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If the United States or Israel 
ever launched A sustained air 

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campaign against Iran, 1 
aircraft would sit at the center

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of that operation via 35 
Lightning, too. 

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Not because it is invisible. 
Not because it is unbeatable, 

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but because modern air warfare 
increasingly depends on which 

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side can see the other first, 
process information faster, and 

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survive inside heavily defended 
airspace long enough to matter. 

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This episode is about that 
contest, the F35 against Iranian

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air defenses. 2 sophisticated 
systems, each designed with the 

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other broadly in mind, each 
carrying serious strengths and 

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serious limitations. 
Understanding both of them 

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honestly, without exaggeration, 
in either direction, tells us 

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something important about what a
major air campaign against Iran 

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would actually look like, and 
why The outcome is far less 

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certain that either confident 
Hawks or reassured skeptics tend

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to suggest. 
The F35 Lightning 2 is the most 

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expensive weapons program in 
human history. 

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Its total life cycle cost across
all variants have been estimated

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at over $1.7 trillion. 
The aircraft entered service 

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with United States Air Force in 
2016 and has since been procured

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by the United Kingdom, Israel, 
Australia, Japan, South Korea, 

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Norway, Italy, the Netherlands 
and several other nations. 

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Israel operates the F35 IA, 
locally modified variant known 

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as the Adir, which carries 
Israeli specific avionics, 

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electronic warfare systems, and 
weapons integration not found in

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any other country's fleet. 
The aircraft was designed around

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a set of capabilities that, 
taken together, represent a 

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fundamental philosophy about how
air warfare should be conducted 

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in the 21st century. 
That philosophy can be 

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summarized in three principles. 
First, reduce the probability of

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being detected. 
Second, collect and process 

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information at a quality and 
speed that exceeds any 

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adversary. 3rd, operate as a 
network node in a broader system

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rather than as a stand alone 
fighting platform. 

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Each of those principles is 
achievable to a degree. 

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None of them is absolute, and 
the degree to which each holds 

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in a specific operational 
environment is precisely what 

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makes air campaign planning so 
difficult. 

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The stealth characteristics of 
the F35 are among its most 

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discussed and most misunderstood
qualities. 

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The aircraft is not invisible. 
It has never been marketed as 

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invisible by the engineers who 
designed it, though that word 

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appears frequently in popular 
coverage. 

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What stealth actually means in 
precise technical terms is a 

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significant reduction in radar 
cross section. 

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The effective size of the 
aircraft is seen by radar 

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returns. 
A conventional fighter like an 

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F16 had a radar cross section 
roughly comparable to a small 

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car. 
The F35, depending on aspect, 

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angle and radar frequency band, 
presents a radar cross section 

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many orders of magnitude 
smaller, often compared to a 

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metal golf ball or in some 
assessments, something closer to

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a marble. 
The reduction is achieved 

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through a combination of 
airframe shaping that deflects 

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radar energy away from the 
emitting source, internal 

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weapons carriage that eliminates
the large external pylons 

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present on conventional 
fighters, radar absorbent 

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surface materials bonded to the 
airframe, and careful management

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of heat signatures and radio 
frequency emissions. 

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What this means operationally is
that the range at which an 

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adversary radar can detect the 
F35 is dramatically compressed. 

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A radar system that might detect
a conventional fighter at 200 

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kilometers might only detect an 
F35 at 30 or 40 kilometers. 

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That difference in detection 
range is the margin inside which

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the F35 pilot can act before the
adversaries fire control 

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solution is complete. 
It does not make the aircraft 

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immune to detection. 
It changes the geometry of the 

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engagement in ways that 
fundamentally disadvantage the 

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defender. 
There are well documented 

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limitations to stealth that any 
serious analysis must 

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acknowledge. 
Low frequency radar systems, 

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specifically very high frequency
and ultra high frequency bands, 

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sometimes referred to as metric 
wave radar, can detect stealth 

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aircraft at longer ranges than 
high frequency fire control 

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radars. 
The physics of radar absorption 

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and airframe shaping are less 
effective at wavelengths longer 

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than the aircraft's own physical
dimensions. 

