1 00:00:01,100 --> 00:00:06,600 Libertarian anarchism responses to ten objections by Roderick T 2 00:00:06,600 --> 00:00:08,800 long. I want to talk about some of the 3 00:00:08,800 --> 00:00:12,000 main objections that have been given to libertarian anarchism 4 00:00:12,300 --> 00:00:15,500 and my attempts to answer them. But before I start giving 5 00:00:15,500 --> 00:00:18,200 objections and trying to answer them, there was no point in 6 00:00:18,200 --> 00:00:21,000 trying to answer objections to have you unless you have been 7 00:00:21,000 --> 00:00:24,100 given some positive reason to hold the view in the first 8 00:00:24,100 --> 00:00:27,000 place. So I just want to say briefly 9 00:00:27,100 --> 00:00:30,000 what? I think the positive case is for 10 00:00:30,000 --> 00:00:32,800 it before. Going on to defend it against 11 00:00:32,800 --> 00:00:37,000 objections. The case for libertarian, 12 00:00:37,000 --> 00:00:40,500 anarchism problems with forced Monopoly. 13 00:00:40,500 --> 00:00:43,600 Think about it this way. What's wrong with a shoe 14 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:47,100 Monopoly? Suppose that I And My Gang are 15 00:00:47,100 --> 00:00:51,000 the only ones who are legally allowed to manufacture and sell 16 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:53,600 shoes. My gang and anyone else I 17 00:00:53,600 --> 00:00:57,100 authorized, but no one else. What's wrong with it? 18 00:00:57,100 --> 00:01:00,700 Well, first of all, from a moral point of view, the question is, 19 00:01:00,900 --> 00:01:05,300 why us, what is so special about us now, in this case? 20 00:01:05,500 --> 00:01:08,600 Because I've chosen me, it is more plausible that I ought to 21 00:01:08,600 --> 00:01:12,200 have that kind of Monopoly. So maybe I should pick a 22 00:01:12,208 --> 00:01:15,800 different example, but still, you might wonder where do I in 23 00:01:15,800 --> 00:01:16,800 my gang? Get off. 24 00:01:17,100 --> 00:01:21,300 Clint claiming this right to make and sell something that no 25 00:01:21,300 --> 00:01:24,300 one else has the right to make and sell to provide a good or 26 00:01:24,300 --> 00:01:26,600 service. No one else has the right to 27 00:01:26,600 --> 00:01:30,400 provide at least as far as you know, I'm just another mortal. 28 00:01:30,600 --> 00:01:34,000 Another human like unto yourselves more or less. 29 00:01:34,300 --> 00:01:38,600 So from a moral standpoint. I have no more right to do it 30 00:01:38,600 --> 00:01:42,700 than anyone else. Then, of course, from a 31 00:01:42,700 --> 00:01:45,100 pragmatic, consequentialist standpoint. 32 00:01:45,300 --> 00:01:49,700 Well, first of all, what is the likely result of my in my gang 33 00:01:49,700 --> 00:01:53,800 having a monopoly on shoes? Well, first of all, there are 34 00:01:53,800 --> 00:01:57,300 incentive problems, if I'm the only person who has the right to 35 00:01:57,300 --> 00:02:01,000 make and sell shoes, you're probably not going to get the 36 00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:03,100 shoes from me. Very cheaply. 37 00:02:04,600 --> 00:02:08,900 I can charge as much as I want. As long as I don't charge too 38 00:02:08,900 --> 00:02:12,000 much that you just can't afford them at all, or you decide 39 00:02:12,000 --> 00:02:14,300 you're happier. Just not having the shoes. 40 00:02:14,700 --> 00:02:17,600 But as long as you're willing and able, I'll charge the 41 00:02:17,600 --> 00:02:21,100 highest price that I can get out of you because you've got no 42 00:02:21,100 --> 00:02:21,900 competition. No. 43 00:02:21,900 --> 00:02:24,600 Where else to go. You also probably shouldn't 44 00:02:24,600 --> 00:02:27,400 expect the shoes to be a particularly high quality 45 00:02:27,400 --> 00:02:31,200 because after all as long as they're barely serviceable and 46 00:02:31,200 --> 00:02:34,600 you still prefer them to going Barefoot, then you have to Them 47 00:02:34,600 --> 00:02:38,200 for me. In addition to the likelihood 48 00:02:38,200 --> 00:02:41,400 that the shoes are going to be expensive and not very good. 49 00:02:41,400 --> 00:02:45,200 There's also the fact that my ability to be the only person 50 00:02:45,400 --> 00:02:49,300 who makes and sells shoes gives me a certain leverage over. 51 00:02:49,300 --> 00:02:52,300 You suppose that I don't like, you suppose you've offended me 52 00:02:52,308 --> 00:02:55,600 in some way. Well, maybe you just don't get 53 00:02:55,600 --> 00:02:59,100 used for a while. So there's also abuse of power 54 00:02:59,100 --> 00:03:04,600 issues, but it's not just the incentive problem because after 55 00:03:04,600 --> 00:03:06,400 all suppose that I'm a perfect saint. 56 00:03:06,600 --> 00:03:08,800 And I will make the best use, I possibly can. 57 00:03:08,800 --> 00:03:10,300 And I'll charge the lowest price. 58 00:03:10,600 --> 00:03:14,300 I can possibly charge and I won't abuse my power at all. 59 00:03:15,400 --> 00:03:17,500 Suppose. I'm utterly trustworthy. 60 00:03:17,800 --> 00:03:21,700 I'm a prince among men not in Machiavelli, since there was 61 00:03:21,700 --> 00:03:26,100 still a problem which is how do I know exactly that I'm doing 62 00:03:26,100 --> 00:03:29,900 the best job I can with these shoes after all, there's no 63 00:03:29,900 --> 00:03:32,900 competition. I guess I could pull people to 64 00:03:32,900 --> 00:03:36,000 try and find out what kind of shoes they seem to want, but 65 00:03:36,000 --> 00:03:37,300 there are lots It's of different ways. 66 00:03:37,300 --> 00:03:40,200 I could make shoes. Some of them are more expensive 67 00:03:40,400 --> 00:03:42,800 ways of making men and some are less expensive. 68 00:03:42,800 --> 00:03:45,300 How do I know given that there's no market? 69 00:03:45,500 --> 00:03:48,800 And there's really not much I can do in the way of profit and 70 00:03:48,800 --> 00:03:52,100 loss accounting. I just have to make guesses. 71 00:03:52,600 --> 00:03:58,600 So even if I'm doing my best the quality I make the quantity I 72 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:03,500 make may not be best suited to satisfy people's preferences and 73 00:04:03,500 --> 00:04:05,900 I have a hard time finding these things out. 74 00:04:07,500 --> 00:04:12,500 Government is a forced Monopoly. So those are all the reasons not 75 00:04:12,500 --> 00:04:16,200 to have a monopoly on the making and selling of shoes. 76 00:04:16,399 --> 00:04:19,300 Now Prime Aphasia. At least it seems as though 77 00:04:20,100 --> 00:04:22,400 those are all good reasons for anyone. 78 00:04:22,400 --> 00:04:26,100 Not to have a monopoly in the provision of Services of 79 00:04:26,100 --> 00:04:29,800 adjudicating disputes and protecting rights and all the 80 00:04:29,800 --> 00:04:33,100 other things that are involved in what you might broadly call 81 00:04:33,100 --> 00:04:36,600 the enterprise of law. First of all, there's a moral. 82 00:04:36,800 --> 00:04:40,400 Question, why does one gang of people get the right to be the 83 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:44,000 only ones in a given territory who can offer certain kinds of 84 00:04:44,000 --> 00:04:47,200 legal services or enforce certain kinds of things. 85 00:04:47,700 --> 00:04:49,600 And then there are these economic questions. 86 00:04:49,800 --> 00:04:51,300 What are the incentives going to be? 87 00:04:51,700 --> 00:04:53,500 Once again? It's a monopoly. 88 00:04:54,100 --> 00:04:57,900 It seems likely that with a captive customer base. 89 00:04:58,400 --> 00:05:01,200 They're going to charge higher prices than they otherwise would 90 00:05:01,200 --> 00:05:04,500 and offer lower quality. There might even be the 91 00:05:04,500 --> 00:05:08,600 occasional abuse abuse of power. And then, even if you managed to 92 00:05:08,600 --> 00:05:12,300 avoid all those problems and you get all the saintly types and to 93 00:05:12,300 --> 00:05:15,800 government, they're still a problem of how do they know that 94 00:05:15,800 --> 00:05:17,800 the particular way? They're providing Legal 95 00:05:17,800 --> 00:05:20,100 Services? The particular mix of Legal 96 00:05:20,100 --> 00:05:22,200 Services. They're offering the particular 97 00:05:22,200 --> 00:05:23,900 ways. They do. 98 00:05:23,900 --> 00:05:27,400 It are really the best ones. They just have to try and figure 99 00:05:27,400 --> 00:05:30,200 out what will work since there's no competition. 