A deal agreed in principle. A supreme leader who has
endorsed the broad template in a foreign ministry in Tehran
saying no agreement is imminent, nothing has been committed and
the nuclear question is not yet on the table.
It is Wednesday the 27th of May 2026, day 89 of Operation Epic
Fury. The war remains suspended, the
bombs are not falling in any sustained sense, the naval
blockade continues to tighten, and the gap between what
Washington says this deal contains and what Tehran says it
contains is at this moment, wider than it has been at any
point since formal negotiations began.
This is Epic Fury, the US Iran war podcast.
There is a great deal to work through today.
Let us get straight into it. Start with the central tension,
because it defines everything else that happened in the past
24 hours. On Sunday and into Monday, a
senior United States official brief reporters that Iran had
agreed in principle to open the Strait of Hormuz, that Iran had
agreed in principle to dispose of its enriched uranium
stockpile, and that the broad template of the memorandum of
understanding had been endorsed by Supreme Leader Mujtaba
Khamenei himself. Those were the most optimistic
public statements from the American side since the
ceasefire began on April 8th. Trump described the deal on
Saturday as largely negotiated. He said an announcement would
come shortly. By Monday evening, Iran's
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmail Bakiya, had delivered a
response that flatly contradicted every major element
of that characterization. But Kiya told reporters that to
say an agreement is about to be signed, no one can make such a
claim. He said negotiations are
ongoing. He acknowledged some headway has
been made on certain issues. But he said the claim Iran had
made concrete commitments on the nuclear file was not accurate.
Iran's semi official Fars news agency published a statement
saying Iran has made no commitments in this agreement
regarding handing over nuclear stockpiles, removing equipment,
closing facilities or pledging not to build a nuclear bomb.
Those two accounts cannot both be correct.
Either Washington is overstating what has been agreed in order to
generate public pressure towards signature, or Tehran is publicly
denying private commitments in order to manage the domestic
politics of what would be the most consequential diplomatic
concession in the Islamic Republic's history.
The honest answer is that from the outside, there is no way to
determine which reading is closer to the truth.
What can be said with confidence is that this pattern of
radically divergent public claims has become the defining
feature of this entire negotiation, and it is the
reason why, 89 days into this conflict, no document has been
signed. The structural shape of what the
United States is proposing is now clearer than it has been at
any earlier point in the talks because American officials
provided more detail over the weekend than at any previous
stage. The proposed Memorandum of
Understanding is organized around 2 distinct phases.
The first phase takes effect at the moment of signature,
involves the simultaneous mutual removal of both blockades.
Iran clears the mines it deployed in the Strait of Hormuz
and allows commercial shipping to transit without tolls. the
United States lifts its naval blockade of Iranian ports and
wave sanctions on Iranian oil sales during a 60 day
negotiating window that immediately follows.
The structure is explicitly performance based.
An American official put it plainly.
No dust, no dollars. If Iran does not perform, Iran
does not receive the economic relief the deal promises.
As the straight opens, the blockade loosens
proportionately. Sanctions relief is tied to
verify performance, not to the signature alone.
The second phase unfolds during those 60 days.
It involves negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, the fate
of the enriched uranium stockpile, the situation in
Lebanon and the broader framework for a permanent into
the conflict. According to American officials,
Iran has given verbal commitments, relayed through
Qatari mediators in Doha, that it will agree in principle to
dispose of all enriched uranium. The American position covers
both the approximately 450 kilograms in rich to near
weapons grade levels and the broader stockpile of roughly
2000 kilograms at lower enrichment concentrations.
American officials were clear. The question is not whether Iran
will relinquish the material, but how.
Nobody disputes that the stockpile will be disposed of,
one official said. The question is how.
The logistics of that process are not simple.
Verifying, securing, transporting and receiving
roughly 2000kg of enriched uranium requires the
International Atomic Energy Agency secure transport
protocols and a willing recipient country or facility
under international supervision. None of those operational
arrangements exist yet. Whether they can be negotiated
within 60 days alongside every other item on the agenda is an
open question. Iran's public position, as
stated by both the Kia and Fars that all of this is premature
because no such commitment has been made.
