The ceasefire is holding tenuously.
A French shipping Giants vessel was attacked while transiting
the Strait of Hormuz, injuring crew members and damaging the
ship. The UAE engaged 2 Iranian
ballistic missiles and three drones on Friday.
Bahrain arrested 41 people alleged to have links to Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran's foreign ministry said on
Friday is not paying attention to deadlines.
Iran's army added on Saturday that states complying with U.S.
sanctions may face difficulties transiting the Strait of Hormuz,
a direct threat at countries honoring the blockade, which
includes most of Iran's major pre war oil customers.
An unnamed Iranian official said the supreme leader is in
complete health and will eventually appear in public.
The first public statement about Khamenei's fiscal status since
the war began 72 days ago. Pakistan's Prime Minister said
his country is in contact with the United States and Iran day
and night, and Iran's government told Al Jazeera's Tehran
correspondent that at this stage is not negotiating its nuclear
program. It is Sunday, May 10th, 2026,
day 72 of Operation Epic Fury. The framework letter has not
publicly arrived. Iran's officials are saying
they're not negotiating the nuclear program at this stage.
The US ceasefire holds, says Washington, and the French
aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is moving toward the Red
Sea and Gulf of Aden to prepare for a future freedom of
navigation mission in a Strait that is still producing attacks
on commercial vessels. This is episode 72 of Epic Fury,
the US Iran War podcast. Follow on Spotify and Apple
podcast to stay with this story as it develops.
Let's get into it. Begin with the nuclear statement
from Tehran, because it is the most significant single piece of
information about Iran's actual negotiating position to emerge
since the framework document was reported on Wednesday, and
because it directly and publicly contradicts Trump's Oval Office
claim that they have agreed. Al Jazeera's correspondent,
reporting from Tehran on Thursday, told the network that
Iranian officials are specifically saying at this
stage they are not negotiating their nuclear program.
The negotiation, as Iran's officials describe it, is only
about ending the war on all fronts.
That formulation, not negotiating the nuclear program
at this stage, is the Iranian government's public
characterization of what the document it is reviewing
actually contains from Tehran's perspective.
Al Jazeera additionally reported that Iran is requiring direct
guarantees from the United Nations Security Council that it
will not be subject to renewed US or Israeli strikes, a demand
that exists alongside the nuclear non negotiation
position. That is an extraordinary demand.
The UN Security Council guarantee against renewed US or
Israeli military action would require the Security Council to
pass a binding resolution constraining the United States,
which the US holds a power to veto and has vetoed every
attempt to constrain its military actions through that
body. No such resolution has ever been
passed against a permanent members own military operations.
Iran's demand for UN Security Council guarantees it maintained
as a genuine condition rather than a negotiating position,
represents A structural impossibility.
The demand for UN Security Council guarantees, if it
represents Iran's genuine and non negotiable position rather
than a maximalist opening point designed to be traded away, may
itself be a substantial part of the explanation for why the
letter has not yet arrived. Not a nuclear deal, Not a
nuclear moratorium. An end to the war on all fronts,
including Lebanon, including the blockade, and possibly including
security guarantees from the United Nations Security Council.
That position appears on its face to be irreconcilable with
the framework is reported by Axios, Reuters and The Times of
Israel, which described the US document as containing a 12 year
enrichment moratorium, the removal of Iran's highly
enriched uranium stockpile from the country, a prohibition on
underground nuclear facilities, and a snap IA inspection regime.
If Iran's government is telling journalists on the ground in
Tehran that the nuclear program is not being negotiated at this
stage, and the US document contains exactly those
provisions, then one of three possibilities is true.
First, Iran's public statements about what is in the document,
characterizing it as a war ending arrangement rather than a
nuclear framework, are accurate from Iran's perspective because
Iran has not accepted the nuclear provisions and regards
the document as a ceasefire framework that includes nuclear
language it has not agreed to. Second, Iran's public statements
about the documents contents are deliberately inaccurate,
strategically designed to maintain the domestic political
position that the nuclear program is non negotiable, while
internal deliberation on exactly how negotiable it might be under
sufficient economic pressure continues behind closed doors.
