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What vitiates entirely the 
socialist economic critique of 

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capitalism is their failure to 
grasp the sovereignty of the 

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consumers in the market economy.
Welcome to Keith's night. 

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Don't tread on anyone today. 
We have. 

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Mr. David D Friedman. 
We will be discussing his book 

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legal systems, very different 
from ours. 

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Mr. Friedman. 
Where's the best? 

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Place to purchase the book. 
You can get the Kindle or the 

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paperback from Amazon, and you 
can also get the Audio book from

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Amazon, or from inaudible. 
Excellent. 

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Links will be in the description
below on all platforms. 

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Mr. Friedman. 
What is the purpose of a legal 

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system? 
Huh? 

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I guess to settle conflicts 
among people's actions. 

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Would be the closest statement. 
It is some way, so that when I 

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want to do something, you don't 
want me to do it. 

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We have some hopefully peaceful 
way. 

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Of settling the question. 
What is the best evidence that 

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you have? 
That people can settle conflicts

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between themselves in the 
absence of a coercively funded 

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Monopoly or a state? 
The fact that there have been 

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first, the fact that in modern 
societies, many of the ways in 

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which we settle disputes, do not
involve any coercively funded 

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Monopoly. 
That, for example, when my, when

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the two kids of my present 
marriage, We're Young, our 

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daughter did not want her 
brother coming into her room 

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without her permission. 
She could enforce that because 

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she was the With the result that
he wanted to play with her more 

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than she wanted to play with him
and she could therefore use the 

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threat to withhold her attention
as a way of enforcing her 

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desires successfully and the 
sign they're both adults at this

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point, but the sign she hung on 
her door telling him not to 

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come. 
In is still there the so but 

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that would be a simple example, 
but to go to the question of 

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where there is. 
Is no framework of a course of 

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Monopoly. 
The answer is that there are a 

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variety of relatively primitive 
societies more primitive than 

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ours at least, in which you had 
stateless orders are different 

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sorts, and they're really well. 
I'm not sure that there any I 

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know much about where there is 
no overarching state, but there 

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are ones where the control isn't
really being done by the state. 

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So if you think say, if the 
Amish is, you're basically 

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unwilling to charge each other 
with cry. 

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Ramos horta, Sue each other. 
They disapprove of that. 

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So they have their own 
mechanisms for enforcing for 

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settling disputes among 
themselves. 

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And the older MIT sanction in 
those mechanisms is ostracism 

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that if you if you don't go 
along with the rules for long 

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enough through enough repeated 
attempts to get you to do, so, 

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then they the clergy of the car.
Aggregation announces that you 

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are now ostracized my doom and 
that means that other members of

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the congregation and probably 
other Amish as well. 

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Will associate with you only in 
a very limited fashion and 

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that's a serious costs enough, 
the cost so that most of the 

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time the system works so that 
would be a modern example in 

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modern day America, but people 
like the Somalia Somali ins the 

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northern Somalia amisom. 
People in Somaliland or the 

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better ones would be examples of
societies where there's nothing.

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We would recognize as a state. 
Now. 

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That doesn't mean there was no 
coercion that in the systems, we

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know about there was always sort
of backing it, the threat that 

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under some circumstances, 
somebody would attack you and it

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was rather a way of controlling 
that. 

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So the normal result was a 
peaceful settlement rather than 

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the normal result being people 
killing each other. 

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But people killing each other 
get happened. 

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Of course, as it happens in our 
society was just that was when 

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the system broke down in effect.
Yeah, one of those systems that 

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I know best is Saga period 
Iceland. 

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And I'm a little reluctant to 
call it stateless because that 

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Society had a legal code of 
legislature in a court system, 

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what it did not have was a state
to enforce the verdicts. 

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So whether you count, I usually 
refer to that as semi stateless,

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whether you count that as a 
state, it's sort of up to you. 

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But that meant that the 
mechanism for enforcing, the 

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verdicts was basically the 
threat of violent Force by other

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people and the court system in 
the legislature and the law code

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were ways of controlling that 
threat. 

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So that ordinarily it was clear 
who was on the in the right and 

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who was in the wrong and most of
the time, if you were in the 

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wrong, you back down and you 
paid the damages, you were 

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supposed to pay, sometimes you 
didn't, of course, is in our 

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system. 
All excellent points. 

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Yeah, I never am in a conflict 
with someone and say, you know, 

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I really need the state to 
intervene to really Sue things 

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over. 
Even when a cop wrote me, a fake

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ticket for waking in a non wake 
zone. 

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It's so much easier just to get 
rid of them. 

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Then, to go through the 
coercively funded court system. 

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One of the major hurdles that 
comes up when discussing legal 

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systems that are very different 
from ours is well any that 

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involves non-state 
participation? 

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Would include me having to pay 
fees and I might be poor. 

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That's why I committed crime and
I might not have the money, what

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confidence, you have that in a 
stateless society. 

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People would be able to afford 
and still have access to Legal 

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Services in the absence of a 
state. 

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Yo, to begin with, of course, in
our current state Society legal 

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services, are not free that if 
you want to invoke this, that is

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legal services where the 
government is going after 

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somebody. 
For doing something, the 

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government disapproves of our 
free for everybody. 

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Except the person they're going 
after and the taxpayers of 

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course, but if I complain about 
something you're doing and why 

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do you use the law against it? 
I have to hire a lawyer. 

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I may have to pay court fees. 
So that's not Costless either. 

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And in the historical societies 
that I know about. 

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It wasn't really a matter of 
paying somebody for the service.

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It was a matter. 
Of having allies and friends and

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relatives and doing things 
yourself. 

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So, that's sort of what's 
happening in one of those 

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societies. 
Is that you do something. 

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I regard as violating my rights,
you kill one of my son's say, I 

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then Go through some procedure 
designed to get you into the 

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legal system and to make you pay
damages for doing that. 

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If that isn't working, then I 
and my allies threatened to use 

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Force against you. 
And if it's a Well functioning 

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system, you don't have allies. 
Because people other people 

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around realize that you're in 
the wrong or you don't have very

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many allies and therefore, 
usually you back down or usually

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I win. 
So it's not. 

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Those societies have money, but 
the money isn't the major 

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element of how they're 
coordinating that sort of thing.

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Now. 
The money does come in at least 

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in the Icelandic system. 
And I think also the Somali 

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system in damage payments. 
So that you I wronged you and 

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the settlement May well be that 
I have to pay you a certain 

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amount of money. 
And there's a famous scene in 

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the all Saga sequence of scenes,
where you have two men, who are 

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Close. 
Friends, their wives hate each 

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other and the wives have been 
organizing getting members of 

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the household to kill members of
the other household back and 

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forth. 
That is they get a to kill B. 

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Then the other person gets see 
to kill a and so forth and you 

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get, I don't know, maybe four or
six. 

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People killed in the course of 
this and the two husbands are 

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passing. 
A purse of silver back and forth

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paying damages for the killings 
of their wonder what sort of a 

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bizarre sequence and we don't 
know if it really happened. 

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Not that which only part of an 
interesting story. 

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So you do have money payments of
that sort and on the whole money

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payment seem like they usually 
make more sense than jail 

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sentences. 
Since jail sentence of you got 

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to pay for the jail and the 
victim doesn't get anything. 

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And of course our tort system is
money payments as well. 

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It's just one way of describing.
The Icelandic system is to say 

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that tort law has swallowed 
criminal law. 

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That is to say that. 
Now that's that's not really a 

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historically, right? 
Because you didn't I in tort law

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in a certain sense. 
Was invented a long after that. 

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But but in our terms that's 
what's happening, but it's 

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privately, enforced tort law. 
Not. 

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And there are, there are 
criminal punishments, in our 

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sense, in the sense that if you 
kill somebody, and the case 

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doesn't settle out of court, you
eventually end up getting 

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outlawed and when you're 
outlawed, it's legal to kill you

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and illegal for anybody protect 
you. 

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So there is an effect, capital 
punishment, but capital 

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punishment, only when the only, 
when the Creation system, breaks

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down whereas in our system when 
we have capital punishment, if 

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you kill somebody, it's the 
state that decides to execute. 

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You. 
Not the close relative of the 

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victim who is the person who 
would be handling it in the in 

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the Icelandic system and and in 
but I think you see one of the 

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things I own interesting is you 
see what looked to me like 

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fossilized remnants of this. 
Mmm, in a variety of other legal

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systems. 
So for example, I have a 

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discussion with regard to Jewish
law where Jewish law as of the 

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time we know it is not really a 
feud system. 

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But Jewish law has features 
which looking awful lot as 

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though, it evolved out of that 
kind of system. 

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And I think that's probably true
of Roman law though. 

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We don't think we'd have is 
clear an idea of how the early 

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parts of that worked. 
It's clearly true of our law 

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have because our legal system is
Anglo-american common law which 

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came out ultimately of 
anglo-saxon law. 

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And if you look at the 
Anglo-Saxon law before its last 

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century or so, it looks an awful
lot. 

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Like act like the Icelandic 
system. 

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Although it's not as pure a case
because there is a king or as I 

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shouldn't had no head. 
No King had, no no formal ruler 

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at all. 
Now, I should say, I don't want 

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listeners to get misled. 
The book is not all about this 

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kind of system. 
The book discusses. 

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00:11:00,000 --> 00:11:05,200
I think about 13, I think. 
Current legal systems of which 

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the Somali and the Icelandic are
really. 

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The only ones that I would 
describe as in some sense. 

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Purely stateless systems. 
The Irish law, clearly has a 

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state with element, but 
unfortunately, we don't have 

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good enough sources of how it 
worked initially to be sure how 

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much of it was staying was and 
how much wasn't, and then you've

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got a number. 
Number of things like the Amish 

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and the Romany where what you 
really have is a stateless 

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system underneath the state that
is, you have what I refer to as 

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an embedded legal system, where 
you've got a group of people who

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have mechanisms for settling 
their disputes themselves, but 

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are at least nominally ruled by 
a state over them. 

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And the basically, the Amish I 
wouldn't say they. 

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00:12:03,600 --> 00:12:07,500
Well basically the Amish policy 
is that if the state wants to 

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make them do something, they 
really disapprove of they engage

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in in passive resistance. 
So the Amish were not willing to

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pay social security for example,
or to send their kids to public 

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schools and in both of those, 
they eventually got their way 

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that one I should say. 
I think the u.s. 

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May be the only place where 
there is still Amish. 

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There may still be some in 
Canada. 

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There are none left in Europe. 
And I think part of the reason 

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is that for whatever reason, the
US was actually quite tolerant 

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with regard to them. 
And so the US government 

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eventually backed down on Social
Security and agreed that Amish 

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did not have to either pay or 
receive Social Security. 

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00:12:48,500 --> 00:12:53,700
Except I think for Amish, 
employees of non-amish employers

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or I think they still pay it. 
And similarly, there was a 

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factually, a Supreme Court 
verdict in their favor on 

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schooling, which held That they 
could take their kids out of 

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school. 
I think after eighth grade, if I

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00:13:05,900 --> 00:13:09,300
remember correctly and in effect
homeschool than they were 

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00:13:09,300 --> 00:13:15,500
thereafter and in I think at the
state level, the Amish have been

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practiced been allowed to run 
their own schools for those 

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00:13:18,900 --> 00:13:21,700
first eighth grades. 
And those schools are not 

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00:13:21,700 --> 00:13:23,000
schools. 
That would be acceptable if 

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anybody else was running them 
because the teachers don't have 

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certification in such being 
themselves, Amish. 

