1 00:00:17,640 --> 00:00:22,000 So, Charles, thank you very much for joining me in Studio 2 for a 2 00:00:22,000 --> 00:00:26,560 discussion about the military. This is going to be fairly 3 00:00:26,560 --> 00:00:30,200 loose, I think, but over quite a few months, you and I have had a 4 00:00:30,200 --> 00:00:33,640 number of discussions where we've said we've really ought to 5 00:00:33,640 --> 00:00:36,200 get together to talk about the military. 6 00:00:36,640 --> 00:00:42,400 And today's the day. I think there's so much to cover 7 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:47,600 that we'll just do as as much as we can in today's conversation. 8 00:00:47,600 --> 00:00:51,800 And then we'll we'll look to do another episode or maybe or 9 00:00:51,800 --> 00:00:58,760 maybe some more episodes. So what counts here? 10 00:00:59,320 --> 00:01:03,320 I think I'm going to pull, I'm going to pull the rank by virtue 11 00:01:03,320 --> 00:01:07,600 of my age. And I, I think I'll start off by 12 00:01:07,600 --> 00:01:11,800 just saying, tell me a little bit about your career because I, 13 00:01:11,920 --> 00:01:16,360 I know, I know quite a few things about you, but it would 14 00:01:16,360 --> 00:01:20,040 be great to hear you tell us a little bit more about yourself. 15 00:01:20,440 --> 00:01:22,880 And I'm sure the, I'm sure the audience would like to know 16 00:01:22,880 --> 00:01:27,480 that. And once you've done that all, I 17 00:01:27,480 --> 00:01:32,280 will reply with a bit about my ancient heritage in the Royal 18 00:01:32,280 --> 00:01:34,560 Navy. Not, not, not that ancient. 19 00:01:34,560 --> 00:01:36,600 Well, in the grand scheme, if. Well, maybe. 20 00:01:36,840 --> 00:01:41,520 But yeah, I think, I think this will be part of a, an evolving 21 00:01:41,520 --> 00:01:43,440 conversation. I mean, not least because of the 22 00:01:43,920 --> 00:01:49,600 speed with which not just the armed forces are evolving, but 23 00:01:49,640 --> 00:01:57,360 the way that they're being treated, dealt with by their 24 00:01:57,360 --> 00:02:00,960 political masters, but also by the society that's puts them 25 00:02:00,960 --> 00:02:02,880 forward. And I think there's a huge 26 00:02:02,880 --> 00:02:04,560 amount to talk. I always like to say we, we, 27 00:02:04,720 --> 00:02:07,000 we've spoken a lot leading up to this discussion about the sorts 28 00:02:07,000 --> 00:02:08,320 of things that we do need to talk about. 29 00:02:08,320 --> 00:02:12,320 Whether or not we'll get to into much of that today, I can't be 30 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:18,120 quite certain. But I think what I'd like to do 31 00:02:18,120 --> 00:02:21,120 is, is sort of talk, of course we, we will, I'm sure, talk 32 00:02:21,120 --> 00:02:23,200 about things that might not make that much sense to people that 33 00:02:23,200 --> 00:02:24,520 perhaps haven't been in the armed forces. 34 00:02:24,520 --> 00:02:27,680 So what I'd like to do is, is try to make a particular point 35 00:02:27,680 --> 00:02:32,440 about speaking as though somebody listening has no idea 36 00:02:33,040 --> 00:02:39,920 what it might be like to be in the armed forces either then or 37 00:02:40,120 --> 00:02:42,840 now. And the reason I say that is 38 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:47,640 that I think one of the things that has changed in actually fun 39 00:02:47,640 --> 00:02:51,400 enough in both directions in the period of time that I've been 40 00:02:51,400 --> 00:02:58,240 sort of within the military orbit is, is how people are 41 00:02:58,240 --> 00:03:02,000 conditioned via various propaganda exercises to either 42 00:03:02,000 --> 00:03:05,800 regard the military as friend or foe. 43 00:03:06,360 --> 00:03:12,560 And I, I, I've seen this sort of ebb and flow over the years. 44 00:03:13,040 --> 00:03:19,680 Now for myself, my first sort of engagement with the armed forces 45 00:03:19,680 --> 00:03:23,680 was back in the mid 90s whilst still at school. 