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I'm Jared. 
And I'm Mike. 

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And this is posting through it 
Bulletin. 

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We're trying something new here.
This is going to be a shorter 

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episode focused on giving you 
the information that will 

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hopefully help guide you as the 
weather warms up and we enter 

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into protest season. 
A lot of crazy shit in this 

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country right now. 
And I think people are going to 

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be active. 
The Trump administration's given

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us no sign of backing down from 
its authoritarian push across 

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the US, which all but guarantees
that we're going to see more 

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conflicts in the streets with 
Trump's paramilitary forces. 

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It's almost inevitable. 
And we've seen in Minneapolis 

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and other places as well. 
You know what they did to Renee 

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Goode, what they did to Alex 
Petty? 

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These people are capable of 
killing. 

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But they've also expressed a 
desire to stamp out anti fascist

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activism, which can 
theoretically include anything 

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that opposes their autocratic 
vision for the country. 

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That puts a greater scrutiny on 
communication between organizers

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and protesters, which is what 
this episode's going to focus 

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on. 
As tensions grew in Minneapolis 

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and protesters, community 
organizers, activists responded 

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to the administration's violent 
I'll fated operation Metro surge

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influencers claim to have quote 
UN quote, infiltrated Signal 

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chats used by people on the 
ground there by joining these 

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groups where links were publicly
shared and then posting 

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screenshots, screen recordings 
and all kinds of outlandish 

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commentary about what those 
chats contained. 

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Right, Jared? 
And it's important to note that 

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these anti antifa Internet 
performers who are essentially 

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interchangeable and wait, if 
you're listening to this in 

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future, there may be new ones I 
haven't even heard of yet. 

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They are not particularly gifted
sleuths generally. 

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They have a tendency to lie and 
self aggrandize. 

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They aren't journalists. 
What they do is designed to 

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serve themselves financially and
to please authority, IE they 

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don't speak truth to power, they
distort tattle, and they flatter

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powerful men. 
They are in no uncertain terms 

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and in a literal sense, 
professional bootlickers. 

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One of these guys is a big 
chunkist named Cam Higbee. 

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We have covered this guy on PCI 
before. 

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Higbee claimed to infiltrate 
so-called antifa networks on 

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Signal. 
Influencers like this call 

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protest protesters terrorists. 
That's the way they describe 

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people who are law abiding 
protesters and they steal that 

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language from the Trump 
administration itself. 

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He unveiled his findings about 
the Minneapolis protests in 

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January 2026 on Benny Johnson's 
show. 

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Benny Johnson, another 
influencer, said this is clearly

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a coordinated infrastructure and
we'd like for the feds to take a

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crack at trying to get rid of 
this infrastructure. 

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The way they approach the mob or
cartels or other terrorist 

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networks, right By the way, the 
mob. 

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OK, this is the anti ICE 
protest. 

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There's no credible evidence of 
technical hacking or covert 

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access beyond simply joining 
these chats like any other user 

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could. 
There's no reason to think Kim 

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Higbee pulled off some sort of 
technical feat that allowed him 

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to get into it. 
The law enforcement is now 

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looking at both the 
communication practices and the 

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public claims these influencers 
are making. 

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FBI Director and frequent PTI 
punchline Akash Patel announced 

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on the same podcast hosted by 
Benny Johnson that after seeing 

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Kim Higbee's post about the 
Signal chats in Minneapolis, he 

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asked the FBI to open up an 
investigation. 

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We immediately opened up that 
investigation because that sort 

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of Signal chat being coordinated
with individuals, not just 

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locally in Minnesota, but maybe 
even around the country. 

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If that leads to a break in the 
federal statute or a violation 

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of some law, then we are going 
to arrest people. 

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You cannot create a scenario 
that illegally entraps and puts 

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law enforcement in harm's way. 
So understandably this has made 

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a lot of people nervous. 
A lot of people have questions 

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about Signal. 
There's some bad information, 

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some bad advice going around. 
So on this one, we've got Bill 

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Buddington with us. 
He's going to talk through how 

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to use Signal effectively during
a protest and in a way that 

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doesn't put you in danger. 
We want everyone to stay safe 

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here. 
Say from a blamely corrupt 

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regime that equates their 
dissent, their dissatisfaction, 

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their outrage, their anger with 
terrorism. 