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You only go on to eighth grade, 
but the system works it. 

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As you can tell, it seems to be 
quite a well functioning 

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00:13:34,400 --> 00:13:39,400
community. 
And but anyway, I was just going

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00:13:39,400 --> 00:13:42,200
to go back and say that the 
majority of the system's. 

228
00:13:42,200 --> 00:13:44,400
I discuss Roman law is Quest, 
Jewish law. 

229
00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:48,700
I discuss Islamic law, I 
discussed the legal system 

230
00:13:48,700 --> 00:13:52,200
apparently and Athens whole 
bunch of interesting ones. 

231
00:13:52,200 --> 00:13:56,000
So that my project is not, this 
is not a book about stateless 

232
00:13:56,000 --> 00:13:58,600
systems. 
This is a book at about a bunch 

233
00:13:58,600 --> 00:14:01,900
of interesting Lee different 
legal systems, where the beige 

234
00:14:01,900 --> 00:14:05,000
one. 
Our basic assumption is that all

235
00:14:05,000 --> 00:14:07,900
human societies face about the 
same problems. 

236
00:14:08,400 --> 00:14:11,000
They solve them in an 
interesting variety of different

237
00:14:11,000 --> 00:14:14,400
ways and they're all grown ups 
that you ought to take all of 

238
00:14:14,400 --> 00:14:16,500
them. 
Seriously, as this is one way in

239
00:14:16,500 --> 00:14:18,100
which these problems could be 
solved. 

240
00:14:18,100 --> 00:14:19,700
Let's see what interesting 
ideas. 

241
00:14:19,700 --> 00:14:22,100
They have what problems they 
encountered and so forth. 

242
00:14:22,100 --> 00:14:25,500
It's not I'm not trying to 
deduce the perfect legal system.

243
00:14:25,500 --> 00:14:29,000
I doubt there is one probably 
depends on various features of 

244
00:14:29,008 --> 00:14:30,900
the environment its functioning 
in. 

245
00:14:31,800 --> 00:14:35,000
I For example, assume that a 
state was system will work in 

246
00:14:35,000 --> 00:14:39,800
all possible, environments are 
just been having an email 

247
00:14:39,800 --> 00:14:42,100
correspondence with somebody in 
Armenia. 

248
00:14:42,200 --> 00:14:45,200
Pretty clearly has generally 
libertarian instincts, but is 

249
00:14:45,200 --> 00:14:49,200
worried about how our media with
turkey on one border and 

250
00:14:49,200 --> 00:14:52,900
Azerbaijan, on the other and 
either than its friend, could 

251
00:14:52,900 --> 00:14:54,600
survive without a government 
mantle. 

252
00:14:54,600 --> 00:14:58,600
I don't know if it could or not.
Maybe it couldn't the but 

253
00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:02,000
anyway, but I should also say 
that there are two chapters. 

254
00:15:02,100 --> 00:15:05,600
In that book, I didn't right 
there is I got two people, I 

255
00:15:05,600 --> 00:15:09,200
knew and written interesting 
books to do essentially chapter 

256
00:15:09,200 --> 00:15:12,300
length versions of those books. 
And one of them is Peter 

257
00:15:12,300 --> 00:15:14,700
Leeson's chapter on 18th century
pirate's. 

258
00:15:14,700 --> 00:15:17,500
Which turns out to be an 
interesting legal system, system

259
00:15:17,500 --> 00:15:19,400
of the pirate ships used for 
themselves. 

260
00:15:19,400 --> 00:15:25,200
And the other one is David 
skarbek on prison gangs, which 

261
00:15:25,200 --> 00:15:28,600
again is quite a fascinating 
story of what's essentially a 

262
00:15:28,600 --> 00:15:34,900
legal system that has arisen 
spontaneously Within Prisons and

263
00:15:35,000 --> 00:15:36,700
those are both quite interesting
chapters. 

264
00:15:36,900 --> 00:15:38,700
Each of them had written an 
interesting book. 

265
00:15:39,200 --> 00:15:43,300
They're interesting people. 
But anyway, it's not mainly 

266
00:15:43,300 --> 00:15:45,600
about salus ones. 
But what I did find interesting 

267
00:15:45,600 --> 00:15:48,700
in the sort of the research that
led to it was that when I wrote 

268
00:15:48,700 --> 00:15:50,900
my first book, nearly 50 years 
ago. 

269
00:15:51,400 --> 00:15:55,100
I one of the things I was doing 
in that book was inventing, an 

270
00:15:55,100 --> 00:16:00,800
imaginary modern version of a 
stateless society and I 

271
00:16:00,800 --> 00:16:04,300
concluded with all this, Stuff. 
I did it on this book that I was

272
00:16:04,300 --> 00:16:09,700
really Reinventing the wheel 
because less less elaborate 

273
00:16:09,700 --> 00:16:13,200
versions had, in fact, existed 
in the real world, you know, a 

274
00:16:13,200 --> 00:16:15,000
thousand years before more or 
less. 

275
00:16:16,300 --> 00:16:20,700
So I should say with regard to 
how common it is. 

276
00:16:20,700 --> 00:16:22,300
There. 
I've got a quote in one of the 

277
00:16:22,300 --> 00:16:26,200
chapters, from a medieval 
historian and he's really 

278
00:16:26,200 --> 00:16:29,400
describing. 
What I think of is Feud society 

279
00:16:29,400 --> 00:16:32,000
as the normal arrangement of the
Early Middle Ages. 

280
00:16:32,200 --> 00:16:36,800
You had a king nominally, but 
what normally happened was that 

281
00:16:36,900 --> 00:16:41,300
somebody aggressed against 
somebody else where the victim 

282
00:16:41,300 --> 00:16:45,700
might be seen as a family, a 
monastery, you know, some group 

283
00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:51,100
it was generally accepted that 
the victims could then as it 

284
00:16:51,100 --> 00:16:54,500
were charged. 
The aggressors asked for 

285
00:16:54,500 --> 00:16:57,700
compensation. 
If they didn't get compensation,

286
00:16:57,700 --> 00:17:00,600
they could use Force against the
aggressors and everybody else 

287
00:17:00,600 --> 00:17:01,700
was and what you know, that's 
alright. 

288
00:17:01,700 --> 00:17:04,700
That's what Supposed to happen. 
So in that sense, he's 

289
00:17:04,700 --> 00:17:09,599
suggesting that really the main 
system in medieval Europe. 

290
00:17:09,599 --> 00:17:13,800
At least for a fair while was 
that where is even though you 

291
00:17:13,800 --> 00:17:17,300
had a nominal system of a king 
and courts and well as and so 

292
00:17:17,300 --> 00:17:19,000
forth over them. 
Now. 

293
00:17:19,000 --> 00:17:21,800
I'm not a medieval historian. 
So I don't know how 

294
00:17:22,200 --> 00:17:24,599
controversial that reading of it
is, but I thought it was quite 

295
00:17:24,599 --> 00:17:26,599
an interesting passage. 
So I quoted it. 

296
00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:30,200
But anyway, lots of interesting.
I guess for the one I start with

297
00:17:30,200 --> 00:17:34,000
is Imperial China, which is Only
not a stateless society by any 

298
00:17:34,000 --> 00:17:40,800
means, but Imperial China had a 
more or less continuous 

299
00:17:40,800 --> 00:17:43,800
functioning legal system, for 
more than 2000 years. 

300
00:17:44,400 --> 00:17:47,500
There were breaks, you had 
breakdowns and then a new 

301
00:17:47,500 --> 00:17:51,800
Dynasty would come up. 
But as far as we can tell the 

302
00:17:51,800 --> 00:17:56,400
legal code of the last Dynasty, 
contained, noticeable amounts of

303
00:17:56,400 --> 00:18:01,600
stuff from the Han Dynasty, 
which was not quite the first, 

304
00:18:01,600 --> 00:18:05,800
but The first one didn't wear 
the first one to unite China, 

305
00:18:05,800 --> 00:18:08,400
didn't last very long and Han 
was its successor. 

306
00:18:08,800 --> 00:18:12,400
So Han Dynasty, roughly is 
contemporary with the Roman 

307
00:18:12,400 --> 00:18:16,100
Republic Roman Empire. 
So starting something like 300 

308
00:18:16,100 --> 00:18:19,800
BC and it only collapsed at the 
end of the 19th century 

309
00:18:19,800 --> 00:18:21,500
beginning of the 20th century, 
roughly. 

310
00:18:21,900 --> 00:18:23,700
So, that's one of the really 
interesting ones in a whole 

311
00:18:23,700 --> 00:18:28,300
bunch of ways. 
We get things from them, the 

312
00:18:28,300 --> 00:18:31,100
whole civil service exam system 
is Chinese. 

313
00:18:31,400 --> 00:18:34,500
That's where we Borrowed that 
particular odds system from as 

314
00:18:34,500 --> 00:18:40,400
far as I can tell. 
And it's way in a sense, one of 

315
00:18:40,400 --> 00:18:44,300
the oddest features of that 
system, which was that the 

316
00:18:44,400 --> 00:18:48,100
procedure for becoming an 
important official involved, 

317
00:18:48,100 --> 00:18:52,900
passing extraordinarily 
selective tests, which were not 

318
00:18:52,900 --> 00:18:55,700
about how to be an official. 
They were about whether you were

319
00:18:55,700 --> 00:18:58,800
educated colder, culture, 
gentleman, who could improvise 

320
00:18:58,800 --> 00:19:02,200
poetry and had beautiful 
handwriting and was really It in

321
00:19:02,208 --> 00:19:10,400
the Confucian Classics and the 
second level of exams had a pass

322
00:19:10,400 --> 00:19:16,200
rate or somewhere around 1% the 
third and highest level, I think

323
00:19:16,200 --> 00:19:19,700
was not much higher than that. 
It was the sort of thing where 

324
00:19:19,700 --> 00:19:23,300
somebody you got through the 
whole thing probably had spent 

325
00:19:23,300 --> 00:19:27,500
his lifetime studying for it and
gradually made it through some 

326
00:19:27,500 --> 00:19:31,200
time in his 30s. 
Why in the world did they have 

327
00:19:31,200 --> 00:19:34,700
such a system for selecting? 
What was basically the ruling 

328
00:19:34,700 --> 00:19:36,600
bureaucrats, which is what it 
was? 

329
00:19:37,000 --> 00:19:40,300
And I then argue that in fact 
that system is Alive and Well in

330
00:19:40,300 --> 00:19:42,700
America, it's not quite as 
extreme or version. 

331
00:19:43,100 --> 00:19:46,400
But if you think about the fact 
that if you want to get most 

332
00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:50,100
respectable jobs, your first 
have to go to college even 

333
00:19:50,100 --> 00:19:52,800
though most of what you're 
depending on your field. 

334
00:19:52,800 --> 00:19:55,700
But in many in many contexts, 
most of what you're studying in 

335
00:19:55,700 --> 00:19:59,300
college, has nothing to do with 
the job, you're going to have So

336
00:19:59,300 --> 00:20:04,000
it's again, somehow a filter 
which is filtering people, 

337
00:20:04,100 --> 00:20:08,100
theoretically, for being sort of
educated civilised culture 

338
00:20:08,100 --> 00:20:12,700
gentleman, rather than for 
knowing the things that you 

339
00:20:12,700 --> 00:20:14,000
would think they had to know for
the job. 

