If the United States or Israel ever launched A sustained air
campaign against Iran, 1 aircraft would sit at the center
of that operation via 35 Lightning, too.
Not because it is invisible. Not because it is unbeatable,
but because modern air warfare increasingly depends on which
side can see the other first, process information faster, and
survive inside heavily defended airspace long enough to matter.
This episode is about that contest, the F35 against Iranian
air defenses. 2 sophisticated systems, each designed with the
other broadly in mind, each carrying serious strengths and
serious limitations. Understanding both of them
honestly, without exaggeration, in either direction, tells us
something important about what a major air campaign against Iran
would actually look like, and why The outcome is far less
certain that either confident Hawks or reassured skeptics tend
to suggest. The F35 Lightning 2 is the most
expensive weapons program in human history.
Its total life cycle cost across all variants have been estimated
at over $1.7 trillion. The aircraft entered service
with United States Air Force in 2016 and has since been procured
by the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, Japan, South Korea,
Norway, Italy, the Netherlands and several other nations.
Israel operates the F35 IA, locally modified variant known
as the Adir, which carries Israeli specific avionics,
electronic warfare systems, and weapons integration not found in
any other country's fleet. The aircraft was designed around
a set of capabilities that, taken together, represent a
fundamental philosophy about how air warfare should be conducted
in the 21st century. That philosophy can be
summarized in three principles. First, reduce the probability of
being detected. Second, collect and process
information at a quality and speed that exceeds any
adversary. 3rd, operate as a network node in a broader system
rather than as a stand alone fighting platform.
Each of those principles is achievable to a degree.
None of them is absolute, and the degree to which each holds
in a specific operational environment is precisely what
makes air campaign planning so difficult.
The stealth characteristics of the F35 are among its most
discussed and most misunderstood qualities.
The aircraft is not invisible. It has never been marketed as
invisible by the engineers who designed it, though that word
appears frequently in popular coverage.
What stealth actually means in precise technical terms is a
significant reduction in radar cross section.
The effective size of the aircraft is seen by radar
returns. A conventional fighter like an
F16 had a radar cross section roughly comparable to a small
car. The F35, depending on aspect,
angle and radar frequency band, presents a radar cross section
many orders of magnitude smaller, often compared to a
metal golf ball or in some assessments, something closer to
a marble. The reduction is achieved
through a combination of airframe shaping that deflects
radar energy away from the emitting source, internal
weapons carriage that eliminates the large external pylons
present on conventional fighters, radar absorbent
surface materials bonded to the airframe, and careful management
of heat signatures and radio frequency emissions.
What this means operationally is that the range at which an
adversary radar can detect the F35 is dramatically compressed.
A radar system that might detect a conventional fighter at 200
kilometers might only detect an F35 at 30 or 40 kilometers.
That difference in detection range is the margin inside which
the F35 pilot can act before the adversaries fire control
solution is complete. It does not make the aircraft
immune to detection. It changes the geometry of the
engagement in ways that fundamentally disadvantage the
defender. There are well documented
limitations to stealth that any serious analysis must
acknowledge. Low frequency radar systems,
specifically very high frequency and ultra high frequency bands,
sometimes referred to as metric wave radar, can detect stealth
aircraft at longer ranges than high frequency fire control
radars. The physics of radar absorption
and airframe shaping are less effective at wavelengths longer
than the aircraft's own physical dimensions.
Soviet era long range surveillance radars, several of
which remain in service with Iran, operate on these lower
frequency bands. The challenge for defenders is
that these systems can provide warning and general bearing
information, but generally cannot generate targeting
quality data with sufficient precision to guide a surface to
air missile to a successful intercept.
They can tell a commander that something is approaching.
They struggled to tell a missile battery exactly where to point.
During the 1999 Kosovo campaign, the United States F117
Nighthawk, the first operational stealth aircraft, was shot down
by a Serbian surface to air missile battery.
That incident is frequently cited as evidence that stealth
can be defeated. The full picture is considerably
more nuanced. Serbian operators reportedly
used a combination of an older Soviet era radar operating on a
lower frequency band, intelligence about the
aircraft's relatively predictable flight path and
schedule, and a degree of tactical patients that allow
them to wait for a more favorable engagement geometry.
The lesson from Kosovo was not that stealth is fundamentally
ineffective. The lesson was that stealth
combined with predictable tactics, lapses and emissions
discipline or repeated sorties on identical routes creates
exploitable windows that a sophisticated and patient
defender can attempt to use. The F35 sensor fusion capability
is arguably more consequential than its reduced radar
signature. The aircraft carries the IN
Slash APJ 81 Active Electronically Scan Array radar,
an Electro optical targeting system, a distributed aperture
system consisting of 6 infrared cameras providing 360°
situational awareness around the entire aircraft, and the IN
slash SQ239 electronic warfare suite.
