1 00:00:16,820 --> 00:00:19,860 There is a sound that soldiers in Ukraine have learned to dread 2 00:00:19,860 --> 00:00:22,980 above almost any other sound on the modern battlefield. 3 00:00:23,420 --> 00:00:25,540 It is not the crack of artillery. 4 00:00:26,100 --> 00:00:28,620 It is not the Thunder of a ballistic missile. 5 00:00:29,220 --> 00:00:34,500 It is a low, buzzing hump, persistent, mechanical, getting 6 00:00:34,500 --> 00:00:37,740 closer. Ukrainian soldiers describe it 7 00:00:37,740 --> 00:00:40,220 as sounding like a dirt bike engine in the sky. 8 00:00:40,680 --> 00:00:43,400 A moped. By the time you hear it clearly, 9 00:00:43,760 --> 00:00:47,320 it may already be too late. That sound is now being heard 10 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:52,760 over Bahrain, over Dubai, over Kuwait City, over American 11 00:00:52,760 --> 00:00:55,160 military bases across the Persian Gulf. 12 00:00:55,600 --> 00:00:59,160 The drone that makes that sound was designed in Iran, refined in 13 00:00:59,160 --> 00:01:03,520 Iran, manufactured in Iran, and supplied by Iran to Russia for 14 00:01:03,520 --> 00:01:06,960 using Ukraine. Russia launched 57,000 of them 15 00:01:06,960 --> 00:01:10,320 at Ukrainian cities and infrastructure since 2022. 16 00:01:10,800 --> 00:01:14,280 And now, in the opening days of Operation Epic Fury, the same 17 00:01:14,280 --> 00:01:17,440 drone has become the primary weapon Iran is using to fight 18 00:01:17,440 --> 00:01:19,880 back against the most powerful military on Earth. 19 00:01:20,360 --> 00:01:25,280 This is a bonus episode of Epic Fury, the US Iran War podcast. 20 00:01:25,720 --> 00:01:28,920 This episode is different from our Daily News briefings. 21 00:01:29,560 --> 00:01:32,920 It exists to answer one specific question that has come up again 22 00:01:32,920 --> 00:01:35,160 and again since this conflict began. 23 00:01:35,520 --> 00:01:37,960 What exactly are these Iranian drones? 24 00:01:38,360 --> 00:01:41,280 Where do they come from? How do they work? 25 00:01:41,960 --> 00:01:46,080 How many does Iran have, and how is America fighting back against 26 00:01:46,080 --> 00:01:48,360 them? To understand Iran's drone 27 00:01:48,360 --> 00:01:51,680 program, you have to understand the strategic problem Iran was 28 00:01:51,680 --> 00:01:54,200 trying to solve when it began building drones in the first 29 00:01:54,200 --> 00:01:56,640 place. Iran is a country that has been 30 00:01:56,640 --> 00:02:00,160 under severe economic sanctions for most of its modern history. 31 00:02:00,720 --> 00:02:03,640 It cannot import the most advanced Western military 32 00:02:03,640 --> 00:02:06,600 technology. It cannot buy American fighter 33 00:02:06,600 --> 00:02:09,000 jets or European missile systems. 34 00:02:09,400 --> 00:02:12,680 Its conventional military, particularly its Air Force, is 35 00:02:12,680 --> 00:02:15,720 equipped largely with aging aircraft purchased before the 36 00:02:15,720 --> 00:02:20,040 1979 revolution, supplemented by Russian and Chinese systems that 37 00:02:20,040 --> 00:02:21,640 are themselves not state-of-the-art. 38 00:02:22,000 --> 00:02:25,520 In a straight conventional air to air or air to ground military 39 00:02:25,520 --> 00:02:28,840 contest with the United States or Israel, Iran would lose 40 00:02:28,840 --> 00:02:33,000 decisively in a matter of days. Iran's military planners knew 41 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:35,360 this. They have always known this. 42 00:02:35,840 --> 00:02:38,400 So Iran built an asymmetric strategy. 43 00:02:38,760 --> 00:02:41,680 Instead of trying to match the United States plane for plane, 44 00:02:41,800 --> 00:02:45,000 missile for missile, and carrier for carrier, Iran focused on 45 00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:47,720 building weapons that are cheap enough to produce an enormous 46 00:02:47,720 --> 00:02:50,760 numbers, simple enough to manufacture under sanctions, 47 00:02:50,920 --> 00:02:54,240 capable enough to threaten high value targets, and expensive 48 00:02:54,240 --> 00:02:56,200 enough for an adversary to intercept. 49 00:02:56,600 --> 00:02:59,720 The drone is the perfect expression of that strategy. 50 00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:03,600 The program began in earnest in the 1980s during the Iran Iraq 51 00:03:03,600 --> 00:03:06,560 War, when Iran realized it needed surveillance and 52 00:03:06,560 --> 00:03:09,360 reconnaissance capability it could not obtain through 53 00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:12,960 conventional procurement. Early Iranian drones were basic, 54 00:03:13,120 --> 00:03:17,520 slow, and limited in range. But the program never stopped. 