340
00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:17,300
So, it's a, the reason for 
they're doing it. 

341
00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:19,700
Let me switch my, my background 
effect. 

342
00:20:19,700 --> 00:20:22,200
So, it's just what's actually in
my office, instead of what 

343
00:20:22,200 --> 00:20:25,100
you're seeing, just sort of 
irrelevant. 

344
00:20:26,100 --> 00:20:28,300
That's a background effect for I
use for other things. 

345
00:20:29,300 --> 00:20:35,400
So, so anyway, so that was sort 
of interesting and lots of other

346
00:20:35,400 --> 00:20:37,800
things. 
I argue that there are some 

347
00:20:37,800 --> 00:20:40,700
features of some of these legal 
systems that we might usefully 

348
00:20:40,700 --> 00:20:44,500
borrow. 
There are some features where a 

349
00:20:44,500 --> 00:20:51,900
feature of the periclean 
Athenian legal system is echoed 

350
00:20:51,900 --> 00:20:54,800
in the way modern Americans run 
some horse races. 

351
00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:57,400
That's sort of one of my 
favorite examples of somebody 

352
00:20:57,400 --> 00:21:03,700
pointed out that that the 
problem one of the issues for a 

353
00:21:03,700 --> 00:21:06,900
legal system, at least a state 
legal system, is how do you pay 

354
00:21:06,900 --> 00:21:09,700
for public goods? 
How do you get somebody to fund 

355
00:21:09,700 --> 00:21:12,300
the Navy for, for Athens and 
other things? 

356
00:21:12,600 --> 00:21:15,900
And the Athenians had their own 
solution to that problem. 

357
00:21:15,900 --> 00:21:18,600
It's sort of a weird system in 
their system. 

358
00:21:18,600 --> 00:21:22,300
If you were one of the richest 
Athenians every other year, you 

359
00:21:22,300 --> 00:21:26,400
had to fund a public good and 
some magistrate would come up to

360
00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:28,600
you and say you see that 
beautiful. 

361
00:21:28,800 --> 00:21:31,300
Ream down on the deck. 
Guess who's paying her bills 

362
00:21:31,300 --> 00:21:35,300
this year or you've heard that 
we're sending a team to the 

363
00:21:35,400 --> 00:21:38,100
Olympics this year, for the 
glory of Athens. 

364
00:21:38,300 --> 00:21:40,400
Congratulations. 
You're the sponsor. 

365
00:21:41,400 --> 00:21:44,500
And the problem of you think 
about it is, how do you find 

366
00:21:44,500 --> 00:21:45,500
out? 
Who is the richest people? 

367
00:21:45,500 --> 00:21:47,400
And I Athens? 
All right. 

368
00:21:47,500 --> 00:21:50,800
The basic rule was that if you 
wanted to get out of one of 

369
00:21:50,808 --> 00:21:54,400
these things, you had to either 
show that you did one last year 

370
00:21:54,900 --> 00:21:57,000
or that you were already doing 
one this year. 

371
00:21:57,400 --> 00:22:01,800
Or that there was somebody else 
who was richer than you were, 

372
00:22:02,300 --> 00:22:05,000
who haven't done one last year 
and wasn't doing one this year. 

373
00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:06,800
And therefore, he, you could 
transfer it to him. 

374
00:22:07,500 --> 00:22:12,100
And the question was, how in a 
society without Accountants and 

375
00:22:12,100 --> 00:22:14,200
IRS and all the rest of that 
stuff. 

376
00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:16,200
How do you prove that? 
Somebody is richer than you are,

377
00:22:17,100 --> 00:22:19,200
right? 
And they had a lovely answer, 

378
00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:23,600
was an economist answer and the 
answer is that you offer to 

379
00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:27,100
trade everything, you own for 
everything he owns and if he 

380
00:22:27,100 --> 00:22:29,300
turns you down, he's admitted. 
He's richer than you were. 

381
00:22:30,900 --> 00:22:33,500
Well, it turns out that that's 
the way. 

382
00:22:33,500 --> 00:22:37,900
What's called a claiming race is
done in modern day America. 

383
00:22:37,900 --> 00:22:40,900
That is the same principle. 
And the problem is you would 

384
00:22:40,900 --> 00:22:43,900
like to have a race in which all
the horses are about equally 

385
00:22:43,900 --> 00:22:48,000
good. 
And if you say to people, we 

386
00:22:48,000 --> 00:22:51,100
want, you know, level X horses. 
There's an obvious incentive for

387
00:22:51,108 --> 00:22:54,000
somebody to enter an X plus one 
horse in order to win the race. 

388
00:22:54,200 --> 00:22:57,600
So what you say instead is if 
you enter this race you were 

389
00:22:57,600 --> 00:23:00,500
agreeing to sell your horse for 
five thousand dollars to anybody

390
00:23:00,500 --> 00:23:04,800
who wants to buy it. 
You could win the race really 

391
00:23:04,800 --> 00:23:06,800
easily by putting in a really 
good horse, but it would be a 

392
00:23:06,808 --> 00:23:08,800
fifteen thousand dollar horse 
should be selling for five 

393
00:23:08,800 --> 00:23:11,800
thousand dollars. 
So that's exactly the same 

394
00:23:11,800 --> 00:23:18,100
principle of self-revealing 
action applied in Athens more 

395
00:23:18,100 --> 00:23:21,700
than 2000 years ago and today in
America, although, in one case. 

396
00:23:21,700 --> 00:23:23,800
It was part of the political 
system in the other case, 

397
00:23:24,200 --> 00:23:27,000
private private Arrangement. 
So, a lot of that sort of stuff 

398
00:23:27,000 --> 00:23:31,300
is just fun looking at it. 
And and to take another example,

399
00:23:32,300 --> 00:23:39,200
A problem that lots of legal 
systems have is if you question 

400
00:23:39,200 --> 00:23:41,200
somebody under torture, how do 
you know if he's telling the 

401
00:23:41,200 --> 00:23:44,600
truth? 
Write that in Athenian, law and 

402
00:23:44,600 --> 00:23:48,700
in Roman law, I believe slaves 
could only be questioned under 

403
00:23:48,700 --> 00:23:52,400
torture. 
And I assume what's going on 

404
00:23:52,400 --> 00:23:54,900
though. 
I don't know is that you mostly 

405
00:23:54,900 --> 00:23:58,400
want to question a slave to get 
information on his owner because

406
00:23:58,400 --> 00:24:00,400
the slave is likely to observe 
things. 

407
00:24:00,400 --> 00:24:04,400
The owner did the owner is in a 
position to punish the slave 

408
00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:08,000
afterwards or to make the slaves
life miserable in one way or 

409
00:24:08,000 --> 00:24:10,400
another. 
So you need some countervailing.

410
00:24:10,400 --> 00:24:11,900
Pressure to make the slave. 
Tell the truth. 

411
00:24:11,900 --> 00:24:13,300
That's my theory. 
I don't know if it's right or 

412
00:24:13,300 --> 00:24:17,000
not, but we know that the 
Athenians argued about the 

413
00:24:17,000 --> 00:24:20,100
question that you have a lot of 
r1r. 

414
00:24:20,200 --> 00:24:25,500
Main sources for Athenian, law 
are the speeches. 

415
00:24:25,700 --> 00:24:30,200
That a professional order would 
write for a party to a law case 

416
00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:34,100
to memorize and deliver because 
you didn't have lawyers but you 

417
00:24:34,200 --> 00:24:37,100
you had to represent yourself, 
but you could represent yourself

418
00:24:37,200 --> 00:24:38,700
with words. 
Somebody else had taught you. 

419
00:24:39,500 --> 00:24:44,200
And it happens that we have one 
oration, which is on the 

420
00:24:44,200 --> 00:24:48,000
question of whether slaves can 
be trusted slave testimony under

421
00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:52,300
torture can be trusted and The 
author of that oration says 

422
00:24:52,400 --> 00:24:53,900
absolutely. 
They can perfectly. 

423
00:24:53,900 --> 00:24:57,000
Well, be trusted there has never
been a case in the history of 

424
00:24:57,000 --> 00:24:59,700
Athens were such testimony 
counting false. 

425
00:25:00,300 --> 00:25:03,200
We have another oration in which
the already has. 

426
00:25:03,200 --> 00:25:04,700
No, of course, they can't be 
trusted. 

427
00:25:04,700 --> 00:25:07,400
They'll say whatever they 
torture wants them to say. 

428
00:25:07,700 --> 00:25:09,300
They were written by the same 
orator. 

429
00:25:10,500 --> 00:25:15,500
Three different clients. 
But we also have a solution to 

430
00:25:15,500 --> 00:25:24,600
this problem in a what I suppose
about 800 years later is so in 

431
00:25:27,500 --> 00:25:30,500
ostrogothic. 
Yeah, it's the ostrogothic law. 

432
00:25:30,500 --> 00:25:36,300
This is ostrogothic Spain before
the Muslims conquered Spain and 

433
00:25:36,300 --> 00:25:41,100
in their law code, the rule was 
that if somebody was accused of 

434
00:25:41,100 --> 00:25:44,300
something really serious. 
Judge, couldn't find enough 

435
00:25:44,300 --> 00:25:46,300
evidence to either convict or 
acquit. 

436
00:25:47,300 --> 00:25:49,500
They didn't have our view. 
If you can't convict, you have 

437
00:25:49,500 --> 00:25:53,900
to equip that. 
He's allowed to torture him, but

438
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:57,400
he can only torture him. 
If there is something that the 

439
00:25:57,400 --> 00:26:00,900
interrogation that the 
interrogator knows that a guilty

440
00:26:00,900 --> 00:26:03,800
person would know, an innocent 
person, wouldn't know some facts

441
00:26:03,800 --> 00:26:09,300
about the crime and if you have 
that then you stop torturing him

442
00:26:09,500 --> 00:26:13,000
when either you decide he's 
innocent or he tells you That 

443
00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:14,300
thing that's showing he's 
guilty. 

444
00:26:15,200 --> 00:26:18,300
All right, and in theory, it 
means you can't torture him 

445
00:26:18,300 --> 00:26:20,200
unless you have some such piece 
of information. 

446
00:26:20,800 --> 00:26:23,700
Now, we use the same method and 
it's got the same problem. 

447
00:26:23,700 --> 00:26:27,700
Of course, that that when we try
to pressure somebody to confess 

448
00:26:28,500 --> 00:26:31,700
one of the evidences that he's 
really confessed rather than 

449
00:26:31,700 --> 00:26:34,600
being pressured either. 
Literally, beaten up, which 

450
00:26:34,600 --> 00:26:36,600
police have been known to do or 
other things. 

451
00:26:36,600 --> 00:26:41,300
Short of that is that he tells 
you things like details of the 

452
00:26:41,300 --> 00:26:42,700
crime that he otherwise wouldn't
know. 

453
00:26:43,300 --> 00:26:46,000
And of course, the problem with 
our system and I suspect that 

454
00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:48,300
their system is, it works just 
fine. 

455
00:26:48,300 --> 00:26:52,200
If the interrogator is honest, 
the interrogator isn't honest. 

456
00:26:52,200 --> 00:26:55,400
He knows the fact so he feeds 
the fact of the guy the guys 

457
00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:57,400
being tortured. 
So he feeds the fact back and 

458
00:26:57,400 --> 00:27:00,300
now you just don't tell anybody 
that you fed him the fact. 

