting high value face to 

689
00:40:08,800 --> 00:40:13,600
face trades with large amounts 
of of cash involved. 

690
00:40:14,080 --> 00:40:17,000
Because you know, that's where a
lot of these crimes of semi 

691
00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:20,560
opportunity happen is people 
targeting the sort of face to 

692
00:40:20,560 --> 00:40:25,000
face OTC traders, getting them 
to meet up in a sort of secluded

693
00:40:25,000 --> 00:40:26,760
hotel room or something like 
that. 

694
00:40:26,760 --> 00:40:32,200
And then basically taking them 
hostage, tying them up and only 

695
00:40:32,200 --> 00:40:34,840
performing 1/2 of the trade, as 
it were. 

696
00:40:35,800 --> 00:40:40,040
But for the the more like long 
term targeted stuff with the 

697
00:40:40,040 --> 00:40:43,920
home invasions and robberies and
whatnot, the the main thing that

698
00:40:43,920 --> 00:40:47,760
you want to focus on is not 
becoming a target. 

699
00:40:48,000 --> 00:40:50,000
And how do you not become a 
target? 

700
00:40:50,240 --> 00:40:53,920
Well, you shut up, you don't go 
around, you know, flaunting 

701
00:40:53,920 --> 00:40:56,440
wealth. 
You don't broadcast to the 

702
00:40:56,440 --> 00:41:00,880
entire Internet that you're 
doing stuff with these assets. 

703
00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:05,560
And preferably if, if it's too 
late for you, if you've already 

704
00:41:05,560 --> 00:41:09,360
basically doxed yourself as 
being, you know, Bitcoin 

705
00:41:09,720 --> 00:41:15,760
evangelist and holder, then you 
should take precautions so that 

706
00:41:15,760 --> 00:41:19,840
it's hard to actually find your 
address where you sleep at 

707
00:41:19,840 --> 00:41:22,360
night. 
That's what I did a number of 

708
00:41:22,360 --> 00:41:25,800
years ago. 
It's, it's not easy, but it's 

709
00:41:25,800 --> 00:41:28,080
feasible, at least in the United
States. 

710
00:41:29,080 --> 00:41:31,800
It can be more difficult in 
other countries that don't have,

711
00:41:31,800 --> 00:41:35,840
you know, some of the same legal
options for, you know, 

712
00:41:35,840 --> 00:41:40,440
protecting your address and your
ownership of property and stuff.

713
00:41:40,440 --> 00:41:44,960
But privacy, I would say is the 
thing that people should be 

714
00:41:44,960 --> 00:41:48,600
investing in the most. 
You think of, you know, any 

715
00:41:48,600 --> 00:41:51,040
security system should be this 
multi layered system. 

716
00:41:51,040 --> 00:41:53,000
So you know, you've got your 
your valuable thing that you're 

717
00:41:53,000 --> 00:41:56,000
protecting at the center and 
then you're sort of rain fencing

718
00:41:56,000 --> 00:41:58,240
it with multiple layers of 
security. 

719
00:41:58,960 --> 00:42:01,120
You never want to only have one 
layer of security. 

720
00:42:01,120 --> 00:42:04,960
You should assume that various 
security mechanisms are going to

721
00:42:04,960 --> 00:42:09,160
get broken through. 
But at the outermost layer 

722
00:42:09,720 --> 00:42:13,000
beyond the actual security is 
your privacy. 

723
00:42:13,240 --> 00:42:17,000
And that privacy layer is very 
important because if you have 

724
00:42:17,000 --> 00:42:20,360
strong privacy, you're not going
to get targeted in the 1st place

725
00:42:20,600 --> 00:42:22,720
and you're not going to have to 
worry about whether or not your 

726
00:42:22,720 --> 00:42:25,400
various layers of security are 
going to fail. 

727
00:42:26,040 --> 00:42:30,960
So, you know, I, I do hear 
people, of course, basically 

728
00:42:30,960 --> 00:42:33,400
saying, oh, I don't have to 
worry about this because I have 

729
00:42:33,400 --> 00:42:36,480
guns and so on and so forth. 
And look, I'm a big firearm 

730
00:42:36,480 --> 00:42:38,640
owner myself. 
There's plenty of photos and 

731
00:42:38,640 --> 00:42:41,320
videos of me with guns on the 
Internet. 

732
00:42:41,680 --> 00:42:47,720
And, you know, if it gets to 
that point, then you are in 

733
00:42:47,720 --> 00:42:49,400
trouble. 
Like it means that all of your 

734
00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:53,280
other privacy and security 
mechanisms have failed and now 

735
00:42:53,280 --> 00:42:57,720
you're in a sort of last ditch 
effort to really fight for your 

736
00:42:57,720 --> 00:42:59,720
life. 
And of course, there are plenty 

737
00:42:59,720 --> 00:43:03,880
of things that can go wrong. 
Simply having a gun is not a 

738
00:43:03,880 --> 00:43:07,080
guarantee that it will be 
successfully used to defend 

739
00:43:07,080 --> 00:43:10,520
yourself. 
I think across the over 200 

740
00:43:10,560 --> 00:43:15,520
different different incidents 
that I've measured, only only 

741
00:43:15,520 --> 00:43:19,000
two of them were successfully 
defended with the firearm by the

742
00:43:19,000 --> 00:43:21,040
victim. 
And why? 

743
00:43:21,040 --> 00:43:24,640
Why do you think that is? 
Like, is it just because you're 

744
00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:27,280
again, they have a jump on you, 
you don't have a jump on them? 

745
00:43:27,440 --> 00:43:30,000
Yeah, you can't be hyper 
vigilant all the time. 

746
00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:33,040
Like unless you're going to go 
spend like a quarter, $1,000,000

747
00:43:33,040 --> 00:43:36,200
a year for 24/7, you know, 
around the clock bodyguard 

748
00:43:36,200 --> 00:43:38,600
security, like nobody has eyes 
in the back of their heads and 

749
00:43:38,600 --> 00:43:40,000
everybody has to sleep at some 
point. 

750
00:43:41,440 --> 00:43:43,840
Gotcha, gotcha. 
Yeah, it's a, it's a, it's a 

751
00:43:43,840 --> 00:43:45,960
very interesting, it's very 
interesting topic. 

752
00:43:45,960 --> 00:43:48,600
And you know, it's, it's one of 
the trade-offs of of self 

753
00:43:48,600 --> 00:43:52,040
custody, right? 
It's 1 something that I think 

754
00:43:52,040 --> 00:43:54,480
bitcoiners all have to really 
put some thought into. 

755
00:43:54,480 --> 00:43:57,480
But I agree with, I agree with 
you lap 100%. 

756
00:43:57,480 --> 00:44:01,080
I think privacy is just that's 
the easiest one, right? 

757
00:44:01,080 --> 00:44:04,040
Because if no one knows who you 
are, there's nowhere to look, 

758
00:44:04,440 --> 00:44:06,720
right? 
And then the also the. 

759
00:44:07,280 --> 00:44:09,880
Go on podcast with your real 
name and face that would be. 

760
00:44:10,640 --> 00:44:15,320
A terrible idea. 
And also Opti did that for a 

761
00:44:15,320 --> 00:44:16,480
while. 
No, I didn't. 

762
00:44:16,480 --> 00:44:17,440
No, I didn't. 
You're lying. 

763
00:44:17,520 --> 00:44:20,040
You put, you put, you put on a 
mask for a while. 

764
00:44:20,040 --> 00:44:21,040
Oh yeah. 
Oh yeah, yeah. 

765
00:44:21,080 --> 00:44:24,760
I wasn't on forever and then 
Nico wrote me into not being a 

766
00:44:24,760 --> 00:44:27,080
non, so now I'm wrecked. 
Thank you, Nico. 

767
00:44:29,000 --> 00:44:33,640
But but hey, someone has. 
Someone has to talk about 

768
00:44:33,640 --> 00:44:36,000
Bitcoin. 
Someone, someone, you have to do

769
00:44:36,000 --> 00:44:38,720
it right. 
But yeah, this is this is a 

770
00:44:38,800 --> 00:44:41,480
very, very fascinating topic. 
Very interesting topic. 

771
00:44:41,640 --> 00:44:44,960
Lop, if people want to go down 
the rabbit hole and read some of

772
00:44:44,960 --> 00:44:46,680
your articles, where could they 
find them? 

773
00:44:47,800 --> 00:44:51,880
Yeah, check out blog.lop.net. 
I've got a lot of privacy 

774
00:44:51,880 --> 00:44:55,240
articles there. 
And in general, if you want to 

775
00:44:55,240 --> 00:44:59,400
go down the privacy rabbit hole,
you should spend the like 40 or 

776
00:44:59,400 --> 00:45:04,680
50 bucks to buy Extreme Privacy 
by Michael Bizzell on Amazon. 

777
00:45:05,560 --> 00:45:06,800
Awesome, awesome. 
So you go. 

778
00:45:07,000 --> 00:45:11,760
We have it in the ticker down 
below, blog.lop.net and check 

779
00:45:11,800 --> 00:45:14,000
check out some of Lop's articles
or some of my favorite. 

780
00:45:14,000 --> 00:45:15,280
I've been reading them for 
years. 

781
00:45:16,240 --> 00:45:19,080
There's one there's one with an 
image of of just like a Moat 

782
00:45:19,120 --> 00:45:22,920
around the house, which it was 
one of my favorite articles. 

783
00:45:23,120 --> 00:45:24,680
So yeah, just go check out all 
this stuff. 

784
00:45:24,680 --> 00:45:27,320
This is all stuff, guys, that 
you have to think about if 

785
00:45:27,320 --> 00:45:30,600
you're taking Bitcoin into self 
custody, especially you've been 

786
00:45:30,600 --> 00:45:32,520
in Bitcoin for a while. 
These are all things that you 

787
00:45:32,520 --> 00:45:35,440
have to think about. 
Think about multi sig, think 

788
00:45:35,440 --> 00:45:38,400
about geographically separating 
your seed phrases, think about 

789
00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:40,400
decoy wallets. 
Those are all things that could 

790
00:45:40,400 --> 00:45:44,240
work to your advantages, to your
advantage, but you have to you 

791
00:45:44,240 --> 00:45:48,440
have to put in the thought, you 
know, the the Spider Man quote 

792
00:45:48,440 --> 00:45:50,760
is ringing my head, right? 
With great power comes great 

793
00:45:50,760 --> 00:45:53,600
responsibility and that's what 
self custody is all about. 

794
00:45:53,920 --> 00:45:56,600
Anyways, guys, we're going to 
jump into the news segment where

795
00:45:56,680 --> 00:45:59,800
we're going to be talking about 
whether Jack Dorsey is Satoshi 

796
00:45:59,800 --> 00:46:02,880
Nakamoto or not. 
So we will be right back. 