55 00:03:17,920 --> 00:03:21,240 Through decades of isolation, sanctions, and intermittent 56 00:03:21,240 --> 00:03:25,480 conflict, Iran's engineers iterated, improved, and expanded 57 00:03:25,480 --> 00:03:29,000 their drone arsenal. They reverse engineered captured 58 00:03:29,000 --> 00:03:31,960 foreign systems. They acquired components through 59 00:03:31,960 --> 00:03:35,040 illicit procurement networks that stretched across multiple 60 00:03:35,040 --> 00:03:37,200 continents. They developed their own 61 00:03:37,200 --> 00:03:40,040 guidance and propulsion technology from the ground up. 62 00:03:40,600 --> 00:03:44,200 And by the time Operation Epic Fury began on February 28th, 63 00:03:44,200 --> 00:03:48,360 2026, Iran had one of the largest and most battle tested 64 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:50,440 drone arsenals of any country on earth. 65 00:03:50,960 --> 00:03:53,920 The most important drone in that arsenal, and the one you've been 66 00:03:53,920 --> 00:03:58,120 hearing about most in our daily episodes, is the Shahid 136. 67 00:03:58,520 --> 00:04:01,800 The Shahid 136 is officially described as a loitering 68 00:04:01,800 --> 00:04:04,960 munition, though military analysts at the Royal United 69 00:04:04,960 --> 00:04:07,520 Services Institute in London have challenged that 70 00:04:07,520 --> 00:04:10,760 classification, noting it is more accurately described as a 71 00:04:10,760 --> 00:04:14,080 one way attack drone. It is delta winged, meaning it 72 00:04:14,080 --> 00:04:17,160 has a distinctive triangular wing shape with a pusher 73 00:04:17,160 --> 00:04:20,600 propeller at the rear driven by a small piston engine producing 74 00:04:20,600 --> 00:04:24,920 approximately 50 horsepower. It is about 3 1/2 meters long 75 00:04:24,920 --> 00:04:29,480 with a wingspan of 2 1/2 meters. From above, it looks almost like 76 00:04:29,480 --> 00:04:33,040 a large model aircraft. From below, it looks like a 77 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:36,520 flying bomb, because that is exactly what it is. 78 00:04:36,920 --> 00:04:41,040 The drone carries an explosive warhead estimated at between 36 79 00:04:41,040 --> 00:04:43,840 and 50 kilograms depending on the variant and the mission. 80 00:04:44,400 --> 00:04:49,360 For context, 50kg of explosive is roughly comparable to a large 81 00:04:49,360 --> 00:04:52,600 conventional artillery shell. It is enough to destroy a 82 00:04:52,600 --> 00:04:56,120 vehicle, collapse a section of a building or kill everyone in a 83 00:04:56,120 --> 00:04:59,440 medium sized room and cause serious structural damage to a 84 00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:01,400 reinforced military installation. 85 00:05:01,880 --> 00:05:05,760 The Shahid 136 can carry that warhead over a range of between 86 00:05:05,760 --> 00:05:10,200 1000 and 2500 kilometers, depending on its flight profile 87 00:05:10,200 --> 00:05:14,520 and payload configuration. That range means a Shahid 136 88 00:05:14,520 --> 00:05:18,000 launched from western Iran can reach every Gulf state, every 89 00:05:18,000 --> 00:05:21,240 American military base in the region, every major Israeli 90 00:05:21,240 --> 00:05:24,720 city, and targets deep into Saudi Arabia without any 91 00:05:24,720 --> 00:05:28,400 modification whatsoever. Its top speed is approximately 92 00:05:28,520 --> 00:05:33,640 185 kilometers per hour. That is slower than many Second 93 00:05:33,640 --> 00:05:37,480 World War propeller aircraft. It is dramatically slower than a 94 00:05:37,480 --> 00:05:41,280 ballistic missile, which travels at speeds many times the speed 95 00:05:41,280 --> 00:05:43,560 of sound. That apparent slowness is 96 00:05:43,560 --> 00:05:47,240 actually a significant tactical asset rather than simply a 97 00:05:47,240 --> 00:05:50,440 limitation. Slow flying, low altitude drones 98 00:05:50,440 --> 00:05:53,440 are in some ways harder to detect and track than fast 99 00:05:53,440 --> 00:05:56,960 moving ballistic missiles. Radar systems designed to detect 100 00:05:56,960 --> 00:06:00,480 high speed threats can miss a slow moving drone flying at low 101 00:06:00,480 --> 00:06:02,640 altitude below the radar horizon. 102 00:06:03,120 --> 00:06:06,440 And the sheer number of Shahid 130 SI access that can be 103 00:06:06,440 --> 00:06:09,600 launched simultaneously means that even the most sophisticated 104 00:06:09,600 --> 00:06:12,720 air defense network can be overwhelmed by volume alone. 