100 00:05:30,400 --> 00:05:33,300 They don't have much way of knowing whether what they're 101 00:05:33,300 --> 00:05:35,800 doing is the most successful thing they could be doing. 102 00:05:36,400 --> 00:05:40,800 So, the purpose of those considerations is to put the 103 00:05:40,800 --> 00:05:45,600 burden of proof on the opponent. So this is the point when the 104 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:50,300 opponent of competition and legal services, has to raise 105 00:05:50,400 --> 00:05:54,900 some objections. Ten objections to the 106 00:05:54,900 --> 00:05:56,500 libertarian. Anarchism. 107 00:05:56,700 --> 00:06:00,800 Number one, government is not in the chaos of Monopoly. 108 00:06:01,400 --> 00:06:05,800 Now one objection that sometimes raised isn't so much an 109 00:06:05,800 --> 00:06:09,100 objection to anarchism as an objection to the moral argument. 110 00:06:09,100 --> 00:06:11,600 For anarchism. We'll look, it's not really a 111 00:06:11,600 --> 00:06:14,900 coercive Monopoly. It's not as though people 112 00:06:14,900 --> 00:06:19,000 haven't consented to this because there's a certain sense 113 00:06:19,000 --> 00:06:23,400 in which people have consented to the existing system by Within 114 00:06:23,400 --> 00:06:26,700 the borders of a particular territory by accepting the 115 00:06:26,700 --> 00:06:31,200 benefits of government offers and so forth. 116 00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:34,700 They have an effect consented just as if you were, I walk into 117 00:06:34,700 --> 00:06:37,400 a restaurant, sit down and say y'all have a steak. 118 00:06:37,800 --> 00:06:41,600 You don't have to explicitly mention that you're agreeing to 119 00:06:41,600 --> 00:06:44,400 pay for it. It's just sort of understood by 120 00:06:44,400 --> 00:06:47,000 sitting down in the restaurant and asking for the steak, you 121 00:06:47,000 --> 00:06:50,000 are agreeing to pay for it. Likewise the argument goes if 122 00:06:50,000 --> 00:06:55,600 you sit down In the territory of this given State and you accept 123 00:06:55,600 --> 00:06:58,500 benefits of police protection or something. 124 00:06:59,000 --> 00:07:02,400 Then you've input plus Italy agreed to abide by its 125 00:07:02,400 --> 00:07:05,400 requirements. Notice that even if this 126 00:07:05,400 --> 00:07:09,000 argument works, it doesn't settle the pragmatic question of 127 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:10,900 whether this is the best working system. 128 00:07:12,600 --> 00:07:16,100 But I think there was something dubious about this argument. 129 00:07:16,100 --> 00:07:18,800 It's certainly true. That if I go onto someone else's 130 00:07:18,800 --> 00:07:22,200 property, then it seems like there's an expectation that, as 131 00:07:22,200 --> 00:07:26,100 long as I'm on their property, I have to do, as they say, I have 132 00:07:26,100 --> 00:07:28,600 to follow their rules. If I don't want to follow their 133 00:07:28,600 --> 00:07:31,900 rules, then I have to leave. So I invite you over to my house 134 00:07:31,900 --> 00:07:36,100 and when you come in, I say, you have to wear the funny hat and 135 00:07:36,100 --> 00:07:39,200 you say what's this? And I say, well, that's the way 136 00:07:39,200 --> 00:07:41,100 it works in my house. Everyone has to wear. 137 00:07:41,200 --> 00:07:42,700 The funny hat. Those are the rules. 138 00:07:42,700 --> 00:07:45,500 Well, you can't say I won't wear this hat, but I'm saying, 139 00:07:45,500 --> 00:07:49,300 anyways, these are my rules. They may be dumb rules, but I 140 00:07:49,300 --> 00:07:54,000 can do it now, suppose that you're at home having dinner and 141 00:07:54,000 --> 00:07:57,100 I'm your next door neighbor, and I come and knock on your door. 142 00:07:57,100 --> 00:08:01,000 You open the door and I come say, you have to wear the funny 143 00:08:01,000 --> 00:08:03,300 hat. And you say, why is this and I 144 00:08:03,300 --> 00:08:05,600 say, well, you moved in next door to me. 145 00:08:05,600 --> 00:08:08,500 Didn't you by doing that? You sort of agreed? 146 00:08:08,800 --> 00:08:10,400 And you say, well, wait a second. 147 00:08:10,400 --> 00:08:11,800 When did I agree? Do this. 148 00:08:13,600 --> 00:08:16,400 I think that the person who makes this argument is already 149 00:08:16,400 --> 00:08:19,500 assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction 150 00:08:19,700 --> 00:08:24,300 over this territory. And then they say, well, now 151 00:08:24,300 --> 00:08:28,800 anyone who was in the territory, is there for agreeing to the 152 00:08:28,800 --> 00:08:32,100 prevailing rules, but there are so many the very things they're 153 00:08:32,100 --> 00:08:36,000 trying to prove namely that jurisdiction over the territory 154 00:08:36,000 --> 00:08:39,400 is legitimate. If it's not, then the government 155 00:08:39,400 --> 00:08:42,100 is just one more group of people. 156 00:08:42,700 --> 00:08:47,100 In this broad General geographical territory, but I've 157 00:08:47,100 --> 00:08:51,400 got my property and exactly what their arrangements are. 158 00:08:51,500 --> 00:08:56,100 I don't know. But here I am in my property and 159 00:08:56,300 --> 00:08:58,500 they don't own it. At least they haven't given me 160 00:08:58,500 --> 00:09:01,800 any argument that they do. And so the fact that I'm living 161 00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:05,200 in this country, means I'm living in a certain geographical 162 00:09:05,200 --> 00:09:08,300 region that they have certain pretensions over. 163 00:09:08,500 --> 00:09:11,000 But the question is, whether those pretensions are 164 00:09:11,000 --> 00:09:13,300 legitimate, you can't assume Zoom it. 165 00:09:13,400 --> 00:09:15,000 As I mean sir. Proving it. 166 00:09:16,900 --> 00:09:19,300 Another thing is one of the problems with these implicit 167 00:09:19,300 --> 00:09:22,800 social contract arguments is that it's not clear, what the 168 00:09:22,800 --> 00:09:26,100 contract is, in the case of ordering food in a restaurant. 169 00:09:26,200 --> 00:09:29,600 Everyone pretty much knows what the contract is so you could run 170 00:09:29,600 --> 00:09:32,700 an implicit consent argument there, but no one would suggest 171 00:09:32,700 --> 00:09:34,500 that you could buy a house in the same way. 172 00:09:36,300 --> 00:09:39,900 There are all rules and things like that when it's something 173 00:09:39,900 --> 00:09:42,500 complicated. No one says you just sort of 174 00:09:42,500 --> 00:09:45,100 agreed by nodding your head at some point or something. 175 00:09:45,300 --> 00:09:50,500 You have to find out what it is. That's exactly in the contract. 176 00:09:50,700 --> 00:09:53,400 What are you agreeing to? It's not clear. 177 00:09:53,400 --> 00:09:57,000 If no one knows what exactly the details of the contract. 178 00:09:57,000 --> 00:09:58,900 Are. It's not that persuasive. 179 00:09:59,200 --> 00:10:01,200 Okay. Well, most of the arguments I'm 180 00:10:01,200 --> 00:10:04,900 going to talk about are pragmatic or a mixture of moral 181 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:08,000 and pragmatic. Objection. 182 00:10:08,000 --> 00:10:11,200 Number to Thomas. Hobbes says government is 183 00:10:11,200 --> 00:10:14,900 necessary for cooperation. Probably the most famous 184 00:10:14,900 --> 00:10:18,100 argument against Anarchy is Hobbs Hobbs. 185 00:10:18,100 --> 00:10:21,900 His argument is well, look, human cooperation. 186 00:10:21,900 --> 00:10:25,100 Social cooperation requires a structure of law in the 187 00:10:25,100 --> 00:10:27,300 background. The reason we can trust each 188 00:10:27,300 --> 00:10:30,700 other to cooperate is because we know that there are legal forces 189 00:10:30,700 --> 00:10:33,200 that will punish us. If we violate each other's 190 00:10:33,200 --> 00:10:35,500 rights. I know they'll punish me if I 191 00:10:35,500 --> 00:10:38,800 violate your rights, but Also punish you if you violate my 192 00:10:38,800 --> 00:10:43,000 rights and so I can trust you because I don't have to rely on 193 00:10:43,000 --> 00:10:46,200 your personal character. I just have to rely on the fact 194 00:10:46,200 --> 00:10:48,000 that you'll be intimidated by the law. 195 00:10:48,300 --> 00:10:54,200 So, social cooperation requires This legal framework backed up 196 00:10:54,200 --> 00:10:59,500 by force of the state. Well, Hobbs is assuming several 197 00:10:59,500 --> 00:11:02,100 things at once here, first. He's assuming that there can't 198 00:11:02,100 --> 00:11:04,900 be any social cooperation with Outlaw second. 