Donald Trump said the deal is largely negotiated.
Iran said the deal is not done. Pakistan said there has been
encouraging progress and the world is waiting to find out
which of those three statements is closest to the truth.
It is Sunday the 24th of May 2026, Day 86 of Operation Epic
Fury. The ceasefire remains
technically in place. The memorandum of understanding
is, by most accounts, in its final stages of drafting, and a
gap between the two sides that was described as deep and
significant just days ago has, according to multiple diplomatic
sources, narrowed considerably. Whether it has narrowed enough
is the question that now defines everything.
This is Epic Fury, the US Iran war podcast.
There is a great deal to work through today.
Let us get straight into it. The most consequential
development of the past 24 hours came on Saturday evening when
President Trump posted on Truth Social that a broader agreement
between the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and, in
his words, the various other countries had been largely
negotiated. He said the final aspects and
details were currently being discussed and will be announced
shortly. He confirmed the proposed
agreement included the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
He said he had spoken personally with the leaders of Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan,
Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain and had held a separate
call with Israel. He described the document in
question as a memorandum of understanding pertaining to
peace. The post was notable not just
for its content but for its tone and its scope.
This was not Trump issuing a threat or a deadline.
This was Trump announcing, in language that sounded more like
a closing statement than a negotiating position, that a
deal had effectively been done. The regional leaders he named,
eight countries plus Israel, represent the full architecture
of the Middle East stakeholders who have been most directly
affected by the conflict. The fact that he had spoken to
all of them before making his announcement suggests the post
was not an impulsive statement, but a coordinated message
intended to build public momentum toward finalization.
That post set off an immediate chain of contradictory responses
that illustrates with unusual clarity exactly how fragile and
contested this moment remains. Within hours, Iran's state
affiliated Fars news agency published its own account of the
current state of the memorandum. It said the Strait of Hormuz
would remain under Iranian management, according to the
latest version of the proposal exchange between the two sides.
It called Trump's description of a deal to reopen the Straight
incomplete and inconsistent with reality.
Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmael Baguii
reinforced that position, telling Iran's official state
media that any mechanism concerning the Strait of Hormuz
should be agreed between Iran, Oman and the country's bordering
the waterway. And that the United States, in
his words, has nothing to do with it.
He added that lifting sanctions on Tehran had explicitly been
included in the text and remained Iran's fixed position.
So within hours of Trump announcing A largely negotiated
deal, Iran's official communications apparatus was
publicly disputing the characterization of one of that
deal's central components. That does not necessarily mean a
deal is not close. It does mean the two sides are
still describing the same document in fundamentally
different terms. This pattern, an American
announcement of progress met by Iranian public skepticism or
partial denial, has played out repeatedly during the
negotiating period. What is different this time is
the specificity of Trump's claim, the breadth of the
regional leaders he said he had consulted, and the fact that
Pakistan's mediators are characterizing the state of the
talks in genuinely optimistic terms rather than cautious
diplomatic language. Secretary of State Marco Rubio
offer more measured assessment than the president.
Speaking to reporters on Saturday, Rubio confirmed that
significant progress had been made, but reiterated that the
United States core objective remained unchanged.
Iran must never have a nuclear weapon.
He also weighed in on the Hormuz question directly, saying that
condoning threats to destroy vessels transiting the Strait
would set a dangerous precedent. That last remark is important.
It speaks directly to one of the issues that has proved most
difficult to resolve in these negotiations, whether Ron
retains the right to manage, charge for, or otherwise control
access to the waterway after any formal agreement is reached.
Rubio has made clear on multiple previous occasions that the
United States views any toll system or Iranian management of
international shipping lanes as illegal and unacceptable.
His language on Saturday left no room for ambiguity on that
point. The question is whether the
Memorandum of Understanding can be constructed in such a way
that both the United States and Iran can publicly claim the
hormones outcome aligns with their respective positions.
Pakistan's role in the past 48 hours has been substantial and
has visibly shifted from background mediator to active
front facing participant in the final stages of negotiations.
Field Marshall Asim Munir, Pakistan's army chief, concluded
a visit to Tehran on Saturday after arriving on Friday and
conducting what were described as high level engagements with
Iranian leadership, including Foreign Minister Abbas Arachi.