797
00:46:04,160 --> 00:46:06,600
I want to give a shout out to 
our sponsor Casa. 

798
00:46:06,720 --> 00:46:09,800
Bitcoin security matters, but 
managing private keys can 

799
00:46:09,800 --> 00:46:12,160
sometimes be complicated, 
especially multi sig. 

800
00:46:12,240 --> 00:46:15,440
What if you can secure your 
Bitcoin without worrying about 

801
00:46:15,440 --> 00:46:17,960
losing a seed phrase or giving 
up custody? 

802
00:46:18,120 --> 00:46:22,040
With Casa, you can completely 
control your Bitcoin with multi 

803
00:46:22,040 --> 00:46:24,760
key security. 
So even if one key is lost or 

804
00:46:24,760 --> 00:46:29,600
stolen, your funds stay safe. 
No single point of failure, no 

805
00:46:29,600 --> 00:46:31,960
stress. 
That's what I absolutely love 

806
00:46:31,960 --> 00:46:34,280
about these guys. 
They make taking Bitcoin and 

807
00:46:34,280 --> 00:46:38,280
into self custody incredibly 
easy with their best in industry

808
00:46:38,360 --> 00:46:40,120
user experience through their 
app. 

809
00:46:40,120 --> 00:46:42,840
I've been personally 
recommending Casa for years now 

810
00:46:42,840 --> 00:46:46,120
to my friends and family because
they will get all the benefits 

811
00:46:46,280 --> 00:46:50,000
of multi key self custody 
security without the hassle of 

812
00:46:50,000 --> 00:46:53,480
having to learn complicated UI. 
And if you're thinking of one 

813
00:46:53,480 --> 00:46:56,480
day passing on your Bitcoin to 
the next generation, their 

814
00:46:56,480 --> 00:46:58,360
inheritance plan has you 
covered. 

815
00:46:58,400 --> 00:47:01,800
Also, if you're a business 
looking to add Bitcoin to your 

816
00:47:01,800 --> 00:47:04,440
treasury, do it the secure way 
with Casa. 

817
00:47:04,440 --> 00:47:09,440
For business to get started, go 
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818
00:47:09,440 --> 00:47:13,720
off Casa Standard or Casa 
Premium with promo code simply. 

819
00:47:21,680 --> 00:47:24,240
I want to give a shout out to 
our sponsor foundation. 

820
00:47:24,240 --> 00:47:28,080
It's self custody done right. 
They built a premium grade 

821
00:47:28,080 --> 00:47:31,720
hardware wallet called Passport 
right here in the US and it 

822
00:47:31,720 --> 00:47:35,280
integrates seamlessly with their
free app called Envoy. 

823
00:47:35,760 --> 00:47:38,720
Passport is fully open source 
and verifiable. 

824
00:47:38,840 --> 00:47:42,080
It's the most intuitive Bitcoin 
wallet designed with a UX 

825
00:47:42,080 --> 00:47:45,560
reminiscent of a classic feature
phone, so you'll know how to 

826
00:47:45,560 --> 00:47:48,120
navigate it and use it the 
moment you pick it up. 

827
00:47:48,320 --> 00:47:52,200
It's also air gaps, meaning 
Bitcoin stays offline, never 

828
00:47:52,200 --> 00:47:55,800
touching an Internet connection.
It's Bitcoin only open source, 

829
00:47:55,800 --> 00:47:59,720
verifiable air gap security 
model, gorgeous design craft, 

830
00:47:59,720 --> 00:48:03,480
premium grade materials. 
Get your Bitcoin off exchanges 

831
00:48:03,600 --> 00:48:07,040
and into your own hands in just 
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832
00:48:07,040 --> 00:48:11,280
foundation dot XYZ slash. 
Simply get Peace of Mind for 

833
00:48:11,280 --> 00:48:18,760
your piece of Bitcoin. 
All right, everybody, this is 

834
00:48:18,760 --> 00:48:22,360
Opti and Opti is not holding a 
Nokia, He's holding a passport 

835
00:48:22,360 --> 00:48:24,680
by Foundation Devices. 
And if you use promo code 

836
00:48:24,680 --> 00:48:28,240
simply, you will get a discount 
not on Opti, but on the Passport

837
00:48:28,240 --> 00:48:30,480
by Foundation device. 
Remember, guys, not your keys, 

838
00:48:30,480 --> 00:48:32,600
not your keys. 
This device is completely open 

839
00:48:32,600 --> 00:48:34,680
source. 
It's completely air gaps and it 

840
00:48:34,680 --> 00:48:37,160
doesn't sacrifice security for 
convenience. 

841
00:48:37,160 --> 00:48:39,720
Get yourself a passport by 
Foundation Devices today. 

842
00:48:40,000 --> 00:48:43,000
Take self custody. 
Not your keys, not your cheese. 

843
00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:46,760
All right, everybody, let us 
let's talk about this gentleman 

844
00:48:46,760 --> 00:48:50,280
right here, Jack Dorsey, which 
lot believes is Satoshi 

845
00:48:50,280 --> 00:48:51,760
Nakamoto. 
No, just kidding. 

846
00:48:51,760 --> 00:48:53,520
That's a joke. 
Blop. 

847
00:48:53,640 --> 00:48:57,560
You dropped this article on your
blog, blog.lop.net. 

848
00:48:58,240 --> 00:49:01,120
The title of the audio the 
title, the title of the article 

849
00:49:01,120 --> 00:49:05,720
for the audio listeners is Jack 
Dorsey is not Satoshi Nakamoto. 

850
00:49:06,800 --> 00:49:09,840
Compilation of evidence that 
Jack Dorsey could not be the 

851
00:49:09,840 --> 00:49:12,400
creator of Bitcoin. 
So let's go through some of 

852
00:49:12,400 --> 00:49:14,160
that. 
Lately some folks have been 

853
00:49:14,160 --> 00:49:18,040
pushing 1/2 baked narrative that
Jack is Satoshi and you can find

854
00:49:18,040 --> 00:49:21,960
the arguments here. 
First one from Sean Murray Why 

855
00:49:21,960 --> 00:49:25,920
Jack Dorsey is Satoshi Nakamoto.
Jack Dorsey was one out of the 

856
00:49:25,920 --> 00:49:31,960
1300 confirmed cyber puns in 
1996 in his UMR e-mail wore an 

857
00:49:31,960 --> 00:49:34,840
atom back T-shirt in the UMR 
yearbook. 

858
00:49:35,280 --> 00:49:39,280
UMR students were called minors.
Was a computer science and math 

859
00:49:39,280 --> 00:49:41,280
major with an interest in 
crypto. 

860
00:49:41,280 --> 00:49:46,000
Continues to go. 
Anyways, you guys get the point.

861
00:49:46,000 --> 00:49:50,720
Back to Lops blog and here this 
is Matthew Siegel. 

862
00:49:50,720 --> 00:49:53,920
He says in the spirit of Full 
disclosure in intellectual 

863
00:49:53,920 --> 00:49:57,000
honesty, prosperity's judgement 
and rigorous debate, I would 

864
00:49:57,000 --> 00:50:00,000
like to share my strong belief. 
I have become personally 

865
00:50:00,000 --> 00:50:03,600
convinced that Jack Dorsey, CEO 
of Square and founder of X is 

866
00:50:03,600 --> 00:50:05,800
Bitcoin's founder Satoshi 
Nakamoto. 

867
00:50:06,320 --> 00:50:09,400
And he posted this was April, 
this was February 18th, this was

868
00:50:09,400 --> 00:50:12,000
February 15th. 
Wow, OK, this is all coming all 

869
00:50:12,560 --> 00:50:17,440
all around the same time. 
But you know and Lop says here 

870
00:50:17,440 --> 00:50:21,200
we go again. 2014 we found 
Satoshi, turns out he was hiding

871
00:50:21,200 --> 00:50:25,040
in plain sight and we listed in 
the phone book. 2025 we found 

872
00:50:25,040 --> 00:50:27,320
Satoshi. 
Turns out he was hiding in plain

873
00:50:27,320 --> 00:50:31,400
sight and appearing on national 
television wearing Satoshi 

874
00:50:31,400 --> 00:50:33,400
shirt. 
I have to play the meme. 

875
00:50:33,760 --> 00:50:39,440
Here we go anyway. 
Continues to say it's true that 

876
00:50:39,440 --> 00:50:42,000
Jack was a cyberpunk and a 
programmer, but that's the 

877
00:50:42,000 --> 00:50:45,440
strongest evidence available to 
support the this theory. 

878
00:50:45,760 --> 00:50:48,400
Everything else is 
circumstantial if not outright 

879
00:50:48,400 --> 00:50:50,840
mental gymnastics via 
numerology. 

880
00:50:51,120 --> 00:50:54,920
I will once again point out that
Satoshi hunting is a Dick move, 

881
00:50:55,240 --> 00:50:58,440
and thus I once again find 
myself interested in 

882
00:50:58,440 --> 00:51:01,560
discrediting said Dicks. 
If you're going to post a 

883
00:51:01,680 --> 00:51:04,960
Satoshi claim, you should put as
much effort into trying to 

884
00:51:04,960 --> 00:51:08,360
disprove improve your own thesis
as you do trying to improve it. 

885
00:51:08,520 --> 00:51:11,080
Otherwise you risk looking like 
a fool. 

886
00:51:11,440 --> 00:51:13,920
Accusing someone of being 
Satoshi without providing 

887
00:51:13,920 --> 00:51:17,680
bulletproof evidence makes you a
massive asshole because you're 

888
00:51:17,680 --> 00:51:20,840
painting a target on them. 
It continues to say. 

889
00:51:21,280 --> 00:51:24,640
The funny thing about Jack is 
that unlike most cyberpunks, he 

890
00:51:24,640 --> 00:51:26,600
was an extremely public 
individual. 

891
00:51:26,600 --> 00:51:30,240
Who posted who? 
Who posted what he was up to on 

892
00:51:30,240 --> 00:51:33,840
nearly an hourly basis during 
2009 and 2010. 

893
00:51:34,120 --> 00:51:39,480
Jack posted over 6200 tweets. 
This gives us a much larger data

894
00:51:39,480 --> 00:51:44,000
set to work with compared to 
Satoshi, who created fewer than 

895
00:51:44,000 --> 00:51:47,040
1000 time stamps events during 
the same period. 

896
00:51:47,920 --> 00:51:51,160
A little common sense. 
During that time period of 2009 

897
00:51:51,160 --> 00:51:54,400
and 2010, Jack Dorsey was not 
only chairman of the board of 

898
00:51:54,400 --> 00:51:57,840
Twitter, but also the CEO of the
fledgling startup Square. 