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Say from far right influencers 
who would not hesitate to ruin 

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your life if it meant content 
they could profit from. 

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And I thought it'd also just be 
helpful to give you some general

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background about what signal is 
and how it works exactly. 

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Bill, thanks for taking some 
time to join us today. 

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A lot of people have, you know, 
I've certainly seen a lot of 

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people getting a little antsy 
about Signal, maybe not fully 

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understanding it. 
And I appreciate you taking the 

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time to sit down with us and 
kind of explain to us what it 

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is, how it works, and if people 
are considering participating in

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a protest or doing some kind of 
activism, what they need to 

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know. 
So first I just want to start 

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off, what can you tell us about 
Signal and its origins? 

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Yeah. 
So Signal came into being as 

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kind of a combination of two 
apps that preceded it and they 

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were developed between 2010 and 
2015. 

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The one app was tech secure and 
that was text messaging, 

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encrypted text messaging. 
And then there was also Red 

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Phone that was encrypted calls 
and they merged to form Signal 

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because all that is incorporated
in Signal and that that merger 

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happened in around 2015. 
So yeah, that that's kind of, 

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you know, was developed by Moxie
Marlinspike originally. 

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Yeah, just kind of was handed 
over to its own nonprofit in 20,

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I want to say like 20-17 around 
then. 

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So when you say encrypted, maybe
this is really basic, but just 

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to break it down for people so 
they understand what that 

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actually means. 
When you say text messages or 

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phone calls are encrypted, 
what's actually going on there? 

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What encryption means in the 
most basic general form is that 

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a message or some communication 
is being a scrambled up and the 

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only way to unscramble it is to 
have some secret key that you're

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able to unscramble it with basic
encryption. 

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So if you go to a website like, 
you know, googleoreff.org, 

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you're going to go to that 
website over what's called HTTPS

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and HTTPS that S stands for 
secure. 

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That's accessing the website 
over protocol that allows you to

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communicate with it in a way 
that your say, coffee shop 

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hacker isn't able to actually 
intercept and see that traffic. 

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So they can't read your messages
or read your communications or 

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be able to look at what's going 
on or, or impersonate you with 

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your communication to that 
website, right? 

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So that's basic encryption 
that's widely deployed 

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everywhere by this point. 
Now there's a more advanced form

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of encryption called end to end 
encryption. 

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An end to end encryption is so 
that you are communicating with 

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your friend and you know, it's 
not so much about the service 

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that that a hacker, for 
instance, can impersonate. 

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But with end to end encryption, 
you're able to, to ensure that 

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you know, your communications 
aren't being able to be seen by 

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the service itself and, and not 
being able to be impersonated by

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that service as well. 
So so there are guarantees that 

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end to end encryption really 
provides above and beyond basic 

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encryption. 
So I make sure I understand it. 

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Basically if you're in Signal, 
you write a message when it goes

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out of the app, it kind of 
scrambles it up and then when it

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gets to the person that you're 
sending it to, it unscrambles it

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and shows it to them. 
Is that does that sound right? 

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Yeah. 
And it's using public key 

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cryptography, which is this 
advanced way of ensuring that 

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there are keys that are 
generated on your device that 

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allow that communication to 
happen. 

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And those are stored on the 
device itself that you're 

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holding in your hand and not on 
the signal servers for instance.

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Anyone can download, you know, 
if you have a smartphone, you 

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can download it right from 
whatever App Store. 

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Protesters are using this in 
Minneapolis as we discussed in 

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the intro. 
Is this still the most effective

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way to organize during a 
protest? 

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Do you believe that signal is 
the most effective way to 

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organize I guess And is that 
what you would recommend vis A 

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vis other products? 
Yeah. 

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So Signal is kind of widely 
considered by security experts 

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and information security field 
in general to be the gold 

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standard in end to end 
encryption and in communication 

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security in general. 
And it's something that I see as

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spring up personally as being 
the most secure option, 

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especially for for audiences, 
audiences that that have access 

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to it. 
Now, when you're in a protest 

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situation, there could be, and 
there have been situations where

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they cut off all Internet access
to a specific area. 

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We haven't seen this recently, 
but this was part of, you know, 

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the Bart protests and and in San
Francisco. 