105 00:06:13,320 --> 00:06:16,280 The drone is also extraordinarily simple to 106 00:06:16,280 --> 00:06:19,960 manufacture. Military analyst Francis Tusa 107 00:06:19,960 --> 00:06:23,400 estimated that a single engineer surrounded by the necessary 108 00:06:23,400 --> 00:06:27,320 components could assemble 12 of them in a single 10 hour shift. 109 00:06:27,760 --> 00:06:30,840 There is no advanced manufacturing facility required, 110 00:06:31,360 --> 00:06:35,040 no specialist tooling, no rare earth materials. 111 00:06:35,520 --> 00:06:39,480 The motor is simple. The navigation system is a small 112 00:06:39,480 --> 00:06:42,880 circuit board. The warhead is unsophisticated. 113 00:06:43,360 --> 00:06:48,080 A Shahid 136 can be built in a garage, and that is essentially 114 00:06:48,080 --> 00:06:52,280 where Iran builds many of them small, dispersed production 115 00:06:52,280 --> 00:06:55,120 sites across the country that are extremely difficult to 116 00:06:55,120 --> 00:06:59,120 identify from satellite imagery and impossible to destroy all at 117 00:06:59,120 --> 00:07:01,480 once. The Shahid batteries, typically 118 00:07:01,480 --> 00:07:05,080 consisting of 10 drones each, can be transported and fired 119 00:07:05,080 --> 00:07:08,920 from underground car parks, forest clearings or open fields. 120 00:07:09,320 --> 00:07:12,720 Their launch sites are mobile, temporary and virtually 121 00:07:12,720 --> 00:07:14,960 untraceable until the moment of launch. 122 00:07:15,360 --> 00:07:19,560 This is the central strategic logic of the Shahid 136. 123 00:07:20,040 --> 00:07:22,480 It is not win through speed or stealth. 124 00:07:23,000 --> 00:07:26,400 It wins through numbers, economics and simplicity. 125 00:07:26,840 --> 00:07:31,480 A Shahid 136 costs approximately $20,000 to build. 126 00:07:31,920 --> 00:07:35,080 The interceptor missiles used to shoot one down cost between 127 00:07:35,080 --> 00:07:38,680 1,000,000 and $12 million each, depending on which system is 128 00:07:38,680 --> 00:07:41,080 used. For every dollar Iran spends 129 00:07:41,080 --> 00:07:44,600 manufacturing a Shahid drone, the United Arab Emirates spends 130 00:07:44,600 --> 00:07:48,000 between 20 and $28.00 intercepting it, according to 131 00:07:48,000 --> 00:07:51,760 calculations by Kelly Greco, a senior fellow at the Washington 132 00:07:51,760 --> 00:07:56,160 Bay Stimson Center. If Iran fires 2000 Shahid 130 s 133 00:07:56,160 --> 00:07:59,520 s and the United States intercepts 90% of them, America 134 00:07:59,520 --> 00:08:03,240 has spent between 1.8 billion and over $10 billion in 135 00:08:03,240 --> 00:08:07,440 interceptor costs alone. Iran spent $40 million building 136 00:08:07,440 --> 00:08:10,560 the drones. The mathematics are brutal and 137 00:08:10,560 --> 00:08:15,200 are not in America's favor. The Shahid 131 is the smaller 138 00:08:15,200 --> 00:08:19,960 sibling of the 136, is more compact, carries a lighter 139 00:08:19,960 --> 00:08:23,520 warhead of between 10 and 20 kilograms, and has a range of 140 00:08:23,520 --> 00:08:26,440 approximately 700 to 1000 kilometers. 141 00:08:26,840 --> 00:08:29,760 It's smaller size makes it slightly harder to detect on 142 00:08:29,760 --> 00:08:33,559 radar, and it's lower cost means even larger numbers can be 143 00:08:33,559 --> 00:08:38,159 fielded simultaneously. The 131 and 136 are typically 144 00:08:38,159 --> 00:08:41,640 used together in mixed swarms, forcing air defense systems to 145 00:08:41,640 --> 00:08:44,680 track and engage targets of different sizes, speeds and 146 00:08:44,680 --> 00:08:47,840 flight profiles at the same time, which multiplies the 147 00:08:47,840 --> 00:08:50,320 complexity of the interception problem considerably. 148 00:08:50,760 --> 00:08:54,920 Then there is the Shahid 238. This is the jet powered 149 00:08:54,920 --> 00:09:00,080 evolution of the 136. Unveiled in November 2023, the 150 00:09:00,080 --> 00:09:03,560 238 replaces the piston propeller engine with a turbojet 151 00:09:03,560 --> 00:09:06,840 engine, dramatically increasing its top speed to somewhere 152 00:09:06,840 --> 00:09:09,600 between 500 and 800 kilometers per hour. 153 00:09:10,120 --> 00:09:14,320 At that speed, the 238 is no longer the slow buzzing drone 154 00:09:14,320 --> 00:09:17,200 that Ukrainian soldiers have learned to shoot down with small 155 00:09:17,200 --> 00:09:21,040 arms and anti aircraft cannon. It is something considerably 156 00:09:21,120 --> 00:09:24,320 harder to engage. It has three variants with 157 00:09:24,320 --> 00:09:28,680 different guidance systems. One uses standard GPS navigation 158 00:09:28,680 --> 00:09:32,600 for attacking fixed targets. 