The Doha talks on Monday between Iran's senior negotiating
delegation and Qatari mediators coordinating with the United
States were described by Tisnim as generally positive, That is a
calibrated formulation. Generally positive means the
talks did not collapse. It means the channel is open.
It means some forward movement was recorded.
It does not confirm what was conceded or agreed.
The Qatari mediation channel has been running for several weeks,
playing the role Oman played in the earlier phase of the
conflict. The fact that Iran's negotiating
team traveled to Doha on the same day American forces
conducted self-defense strikes near Bandar Abbas is itself a
signal the diplomatic track has acquired A resilience that the
military track has repeatedly tested and failed to destroy The
blockades. 100 ship was intercepted in this period. the
United States Navy has now redirected 100 commercial
vessels attempting to enter or leave Iranian port since the
blockade began on April 13th. That figure, 100 ships in 44
days, represents A sustained assault on Iran's economic
position that is compounding with every additional
interception. Oil exports blocked, imports
denied. Iranian financial institutions
further isolated insurance costs for the rare vessel that does
seek to move Iranian cargo rising with each passing week.
The economic pressure function of this conflict, which began
with the aerial campaign, has been running on blockade alone
since mid-april. It does not require active
combat operations. It simply requires the Navy to
maintain its position and Iran to remain unable to force the
ships through. Iranian President Massoud
Posseski and addressed the nuclear question on Sunday.
He said Iran is ready to reassure the world that it is
not seeking nuclear weapons. He added that negotiators will
not compromise when it comes to the country's honor and dignity.
Both parts of that statement need to be read carefully.
The first is a message to Washington and the international
community. Iran is not an obstacle.
Iran accepts that some reassurance is necessary.
Iran does not want a bomb. The second is a message to the
domestic audience, the IRGC, the Assembly of Experts, the hard
line faction. Iran will not capitulate, will
not sign terms that read as national humiliation, and will
not accept an agreement in which the other side claims total
victory. For a deal to be reachable, both
of those things need to be simultaneously true.
Whether they are compatible with a specific wording American
officials are presenting is the question at the center of the
stalemate. The enrichment question deserves
extended attention because its roots extend far beyond the
current conflict. Iran has enriched uranium
domestically for more than two decades.
The program survived the 2015 nuclear agreement, in which Iran
accepted limits on enrichment but not its elimination.
It survived the American withdrawal from that agreement
in 2018. It survived maximum pressure
sanctions under the first Trump administration.
It survived the preliminary strikes of June 2025.
It survived the opening 40 days of Operation Epic Fury.
It is not simply a technical capability.
It has become a symbol of sovereign scientific
achievement, of resistance to sustain external coercion, of
the Islamic Republic's capacity to develop advanced technology
under decades of international pressure.
Khamenei's father, the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,
spent the last decade of his life declaring that the
enrichment program was a non negotiable red line.
Mojtaba Khamenei inherited both the position and the ideological
framework surrounding it. To sign a document committing
Iran to suspending enrichment and disposing of the stockpile
is therefore not a technical transaction.
It is a fundamental revision of what the Islamic Republic has
publicly stood for. It requires the Supreme leader
to tell the IRGC, the hard line establishment and the Iranian
public that the red line, defined and defended over
decades, has now been traded away.
That may be achievable under the right conditions, if the
suspension is framed as temporary, if Iran retains A
theoretical right to enrich at some future point under a
comprehensive final agreement, if the gains are tangible and
immediate, and if the framing allows Tehran to present the
outcome as a sovereign choice rather than impose defeat.
The sequencing and language matter enormously.
Agreements that are substantively identical can be
politically viable or politically lethal, depending
entirely on how they are presented to the domestic
audience. Trump's public posture has
complicated that framing in ways that may not be entirely
accidental. His Truth Social post in capital
letters stating that his administration will not allow
any enrichment, removes in public precisely the ambiguity
Iranian negotiators need to present a deal as anything other
than unconditional surrender. Reports emerged earlier this
month that the United States might accept civilian grade
enrichment below the 3.67% limit from the 2015 agreement.
Trump contradicted those reports directly.
Rubio reiterated the American position from India last week.
Stop enriching. Give up the stockpile.
He added his consistent formulation.
This problem will be solved one way or another.