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Soviet era long range 
surveillance radars, several of 

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which remain in service with 
Iran, operate on these lower 

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frequency bands. 
The challenge for defenders is 

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that these systems can provide 
warning and general bearing 

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information, but generally 
cannot generate targeting 

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quality data with sufficient 
precision to guide a surface to 

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air missile to a successful 
intercept. 

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They can tell a commander that 
something is approaching. 

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They struggled to tell a missile
battery exactly where to point. 

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During the 1999 Kosovo campaign,
the United States F117 

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Nighthawk, the first operational
stealth aircraft, was shot down 

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by a Serbian surface to air 
missile battery. 

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That incident is frequently 
cited as evidence that stealth 

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can be defeated. 
The full picture is considerably

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more nuanced. 
Serbian operators reportedly 

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used a combination of an older 
Soviet era radar operating on a 

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lower frequency band, 
intelligence about the 

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aircraft's relatively 
predictable flight path and 

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schedule, and a degree of 
tactical patients that allow 

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them to wait for a more 
favorable engagement geometry. 

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The lesson from Kosovo was not 
that stealth is fundamentally 

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ineffective. 
The lesson was that stealth 

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combined with predictable 
tactics, lapses and emissions 

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discipline or repeated sorties 
on identical routes creates 

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exploitable windows that a 
sophisticated and patient 

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defender can attempt to use. 
The F35 sensor fusion capability

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is arguably more consequential 
than its reduced radar 

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signature. 
The aircraft carries the IN 

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Slash APJ 81 Active 
Electronically Scan Array radar,

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an Electro optical targeting 
system, a distributed aperture 

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system consisting of 6 infrared 
cameras providing 360° 

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situational awareness around the
entire aircraft, and the IN 

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slash SQ239 electronic warfare 
suite. 

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All of this information is 
integrated and presented to the 

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pilot through a helmet mounted 
display that projects the sensor

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picture directly onto the visor 
regardless of where the pilot is

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physically looking. 
What this means in practice is 

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that an F35 pilot possesses a 
level of situational awareness 

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that was simply impossible in 
previous generations of combat 

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aircraft. 
The aircraft sees threats from 

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directions the pilot cannot 
physically face. 

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It classifieds radar emitters 
automatically and presents 

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identification data. 
It builds and continuously 

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updates a tactical picture 
without requiring the pilot to 

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manually correlate information 
from multiple sources beyond 

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what the individual aircraft 
sees. 

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The F35 is designed as a node in
a networked architecture by the 

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multifunction Advanced Data 
Link. 

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It shares sensor data in near 
real time with other F-30 fives,

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with 4th generation fighters, 
with airborne early warning and 

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control systems, and with ground
stations. 

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A formation of F-30 Fives 
operating together shares its 

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combined picture across every 
platform simultaneously. 

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The first aircraft to detect a 
threat can share that detection 

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with every other aircraft in the
network within seconds, 

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potentially before the adversary
radar operator has even 

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processed the initial return. 
This network capability operates

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within a broader infrastructure 
that a modern air campaign would

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bring to any contested theater. 
Airborne early warning and 

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control aircraft operating while
outside threat envelopes provide

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long range surveillance and 
coordination. 

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Electronic warfare aircraft in 
the United States Inventory The 

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18G Growler conduct dedicated 
suppression of enemy air 

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defenses through both active 
jamming and the use of high 

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speed anti radiation missiles at
home on radar emissions. 

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Intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance assets, including

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satellites, high altitude 
unmanned systems, and signals 

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intelligence platforms, map the 
adversary air defense network 

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continuously before any strike 
aircraft enter contested 

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airspace. 
Aerial refueling tankers extend 

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the reach and combat persistence
of every element in the strike 

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package. 
Iran has spent several decades 

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building an air defense 
architecture that attempts to 

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account for this kind of multi 
domain pressure. 