899
00:51:58,120 --> 00:52:01,640
It's quite clear that he was an 
extremely busy person, not only 

900
00:52:01,640 --> 00:52:05,000
oversight, overseeing multiple 
companies, but traveling around 

901
00:52:05,000 --> 00:52:08,120
the world, meeting important 
people, doing press conferences,

902
00:52:08,200 --> 00:52:11,600
speaking at conferences, and 
promoting philanthropic causes 

903
00:52:11,600 --> 00:52:14,160
and more. 
His activities do not fit the 

904
00:52:14,160 --> 00:52:17,480
profile of someone who had the 
time and mental bandwidth to 

905
00:52:17,480 --> 00:52:23,160
also be. 
Did we lose Nico? 

906
00:52:24,480 --> 00:52:26,240
It seems like it's. 
OK, OK. 

907
00:52:27,000 --> 00:52:29,560
Oh wait, he's back. 
Oh did did I drop out? 

908
00:52:29,560 --> 00:52:30,920
Yeah, for a second. 
You're back. 

909
00:52:30,920 --> 00:52:31,600
You're back. 
What? 

910
00:52:31,600 --> 00:52:33,120
What part? 
What part did I drop out? 

911
00:52:33,400 --> 00:52:37,240
Of the persona part. 
Oh, OK, all right, perfect. 

912
00:52:37,240 --> 00:52:39,920
I mean, so everything, the 
little common sense, all that. 

913
00:52:40,200 --> 00:52:43,160
OK, anyways and. 
So the the my point here about 

914
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:47,120
Windows is that we know Satoshi 
was building on Windows. 

915
00:52:47,280 --> 00:52:50,400
The first version was Windows 
only, so I shouldn't clarify 

916
00:52:50,400 --> 00:52:53,120
that. 
Yeah, so, Lop, first of all, 

917
00:52:53,120 --> 00:52:56,080
excellent article kind of 
debunking all of this. 

918
00:52:56,880 --> 00:53:00,080
What, you know, what motivated 
you to do this? 

919
00:53:00,080 --> 00:53:01,800
I mean, it's kind of a 
self-explanatory. 

920
00:53:01,800 --> 00:53:03,080
You feel like these people are 
Dicks. 

921
00:53:03,080 --> 00:53:06,720
Why are they Dicks for trying to
expose Satoshi Nakamoto? 

922
00:53:08,040 --> 00:53:11,320
Yeah, I guess I'll leave that to
the very end the the conclusion 

923
00:53:11,320 --> 00:53:15,560
in which I basically say that, 
look, Satoshi should be an idea 

924
00:53:15,560 --> 00:53:18,400
and a myth. 
You know, I think we are all 

925
00:53:18,400 --> 00:53:19,880
Satoshi. 
You know, Satoshi left the 

926
00:53:19,880 --> 00:53:23,280
project to us. 
And the problem comes in when 

927
00:53:23,280 --> 00:53:27,760
you try to paint Satoshi as a 
singular figure of a human 

928
00:53:27,760 --> 00:53:29,840
being. 
You know, a human being is 

929
00:53:29,840 --> 00:53:34,320
fragile as a single point of 
failure is going to be human. 

930
00:53:34,320 --> 00:53:37,760
They're going to have said or 
done probably controversial 

931
00:53:37,760 --> 00:53:41,600
things that people are going to 
dig into and try to use to 

932
00:53:41,600 --> 00:53:45,720
basically cast aspersions upon 
the entire Bitcoin project. 

933
00:53:46,040 --> 00:53:49,960
So as a result, I think Bitcoin 
is stronger when there is no, 

934
00:53:50,200 --> 00:53:55,720
you know, single human point 
that people can basically try 

935
00:53:55,720 --> 00:53:58,600
to. 
Denigrate 100%. 

936
00:53:58,600 --> 00:54:01,400
And I think that's something 
that Bitcoiners fundamentally 

937
00:54:01,400 --> 00:54:03,680
understand. 
I think if you've been in 

938
00:54:03,680 --> 00:54:08,040
Bitcoin long enough, you 
understand that it's actually 

939
00:54:08,040 --> 00:54:12,120
better that Satoshi's identity 
is never discovered because it 

940
00:54:12,120 --> 00:54:14,440
if it is discovered, it it 
essentially connects his 

941
00:54:14,440 --> 00:54:16,640
identity to a mortal, to a human
being. 

942
00:54:16,960 --> 00:54:20,920
Human beings have flaws, right? 
Human beings, you know, they 

943
00:54:20,920 --> 00:54:23,080
have to sleep, they have to do 
other things, right? 

944
00:54:23,080 --> 00:54:26,520
They have to eat. 
But if if he remains this 

945
00:54:26,520 --> 00:54:30,000
mythological figure, there's 
really no flaws there, right? 

946
00:54:30,000 --> 00:54:34,280
You only have like, you know, 
certain interactions that he's 

947
00:54:34,280 --> 00:54:38,320
had. 
I know in the CSW lawsuit, it 

948
00:54:38,320 --> 00:54:42,160
was very interesting to, to see 
some of some extra 

949
00:54:42,360 --> 00:54:45,040
communications that Satoshi had 
that wasn't exposed to the 

950
00:54:45,040 --> 00:54:48,520
public, right? 
So I, I fundamentally agree, I 

951
00:54:48,520 --> 00:54:52,440
think the less we know, know 
about Satoshi, the better. 

952
00:54:52,680 --> 00:54:57,040
I think that if you've been in 
Bitcoin long enough, you've come

953
00:54:57,040 --> 00:55:01,040
to realize that knowing the 
identity of Satoshi is not 

954
00:55:01,040 --> 00:55:04,640
important. 
It's what Satoshi did is that is

955
00:55:04,640 --> 00:55:07,440
important. 
And I think it would be actually

956
00:55:07,440 --> 00:55:10,960
a negative to the industry and 
to the movement because this is 

957
00:55:10,960 --> 00:55:13,840
really what Bitcoin is if we 
discovered his identity. 

958
00:55:13,880 --> 00:55:16,840
I don't think that's ever going 
to happen, by the way. 

959
00:55:16,840 --> 00:55:19,640
And I don't think those coins 
are ever going to move, by the 

960
00:55:19,640 --> 00:55:23,240
way. 
Also, I think that he under, he 

961
00:55:23,240 --> 00:55:27,000
fundamentally understood that he
created something bigger than 

962
00:55:27,000 --> 00:55:30,400
himself and that's why he walked
away and left it to its own 

963
00:55:30,400 --> 00:55:33,080
devices. 
And here we are 16 years later 

964
00:55:33,360 --> 00:55:37,160
and we're talking about nation 
state adoption and all that 

965
00:55:37,160 --> 00:55:39,000
stuff. 
So it's been a tremendous 

966
00:55:39,000 --> 00:55:40,960
success. 
So if you're look, if you're 

967
00:55:40,960 --> 00:55:44,920
still trying to discover 
Satoshi's identity, you don't 

968
00:55:44,920 --> 00:55:46,240
get Bitcoin. 
That's my take. 

969
00:55:46,280 --> 00:55:49,160
My maybe I'm wrong, but that 
that's my opinion. 

970
00:55:49,960 --> 00:55:51,560
Opti, what's your take on this 
brother? 

971
00:55:52,160 --> 00:55:55,600
Yeah, well, I'm with lap on this
one. 

972
00:55:55,600 --> 00:55:59,840
I don't think Jack Dorsey is 
Satoshi and I don't really need 

973
00:55:59,840 --> 00:56:02,720
any any evidence for this. 
It's maybe it's just a vibe 

974
00:56:02,720 --> 00:56:05,200
check here. 
I just I does makes no sense to 

975
00:56:05,200 --> 00:56:07,320
me. 
And I I find it interesting 

976
00:56:07,320 --> 00:56:10,720
though part of this idea, like 
you were saying, Nico, if you 

977
00:56:10,720 --> 00:56:12,920
are trying to find out who 
Satoshi is, you don't understand

978
00:56:12,920 --> 00:56:15,080
Bitcoin. 
I find it interesting that 

979
00:56:15,920 --> 00:56:18,920
usually for a lot of new people 
in Bitcoin, this is like their 

980
00:56:18,920 --> 00:56:21,040
one caveat. 
This is the one thing that they 

981
00:56:21,040 --> 00:56:24,560
always say that, you know, makes
them not trust Bitcoin. 

982
00:56:24,560 --> 00:56:26,360
And us Bitcoiners are completely
opposite. 

983
00:56:26,360 --> 00:56:28,960
It's like this is a good thing 
that we don't know who Satoshi 

984
00:56:28,960 --> 00:56:31,640
is, whereas most people come in.
It's like, how could you trust 

985
00:56:31,640 --> 00:56:34,520
this Internet money thing with 
an anonymous creator? 

986
00:56:34,720 --> 00:56:36,080
Like, don't you want to know who
it is? 

987
00:56:36,080 --> 00:56:37,840
And I'm like, no, it doesn't 
matter. 

988
00:56:37,840 --> 00:56:40,520
This is the beauty of it. 
This is this is the whole point 

989
00:56:40,520 --> 00:56:44,240
that the creator came anonymous,
gave us a gift and disappeared 

990
00:56:44,440 --> 00:56:46,440
like Batman. 
And this, This is why no. 

991
00:56:46,440 --> 00:56:49,240
One controls the. 
Network, but an interesting kind

992
00:56:49,240 --> 00:56:53,600
of take on this is that those 
bitcoiners on Twitter that are 

993
00:56:53,600 --> 00:56:56,080
saying this they're not like 
newbie bitcoiners. 

994
00:56:56,080 --> 00:56:58,680
And so I, I find it kind of 
interesting that they are 

995
00:56:58,680 --> 00:57:01,240
pushing this narrative and I 
wonder what the incentive is and

996
00:57:01,400 --> 00:57:03,840
you know that's that's kind of 
my take on this. 

997
00:57:03,840 --> 00:57:06,800
It's like it's not like they're 
new people into the space that 

998
00:57:06,800 --> 00:57:08,640
are saying this. 
They've been around for a couple

999
00:57:08,640 --> 00:57:10,320
of years and now they're pushing
this. 

1000
00:57:10,320 --> 00:57:13,120
So that's what that's like the 
things that gets me kind of 

1001
00:57:13,120 --> 00:57:15,840
wondering, like what what is the
incentive to push that? 

1002
00:57:16,240 --> 00:57:19,360
Jack Dorsey is Satoshi. 
But yeah, like I said, it's it's

1003
00:57:19,360 --> 00:57:22,480
usually newer people in the 
space that come in and they 

1004
00:57:22,480 --> 00:57:24,680
wonder who Satoshi is. 
And all of us here that been 

1005
00:57:24,680 --> 00:57:27,000
around for a while were like, 
dude, it doesn't matter. 