That phrase is not incidental. It is a standing signal that the
military option remains available in Washington.
The political dimension of the negotiation has also evolved.
Republican senators who have been broadly supportive of the
operation are beginning to ask for definition.
What constitutes success? What does a final agreement need
to contain? At what point does sustain
military and economic pressure become indefinite, open-ended
conflict? Those questions are not yet
producing legislative action. The war powers framework remains
stable, but the conversations are occurring, and the
administration is aware that the political window for maintaining
the current posture without a visible diplomatic result is not
unlimited. Trump needs a deal he can
present as a win. The 89 days of pressure give him
the standing to describe a deal on favorable terms, but that
standing erodes if the waiting extends further without
resolution. There is a related question that
has received less attention than the nuclear file, but that
shapes everything else in the negotiation, the internal
Iranian political situation and whether the people conducting
these talks have the authority to conclude them.
The Iranian negotiating team in Doha is led by senior officials
who report through the Foreign Ministry.
The foreign ministry reports to President Posseschian.
Posseschian is a reformist who ran on a platform of reengaging
with the West and who has spoken publicly in constructive terms
about Iran's willingness to provide assurances on its
nuclear intentions. But the Foreign Ministry is not
the final authority in Iranian decision making.
The Supreme National Security Council, which coordinates the
country's strategic policy, also has a role.
The IRGC, which controls significant parts of Iran's
military and economic infrastructure, has a stake in
any outcome. An ultimate authority rests with
Mojtaba Khamenei, whose endorsement of the broad
template, if real, is necessary but not sufficient for a deal to
be concluded and implemented. The pattern of Iranian decision
making throughout this conflict has illustrated that gap between
negotiating and deciding. Repeatedly, Iranian officials
have signaled flexibility through intermediaries, then
pulled back under pressure from hardliners.
The Foreign Ministry has said one thing, while IRGC commanders
have said another. Posseschian has spoken in
constructive terms, while Common A's own public statements have
maintained defiance. That internal incoherence is not
accidental, and it is not simply a negotiating tactic.
It reflects A genuine distribution of power inside the
Iranian system in which no single actor can commit the
entire apparatus to a course of action that other actors oppose.
The Doha delegation can reach an agreement.
Whether that agreement survives the journey through the Supreme
National Security Council passed the Irgcs institutional
interests and de Kamenes desk for final authorization is a
separate question entirely. Russia and China have been
watching these negotiations closely.
Both countries have maintained their alignment with Iran
throughout the conflict, condemning the American military
operation, calling for a ceasefire, and opposing the
blockade in international forums.
Moscow and Beijing both have economic interests in Iranian
oil and strategic interests in preventing a settlement that
consolidated American influence over the region's security
architecture. Neither country has a formal
role in the current Doha mediation, but both countries
have lines of communication to Tehran, and both have capacity
to either encourage or discourage Iranian flexibility,
depending on their assessment of what a deal would mean for their
own interests. The US Iran agreement that opens
the Strait, lifts the blockade and begins a 60 day nuclear
negotiation with ease global oil markets reduce inflationary
pressure on import dependent economies and be presented by
the Trump administration as a major diplomatic success.
That outcome is not obviously in Moscow's or Beijing.
Short term interest. Russian oil revenue benefits
from elevated global prices. Chinese leverage over Iran
increases the longer Tehran remains isolated.
The degree to which Russian and Chinese advice to Tehran is
encouraging resolution or prolonging the stalemate is not
knowable from outside, but it is a factor that American planners
are aware of and that shapes the broader geopolitical context in
which the deal making is occurring.
In the Lebanese theater. Overnight, Israeli strikes
continued. Netanyahu has been consistent
throughout. Israel's campaign against
Hezbollah is not subject to any US Iran ceasefire arrangement.
From Israel's perspective, Hezbollah's disarmament and
northern Israel's security are objectives that precede and
supersede the bilateral US Iran diplomatic track.
From Iran's perspective, an agreement in which Israel
continues to strike Lebanon while Tehran holds fire violates
the fundamental premise of the ceasefire.
This asymmetry that Washington can commit the United States but
cannot commit Israel is one of the structural features of the
negotiation that receives less public attention than the
nuclear question but may be equally difficult to navigate.