459
00:27:00,500 --> 00:27:02,600
So I just thought I was an 
interesting kind of parallelism 

460
00:27:02,600 --> 00:27:05,700
of the same issues arising. 
Anyway. 

461
00:27:05,700 --> 00:27:10,300
The whole I just found it, sort 
of quite a lot of fun. 

462
00:27:10,300 --> 00:27:12,700
I the way I got into this book 
originally. 

463
00:27:13,100 --> 00:27:16,200
At a very long time ago. 
I got interested in the legal 

464
00:27:16,200 --> 00:27:20,300
system of saga, period, Iceland 
and that other than my having 

465
00:27:20,300 --> 00:27:23,900
read, some of the sagas. 
I got interested in that because

466
00:27:23,900 --> 00:27:27,700
of the controversy among two 
pairs of Scholars at University 

467
00:27:27,700 --> 00:27:31,000
of Chicago, Gary, Becker, and 
George Stigler. 

468
00:27:31,000 --> 00:27:35,600
Both, until eventually got Nobel
prize in economics, and Richard 

469
00:27:35,600 --> 00:27:39,400
Posner. 
And Bill, Landis Posner was a 

470
00:27:39,800 --> 00:27:42,900
federal appeals court judge and 
they were both. 

471
00:27:43,000 --> 00:27:49,000
Very prominent law, school, 
Lonnie Khan Scholars, and it was

472
00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:53,700
an argument over the possibility
of switching, our criminal 

473
00:27:53,700 --> 00:27:59,700
system to a system where instead
of having police be employees 

474
00:27:59,700 --> 00:28:05,500
paid a salary, the criminal pays
a fine and the policeman 

475
00:28:05,500 --> 00:28:10,100
classified. 
And the original Decker, Stigler

476
00:28:10,100 --> 00:28:12,600
argument was look, the present 
system is not incentive 

477
00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:16,100
compatible because after all, 
I've got the goods on you. 

478
00:28:17,200 --> 00:28:20,100
The punishment is the equivalent
view of a hundred thousand 

479
00:28:20,100 --> 00:28:24,000
dollar fine. 
The reward to me in our system 

480
00:28:24,000 --> 00:28:27,900
for catching you is a gold star 
on my report card that I my 

481
00:28:27,900 --> 00:28:31,000
reputation is a cop goes up a 
bit and I make more 10,000 

482
00:28:31,000 --> 00:28:35,300
dollars more in my lifetime. 
And according to Dragnet. 

483
00:28:35,300 --> 00:28:36,800
We know what happens, I take the
evidence. 

484
00:28:36,900 --> 00:28:39,100
It's to the DA and you get 
prosecuted. 

485
00:28:39,800 --> 00:28:43,100
Court of Economics note, we 
knows what happens to markets 

486
00:28:43,100 --> 00:28:46,300
exist to move resources to their
highest value use. 

487
00:28:46,700 --> 00:28:50,300
So the criminal pays off the cop
and the cop turns the evidence. 

488
00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:53,100
And that means that in order for
the system to work, you need a 

489
00:28:53,100 --> 00:28:55,800
second layer of cops watching 
the first layer and maybe a 

490
00:28:55,808 --> 00:28:57,900
third layer. 
Wedge, the saying it's not as 

491
00:28:57,900 --> 00:29:00,400
I'm not that it's impossible. 
It makes it much harder and 

492
00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:03,400
Becker and take their said, 
look, if I collect 100,000 

493
00:29:03,400 --> 00:29:07,200
dollars, you pay the problem 
disappears and land is imposed 

494
00:29:07,200 --> 00:29:09,700
nor pointed out a number of 
problems with that. 

495
00:29:09,700 --> 00:29:12,900
And suggested that after you 
finished dealing with those 

496
00:29:12,900 --> 00:29:16,000
problems. 
What what Becker and Stigler, it

497
00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:19,600
really done was to reinvent tort
law because in tort law, after 

498
00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:23,800
all the victim has a claim 
against the tortfeasor, it is up

499
00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:27,100
to the victim to get that claim 
Vindicated in the chord. 

500
00:29:27,100 --> 00:29:31,900
And then the tortfeasors damage,
payment goes to the victim and I

501
00:29:31,908 --> 00:29:35,600
got interested in that and I was
interested in part because I 

502
00:29:35,600 --> 00:29:38,000
thought I knew about her real. 
System that worked that way, 

503
00:29:38,000 --> 00:29:41,600
namely Saga period Iceland and I
ended up writing two different 

504
00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:44,500
Journal articles for journals 
published in Chicago. 

505
00:29:45,400 --> 00:29:49,700
One of which was a attempt to 
understand the Icelandic system 

506
00:29:49,700 --> 00:29:52,800
of thousand years ago. 
And the other of which was a 

507
00:29:52,800 --> 00:29:57,500
purely theoretical article 
showing that what land is 

508
00:29:57,500 --> 00:30:00,100
imposed or thought was an 
insoluble problem with their 

509
00:30:00,100 --> 00:30:01,800
Frozen was not. 
In fact, insoluble. 

510
00:30:01,800 --> 00:30:05,000
There was a simple and elegant 
way of solving the problem. 

511
00:30:05,000 --> 00:30:07,900
They had raised and those were 
both Published. 

512
00:30:07,900 --> 00:30:11,000
And the result was that Landis 
and Posner invited me to come to

513
00:30:11,000 --> 00:30:14,600
Chicago, to argue with them. 
A shorter range and I ended up 

514
00:30:14,600 --> 00:30:18,600
spending eight or ten years as a
faculty fellow Chicago, Law 

515
00:30:18,600 --> 00:30:23,300
School as a result with that. 
So that's really the point at 

516
00:30:23,300 --> 00:30:25,600
which I switched from doing 
other kinds of Economics to 

517
00:30:25,600 --> 00:30:29,300
doing economic analysis of law. 
But anyway, so I did the article

518
00:30:29,400 --> 00:30:32,300
and on Iceland and it was a fun 
article and I learned lots of 

519
00:30:32,300 --> 00:30:35,200
neat stuff and thought it was 
really interesting and then I 

520
00:30:35,208 --> 00:30:38,200
was lazy. 
And eventually I got interested 

521
00:30:38,200 --> 00:30:40,800
in another legal system, which 
is the legal system, the 

522
00:30:40,800 --> 00:30:42,800
criminal law of 18th century 
England. 

523
00:30:43,300 --> 00:30:46,500
Because 18th century England on 
paper is our legal system. 

524
00:30:47,200 --> 00:30:49,900
The only thing is there are no 
police or public prosecutors. 

525
00:30:51,000 --> 00:30:53,500
I slightly exaggerated. 
There are public prosecutors 

526
00:30:53,500 --> 00:30:55,900
that you actually commit a 
crime, a crime against the 

527
00:30:55,900 --> 00:30:58,300
against the crown if you need to
steal money from the treasury or

528
00:30:58,308 --> 00:31:00,300
something, but for practical 
purposes, there are no public 

529
00:31:00,300 --> 00:31:02,700
prosecutors. 
So it was a system in which the 

530
00:31:02,700 --> 00:31:07,300
law was made and enforced by the
state, but the Or prosecution 

531
00:31:07,300 --> 00:31:09,700
process the process by which we 
figured out who is guilty and 

532
00:31:09,700 --> 00:31:11,300
prove. 
He's guilty was entirely private

533
00:31:11,700 --> 00:31:14,800
responsibility of the victim. 
And so how did that work? 

534
00:31:14,800 --> 00:31:17,100
And that was really interesting 
and I am not writing an article 

535
00:31:17,100 --> 00:31:18,200
on that. 
And again, I thought it was a 

536
00:31:18,208 --> 00:31:21,000
fun article and there's lots of 
interesting stuff some of it 

537
00:31:21,000 --> 00:31:24,800
relevant to Modern societies and
then I was lazy for a long time 

538
00:31:25,600 --> 00:31:29,800
and I said to myself eventually 
I should stop being lazy, but 

539
00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:32,600
I'm lazy by Nature. 
How can I make myself get some 

540
00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:36,000
work done? 
So there was a solution to that.

541
00:31:36,300 --> 00:31:39,000
I am now, sitting next year. 
I was teaching a seminar or 

542
00:31:39,000 --> 00:31:40,900
legal system is very different 
from ours. 

543
00:31:41,600 --> 00:31:43,300
Well, I had two of them, I 
needed some more. 

544
00:31:44,000 --> 00:31:47,500
So I went to our nice Librarians
and I said, can you find me 

545
00:31:47,500 --> 00:31:51,100
books, describing legal systems 
other than ours and they 

546
00:31:51,100 --> 00:31:53,500
presented me with one of these 
rolling bookcases. 

547
00:31:53,500 --> 00:31:57,900
I think maybe two or three 
shelves, High, fill the books. 

548
00:31:57,900 --> 00:32:00,800
And I went through the books and
I ended up finding enough to do 

549
00:32:00,800 --> 00:32:04,600
a seminar and I did that seminar
every other year for I suppose 

550
00:32:04,600 --> 00:32:07,700
about 10 or 12 years. 
And I got some additional 

551
00:32:07,700 --> 00:32:10,400
information for my students 
because the students in the 

552
00:32:10,408 --> 00:32:13,800
summer and I were writing papers
and almost all the papers 

553
00:32:13,800 --> 00:32:17,200
consisted of a description of 
some legal system that I had 

554
00:32:17,200 --> 00:32:18,800
covered and that they 
investigate. 

555
00:32:19,200 --> 00:32:23,200
And that was a lot of fun was 
interesting. 

556
00:32:23,200 --> 00:32:25,000
Sort of what, what what they 
did. 

557
00:32:25,500 --> 00:32:28,800
One of my favorite cases with, I
had a student who was a sort of 

558
00:32:28,800 --> 00:32:32,000
a tall, very Anglo looking 
fellow. 

559
00:32:32,600 --> 00:32:35,100
And so I was asking if the 
beginning of the seminar, you 

560
00:32:35,100 --> 00:32:37,800
know, do you have any special? 
Sources of information that 

561
00:32:37,800 --> 00:32:41,300
would suggest a legal system, 
but they said, well, I do speak 

562
00:32:41,300 --> 00:32:45,400
Vietnamese. 
And I was a little surprised 

563
00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:49,600
that, you know, how do you 
happen to be a to speak me as 

564
00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:51,800
well? 
He was a Mormon, and he said, 

565
00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:55,200
he'd been a missionary and I 
said, oh, in Vietnam, he said no

566
00:32:55,300 --> 00:32:59,200
Los Angeles, but he didn't make 
it legal. 

567
00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:02,100
Did me a reasonably interesting 
paper on the traditional legal 

568
00:33:02,100 --> 00:33:06,200
system of Vietnam. 
And the last year I took it, 

569
00:33:06,200 --> 00:33:10,400
which was particularly fun. 
Most of my class consisted of 

570
00:33:10,400 --> 00:33:13,500
Saudi. 
Llm students the ELA a few. 

571
00:33:13,700 --> 00:33:16,700
Gotten there who've been through
three years of law school, and 

572
00:33:16,700 --> 00:33:17,800
then want to get a little bit 
more. 

573
00:33:17,800 --> 00:33:20,000
Basically. 
I don't know why they were there

574
00:33:20,400 --> 00:33:24,900
but they were almost all Saudis.
Saudi Arabia was more or less. 