199 00:11:04,900 --> 00:11:08,200 He's assuming that there can't be any law, unless it's enforced 200 00:11:08,200 --> 00:11:11,500 by physical force, and third, he's assuming, you can't have 201 00:11:11,500 --> 00:11:15,300 law, enforced by physical Force, unless it's done by a monopoly 202 00:11:15,300 --> 00:11:19,900 state, but all of those assumptions are false. 203 00:11:20,000 --> 00:11:23,600 It's certainly true that cooperation can and does emerge. 204 00:11:23,600 --> 00:11:26,700 Maybe not as effectively as it would with law, but without law. 205 00:11:27,200 --> 00:11:30,500 Robert elections book order without law, where he talks 206 00:11:30,500 --> 00:11:32,700 about how neighbors managed to resolve disputes. 207 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:35,500 He offers all these examples about what happens if one 208 00:11:35,500 --> 00:11:39,000 Farmers cow wanders onto another Farmers territory and they solve 209 00:11:39,000 --> 00:11:43,300 it through some mutual customary agreements and so forth. 210 00:11:43,300 --> 00:11:46,400 So there's no legal framework for resolving it. 211 00:11:46,400 --> 00:11:49,300 Maybe that's not enough for a complex economy, but it 212 00:11:49,300 --> 00:11:52,900 certainly shows that you can't have some kind of cooperation, 213 00:11:53,100 --> 00:11:55,200 without an actual legal framework. 214 00:11:55,400 --> 00:11:57,000 Second. You can have a legal framework. 215 00:11:57,100 --> 00:11:59,300 I'm work. That isn't backed up by force. 216 00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:02,500 An example would be the law Merchant in the late Middle 217 00:12:02,500 --> 00:12:05,000 Ages. A system of commercial law that 218 00:12:05,000 --> 00:12:07,300 was backed up by threats of boycott. 219 00:12:07,500 --> 00:12:11,100 Boycott is an act of force, but still, you've got Merchants 220 00:12:11,100 --> 00:12:14,000 making all these contracts. And if you don't abide by the 221 00:12:14,000 --> 00:12:18,700 contract, then the courts just publicizes to everyone. 222 00:12:19,100 --> 00:12:22,300 This person didn't abide by the contract, take that into 223 00:12:22,300 --> 00:12:24,400 account. If you're going to make another 224 00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:29,800 contract with him. And third, you can have formal 225 00:12:29,800 --> 00:12:33,900 legal systems that do not use force that are not monopolistic. 226 00:12:34,000 --> 00:12:36,500 Since Hobbs doesn't even consider that possibility. 227 00:12:36,700 --> 00:12:39,400 He doesn't really give any argument against it but you can 228 00:12:39,400 --> 00:12:41,200 certainly see examples in history. 229 00:12:41,300 --> 00:12:44,600 The history of medieval Iceland, for example where there was no 230 00:12:44,600 --> 00:12:47,400 Center of enforcement. Although there was something 231 00:12:47,400 --> 00:12:49,400 that you might perhaps call a government. 232 00:12:49,400 --> 00:12:51,800 It had no executive arm at all. It had no police. 233 00:12:51,800 --> 00:12:53,200 No soldiers. No nothing. 234 00:12:53,700 --> 00:12:55,600 It had sort of a competitive Court. 235 00:12:55,900 --> 00:13:01,600 Mmm, but then enforcement was just up to whoever and there 236 00:13:01,600 --> 00:13:04,000 were systems that evolved for taking care of that. 237 00:13:06,100 --> 00:13:10,200 Objection number, three lakh, three inconveniences of Anarchy. 238 00:13:10,400 --> 00:13:13,000 Okay. Well more interesting arguments 239 00:13:13,000 --> 00:13:16,400 come from Locke Locke argues that anarchy involves three 240 00:13:16,400 --> 00:13:20,300 things called inconveniences. And inconvenience has somewhat 241 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:24,500 more weighty of a sound in the 17th century English than it 242 00:13:24,500 --> 00:13:27,700 does in Modern English, but still his point in calling it 243 00:13:27,700 --> 00:13:32,600 inconveniences, which still is a bit weaker was the that lock 244 00:13:32,600 --> 00:13:35,600 thought that social cooperation could exist under some Anarchy. 245 00:13:35,900 --> 00:13:38,200 He was more optimistic than hops was. 246 00:13:38,700 --> 00:13:42,400 And thought on the basis of moral sympathies on one hand and 247 00:13:42,400 --> 00:13:45,800 self-interest on the other cooperation could emerge. 248 00:13:46,100 --> 00:13:48,500 He thought there were three problems? 249 00:13:50,100 --> 00:13:52,900 One problem. He said was that there wouldn't 250 00:13:52,900 --> 00:13:56,300 be a general body of law, that was generally known and agreed 251 00:13:56,300 --> 00:13:59,300 upon in understood. People could grasp certain basic 252 00:13:59,300 --> 00:14:02,200 principles of the law of nature, but their applications in 253 00:14:02,200 --> 00:14:05,500 precise detail were always going to be controversial. 254 00:14:06,400 --> 00:14:09,400 Even Libertarians, don't agree. They can agree on General 255 00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:12,100 things, but we're always arguing with each other about various 256 00:14:12,100 --> 00:14:13,400 points of fine. Detail. 257 00:14:13,600 --> 00:14:16,100 So, even in the Society of peaceful Cooperative 258 00:14:16,100 --> 00:14:19,700 Libertarians, there are going to be disagreements about detail. 259 00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:23,300 And so, unless there's some general body of law that 260 00:14:23,300 --> 00:14:26,500 everyone knows about so that they can know what they can 261 00:14:26,500 --> 00:14:29,900 count on being able to do and what not. 262 00:14:30,200 --> 00:14:32,500 It's not going to work. So that was locks. 263 00:14:32,500 --> 00:14:35,100 First argument. There has to be a generally 264 00:14:35,100 --> 00:14:39,000 known Universal body of law that applies to everyone that 265 00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:41,000 everyone knows about ahead of time. 266 00:14:42,700 --> 00:14:45,400 Second, there's a power of enforcement problem. 267 00:14:45,700 --> 00:14:48,100 He thought that without a government, you don't have 268 00:14:48,100 --> 00:14:50,500 sufficiently unified power to enforce. 269 00:14:50,800 --> 00:14:54,200 You just have individuals forcing things on their own, and 270 00:14:54,200 --> 00:14:56,700 they're just too weak. They're not organized enough. 271 00:14:56,700 --> 00:14:59,500 They could be overrun by a gang of Bandits or something. 272 00:15:01,300 --> 00:15:05,200 Third lock said, the problem is that people can't be trusted to 273 00:15:05,200 --> 00:15:08,600 be judges in their own case. If two people have a 274 00:15:08,600 --> 00:15:12,200 disagreement and one of them says, well, I know what the law 275 00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:15,600 of nature is and I'm going to enforce it on you. 276 00:15:16,000 --> 00:15:19,200 Well people tend to be biased and they're going to find most 277 00:15:19,200 --> 00:15:22,200 plausible deer per interpretation of the law of 278 00:15:22,200 --> 00:15:24,400 nature that favors their own case. 279 00:15:24,700 --> 00:15:27,200 So we thought that you can't trust people to be judges in 280 00:15:27,200 --> 00:15:29,200 their own case. Therefore, they should be 281 00:15:29,200 --> 00:15:32,900 morally required to submit. Disputes to an Arbiter. 282 00:15:33,600 --> 00:15:36,500 Maybe in cases of emergency, they can still defend themselves 283 00:15:36,500 --> 00:15:39,500 on the spot, but for other cases, it's not a matter of 284 00:15:39,500 --> 00:15:42,700 immediate self-defense. They need to delegate this to an 285 00:15:42,700 --> 00:15:45,700 Arbiter, a third party and that's the state. 286 00:15:47,300 --> 00:15:50,300 So Locke thinks that these are three problems, you have under 287 00:15:50,300 --> 00:15:53,100 Anarchy, and you wouldn't have them under government or at 288 00:15:53,100 --> 00:15:55,300 least the right kind of government, but I think it's 289 00:15:55,300 --> 00:15:57,200 actually exactly the other way around. 