1 uses Electro optical and 159 00:09:32,600 --> 00:09:36,240 infrared camera sensors, giving it a heat seeking capability 160 00:09:36,240 --> 00:09:39,960 against military vehicles and radar systems, and 1 uses a 161 00:09:39,960 --> 00:09:42,840 radar detection system specifically designed to find 162 00:09:42,840 --> 00:09:46,360 and destroy air defense radars, a role the military calls 163 00:09:46,360 --> 00:09:48,480 suppression of enemy air defenses. 164 00:09:48,880 --> 00:09:52,560 The 238 is designed to fly ahead of or alongside conventional 165 00:09:52,560 --> 00:09:55,720 drone swarms and destroy the radar systems that the air 166 00:09:55,720 --> 00:09:58,160 defense batteries need to detect and engage. 167 00:09:58,160 --> 00:10:01,840 The drones that follow destroy the radar 1st, and the 168 00:10:01,840 --> 00:10:05,840 conventional Shahid 136 swarm that arrives moments later 169 00:10:05,920 --> 00:10:07,920 becomes dramatically harder to stop. 170 00:10:08,320 --> 00:10:11,680 The Mohedra series is Iran's primary reconnaissance drone 171 00:10:11,680 --> 00:10:14,640 family. The Mohedra 6, the latest and 172 00:10:14,640 --> 00:10:18,200 most capable version, entered service in 2017. 173 00:10:18,640 --> 00:10:21,200 It has an endurance of approximately 12 hours in the 174 00:10:21,200 --> 00:10:25,480 air, a line of sight data range of around 200 kilometers and is 175 00:10:25,480 --> 00:10:28,320 equipped with Electro, optical and infrared sensors for 176 00:10:28,320 --> 00:10:31,680 surveillance and targeting. The Mahedra 6 does not carry a 177 00:10:31,680 --> 00:10:34,840 large explosive warhead in its primary reconnaissance 178 00:10:34,840 --> 00:10:37,920 configuration. Its role is to find targets, 179 00:10:37,960 --> 00:10:40,800 track troop movements and provide real time video 180 00:10:40,800 --> 00:10:42,440 intelligence to ground commanders. 181 00:10:42,880 --> 00:10:45,920 It is the eye in the sky that tells Iran where to direct the 182 00:10:45,920 --> 00:10:49,200 strike drones. The Carer is a faster and more 183 00:10:49,200 --> 00:10:53,080 capable attack drone adopted by Iran in 2010. 184 00:10:53,480 --> 00:10:56,240 It is built on a reverse engineer design based on the 185 00:10:56,240 --> 00:11:00,320 American Beechcraft MQM One O 7 target drone. 186 00:11:00,840 --> 00:11:04,400 The Carer can reach speeds of approximately 900 kilometers per 187 00:11:04,400 --> 00:11:08,120 hour, giving it a performance profile closer to a jet fighter 188 00:11:08,160 --> 00:11:11,240 than a conventional drone. It carries A heavier payload 189 00:11:11,240 --> 00:11:14,680 than a Shahid series and can be used for strikes against fixed 190 00:11:14,680 --> 00:11:18,120 military installations, naval targets and air defense 191 00:11:18,120 --> 00:11:21,360 infrastructure. The Arash is a kamikaze attack 192 00:11:21,360 --> 00:11:24,280 drone that entered service around 2019. 193 00:11:24,720 --> 00:11:27,720 It has a missile like body shape with mid mounted wings and a 194 00:11:27,720 --> 00:11:31,880 single tail fin. Like the Shahid 136, it is an 195 00:11:31,880 --> 00:11:35,600 expendable system designed to fly into its target and detonate 196 00:11:35,600 --> 00:11:38,640 on impact. It is typically used in attacks 197 00:11:38,640 --> 00:11:42,200 on radar installations, command centers, and hardened military 198 00:11:42,200 --> 00:11:45,120 structures. Iran also operates the Shahid 199 00:11:45,200 --> 00:11:49,520 129A surveillance and attack drone that bears a strong visual 200 00:11:49,520 --> 00:11:52,040 resemblance to the American MQ One Predator. 201 00:11:52,520 --> 00:11:55,840 Like the Predator, it has a long endurance of approximately 24 202 00:11:55,840 --> 00:11:59,160 hours, can carry guided missiles, and can conduct both 203 00:11:59,160 --> 00:12:01,960 reconnaissance and strike missions from extended range. 204 00:12:02,360 --> 00:12:07,120 The Shahid 149 closely resembles the larger American MQ 9 Reaper 205 00:12:07,280 --> 00:12:11,040 and represents the upper tier of Iran's drone combat capability 206 00:12:11,160 --> 00:12:14,160 in terms of payload, range, and sensor integration. 