575
00:33:24,900 --> 00:33:29,400
The closest thing that exists in
the modern world to Islamic law 

576
00:33:29,800 --> 00:33:31,800
to real Islamic law traditional 
Islamic. 

577
00:33:31,800 --> 00:33:35,100
On most of the Muslim states, 
talked a whole lot about Sharia,

578
00:33:35,100 --> 00:33:36,400
but that's not really what they 
have. 

579
00:33:36,400 --> 00:33:39,900
But they really have our bits 
and pieces of traditional system

580
00:33:40,100 --> 00:33:44,800
pasted into a moderately system,
but the Additional Islamic law 

581
00:33:44,800 --> 00:33:48,200
was not made by the state. 
Traditional Islamic law was 

582
00:33:48,200 --> 00:33:53,100
discovered by Scholars from 
religious sources and the state,

583
00:33:53,100 --> 00:33:55,600
appointed the judges, but the 
judges are supposed to either be

584
00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:58,400
expert in the religious sources 
or insulted. 

585
00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:00,500
So that was an interesting 
system. 

586
00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:03,800
But now I had a whole classroom 
full of people who had lived in 

587
00:34:03,800 --> 00:34:07,200
something at least not too far 
from that system. 

588
00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:09,000
So I could get information from 
them. 

589
00:34:09,300 --> 00:34:13,500
It turned out that there was a 
particular institution which my 

590
00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:18,600
Very high-status modern 
secondary sources, claimed 

591
00:34:18,600 --> 00:34:21,500
gotten had become exist extinct 
centuries ago. 

592
00:34:21,500 --> 00:34:22,900
He said, oh no, it's not extinct
T. 

593
00:34:22,900 --> 00:34:25,600
All of us are part of one of 
those way. 

594
00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:28,500
A form of clustering that had 
that, which was originally 

595
00:34:28,500 --> 00:34:31,100
tribes probably, which had legal
consequences. 

596
00:34:31,500 --> 00:34:33,800
It has not just legal 
Consequence, the Germans who you

597
00:34:33,800 --> 00:34:37,400
can marry in that system because
it's an endogamous system in 

598
00:34:37,400 --> 00:34:39,800
which you only marry an effect 
within your own, right? 

599
00:34:39,900 --> 00:34:43,199
So that was really, really neat 
and was fun. 

600
00:34:43,900 --> 00:34:46,000
Anyway, that was the last year 
before I retired. 

601
00:34:47,300 --> 00:34:50,400
So anyway, so so my basic point 
is that the book really came out

602
00:34:50,400 --> 00:34:53,800
of this experience that came out
of the combination of what I 

603
00:34:53,800 --> 00:34:57,000
learned in order to teach to 
them, and what they learned and 

604
00:34:57,000 --> 00:34:58,900
taught me in the course of doing
their papers. 

605
00:34:59,800 --> 00:35:04,400
That was quite a lot of fun sex.
Excellent. 

606
00:35:04,700 --> 00:35:08,100
The book is legal systems, very 
different from ours. 

607
00:35:08,100 --> 00:35:11,000
I am going to turn things over 
to my colleague at the 

608
00:35:11,000 --> 00:35:13,400
libertarian Institute and 
Liberty weekly. 

609
00:35:13,400 --> 00:35:17,300
He is a practicing Attorney, 
Patrick, take it over for me. 

610
00:35:18,000 --> 00:35:21,000
Hey, professor Friedman. 
I just wanted to thank you for 

611
00:35:21,300 --> 00:35:23,000
being so generous with your 
time. 

612
00:35:23,500 --> 00:35:26,100
With us. 
Just dovetailing off of what 

613
00:35:26,100 --> 00:35:30,000
Keith had asked about. 
Do you view the Have you viewed 

614
00:35:30,000 --> 00:35:32,500
that, there's a lack of 
scholarship in the area of 

615
00:35:32,500 --> 00:35:34,400
studying comparative legal 
systems? 

616
00:35:35,600 --> 00:35:38,500
Huh. 
There certainly is a literature 

617
00:35:38,500 --> 00:35:43,100
on comparative legal systems, 
but I think most of it goes into

618
00:35:43,100 --> 00:35:46,200
comparing what from my 
standpoint or versions of the 

619
00:35:46,200 --> 00:35:49,200
same legal system. 
That if you look at it relative 

620
00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:52,800
to Imperial Chinese law or 
apparently, in Athenian law 

621
00:35:53,000 --> 00:35:56,800
American law, Japanese law in 
German law are not that 

622
00:35:56,800 --> 00:35:59,000
different. 
They're, you know, they're 

623
00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:01,900
somewhat different. 
The German law is theoretically 

624
00:36:01,900 --> 00:36:05,200
coming out of some mix of Roman 
and code Napoleon stuff. 

625
00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:09,800
And the American law is coming 
out of old man, the English 

626
00:36:09,900 --> 00:36:14,200
common law and Anglo-Saxon law 
originally, but nowadays in the 

627
00:36:14,200 --> 00:36:16,100
modern world. 
They've got an awful lot more in

628
00:36:16,100 --> 00:36:19,800
common than difference. 
And I don't think that there is 

629
00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:22,200
very much done of what I was 
doing. 

630
00:36:22,200 --> 00:36:25,700
The certainly, some of it. 
I ended up the book doesn't have

631
00:36:25,700 --> 00:36:29,300
anything on Roman law, but I did
do a chapter on Roman law for 

632
00:36:29,300 --> 00:36:33,600
somebody else's book and it was 
clear there that there was just 

633
00:36:33,600 --> 00:36:37,200
an immense scholarship. 
And I was trying to look at a 

634
00:36:37,207 --> 00:36:40,800
particular kind of question. 
And I think I said some things 

635
00:36:40,800 --> 00:36:44,000
about it might have been true. 
But I really felt like short of 

636
00:36:44,000 --> 00:36:48,600
a novice in this sea of stuff by
people all of whom were fluent 

637
00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:52,000
in Latin. 
Where's my Latin is terrible and

638
00:36:52,000 --> 00:36:55,900
who knew a whole lot more about 
the details and the very large 

639
00:36:55,900 --> 00:36:58,900
textual stuff that survived from
most of the Empire. 

640
00:36:58,900 --> 00:37:00,900
We don't have that much from the
Republic. 

641
00:37:01,700 --> 00:37:04,000
And so I think there are 
particular areas where people 

642
00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:05,500
have done quite a lot. 
Not. 

643
00:37:06,200 --> 00:37:14,300
But as far as I could tell for 
Somali law until pretty 

644
00:37:14,300 --> 00:37:17,200
recently, there was really One 
Source. 

645
00:37:17,700 --> 00:37:25,500
One person, a London School of 
Economics Anthropologist who had

646
00:37:25,500 --> 00:37:29,700
been studying extending the late
50s and I corresponded with him 

647
00:37:30,100 --> 00:37:32,300
and I basically had some 
questions for him and he 

648
00:37:32,300 --> 00:37:34,900
basically rather than answering 
my questions as the answer is in

649
00:37:34,900 --> 00:37:36,500
this book. 
Of mine and I found the book and

650
00:37:36,500 --> 00:37:38,900
it was that was really 
interesting. 

651
00:37:39,300 --> 00:37:44,600
And since then my friend Peter, 
Lee sin is written about Somalia

652
00:37:44,700 --> 00:37:46,900
and I've written about it. 
I'm sure there were a few other 

653
00:37:46,900 --> 00:37:50,000
people who have, but I don't 
think there's been much on that 

654
00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:52,500
legal system and similarly, 
there have been some 

655
00:37:52,500 --> 00:37:56,000
Libertarians who have written on
the early Irish system and maybe

656
00:37:56,000 --> 00:37:57,400
I should look at more of what 
they've got. 

657
00:37:57,400 --> 00:38:01,800
But I was when I was going by, 
was basically the work by a 

658
00:38:01,800 --> 00:38:05,100
modern high level scholar of 
early. 

659
00:38:05,300 --> 00:38:08,900
The Irish legal history, and I 
concluded from that, that it was

660
00:38:08,900 --> 00:38:11,000
an interesting system. 
It was hard to be really sure 

661
00:38:11,000 --> 00:38:14,200
what was going on, because we've
got fragmentary sources. 

662
00:38:14,200 --> 00:38:15,900
They don't seem to agree with 
each other. 

663
00:38:15,900 --> 00:38:18,800
We aren't sure whether the 
disagreement is changes over 

664
00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:22,500
time or changes over space or 
different people, wanting to 

665
00:38:22,508 --> 00:38:25,500
Accent different things, or 
maybe even distortions and 

666
00:38:25,508 --> 00:38:27,700
transmission. 
Because you're talking about 

667
00:38:27,700 --> 00:38:31,500
what something like 9th century 
sources and survive in 14th 

668
00:38:31,500 --> 00:38:35,100
century, 15th century, or 16th 
century sources. 

669
00:38:36,100 --> 00:38:41,100
But but I don't think I have at 
least come across anything. 

670
00:38:41,100 --> 00:38:44,500
That's very much like what I was
doing and it was sort of taking 

671
00:38:44,700 --> 00:38:46,800
a bunch of very different 
systems. 

672
00:38:47,100 --> 00:38:51,100
And again, there's certainly a 
lot of stuff on Jewish law and 

673
00:38:51,700 --> 00:38:55,100
noticeable amount on Islamic law
at least in English. 

674
00:38:55,100 --> 00:39:01,000
Maybe not not that much, but it 
also, of course, the people who 

675
00:39:01,000 --> 00:39:04,200
wrote most of those things where
economists and that gives you a 

676
00:39:04,200 --> 00:39:07,600
particular Angle for trying to 
make sense of things, which I 

677
00:39:07,600 --> 00:39:10,100
think is at least occasionally 
and informative one. 

678
00:39:11,200 --> 00:39:12,600
So, no, there certainly is 
stuff. 

679
00:39:12,600 --> 00:39:16,100
But I in general, I write more 
than I read. 

680
00:39:16,300 --> 00:39:17,700
That is to say it's not 
literally true. 

681
00:39:17,700 --> 00:39:22,200
I read a lot of books for this 
but I tend not to get into the 

682
00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:26,900
very common scholarly pattern of
here is a here is a area of 

683
00:39:26,900 --> 00:39:29,300
research in my field. 
I'll read everything in that and

684
00:39:29,300 --> 00:39:33,100
then try to contribute to it 
that I try rather to say here's 

685
00:39:33,100 --> 00:39:35,100
something I'm interested in. 
What can I learn about? 

686
00:39:35,300 --> 00:39:36,500
Of and I understand what I can 
write. 

687
00:39:36,500 --> 00:39:39,600
What can I write about it? 
And it's at least quite likely. 

688
00:39:40,100 --> 00:39:43,000
Maybe some other crazy person 
three years ago, did something 

689
00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:44,900
similar. 
I've, had that experience, at 

690
00:39:44,900 --> 00:39:49,800
least once, but but it's not. 
It's not, you know, this is my 

691
00:39:50,400 --> 00:39:52,900
little bit added to the 
literature and in the field. 

692
00:39:52,900 --> 00:39:59,900
That's, I've I've sometimes said
in the context of Economics that

693
00:39:59,900 --> 00:40:03,100
there are basically two 
different approaches to economic

694
00:40:03,100 --> 00:40:08,000
research, which is I identify 
with the Intensive and extensive

695
00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:11,600
margin and those are turned 
that's terminology Ricardo used 

696
00:40:11,600 --> 00:40:16,000
with regard to Agriculture and 
the Intensive margin consists of

697
00:40:16,000 --> 00:40:18,200
trying to grow more Grain on the
field. 