The two exchange views on the latest diplomatic efforts and
initiatives to prevent escalation of tensions,
according to a post on Arachi's Telegram channel.
Pakistan's military issued a statement after the visit saying
that negotiations over the preceding 24 hours had resulted
in encouraging progress toward a final understanding.
Pakistan's foreign minister IS Shakhtar followed with a post on
social media saying the achievements of the negotiations
offered grounds for optimism that a positive and durable
outcome was within reach. Iran's ambassador to Pakistan,
Reza Amiri Mogadam, said on his return to Tehran that with
conservative optimism, one could hope that a positive stride was
taking shape if he added carefully, the other side was
adequately committed. Al Jazeera's Tehran
correspondent observed that the visit of Pakistan's army chief
to Tehran was itself a sign of significant progress, noting
that Arachi had also held phone calls with his Turkish, Iraqi,
Qatari and Omani counterparts, as well as with United Nations
Secretary General Antonio Guterres about the state of the
peace talks. What is emerging is a multi
track diplomatic effort spanning at least half a dozen countries
and two international organizations.
That breadth of engagement suggests both sides are serious
about reaching an agreement and that the regional stakeholders
who have the most to gain from a resolution.
The Gulf states, whose energy infrastructure and economic
stability depend on a functioning straight of Hormuz,
are applying sustained pressure on both Washington and Tehran to
close the remaining gaps. Iran's own Foreign ministry
spokesman gave the most structured public description of
where the current document stands, but Guy confirmed that
Tehran was in the final stages of drafting A framework
agreement aimed at ending the conflict.
He said the framework would take the form of a memorandum of
understanding containing 14 clauses.
The deals terms, he said, would provide for the gradual
reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the United
States naval blockade on Iranian ports, the release of frozen
Iranian fawns, and a subsequent 30 to 60 day period of detailed
negotiations on a broader agreement.
He also stressed that nuclear issues are not part of this
initial framework. Iran's position, clearly and
repeatedly stated, is that the first phase of any agreement is
about ending the war and reopening the Strait.
Nuclear talks come in phase two. That sequencing is itself a
source of ongoing tension. The United States has
consistently insisted that Iran's nuclear program must be
central to any deal. Rubio's statement on Saturday
reaffirmed that the United States goal is for Iran never to
have a nuclear weapon. Whether Washington is prepared
to accept the first phase agreement that sets nuclear
questions aside for later, or whether it is insisting that at
minimum a commitment on enrichment be embedded in the
memorandum itself, remains one of the unresolved questions.
A source familiar with the negotiations, speaking to CNN,
said Iran is prepared to reopen the Strait of Hormuz in the
deals first phase, with a nuclear issue addressed in the
second phase. That framing aligns with what
the guy described publicly. But whether the United States
has formally accepted that sequencing or is still pushing
to include at least a preliminary nuclear commitment
in the initial document is not confirmed by public statements
from either side. The broader outline of what is
being discussed has been described in reporting by the
Financial Times and other outlets.
The proposed deal includes a 60 day extension of the ceasefire,
the gradual reopening of the Strait, discussions over
diluting or transferring Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium,
steps by Washington to ease restrictions on Iranian ports,
and potential sanctions relief across a range of sectors.
Iran's Foreign Ministry has confirmed the general structure
but on the most difficult points, sovereignty over Hormuz,
the enriched uranium stockpile, and the scope of any nuclear
commitment. The two sides have not publicly
announced agreement. The enriched uranium question
deserves particular attention because it has been one of the
most complex and contentious issues throughout the entire
negotiating process. Iran has accumulated a
significant stockpile of uranium enriched to varying levels,
including material enriched to 60% purity, which sits below
weapons grade but well above the levels required for civilian
reactor fuel. the United States has pushed for that material to
be transferred out of Iran or diluted to lower enrichment
levels. Iran's Foreign ministry has
stated flatly that the uranium will under no circumstances be
transferred anywhere. There have been reports
exploring whether a third country, Russia, has been
mentioned in some contexts could take custody of the material,
but Iran has publicly rejected that approach.