1006
00:57:27,000 --> 00:57:28,520
I don't care. 
I literally don't care. 

1007
00:57:28,520 --> 00:57:31,040
I don't ever want to know. 
I hope he never comes out. 

1008
00:57:31,240 --> 00:57:33,800
But it's funny that when new 
people come in, they always ask 

1009
00:57:33,800 --> 00:57:36,080
the same questions. 
Like, how could you trust this 

1010
00:57:36,080 --> 00:57:37,760
money? 
You don't even know who created.

1011
00:57:37,760 --> 00:57:40,120
I'm like, this is a good thing. 
What are you talking about? 

1012
00:57:40,120 --> 00:57:41,600
Do you even understand what's 
going on here? 

1013
00:57:42,160 --> 00:57:45,400
I think that some people just 
want to have a hero or a leader 

1014
00:57:45,400 --> 00:57:48,640
figure and that, you know, it 
would be cool if Satoshi 

1015
00:57:48,640 --> 00:57:51,320
happened to also be this guy 
who's a billionaire and one of 

1016
00:57:51,320 --> 00:57:56,360
the richest people outside of 
the Bitcoin, the Satoshi mind. 

1017
00:57:56,800 --> 00:57:58,920
I think that's a similar reason 
why some people have floated the

1018
00:57:58,920 --> 00:58:02,280
Elon Musk theory, which is, you 
know, similarly ridiculous. 

1019
00:58:02,680 --> 00:58:06,200
But, you know, people come in 
and I think they want to know 

1020
00:58:06,200 --> 00:58:08,280
who Satoshi is because they 
think that there might be a 

1021
00:58:08,280 --> 00:58:10,880
backdoor in the code. 
You know, Satoshi could be the 

1022
00:58:10,920 --> 00:58:15,160
NSA or the CIA, and it doesn't 
matter because we know what the 

1023
00:58:15,160 --> 00:58:16,640
code does. 
We can look at it. 

1024
00:58:16,640 --> 00:58:19,480
It's open source. 
It's been reviewed by countless 

1025
00:58:19,760 --> 00:58:23,160
individuals who have tried to 
find weaknesses in it for 15 

1026
00:58:23,160 --> 00:58:26,160
years now and then I think some 
other people are slightly 

1027
00:58:26,160 --> 00:58:29,600
worried about the economics 
aspect of, you know, one person 

1028
00:58:29,600 --> 00:58:32,760
controlling such a large portion
of the supply. 

1029
00:58:33,040 --> 00:58:36,440
And I tend to agree with Nico 
that the coins are never going 

1030
00:58:36,440 --> 00:58:38,840
to move. 
I have a blog post a few years 

1031
00:58:38,840 --> 00:58:43,480
ago entitled Satoshi was Not a 
Greedy Minor in which I go into 

1032
00:58:43,480 --> 00:58:47,640
the really deep technical 
details of Satoshi's mining 

1033
00:58:47,640 --> 00:58:52,280
operation and I show that they 
actually mined a lot slower than

1034
00:58:52,280 --> 00:58:55,840
they could have. 
And so my thesis or Satoshi's 

1035
00:58:55,840 --> 00:59:01,040
mining operation is that it was 
never meant to accumulate coins.

1036
00:59:01,040 --> 00:59:04,080
It was really meant to act as a 
heartbeat for the network. 

1037
00:59:04,440 --> 00:59:08,840
And you can actually see that 
Satoshi would stop mining for 5 

1038
00:59:08,840 --> 00:59:13,000
minutes after finding a block to
basically give the rest of the 

1039
00:59:13,000 --> 00:59:15,640
world a chance to try to find a 
block. 

1040
00:59:15,880 --> 00:59:20,880
And then over the the years, 
Satoshi actually decreased their

1041
00:59:20,880 --> 00:59:23,720
hash rate as the hash rate of 
the rest of that network 

1042
00:59:23,760 --> 00:59:26,520
increased. 
And so that that was because 

1043
00:59:26,520 --> 00:59:30,360
they no longer needed to be that
stabilizing force to ensure that

1044
00:59:30,360 --> 00:59:33,560
blocks were still being produced
at a consistent rate in those 

1045
00:59:33,560 --> 00:59:38,320
very early days. 100% no. 
And he was, and I remember some 

1046
00:59:38,320 --> 00:59:41,400
of the earlier, earlier 
communications. 

1047
00:59:41,400 --> 00:59:44,480
Lop to add to your point, he was
like basically saying like guys 

1048
00:59:44,480 --> 00:59:47,680
like calm, you know, like, let's
make sure that this hash is 

1049
00:59:47,680 --> 00:59:51,000
distributed right? 
Like let's calm down because in 

1050
00:59:51,000 --> 00:59:53,560
the beginning it was, it was, it
was very delicate. 

1051
00:59:53,560 --> 00:59:56,120
You could you can even make an 
argument that it was, it was 

1052
00:59:56,120 --> 00:59:58,520
centralized. 
Lop, isn't there a story that 

1053
00:59:58,920 --> 01:00:04,280
essentially Satoshi ran Bitcoin 
and stealth in the for like, 

1054
01:00:04,280 --> 01:00:07,840
kind of like in the very, very 
early days on purpose? 

1055
01:00:10,600 --> 01:00:12,760
I'm not sure what you mean by 
stealth. 

1056
01:00:12,760 --> 01:00:14,600
I mean, I think he, he. 
He was running. 

1057
01:00:14,600 --> 01:00:16,560
He was running the software by 
himself. 

1058
01:00:19,080 --> 01:00:23,960
No, like there were other early 
miners even in the first, you 

1059
01:00:23,960 --> 01:00:27,200
know, day or so of blocks. 
If I recall correctly, there was

1060
01:00:27,200 --> 01:00:32,040
actually some logic in the 
Bitcoin client at the time where

1061
01:00:32,360 --> 01:00:35,640
it would not start mining blocks
until there was at least some 

1062
01:00:35,640 --> 01:00:37,680
other peer connected to the 
node. 

1063
01:00:38,080 --> 01:00:42,240
Interesting. 
So he so someone else had to is 

1064
01:00:42,280 --> 01:00:46,320
is that I don't want to ask what
that person is, but I mean like,

1065
01:00:46,840 --> 01:00:49,840
like some of these people are 
are public, are they not? 

1066
01:00:50,000 --> 01:00:53,920
Yes, we do know some of the very
early minors and then there are 

1067
01:00:53,920 --> 01:00:57,160
plenty of those early blocks 
that as far as we know have not 

1068
01:00:57,160 --> 01:00:59,560
been attributed to any specific 
identity. 

1069
01:00:59,960 --> 01:01:01,920
Yeah, those guys, they're doing 
it right. 

1070
01:01:01,920 --> 01:01:03,760
They're doing it right. 
They're watching all this 

1071
01:01:03,760 --> 01:01:05,600
content, they're going to the 
conferences. 

1072
01:01:05,600 --> 01:01:06,360
They. 
They're not. 

1073
01:01:06,360 --> 01:01:08,440
Going to the conferences. 
No, they might. 

1074
01:01:08,440 --> 01:01:11,000
You have no idea. 
You would have no idea, right? 

1075
01:01:11,000 --> 01:01:13,320
Anyways, alright guys. 
Hey wait, Nico, before we go on,

1076
01:01:13,320 --> 01:01:16,680
since we got Lop here, SpongeBob
SquarePants in the chat has a 

1077
01:01:16,680 --> 01:01:19,880
question here, and I think Lop's
perfect, perfect person to add, 

1078
01:01:20,120 --> 01:01:22,480
why hasn't Satoshi's wallet's 
been hacked? 

1079
01:01:24,200 --> 01:01:26,440
Well, the keys might have been 
destroyed. 

1080
01:01:26,680 --> 01:01:29,800
I think there's there's plenty 
of reason to believe why the 

1081
01:01:29,800 --> 01:01:33,000
keys are no longer laying 
around. 

1082
01:01:33,240 --> 01:01:38,240
Like I said, you know, my take 
away from looking into Satoshi's

1083
01:01:38,240 --> 01:01:42,200
mining activities was that it 
was actually a very specialized 

1084
01:01:42,200 --> 01:01:46,720
machine with it was running 
specialized multi threaded 

1085
01:01:46,720 --> 01:01:50,720
mining software that was not 
like public open source mining 

1086
01:01:50,720 --> 01:01:53,800
software was not the software 
that was built into the Bitcoin 

1087
01:01:53,800 --> 01:01:57,280
client at the time. 
And so that's, you know, another

1088
01:01:57,280 --> 01:02:00,760
reason why I believe that 
Satoshi basically just had that 

1089
01:02:00,760 --> 01:02:04,280
infrastructure running to keep 
the network going for those 

1090
01:02:04,280 --> 01:02:09,080
first 18 months to 24 months. 
And then once the network seemed

1091
01:02:09,080 --> 01:02:11,640
like it had bootstrapped itself,
they turned it off. 

1092
01:02:11,880 --> 01:02:13,880
So you know what happened to 
those keys? 

1093
01:02:14,560 --> 01:02:18,760
Maybe they destroyed them, maybe
they still exist. 

1094
01:02:18,760 --> 01:02:20,160
But I think it's basically 
there. 

1095
01:02:20,200 --> 01:02:23,440
That money is like too hot. 
Like I don't know how you would 

1096
01:02:23,440 --> 01:02:26,480
actually spend any of that money
without putting yourself at 

1097
01:02:26,480 --> 01:02:31,120
extreme risk of of being doxed. 
100%, I 100% agree with that. 

1098
01:02:31,400 --> 01:02:33,320
I do, I do. 
Before we move on to the next 

1099
01:02:33,320 --> 01:02:37,440
segment, I do want to end or you
know, finish off some of the 

1100
01:02:38,040 --> 01:02:41,400
reasons as to why Jack Dorsey is
not Satoshi. 

1101
01:02:41,400 --> 01:02:46,120
A LOP lined it up there, lined 
it up here because I'm sure Jack

1102
01:02:46,120 --> 01:02:49,160
used Windows at some point in 
his life, but he has been a die 

1103
01:02:49,160 --> 01:02:52,320
hard Apple fan ever since the 
original iPhone came out. 

1104
01:02:52,680 --> 01:02:55,440
And it says can't use my 
computer because both my Magic 

1105
01:02:55,440 --> 01:02:58,440
Track pack and keyboard are out 
of batteries. 

1106
01:02:58,800 --> 01:03:01,520
And it says most of the evidence
in this report is based upon 

1107
01:03:01,520 --> 01:03:03,080
timestamps, meet space 
activities. 