3rd, the document Iran is reviewing is a different or
later version of the proposed framework than what was
described to American media, one that may have deferred or soften
the nuclear specifics in favor of a more general war ending
arrangement during the negotiations that have continued
since Wednesday's reporting. All three possibilities are
genuinely consistent with a publicly available information.
The most important question they generate is whether the
framework, when it is eventually agreed or rejected, will contain
specific and verifiable nuclear constraints or will rely on the
creative vagueness that vase described language that allows
both governments to sign something while the genuinely
substantive nuclear question is deferred to the 30 day follow on
negotiations. If the framework is sufficiently
vague on nuclear terms, it may be signed if it requires the
specific 12 year moratorium and physical stockpile removal from
the country that U.S. officials described to American media.
It faces the same obstacle that has blocked every previous
Iranian proposal, no confirmed internal Iranian consensus on
making those specific concessions, and a supreme
leader who has not been publicly visible to issue that
authorization for 72 days. Ali Vais, director of the Iran
Project at the International Crisis Group and one of the most
reliable independent analysts of US Iran negotiations, offered
the clearest summary of where things stand.
He told Al Jazeera that both sides would either have to make
painful concessions or leave the main areas of disagreement vague
if they are to finalize a framework understanding at all
that is a precise and accurate diagnosis of the core problem,
painful concessions, or strategic vagueness.
Either Iran explicitly accepts a specific nuclear constraint, A
moratorium, stockpile removal for Dow prohibition, and the
IRGC accepts that commitment is something other than
capitulation under duress. Or the framework uses language
that both sides can describe to their respective domestic
establishments, is consistent with their positions, language
vague enough to allow each government to call it a win,
while the genuinely substantive nuclear questions are deferred
to the 30 day negotiating period that follows the vagueness
option. A framework that uses
deliberately ambiguous language on the nuclear question to allow
both sides to sign something they can describe to their
respective domestic establishments is consistent
with their positions is the mechanism that has produced
signed agreements in previous diplomatically intractable
situations. It is not a genuine resolution
of the nuclear question. It is a postponement of the
resolution wrapped in signing ceremony language.
The 2015 JCPOA required 2 full years of negotiation precisely
because the nuclear provisions were not vague but specific.
Enrichment levels, centrifuge numbers, stockpile caps,
inspection mechanisms, sunset clauses, all defined with the
precision that produced a verifiable agreement.
A1 page framework with a 30 day follow on process has
structurally less space for the specificity that produces
genuine mutual constraint, and structurally more space for the
creative ambiguity that produces a signing ceremony without
resolving the underlying dispute.
A document that commits Iran to never seeking a nuclear weapon.
The formulation Trump described from the Oval Office is
different from a document that commits Iran to a 12 year
enrichment moratorium with physical stockpile removal.
The 1st is a political statement.
The second is a verifiable technical commitment with
physical consequences. Iran's government can sign the
1st and argue it has not conceded anything substantive
because it has always maintained it is not seeking a nuclear
weapon. The second requires physical,
irreversible action, moving uranium out of Iranian territory
and into foreign custody. That cannot be undone by a
change of government or a reinterpretation of the
agreements text. Whether a creatively ambiguous
nuclear formulation satisfies Trump's stated floor, they will
not have nuclear weapons. They are handing over the
nuclear dust is the question that the frameworks exact
language, when it becomes public, will definitively
answer. If the language requires the
physical removal of the nuclear material, the framework is
substantive. If it requires only a political
commitment, the hard work has been deferred to the 30 days.
Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on Friday that
Iran is not paying attention to deadlines.
That statement is directed at the American pressure
architecture, the implied 48 hour window, the sign fast
imperative, the one big low threat Project Freedom Plus
warning that has characterized the administration's
communications since Wednesday. Iran is explicitly saying that
the American pressure calendar does not govern its
deliberation. Whether that means Iran is
genuinely indifferent to the US pressure timeline or whether it
means Iran is managing its domestic audience's perception
of the deliberation is sovereign rather than coerced is what the
letters eventual arrival or non arrival will show.