All of this information is integrated and presented to the
pilot through a helmet mounted display that projects the sensor
picture directly onto the visor regardless of where the pilot is
physically looking. What this means in practice is
that an F35 pilot possesses a level of situational awareness
that was simply impossible in previous generations of combat
aircraft. The aircraft sees threats from
directions the pilot cannot physically face.
It classifieds radar emitters automatically and presents
identification data. It builds and continuously
updates a tactical picture without requiring the pilot to
manually correlate information from multiple sources beyond
what the individual aircraft sees.
The F35 is designed as a node in a networked architecture by the
multifunction Advanced Data Link.
It shares sensor data in near real time with other F-30 fives,
with 4th generation fighters, with airborne early warning and
control systems, and with ground stations.
A formation of F-30 Fives operating together shares its
combined picture across every platform simultaneously.
The first aircraft to detect a threat can share that detection
with every other aircraft in the network within seconds,
potentially before the adversary radar operator has even
processed the initial return. This network capability operates
within a broader infrastructure that a modern air campaign would
bring to any contested theater. Airborne early warning and
control aircraft operating while outside threat envelopes provide
long range surveillance and coordination.
Electronic warfare aircraft in the United States Inventory The
18G Growler conduct dedicated suppression of enemy air
defenses through both active jamming and the use of high
speed anti radiation missiles at home on radar emissions.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, including
satellites, high altitude unmanned systems, and signals
intelligence platforms, map the adversary air defense network
continuously before any strike aircraft enter contested
airspace. Aerial refueling tankers extend
the reach and combat persistence of every element in the strike
package. Iran has spent several decades
building an air defense architecture that attempts to
account for this kind of multi domain pressure.
Its approach is layered, geographically dispersed and
deliberately redundant, with explicit doctrinal goal of
ensuring that no single strike package can collapse the entire
system simultaneously at the long range tier.
Iran's most capable system is the S300 PMU 2, delivered by
Russia following a protracted diplomatic dispute and
ultimately supplied in 2016 after years under arms embargo.
This 300 family is a serious and well regarded system by any
objective measure. Its radar can track multiple
targets simultaneously at long range.
Its missiles carry engagement ranges extending to roughly 150
kilometers against certain target types, though effective
range against low observable aircraft will be considerably
shorter. Given that reduced radar cross
section directly compresses the engagement envelope available to
any surface to air missile system, Iran has invested
significantly in operator training and in integrating the
S 300 into its broader command and control network.
Alongside the S 300, Iran has developed the Bavar 373, a
domestically produced long range surface to air missile system
that Iranian officials and state media have described as
competitive with or superior to the S 300 in certain performance
categories. Independent assessment of the
Bavar 373 is constrained by limited, publicly verifiable
technical data. Western analysts generally
approach Iranian claims about domestically produced defense
systems with appropriate skepticism, while acknowledging
that the Brevard 373 represents A genuine engineering program
that should not be reflexively dismissed at medium range.
Iran operates the Kordat family of systems, most notably the
third of Kordat system, which received sustained international
attention in June 2019 when Iran claimed it had engaged and
destroyed a United States Navy RQ for a Global Hawk
surveillance drone operating near the Strait of Hormuz.
The precise circumstances of that incident remain a matter of
dispute between Washington and Tehran, but the episode
confirmed that the Chordad system is operationally active
and capable of engaging real targets at operationally
relevant altitudes. Critically, the system is
mobile, and mobility is one of its most significant tactical
advantages against a force conducting suppression
operations. Mobility is a theme running
through Iran's entire air defense posture.
The lessons of the 1991 Gulf War were studied carefully in Tehran
as they were studied by military establishments around the world.
In Operation Desert Storm, the United States and coalition
forces demonstrated that fixed, networked air defense
infrastructure, however densely layered, could be systematically
dismantled through coordinated suppression and destruction
operations. The Iraqi air defense system,
which on paper was among the most capable in the region, was
effectively defeated within the 1st 72 hours of the air
campaign. Iran has spent the subsequent
decades designing a system that is harder to locate precisely
and therefore harder to target precisely than the Iraqi system
was. Iranian air defense units
trained to relocate regularly. Radar systems are operated under
strict emission control, transmitting intermittently
rather than continuously, which dramatically reduces the time
available for anti radiation missiles or electronic
intelligence assets to fix their position.
Decoy emitters are used to attract anti radiation missiles
away from operational systems. Underground facilities provide
survivable infrastructure for command and control nodes and
for some radar capabilities. Communications between elements
of the air defense network use a mixture of digital data link,
hardened fiber optic cable, and low probability of intercept
radio protocols to complicate signals intelligence collection
by opposing forces. Iran's geography adds complexity
that any attacking force must account for systematically.
Iran is not a compact country. Its territory covers an area
roughly equivalent to Western Europe.
The very terrain, the Zagaris and Alborz mountain ranges,
central desert plateaus, the coastal plains bordering the
Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Caspian Seashore,
creates radar coverage gaps that defenders can exploit and that
attackers must plan around carefully.