207 00:12:14,680 --> 00:12:18,360 And Iran operates the SIG 2 and the Simorg, both of which are 208 00:12:18,360 --> 00:12:22,400 reverse engineer derivatives of the American Lockheed RQ 170 209 00:12:22,400 --> 00:12:25,560 Sentinel stealth reconnaissance drone, which Iran captured in 210 00:12:25,560 --> 00:12:28,480 2011. The fact that Iran captured one 211 00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:31,160 of the most advanced American stealth reconnaissance drones 212 00:12:31,160 --> 00:12:34,000 and then reverse engineered it into its own program is one of 213 00:12:34,000 --> 00:12:36,760 the most extraordinary intelligence windfalls in modern 214 00:12:36,760 --> 00:12:40,480 military history and speaks to the determination and capability 215 00:12:40,480 --> 00:12:42,720 of Iran's defense engineering establishment. 216 00:12:43,160 --> 00:12:46,440 Iran inducted 1000 newly developed drones into its 217 00:12:46,440 --> 00:12:50,680 regular army in January 2026 alone, just one month before 218 00:12:50,680 --> 00:12:54,560 Operation Epic Fury began. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard 219 00:12:54,560 --> 00:12:57,920 Corps has its own separate and substantially larger drone 220 00:12:57,920 --> 00:13:01,280 inventory, with production lines that Western analysts say no 221 00:13:01,280 --> 00:13:04,200 other country outside China and the United States can match its 222 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:07,360 scale. Iran can build approximately 100 223 00:13:07,360 --> 00:13:10,400 Shahid series drones per month under normal peacetime 224 00:13:10,400 --> 00:13:13,560 production conditions. Under wartime conditions, with 225 00:13:13,560 --> 00:13:17,320 full prioritization of resources and workforce, that number is 226 00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:19,320 believed to be significantly higher. 227 00:13:19,760 --> 00:13:22,960 Iran is also drawn on four years of Russian battlefield 228 00:13:22,960 --> 00:13:24,920 experience with the Shahid in Ukraine. 229 00:13:25,320 --> 00:13:28,760 Russian engineers improved the drones, anti jamming antennas, 230 00:13:29,040 --> 00:13:32,360 modified its warheads and added data links using mobile 231 00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:34,920 networks. Those upgrades were fed back to 232 00:13:34,920 --> 00:13:38,080 Iran and are believed to be incorporated into the variants 233 00:13:38,080 --> 00:13:41,680 now being used across the Gulf. Now let us turn to how America 234 00:13:41,680 --> 00:13:45,200 is fighting back, because the American response to Iran's 235 00:13:45,200 --> 00:13:48,280 drone campaign is one of the most strategically revealing 236 00:13:48,280 --> 00:13:50,240 dimensions of this entire conflict. 237 00:13:50,640 --> 00:13:54,080 The primary American air defense systems deployed across the Gulf 238 00:13:54,080 --> 00:13:57,440 are the Patriot and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 239 00:13:57,440 --> 00:14:00,880 System, known as that. Both are made by Lockheed 240 00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:03,560 Martin. Both are designed to detect, 241 00:14:03,720 --> 00:14:07,200 track and destroy incoming missiles and drones before they 242 00:14:07,200 --> 00:14:10,400 reach their targets. Both are extraordinarily 243 00:14:10,400 --> 00:14:14,200 effective and both are extraordinarily expensive to 244 00:14:14,240 --> 00:14:17,920 operate at scale against a weapon that cost $20,000 to 245 00:14:17,920 --> 00:14:20,320 build. The Patriot system has been the 246 00:14:20,320 --> 00:14:23,480 backbone of American ground based air defense for four 247 00:14:23,480 --> 00:14:25,880 decades. Its interceptor missiles, 248 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:29,600 particularly the PAC 3 variant, can engage ballistic missiles, 249 00:14:29,600 --> 00:14:33,080 cruise missiles and drones at ranges of up to 70 kilometers 250 00:14:33,080 --> 00:14:35,320 and altitudes of up to 24 kilometers. 251 00:14:35,760 --> 00:14:39,480 A single PAC 3 interceptor cost several $1,000,000. 252 00:14:39,920 --> 00:14:43,360 A full Patriot battery with its radar launchers and control 253 00:14:43,360 --> 00:14:46,080 systems cost between 1:00 and $2 billion. 254 00:14:46,520 --> 00:14:50,360 There are a limited number of these systems in the world. the 255 00:14:50,360 --> 00:14:53,200 United States has been deploying them to support allies since 256 00:14:53,200 --> 00:14:56,920 Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the stockpile of 257 00:14:56,920 --> 00:14:59,640 interceptor missiles has been under sustained pressure for 258 00:14:59,640 --> 00:15:02,720 years before Operation Epic Fury even began. 