Reporting from earlier in the negotiations suggested the
United States may be exploring a time limited commitment on
enrichment rather than a permanent restriction, and that
Iran has countered with a shorter time frame.
Neither side has confirmed the specific terms currently under
discussion. The internal divisions within
Iran over these negotiations have not dissolved.
Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, the hardline commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has been publicly
critical of what he views as concessions by Iran's civilian
leadership. He was reported in April to the
said the supreme leader had not even been buried before
negotiations began with those who had killed him.
That sentiment reflects a genuine tension within the
Iranian system between those who want an end to the conflict and
those who believe the act of negotiating represents a
compromise of the Islamic Republic's foundational
principles. The Irgc's political influence
within Iran's decision making architecture is not incidental,
It is structural. The corps commands enormous
economic interests within Iran beyond its military function,
and any deal that fundamentally reshapes Iran's strategic
posture will have direct implications for the Irgc's
institutional power. That is why Vahidi skepticism is
not merely ideological posturing.
It reflects the interests of an institution that has thrived in
part because of the very confrontational posture with the
United States and Israel that the current negotiations would
formally bring to an end. Parliament Speaker Muhammad
Baker Kalabaf has served as Iran's lead negotiator
throughout the Islamabad process.
Kalabaf is himself a former IRGC commander, a figure who has
spent decades navigating between hardline military factions and
technocratic pragmatism. Analysts have noted that while
Kalabaf has the authority to negotiate a deal, he remains in
contact with figures like Vahidi in order to understand where the
genuine red lines within the system lie.
That dynamic civilian negotiators with authority to
talk military hardliners with the capacity to obstruct
implementation has shaped every round of these negotiations and
will continue to shape whatever agreement eventually emerges.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has remained largely absent from
public view throughout the ceasefire and negotiating
period. He has not appeared on camera.
He is not given a speech. His position on the current
Memorandum of Understanding is not publicly known, and that
opacity matters enormously. Any agreement that cannot
demonstrate the explicit backing of the Supreme Leader risks
being challenged, walked back, or undermined from within after
the fact. Whether Common A is actively
directing the negotiating posture, or whether the civilian
and parliamentary leadership are operating within parameters he
set some time ago and has not revisited remains unclear.
The global economic dimension of where these talks stand
continues to press on both sides.
Trump referenced the Strait of Hormuz in his Saturday post in
the context of the Memorial Day holiday weekend, noting that
Americans are facing elevated fuel prices at a moment of peak
summer travel demand. Brent crude oil remains
significantly above its pre war level.
The disruption to global shipping that has accumulated
over 86 days of conflict has left a mark on supply chains,
insurance markets and energy logistics that will not be
instantly reversed even if a deal is formally announced
tomorrow. Shipping insurers have priced in
months of elevated risk. Carriers have restructured
routes. Some long term supply contracts
have been renegotiated. The economic argument for a
swift resolution is overwhelming, and it applies
with equal force on the Iranian side, where the war and the
blockade have compounded an already strained economic
situation. Iran's oil exports, which have
been partially recovering through informal channels before
the conflict began, have been severely disrupted.
Sanctions relief, which Tehran has made a fixed demand in the
current negotiations, represents not just a symbolic prize but a
genuine economic lifeline. The Iranian public has borne the
cost of this war in terms of inflation, supply shortages and
the broader psychological burden of a country under sustained
bombardment. Any government in Tehran has an
interest in delivering economic relief alongside whatever
narrative of national resilience it chooses to construct around
the outcome of the negotiations. The position of Israel is a
factor that has complicated these negotiations throughout.
Both the United States and Israel have stated that the
Pakistan mediated agreement does not extend to Lebanon, where a
separately negotiated ceasefire governs the situation involving
Hezbollah. Israel's interest in the final
shape of any US Iran agreement extends well beyond the
immediate question of the ceasefire.
Israel went into this conflict with the stated objective of
eliminating Iran's nuclear capability and its capacity to
arm proxy forces across the region.