290 00:15:57,300 --> 00:16:00,700 I think that anarchy can solve all three of these problems and 291 00:16:00,700 --> 00:16:03,800 that the state by its very nature, cannot possibly solve 292 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:07,900 them. So let's first take the case of 293 00:16:07,900 --> 00:16:11,500 universality or having a universally known body of law 294 00:16:11,500 --> 00:16:14,200 that people can know ahead of time and count on. 295 00:16:14,600 --> 00:16:18,000 Now, can that emerge in a non State system? 296 00:16:18,300 --> 00:16:21,600 Well, in fact, it did emerge in the law Merchant precisely 297 00:16:21,600 --> 00:16:24,100 because the states were not providing it. 298 00:16:24,700 --> 00:16:28,200 One of the things that helped to bring about the emergence of the 299 00:16:28,200 --> 00:16:32,300 law, Merchant is the individual states and Europe each had 300 00:16:32,300 --> 00:16:34,500 different sets of laws. Governing merchants. 301 00:16:36,500 --> 00:16:39,200 They were all different and the court in France. 302 00:16:39,200 --> 00:16:42,400 Wouldn't uphold a contract made in England under the laws of 303 00:16:42,400 --> 00:16:45,500 England and vice versa. And so the merchants ability to 304 00:16:45,500 --> 00:16:49,200 engage in international trade was hampered by the fact that 305 00:16:49,200 --> 00:16:52,600 there wasn't any uniform system of commercial law for all of 306 00:16:52,600 --> 00:16:54,700 Europe. So the merchants got together 307 00:16:54,700 --> 00:16:57,400 and said, we'll just make some of our own. 308 00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:01,000 The courts are coming up with these crazy rules and they're 309 00:17:01,000 --> 00:17:03,800 all different and they won't respect each other's decisions. 310 00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:06,200 So we'll just ignore them and we'll set up our own system. 311 00:17:07,099 --> 00:17:10,500 So this is a case in which uniformity and predictability 312 00:17:10,500 --> 00:17:14,400 were produced by the market and not by the state, and you can 313 00:17:14,400 --> 00:17:18,900 see why that's not surprising. It's in the interest of those 314 00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:22,200 who are providing a private system, to make it uniform and 315 00:17:22,200 --> 00:17:25,599 predictable, if that's what the customers need. 316 00:17:27,400 --> 00:17:30,800 It's for the same reason that you don't find any triangular 317 00:17:30,800 --> 00:17:32,900 ATM cards. As far as I know. 318 00:17:32,900 --> 00:17:36,200 There's no law saying that you can't have a triangular ATM 319 00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:38,200 card. But if anyone tried to Market 320 00:17:38,200 --> 00:17:41,300 them, they just wouldn't be very popular because they wouldn't 321 00:17:41,300 --> 00:17:45,300 fit into the existing machines. When what people need is 322 00:17:45,300 --> 00:17:48,200 diversity, when what people need is different systems for 323 00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:51,200 different people. The market provides that but 324 00:17:51,200 --> 00:17:53,400 there are some things where uniformity is better. 325 00:17:53,600 --> 00:17:56,400 Your ATM card is more valuable to you. 326 00:17:56,700 --> 00:18:02,200 If everyone else is using the same kind as well or a kind 327 00:18:02,200 --> 00:18:05,900 compatible with it. So you can use the machines 328 00:18:05,900 --> 00:18:09,100 wherever you go on there for the merchants if they want to make a 329 00:18:09,108 --> 00:18:11,900 profit, they're going to provide uniformity. 330 00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:16,100 So the market has an incentive. To provide uniformity in a way 331 00:18:16,100 --> 00:18:18,300 that government doesn't necessarily. 332 00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:23,200 On the question of having sufficient power for organizing 333 00:18:23,200 --> 00:18:25,000 for defense. Well, there's no reason you 334 00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:28,000 can't have organization under Anarchy in Turkey, doesn't mean 335 00:18:28,000 --> 00:18:30,100 that each person makes their own shoes. 336 00:18:30,100 --> 00:18:33,100 The alternative to government, providing all the shoes is not 337 00:18:33,100 --> 00:18:34,900 that each person makes their own shoes. 338 00:18:35,100 --> 00:18:37,700 So likewise the alternative, the government providing all the 339 00:18:37,700 --> 00:18:41,100 legal services is not that each person has to be their own 340 00:18:41,100 --> 00:18:43,700 independent policeman. There's no reason that they 341 00:18:43,700 --> 00:18:47,100 can't organize in various ways. In fact, if you're worried about 342 00:18:47,100 --> 00:18:50,000 not having sufficient Force to resist an aggressor. 343 00:18:50,300 --> 00:18:52,800 Well, I'm an awfully government is a much more dangerous 344 00:18:52,800 --> 00:18:57,400 aggressor than just some gang of Bandits or other because it's 345 00:18:57,400 --> 00:19:02,100 unified all this power in just one point in the whole society. 346 00:19:03,700 --> 00:19:07,000 But I think most interestingly the argument about being a judge 347 00:19:07,000 --> 00:19:09,700 in your own case, really boomerangs against Locke's 348 00:19:09,700 --> 00:19:12,400 argument here. Because first of all, it's not a 349 00:19:12,400 --> 00:19:16,100 good argument for a monopoly because it's a fallacy to argue 350 00:19:16,100 --> 00:19:19,800 from everyone should submit their disputes to a third party. 351 00:19:20,200 --> 00:19:23,300 Two, there should be a third party that everyone submits 352 00:19:23,300 --> 00:19:27,400 their disputes to that's like arguing from Everyone likes at 353 00:19:27,400 --> 00:19:31,600 least one TV show to. There's at least one TV show 354 00:19:31,600 --> 00:19:33,800 that Everyone likes. It just doesn't follow. 355 00:19:34,100 --> 00:19:37,000 You can have everyone submitting their disputes to third parties 356 00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:41,600 without there being one, third party that everyone submits 357 00:19:41,600 --> 00:19:43,600 their disputes to. So, suppose. 358 00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:49,200 You've got three people on an island, A and B can submit their 359 00:19:49,200 --> 00:19:54,300 disputes to see And ANC can submit their disputes to B, and 360 00:19:54,300 --> 00:19:56,900 B and C can submit their disputes to a. 361 00:19:56,900 --> 00:20:00,300 So, you don't need a monopoly in order to embody this principle 362 00:20:00,300 --> 00:20:04,900 that people should submit their disputes to a third party, but 363 00:20:04,900 --> 00:20:07,800 moreover, not only do you not need a government but a 364 00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:11,300 government is precisely what? Doesn't satisfy that principle 365 00:20:11,300 --> 00:20:15,700 because if you have a dispute with the government, the 366 00:20:15,700 --> 00:20:18,100 government doesn't submit that dispute to a third party. 367 00:20:18,100 --> 00:20:20,700 If you have a dispute with the Permanent. 368 00:20:20,700 --> 00:20:23,000 It'll be settled in a government court. 369 00:20:23,100 --> 00:20:26,700 If you're lucky, if you're unlucky, if you live under one 370 00:20:26,700 --> 00:20:29,600 of the more Rough and Ready, governments, you won't even get 371 00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:31,100 as far as court. Now. 372 00:20:31,300 --> 00:20:33,800 Of course, it's better. If the government is itself, 373 00:20:33,800 --> 00:20:36,300 divided has checks and balances and so forth. 374 00:20:36,500 --> 00:20:39,300 It's a little bit better. That's closer to their being 375 00:20:39,300 --> 00:20:41,500 third parties. But still they are all part of 376 00:20:41,500 --> 00:20:44,400 the same system. The judges are paid by tax money 377 00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:47,600 and so forth. So it's not as though you can't 378 00:20:47,600 --> 00:20:50,700 have better and worse. Approximations to the Principal 379 00:20:50,700 --> 00:20:53,000 among different kinds of governments still. 