Turn now to the common a health statement because Friday's
unnamed Iranian official assertion marks the first time
any Iranian official sources publicly addressed the Supreme
Leader's physical conditions since Operation Epic Fury began
72 days ago. An unnamed Iranian official told
reporters on Friday that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is in
complete health and will eventually appear in public.
Khamenei has not been seen on camera since the war began.
He has not delivered a public address.
He has not appeared at any ceremony, prayer or state
function. His image has been presented
through AI generated video. His decisions have been
communicated through official statements attributed to him.
Russia's government confirmed receiving a written message from
him, but no living appearance of any kind, No video footage, no
photograph, no audio of his voice has been made public in
the 72 days since the war began. The complete health statement
made by an unnamed official rather than by a name senior
Iranian figure does not resolve the questions about Common A's
governing capacity that have surrounded his absence for 72
days. It confirms that at least one
person with sufficient access to make the claim is willing to
assert on the record that the Supreme Leader is healthy.
That is not a trivial statement. Is the first time anyone in the
Iranian government has publicly addressed Common A's physical
conditions since the February 28th strikes, but it is notably
lacking in detail and attribution.
The will eventually appear in public formulation is worth
examining closely. Not soon, Not imminently, Not in
the coming days. Eventually.
That specific word choice, eventually, rather than soon,
imminently or in the coming days, leaves open an enormous
range of possibilities about when that appearance might
occur. Eventually can mean next week.
It can mean next year. It can mean when the security
situation allows it, which may itself be undefined.
Whether Common A's continued absence from any public view, no
camera, no photograph, no audio, no appearance is primarily a
security decision or primarily a physical one has significant
implications for the framework deliberation.
A physically healthy supreme leader who is choosing not to
appear publicly for security reasons, keeping his location
unknown during an act of conflict is a very different
governing reality from a supreme leader who is unable to appear
publicly because of an injury or illness that limits his
functioning capacity. The former can issue
authorizations, direct internal deliberations, and approve
framework documents with a full institutional authority of a
functioning head of state. The latter raises legitimate
questions about whether the decisions attributed to him are
genuinely his own and whether any nuclear commitment made in
his name carries the institutional weight and long
term durability that a permanent framework agreement requires.
The Officials complete health assertion does not definitively
resolve that question, but its existence.
The fact that an Iranian official felt the need to make
that assertion publicly on Friday after 72 days of silence
is itself a response to the 72 day accumulation of
international and domestic uncertainty about the Supreme
Leader's status. It was issued the same day Rubio
was hoping for a serious Iranian offer.
The timing is not incidental. The Bahrain arrest of 41 people
alleged to have links to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps is the
largest single Gulf state domestic security action of the
conflict to date. Bahrain's Interior Ministry
described the 41 detainees as the core of an alleged
organization tied to the IRGC. Legal proceedings are underway
and further investigations are continuing, the ministry said.
The cases involve alleged espionage for foreign entities
and expressions of support for Iranian attacks during the war.
Bahrain hosts the US Navy's Fifth Fleet at Naval Support
Activity Bahrain, the primary US naval base in the Persian Gulf.
Bahrain, hosting the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, the primary US
naval command for the Gulf region, makes the alleged
presence of an IRGC linked organization inside the country
among the most operationally sensitive domestic security
discoveries of the entire conflict.
It follows the UAE's arrest of 27 people in April and Kuwait's
arrest of 24 people in late April for broadly similar
alleged offenses, forming a clear and consistent regional
pattern of Gulf states hardening their domestic security postures
against alleged Iranian proxy and espionage networks during
the ceasefire period. The attack on the CMACGM San
Antonio is a significant escalation of the maritime
threat to commercial shipping in the Strait.
CMA and CGM is one of the world's three largest container
shipping operators, a French headquarter conglomerate that
moves approximately 12% of global container cargo.