259 00:15:03,080 --> 00:15:06,800 The United States produces approximately 600 Patriot 260 00:15:06,800 --> 00:15:12,160 interceptors per year, 600 for the entire world's demand. 261 00:15:12,800 --> 00:15:16,120 FAD is the higher tier system designed to engage ballistic 262 00:15:16,120 --> 00:15:19,200 missiles at greater altitude and range than a Patriot. 263 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:24,080 A single FAD battery cost between 1:00 and $1.8 billion. 264 00:15:24,480 --> 00:15:28,920 There are 9 active FAD batteries in the world as of mid 2025. 265 00:15:29,400 --> 00:15:33,320 Each battery carries 48 interceptors across 6 launchers. 266 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:37,800 Those 48 interceptors represent the entire high altitude defense 267 00:15:37,800 --> 00:15:41,360 capability of that battery. Replenishing them takes months 268 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:45,280 of production, integration, testing, transport and 269 00:15:45,280 --> 00:15:48,600 deployment. During the June 20, 2512 Day War 270 00:15:48,600 --> 00:15:51,880 between Iran and Israel, the United States fired more than 271 00:15:51,880 --> 00:15:56,320 150 FAT interceptors, approximately 25% of its total 272 00:15:56,320 --> 00:15:59,000 global FAT inventory. In less than two weeks. 273 00:15:59,400 --> 00:16:02,600 Operation Epic Fury began with that stockpile already 274 00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:06,840 significantly depleted at sea. the United States Navy's Arleigh 275 00:16:06,840 --> 00:16:09,520 Burke class guided missile destroyers use the standard 276 00:16:09,520 --> 00:16:14,120 missile family of interceptors, particularly the SM-3 and SM-6, 277 00:16:14,280 --> 00:16:18,720 to engage in coming threats. This M6 cost approximately $4 278 00:16:18,720 --> 00:16:22,920 million per missile. M6 production has historically 279 00:16:22,920 --> 00:16:26,040 averaged little more than 120 units per year. 280 00:16:26,440 --> 00:16:29,680 Standard Missile 3 interceptors are already running low, 281 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:33,160 according to multiple analysts, depleted by years of operations 282 00:16:33,160 --> 00:16:37,400 against Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea and the 2025 Iran 283 00:16:37,400 --> 00:16:40,600 Israel conflict. The stockpile situation entering 284 00:16:40,600 --> 00:16:43,640 this conflict was stressed at every single level of the 285 00:16:43,640 --> 00:16:46,920 defense supply chain. The economic mathematics of this 286 00:16:46,920 --> 00:16:50,040 situation are exactly the strategic problem that Iran's 287 00:16:50,040 --> 00:16:52,280 drone program was designed to create. 288 00:16:52,720 --> 00:16:57,880 Each Shahid 136 costs approximately $20,000 each. 289 00:16:57,880 --> 00:17:02,240 Interception by a Patriot PAC 3 cost several $1,000,000 each. 290 00:17:02,240 --> 00:17:06,359 That interception cost $13 million. the United States is 291 00:17:06,359 --> 00:17:10,680 spending between 50 and 650 times more money shooting down 292 00:17:10,680 --> 00:17:13,119 each Iranian drone than Iran spent building it. 293 00:17:13,640 --> 00:17:16,000 At the scale of thousands of drones per week. 294 00:17:16,400 --> 00:17:19,520 This arithmetic is not sustainable over an extended 295 00:17:19,520 --> 00:17:22,480 conflict. This is what military analysts 296 00:17:22,480 --> 00:17:26,880 call the drone attrition trap. Iran fires cheap drones in 297 00:17:26,880 --> 00:17:30,440 enormous numbers. America intercepts most of them. 298 00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:34,520 America wins tactically by protecting its assets. 299 00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:38,120 But America loses strategically because it depletes its 300 00:17:38,120 --> 00:17:41,160 interceptor stockpile faster than it can replenish it. 301 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:44,600 Kelly Greco at the Stimson Center put it bluntly. 302 00:17:45,000 --> 00:17:48,520 For 30 years, the United States and other Western air forces had 303 00:17:48,520 --> 00:17:51,960 easily gained air superiority over enemy battlefields and 304 00:17:51,960 --> 00:17:54,880 therefore neglected investing in air and missile defense 305 00:17:54,880 --> 00:17:57,360 capabilities. And what we have found, she 306 00:17:57,360 --> 00:18:00,760 said, is that it is really hard to ramp up this production. 