A suppression campaign that might take 48 to 72 hours in a
geographically confined theater could require sustained
operations over several weeks in Iran simply because the physical
distances involved demand more sorties, more aerial refueling,
more continuous logistics support, and longer period of
exposure to whatever residual air defense capability survives
each phase of the campaign. The opening phase of any serious
air campaign against Iranian air defenses would almost certainly
prioritize the suppression and destruction of radar networks,
communications infrastructure and command nodes before
attempting to strike the hardened sites deeper in the
interior. This is the established doctrine
that evolved from Desert Storm and was refined in every
subsequent major air campaign. 18G Growlers and dedicated anti
radiation missiles would target emitting radar systems during
the initial wave. Low observable aircraft,
including the B2 Spirit stealth bomber and the F35, would
penetrate the highest threat defended areas where 4th
generation aircraft would face attrition rates judged
unacceptable. Tomahawk cruise missiles
launched from surface ships and submarines operating well beyond
Iranian retaliatory reach would strike fixed infrastructure
targets without requiring strike aircraft to enter contested
airspace at all. Whether Iran could realistically
detect and successfully engage in F35 during such a campaign is
a question that resists a simple answer.
The honest analytical assessment is that Iran's realistic
opportunities lie in a specific combination of circumstances.
Early warning from lower frequency radars providing
general threat bearing rather than precision tracking.
Passive intelligence gathered over time about operational
flight patterns. Opportunistic engagement during
phases when aircraft behavior is more predictable, such as during
aerial refueling at lower altitudes over coastal
approaches, or during sortie patterns that become repetitive
over the course of a sustained campaign.
And the cumulative statistical possibility that in an operation
involving many hundreds of sorties over several weeks, some
encounter results in a successful engagement through a
combination of factors that no individual planning step fully
controlled against. A well managed F35 operation
employing proper emissions discipline, varied ingress and
egress routing, prior suppression of the radar network
and dedicated electronic warfare support.
Iran's probability of successfully engaging in F35 on
any given sortie is assessed by most Western analysts as low.
That is not the same as zero in an extended campaign.
Over weeks, cumulative risk rises with every mission flown.
The broader challenge for any sustained campaign is not the
opening phase. Opening phases are what advanced
air forces do best Concentrated, coordinated, exploiting the full
suite of capabilities against the system that is not yet
adapted to the specific operational approach being used.
The harder phase is what follows.
Mobile systems that survive the initial suppression effort begin
to reconstitute in new positions.
Operators who have observed the attack sequence adapt their
emission patterns and their engagement procedures.
The electronic order of battle that was painstakingly mapped
before the campaign began is now partially obsolete.
This dynamic has been demonstrated at varying scales
in recent conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh.
In 2020, Azerbaijani drone operation showed the lethal
vulnerability of static or predictably positioned air
defense systems to persistent surveillance combined with
precision strike. In the ongoing war in Ukraine,
both sides have demonstrated that air defense is ultimately
an attrition contest as much as a technical one.
Systems are destroyed, replaced or relocated, improvised and
adapted in a continuous cycle that does not end with an
opening salvo and does not resolve cleanly for the United
States or Israel operating against Iran, the military
technical balance does favor the attacker in the opening phases
and against fixed infrastructure.
The F35 sensor architecture, it's reduced detection range,
it's networked integration with a broader air campaign
structure, and the full depth of American air power create a
combination that Iran's current air defense inventory would
struggle to defeat comprehensively.
But struggle to defeat comprehensively is not the same
as being defenseless, and a prolonged campaign introduces
variables, attrition across all systems, munitions inventory
depletion, maintenance demands on complex platforms, political
sustainability, and adversary adaptation that cannot be
resolved by any single technological advantage.
There is a dimension of this contest that deserves more
attention than it typically receives.
The information competition that precedes and shapes the physical
exchange. Modern air campaigns are decided
substantially before the 1st aircraft crosses a border.
The side with better intelligence about the
adversary's radar network, more accurate knowledge of where
mobile systems have repositioned, more complete
understanding of the adversary's operational procedures and
emission patterns, that side holds an advantage that no
quantity of missiles can simply overcome.
Conversely, a defender who successfully denies that
intelligence picture, who presents a system that looks
meaningfully different from what was mapped in preparation, who
maintains deception and unpredictability across the
campaign, the defender imposes uncertainty that translates
directly into risk for attacking Cruz and higher cost for the
attacking force. The F35 was designed to operate
inside that information contest and to tip it decisively in
favor of the attacker. Iran's air defense doctrine and
its investment in mobility, redundancy and emission control
were designed to complicate and disrupt it.
Neither has yet faced the other in a full, sustained campaign at
scale. What military planers on both
sides understand, and what drives the continued investment
on each side, is that the outcome would depend less on any
individual piece of hardware and more on which side could
maintain a clearer picture of the other, act on that picture
faster, and keep its own dispositions in the dark.
In modern air warfare, the most dangerous weapon is not the one
that fires the furthest, it is the one that knows where to
look.