380 00:20:53,100 --> 00:20:56,900 As long as it's a monopoly system by its nature. 381 00:20:57,400 --> 00:21:03,100 It's in a certain sense Lawless it never ultimately submits its 382 00:21:03,100 --> 00:21:08,700 disputes to a third party objection, number four by Ian. 383 00:21:08,700 --> 00:21:13,700 Rand private protection agencies will battle probably the most 384 00:21:13,700 --> 00:21:16,200 popular argument against libertarian. 385 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:20,000 Anarchy is well what happens if and this is on Ranch? 386 00:21:20,200 --> 00:21:23,300 Famous argument. I think you violated my rights 387 00:21:23,300 --> 00:21:26,400 and you think you haven't? So I call up my protection 388 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:29,300 agency and you call up your protection agency. 389 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:33,600 Why won't they just go to battle what guarantees that they won't 390 00:21:33,600 --> 00:21:35,900 battle to which? Of course, the answer is well, 391 00:21:36,000 --> 00:21:39,700 nothing guarantees. They won't do battle human 392 00:21:39,700 --> 00:21:42,100 beings have free. Will they can do all kinds of 393 00:21:42,100 --> 00:21:44,500 crazy things. They might go to battle, 394 00:21:44,700 --> 00:21:47,300 likewise George Bush, might decide to push the nuclear 395 00:21:47,300 --> 00:21:49,500 button tomorrow. They might do all sorts of 396 00:21:49,500 --> 00:21:54,200 things. The question is what's likely 397 00:21:55,100 --> 00:21:58,800 switches likelier to settle its dispute through violence a 398 00:21:58,800 --> 00:22:01,800 government or a private Protection Agency. 399 00:22:02,100 --> 00:22:04,900 Well, the difference is that private protection agencies have 400 00:22:04,900 --> 00:22:08,400 to bear the cost of their own decisions to go to war, going to 401 00:22:08,400 --> 00:22:11,000 war is expensive. If you have a choice between 402 00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:13,900 two, protection agencies and one solves its disputes through 403 00:22:13,900 --> 00:22:17,300 violence, most of the time and the other solves its disputes 404 00:22:17,500 --> 00:22:22,600 through arbitration, most of the time now, You might think I want 405 00:22:22,600 --> 00:22:25,200 the one that solves its disputes through violence. 406 00:22:25,200 --> 00:22:28,700 They sound really cool. But then you look at your 407 00:22:28,700 --> 00:22:30,600 monthly premiums and you think well. 408 00:22:31,800 --> 00:22:34,500 How committed are you to this Viking mentality? 409 00:22:34,500 --> 00:22:36,600 Now? You might be so committed to the 410 00:22:36,600 --> 00:22:38,700 Viking mentality. That you're willing to pay for 411 00:22:38,700 --> 00:22:40,800 it. But still it's more expensive. 412 00:22:40,800 --> 00:22:44,200 A lot of consumers are going to say, I want to go to the one 413 00:22:44,200 --> 00:22:47,400 that doesn't charge all this extra amount for the violence. 414 00:22:47,600 --> 00:22:50,300 Whereas government's, first of all, they've got captive 415 00:22:50,300 --> 00:22:52,100 customers. They can't do elsewhere. 416 00:22:52,300 --> 00:22:55,100 But since they're taxing, the customers anyways, and so the 417 00:22:55,100 --> 00:22:58,600 customers don't have the option to switch to a different agency 418 00:22:59,100 --> 00:23:03,500 and So governments can externalize the cost of, they're 419 00:23:03,500 --> 00:23:06,200 going to warm much more effectively than private 420 00:23:06,200 --> 00:23:11,000 agencies can. And just a quick side note, 421 00:23:11,300 --> 00:23:14,000 isn't it funny? They're so terrified of like, 422 00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:17,800 neighbor a thinking you stole my TV and then the other neighbor 423 00:23:17,800 --> 00:23:19,900 saying, no, we didn't and violence. 424 00:23:19,900 --> 00:23:23,100 Resulting. It's like, um, has there ever 425 00:23:23,300 --> 00:23:27,500 been an example of government's going to war? 426 00:23:27,900 --> 00:23:30,000 Like, you're really think neighbors are going to start 427 00:23:30,000 --> 00:23:32,000 going to war. Let's see. 428 00:23:32,000 --> 00:23:34,500 If this criticism also applies to your system. 429 00:23:34,800 --> 00:23:39,500 Is there any historical examples of governments using It's may be 430 00:23:39,500 --> 00:23:43,300 destroying property, maybe even killing innocent people. 431 00:23:43,700 --> 00:23:46,600 I mean, you got a couple world wars, a couple genocides by 432 00:23:46,600 --> 00:23:49,600 dictators. You got carpet bombings. 433 00:23:49,600 --> 00:23:53,600 You got Mass arrests for victimless crimes. 434 00:23:53,600 --> 00:23:57,500 You got stealing four trillion dollars annually, but at least 435 00:23:57,500 --> 00:24:00,100 there's no disputes because under Anarchy. 436 00:24:00,100 --> 00:24:05,300 There might be disputes in which bad things happen, huh? 437 00:24:06,300 --> 00:24:08,400 Objection. Number 5, Robert Ben. 438 00:24:08,400 --> 00:24:12,100 And I do know, final Arbiter of disputes. 439 00:24:12,300 --> 00:24:15,600 One common objection. This is, when you find, for 440 00:24:15,600 --> 00:24:19,600 example, in Robert didn't Otto, who's a randian, who's written a 441 00:24:19,600 --> 00:24:21,300 number of Articles against Anarchy. 442 00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:24,100 He and I have sort of had a running debate online about 443 00:24:24,100 --> 00:24:27,900 this, his principal objection to Anarchy, is that under Anarchy? 444 00:24:27,900 --> 00:24:31,200 There's no final Arbiter and disputes under government. 445 00:24:31,200 --> 00:24:34,900 Some final Arbiter at some point comes along and resolve the 446 00:24:34,900 --> 00:24:39,400 dispute one way or another well, under Anarchy since there's no 447 00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:42,800 agency that has the right to settle things once and for all 448 00:24:43,100 --> 00:24:45,700 there's no fun. Anil Arbiter and so disputes in 449 00:24:45,700 --> 00:24:47,500 some sense. Never end. 450 00:24:47,800 --> 00:24:51,800 They never get resolved. They always remain open ended. 451 00:24:53,200 --> 00:24:55,600 So what's the answer to that? Well, I think there's an 452 00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:59,000 ambiguity to the concept here. Are they a final Arbiter by 453 00:24:59,100 --> 00:25:01,900 final Arbiter? You could mean the final Arbiter 454 00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:07,000 in what I call the playtonic sense that is to say someone or 455 00:25:07,000 --> 00:25:09,800 something or some institution that somehow absolutely 456 00:25:09,800 --> 00:25:13,400 guarantees that the dispute is resolved forever that absolutely 457 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:19,000 guarantees the resolution. Or instead by final Arbiter, you 458 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:22,100 could simply mean some person or a process of institution or 459 00:25:22,100 --> 00:25:26,100 something or other that more or less reliably guarantees, most 460 00:25:26,100 --> 00:25:29,100 of the time that these problems get resolved. 461 00:25:30,700 --> 00:25:33,900 Now it is true that in the platonic sense of an absolute 462 00:25:33,900 --> 00:25:36,100 guarantee of a final Arbiter. In that sense. 463 00:25:36,500 --> 00:25:39,800 Anarchy does not provide one. But neither does any other 464 00:25:39,800 --> 00:25:41,900 system. Take a Min artist constitutional 465 00:25:41,900 --> 00:25:45,900 republic, the sort that Ben and I do favors. 466 00:25:46,100 --> 00:25:49,400 Is there a final Arbiter under the system in the sense of 467 00:25:49,400 --> 00:25:52,900 something that absolutely guarantees ending the process of 468 00:25:52,900 --> 00:25:56,500 dispute forever. Well, I sue you or I've been 469 00:25:56,500 --> 00:25:58,300 sued or I'm accused of something. 470 00:25:58,300 --> 00:26:01,100 Whatever. I'm in some kind of Court case, 471 00:26:01,100 --> 00:26:02,400 I lose it. I appeal it. 472 00:26:02,600 --> 00:26:04,300 I appeal it. It goes to the Supreme Court. 