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And so if that happens, then you
might not have access to signal 

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at that particular time. 
So it's important to point that 

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out as a caveat and there might 
be other kind of more local 

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options available. 
So that's something they have 

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the, the government would have 
the capacity to do to people to 

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in order to eliminate the, the 
advantages you might get from 

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being able to use that in a 
protest. 

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How does it prevent outside 
surveillance? 

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Better necessarily than 
Telegram, Discord or WhatsApp? 

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Those are the three that come to
mind. 

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But there are, I mean there are 
others that are out there. 

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WhatsApp employs the Signal 
protocol, so it's able to 

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scramble messages and send them 
and, you know, unscramble in the

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same way as Signal is. 
But in terms of the emphasis, 

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they prioritize usability over 
the encryption and safety. 

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And that means, for instance, 
that they'll make certain 

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choices like, you know, not 
having your backups for your 

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chats encrypted by default. 
And that will completely 

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circumvent the protection that 
you get from an app like Signal.

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So Signal, you're going to have 
all of your defaults, all of 

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your settings as secure as 
possible right out-of-the-box. 

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And WhatsApp, you know it can do
that, but it's not going to have

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those settings enabled and 
locked down just as you're 

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downloading it. 
There's going to be a lot of 

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ways in which the you can trip 
over the settings and not have 

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your communications secure. 
So when it came to Minneapolis, 

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one of the concerns about Signal
I saw come out of that came 

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after Alex Pretty was killed. 
About an hour later, this guy 

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named Cam Higbee started posting
a screen, recording videos, 

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scrolling through different 
Signal chats, showing who's in 

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there. 
You saw all kinds of people jump

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in on it, trying to make amateur
identifications of who might be 

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in it, that sort of thing. 
So one of the things that people

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that we saw were talking about 
that we wanted to, you know, try

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to make an episode to help 
people understand the reality 

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about is the idea of 
infiltration. 

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There's different kinds of 
signal group chat links you can 

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send. 
There's, you know, publicly 

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shared links, privately shared 
links. 

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But when it comes to 
infiltration or, or, or this 

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idea that maybe the police might
join your signal chat or one of 

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these influencers who seeks to 
get the police to crack down on 

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you joins into it or a counter 
organizer, I mean, whoever it 

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may be. 
How real is that risk? 

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Does it have anything to do with
the app itself or sort of how 

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it's used? 
Or help me understand that? 

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This is a situation where you're
adding someone to a chat and 

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they can be someone who you're 
not intending to, to actually 

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add to the chat, right? 
You need to make sure that 

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you're vetting that person. 
And, and as the National 

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Security Advisor Mike Waltz 
found out when he mistakenly 

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added chief editor of The 
Atlantic to a group chat, you 

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know, you need to to make sure 
that the you're actually adding 

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the people that you expect to be
adding, right? 

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So it's important to kind of do 
that vetting and because 

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otherwise you can have that 
situation where your messages 

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are inadvertently leaked and 
posted all over the Atlantic's 

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website for the case of, you 
know, the current 

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administration. 
Yeah. 

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And and also I think it's 
important to point out that we 

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want to have people actually 
using the official Signal app 

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because, you know, they're not. 
The other aspect of that story 

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is that there was this third 
party app that the 

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administration was using and 
that app was also kind of 

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storing all their backups onto a
third party server. 

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So something that you really 
want to make sure that you're 

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using official software and not 
some kind of, you know, clone of

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the official software. 
This, There may not be a correct

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answer to this, but let's say 
Minneapolis is happening in your

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neighborhood. 
And I don't just mean the cold. 

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You want to organize a kind of a
large group of people very 

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quickly. 
Is there really anything you can

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do about that other than a 
public facing link to kind of 

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just get people to, you know, on
the same page? 

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I mean, other than perhaps 
spelling out some rules of 

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engagement and just to make 
people realize that like, hey, 

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what you post on here could 
create problems for you. 

241
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This is a public facing link. 
I mean, is there anything else 

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that we, you know, they can do 
to avoid, you know, falling into

243
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the hands of of these, you know,
far right agitators or the FBI? 

244
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You know, what can you do when 
you need to organize a group of 

245
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people in a neighborhood fairly 
quickly? 

246
00:15:57,320 --> 00:15:59,880
I mean, I to me it doesn't seem 
like there's an easy answer. 