307 00:18:01,360 --> 00:18:04,920 George Barros at the Institute for the Study of War was even 308 00:18:04,920 --> 00:18:07,720 more direct. None of these things are novel 309 00:18:07,720 --> 00:18:10,640 techniques, he said. America had the lessons from 310 00:18:10,640 --> 00:18:14,160 Ukraine in front of it for four years and did not fully apply 311 00:18:14,160 --> 00:18:17,280 them. Iran recognized this dynamic and 312 00:18:17,280 --> 00:18:19,880 adapted its targeting strategy accordingly. 313 00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:23,800 Rather than simply firing drones at military infrastructure, 314 00:18:24,120 --> 00:18:27,840 Iranian forces began targeting the radar systems that make air 315 00:18:27,840 --> 00:18:31,160 defense work at all. Without its radar, a Patriot 316 00:18:31,160 --> 00:18:34,480 battery is blind. Satellite imagery from Planet 317 00:18:34,480 --> 00:18:38,200 Labs analyzed by CNN show that the radar for an American THAD 318 00:18:38,200 --> 00:18:42,120 battery at Mwafaq Salty Air Base in Jordan was struck and 319 00:18:42,120 --> 00:18:45,000 apparently destroyed in the first days of the conflict, more 320 00:18:45,000 --> 00:18:48,800 than 500 miles from Iran. Buildings housing radar systems 321 00:18:48,800 --> 00:18:52,000 were also hit at 2 locations in the United Arab Emirates. 322 00:18:52,440 --> 00:18:56,280 A radar site near Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia was 323 00:18:56,280 --> 00:18:59,920 struck on March 1st, and the Qatari early warning radar 324 00:18:59,920 --> 00:19:02,640 system at Hamda Hall was also damaged. 325 00:19:03,080 --> 00:19:07,600 Iran was not just firing drones at targets, it was using cheaper 326 00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:11,400 drones to systematically blind the expensive systems designed 327 00:19:11,400 --> 00:19:14,280 to stop them. That is a sophisticated and 328 00:19:14,280 --> 00:19:17,440 deliberate strategy. The American response has been 329 00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:20,360 one of the most significant and underreported stories of this 330 00:19:20,360 --> 00:19:23,720 conflict. In December 2025, Defense 331 00:19:23,720 --> 00:19:27,680 Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the accelerated acquisition and 332 00:19:27,680 --> 00:19:29,640 deployment of cheap autonomous weapons. 333 00:19:30,040 --> 00:19:33,880 CENTCOM established Task Force Scorpion Strike, the first 334 00:19:33,880 --> 00:19:37,000 dedicated one way attack drone squadron in the history of the 335 00:19:37,000 --> 00:19:40,040 United States military. And the drone and deployed is 336 00:19:40,040 --> 00:19:43,960 perhaps the most extraordinary detail of the entire Operation 337 00:19:43,960 --> 00:19:47,120 epic Fury story. The low cost unmanned combat 338 00:19:47,120 --> 00:19:51,320 attack system known as Lucas is a direct copy of the Iranian 339 00:19:51,320 --> 00:19:56,320 Shahid 136. Not inspired by it, not similar 340 00:19:56,320 --> 00:20:01,080 to it, a direct copy. the United States military acquired down 341 00:20:01,080 --> 00:20:04,520 Shahid and Garand drones from Ukraine's armed forces and its 342 00:20:04,520 --> 00:20:07,720 engineers at an Arizona based company called Specterworks use 343 00:20:07,720 --> 00:20:10,520 them as a blueprint. CENTCOM announced the combat 344 00:20:10,520 --> 00:20:15,240 debut of Lucas on February 28th, 2026, the first day of Operation 345 00:20:15,240 --> 00:20:18,920 Epic Fury with a social media post reading these low cost 346 00:20:18,920 --> 00:20:22,640 drones modeled after Iran Shahid drones are now delivering 347 00:20:22,640 --> 00:20:25,760 American made retribution. The Lucas has a range of 348 00:20:25,760 --> 00:20:28,680 approximately 500 miles and carries a payload of 349 00:20:28,680 --> 00:20:32,560 approximately 40 lbs, twice the payload of a Hellfire missile. 350 00:20:33,160 --> 00:20:38,680 It costs $35,000 per unit. Iran designed the Shade 136 to 351 00:20:38,680 --> 00:20:42,520 overwhelm American air defenses with cheap, expendable drones. 352 00:20:42,920 --> 00:20:46,120 The United States copy the design and is now using it to 353 00:20:46,120 --> 00:20:50,360 overwhelm Iranian air defenses. The weapon Iran created to 354 00:20:50,360 --> 00:20:53,800 challenge American military dominance is now being turned 355 00:20:53,800 --> 00:20:55,560 against the country that inspired it. 356 00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:59,400 Ukraine's role in solving the drone problem deserves detailed 357 00:20:59,400 --> 00:21:03,240 attention. In 2025 alone, Russia launched 358 00:21:03,240 --> 00:21:07,640 more than 54,000 Shahid type drones at Ukraine, an average of 359 00:21:07,640 --> 00:21:12,560 150 per day for an entire year. Ukraine had no choice but to 360 00:21:12,560 --> 00:21:15,440 find solutions that did not deplete its finite missile 361 00:21:15,440 --> 00:21:18,040 stockpile faster than the drones were arriving. 