698
00:40:18,200 --> 00:40:21,800
You already growing grain in and
the extensive margin is bringing

699
00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:26,700
new land under cultivation. 
And in economics. 

700
00:40:26,900 --> 00:40:30,200
I like to say the Intensive 
margin is trying to say 

701
00:40:30,200 --> 00:40:33,400
something new about a question 
that smart people have been 

702
00:40:33,500 --> 00:40:37,500
talking about for 100 years. 
The extensive margin is finding 

703
00:40:37,500 --> 00:40:41,900
some place where your ideas can 
be applied in Attica and I would

704
00:40:41,900 --> 00:40:45,700
take the of the modern people, 
Peter, leasing would probably be

705
00:40:45,700 --> 00:40:47,700
my favorite example of someone 
who now works. 

706
00:40:47,700 --> 00:40:50,400
The extensive margin, not just 
Pirates. 

707
00:40:50,400 --> 00:40:52,000
He's done a variety of other 
things. 

708
00:40:52,300 --> 00:40:53,600
That's what? 
Gary Becker did. 

709
00:40:53,600 --> 00:40:55,600
Gary Becker. 
Did it with both the family. 

710
00:40:55,600 --> 00:40:59,500
I'm with crime, economic 
analysis of, that's what Jim 

711
00:40:59,500 --> 00:41:02,600
Buchanan and Gordon tullock. 
Did with public Choice Theory 

712
00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:05,100
and I just find that more 
exciting and more interesting. 

713
00:41:05,200 --> 00:41:06,600
And on the whole more 
productive. 

714
00:41:07,300 --> 00:41:12,000
The a long time ago. 
I was at UCLA and I didn't have 

715
00:41:12,000 --> 00:41:15,200
tenure and I didn't get tenure 
and the chair. 

716
00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:17,500
I had a conversation with the 
chairman of the department and 

717
00:41:17,500 --> 00:41:19,000
he said, look, you're a bright 
guy. 

718
00:41:19,400 --> 00:41:23,600
If you followed the journals and
wrote articles on whatever with 

719
00:41:23,600 --> 00:41:27,300
current Hot Topic, you'd get the
kind of record that would get 

720
00:41:27,300 --> 00:41:29,100
you 10. 
You're in a place like UCLA. 

721
00:41:29,100 --> 00:41:32,700
And I said, yeah, probably would
if you were me, would you do 

722
00:41:32,700 --> 00:41:33,600
that? 
He said no. 

723
00:41:37,100 --> 00:41:39,900
That was Lamer I think was the 
person as I remember involved. 

724
00:41:39,900 --> 00:41:42,400
I just remember that is, and I 
think that's right. 

725
00:41:42,400 --> 00:41:46,100
And it's and, you know, I'm, I 
prefer my the policy that I 

726
00:41:46,100 --> 00:41:47,800
followed his more fun and more 
interesting. 

727
00:41:48,400 --> 00:41:54,100
Well, I'm sure it is. 
And so the first off those, that

728
00:41:54,100 --> 00:41:58,200
one book that you were referring
to about ali land, what do you 

729
00:41:58,200 --> 00:41:59,500
recall? 
The name of that book? 

730
00:41:59,900 --> 00:42:01,900
I've got the this more than more
than one book. 

731
00:42:01,900 --> 00:42:04,200
It was just one that had that 
particular answers, but the 

732
00:42:04,200 --> 00:42:07,500
answers As if you look and legal
systems, I'm trying to remember 

733
00:42:07,500 --> 00:42:09,600
the name. 
He's it's a Welsh name though. 

734
00:42:09,600 --> 00:42:13,100
Not an obvious Welsh like, is it
pronounceable? 

735
00:42:13,300 --> 00:42:14,200
Oh, yeah. 
Sure. 

736
00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:17,400
No. 
No, let me, I should be able to 

737
00:42:17,400 --> 00:42:19,300
find that. 
Give me just a minute since I've

738
00:42:19,300 --> 00:42:20,900
got my computer right in front 
of me. 

739
00:42:20,900 --> 00:42:24,800
So it makes it easy to find 
stuff. 

740
00:42:25,200 --> 00:42:31,800
And I just have to get to the 
web copy of legal systems, which

741
00:42:31,800 --> 00:42:39,400
is right here. 
And then all, I still need is to

742
00:42:39,400 --> 00:42:42,600
go to the Somali chapter Somalia
chapter. 

743
00:42:43,100 --> 00:42:45,100
And at the end of the Somalia 
chapter. 

744
00:42:45,700 --> 00:42:49,800
I think I have my, my memory is 
that in this? 

745
00:42:53,500 --> 00:42:56,900
That in this. 
Version. 

746
00:42:57,100 --> 00:43:01,300
I put the know, I guess. 
I've got it all at the end. 

747
00:43:01,300 --> 00:43:03,500
So that will take a minute. 
Okay. 

748
00:43:03,900 --> 00:43:05,900
I have the copy here. 
I think. 

749
00:43:05,900 --> 00:43:10,600
All right. 
Look at if you go actually, I 

750
00:43:10,600 --> 00:43:15,000
could probably have done better 
than that because if II probably

751
00:43:15,000 --> 00:43:18,500
footnote to it put not 
reference. 

752
00:43:18,500 --> 00:43:21,700
I'm just I too often I lose 
words. 

753
00:43:21,700 --> 00:43:24,000
And at this point, I'm just not 
remembering the guys name. 

754
00:43:24,000 --> 00:43:25,700
I could remember it five 
minutes. 

755
00:43:25,800 --> 00:43:31,600
It's from now, maybe but the 
that's okay. 

756
00:43:31,600 --> 00:43:33,600
Just just in the interests of 
time. 

757
00:43:33,600 --> 00:43:39,700
Then my other question is, do 
you think that a legal system is

758
00:43:39,700 --> 00:43:42,100
something less Lewis? 
I am Luis. 

759
00:43:42,500 --> 00:43:43,800
I am Luis. 
Okay. 

760
00:43:44,000 --> 00:43:45,500
Yeah. 
I remember what the I and the m 

761
00:43:45,500 --> 00:43:47,500
stand for. 
But he's very good. 

762
00:43:47,600 --> 00:43:51,700
He's very interesting and I 
think he makes good sense out of

763
00:43:51,700 --> 00:43:54,000
it. 
I had another source from 

764
00:43:54,000 --> 00:43:57,400
somebody less expert who lived 
in In Somalia for a fair while 

765
00:43:58,200 --> 00:44:01,200
and I could compare them and you
had another question though. 

766
00:44:01,700 --> 00:44:05,300
Oh, yeah, I'm sorry. 
So do you do you think that you 

767
00:44:05,300 --> 00:44:08,300
can see is something not a 
society, can intentionally 

768
00:44:08,300 --> 00:44:10,500
adopt? 
And I'm thinking about you know,

769
00:44:10,500 --> 00:44:14,000
the reasons why that were 
different legal systems 

770
00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:17,900
ostensibly is to try and figure 
out how we can improve our own 

771
00:44:17,900 --> 00:44:20,000
system. 
But when you're talking about 

772
00:44:20,000 --> 00:44:25,500
such fundamental changes, so I 
think the answer in practice. 

773
00:44:25,800 --> 00:44:29,600
Most of the time is that most of
your legal system you inherit 

774
00:44:29,600 --> 00:44:32,000
from the past, but you can make 
changes. 

775
00:44:32,600 --> 00:44:36,100
So that the US for example 
adopted no-fault divorce in 

776
00:44:36,400 --> 00:44:43,300
various States, the u.s. 
Stopped enforcing damages for 

777
00:44:43,300 --> 00:44:48,500
breach of contract to marry and 
there have been various changes.

778
00:44:48,500 --> 00:44:52,000
And often the changes are driven
by somebody, or some group of 

779
00:44:52,000 --> 00:44:54,000
people who say look, this is 
clearly a better way of doing 

780
00:44:54,000 --> 00:44:54,800
it. 
They may be wrong. 

781
00:44:54,800 --> 00:44:56,900
Of course. 
But I think that's what 

782
00:44:56,900 --> 00:44:58,800
happened. 
So I think you can do that. 

783
00:44:59,900 --> 00:45:03,300
And maybe over an extended 
period of time, you can add have

784
00:45:03,300 --> 00:45:07,600
changes that really mattered 
that. 

785
00:45:08,100 --> 00:45:14,300
For example, I've seen it argued
that in theory, the u.s. 

786
00:45:14,300 --> 00:45:17,800
Basically abandoned freedom of 
contract over the last century 

787
00:45:18,100 --> 00:45:22,800
so that if I make a product and 
I only sell the people who 

788
00:45:22,800 --> 00:45:25,100
promise, not to, sue me, if it 
goes wrong. 

789
00:45:25,700 --> 00:45:27,600
That's not going to be 
enforceable agreement in 

790
00:45:27,600 --> 00:45:32,100
practice. 
However, I gather that to some 

791
00:45:32,100 --> 00:45:36,200
extent that's been reversed by 
making arbitration agreements 

792
00:45:36,200 --> 00:45:39,700
enforceable. 
That is to say that in, at least

793
00:45:39,700 --> 00:45:42,800
some contexts. 
There are contracts, you could 

794
00:45:42,800 --> 00:45:47,100
not write and have enforceable 
under the legal system, but you 

795
00:45:47,100 --> 00:45:50,600
can by agreeing to arbitration 
with those as part of the terms 

796
00:45:50,600 --> 00:45:52,700
of the agreement. 
So that would be a case where 

797
00:45:52,700 --> 00:45:56,900
you might be able to work around
as it were and Defacto and it. 

798
00:45:56,900 --> 00:45:59,200
Similarly. 
After all our whole criminal 

799
00:45:59,200 --> 00:46:04,100
system is a fraud that is to say
the formal description of our 

800
00:46:04,100 --> 00:46:06,300
criminal system. 
We will get a trial by jury. 

801
00:46:06,800 --> 00:46:08,500
Well for felons, that's true of 
what. 

802
00:46:08,500 --> 00:46:12,400
Two percent of all felons that 
virtually all felony cases are 

803
00:46:12,400 --> 00:46:16,200
settled by plea Bargains, Navy 
that may be a good or a bad 

804
00:46:16,200 --> 00:46:17,900
thing. 
You can argue about that, but 

805
00:46:17,900 --> 00:46:19,900
that's the case. 
Where there was never a point at

806
00:46:19,908 --> 00:46:21,000
which people said. 
Oops. 

807
00:46:21,200 --> 00:46:22,800
Sorry, trial, by jury doesn't 
work. 

808
00:46:22,800 --> 00:46:27,100
Let's, let's switch to something
else, but But given the 

809
00:46:27,200 --> 00:46:30,700
difficulties of giving everybody
a trial by jury. 

810
00:46:30,700 --> 00:46:34,400
There was clearly a pressure to,
to maintain a way around it as 

811
00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:37,500
it were, and that developed to 
the point where it, where the 

812
00:46:37,500 --> 00:46:39,600
exception swallow the rule, so 
to speak. 

813
00:46:40,000 --> 00:46:42,700
So that would be terribly, 
interesting case to to me, where

814
00:46:42,700 --> 00:46:46,300
you really had quite a large 
change in the system, which 

815
00:46:46,300 --> 00:46:50,800
happened, I think not really, is
that there probably were some 

816
00:46:50,800 --> 00:46:55,700
people who argued for it, but 
not really designed, but, The. 