1108
01:03:03,080 --> 01:03:07,040
Jack was bicoastal in 2009 and 
2010, frequently alternating 

1109
01:03:07,040 --> 01:03:09,400
between San Francisco and New 
York because those are the 

1110
01:03:09,400 --> 01:03:13,720
locations of Twitter HQ. 
And then I think this is the 

1111
01:03:13,720 --> 01:03:16,840
most interesting one right here.
I think out of out of the things

1112
01:03:16,840 --> 01:03:20,520
that you've posted LOP. 
This to me is, I mean, like, 

1113
01:03:20,520 --> 01:03:24,120
unless Satoshi could be two 
places at the same time, like I 

1114
01:03:24,120 --> 01:03:28,200
feel like Jack Dorsey just 
planning all of this, you know. 

1115
01:03:28,200 --> 01:03:32,000
But anyways, so Satoshi's public
activity hour of the day. 

1116
01:03:32,520 --> 01:03:38,160
And then here is Jack Dorsey's 
public Jack Dorsey's tweets hour

1117
01:03:38,160 --> 01:03:40,280
of the day. 
Obviously he needs to be awake 

1118
01:03:40,280 --> 01:03:42,560
to tweet. 
I mean, I mean, I don't know 

1119
01:03:42,560 --> 01:03:44,560
Lop. 
He could be the sophisticated 

1120
01:03:44,560 --> 01:03:47,680
shadow coder and be planning his
tweets. 

1121
01:03:48,440 --> 01:03:52,880
Technically, like any activity 
can be automated, right, But you

1122
01:03:52,920 --> 01:03:56,160
know, you you kind of have to go
with the Occam's razor on on 

1123
01:03:56,640 --> 01:04:00,080
yes, like is the more 
complicated question or answer 

1124
01:04:00,080 --> 01:04:01,920
to it really the more likely 
one. 

1125
01:04:01,920 --> 01:04:04,080
I think that. 
I have a question for you. 

1126
01:04:04,080 --> 01:04:08,760
Lop like it. 
It seems like Satoshi based on 

1127
01:04:08,760 --> 01:04:10,040
this. 
What? 

1128
01:04:10,040 --> 01:04:13,080
Seems like he was on the E in US
time zone. 

1129
01:04:14,240 --> 01:04:17,520
Yeah, it really lines up well 
with what you would consider to 

1130
01:04:17,520 --> 01:04:20,840
be a typical waking and sleeping
schedule of someone on the 

1131
01:04:20,840 --> 01:04:23,520
Pacific Time zone. 
Interesting. 

1132
01:04:24,280 --> 01:04:26,840
Very, very OK All right 
everybody, we're going to move 

1133
01:04:26,840 --> 01:04:29,680
on to the culture segment. 
We have tons. 

1134
01:04:29,880 --> 01:04:32,360
We have tons to cover and tons 
to talk about. 

1135
01:04:32,360 --> 01:04:34,160
We're going to be talking about 
Casa. 

1136
01:04:34,480 --> 01:04:37,960
It makes multi sig easy. 
It makes self custody easy. 

1137
01:04:38,120 --> 01:04:40,760
There's an app that I've been 
recommending to friends and 

1138
01:04:40,760 --> 01:04:44,440
family because I want them to 
have all the benefits of taking 

1139
01:04:44,440 --> 01:04:48,680
self custody, but also but not 
losing their keys. 

1140
01:04:49,040 --> 01:04:51,960
I don't know how many times I've
found myself in the situation 

1141
01:04:51,960 --> 01:04:54,960
where either, you know, just 
family members of mine. 

1142
01:04:54,960 --> 01:04:56,600
They're like Nico, I lost my 
seed phrase. 

1143
01:04:56,600 --> 01:04:59,120
I'm like, don't worry, we can 
just replace it, right? 

1144
01:04:59,560 --> 01:05:02,400
So the Casa app enables that 
makes it easy. 

1145
01:05:02,640 --> 01:05:04,400
So we're going to talk about all
of that. 

1146
01:05:04,400 --> 01:05:05,840
We're going to hit the culture 
segment. 

1147
01:05:05,840 --> 01:05:09,880
We will be right back. 
I want to give a shout out to 

1148
01:05:09,880 --> 01:05:12,640
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1149
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1150
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1152
01:05:25,360 --> 01:05:28,600
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1153
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1155
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01:05:41,360 --> 01:05:44,080
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1158
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01:05:55,720 --> 01:05:58,560
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1160
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1161
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1170
01:06:32,920 --> 01:06:35,960
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01:06:36,040 --> 01:06:39,600
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1173
01:06:47,080 --> 01:06:49,400
All right, everybody, we are 
back guys. 

1174
01:06:49,400 --> 01:06:52,200
So we're going to talk about 
Casa and of course we have 

1175
01:06:52,200 --> 01:06:55,200
Jameson Lop here in the house 
joining us today on Simply 

1176
01:06:55,200 --> 01:07:00,080
Bitcoin Live. 
Jameson is the CTO of Casa. 

1177
01:07:00,320 --> 01:07:04,320
Jameson quick elevator pitch. 
If you had one minute in an 

1178
01:07:04,320 --> 01:07:08,320
elevator with someone and 
they're like Jameson, what is 

1179
01:07:08,320 --> 01:07:10,680
this Casa thing? 
How would you describe it? 

1180
01:07:12,640 --> 01:07:17,640
So basically, we help you be 
your own bank and we make it 

1181
01:07:17,640 --> 01:07:20,640
easy to do so because you know, 
when you are setting up 

1182
01:07:21,040 --> 01:07:23,280
essentially your own bank 
security, there's many, many 

1183
01:07:23,280 --> 01:07:26,560
different decisions to be made, 
many best practices to be 

1184
01:07:26,560 --> 01:07:29,400
followed. 
And if you're not deep in the 

1185
01:07:29,400 --> 01:07:34,520
weeds of all of that, then it's 
very helpful to have a software 

1186
01:07:34,520 --> 01:07:38,040
that basically guides you down 
following best practices, and to

1187
01:07:38,040 --> 01:07:42,200
have actual humans that you can 
talk to who can help you 

1188
01:07:42,840 --> 01:07:46,080
understand the trade-offs of the
different decisions that need to

1189
01:07:46,080 --> 01:07:49,480
be made. 
Great, and I love I love that 

1190
01:07:49,480 --> 01:07:52,760
phrase. 
We help you be your own bank. 

1191
01:07:52,760 --> 01:07:54,960
That that's a very, very 
powerful statement. 

1192
01:07:55,320 --> 01:07:59,200
And and I agree. 
I think, you know, taking 

1193
01:07:59,200 --> 01:08:02,320
Bitcoin into self custody, 
especially with multi sig and 

1194
01:08:02,320 --> 01:08:05,360
all the capabilities that that 
gives you, you feel like your 

1195
01:08:05,360 --> 01:08:08,080
own bank. 
It's it's it's badass AF. 

1196
01:08:08,880 --> 01:08:10,280
Do you have any questions before
I move on? 

1197
01:08:10,520 --> 01:08:13,280
Yeah, definitely. 
So when we were starting the 

1198
01:08:13,280 --> 01:08:15,800
show, I asked Slob, what's the 
main message you want to get 

1199
01:08:15,800 --> 01:08:19,399
across to our audience and Lop 
said it very simply that we are 

1200
01:08:19,399 --> 01:08:22,640
fighting an uphill battle of 
convenience when it comes to 

1201
01:08:22,640 --> 01:08:25,200
self custody. 
So can we elaborate on that for 

1202
01:08:25,200 --> 01:08:26,960
the audience? 
I know our audience is pretty 

1203
01:08:26,960 --> 01:08:30,520
much most of them are self 
custody maximalist, but we still

1204
01:08:30,520 --> 01:08:33,319
see some people that are on the 
fence about taking their Bitcoin

1205
01:08:33,319 --> 01:08:36,800
into personal custody. 
Yeah. 

1206
01:08:36,800 --> 01:08:40,720
I mean, beyond just, you know, 
our operations as a company, you

1207
01:08:40,720 --> 01:08:44,120
know, this is a systemic issue 
for the entire ecosystem. 

1208
01:08:44,200 --> 01:08:52,120
And my sort of black pill view 
of privacy and security is that,

1209
01:08:52,120 --> 01:08:55,439
you know, unfortunately, human 
nature is to prioritize 

1210
01:08:55,439 --> 01:08:58,080
convenience at the expense of 
almost everything else. 

1211
01:08:58,439 --> 01:09:03,160
And we know that using a trusted
third party to hold your money 

1212
01:09:03,160 --> 01:09:05,840
for you is always going to be 
the most convenient thing. 

1213
01:09:05,840 --> 01:09:11,399
Basically pushing off all of the
responsibility to someone else 

1214
01:09:11,399 --> 01:09:13,560
is easy. 
And we do that in many different

1215
01:09:13,560 --> 01:09:16,160
aspects of our lives. 
So it's basically second nature 

1216
01:09:16,160 --> 01:09:19,120
to us. 
So what we're trying to do is 

1217
01:09:19,120 --> 01:09:22,439
we're trying to make it as easy 
as possible, reduce as much 

1218
01:09:22,439 --> 01:09:26,960
friction as possible so that 
people can be more confident to 

1219
01:09:26,960 --> 01:09:31,319
take that responsibility. 
And we want people to be able to

1220
01:09:31,359 --> 01:09:35,160
sleep at night with the 
understanding that, you know, 

1221
01:09:35,160 --> 01:09:38,560
they can do self custody without
screwing it up and without 

1222
01:09:38,560 --> 01:09:42,279
having to worry that, you know, 
there's a weakness somewhere or 

1223
01:09:42,279 --> 01:09:45,120
that, you know, one thing might 
go wrong and be catastrophic. 

1224
01:09:45,399 --> 01:09:49,040
So that's everything that we're 
doing is to put people into an 

1225
01:09:49,040 --> 01:09:53,080
architecture that eliminates 
single points of failure because

1226
01:09:53,080 --> 01:09:57,080
we understand things go wrong, 
humans make mistakes, and you 

1227
01:09:57,080 --> 01:10:00,000
don't want to be in a really 
brittle set up where one thing 

1228
01:10:00,000 --> 01:10:02,920
going wrong results in you 
losing all of your assets. 

1229
01:10:04,080 --> 01:10:08,440
Totally lot you've been in 
Bitcoin for a long time, your 

1230
01:10:08,440 --> 01:10:12,720
cybersecurity expert from your 
vantage point from where we are 

1231
01:10:12,720 --> 01:10:17,040
today, do you think self custody
or rather the idea of people 

1232
01:10:17,040 --> 01:10:19,840
self custody, do you think 
that's going to improve or is 

1233
01:10:19,840 --> 01:10:23,960
this will this always be a niche
idea for the the like average 

1234
01:10:23,960 --> 01:10:29,440
mainstream layman? 
I, I suspect that in relative 

1235
01:10:29,440 --> 01:10:34,320
terms, you know, as we go more 
mainstream, that the vast 

1236
01:10:34,320 --> 01:10:37,640
majority of adoption will happen
through trusted third parties. 