247
00:16:00,360 --> 00:16:03,680
Yeah, I think that there isn't 
this inherent problem with your 

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trying to publicize an event and
make people aware of it, but yet

249
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you're trying to keep out those 
that might be trying to disrupt 

250
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it or to, you know, have a 
negative influence on what 

251
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you're trying to do. 
And so I, I, I don't think that 

252
00:16:19,040 --> 00:16:21,200
there is a technological 
solution that's that's more of 

253
00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:24,400
like a social problem and and 
social problems don't have 

254
00:16:24,400 --> 00:16:26,760
technical solutions, right? 
They have they have social 

255
00:16:26,760 --> 00:16:30,960
solutions that that kind of is 
kind of inherent with the the 

256
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way that you're trying to 
organize that. 

257
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That's not what our AI overlords
have been telling me, but I'll 

258
00:16:36,080 --> 00:16:38,800
take your word for it, Bill. 
But it seems to, yeah, it seems 

259
00:16:38,800 --> 00:16:41,760
to me, I mean, this is just just
a hypothesis from me and I'm not

260
00:16:41,760 --> 00:16:44,040
an expert. 
I'm just one of the hosts of 

261
00:16:44,040 --> 00:16:47,080
posting through it. 
But it seems to me that that 

262
00:16:47,080 --> 00:16:50,880
perhaps people should make 
distinctions publicly, you know,

263
00:16:51,240 --> 00:16:53,760
make distinctions, Hey, this is 
a public facing group. 

264
00:16:53,800 --> 00:16:56,240
And just be very clear about 
that and just say there are 

265
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certain risks involved with 
that. 

266
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Private groups can break off 
into, you know, their thing that

267
00:17:01,640 --> 00:17:04,640
are that are carefully vetted 
and public facing, you know, 

268
00:17:04,640 --> 00:17:06,400
public facing groups just to 
make rules. 

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And wherever you're posting it, 
be it blue sky or X, God forbid,

270
00:17:11,680 --> 00:17:15,280
or wherever else, just to say 
like, Hey, just be be a little 

271
00:17:15,280 --> 00:17:17,920
careful about this this one. 
You know this is potentially 

272
00:17:17,920 --> 00:17:20,280
that, but instructions will be 
given here. 

273
00:17:20,920 --> 00:17:23,200
Yeah, that makes sense. 
I mean, yeah, giving those 

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00:17:23,200 --> 00:17:27,240
caveats to a public facing 
group, I think that, yeah, 

275
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people tend to think that, oh, 
this is signal, so this is 

276
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secure and it is in one sense. 
It's technically secure, but 

277
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it's not socially secure. 
It's going to be posted to 

278
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everyone that was added to that 
group, right. 

279
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If you say something in a group 
that has member of law 

280
00:17:47,240 --> 00:17:51,600
enforcement in it, then that 
message is going to be delivered

281
00:17:51,600 --> 00:17:56,400
to that person. 
You don't necessarily not 

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00:17:56,400 --> 00:17:59,680
necessarily going to be divulge 
your identity. 

283
00:17:59,880 --> 00:18:03,520
Your identity might be kept 
secret, but that message and the

284
00:18:03,520 --> 00:18:06,560
fact that someone posted, you 
know, a message in that group 

285
00:18:06,560 --> 00:18:10,800
saying let's do criminal 
activity X will will be let out.

286
00:18:10,800 --> 00:18:15,400
And at that point, you know, so 
it's, so it's important to make 

287
00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:19,720
sure that you know the 
parameters of a group that 

288
00:18:19,720 --> 00:18:25,760
you're being added to. 
So if it's a group that has all 

289
00:18:25,760 --> 00:18:29,440
of its members well vetted for, 
then that's a very different 

290
00:18:29,440 --> 00:18:34,800
situation then hey, I just got 
added to a group of 600 people 

291
00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:39,160
that are going to post updates 
on where they supposedly saw 

292
00:18:39,160 --> 00:18:41,400
ICE. 
Speaking of law enforcement, 

293
00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:45,080
this is another question that 
sort of sticks out with me that 

294
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:49,880
it could be useful to get some 
clarity on the message is, you 

295
00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:53,480
know, you've explained our end 
to end encrypted, right? 