473 00:26:04,300 --> 00:26:06,600 They go against me. I Lobby Congress to change the 474 00:26:06,600 --> 00:26:08,500 laws in favor me. They don't do it. 475 00:26:09,000 --> 00:26:12,500 So I try to get a movement for a constitutional amendment going 476 00:26:12,800 --> 00:26:15,000 that fail. So, I try to get people together 477 00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:18,800 to vote a new people in Congress, who will vote for it. 478 00:26:19,300 --> 00:26:22,000 In some sense. It can go on forever. 479 00:26:22,000 --> 00:26:26,700 The dispute isn't over. But as a matter of fact, most of 480 00:26:26,700 --> 00:26:29,100 the time, legal disputes, eventually end. 481 00:26:29,500 --> 00:26:33,300 Someone finds it too costly to continue fighting likewise under 482 00:26:33,300 --> 00:26:36,500 Anarchy, of course, there's no guarantee that the conflict 483 00:26:36,500 --> 00:26:39,400 won't go on forever. There are very few guarantees of 484 00:26:39,400 --> 00:26:43,400 that Ironclad sort, but there's no reason not to expect it to 485 00:26:43,400 --> 00:26:48,100 work. Objection number six property, 486 00:26:48,100 --> 00:26:51,200 law. Cannot emerge from the market. 487 00:26:51,200 --> 00:26:55,900 Another popular argument also used Often by Randy ins is that 488 00:26:55,900 --> 00:26:59,200 market exchanges, presuppose a background of property law. 489 00:26:59,500 --> 00:27:02,700 You and I can't be making exchanges of goods for services 490 00:27:02,900 --> 00:27:06,300 or money for services or whatever unless there's already 491 00:27:06,300 --> 00:27:10,100 a stable background of property law, that ensures us the 492 00:27:10,100 --> 00:27:13,800 property titles we have. And, because the market in order 493 00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:17,300 to function Suppose has existing background property law. 494 00:27:17,900 --> 00:27:22,100 Therefore, that property law cannot itself, be the product of 495 00:27:22,100 --> 00:27:25,000 the market. The property law must emerge. 496 00:27:25,300 --> 00:27:28,700 They must really think, it must emerge out of an infallible, 497 00:27:28,700 --> 00:27:33,200 robot or something, but I don't know exactly what it emerges 498 00:27:33,200 --> 00:27:36,900 from, but somehow, it can't emerge from the market. 499 00:27:37,300 --> 00:27:42,200 So, the argument goes, But their thinking is sort of like this 500 00:27:43,100 --> 00:27:46,100 first. There's this property law, and 501 00:27:46,100 --> 00:27:48,800 it's all put in place and no Market transactions are 502 00:27:48,800 --> 00:27:51,400 happening. Everyone is just waiting for the 503 00:27:51,400 --> 00:27:54,800 whole legal structure to be put in place and then it's in place 504 00:27:54,900 --> 00:27:57,600 and now we can finally start trading back and forth. 505 00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:01,100 It certainly is true that you can't have functioning markets 506 00:28:01,100 --> 00:28:02,900 without a functioning legal system. 507 00:28:03,100 --> 00:28:06,600 That's true, but it's not as though the first legal system is 508 00:28:06,600 --> 00:28:09,600 in place. And then on the last day, they 509 00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:12,600 Italy, finished putting the legal system together. 510 00:28:12,800 --> 00:28:15,600 Then the people begin their trading, these things arise 511 00:28:15,600 --> 00:28:20,400 together, legal institutions and economic trade arise together in 512 00:28:20,400 --> 00:28:24,600 one and the same place at one. In the same time. 513 00:28:24,800 --> 00:28:27,500 The legal system is not something independent of the 514 00:28:27,500 --> 00:28:29,100 activity. It constrains. 515 00:28:29,300 --> 00:28:33,600 After all, a legal system again is not a robot or a God or 516 00:28:33,600 --> 00:28:36,700 something separate from us, the existence of a legal system 517 00:28:36,700 --> 00:28:41,200 consists in people obeying it if We won ignored the legal system. 518 00:28:41,300 --> 00:28:44,400 It would have no power at all. So it's only because people 519 00:28:44,400 --> 00:28:49,300 generally go along with it that it survives, the legal system to 520 00:28:49,600 --> 00:28:55,100 depends on voluntary support. I think that a lot of people, 521 00:28:55,600 --> 00:28:59,400 one reason that they're scared of Anarchy is they think that 522 00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:03,300 under government it's as though there's some kind of guarantee 523 00:29:03,500 --> 00:29:07,700 that's taken away under Anarchy that somehow there's this firm 524 00:29:07,700 --> 00:29:11,000 background. We can always fall back on that 525 00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:12,900 under Anarchy. It's just gone. 526 00:29:13,400 --> 00:29:16,000 But the firm background is just the product of people 527 00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:19,200 interacting with incentives that they have. 528 00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:22,400 Likewise when anarchists a people under an He would 529 00:29:22,400 --> 00:29:25,800 probably have the incentive to do this or that, and people say, 530 00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:30,800 well that's not good enough. I just don't want it to be 531 00:29:30,800 --> 00:29:33,800 likely, they'll have the incentive to do this. 532 00:29:33,800 --> 00:29:37,000 I want the government to absolutely guarantee that 533 00:29:37,000 --> 00:29:41,100 they'll do it. But the government is just 534 00:29:41,100 --> 00:29:44,800 people and depending on what the Constitutional structure of the 535 00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:47,800 government is. It's likely that they'll do this 536 00:29:47,800 --> 00:29:51,300 or that you can't design a constitution that will guarantee 537 00:29:51,500 --> 00:29:53,700 that the people in the government will behave in any 538 00:29:53,700 --> 00:29:56,200 particular way. You can structure it in such a 539 00:29:56,200 --> 00:30:00,800 way so that they're more likely to do this or less likely to do 540 00:30:00,800 --> 00:30:05,500 that and you can see Anarchy as just an extension of checks and 541 00:30:05,500 --> 00:30:12,400 balances to a broader level. For example, people say what 542 00:30:12,400 --> 00:30:15,800 guarantees that the different agencies will resolve things in 543 00:30:15,800 --> 00:30:19,500 any particular way. Well, the US Constitution says, 544 00:30:19,500 --> 00:30:22,100 nothing about what happens if different branches of the 545 00:30:22,100 --> 00:30:24,300 government disagree about how to resolve things. 546 00:30:24,600 --> 00:30:27,500 It doesn't say what happens if the Supreme Court thinks 547 00:30:27,500 --> 00:30:31,000 something is unconstitutional. But Congress thinks it doesn't 548 00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:33,600 and wants to go ahead and do it. Anyway, famously. 549 00:30:33,800 --> 00:30:37,100 It doesn't say what happens if there's a dispute between the 550 00:30:37,100 --> 00:30:42,300 states and the Federal I meant the current system where once 551 00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:45,600 the Supreme Court, declare something unconstitutional, then 552 00:30:45,600 --> 00:30:48,300 the Congress and the president. Don't try to do it anymore. 553 00:30:48,300 --> 00:30:51,000 Or at least not as much that didn't always exist. 554 00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:55,200 Remember when the court declared that what Andrew Jackson was 555 00:30:55,200 --> 00:30:57,900 doing was unconstitutional. When he was president. 556 00:30:57,900 --> 00:31:00,400 He just said, well, they've made that decision. 557 00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:04,100 Let them enforce it. The Constitution doesn't say 558 00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:07,200 whether the way Jackson did, it was the right way. 559 00:31:09,600 --> 00:31:13,600 The way we do it now is just the way that's emerged through 560 00:31:13,600 --> 00:31:16,000 custom, maybe your for it. Maybe you're against it, 561 00:31:16,000 --> 00:31:19,000 whatever it is. It was never codified in law. 562 00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:23,700 Objection. Number seven, organized crime 563 00:31:23,700 --> 00:31:27,100 will take over one objection. Is that under Anarchy? 