46 00:03:23,680 --> 00:03:29,200 And that was a period of quite high turbulence after the 47 00:03:29,440 --> 00:03:33,000 Options for Change programme. That had been a lot, I'm sorry, 48 00:03:33,000 --> 00:03:35,120 I should qualify that I'm specifically talking about the 49 00:03:35,120 --> 00:03:36,960 Army, whereas you're going to be primarily talking about the 50 00:03:36,960 --> 00:03:38,480 Navy. And I think that's a distinction 51 00:03:38,480 --> 00:03:42,240 worth making. But at that point the with, with 52 00:03:42,240 --> 00:03:47,040 the collapse with the Soviet Union and all the fallout from 53 00:03:47,040 --> 00:03:51,120 that, the, the army specifically was put in a position where 54 00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:53,600 things were being made to change. 55 00:03:53,600 --> 00:03:56,120 Definitely not in a way that people were universally happy 56 00:03:56,120 --> 00:03:59,000 with. There were a lot of very uneasy 57 00:03:59,080 --> 00:04:03,320 regimental amalgamations which to put that in the sort of silly 58 00:04:03,320 --> 00:04:09,480 speak is I suppose a form of a merger or or indeed could be 59 00:04:09,480 --> 00:04:12,880 perceived as an acquisition between two different entities 60 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:17,000 and therefore personnel inevitably have to disappear. 61 00:04:17,120 --> 00:04:20,560 There's a sort of rebranding exercise and if it's not managed 62 00:04:20,560 --> 00:04:25,520 correctly, there are a lot of upside down smiles because 63 00:04:26,080 --> 00:04:30,800 people are left in some way bereft of what they regard as 64 00:04:30,800 --> 00:04:33,040 their identity. And I think this is a, a thing 65 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:34,400 that's really worth talking about. 66 00:04:34,400 --> 00:04:38,360 We, we joked before recording that we're both wearing checked 67 00:04:38,360 --> 00:04:39,640 shirts. So I said, well, there's a, 68 00:04:40,320 --> 00:04:43,280 there's a, there's a, there's a conversation about uniform. 69 00:04:43,280 --> 00:04:47,000 And I don't, and I mean that partially glibly, but actually 70 00:04:47,000 --> 00:04:50,000 there is a serious point because I think again, to look at it 71 00:04:50,000 --> 00:04:54,280 from the outside in, for a lot of people, looking at the armed 72 00:04:54,280 --> 00:04:58,200 forces creates a sort of sense of revulsion at the idea of 73 00:04:58,200 --> 00:05:00,840 being told what to do, being a tiny cog in a machine, of not 74 00:05:00,840 --> 00:05:04,080 having any control over your own destiny and all this, all this 75 00:05:04,080 --> 00:05:07,160 sort of thing with which I I sympathize and understand why 76 00:05:07,160 --> 00:05:09,760 people say that. That's not my perspective at 77 00:05:09,760 --> 00:05:12,800 all. My view of it is that you go 78 00:05:12,800 --> 00:05:18,360 into one of these systems in order to hone your skills in a 79 00:05:18,360 --> 00:05:20,920 particular job. That means you are going to be 80 00:05:21,080 --> 00:05:24,960 used, OK, fair enough, use to the very best of your ability. 81 00:05:24,960 --> 00:05:29,200 And you actually do exert a huge amount of control over the way 82 00:05:29,200 --> 00:05:33,000 in which you do do that. And the uniform part is really 83 00:05:33,000 --> 00:05:38,360 significant in that by making everybody look the same, you're 84 00:05:38,360 --> 00:05:42,840 creating a sense of compassion. You're, you're creating a sort 85 00:05:42,840 --> 00:05:46,880 of family situation in which people are subconsciously at 86 00:05:46,880 --> 00:05:50,200 least, if not consciously feeling like they're all part of 87 00:05:50,680 --> 00:05:56,000 1 body and therefore they will go above and beyond to look 88 00:05:56,000 --> 00:05:58,480 after and protect those people around them. 89 00:05:58,480 --> 00:06:01,760 And, and a uniform is absolutely critical to that as our 90 00:06:02,280 --> 00:06:04,000 standards of behaviour and all the rest of it. 91 00:06:04,000 --> 00:06:07,200 And that's something that I think has has slipped 92 00:06:07,400 --> 00:06:08,800 dramatically. So