If Iran signs a milieu and Israel escalates significantly
in Lebanon the following day, Tehran will face immediate
domestic pressure to walk away from whatever it has just signed
on the energy markets. The past 48 hours illustrated
the equilibriums fragility with precision.
Trump's Saturday description of the deal as largely negotiated
briefly pushed Brent crude below $88 per barrel, reflecting
market pricing of imminent straight reopening.
By Monday, after the Kia's rebuttal and the Fars denial of
nuclear commitments, oil had largely reversed that move.
Markets repriced the extended uncertainty quickly and
comprehensively. The episode demonstrated
something important. Positive signals from Washington
can move oil prices in a matter of hours, but the reversal
happens with equal speed. The market sensitivity to each
development in this negotiation is itself a form of pressure on
the negotiators, because a deal that is announced and then falls
apart will be more damaging to market confidence than the
current sustained uncertainty. Global supply chains remain
disrupted. The OECDS most recent
projections incorporate an extended straight closure as
their base case, not as a tail risk.
Shipping companies have now had three months to reroute their
logistics around the Persian Gulf, and some of those
rerouting decisions are becoming structurally embedded in
contracts and infrastructure investment.
The longer the straight remains contested, the more of that
rerouting becomes permanent rather than temporary.
When the straight eventually reopens, the full restoration of
pre conflict traffic patterns will take longer than a simple
reopening would suggest because some of the rerouting is now
baked into long term shipping agreements that cannot be
unwound overnight. the United States says the agreement will
be signed in the coming days. Iran says nothing is imminent.
Common A has reportedly endorsed the broad template, according to
Washington. Tehran has not confirmed that
publicly. The Doha talks were generally
positive. They produced no announcement.
The blockade has now intercepted 100 ships.
Consider the position of each side entering day 90.
Washington holds significant leverage.
The military destruction of Iran's air defenses, nuclear
infrastructure, naval capability, and proxy networks
over 89 days has left Iran in a substantially weaker military
position than it occupied on February 27th.
The blockade is strangling Iran's oil revenues at a moment
when those revenues are essential to maintaining public
order and government functionality.
Trump has a domestic political incentive to close the deal.
A sign agreement would be a major foreign policy achievement
and would validate the decision to launch Operation Epic Fury.
Every day without a signature is a day the operations cost human
and financial compound. Without visible resolution,
Iran's position is harder to summarize cleanly because Iran's
goals are multiple and partly contradictory.
Iran wants the blockade lifted. Iran needs the oil revenues.
Iran wants international sanctions eased.
Those are all achievable through the MO U framework.
But Iran also needs to avoid signing a document that domestic
hardliners can credibly describe as surrender.
Iran needs to preserve some pathway to a future enrichment
capability. Iran wants guarantees about
Lebanon and about Israeli behavior that the United States
cannot unilaterally provide. Iran needs the supreme leader to
be able to present whatever is agreed as a victory rather than
a defeat. Those requirements are harder to
satisfy within the wording that the American side is currently
presenting. The specific question of
wording, which words appear in the memorandum of understanding,
in what order, with what conditional clauses, and what
escape provisions may ultimately be the thing that determines
whether this deal closes. Both sides are close enough to
an agreement that the substantive gaps are narrowing.
But wording matters enormously in diplomatic documents because
wording determines how the document can be read in Tehran
to domestic hardliners, how it can be read in Washington to
congressional Hawks, how it can be used by either side if the 60
day negotiating process subsequently fails.
A deal that collapses inside 60 days is worse than no deal
because it would discredit the diplomatic track and produce
renewed military pressure with more legitimacy and less
international sympathy than the original operation commanded.
Day 89 ends where Day 88 ended, with a deal closer than it has
been at any previous point in this conflict and still
insigned. The pressure on both sides to
find a resolution is higher than it has ever been.
The cost of continued failure is also higher than it has ever
been. Something will give.
The question is what and when? If this podcast is helping you
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This has been episode 89 of Epic Fury, the US Iran war podcast
Day 89. The deal is described as largely
negotiated. The signature has not come.
The blockade has reached 100 ships.
The enrichment question remains the central obstacle, and the
clock continues to run. We will be back very soon.