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Its approach is layered, 
geographically dispersed and 

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deliberately redundant, with 
explicit doctrinal goal of 

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ensuring that no single strike 
package can collapse the entire 

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system simultaneously at the 
long range tier. 

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Iran's most capable system is 
the S300 PMU 2, delivered by 

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Russia following a protracted 
diplomatic dispute and 

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ultimately supplied in 2016 
after years under arms embargo. 

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This 300 family is a serious and
well regarded system by any 

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objective measure. 
Its radar can track multiple 

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targets simultaneously at long 
range. 

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Its missiles carry engagement 
ranges extending to roughly 150 

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kilometers against certain 
target types, though effective 

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range against low observable 
aircraft will be considerably 

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shorter. 
Given that reduced radar cross 

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section directly compresses the 
engagement envelope available to

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any surface to air missile 
system, Iran has invested 

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significantly in operator 
training and in integrating the 

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S 300 into its broader command 
and control network. 

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Alongside the S 300, Iran has 
developed the Bavar 373, a 

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domestically produced long range
surface to air missile system 

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that Iranian officials and state
media have described as 

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competitive with or superior to 
the S 300 in certain performance

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categories. 
Independent assessment of the 

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Bavar 373 is constrained by 
limited, publicly verifiable 

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technical data. 
Western analysts generally 

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approach Iranian claims about 
domestically produced defense 

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systems with appropriate 
skepticism, while acknowledging 

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that the Brevard 373 represents 
A genuine engineering program 

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that should not be reflexively 
dismissed at medium range. 

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Iran operates the Kordat family 
of systems, most notably the 

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third of Kordat system, which 
received sustained international

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attention in June 2019 when Iran
claimed it had engaged and 

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00:10:31,720 --> 00:10:34,920
destroyed a United States Navy 
RQ for a Global Hawk 

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00:10:34,920 --> 00:10:37,440
surveillance drone operating 
near the Strait of Hormuz. 

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The precise circumstances of 
that incident remain a matter of

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dispute between Washington and 
Tehran, but the episode 

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confirmed that the Chordad 
system is operationally active 

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and capable of engaging real 
targets at operationally 

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relevant altitudes. 
Critically, the system is 

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mobile, and mobility is one of 
its most significant tactical 

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advantages against a force 
conducting suppression 

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00:11:00,240 --> 00:11:03,000
operations. 
Mobility is a theme running 

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00:11:03,000 --> 00:11:05,720
through Iran's entire air 
defense posture. 

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The lessons of the 1991 Gulf War
were studied carefully in Tehran

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00:11:10,880 --> 00:11:13,760
as they were studied by military
establishments around the world.

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00:11:14,240 --> 00:11:17,600
In Operation Desert Storm, the 
United States and coalition 

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00:11:17,600 --> 00:11:20,840
forces demonstrated that fixed, 
networked air defense 

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00:11:20,840 --> 00:11:24,600
infrastructure, however densely 
layered, could be systematically

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00:11:24,600 --> 00:11:27,440
dismantled through coordinated 
suppression and destruction 

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00:11:27,440 --> 00:11:30,400
operations. 
The Iraqi air defense system, 

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00:11:30,440 --> 00:11:33,600
which on paper was among the 
most capable in the region, was 

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00:11:33,600 --> 00:11:36,840
effectively defeated within the 
1st 72 hours of the air 

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00:11:36,840 --> 00:11:39,320
campaign. 
Iran has spent the subsequent 

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00:11:39,320 --> 00:11:42,880
decades designing a system that 
is harder to locate precisely 

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00:11:43,200 --> 00:11:46,680
and therefore harder to target 
precisely than the Iraqi system 

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00:11:46,680 --> 00:11:49,120
was. 
Iranian air defense units 

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00:11:49,120 --> 00:11:53,200
trained to relocate regularly. 
Radar systems are operated under

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00:11:53,200 --> 00:11:56,240
strict emission control, 
transmitting intermittently 

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00:11:56,240 --> 00:11:59,600
rather than continuously, which 
dramatically reduces the time 

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00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:02,520
available for anti radiation 
missiles or electronic 

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00:12:02,520 --> 00:12:04,800
intelligence assets to fix their
position. 