296
00:18:53,480 --> 00:18:57,800
So the likelihood that they set 
up an antenna and yank it out, 

297
00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:02,200
you know, the, the way they 
might standard text message or 

298
00:19:02,200 --> 00:19:05,640
or a phone call or something may
be more limited. 

299
00:19:05,800 --> 00:19:11,560
But what kind of ways could law 
enforcement access signal chat 

300
00:19:11,560 --> 00:19:15,080
records? 
Because the bleak of the chat 

301
00:19:15,080 --> 00:19:18,680
groups in Minneapolis that I 
mentioned earlier, Kosh Patel, 

302
00:19:18,680 --> 00:19:22,360
the director of the FBI, went on
a podcast a couple days later 

303
00:19:22,360 --> 00:19:24,720
and was like, I saw those tweets
and we're opening an 

304
00:19:24,720 --> 00:19:27,840
investigation. 
I guess I'm curious, just how 

305
00:19:27,840 --> 00:19:31,240
much, how much risk are the 
people in those group chats 

306
00:19:31,760 --> 00:19:36,280
actually facing from the FBI at 
this point? 

307
00:19:36,640 --> 00:19:39,840
Like like what can they do? 
There's a number of ways, and 

308
00:19:39,840 --> 00:19:42,400
I'm just going to take the first
part of that question, a number 

309
00:19:42,400 --> 00:19:47,480
of ways in which your chats can 
be divulged even if Signal 

310
00:19:47,480 --> 00:19:53,920
itself isn't compromised. 
And one of those instances is 

311
00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:59,680
having a piece of spy Ware that 
has targeted you being installed

312
00:19:59,720 --> 00:20:04,360
on your device, right? 
So we know of some of these. 

313
00:20:04,720 --> 00:20:12,200
Pieces of spyware like Pegasus 
and other, you know, kind of of 

314
00:20:12,200 --> 00:20:16,880
the state, state sponsored 
malware attacks and they have 

315
00:20:17,040 --> 00:20:20,880
specifically targeted human 
rights defenders, political 

316
00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:24,120
opponents, I would say the Pina 
Nieto regime in Mexico. 

317
00:20:24,560 --> 00:20:30,000
There's been Jamal Khashoggi, a 
journalist that was that was 

318
00:20:30,200 --> 00:20:33,680
targeted. 
And by and large, these are 

319
00:20:33,800 --> 00:20:36,840
extremely targeted attacks. 
And they're not deploying this 

320
00:20:37,600 --> 00:20:41,560
to a wide swath of society. 
Why? 

321
00:20:42,240 --> 00:20:47,600
Well, they would love to, but 
they know that once they start 

322
00:20:48,520 --> 00:20:52,960
mass deploying these 
vulnerabilities that they get 

323
00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:57,960
into, that they use to get into 
people's devices, that there's 

324
00:20:57,960 --> 00:21:01,840
some traces, some indicators 
that that's happened. 

325
00:21:02,360 --> 00:21:09,480
And right now, the developers of
those pieces of a spy Ware are 

326
00:21:09,480 --> 00:21:14,680
in kind of a cat and mouse game 
with the Apples and Googles of 

327
00:21:14,680 --> 00:21:18,440
the world. 
And that's why when your phone 

328
00:21:18,440 --> 00:21:22,040
says you have a security update,
it's important to install that 

329
00:21:22,040 --> 00:21:24,920
security update because it's 
going to patch some of those 

330
00:21:24,920 --> 00:21:30,600
vulnerabilities that the NSO 
group uses, for instance, to 

331
00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:34,320
bundle into Pegasus malware and 
compromise your device. 

332
00:21:34,640 --> 00:21:39,440
And likewise, you know, spyware 
on the one hand is, is something

333
00:21:39,440 --> 00:21:47,560
that's, you know, going to to be
a way in which someone's device 

334
00:21:47,560 --> 00:21:53,320
gets compromised by a remote 
hacker, you know, just just by 

335
00:21:53,440 --> 00:21:55,760
merit of it being on the 
Internet. 

336
00:21:56,240 --> 00:21:58,440
But there's this other side of 
it. 

337
00:21:59,200 --> 00:22:03,400
If your device is seized, if 
you're arrested and your device 

338
00:22:03,400 --> 00:22:06,920
is taken away from you, then 
they can take that device and 

339
00:22:06,920 --> 00:22:11,360
plug it into a forensic imaging 
piece of hardware. 