Its decisions about which routes are safe for its vessels set the
commercial benchmark for the entire container shipping
industry. When CMACGM stops routing ships
through a waterway, the insurance market and smaller
operators follow. A CMA CGM vessel being attacked
with crew members injured in the ship Physically damaged while
transiting the Strait is not an anonymous third flag tanker hit
by unidentified projectiles. It is a named vessel belonging
to a Tier one global shipping operator damaged in a publicly
reported attack with injured crew on record.
That attack will be processed by the global shipping industry is
clear evidence that the Strait of Hormuz is not safe for
commercial transit and that U.S. military guidance Project
Freedom does not provide sufficient security for
commercial vessels to return. France's decision to move the
Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group into the Red Sea and Gulf
of Aden in preparation for a future freedom of navigation
mission in the Strait of Hormuz is France's institutional
response to the commercial and security reality its own
shipping is experiencing. France led the Maritime
Coalition planning meetings at the RAF base in Britain in late
April. It announced the second round of
Israel Lebanon peace negotiations on Friday and is
now moving its primary carrier strike capability toward the
Strait. Britain and France have both
stressed that their freedom of navigation mission will not
launch until there is a sustainable ceasefire and the
maritime industry is reassured ships can pass safely.
The CMA CGM San Antonio attack makes both of those
preconditions sustainable ceasefire and maritime industry
reassurance further from being met rather than closer.
Pakistan Prime Minister Shabash Sharif said on Saturday that
Pakistan has been in contact with the United States and Iran
day and night in an effort to extend the ceasefire and reach a
peace deal. The day and night formulation is
notable. It suggests the pace of
Pakistan's mediation activity has not slowed during the
framework letter delay, but has, if anything, intensified as the
gap between the US nuclear position and Iran's publicly
stated non negotiation of the nuclear program persists.
Every day that passes without the letter arriving is another
day. Pakistani mediation
infrastructure is actively engaged in attempting to close a
gap that has resisted closure for 72 days.
Russia's Foreign Ministry said Saturday that Russia and Saudi
Arabia were both calling for diplomatic efforts to reach a
sustainable long term agreement to end the war.
Russia calling for a sustainable long term agreement while
simultaneously maintaining its intelligence sharing
relationship with Iran, its defense meeting, coordination
with the Iranian deputy defense minister and its commitment to
do everything that serves Iran's interest.
Is Russia playing both sides of the diplomatic Ledger, publicly
supporting a deal while ensuring Iran knows it has a powerful
backer regardless of what the deal contains or whether it
materializes? Egypt and Qatar's foreign
ministers spoke on Saturday and jointly affirmed that diplomacy
is the sole path to resolution. The two countries represent the
Arab League's most active diplomatic voices in this
conflict and their Saturday call reflects the Arab world shared
interest in a negotiated end that does not leave the Gulf
state security architecture permanently altered by a failed
or absent deal. The diplomatic coalition around
the US Iran process is now broader than at any previous
point in the war. Pakistan, Oman, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, France, Germany and implicitly China,
whose entities were sanctioned on Friday for supporting Iran's
defense industrial base. Every major regional and
international power is simultaneously calling for a
deal and will not get one through their calling.
The only force compelling Iran's consideration of the nuclear
framework is the American blockade that none of them
operates and the American military threat that none of
them has issued. The coalition's diplomatic
unanimity exists. The course of capacity that
makes it matter belongs exclusively to Washington.
If this podcast is helping you make sense of what's happening,
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you can unlock the premium episodes directly in Spotify or
Apple Podcasts. This has been episode 72 of Epic
Fury, the US Iran war podcast. Iran's officials say the nuclear
program is not being negotiated at this stage.
Trump says they have already agreed to it.
France's Charles de Gaulle is moving toward the region.
Bahrain arrested 41 people with alleged IRGC links.
The ceasefire holds. The letter has not publicly
arrived. Pakistan is working day and
night, and the war is simultaneously closer to
resolution and further from certainty than it has been at
any point in 72 days. We will be back very soon.