I don't, I don't want to be a 93 00:06:08,800 --> 00:06:11,160 too far off point, but but, but yes, in my, my sort of first 94 00:06:11,280 --> 00:06:15,440 engagement was, was mid 90s and with, you know, sort of school 95 00:06:15,440 --> 00:06:18,280 and university and whatnot. It wasn't actually until the 96 00:06:18,640 --> 00:06:22,360 2000s that I then went to the wrong Military Academy, 97 00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:26,040 Sandhurst, which is where the officer training has happened 98 00:06:26,040 --> 00:06:28,320 for many years. It's now the only place that 99 00:06:28,320 --> 00:06:30,600 officer training happens for, for the Army. 100 00:06:30,600 --> 00:06:32,800 It's a year long course. It is. 101 00:06:33,880 --> 00:06:35,960 It is very, very physically demanding. 102 00:06:35,960 --> 00:06:38,160 It's also supposed to be intellectually demanding and 103 00:06:38,160 --> 00:06:40,880 it's supposed to put you at the other side where you're in a 104 00:06:40,880 --> 00:06:44,160 position to be able to manage for the responsibility of 105 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:49,280 looking after, if you're an infanteer, like I was around 30 106 00:06:49,560 --> 00:06:51,600 soldiers. And, and that's it's, it's 107 00:06:51,600 --> 00:06:55,840 largely a welfare job, but specifically as a, as a, as an 108 00:06:55,840 --> 00:06:58,720 officer, as a commander, you're supposed to have the capability 109 00:06:58,720 --> 00:07:03,560 to plan and plan in such a way that you're going to achieve 110 00:07:04,080 --> 00:07:08,080 success on the battlefield. And that again is ultimately a 111 00:07:08,080 --> 00:07:10,840 welfare consideration because you're talking about not losing 112 00:07:10,840 --> 00:07:16,080 life now, talking about the mid 90s and all change there in the 113 00:07:16,080 --> 00:07:18,480 mid 2000s. And Mike and Patrick have just 114 00:07:18,480 --> 00:07:24,480 had an amazing discussion on the 20 years since the 77 events in 115 00:07:24,480 --> 00:07:30,160 London in 2005. Now that I would say my 116 00:07:30,160 --> 00:07:34,840 perspective both at the time and now is how that was yet another 117 00:07:34,840 --> 00:07:41,400 manipulation in the narrative in order to change what it was that 118 00:07:41,880 --> 00:07:46,120 the country, the politicians were going to do with the armed 119 00:07:46,120 --> 00:07:47,400 forces. And it was very, very 120 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:48,800 interesting. If you go back and you look at 121 00:07:48,800 --> 00:07:51,040 what was being said by the Ministry of Defence, because of 122 00:07:51,040 --> 00:07:56,840 course we were already four years into an operational, an 123 00:07:56,840 --> 00:07:58,840 active operational theatre in Afghanistan, which had 124 00:07:58,840 --> 00:08:01,560 supposedly started, you know, John Reed's words, without a 125 00:08:01,560 --> 00:08:04,560 shot being fired, which of course was never realistic. 126 00:08:04,560 --> 00:08:07,560 And then Iraq starting in 2003. So we had we had two medium 127 00:08:07,560 --> 00:08:14,040 sized operations going on and the suggestion was never 128 00:08:14,040 --> 00:08:17,160 anything other than, you know, K the goal posts always move or 129 00:08:17,160 --> 00:08:20,640 whether it was regime change or stability to the region or any 130 00:08:20,640 --> 00:08:24,600 of those sorts of things. And then in 2005 it changed and 131 00:08:24,960 --> 00:08:29,040 up for me the touchdown that what it was that triggered that 132 00:08:29,040 --> 00:08:34,919 was comments both made by Richard Dannison, Mike Jackson, 133 00:08:34,919 --> 00:08:38,039 who were who were successive heads of the Army and Cronty is 134 00:08:38,039 --> 00:08:40,080 not quite right there because then it was later. 135 00:08:40,080 --> 00:08:44,400 But there there was this suggestion that the armed forces 136 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:46,560 weren't sort of getting to do what they wanted to do. 137 00:08:46,560 --> 00:08:48,200 They weren't they were underemployed. 