340
00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:15,320
You know, the two main vendors 
of this are magnet forensics 

341
00:22:16,040 --> 00:22:23,200
that that produces a piece of 
hardware called the grey key. 

342
00:22:23,720 --> 00:22:29,560
And another vendor is Celebrite 
who produces a piece of hardware

343
00:22:29,560 --> 00:22:32,160
called the universal forensic 
extraction device. 

344
00:22:32,320 --> 00:22:38,560
And once a cop or whatever plugs
your device into one of these 

345
00:22:39,040 --> 00:22:42,840
forensic imagers, it'll try 
different combinations of your 

346
00:22:42,840 --> 00:22:46,080
pass of pass phrases just to get
into that device. 

347
00:22:46,240 --> 00:22:51,080
And then once it's able to crack
your device passphrase, then all

348
00:22:51,080 --> 00:22:54,200
bets are off. 
It can take a whole image of 

349
00:22:54,200 --> 00:22:56,280
your disk. 
It can see the messages that 

350
00:22:56,280 --> 00:23:00,880
you've sent. 
It can see your images and 

351
00:23:00,880 --> 00:23:04,680
videos, medical data that's 
stored on the device, crypto 

352
00:23:04,680 --> 00:23:08,360
keys for your Bitcoin or sounds.
Bad. 

353
00:23:09,120 --> 00:23:12,240
Yeah, yeah. 
So, you know, that's one of the 

354
00:23:12,240 --> 00:23:16,200
reasons why it's important to to
kind of practice data 

355
00:23:16,200 --> 00:23:23,040
minimalization, that if you are 
afraid of your, what your phone 

356
00:23:23,040 --> 00:23:27,480
actually holds being divulged, 
then don't bring it to that 

357
00:23:27,480 --> 00:23:29,320
protest. 
Don't bring it into a situation 

358
00:23:29,320 --> 00:23:34,680
where you're at risk of getting 
detained because it could fall 

359
00:23:34,680 --> 00:23:37,880
into the wrong hands and have 
all that data extracted from it.

360
00:23:38,360 --> 00:23:43,840
A follow up again thinking about
the leak of Signal chats in 

361
00:23:43,840 --> 00:23:45,960
Minneapolis and what happened 
there. 

362
00:23:46,440 --> 00:23:49,760
Let let's assume and I don't 
know if this is true or not, 

363
00:23:50,160 --> 00:23:54,000
that nobody in these Signal 
chats they have custody of and 

364
00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:57,720
made a cop, you know, we're able
to crack into a phone and take a

365
00:23:58,120 --> 00:24:02,640
a copy of the disk. 
They just have, you know, video 

366
00:24:02,880 --> 00:24:05,480
of recordings of screenshots 
inside the Signal app. 

367
00:24:05,920 --> 00:24:11,440
You've got usernames, user 
profile pictures, copies of the 

368
00:24:11,440 --> 00:24:16,240
messages. 
Is there a way the FBI can 

369
00:24:16,240 --> 00:24:19,040
figure out who is in these 
chats? 

370
00:24:19,040 --> 00:24:24,280
Like can they subpoena Signal or
or will the company give up 

371
00:24:24,280 --> 00:24:29,600
those records? 
So what the FBI or federal law 

372
00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:33,480
enforcement or even local law 
enforcement can do is they can 

373
00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:38,600
use traditional police work and,
you know, they have a, you know,

374
00:24:38,600 --> 00:24:43,080
leaked document or just a, you 
know, a copy of someone's signal

375
00:24:43,080 --> 00:24:47,040
username. 
Then, you know, they might ask 

376
00:24:47,040 --> 00:24:51,800
or just might try to corroborate
that with, you know, someone 

377
00:24:51,800 --> 00:24:55,600
else that has that knows a 
person and there and they know 

378
00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:57,480
that their signal name is XY or 
Z. 

379
00:24:57,800 --> 00:25:04,360
The power of subpoena only goes 
so far in that what Signal 

380
00:25:04,480 --> 00:25:06,560
doesn't have, they can't give 
over. 