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00:12:05,240 --> 00:12:08,520
Decoy emitters are used to 
attract anti radiation missiles 

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00:12:08,520 --> 00:12:12,360
away from operational systems. 
Underground facilities provide 

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00:12:12,360 --> 00:12:15,840
survivable infrastructure for 
command and control nodes and 

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00:12:15,840 --> 00:12:19,640
for some radar capabilities. 
Communications between elements 

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00:12:19,640 --> 00:12:22,800
of the air defense network use a
mixture of digital data link, 

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00:12:23,000 --> 00:12:26,240
hardened fiber optic cable, and 
low probability of intercept 

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00:12:26,240 --> 00:12:29,600
radio protocols to complicate 
signals intelligence collection 

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00:12:29,600 --> 00:12:33,320
by opposing forces. 
Iran's geography adds complexity

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00:12:33,320 --> 00:12:36,520
that any attacking force must 
account for systematically. 

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00:12:37,000 --> 00:12:41,600
Iran is not a compact country. 
Its territory covers an area 

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00:12:41,600 --> 00:12:43,520
roughly equivalent to Western 
Europe. 

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00:12:43,920 --> 00:12:47,240
The very terrain, the Zagaris 
and Alborz mountain ranges, 

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00:12:47,400 --> 00:12:50,360
central desert plateaus, the 
coastal plains bordering the 

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00:12:50,360 --> 00:12:54,440
Persian Gulf, the Strait of 
Hormuz and the Caspian Seashore,

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00:12:54,760 --> 00:12:58,000
creates radar coverage gaps that
defenders can exploit and that 

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00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:00,080
attackers must plan around 
carefully. 

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00:13:00,480 --> 00:13:03,920
A suppression campaign that 
might take 48 to 72 hours in a 

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00:13:03,920 --> 00:13:06,920
geographically confined theater 
could require sustained 

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00:13:06,920 --> 00:13:10,480
operations over several weeks in
Iran simply because the physical

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00:13:10,480 --> 00:13:14,160
distances involved demand more 
sorties, more aerial refueling, 

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00:13:14,200 --> 00:13:17,320
more continuous logistics 
support, and longer period of 

234
00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:20,960
exposure to whatever residual 
air defense capability survives 

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00:13:20,960 --> 00:13:24,440
each phase of the campaign. 
The opening phase of any serious

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00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:27,920
air campaign against Iranian air
defenses would almost certainly 

237
00:13:27,920 --> 00:13:31,080
prioritize the suppression and 
destruction of radar networks, 

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00:13:31,320 --> 00:13:34,280
communications infrastructure 
and command nodes before 

239
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attempting to strike the 
hardened sites deeper in the 

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interior. 
This is the established doctrine

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that evolved from Desert Storm 
and was refined in every 

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subsequent major air campaign. 
18G Growlers and dedicated anti 

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radiation missiles would target 
emitting radar systems during 

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the initial wave. 
Low observable aircraft, 

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including the B2 Spirit stealth 
bomber and the F35, would 

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penetrate the highest threat 
defended areas where 4th 

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00:13:59,840 --> 00:14:02,480
generation aircraft would face 
attrition rates judged 

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unacceptable. 
Tomahawk cruise missiles 

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launched from surface ships and 
submarines operating well beyond

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Iranian retaliatory reach would 
strike fixed infrastructure 

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targets without requiring strike
aircraft to enter contested 

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airspace at all. 
Whether Iran could realistically

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detect and successfully engage 
in F35 during such a campaign is

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a question that resists a simple
answer. 