817
00:46:55,700 --> 00:46:57,300
I mean, I'm not really an 
engineer. 

818
00:46:57,400 --> 00:47:01,500
I'm really interested in 
understanding things and I will 

819
00:47:01,500 --> 00:47:02,400
let it die. 
Believe it. 

820
00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:04,900
Other people to hopefully use 
some of that understanding and 

821
00:47:04,900 --> 00:47:07,600
making the world a better place.
Do you? 

822
00:47:07,600 --> 00:47:10,900
Do you have an opinion on 
whether or not the most 

823
00:47:10,900 --> 00:47:13,900
meaningful? 
Change comes from a positive law

824
00:47:13,900 --> 00:47:17,700
situation or from bubbling up 
through the common law, you 

825
00:47:17,700 --> 00:47:21,000
know, organic interactions on 
the marketplace so to speak. 

826
00:47:21,000 --> 00:47:22,800
I don't think I haven't. 
I don't think I know enough to 

827
00:47:22,808 --> 00:47:24,000
answer that kind of question. 
Yeah. 

828
00:47:24,500 --> 00:47:31,600
Yeah. 
The, but and sort of unclear to 

829
00:47:31,600 --> 00:47:34,200
what extent political changes 
aren't really organic to. 

830
00:47:34,200 --> 00:47:35,800
In the sense. 
They come from changes and 

831
00:47:35,800 --> 00:47:38,400
ideas. 
I was just, I was thinking about

832
00:47:38,400 --> 00:47:39,900
that an entirely different 
context. 

833
00:47:39,900 --> 00:47:43,600
There's as you may know, there 
used to be a Blog called slate 

834
00:47:43,600 --> 00:47:46,000
star codex by a guy called Scott
Alexander. 

835
00:47:46,000 --> 00:47:48,400
A very interesting blog that I 
spent a lot of time on and it's 

836
00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:51,400
now been revived under a 
different name for, but with the

837
00:47:51,400 --> 00:47:55,400
same person doing it and he had 
an exchange recently with some 

838
00:47:55,500 --> 00:47:58,700
Buddy on the question of whether
certain approaches to improving 

839
00:47:58,700 --> 00:48:02,100
the world where good or not and 
it was sort of trying to 

840
00:48:02,100 --> 00:48:07,000
distinguish between experts, 
figuring out what the right rule

841
00:48:07,000 --> 00:48:09,800
was an imposing it and somehow 
having something evolve Up From 

842
00:48:09,800 --> 00:48:13,200
Below, but it was pretty fuzzy 
what the argument was about. 

843
00:48:13,200 --> 00:48:16,100
But it occurred to me to think 
about a real world example 

844
00:48:16,400 --> 00:48:18,500
because it was one that came up 
in what they were discussing. 

845
00:48:18,500 --> 00:48:21,700
Although they were discussing it
now and not originally and 

846
00:48:21,700 --> 00:48:23,800
that's the auctioning off of the
airwaves. 

847
00:48:24,400 --> 00:48:27,800
All right the idea. 
Via the standard system for the 

848
00:48:27,800 --> 00:48:31,400
airwaves for a long time. 
Was that a government regulatory

849
00:48:31,400 --> 00:48:34,700
agency decides, which radio 
broadcasts are broadcasting in 

850
00:48:34,700 --> 00:48:36,900
the public interest and they 
gotta, like, give them the right

851
00:48:36,900 --> 00:48:42,100
to broadcast and Ronald coase 
suggested, got it must by now, 

852
00:48:42,100 --> 00:48:44,900
be 60 years ago, or something 
like that, that it would make 

853
00:48:44,900 --> 00:48:46,800
much more sense to Simply 
auction it off. 

854
00:48:46,800 --> 00:48:48,800
Auction off the spectrum that 
it's true. 

855
00:48:48,800 --> 00:48:51,700
We had to scarce resource, but 
the way we usually handle scarce

856
00:48:51,700 --> 00:48:54,100
resources, not government 
allocation, its Market 

857
00:48:54,100 --> 00:48:56,200
allocation. 
And at the time was obviously a 

858
00:48:56,207 --> 00:48:58,100
crazy idea. 
Nobody would ever do, maybe it's

859
00:48:58,100 --> 00:49:02,800
not what they do. 
But the question was, when they 

860
00:49:02,800 --> 00:49:08,400
finally did it. 
Does that count as the experts 

861
00:49:08,400 --> 00:49:10,900
from above saying, Hi, here's 
this clever idea. 

862
00:49:10,900 --> 00:49:14,500
Let's impose it on the system or
does that count on Ronald coase 

863
00:49:14,500 --> 00:49:17,500
60 years ago? 
Having said, let's put an idea 

864
00:49:17,500 --> 00:49:20,400
into the into the stream as it 
were. 

865
00:49:20,700 --> 00:49:23,300
That idea will work. 
Its way organically through the 

866
00:49:23,300 --> 00:49:26,000
economics profession, because 
it's an Idea that it's obviously

867
00:49:26,000 --> 00:49:29,700
the right idea at any really 
good Economist and eventually lo

868
00:49:29,700 --> 00:49:32,300
and behold it gets pregnant. 
So it's not always a clear 

869
00:49:32,300 --> 00:49:35,700
distinction, what you count is 
as sort of top-down versus 

870
00:49:35,900 --> 00:49:40,100
versus organic and similarly you
think about this whole woke 

871
00:49:40,100 --> 00:49:43,000
isn't nonsense at present that's
organic. 

872
00:49:43,000 --> 00:49:46,200
And the sense that somehow this 
weird new religion, spread 

873
00:49:46,200 --> 00:49:49,000
through the society and got a 
very powerful position. 

874
00:49:50,400 --> 00:49:53,000
But it's inorganic it as much as
it then says. 

875
00:49:53,000 --> 00:49:54,800
Alright, well, thank you over 
the head if you say the wrong 

876
00:49:54,800 --> 00:49:58,500
things in effect or fire you or 
do something to you. 

877
00:50:00,400 --> 00:50:03,000
Anyway, other questions. 
Yeah. 

878
00:50:03,000 --> 00:50:06,000
Well, that's really interesting.
But just just to make a comment 

879
00:50:06,000 --> 00:50:07,900
on that. 
One of the reasons I asked is 

880
00:50:07,900 --> 00:50:11,000
because I have done some 
studying, I think in my second 

881
00:50:11,000 --> 00:50:14,900
year in law school. 
I did some studying on customary

882
00:50:14,900 --> 00:50:18,800
legal systems and one of the big
things that comes up is that 

883
00:50:19,100 --> 00:50:22,200
well in in, I guess what we 
would call, the less developed 

884
00:50:22,200 --> 00:50:26,200
World, folks can't rely on the 
government to to enforce any 

885
00:50:26,200 --> 00:50:29,200
kind of legal system. 
So it comes up that they create.

886
00:50:29,700 --> 00:50:31,500
You know, a lot of its 
community-based. 

887
00:50:31,500 --> 00:50:34,900
Well, whether you have tribe of 
Elders or anything like that, it

888
00:50:35,900 --> 00:50:39,700
just as a matter of 
circumstance, but that's the 

889
00:50:39,700 --> 00:50:41,800
situation inside an American 
prison, too. 

890
00:50:42,400 --> 00:50:44,800
Yeah, you're inside an American 
prison. 

891
00:50:44,900 --> 00:50:48,800
You'd like to buy some heroin 
from another prisoner, who's 

892
00:50:48,800 --> 00:50:51,500
gotten it smuggled in. 
And for some reason, the prison 

893
00:50:51,500 --> 00:50:54,100
guards aren't willing to enforce
the contract by which you agree 

894
00:50:54,100 --> 00:50:59,200
to pay for him next week. 
And so they developed their own.

895
00:50:59,300 --> 00:51:02,200
Isms for enforcing those rules. 
That's part of what's 

896
00:51:02,400 --> 00:51:05,700
fascinating about, David's 
garvik's book describing that, 

897
00:51:06,000 --> 00:51:10,100
that, that, that mechanism. 
And of course, a lot of stuff in

898
00:51:10,100 --> 00:51:11,700
a modern society, a lot of 
stuff. 

899
00:51:11,700 --> 00:51:13,400
He's in practice, enforced by 
Norms. 

900
00:51:13,400 --> 00:51:16,500
Not bylaws. 
So, that's really privately. 

901
00:51:16,500 --> 00:51:19,700
Enforced by forms of social 
pressure. 

902
00:51:19,700 --> 00:51:24,200
I, I like to say that there is 
no legal rule, that would 

903
00:51:24,200 --> 00:51:27,500
prevent me from teaching a class
naked to the waist. 

904
00:51:28,400 --> 00:51:31,200
I don't be a stupid thing to do,
because it would have negative 

905
00:51:31,200 --> 00:51:34,400
effects on my reputation. 
And then you think about how 

906
00:51:34,400 --> 00:51:38,800
Norms change and I like to 
specify the hypothetical. 

907
00:51:38,800 --> 00:51:43,300
But not actually hypothetical 
example of a brave Professor who

908
00:51:43,400 --> 00:51:48,600
teaches his class in t-shirt, 
and cut off shorts and whatever 

909
00:51:48,600 --> 00:51:51,500
you kind of call the things you 
wear instead of shoes that are 

910
00:51:52,400 --> 00:51:56,400
rubber sandal kinds of things 
and he gets away with it. 

911
00:51:57,800 --> 00:52:00,700
And after a while, maybe some 
other people start doing that 

912
00:52:00,700 --> 00:52:02,700
sound Norms change. 
And that's a friend of mine at 

913
00:52:02,700 --> 00:52:05,000
George Mason, who behaves that 
way. 

914
00:52:06,200 --> 00:52:08,500
Now, it helps that he's also 
very productive, academic. 

915
00:52:08,900 --> 00:52:10,800
Therefore can get away with 
things like that. 

916
00:52:11,300 --> 00:52:14,300
So so Norms do sometimes change 
in interesting ways. 

917
00:52:17,300 --> 00:52:21,000
Have you ever found that that 
folks and other academics or 

918
00:52:21,000 --> 00:52:25,000
maybe duritz would scoff at the 
idea that we could learn 

919
00:52:25,000 --> 00:52:27,700
something from, you know, quote 
unquote more. 

920
00:52:27,900 --> 00:52:32,100
Primitive legal systems know 
that is, that may well be people

921
00:52:32,100 --> 00:52:35,400
who think that, but I would 
guess that, if anything, the 

922
00:52:35,400 --> 00:52:40,400
sort of academic bias, he's are 
going the other way that, you 

923
00:52:40,400 --> 00:52:44,900
know, you're supposed to respect
diversity and stuff like that. 

924
00:52:44,900 --> 00:52:48,200
And, you know, practice respect 
for diversity tends to be 

925
00:52:48,200 --> 00:52:51,300
limited to rather specific kinds
of diversity of the you like. 