564 00:31:27,100 --> 00:31:28,800 Organized crime. Will take over. 565 00:31:29,300 --> 00:31:32,200 Well, it might. But is it likely organized 566 00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:33,600 crime? Gets its power because it 567 00:31:33,600 --> 00:31:37,400 specializes in things that are illegal, things like drugs, 568 00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:40,400 alcohol prostitution. And so During the years, when 569 00:31:40,400 --> 00:31:44,000 alcohol was prohibited organized crime, specialized in the 570 00:31:44,000 --> 00:31:47,500 alcohol trade nowadays, there are not so big in the alcohol 571 00:31:47,500 --> 00:31:49,900 trade. So the power of organized crime 572 00:31:49,900 --> 00:31:54,300 to a large extent, depends on the power of government. 573 00:31:54,300 --> 00:31:57,200 It's sort of a parasite on the government's activities 574 00:31:57,500 --> 00:32:00,400 governments by Banning things create black markets. 575 00:32:00,500 --> 00:32:04,200 Black markets are dangerous things to be in because you have 576 00:32:04,200 --> 00:32:08,900 to worry both about the government and about other dodgy 577 00:32:08,900 --> 00:32:10,700 people. People who are going to be in 578 00:32:10,700 --> 00:32:14,200 the black market filled. Organized crime, specializes in 579 00:32:14,200 --> 00:32:16,500 that. So We're Goin eyes crime. 580 00:32:17,400 --> 00:32:21,000 I think would be weaker not stronger in a Libertarian 581 00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:25,200 system. Objection number 8, the rich 582 00:32:25,200 --> 00:32:28,300 will rule. Another worry, is that the rich 583 00:32:28,300 --> 00:32:32,800 would rule under Anarchy after? All won't Justice. 584 00:32:32,800 --> 00:32:35,200 Just go to the highest bidder. In that case. 585 00:32:35,600 --> 00:32:39,000 If you turn Legal Services into an economic good, that's a 586 00:32:39,008 --> 00:32:40,700 common objection. Interestingly. 587 00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:43,000 It's a particularly common objection. 588 00:32:43,000 --> 00:32:46,000 Among Randy ends who suddenly become very concerned about the 589 00:32:46,000 --> 00:32:50,600 poor impoverished masses, but under which system are the rich, 590 00:32:50,600 --> 00:32:53,800 more powerful. Either the current system or 591 00:32:53,800 --> 00:32:58,400 under Anarchy. Certainly, you've always got 592 00:32:58,400 --> 00:33:00,500 some sort of Advantage. If you're rich, it's good to be 593 00:33:00,500 --> 00:33:02,300 rich. You're always in a better 594 00:33:02,300 --> 00:33:05,400 position, a bride people. If you're rich, then if you're 595 00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:09,300 not, that's true, but under the current system, the power of the 596 00:33:09,300 --> 00:33:14,100 riches magnified suppose that I'm an evil rich person and I 597 00:33:14,100 --> 00:33:17,000 want to get the government to do something or other that cost a 598 00:33:17,008 --> 00:33:19,600 million dollars. Do I have to bribe some 599 00:33:19,600 --> 00:33:21,800 bureaucrat a million dollars to get it done? 600 00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:24,200 No. Because I'm not asking him to do 601 00:33:24,200 --> 00:33:25,300 it with his own money. Any. 602 00:33:25,600 --> 00:33:28,900 Obviously, if I were asking him to do it with his own money, I 603 00:33:28,900 --> 00:33:31,800 couldn't get him to spend a million dollars by bribing him 604 00:33:31,800 --> 00:33:36,500 any less than 1 million. It would have to be at least 1 605 00:33:36,500 --> 00:33:41,300 million dollars in one cent. But people who control tax 606 00:33:41,300 --> 00:33:44,600 money, that they don't themselves personally owned and 607 00:33:44,600 --> 00:33:48,100 therefore can't do whatever they want with. 608 00:33:48,600 --> 00:33:52,000 The bureaucrat can't just pocket a million and go home. 609 00:33:52,400 --> 00:33:55,000 Although it can get surprisingly close to. 610 00:33:55,500 --> 00:33:59,900 All I have to do is bribe him a few thousand and he can direct 611 00:33:59,900 --> 00:34:03,300 this million dollars in tax money to my favorite project or 612 00:34:03,300 --> 00:34:05,700 whatever. And thus, the power of my bribe 613 00:34:05,700 --> 00:34:11,100 money is multiplied. Whereas, if you were the head of 614 00:34:11,100 --> 00:34:14,000 some private Protection Agency, and I'm trying to get you to do 615 00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:16,199 something that costs a million dollars. 616 00:34:16,400 --> 00:34:18,500 I'd have to bribe, you more than a million. 617 00:34:18,699 --> 00:34:23,100 So the power of the riches actually less under Anarchy, and 618 00:34:23,100 --> 00:34:25,600 of course, any court that got this reputation of 619 00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:28,400 discriminating in favor of millionaires against poor. 620 00:34:28,400 --> 00:34:31,400 People would also presumably have the reputation of 621 00:34:31,400 --> 00:34:34,199 discriminating for billionaires against millionaires. 622 00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:37,900 So the millionaires would not want to deal with it all of the 623 00:34:37,900 --> 00:34:40,400 time. They'd only want to deal with it 624 00:34:40,699 --> 00:34:42,500 when they're dealing with people poorer. 625 00:34:42,500 --> 00:34:45,500 Not people richer the reputation effects. 626 00:34:45,800 --> 00:34:48,900 I don't think this would be too popular, an outfit. 627 00:34:51,500 --> 00:34:54,600 Worries about poor victims, who can't afford legal services or 628 00:34:54,600 --> 00:34:56,600 victims, who died without heirs again. 629 00:34:56,600 --> 00:34:59,400 The Randy ends are very worried about victims dying without. 630 00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:01,900 Heirs, in the case of the poor victims. 631 00:35:02,200 --> 00:35:04,900 You can do what they did. In medieval Iceland, you're too 632 00:35:04,900 --> 00:35:07,900 poor to purchase legal services, but still, if someone has 633 00:35:07,900 --> 00:35:11,300 harmed, you, you have a claim to compensation from that person. 634 00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:16,200 You can sell that claim part of the claim or all of the claim to 635 00:35:16,200 --> 00:35:20,100 someone else. Actually, it's kind of like 636 00:35:20,100 --> 00:35:23,400 hiring a lawyer on a contingency fee basis. 637 00:35:23,900 --> 00:35:26,900 You can sell to someone who was in a position to enforce your 638 00:35:26,900 --> 00:35:30,800 claim or if you die without heirs in a sense, one of the 639 00:35:30,800 --> 00:35:35,200 goods you left behind was your claim to compensation and that 640 00:35:35,200 --> 00:35:40,000 can be homesteaded. Objection number 9 in the masses 641 00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:44,400 will demand bad laws. Another worried that bitten Otto 642 00:35:44,400 --> 00:35:47,800 has and this is sort of the opposite view that the ritual 643 00:35:47,800 --> 00:35:50,900 rule is will look isn't mises right? 644 00:35:51,300 --> 00:35:54,600 That the market is like a big democracy where there is 645 00:35:54,600 --> 00:35:58,600 consumer sovereignty in the masses, get whatever they want. 646 00:35:58,800 --> 00:36:01,700 That's great when it's like refrigerators and cars and so 647 00:36:01,700 --> 00:36:04,700 forth, but surely it's not a good thing when it's laws 648 00:36:04,900 --> 00:36:08,900 because after all the masses are a bunch of I went intolerant 649 00:36:08,900 --> 00:36:12,500 fools and if they just get whatever laws they want, who 650 00:36:12,500 --> 00:36:14,500 knows what horrible things they will make. 651 00:36:16,300 --> 00:36:19,900 Of course, the difference between economic democracy of 652 00:36:19,900 --> 00:36:23,200 the mises sort, and political democracy is well. 653 00:36:23,400 --> 00:36:25,200 Yeah, they get whatever they want. 654 00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:27,100 But they're going to have to pay for it. 655 00:36:27,400 --> 00:36:30,100 Now. It's perfectly true, that if you 656 00:36:30,100 --> 00:36:34,500 have people who are fanatical enough about wanting to impose, 657 00:36:34,600 --> 00:36:37,200 some wretched thing on other people, you've got a large 658 00:36:37,200 --> 00:36:40,300 enough group of people who are fanatical enough about this. 659 00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:43,700 Then Anarchy might not lead to libertarian results. 