138 00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:50,600 And there was, there was reported to have been a 139 00:08:50,600 --> 00:08:53,720 conversation with Tony Blair, then Prime Minister who, who, 140 00:08:53,920 --> 00:08:58,680 who but basically didn't take to this idea very well. 141 00:08:58,680 --> 00:09:01,760 And, and the result of that combined with the, the sort of 142 00:09:01,960 --> 00:09:04,680 this spectre of terrorism and then it being good sort of going 143 00:09:04,680 --> 00:09:09,120 live in London, was the idea that somehow operations in 144 00:09:09,120 --> 00:09:13,440 Afghanistan and Iraq had a bearing on our security in the 145 00:09:13,480 --> 00:09:15,760 UK. And it was this idea that that 146 00:09:15,760 --> 00:09:19,840 we would then have to protect the UK and to keep our streets 147 00:09:19,840 --> 00:09:22,280 safe, which had just come from nowhere. 148 00:09:22,280 --> 00:09:27,000 There was, that was never, ever part of the, the sort of the 149 00:09:27,080 --> 00:09:30,240 operational plan or, or indeed the messaging around it. 150 00:09:30,240 --> 00:09:32,120 So it's a very, very interesting transition. 151 00:09:32,120 --> 00:09:35,120 And I think if you look at what's happening the, the, the 152 00:09:35,120 --> 00:09:39,360 sort of succeeding 20 years, then it, it does explain an 153 00:09:39,360 --> 00:09:42,040 awful lot about how we've got to, to where we've got now. 154 00:09:42,400 --> 00:09:44,920 But, but, but to, to return to the point, I mean, I, I 155 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:47,040 therefore, because of those operations, it meant that the 156 00:09:47,040 --> 00:09:50,680 pace of life, the tempo in the Army was different from what it 157 00:09:50,680 --> 00:09:54,480 had been say, for, for the 20 years prior where there was a 158 00:09:54,480 --> 00:09:58,320 lot of time in sort of Garrison context where there'd be a lot 159 00:09:58,320 --> 00:10:03,240 of training activity, but but nothing then perhaps after that. 160 00:10:03,240 --> 00:10:06,360 So people were by and large in the same place doing sort of 161 00:10:06,360 --> 00:10:08,200 similar, perhaps slightly repetitive things. 162 00:10:08,200 --> 00:10:10,560 I, however, spent a period of time where that wasn't the case 163 00:10:10,560 --> 00:10:12,360 at all. There was massive uncertainty. 164 00:10:12,760 --> 00:10:17,360 There was a huge, well, mismanagement, let's say, of 165 00:10:17,440 --> 00:10:19,840 resources. So there was a lot of areas in 166 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:23,120 which funding was cut to to, you know, access to training, 167 00:10:23,120 --> 00:10:26,760 training areas and all sorts of things that should make an Army 168 00:10:26,760 --> 00:10:30,840 career sort of interesting, exciting and rewarding for 169 00:10:30,840 --> 00:10:35,560 everybody was was being threatened to. 170 00:10:36,400 --> 00:10:41,480 And then that led inevitably and sort of later towards and yet 171 00:10:41,480 --> 00:10:43,920 another panic, which is right. Well, these, these operations 172 00:10:43,920 --> 00:10:46,720 aren't going to last forever. What are we going to do next? 173 00:10:46,720 --> 00:10:50,800 And that's, that's both thrown without and within because you 174 00:10:50,800 --> 00:10:54,960 know, as much as one might think that the military does to a 175 00:10:54,960 --> 00:10:57,640 large extent control what it does, the reality is actually 176 00:10:57,640 --> 00:10:59,800 very different. That's, that's not at all what I 177 00:10:59,800 --> 00:11:05,200 saw happening. And to, to, to try to engineer 178 00:11:05,200 --> 00:11:08,560 the system so that you are going to be doing something is 179 00:11:08,560 --> 00:11:10,320 different. I mean, I, I personally ended up 180 00:11:10,320 --> 00:11:12,440 in East Africa. Well, I suppose I should say 181 00:11:12,440 --> 00:11:16,840 Eastern Africa based in Kenya. And it was fascinating then to 182 00:11:16,840 --> 00:11:20,960 see how there was a sort of, there was really a scramble for 183 00:11:21,000 --> 00:11:24,440 jobs and, and, you know, people being called off to, to hold 184 00:11:24,440 --> 00:11:27,400 this idea of Somali piracy and, and, and all sorts of other 185 00:11:27,400 --> 00:11:30,400 things. So, you know, it was a real 186 00:11:30,440 --> 00:11:32,440 period of flux, but also it was the beginning. 