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The honest analytical assessment
is that Iran's realistic 

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00:14:27,760 --> 00:14:31,160
opportunities lie in a specific 
combination of circumstances. 

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Early warning from lower 
frequency radars providing 

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general threat bearing rather 
than precision tracking. 

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Passive intelligence gathered 
over time about operational 

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flight patterns. 
Opportunistic engagement during 

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phases when aircraft behavior is
more predictable, such as during

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aerial refueling at lower 
altitudes over coastal 

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00:14:49,080 --> 00:14:53,000
approaches, or during sortie 
patterns that become repetitive 

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over the course of a sustained 
campaign. 

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And the cumulative statistical 
possibility that in an operation

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involving many hundreds of 
sorties over several weeks, some

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encounter results in a 
successful engagement through a 

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combination of factors that no 
individual planning step fully 

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controlled against. 
A well managed F35 operation 

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employing proper emissions 
discipline, varied ingress and 

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egress routing, prior 
suppression of the radar network

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and dedicated electronic warfare
support. 

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Iran's probability of 
successfully engaging in F35 on 

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00:15:23,080 --> 00:15:26,320
any given sortie is assessed by 
most Western analysts as low. 

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That is not the same as zero in 
an extended campaign. 

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Over weeks, cumulative risk 
rises with every mission flown. 

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00:15:35,240 --> 00:15:38,640
The broader challenge for any 
sustained campaign is not the 

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00:15:38,640 --> 00:15:41,840
opening phase. 
Opening phases are what advanced

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00:15:41,840 --> 00:15:46,320
air forces do best Concentrated,
coordinated, exploiting the full

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00:15:46,320 --> 00:15:49,360
suite of capabilities against 
the system that is not yet 

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00:15:49,360 --> 00:15:52,480
adapted to the specific 
operational approach being used.

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The harder phase is what 
follows. 

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Mobile systems that survive the 
initial suppression effort begin

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to reconstitute in new 
positions. 

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00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:03,760
Operators who have observed the 
attack sequence adapt their 

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00:16:03,760 --> 00:16:06,520
emission patterns and their 
engagement procedures. 

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The electronic order of battle 
that was painstakingly mapped 

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00:16:09,920 --> 00:16:13,160
before the campaign began is now
partially obsolete. 

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00:16:13,560 --> 00:16:16,840
This dynamic has been 
demonstrated at varying scales 

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00:16:16,840 --> 00:16:19,640
in recent conflicts in Nagorno 
Karabakh. 

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00:16:19,640 --> 00:16:23,240
In 2020, Azerbaijani drone 
operation showed the lethal 

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00:16:23,240 --> 00:16:26,640
vulnerability of static or 
predictably positioned air 

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00:16:26,640 --> 00:16:29,320
defense systems to persistent 
surveillance combined with 

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00:16:29,320 --> 00:16:32,320
precision strike. 
In the ongoing war in Ukraine, 

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00:16:32,640 --> 00:16:35,400
both sides have demonstrated 
that air defense is ultimately 

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00:16:35,400 --> 00:16:37,920
an attrition contest as much as 
a technical one. 

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00:16:38,200 --> 00:16:41,960
Systems are destroyed, replaced 
or relocated, improvised and 

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00:16:41,960 --> 00:16:45,000
adapted in a continuous cycle 
that does not end with an 

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00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:48,440
opening salvo and does not 
resolve cleanly for the United 

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00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:51,800
States or Israel operating 
against Iran, the military 

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00:16:51,800 --> 00:16:55,000
technical balance does favor the
attacker in the opening phases 

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00:16:55,120 --> 00:16:56,840
and against fixed 
infrastructure. 