660 00:36:45,300 --> 00:36:48,800 If you live in California, you've got enough people who are 661 00:36:48,800 --> 00:36:52,000 absolutely fanatical about banning smoking or maybe you 662 00:36:52,000 --> 00:36:55,300 live in Alabama and it's homosexuality instead of 663 00:36:55,300 --> 00:36:56,600 smoking. They want to ban. 664 00:36:57,000 --> 00:37:01,000 Neither one would ban the other. I think in that case, it might 665 00:37:01,000 --> 00:37:05,900 happen that there. So fanatical about it that they 666 00:37:05,900 --> 00:37:08,700 would ban it. But remember that they're going 667 00:37:08,700 --> 00:37:11,300 to have to be paying for this. So when you get your monthly 668 00:37:11,300 --> 00:37:13,900 premium, you'll see, here's your basic services. 669 00:37:14,300 --> 00:37:16,000 Then you will go against aggression. 670 00:37:16,000 --> 00:37:19,000 Oh, and here's also your extended service. 671 00:37:19,000 --> 00:37:24,000 The extra fee for that appearing on to your neighbors window. 672 00:37:24,000 --> 00:37:28,500 To make sure they're not either smoking tobacco or engaging in 673 00:37:28,500 --> 00:37:32,000 homosexuality or whatever it is. You're worried about. 674 00:37:32,200 --> 00:37:35,300 Now, the really fanatical people will say yes. 675 00:37:35,300 --> 00:37:37,700 I'm going to Shell out extra money for this. 676 00:37:38,100 --> 00:37:40,300 Of course, if they're that fanatical, they're probably 677 00:37:40,300 --> 00:37:44,900 going to be trouble under menarche or statism to But if 678 00:37:44,900 --> 00:37:49,300 they're not that fanatical, they'll say, well, if all I have 679 00:37:49,300 --> 00:37:52,500 to do is go into a voting booth and vote for these laws 680 00:37:52,500 --> 00:37:54,100 restricting, other people's freedom. 681 00:37:54,100 --> 00:37:57,700 Well heck, I'd go in, it's pretty easy to go in and just 682 00:37:57,700 --> 00:38:00,200 vote for it. But if they actually have to pay 683 00:38:00,200 --> 00:38:05,100 for it G, I don't know. Maybe I can reconcile myself to 684 00:38:05,100 --> 00:38:09,900 this. Objection, number 10, Robert 685 00:38:09,900 --> 00:38:12,500 nozick and Tyler. Cowen, private, protection 686 00:38:12,500 --> 00:38:15,700 agencies will become a de facto government. 687 00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:19,300 Okay, one last consideration I want to talk about this is a 688 00:38:19,308 --> 00:38:23,000 question that originally was raised by Robert nozick and has 689 00:38:23,000 --> 00:38:24,900 since been pushed further by Tyler. 690 00:38:24,900 --> 00:38:27,700 Cowen nosek said, suppose you have Anarchy. 691 00:38:27,800 --> 00:38:29,900 One of three things will happen either. 692 00:38:29,900 --> 00:38:33,200 The agencies will fight and he gives two different scenarios of 693 00:38:33,200 --> 00:38:35,900 what will happen if they fight. But I've already talked about 694 00:38:36,000 --> 00:38:37,900 What happens if they fight. So I'll talk about the third 695 00:38:37,900 --> 00:38:39,800 option. What if they don't fight? 696 00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:44,100 Then he says, if instead they agree to these, Mutual 697 00:38:44,300 --> 00:38:48,200 arbitration contracts and so forth, then basically, the whole 698 00:38:48,200 --> 00:38:51,000 thing just turned into a government and then Tyler Cowen 699 00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:52,400 has pushed this argument further. 700 00:38:52,600 --> 00:38:56,900 He said what happens is that basically, this forms a cartel 701 00:38:57,100 --> 00:39:00,500 and it's going to be in the interest of this cartel to sort 702 00:39:00,500 --> 00:39:05,100 of turn itself into a government and any new agency that comes 703 00:39:05,100 --> 00:39:07,300 along. You can just boycott it. 704 00:39:10,500 --> 00:39:12,200 That's great. The worst thing that could 705 00:39:12,200 --> 00:39:14,400 happen on her. Anarchy is government. 706 00:39:14,600 --> 00:39:20,400 So I'm an advocate government. Going on, just as it's in your 707 00:39:20,400 --> 00:39:23,600 interest. If you come along with in new 708 00:39:23,600 --> 00:39:26,800 ATM card, that it can be compatible with everyone else's 709 00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:29,000 machines. So if you come along with a 710 00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:33,000 brand-new Protection Agency, it is in your interest that you get 711 00:39:33,000 --> 00:39:36,800 to be part of this system of contracts and arbitration and so 712 00:39:36,800 --> 00:39:40,600 forth that the existing ones have consumers aren't going to 713 00:39:40,600 --> 00:39:44,700 come to you if they find you don't have any agreements as to 714 00:39:44,700 --> 00:39:47,600 what happens if you're in a conflict with these other. 715 00:39:47,700 --> 00:39:52,200 These and so on, this cartel will be able to freeze everyone 716 00:39:52,300 --> 00:39:56,200 out. Well, could that happen? 717 00:39:56,600 --> 00:39:58,600 Sure. All kinds of things can happen, 718 00:39:58,600 --> 00:40:01,900 half the country could commit suicide tomorrow, but is it 719 00:40:01,900 --> 00:40:05,800 likely, is this cartel likely to be able to abuse its power in 720 00:40:05,800 --> 00:40:08,000 this way. The problem is cartels are 721 00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:11,000 unstable for all the usual reasons. 722 00:40:11,300 --> 00:40:14,500 That doesn't mean that it's impossible, that a cartel 723 00:40:14,800 --> 00:40:17,000 succeed. After all, people have free 724 00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:20,200 will, but it's unlikely because the very incentives that lead 725 00:40:20,200 --> 00:40:23,900 you to form the cartel. Also lead you to cheat on it. 726 00:40:24,100 --> 00:40:26,500 Because it's always in the interest of anyone to make 727 00:40:26,500 --> 00:40:32,000 agreements outside the cartel. Once they are in it Bryan 728 00:40:32,000 --> 00:40:34,500 Caplan. The Economist makes a 729 00:40:34,500 --> 00:40:38,000 distinction between self-enforcing boycotts and 730 00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:41,500 non-self enforcing boycotts. Self-enforcing boycotts. 731 00:40:41,700 --> 00:40:45,500 Are one where the boycott is pretty stable because it's a 732 00:40:45,500 --> 00:40:48,700 boycott against, for example, doing business with people who 733 00:40:48,700 --> 00:40:52,500 cheated their business partners. Now, you don't have to have some 734 00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:55,800 iron resolve. Of moral commitment in order to 735 00:40:55,800 --> 00:40:59,200 avoid doing business with people who cheat their business 736 00:40:59,200 --> 00:41:03,500 partners, you have a perfectly self-interested reason not to do 737 00:41:03,500 --> 00:41:08,500 business with those people. But think, instead of a 738 00:41:08,508 --> 00:41:11,400 commitment not to do business with someone because you don't 739 00:41:11,400 --> 00:41:14,900 like their religion or something like that, or they're a member 740 00:41:14,900 --> 00:41:18,900 of the wrong Protection Agency. One that your fellow protection 741 00:41:18,900 --> 00:41:20,700 agencies told you not to deal with. 742 00:41:20,700 --> 00:41:23,800 Well, the boycott might work. Maybe enough people. 743 00:41:24,000 --> 00:41:26,500 And maybe everyone in this cartel is so committed to 744 00:41:26,500 --> 00:41:29,300 upholding the cartel that they just won't deal with this 745 00:41:29,300 --> 00:41:31,600 person. Is that possible? 746 00:41:31,600 --> 00:41:35,100 Yes, but if we assume that they form the cartel out of their own 747 00:41:35,300 --> 00:41:38,600 economic self-interest than the economic self-interest is 748 00:41:38,600 --> 00:41:42,400 precisely what leads to the undermining because it's in 749 00:41:42,400 --> 00:41:46,200 their interest to deal with the person just as it's always in 750 00:41:46,200 --> 00:41:48,000 your interest to engage in.