926
00:52:51,600 --> 00:52:54,600
But nonetheless, I think 
somebody might well object-- to 

927
00:52:54,600 --> 00:52:58,800
a particular example and think 
it was a bad. system, but I 

928
00:52:58,800 --> 00:53:01,900
don't think that the general 
idea of saying you could learn 

929
00:53:01,900 --> 00:53:04,500
things from other cultures, that
sort of sounds, you know, 

930
00:53:04,500 --> 00:53:09,500
touchy-feely modern kind of 
fashionable views, but I think 

931
00:53:09,500 --> 00:53:15,700
it's also true that you can that
I mean there are enough really 

932
00:53:15,700 --> 00:53:18,900
smart people in the past so that
even though we've got this 

933
00:53:18,900 --> 00:53:22,000
puzzle about a w y IQ scores, a 
gradually crept over. 

934
00:53:22,000 --> 00:53:25,200
It's over time. 
I don't think it's believable 

935
00:53:25,500 --> 00:53:28,100
that the reason those systems 
are just had what's called. 

936
00:53:28,100 --> 00:53:29,700
He will lead them. 
Were too stupid. 

937
00:53:30,600 --> 00:53:35,500
And then I think, you know that 
some of them may be were stupid,

938
00:53:35,500 --> 00:53:40,400
but I think I like to describe 
the Athenian system as the legal

939
00:53:40,400 --> 00:53:45,200
system of mad Economist because 
It's sort of got multiple ideas 

940
00:53:45,200 --> 00:53:48,400
which might or might not work. 
But our clever ideas such as the

941
00:53:48,400 --> 00:53:50,700
wave of finding out whether 
somebody is richer than you are.

942
00:53:50,700 --> 00:53:53,900
And there are other examples of 
that in that legal system. 

943
00:53:55,300 --> 00:53:59,500
They had very elaborate 
mechanisms for making sure that 

944
00:53:59,500 --> 00:54:02,200
a juror never knew which case he
was going to be on until the 

945
00:54:02,200 --> 00:54:05,200
last minute in order to keep 
people from bribing, the jurors 

946
00:54:05,600 --> 00:54:08,900
for example, and they do another
other interesting things. 

947
00:54:10,400 --> 00:54:12,900
And I'm not particularly admirer
of song. 

948
00:54:13,100 --> 00:54:16,600
Your relation or for that matter
of Imperial China, but all of 

949
00:54:16,600 --> 00:54:19,300
them are human beings doing 
interesting things. 

950
00:54:19,300 --> 00:54:24,300
And I want to understand them 
and I think maybe some of the 

951
00:54:24,300 --> 00:54:28,300
human hubris of libertarian 
Theory says, that were always 

952
00:54:28,300 --> 00:54:32,300
trying to look to the past and 
say because a big objection to a

953
00:54:32,308 --> 00:54:35,500
stateless society or the 
feasibility of it is like, okay 

954
00:54:35,500 --> 00:54:39,600
well point to when in the past 
we had a society that existed 

955
00:54:39,600 --> 00:54:43,400
without government. 
And so what you try to do is At 

956
00:54:43,400 --> 00:54:46,100
least from my perspective when I
was a 20 in law school. 

957
00:54:46,100 --> 00:54:48,600
I was trying to look to find 
here. 

958
00:54:48,600 --> 00:54:49,700
Aha. 
I found it. 

959
00:54:49,700 --> 00:54:52,900
You know, this is the point 
where anarcho-capitalism 

960
00:54:52,900 --> 00:54:57,200
existed. 
However, I, you know, a lot of 

961
00:54:57,207 --> 00:55:00,200
times people will say, well, you
know, why don't you move to 

962
00:55:00,200 --> 00:55:03,200
Somalia, because that's an 
anarchic system, and it was a 

963
00:55:03,400 --> 00:55:06,000
disaster which we have 
scholarship that kind of 

964
00:55:06,000 --> 00:55:10,700
underlines maybe the opposite. 
So they'll say, oh well, why 

965
00:55:10,700 --> 00:55:12,800
would you want to emulate? 
Emulate? 

966
00:55:13,100 --> 00:55:14,600
Small. 
Yeah, yeah. 

967
00:55:14,900 --> 00:55:18,500
Yeah, but but the answer, of 
course, is there a whole lot of 

968
00:55:18,500 --> 00:55:21,100
differences and Somalia is a 
great deal poorer than we are. 

969
00:55:21,100 --> 00:55:22,800
And they speak a language. 
You don't know. 

970
00:55:24,100 --> 00:55:26,400
And even that is in the case of 
small. 

971
00:55:26,400 --> 00:55:30,100
You as you probably know, the 
mess came, when England Italy, 

972
00:55:30,600 --> 00:55:34,600
set up a centralized democratic 
government for society. 

973
00:55:34,600 --> 00:55:38,600
They never had such a thing. 
But even when it was functioning

974
00:55:38,600 --> 00:55:41,300
tolerably, well, it was still 
not nearly as nice place to live

975
00:55:41,300 --> 00:55:42,900
is America. 
Is it the moment for a lot? 

976
00:55:43,000 --> 00:55:48,400
Of different reasons, I think 
people mostly don't appreciate 

977
00:55:48,400 --> 00:55:51,300
just how much better off. 
We are we being the developed 

978
00:55:51,300 --> 00:55:53,600
World in general. 
Not a particular part of it that

979
00:55:53,800 --> 00:55:56,200
that the figure that McCloskey 
gives somewhere, which I think 

980
00:55:56,200 --> 00:55:59,800
is, right? 
Is that the real, the average 

981
00:55:59,800 --> 00:56:04,500
real income of developed world 
at present is 20 to 30 times? 

982
00:56:04,500 --> 00:56:07,200
What it was through most of 
history for the world as a whole

983
00:56:08,100 --> 00:56:10,700
and I think for the globe is a 
whole of maybe 10 times, 

984
00:56:10,700 --> 00:56:14,700
something like that. 
So, You know, given a very poor 

985
00:56:14,700 --> 00:56:16,900
Society. 
It's not at all clear that a 

986
00:56:16,908 --> 00:56:21,400
modern set of sis institutions 
would have lasted for a month in

987
00:56:21,400 --> 00:56:25,300
that Society. 
I mean, putting people in jail, 

988
00:56:25,300 --> 00:56:27,600
unless you're going to work them
in jail is awfully expensive. 

989
00:56:27,600 --> 00:56:30,500
If that means somebody else's 
starving to them, which it very 

990
00:56:30,500 --> 00:56:35,000
likely would in a so that that 
imprisonment is not a very 

991
00:56:35,000 --> 00:56:40,400
common pattern in past as eyes 
much less common than in modern 

992
00:56:40,400 --> 00:56:44,100
societies and what you do have 
in, Prison minutes, likely to be

993
00:56:44,100 --> 00:56:49,300
things like galley-slaves where 
you're actually using them as 

994
00:56:49,300 --> 00:56:52,500
labor and not just locking them 
up and feeding them, which is 

995
00:56:52,500 --> 00:57:00,200
what we mostly do. 
So, anyway, the yeah. 

996
00:57:01,800 --> 00:57:06,300
Is there any of these? 
It's very hard to say that in 

997
00:57:06,300 --> 00:57:09,200
their society and their 
circumstances, you could just 

998
00:57:09,500 --> 00:57:11,700
have come down. 
Let me go back to something else

999
00:57:11,700 --> 00:57:16,100
that Ronald coase did cosas last
work, which would have been 

1000
00:57:16,100 --> 00:57:18,400
finished with as close to 100. 
He's no longer alive. 

1001
00:57:18,400 --> 00:57:21,800
Unfortunately, was a book he 
co-authored with a Chinese 

1002
00:57:21,800 --> 00:57:24,300
Economist on how China went 
capitalist. 

1003
00:57:25,000 --> 00:57:30,400
And, as I read the book, one of 
the lessons, he draws was the 

1004
00:57:30,400 --> 00:57:32,200
China. 
Who did better with what they 

1005
00:57:32,200 --> 00:57:35,700
did, which was a sort of a trial
and error blundering into the 

1006
00:57:35,700 --> 00:57:39,500
system. 
Then if they had hired, lawyers,

1007
00:57:39,500 --> 00:57:44,000
hired economists for America, 
whether from Chicago or Harvard,

1008
00:57:44,300 --> 00:57:47,700
and done what they told them 
because they had to deal with 

1009
00:57:47,700 --> 00:57:51,600
their society and its existing 
institutions and beliefs and all

1010
00:57:51,600 --> 00:57:56,000
the rest of it. 
And the result is the China did 

1011
00:57:56,000 --> 00:57:59,000
much better than Russia or most 
of them. 

1012
00:57:59,100 --> 00:58:00,800
I think any of the Eastern 
European countries. 

1013
00:58:01,000 --> 00:58:04,600
Please accept those that had 
become communist late enough. 

1014
00:58:04,600 --> 00:58:06,500
So they still remember it. 
Like, czechia. 

1015
00:58:06,500 --> 00:58:10,500
For example, what a capitalist 
Society was like, but I think 

1016
00:58:10,500 --> 00:58:13,000
that the other ones have not 
been as well as China did 

1017
00:58:13,000 --> 00:58:16,600
relatively speaking and that now
it's not doing as well. 

1018
00:58:16,600 --> 00:58:20,000
Now and unfortunately Dangs no 
longer around sort of with a 

1019
00:58:20,000 --> 00:58:23,900
hand on on things. 
But at least by coasters 

1020
00:58:23,900 --> 00:58:26,400
account, it wasn't that the 
Chinese government said here's 

1021
00:58:26,400 --> 00:58:28,600
what we would do is to the 
Chinese government. 

1022
00:58:28,600 --> 00:58:31,600
We don't know what to do. 
So Wendy We will do things, 

1023
00:58:31,600 --> 00:58:36,000
don't stomp on them and they do 
things and they work, let them 

1024
00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:38,800
keep doing it and if they keep 
working maybe encourage them. 

1025
00:58:39,100 --> 00:58:42,700
And that's how you got a semi 
privatization of Agriculture. 

1026
00:58:42,700 --> 00:58:45,900
That's how you got. 
A lot of small firms in the 

1027
00:58:46,300 --> 00:58:48,900
cities and a bunch of other 
things happening. 

1028
00:58:49,000 --> 00:58:53,000
So it's a very interesting book.
I would recommend the the coast 

1029
00:58:53,000 --> 00:58:57,500
and Wang Wang Wang, I think is 
his name book on how you're 

1030
00:58:57,500 --> 00:59:01,700
trying to make capitalist. 
The book is legal systems, very 

1031
00:59:01,700 --> 00:59:03,700
different from ours. 
Mr. Friedman. 

1032
00:59:03,700 --> 00:59:06,800
Thank you so much for your time 
is the best place to find your 

1033
00:59:06,800 --> 00:59:09,900
work, David defragment.com? 
Yes, David D. 

1034
00:59:09,900 --> 00:59:15,000
Freeman.com is my home page. 
It has links to the full text of

1035
00:59:15,000 --> 00:59:17,700
some of my books. 
Most of my articles. 

1036
00:59:18,200 --> 00:59:22,200
It has a link to my blog which 
is got 15 years of essays on a 

1037
00:59:22,200 --> 00:59:28,300
very wide variety of subjects. 
And so that Oddity on to be 

1038
00:59:28,300 --> 00:59:29,900
useful. 
Mr. Friedman. 

1039
00:59:29,900 --> 00:59:32,200
Thank you so much for your time.
And thank you everyone for 

1040
00:59:32,200 --> 00:59:33,000
watching. 
Keith Knight. 

1041
00:59:33,000 --> 00:59:36,700
Don't tread on anyone and the 
Liberty weekly podcast. 

1042
00:59:37,300 --> 00:59:37,900
Thank you.