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00:16:57,280 --> 00:17:01,040
The F35 sensor architecture, 
it's reduced detection range, 

304
00:17:01,200 --> 00:17:03,760
it's networked integration with 
a broader air campaign 

305
00:17:03,760 --> 00:17:07,000
structure, and the full depth of
American air power create a 

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00:17:07,000 --> 00:17:09,920
combination that Iran's current 
air defense inventory would 

307
00:17:09,920 --> 00:17:11,880
struggle to defeat 
comprehensively. 

308
00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:15,440
But struggle to defeat 
comprehensively is not the same 

309
00:17:15,440 --> 00:17:18,920
as being defenseless, and a 
prolonged campaign introduces 

310
00:17:18,920 --> 00:17:22,720
variables, attrition across all 
systems, munitions inventory 

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00:17:22,720 --> 00:17:26,560
depletion, maintenance demands 
on complex platforms, political 

312
00:17:26,560 --> 00:17:30,040
sustainability, and adversary 
adaptation that cannot be 

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00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:32,840
resolved by any single 
technological advantage. 

314
00:17:33,280 --> 00:17:36,000
There is a dimension of this 
contest that deserves more 

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00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:37,960
attention than it typically 
receives. 

316
00:17:38,240 --> 00:17:41,440
The information competition that
precedes and shapes the physical

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00:17:41,440 --> 00:17:44,200
exchange. 
Modern air campaigns are decided

318
00:17:44,200 --> 00:17:47,880
substantially before the 1st 
aircraft crosses a border. 

319
00:17:48,320 --> 00:17:50,160
The side with better 
intelligence about the 

320
00:17:50,160 --> 00:17:53,160
adversary's radar network, more 
accurate knowledge of where 

321
00:17:53,160 --> 00:17:55,680
mobile systems have 
repositioned, more complete 

322
00:17:55,680 --> 00:17:58,520
understanding of the adversary's
operational procedures and 

323
00:17:58,520 --> 00:18:01,400
emission patterns, that side 
holds an advantage that no 

324
00:18:01,400 --> 00:18:03,440
quantity of missiles can simply 
overcome. 

325
00:18:03,880 --> 00:18:06,760
Conversely, a defender who 
successfully denies that 

326
00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:09,440
intelligence picture, who 
presents a system that looks 

327
00:18:09,440 --> 00:18:12,520
meaningfully different from what
was mapped in preparation, who 

328
00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:15,240
maintains deception and 
unpredictability across the 

329
00:18:15,240 --> 00:18:19,040
campaign, the defender imposes 
uncertainty that translates 

330
00:18:19,040 --> 00:18:22,120
directly into risk for attacking
Cruz and higher cost for the 

331
00:18:22,120 --> 00:18:25,600
attacking force. 
The F35 was designed to operate 

332
00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:29,320
inside that information contest 
and to tip it decisively in 

333
00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:33,080
favor of the attacker. 
Iran's air defense doctrine and 

334
00:18:33,080 --> 00:18:36,720
its investment in mobility, 
redundancy and emission control 

335
00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:38,800
were designed to complicate and 
disrupt it. 

336
00:18:39,240 --> 00:18:42,880
Neither has yet faced the other 
in a full, sustained campaign at

337
00:18:42,880 --> 00:18:45,280
scale. 
What military planers on both 

338
00:18:45,280 --> 00:18:48,080
sides understand, and what 
drives the continued investment 

339
00:18:48,080 --> 00:18:51,120
on each side, is that the 
outcome would depend less on any

340
00:18:51,120 --> 00:18:54,000
individual piece of hardware and
more on which side could 

341
00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:56,880
maintain a clearer picture of 
the other, act on that picture 

342
00:18:56,880 --> 00:18:59,560
faster, and keep its own 
dispositions in the dark. 

343
00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:03,600
In modern air warfare, the most 
dangerous weapon is not the one 

344
00:19:03,600 --> 00:19:06,760
that fires the furthest, it is 
the one that knows where to 

345
00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:07,160
look.