187 00:11:32,440 --> 00:11:35,280 I don't want to jump ahead and, and I'll absolutely hand over in 188 00:11:35,280 --> 00:11:38,800 a second, but it was also the beginning of the period of time 189 00:11:38,800 --> 00:11:44,400 where the, this idea that veterans were a sort of 190 00:11:44,400 --> 00:11:47,000 protected species started to come in. 191 00:11:47,240 --> 00:11:50,520 And I think we'll go on perhaps later or at another time to talk 192 00:11:50,520 --> 00:11:52,680 about how that's been hugely manipulated. 193 00:11:53,040 --> 00:11:56,160 But, but that was what I saw. And, and I think, you know, 194 00:11:56,360 --> 00:11:59,040 during that period, for all the reasons that I've given, there 195 00:11:59,040 --> 00:12:02,640 was there was an enormous transition which has absolutely 196 00:12:02,640 --> 00:12:06,280 not corrected itself. And, and, and the trend, you 197 00:12:06,280 --> 00:12:10,000 know, as reported many, many times on, on UK column If funds 198 00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:14,280 to if, if, if you're to strip away all the, the control 199 00:12:14,280 --> 00:12:16,960 elements and the, the appalling situations in which the armed 200 00:12:16,960 --> 00:12:21,440 forces do get put, let's say, politically or strategically in 201 00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:23,480 terms of messing up other people's countries. 202 00:12:23,800 --> 00:12:26,840 If you just take the organization itself and the, the 203 00:12:26,840 --> 00:12:29,800 way in which there has been a deterioration and A and a loss 204 00:12:29,800 --> 00:12:32,160 of of sort of quality and numbers that was absolutely 205 00:12:32,160 --> 00:12:34,760 already happening then. And it, and it looked, you know, 206 00:12:34,760 --> 00:12:37,720 to, to use your sort of language, it looked very 207 00:12:37,720 --> 00:12:39,720 deliberate the way in which it was being done. 208 00:12:39,840 --> 00:12:41,600 But I can go on to prevent more of that later. 209 00:12:41,600 --> 00:12:44,040 But anyway, now that let's say that's a little bit of. 210 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:46,920 Well, Charles, that was not there. 211 00:12:47,040 --> 00:12:50,960 And yeah, I was thinking as you're going through, you know, 212 00:12:51,040 --> 00:12:54,440 there's so many points and where do I start from that? 213 00:12:54,720 --> 00:12:57,320 I think I just want to ask you one more question before I 214 00:12:57,320 --> 00:13:00,760 respond. And that's that's you joined. 215 00:13:00,760 --> 00:13:04,320 You did join the army. Why did you do that? 216 00:13:04,640 --> 00:13:06,120 Yeah, that's a very good question. 217 00:13:06,120 --> 00:13:08,800 And actually in the first instance, it was almost by 218 00:13:08,800 --> 00:13:13,680 accident, which a lot of people have said over the years very 219 00:13:13,680 --> 00:13:17,840 specifically, and this is, this is an initiative of somebody 220 00:13:17,840 --> 00:13:22,360 who's sort of good at their job. When I was at school, there was 221 00:13:22,360 --> 00:13:26,120 a that's sadly defunct. Well, I would say sad because I 222 00:13:26,120 --> 00:13:27,840 thought it did actually it worked well. 223 00:13:28,160 --> 00:13:30,920 They ran a program called an Army Scholarship, which meant 224 00:13:30,920 --> 00:13:33,760 that you could, as a 16 year old, you could go forward to the 225 00:13:34,440 --> 00:13:39,440 regimental selection board and go basically go through the 226 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:43,200 officer's selection as a schoolboy and get a, get a place 227 00:13:43,200 --> 00:13:46,160 at Sandhurst for whenever it was you wanted to take it up. 228 00:13:46,760 --> 00:13:50,840 And I had been informed of this, so I went along to speak to the 229 00:13:50,840 --> 00:13:53,840 visiting careers officer or whatever he was called. 