1237
01:10:38,040 --> 01:10:41,920
I think that's just the, the 
reality of the situation, at 

1238
01:10:41,920 --> 01:10:47,360
least in our lifetimes. 
The problem here, it really is, 

1239
01:10:47,360 --> 01:10:51,040
I think cultural and it, and 
it's also, it's a result of how 

1240
01:10:51,040 --> 01:10:56,040
human civilization has developed
over millennia is that we have 

1241
01:10:56,040 --> 01:11:00,040
created these economic 
powerhouses that have been able 

1242
01:11:00,040 --> 01:11:05,280
to leverage extreme efficiency 
and performance gains through 

1243
01:11:05,280 --> 01:11:09,440
specialization of tasks. 
And, and so we've created these 

1244
01:11:09,440 --> 01:11:13,840
systems where you're outsourcing
the vast majority of the, you 

1245
01:11:13,840 --> 01:11:17,960
know, important aspects of your 
lives to 3rd party specialists 

1246
01:11:17,960 --> 01:11:20,760
because they're going to be 
better at doing something than 

1247
01:11:20,760 --> 01:11:23,440
you are if you had to do 
everything yourself. 

1248
01:11:23,440 --> 01:11:27,000
Like, This is why it's so much 
easier and efficient for us to 

1249
01:11:27,000 --> 01:11:29,880
go to the grocery store than it 
is to grow our own food and 

1250
01:11:29,880 --> 01:11:36,280
slaughter our own animals. 
However, while that's convenient

1251
01:11:36,320 --> 01:11:40,520
and it's efficient, it is also 
fragile. 

1252
01:11:40,880 --> 01:11:44,240
It's, it's creating all of these
potential points of failure such

1253
01:11:44,240 --> 01:11:48,520
that, you know, if the supply 
chains for food and, and 

1254
01:11:48,520 --> 01:11:52,600
delivery of important, you know,
medicines and, and other 

1255
01:11:52,600 --> 01:11:56,800
physical items broke down, you 
know, we'd be in pretty dire 

1256
01:11:56,800 --> 01:11:59,680
straits within a week or two 
with the way that the modern 

1257
01:11:59,680 --> 01:12:04,440
society is architected. 
So that similar thing basically 

1258
01:12:04,440 --> 01:12:07,360
trickles down to, you know, 
where we are with self custody. 

1259
01:12:07,880 --> 01:12:11,440
You know, people who have bank 
accounts are used to the idea of

1260
01:12:11,440 --> 01:12:14,120
having all of their money in a 
trusted third party who's 

1261
01:12:14,120 --> 01:12:17,680
managing it for them. 
And so this is, as a result, is 

1262
01:12:17,680 --> 01:12:22,280
kind of a cultural issue where I
suspect that it could take 

1263
01:12:22,280 --> 01:12:26,320
generations for us to kind of 
reverse course on that and 

1264
01:12:27,040 --> 01:12:31,040
really teach our children and 
our grandchildren to take 

1265
01:12:31,040 --> 01:12:34,280
responsibility for some of these
extremely important aspects of 

1266
01:12:34,280 --> 01:12:35,960
their lives. 
Totally. 

1267
01:12:35,960 --> 01:12:39,240
Yeah, I, I, I very much agree 
that it's a culture issue. 

1268
01:12:39,240 --> 01:12:42,240
Now you did kind of mention 
about businesses and Bitcoin 

1269
01:12:42,240 --> 01:12:46,480
treasuries. 
So as someone that is working on

1270
01:12:46,480 --> 01:12:50,880
a Bitcoin treasury product, how 
big of a product or a problem do

1271
01:12:50,880 --> 01:12:55,480
you think that these honeypots 
are like Coinbase and etcetera 

1272
01:12:55,480 --> 01:12:57,920
in the in the space right now? 
We know a lot of the Bitcoin 

1273
01:12:57,920 --> 01:13:00,440
ETFs are all custody essentially
at the same companies. 

1274
01:13:00,760 --> 01:13:04,800
And obviously it's your kind of 
life motto here. 

1275
01:13:04,800 --> 01:13:07,880
Your life purpose is to 
obviously destroy, distribute 

1276
01:13:07,880 --> 01:13:10,440
that security away from these 
honeypots. 

1277
01:13:10,440 --> 01:13:12,800
So how big of an issue do you 
think this is? 

1278
01:13:13,080 --> 01:13:16,080
And is this something that you 
think, you know, that keeps you 

1279
01:13:16,080 --> 01:13:18,000
up at night? 
Do you think we might see 

1280
01:13:18,000 --> 01:13:20,680
another, I don't know, exchange 
blow up? 

1281
01:13:20,680 --> 01:13:22,480
Like what? 
What's your thoughts on that, on

1282
01:13:22,480 --> 01:13:27,200
that perspective? 
Oh, I mean, look at what 

1283
01:13:27,200 --> 01:13:30,240
happened last week, right? 
Like this is it's not stopping. 

1284
01:13:30,280 --> 01:13:35,120
I mean, we are, we are improving
security best practices, but 

1285
01:13:35,280 --> 01:13:37,160
security is a cat and mouse 
game. 

1286
01:13:37,160 --> 01:13:40,720
It's a never ending battle. 
And so as this ecosystem 

1287
01:13:40,720 --> 01:13:44,560
continues to grow and the total 
value of the ecosystem grows, 

1288
01:13:44,560 --> 01:13:47,960
and then the total value of the 
single points of failure, 

1289
01:13:47,960 --> 01:13:52,640
honeypot custodians continues to
grow, then that means that the 

1290
01:13:53,120 --> 01:13:57,600
attackers are incentivized to 
spend even more resources trying

1291
01:13:57,600 --> 01:14:00,960
to find the weaknesses in them 
because the payoff of of a 

1292
01:14:00,960 --> 01:14:02,920
successful attack is also 
growing. 

1293
01:14:03,360 --> 01:14:07,640
So, you know, I think that in 
terms of risk, it's just it's 

1294
01:14:07,640 --> 01:14:12,080
better to distribute risk across
millions of different points 

1295
01:14:12,320 --> 01:14:17,720
such that, you know, if, if the 
average individual has a, a 

1296
01:14:17,720 --> 01:14:21,240
failure and, and their self 
custody gets successfully 

1297
01:14:21,240 --> 01:14:24,640
attacked, yes, it could be very 
bad for that individual. 

1298
01:14:24,640 --> 01:14:27,560
But there's no, you know, ripple
effects across the rest of the 

1299
01:14:27,680 --> 01:14:32,080
ecosystem where, where you, you 
don't have like one failure 

1300
01:14:32,080 --> 01:14:35,560
causing hundreds of thousands or
millions of people to lose their

1301
01:14:35,560 --> 01:14:39,520
money instantaneously. 
And then you don't have the the 

1302
01:14:39,520 --> 01:14:42,520
economic pressure, as we talked 
about earlier of, you know, a 

1303
01:14:42,520 --> 01:14:46,120
billion dollars worth of 
liquidity trying to be extracted

1304
01:14:46,120 --> 01:14:48,480
from the system as quickly as 
possible by the attackers. 

1305
01:14:49,000 --> 01:14:52,920
So LOP, we have a, we have a A. 
It seems like we have a Casa 

1306
01:14:52,920 --> 01:14:56,480
user in the chat, so I don't 
know how to pronounce that. 

1307
01:14:56,480 --> 01:15:01,120
OP, do you want to give it a go?
Psycho Psycho psycho 05 says 

1308
01:15:01,120 --> 01:15:03,600
Lop. 
Can we have foundation and cold 

1309
01:15:03,600 --> 01:15:06,480
cards for signing devices? 
I haven't used Casa because we 

1310
01:15:06,480 --> 01:15:11,480
get sent treasors. 
Yeah, we support both of those 

1311
01:15:11,480 --> 01:15:15,320
devices and you know, you can 
either buy them for yourself off

1312
01:15:15,320 --> 01:15:18,760
the shelf or it really depends 
on like which tier you're at. 

1313
01:15:18,760 --> 01:15:24,760
I think we only really offer the
customization of hardware at the

1314
01:15:24,760 --> 01:15:26,880
private clients tier if I recall
correctly. 

1315
01:15:26,880 --> 01:15:31,440
But you can you can definitely 
buy any of our supported devices

1316
01:15:32,760 --> 01:15:38,840
and we support the cold card 
Mark four and the Q both seem to

1317
01:15:38,840 --> 01:15:41,640
work pretty well as well as 
foundation passport. 

1318
01:15:41,640 --> 01:15:46,000
It just it depends on if you 
prefer doing the like AQR code 

1319
01:15:46,000 --> 01:15:49,200
based signing or not. 
And that can be a bit tricky. 

1320
01:15:49,200 --> 01:15:53,960
I have you know several articles
about multi sig performance 

1321
01:15:53,960 --> 01:15:57,600
testing of like signing really 
large data size transactions. 

1322
01:15:58,720 --> 01:16:00,520
Yeah. 
And and let me ask you something

1323
01:16:00,520 --> 01:16:06,040
else, Lob. 
So maybe in in the chat, the 

1324
01:16:06,040 --> 01:16:09,040
supplies right and the reason 
that I love the cost of product 

1325
01:16:09,040 --> 01:16:14,720
is again, it makes the whole 
self custody aspect easy without

1326
01:16:14,720 --> 01:16:17,200
sacrificing convenience. 
And I think you guys have 

1327
01:16:17,200 --> 01:16:22,320
mastered the UIUI is incredible 
even has a little haptic tick to

1328
01:16:22,320 --> 01:16:24,120
make you feel good when you sign
something right. 

1329
01:16:25,560 --> 01:16:29,880
So and I think that makes it 
very easy for someone that 

1330
01:16:29,880 --> 01:16:32,840
perhaps is transitioning from 
the Fiat standard, the Fiat 

1331
01:16:32,840 --> 01:16:35,400
matrix to a Bitcoin standard 
where they're taking self 

1332
01:16:35,400 --> 01:16:37,360
custody. 
And it kind of gives them the 

1333
01:16:37,360 --> 01:16:40,680
same vibe of, oh, this is like a
bank, but it's not a bank 

1334
01:16:40,680 --> 01:16:43,640
because it's self custody. 
So you guys cover a lot of the 

1335
01:16:43,640 --> 01:16:46,200
complexities there. 
What would your pitch be to 

1336
01:16:46,200 --> 01:16:49,480
Someone Like, You know, like, 
hey, look, I I already have a 

1337
01:16:49,480 --> 01:16:53,440
single sig and then I'm using, 
you know, I'm using a passport, 

1338
01:16:53,440 --> 01:16:56,400
I'm using a cold card and you 
know, I'm on I have Sparrow 

1339
01:16:56,400 --> 01:16:58,480
like, you know, why should I use
Casa? 