362 00:21:18,560 --> 00:21:21,680 Ukraine built a layered defense system from a combination of 363 00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:25,800 technology and improvisation. Electronic jamming vehicles 364 00:21:25,800 --> 00:21:30,640 scramble GPS navigation. Germany's Jeopard anti aircraft 365 00:21:30,640 --> 00:21:33,440 cannon shreds drones at a fraction of the cost of a 366 00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:35,720 missile. Teams with shoulder fired 367 00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:38,400 missiles are dispatched along predicted routes. 368 00:21:38,800 --> 00:21:42,240 Fighter jets using their onboard cannon engaged drones from 369 00:21:42,240 --> 00:21:45,320 behind. Ukraine even sent up vintage Act 370 00:21:45,360 --> 00:21:49,080 52 training aircraft with Gunners firing rifles from open 371 00:21:49,080 --> 00:21:52,400 cockpits to reach targets flying too high for ground teams. 372 00:21:52,840 --> 00:21:55,560 And at the center is a small, cheap Ukrainian built 373 00:21:55,560 --> 00:21:58,680 interceptor drone designed to destroy Shahid's in mid air, 374 00:21:58,960 --> 00:22:03,280 achieving a 68 to 70% success rate and accounting for 30% of 375 00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:06,120 all anti Shahid kills by early 2026. 376 00:22:06,560 --> 00:22:10,560 Ukraine's Minister of Industry Alexander Kamishin summarized 377 00:22:10,560 --> 00:22:13,720 the lesson directly. All of Iran's neighbors faced 378 00:22:13,720 --> 00:22:17,400 the same 2 threats, he said. Missiles and drones, 379 00:22:17,800 --> 00:22:20,560 intercepting them with traditional missile systems is 380 00:22:20,560 --> 00:22:24,000 extremely expensive. In Ukraine, we learned how to 381 00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:27,560 shift that equation. We developed drone interceptors 382 00:22:27,560 --> 00:22:30,680 that are far cheaper and far more efficient for this type of 383 00:22:30,680 --> 00:22:33,560 threat. Trump accepted Zelinsky's offer 384 00:22:33,560 --> 00:22:36,400 to deploy Ukrainian drone specialist to the Gulf. 385 00:22:36,840 --> 00:22:39,560 Those specialists are now operating in the region. 386 00:22:40,240 --> 00:22:43,280 The Pentagon and at least one Gulf government are reportedly 387 00:22:43,280 --> 00:22:46,560 in talks to purchase Ukrainian made drone interceptors 388 00:22:46,560 --> 00:22:48,880 directly. The buzzing sound in the sky 389 00:22:48,880 --> 00:22:52,280 over Bahrain and Dubai and Kuwait City is the sound of a 390 00:22:52,280 --> 00:22:56,120 strategic calculation made in Tehran decades ago playing out 391 00:22:56,120 --> 00:22:58,920 in real time. Iran built a weapon it could 392 00:22:58,920 --> 00:23:02,320 afford an enormous numbers that its adversaries could not afford 393 00:23:02,320 --> 00:23:06,440 to stop in enormous numbers. America answered by copying the 394 00:23:06,440 --> 00:23:10,400 weapon and turning it around. Ukraine answered by building 395 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:12,760 systems that match the cost of the threat. 396 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:15,800 And the outcome of this drone attrition war being fought 397 00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:18,840 across the skies of the Persian Gulf will depend on which side 398 00:23:18,840 --> 00:23:21,880 can sustain its rate of production, consumption, and 399 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:23,960 adaptation over the days and weeks ahead. 400 00:23:24,360 --> 00:23:29,200 This was a bonus episode of Epic Fury, the US Iran War podcast. 401 00:23:29,600 --> 00:23:32,720 For daily coverage of the ongoing conflict, subscribe on 402 00:23:32,720 --> 00:23:35,000 Spotify, Apple Podcast or YouTube. 403 00:23:35,440 --> 00:23:37,840 Every new episode lands directly with you. 404 00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:41,720 Share this episode with someone who wants to understand not just 405 00:23:41,720 --> 00:23:44,280 what is happening, but how it is being fought.