230 00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:57,720 And my idea was that I was getting along just for him to 231 00:13:57,720 --> 00:14:01,680 explain a little bit about it, which is how I came away from 232 00:14:01,680 --> 00:14:04,440 the conversation only to get a letter in the post about two 233 00:14:04,440 --> 00:14:07,600 days later saying how, you know, delighted to meet you, so glad 234 00:14:07,600 --> 00:14:10,200 you've decided to go forward for this thing. 235 00:14:10,520 --> 00:14:12,240 And he had entered me into the process. 236 00:14:12,240 --> 00:14:16,440 So, so that that was how it sort of took over that that's, that's 237 00:14:16,440 --> 00:14:22,920 a sort of slightly silly detail. I, my my family have a have a 238 00:14:22,920 --> 00:14:26,360 strong military background, which is not absolutely not been 239 00:14:26,360 --> 00:14:28,840 a defining factor, but it did mean and, and as I said, going 240 00:14:28,840 --> 00:14:31,680 back to the beginning about trying to civilianize this talk, 241 00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:36,400 it gave me an idea of the sorts of things that military life, 242 00:14:36,400 --> 00:14:38,000 army life in particular entailed. 243 00:14:38,000 --> 00:14:41,000 And it wasn't the idea of sort of rigid discipline and being 244 00:14:41,000 --> 00:14:42,880 told what to do. It was actually totally the 245 00:14:42,880 --> 00:14:48,680 obverse, which was being able to be fit and do exciting 246 00:14:48,680 --> 00:14:52,000 adventurous stuff and be paid for it and, and use your brain 247 00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:54,200 at the same time. And I, I couldn't really at that 248 00:14:54,200 --> 00:14:56,280 age or stage imagine anything better. 249 00:14:56,280 --> 00:15:00,680 It was, it was a huge appeal. I, I, I didn't really consider 250 00:15:00,680 --> 00:15:02,320 that there was any other professional out there that was 251 00:15:02,320 --> 00:15:07,440 offering in any way that kind of thing, as well as the enormous 252 00:15:08,040 --> 00:15:12,200 responsibility and privilege of helping other people run their 253 00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:16,200 lives in, in a command sentence. And that, that was absolutely 254 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:22,960 borne out by getting to my first platoon and having a, a bunch of 255 00:15:24,400 --> 00:15:28,640 in the main, absolutely unbelievable individuals to, to 256 00:15:29,480 --> 00:15:31,480 look after if they want to a better term. 257 00:15:31,480 --> 00:15:36,640 And, and I think it's a huge shame that that that I'm talking 258 00:15:36,640 --> 00:15:39,720 about the perspective of an officer, but this is not 259 00:15:39,720 --> 00:15:42,280 exclusively the preserve of an officer because everybody has 260 00:15:42,280 --> 00:15:44,200 this sort of welfare responsibility. 261 00:15:44,640 --> 00:15:48,320 And for people not to understand that that is such a huge part of 262 00:15:48,320 --> 00:15:49,760 it. I think it's really regrettable. 263 00:15:49,760 --> 00:15:52,840 And I think it's also deliberate because it does sort of 264 00:15:52,840 --> 00:15:55,920 desensitize the whole issue and it, and it enables when 265 00:15:55,920 --> 00:15:58,800 expedient for people in the armed forces to be sort of 266 00:15:58,800 --> 00:16:00,800 othered to, you know, they're not high casts. 267 00:16:00,800 --> 00:16:02,000 They're, they're, they're different. 268 00:16:02,000 --> 00:16:04,960 And I think again, that's a, that's a, that's a great shame. 