1340
01:17:00,440 --> 01:17:04,800
Now look, if you are comfortable
with using the totally free 

1341
01:17:04,800 --> 01:17:07,720
tools that are out there, then 
go for it. 

1342
01:17:08,240 --> 01:17:12,600
You know, nothing, nothing that 
we do can't be replicated by 

1343
01:17:12,600 --> 01:17:15,440
someone if you put in enough 
time and effort to do so. 

1344
01:17:15,720 --> 01:17:19,760
And in fact, like if you want to
try to replicate everything that

1345
01:17:19,760 --> 01:17:23,080
we've done, I highly recommend 
that you look up our wealth 

1346
01:17:23,080 --> 01:17:28,360
security protocol. 
And that is several dozen pages 

1347
01:17:28,360 --> 01:17:31,560
explaining all of the threats 
that we're trying to mitigate 

1348
01:17:32,120 --> 01:17:36,120
and exactly what steps that and 
decisions that we made in our 

1349
01:17:36,120 --> 01:17:38,800
architecture to mitigate those 
threats. 

1350
01:17:40,760 --> 01:17:44,120
But really I think a lot of it 
comes down, as I said earlier, 

1351
01:17:44,120 --> 01:17:50,560
to convenience, to really 
providing a very simple user 

1352
01:17:50,560 --> 01:17:53,520
experience. 
Like we on purpose, we do not 

1353
01:17:53,640 --> 01:17:57,640
offer a lot of the more advanced
functionality that you can do 

1354
01:17:57,640 --> 01:17:59,680
with Bitcoin. 
And that's because we think that

1355
01:17:59,680 --> 01:18:02,680
it's actually kind of dangerous,
You know, it could be a foot gun

1356
01:18:03,240 --> 01:18:05,440
in the hands of an 
unsophisticated user. 

1357
01:18:05,800 --> 01:18:09,520
So what we're trying to do is 
we're trying to build super high

1358
01:18:09,520 --> 01:18:13,720
security and cold storage set up
that eliminates single points of

1359
01:18:13,720 --> 01:18:19,320
failure and is accessible to a 
non-technical user that you may 

1360
01:18:19,320 --> 01:18:22,040
not know all of the insurance 
and outs of the protocol and 

1361
01:18:22,040 --> 01:18:23,640
security best practices and 
such. 

1362
01:18:24,000 --> 01:18:28,040
So what you're really doing is 
you're saving yourself a lot of 

1363
01:18:28,040 --> 01:18:32,920
effort of having to learn all of
those best practices and put 

1364
01:18:32,920 --> 01:18:35,800
them into place. 
But it's certainly possible to 

1365
01:18:35,800 --> 01:18:38,360
do it yourself. 
And you know, I think that's one

1366
01:18:38,360 --> 01:18:42,240
of the great things about 
Bitcoin, like you don't need us 

1367
01:18:42,560 --> 01:18:46,120
to self custody. 
We're really here to help you 

1368
01:18:46,520 --> 01:18:50,960
get into the best possible 
position as quickly and as 

1369
01:18:50,960 --> 01:18:56,760
easily as possible. 
A. 100% and but someone who it 

1370
01:18:57,200 --> 01:19:01,000
learning, learn, I learned self 
learn multi sigs, specifically 

1371
01:19:01,000 --> 01:19:04,120
using electron and Sparrow. 
There's different standards. 

1372
01:19:04,120 --> 01:19:05,600
People don't realize this, 
right? 

1373
01:19:06,720 --> 01:19:09,120
If you don't update your 
devices, all of a sudden it's 

1374
01:19:09,120 --> 01:19:12,040
like, wait a second. 
Oh my God, I can't spend right 

1375
01:19:12,040 --> 01:19:13,240
there. 
There's there's a lot. 

1376
01:19:13,240 --> 01:19:14,640
It's it's a very deep rabbit 
hole. 

1377
01:19:14,640 --> 01:19:18,240
Ladies and gentlemen, electron 
crashes when you like. 

1378
01:19:18,640 --> 01:19:22,280
There's so many like you know, 
and that's what I love about 

1379
01:19:22,280 --> 01:19:24,200
Casa is that you guys make this 
easy. 

1380
01:19:26,000 --> 01:19:30,800
You guys make something that is 
highly complex, easy to use for 

1381
01:19:31,120 --> 01:19:34,920
the everyday user and of course 
you guys offer support and all 

1382
01:19:34,920 --> 01:19:38,000
that stuff. 
Now my question to you, Lop, is,

1383
01:19:38,160 --> 01:19:41,080
so you guys offer a two of three
and a three of five. 

1384
01:19:41,800 --> 01:19:43,720
What happened for anyone doesn't
know. 

1385
01:19:43,720 --> 01:19:49,120
So the two of three you hold, 
the user holds two of two of the

1386
01:19:49,120 --> 01:19:53,520
three keys Casa owns one or not 
owns, but holds one key. 

1387
01:19:53,800 --> 01:19:58,160
And then for the three of five, 
Casa holds one key, the user 

1388
01:19:58,160 --> 01:20:01,720
holds four. 
One of the keys is on your 

1389
01:20:01,720 --> 01:20:04,720
phone, which is backed up to 
iCloud or the Google equivalent.

1390
01:20:05,160 --> 01:20:12,200
And then the the the rest of the
three keys the the user, the 

1391
01:20:12,200 --> 01:20:14,680
user holds. 
Now, what's really interesting 

1392
01:20:14,680 --> 01:20:17,600
about the three of five? 
Is that it actually feels like 

1393
01:20:17,600 --> 01:20:22,160
you're signing a two of three 
because the the phone key, it's 

1394
01:20:22,160 --> 01:20:25,200
like a basically it's like as 
soon as it's, you know, you, you

1395
01:20:25,200 --> 01:20:27,960
put in your phone password with 
your face or your fingerprint, 

1396
01:20:28,280 --> 01:20:30,400
it like it signs automatically, 
right. 

1397
01:20:31,120 --> 01:20:35,320
So the experience is is very 
pleasant in in my experience. 

1398
01:20:36,040 --> 01:20:39,320
And let me let me ask you 
something lop, So what what 

1399
01:20:39,320 --> 01:20:42,040
happens if Casa disappears? 
You know, could, could people 

1400
01:20:42,040 --> 01:20:44,920
still access their Bitcoin? 
Like, for whatever reason, the 

1401
01:20:44,920 --> 01:20:49,040
app is pulled from the from the 
App Store, You know, something 

1402
01:20:49,040 --> 01:20:52,960
funky happens, you know, would, 
could people still sovereign 

1403
01:20:52,960 --> 01:20:57,360
recover their Bitcoin? 
Absolutely and because we're not

1404
01:20:57,360 --> 01:21:00,680
doing anything proprietary here,
we're not doing any sort of like

1405
01:21:00,680 --> 01:21:03,920
proprietary multi party 
computation or should be your 

1406
01:21:03,920 --> 01:21:05,280
secret sharing or anything like 
that. 

1407
01:21:05,280 --> 01:21:10,240
We're doing the you know, native
on chain multi sig, which means 

1408
01:21:10,240 --> 01:21:13,960
that there are many other wallet
software out there that supports

1409
01:21:13,960 --> 01:21:16,680
the same thing. 
So, you know, we added wallet 

1410
01:21:16,680 --> 01:21:21,080
descriptor support last year 
that makes it really easy to, 

1411
01:21:21,080 --> 01:21:24,480
you know, export and import the 
sort of skeleton, you know, 

1412
01:21:24,480 --> 01:21:28,680
descriptor of your wallet. 
And you know, you can import 

1413
01:21:28,680 --> 01:21:32,280
that into like Electron or 
Sparrow, you know, any, any 

1414
01:21:32,280 --> 01:21:36,840
other wallet that supports sort 
of arbitrary complex multi sig 

1415
01:21:36,840 --> 01:21:39,480
setups. 
And the first thing that 

1416
01:21:39,480 --> 01:21:43,880
actually happens when you finish
initializing your multi sig 

1417
01:21:44,200 --> 01:21:48,280
vault with Casa is that we send 
you instructions for what we 

1418
01:21:48,280 --> 01:21:51,400
call sovereign recovery. 
And that's basically, you know, 

1419
01:21:51,400 --> 01:21:55,640
if Casa ceases to function or 
exist or, or for whatever is not

1420
01:21:55,640 --> 01:22:00,680
working, then you have the your 
step by step instructions for 

1421
01:22:00,680 --> 01:22:04,320
how to recreate your wallet and 
spend your funds without ever 

1422
01:22:04,440 --> 01:22:06,920
relying upon our software or our
infrastructure. 

1423
01:22:06,920 --> 01:22:11,200
So I say this a lot, but the 
primary point of Casa is to 

1424
01:22:11,200 --> 01:22:13,720
eliminate single points of 
failure, and that includes Casa 

1425
01:22:13,720 --> 01:22:17,040
itself as an organization. 
Yeah, and, and you guys do a 

1426
01:22:17,040 --> 01:22:20,520
very good job at that because 
I've been in situations where, 

1427
01:22:20,640 --> 01:22:25,320
and I mentioned this earlier 
where you know, someone loses 

1428
01:22:25,320 --> 01:22:27,880
one of their keys on their multi
sig setup. 

1429
01:22:28,240 --> 01:22:32,880
It's incredibly easy to replace 
you just you you press a button,

1430
01:22:32,880 --> 01:22:35,840
a little haptic makes you feel 
good about losing your key, 

1431
01:22:36,200 --> 01:22:40,040
sends you an e-mail, you plug in
your new device and boom, BOM 

1432
01:22:40,040 --> 01:22:42,080
Bing. 
You know, your, your, you know, 

1433
01:22:42,120 --> 01:22:46,920
your, you know, your wallet is, 
is good to go without that UI. 

1434
01:22:46,920 --> 01:22:51,280
You don't know the only way, you
know, by trial and error. 

1435
01:22:52,360 --> 01:22:56,560
And it took me a while and you 
know, Sparrow wasn't around, but

1436
01:22:56,560 --> 01:22:59,080
so I had to learn a lot of this 
stuff on Electrum and I'm still 

1437
01:22:59,080 --> 01:23:02,200
an electrum junkie and I love 
electrum, despite what people 

1438
01:23:02,200 --> 01:23:03,920
say. 
OK, it's a great wallet. 