Whatever agreement emerges will be scrutinized in Jerusalem
against those benchmarks, and any deal that is perceived as
leaving Iran with a residual nuclear program or a functioning
proxy network will face significant Israeli opposition.
the United States has repeatedly stated that Israel was not part
of the Pakistan mediated process, but the two countries
have remained in close consultation throughout, and
Trump's Saturday posts specifically mentioned a
separate call with Israel alongside his calls with the
Gulf states. Hezbollah's leader received a
letter from Iranian Foreign Minister Arachi on Saturday,
with Al Mana television reporting that the letter said
Tehran would not abandon its allies.
Whether that communication was intended to reassure Hezbollah
ahead of an agreement that Hezbollah might view as leaving
it exposed, or whether it reflects A genuine constraint on
what Tehran can commit to in the memorandum, is not certain.
What is clear is that the Lebanese dimension of this
conflict remains an unresolved thread running beneath the
surface of the current negotiations, and it will need
to be addressed in whatever second phase process follows the
memorandum of understanding. Where does this leave things as
Sunday gets underway? Trump has said a deal is largely
negotiated and will be announced shortly.
Iran has said its positions on Hormuz and sanctions are fixed.
Pakistan has said there has been encouraging progress.
Rubio has confirmed significant progress while reiterating core
United States objectives. The Iranian Foreign Ministry
spokesman said viewpoints are getting closer and that three to
four more days may be needed. The 14 clause memorandum of
understanding is, by multiple accounts, being fine-tuned
rather than drafted from scratch.
That is a materially different stage from where these
negotiations stood even 2 weeks ago.
The gap that remains is real. The distance between a Strait of
Hormuz that reopens under international freedom of
navigation and a Strait of Hormuz that reopens under some
form of Iranian management is not a semantic distinction.
It reflects 2 fundamentally different visions of what the
post war order in the Persian Gulf looks like.
The same is true of the nuclear question.
Whether enrichment limits appear in the first phase memorandum or
are deferred entirely to a second phase negotiation is not
merely A sequencing matter. It determines whether the United
States can credibly present the agreement as having addressed
the central threat that justified the launch of the war
in the first place. It is also worth understanding
what a memorandum of understanding is and is not.
It is a framework document, not a binding treaty.
It establishes intent and outlines the structure for more
detailed negotiations that follow.
Both sides can, and in all likelihood will, interpret its
language according to their own domestic and political needs.
The United States will present it as a historic agreement that
dismantled Iran's nuclear ambitions and restored freedom
of navigation. Iran will present it as a
sovereign state successfully defending its interests and
securing the lifting of unjust sanctions.
Both narratives can coexist within the same 14 Clause
document, as long as the language is drafted carefully
enough to allow each side the flexibility to claim what it
needs to claim. That is both the opportunity and
the risk of the current moment. A memorandum of understanding
that both sides can sell at home might be achievable.
A memorandum of understanding that resolves every underlying
strategic disagreement between the United States and Iran is
not achievable in a matter of days.
The question is whether a document that opens a path
forward, imperfect, contested, subject to future
interpretation, is enough to formally end the conflict,
reopen the straight, and allow both sides to begin the longer
and more difficult work of a lasting settlement.
These are not small gaps. They are also not, based on
everything reported in the past 24 hours, unbridgeable ones.
The question of whether they can be closed in the days ahead,
before the current ceasefire window expires and before
domestic political pressure on both sides intensifies further,
is the question that now sits at the center of this entire
conflict. 86 days since Operation Epic Fury began. 46
days since the ceasefire took hold, a war that began with
bombs falling on Tehran in the early hours of a February
morning has reached a point where the President of the
United States is describing a peace agreement as largely
negotiated. Mediators from Islamabad to
Muscat are expressing cautious optimism and Iran's Foreign
Ministry is confirming A-14 Klaas memorandum is in its final
stages. The distance from where this
conflict started to where it stands today is extraordinary.
The distance remaining to a formally agreed and sustainable
peace is, by the accounts of those closest to the process,
short. Whether the world is days away
from an announcement, or whether the final gaps will prove harder
to close than the optimistic signal suggest is a question
that will be answered in the hours and days immediately
ahead. The world is closer to an answer
than it has been at any point in this war.
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Apple Podcasts. That is Day 86.
The deal is not done, but it is closer than it was yesterday and
tomorrow, one way or another, we will know more.
Stay with us.