381
00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:11,720
And just as there's data 
minimization when it comes to us

382
00:25:11,720 --> 00:25:17,360
protecting our own devices, 
Signal employs data minimization

383
00:25:17,800 --> 00:25:22,080
in that they don't retain 
records longer than they have to

384
00:25:22,080 --> 00:25:24,320
just to make that communication 
possible. 

385
00:25:24,920 --> 00:25:28,800
And So what they, what we've 
seen and you can go to 

386
00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:32,320
signal.org/bigbrother to kind of
see some of these law 

387
00:25:32,320 --> 00:25:37,960
enforcement requests is that 
they have access to, for 

388
00:25:37,960 --> 00:25:41,840
instance, when an account was 
created and what the last time 

389
00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:45,440
that account was logged into. 
But they don't really have 

390
00:25:45,720 --> 00:25:48,360
information beyond that because 
they don't retain it. 

391
00:25:48,360 --> 00:25:51,120
They throw it out, they don't 
keep it in the first place. 

392
00:25:51,320 --> 00:25:56,760
They employ strict data 
minimization in order to ward 

393
00:25:56,760 --> 00:26:02,240
off the possibility that their 
users will become vulnerable to,

394
00:26:02,560 --> 00:26:05,680
you know, law enforcement 
requests or requests or even 

395
00:26:05,680 --> 00:26:07,880
hacks. 
You know, if their servers are 

396
00:26:07,880 --> 00:26:13,280
hacked, then a remote hacker 
could get access to who is who 

397
00:26:13,280 --> 00:26:18,000
and any records that they have. 
So they try to make sure that 

398
00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:21,640
that doesn't happen by simply 
not having those requests, those

399
00:26:21,920 --> 00:26:24,680
that data to give over. 
My last question for you, Bill, 

400
00:26:25,840 --> 00:26:28,000
do you listen to techno? 
What kind of music do you like? 

401
00:26:28,400 --> 00:26:29,920
We listen to a lot of techno 
around here. 

402
00:26:29,920 --> 00:26:34,480
Thanks to Mike. 
Does Kraut rock count? 

403
00:26:34,480 --> 00:26:37,040
Yes, Techno. 
Okay, yes, now we're here. 

404
00:26:37,040 --> 00:26:38,920
Are you listening to? 
Can you fuck with? 

405
00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:40,160
Can I love? 
Can I love? 

406
00:26:40,200 --> 00:26:42,360
Can All right okay, now we got 
3. 

407
00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:44,720
Okay, yeah. 
Yeah. 

408
00:26:44,920 --> 00:26:46,440
Yeah, yeah, OK. 
It was great. 

409
00:26:46,600 --> 00:26:49,640
Faust, you. 
Fucking I need my vitamin C and 

410
00:26:49,640 --> 00:26:55,480
Faust and yeah, I yeah, like 
Tangerine Dream. 

411
00:26:55,800 --> 00:26:57,760
Wow, yeah, okay, okay, I get 
down with. 

412
00:26:57,760 --> 00:26:59,280
That cuts. 
Deep cuts. 

413
00:26:59,440 --> 00:27:01,960
Well, I love Tangerine Dream. 
We got we got a real 1 here 

414
00:27:01,960 --> 00:27:04,120
folks. 
Yeah, absolutely. 

415
00:27:04,120 --> 00:27:08,760
We should get make sure he gets 
the make sure he gets the free 

416
00:27:09,120 --> 00:27:12,160
premium subscription that comes 
with being a guest because we do

417
00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:14,520
album Rex at the end of our of 
those episodes. 

418
00:27:15,120 --> 00:27:18,000
Bill, thank you so much for for 
coming and and hopefully this 

419
00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:23,120
has been a valuable service to 
our listeners, particularly, you

420
00:27:23,120 --> 00:27:25,720
know, as the summer months start
approaching, we're getting into 

421
00:27:25,720 --> 00:27:27,400
the spring summer. 
Is there going to be a lot of 

422
00:27:27,400 --> 00:27:30,400
people on the streets and. 
My pleasure. 

423
00:27:30,720 --> 00:27:34,320
I hope everybody is is, I hope 
everybody is, you know, watching

424
00:27:34,320 --> 00:27:36,640
out for themselves and, and, and
listening to this and thinking 

425
00:27:36,640 --> 00:27:40,080
about how they can protect 
themselves with signal.