1439
01:23:05,880 --> 01:23:09,920
But yeah, it it you guys 
essentially make a very 

1440
01:23:09,920 --> 01:23:15,160
sophisticated thing incredibly 
easy to use without sacrificing 

1441
01:23:15,160 --> 01:23:18,000
security. 
And it's convenient for people 

1442
01:23:18,000 --> 01:23:22,440
that want to benefit from multi 
sig, but again, don't have the 

1443
01:23:22,440 --> 01:23:25,640
technical capability of 
technical know how to to to go 

1444
01:23:25,640 --> 01:23:27,680
down that. 
Now my question to you LOB as 

1445
01:23:27,680 --> 01:23:34,120
well is, OK, so let's talk about
geographically multi sig, 

1446
01:23:34,360 --> 01:23:37,160
geographically separated keys, 
right? 

1447
01:23:37,160 --> 01:23:39,800
Because I think that is 
incredibly important, especially

1448
01:23:39,800 --> 01:23:42,360
if you're using multi sig. 
Could you talk a little bit 

1449
01:23:42,360 --> 01:23:46,760
about that, right, Keeping your 
keys in different locations and 

1450
01:23:46,760 --> 01:23:51,680
that obviously helps protect you
from, you know, $5 Reg attack, 

1451
01:23:51,680 --> 01:23:53,840
which we were talking earlier. 
And there's something that 

1452
01:23:53,840 --> 01:23:56,120
you've said in the past that 
really resonated with me and 

1453
01:23:56,120 --> 01:24:03,040
I've never forgotten it. 
It will take an attacker just as

1454
01:24:03,040 --> 01:24:07,120
much time to spend your Bitcoin 
than it takes you to spend your 

1455
01:24:07,120 --> 01:24:08,680
Bitcoin. 
And that's the way that you 

1456
01:24:08,680 --> 01:24:12,320
should be looking at it, right? 
So if it's if it takes you 10 

1457
01:24:12,320 --> 01:24:17,000
minutes to, you know, sign your 
big sign a transaction, send 

1458
01:24:17,000 --> 01:24:20,320
your Bitcoin out of cold storage
in your mind, the back of your 

1459
01:24:20,320 --> 01:24:22,920
mind, you'd be like, it will 
take an attacker 10 minutes to 

1460
01:24:22,920 --> 01:24:25,840
send Bitcoin, whatever. 
But if you know that your multi 

1461
01:24:25,840 --> 01:24:29,280
sig setup and your keys are 
geographically separated, so it 

1462
01:24:29,280 --> 01:24:34,000
takes some couple hours to go, 
you know, from place A to place 

1463
01:24:34,000 --> 01:24:37,600
B and etcetera, etcetera, then 
it becomes a little bit more 

1464
01:24:37,600 --> 01:24:40,480
complex, right? 
And then it's not just a, you 

1465
01:24:40,480 --> 01:24:42,640
know, let me just jump in here 
and stay a couple hours. 

1466
01:24:42,640 --> 01:24:45,280
Now it's like, Oh my God, this 
might take a couple days. 

1467
01:24:45,720 --> 01:24:49,400
Obviously that raises the risk 
for the attacker himself. 

1468
01:24:50,640 --> 01:24:53,440
So it's it's just some some 
things to talk about. 

1469
01:24:53,440 --> 01:24:56,280
So can you talk a little bit 
about that Lop geographically 

1470
01:24:56,280 --> 01:25:01,040
separated keys for multi sig? 
Well, yeah, so the name of the 

1471
01:25:01,040 --> 01:25:07,200
game when it comes to building 
the best possible multi sig 

1472
01:25:07,200 --> 01:25:10,600
setup, because multi sig in and 
of itself is not panacea. 

1473
01:25:11,240 --> 01:25:15,200
If you keep all your keys at 
home, then congratulations, 

1474
01:25:15,200 --> 01:25:17,600
you've introduced a single point
of failure to your multi sig 

1475
01:25:17,600 --> 01:25:23,960
setup. 
Distributing the keys in as many

1476
01:25:23,960 --> 01:25:27,480
different ways as possible is 
what gives you great strength, 

1477
01:25:27,480 --> 01:25:31,320
and it actually lets you 
leverage the benefit of what we 

1478
01:25:31,320 --> 01:25:35,480
call additive security. 
It's basically, you know, 

1479
01:25:35,480 --> 01:25:39,080
strength through diversity. 
And this is diversity in a 

1480
01:25:39,080 --> 01:25:40,920
number of different things. 
You know, you mentioned 

1481
01:25:40,920 --> 01:25:45,040
geographic diversity, but also 
you want diversity of like what 

1482
01:25:45,040 --> 01:25:49,320
devices they're stored on, what 
are the physical security 

1483
01:25:49,920 --> 01:25:53,440
protocols around where each 
device is. 

1484
01:25:53,720 --> 01:25:58,440
And basically you want all of 
these things to be different 

1485
01:25:58,720 --> 01:26:03,920
because when something goes 
wrong, you want that particular 

1486
01:26:03,920 --> 01:26:07,640
attack or failure scenario to 
only affect one of your keys and

1487
01:26:07,640 --> 01:26:10,600
not affect all of your keys. 
And when you're in a more of a, 

1488
01:26:11,640 --> 01:26:15,120
you know, homogeneous set up, 
then it's more likely that you 

1489
01:26:15,120 --> 01:26:18,320
have one weakness that could 
potentially affect enough of 

1490
01:26:18,320 --> 01:26:21,640
your keys that either your money
gets lost or stolen. 

1491
01:26:22,120 --> 01:26:25,280
So you're having geographic 
separation. 

1492
01:26:25,800 --> 01:26:27,400
Yes. 
I mean, it's, it's obviously 

1493
01:26:28,000 --> 01:26:30,360
that's the way to protect 
against wrench attacks. 

1494
01:26:30,880 --> 01:26:33,720
But even more commonly, it's 
just how you protect against 

1495
01:26:33,720 --> 01:26:37,120
natural disasters and, you know,
things going wrong like your 

1496
01:26:37,120 --> 01:26:39,600
house burning down. 
We've had clients whose houses 

1497
01:26:39,600 --> 01:26:42,960
burned down. 
We've had clients who have been 

1498
01:26:42,960 --> 01:26:46,080
in flood zones and if, you know,
had various types of 

1499
01:26:47,480 --> 01:26:50,840
catastrophic destruction to 
their primary residence. 

1500
01:26:51,200 --> 01:26:55,040
And so having you know, keys in 
different geographic areas that 

1501
01:26:55,040 --> 01:26:59,560
are, you know, prone to 
different types of weather and 

1502
01:26:59,560 --> 01:27:03,080
natural disaster events gives 
you some improved, you know, 

1503
01:27:03,080 --> 01:27:05,720
robustness there. 
If you want to take it to the 

1504
01:27:05,720 --> 01:27:09,760
extreme, not just upon like 
wrench attacks, but upon like 

1505
01:27:09,760 --> 01:27:15,320
nation states 61O2 seizure style
attacks, our most paranoid 

1506
01:27:15,320 --> 01:27:19,280
clients actually go to the 
extreme of distributing their 

1507
01:27:19,280 --> 01:27:23,800
keys in different countries, 
different jurisdictions that you

1508
01:27:23,840 --> 01:27:26,720
do not play nicely with each 
other. 

1509
01:27:27,000 --> 01:27:30,760
So that, you know, it's unlikely
for A61O2 attack to be able to 

1510
01:27:30,760 --> 01:27:37,160
reach across borders and be able
to, you know, force the turning 

1511
01:27:37,160 --> 01:27:40,280
over of those keys that are, you
know, outside of the reach of 

1512
01:27:40,280 --> 01:27:45,240
any given justice system. 
Yeah, love the way guys, this is

1513
01:27:45,240 --> 01:27:46,800
all things that you got to think
about. 

1514
01:27:47,080 --> 01:27:49,600
These are all things again, with
great power comes great 

1515
01:27:49,600 --> 01:27:51,360
responsibility. 
That's what self custody is all 

1516
01:27:51,360 --> 01:27:54,200
about. 
Casa makes it incredibly easy. 

1517
01:27:54,760 --> 01:27:58,440
If you feel intimidated by the 
the tech stuff, and I'm telling 

1518
01:27:58,440 --> 01:28:02,880
you, someone who loves 
computers, the trial and error 

1519
01:28:02,880 --> 01:28:04,480
that I had to end the mini heart
attacks. 

1520
01:28:04,480 --> 01:28:08,320
No one tells you that, right? 
The the trial and error of 

1521
01:28:08,320 --> 01:28:13,640
having to learn this stuff was 
not a was not a a a walk in the 

1522
01:28:13,640 --> 01:28:16,800
park. 
So this is a great way to 

1523
01:28:16,800 --> 01:28:19,720
especially if if you hold a 
decent amount of Bitcoin, you 

1524
01:28:19,720 --> 01:28:22,320
should definitely have it on 
multi sig like I I can't 

1525
01:28:22,320 --> 01:28:25,200
recommend that enough. 
I think a single sig is just 

1526
01:28:25,200 --> 01:28:27,880
like so it's a terrible idea in 
so many. 

1527
01:28:28,680 --> 01:28:30,880
Point of failure right there in 
the name. 

1528
01:28:31,280 --> 01:28:34,080
Yeah, exactly. 
So if you if if you know you've 

1529
01:28:34,080 --> 01:28:37,680
been a Bitcoin for a while, I 
highly, highly recommend multi 

1530
01:28:37,680 --> 01:28:41,200
Sig and Casa makes it 
incredibly, incredibly easy 

1531
01:28:41,320 --> 01:28:44,200
without sacrificing security. 
I want to give a very special 

1532
01:28:44,200 --> 01:28:46,640
shout out to our guest today, 
Jamison Lop. 

1533
01:28:46,920 --> 01:28:50,440
Go check out his blog 
blog.lop.net. 

1534
01:28:50,440 --> 01:28:52,960
And of course, go check out 
Casa. 

1535
01:28:52,960 --> 01:28:57,320
Go to Casa dot IO slash simply. 
Of course, today's show was 

1536
01:28:57,320 --> 01:29:00,760
February 27th, 2025. 
I'm your host Nico, our guest 

1537
01:29:00,760 --> 01:29:03,760
today, Lop and of course, my 
legendary Co host Optimus 

1538
01:29:03,760 --> 01:29:05,480
Fields. 
We'll see you guys tomorrow for 

1539
01:29:05,480 --> 01:29:08,800
a brand new episode of Simply 
Bitcoin Live. 

1540
01:29:09,720 --> 01:29:12,960
Today's episode was brought to 
you by bitcoinwell.com, a 

1541
01:29:12,960 --> 01:29:16,080
Bitcoin only platform on a 
mission to enable financial 

1542
01:29:16,080 --> 01:29:16,920
independence.