269 00:16:04,960 --> 00:16:07,960 But that, but that was, that was a huge, huge part of it. 270 00:16:08,240 --> 00:16:11,520 And I, the reason I make that point is that I, what I would 271 00:16:11,520 --> 00:16:15,560 like to say is it as a really distinct issue is that I was not 272 00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:19,960 at all drawn to the idea of guns and ammo. 273 00:16:20,240 --> 00:16:24,640 I just, that was, that's going to be part of it. 274 00:16:24,640 --> 00:16:28,280 But I was not one of those people who just wanted to, you 275 00:16:28,280 --> 00:16:32,000 know, get on the ranges and fire off loads of ammunition or, or 276 00:16:32,520 --> 00:16:36,160 indeed go into a theatre of conflict in order to kill 277 00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:39,040 people. That was never ever any of my 278 00:16:39,120 --> 00:16:42,120 motivation at all. But that was because naively 279 00:16:42,520 --> 00:16:46,800 Queen and country even then still to me meant something. 280 00:16:47,120 --> 00:16:50,480 And and and this is the problem. But we can come back to that. 281 00:16:50,480 --> 00:16:52,360 But say, yeah, that was that was the motivation. 282 00:16:52,600 --> 00:16:55,160 But. Charles, I'm glad I asked you 283 00:16:55,160 --> 00:17:02,480 the question because I also got a scholarship and at the age of 284 00:17:02,480 --> 00:17:08,200 16, and this came about because my father had had done wartime 285 00:17:08,200 --> 00:17:11,040 service in the Navy. He'd originally worked in the 286 00:17:11,040 --> 00:17:16,599 dockyard here in Devonport and in a particular year, I think it 287 00:17:16,599 --> 00:17:21,680 was the very beginning of 42, a small number of people from 288 00:17:21,680 --> 00:17:25,400 protected industries in the dockyard was one of them were 289 00:17:25,400 --> 00:17:29,200 actually called up. And I can't remember how many 290 00:17:29,200 --> 00:17:32,680 went from Devonport Dockyard. Several, 100. 291 00:17:32,680 --> 00:17:35,560 Not on the scale of the thousands that worked there. 292 00:17:35,560 --> 00:17:38,400 It wasn't very many, but anyway, it resulted in my father 293 00:17:39,960 --> 00:17:42,880 spending the Second World War in, in the Navy. 294 00:17:44,840 --> 00:17:49,720 And he he, he ended up chief shipwright, chief Petty Officer 295 00:17:50,560 --> 00:17:57,120 and he saw some things which, you know, deeply upset him, but 296 00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:01,000 it was clear that, that he enjoyed a lot of his service 297 00:18:01,000 --> 00:18:04,120 time. But at the end of the war, he'd 298 00:18:04,120 --> 00:18:06,120 met my mum, which is probably a good thing. 299 00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:10,520 And he, he decided that he was going to come out, even though 300 00:18:10,520 --> 00:18:14,920 the Navy offered him the opportunity to stay on a full 301 00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:16,760 time career. And they didn't do that with 302 00:18:16,760 --> 00:18:19,840 many people. So that was a, a feather in his 303 00:18:19,840 --> 00:18:23,640 cap. But when sort of I, I was a 304 00:18:23,640 --> 00:18:26,960 teenager and you, you start thinking about what your career 305 00:18:26,960 --> 00:18:33,120 is, I was pretty uncertain. And then 11 week, my father 306 00:18:33,120 --> 00:18:36,640 announced that on the Wednesday he was going to be taking me 307 00:18:36,640 --> 00:18:39,920 into, it was called HMS Flying Fox. 308 00:18:39,920 --> 00:18:43,120 It was a little ship that was alongside in Bristol. 309 00:18:43,680 --> 00:18:45,840 And this was just to have a chat. 310 00:18:46,320 --> 00:18:48,240 It's a parallel just to have a chat. 311 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:55,840 And so one very misty cold morning I was my dad and I drove 312 00:18:55,840 --> 00:19:00,400 down into Bristol and I go on board HMS Flying Fox and I meet 313 00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:03,200 her. Well, he seemed quite old to me, 314 00:19:03,200 --> 00:19:06,320 but I suspect he was, he was quite a young Lieutenant. 315 00:19:06,840 --> 00:19:10,560 And the next minute I was asked a whole load of questions about 316 00:19:10,560 --> 00:19:14,520 this and that which I quite enjoyed and I didn't find it 317 00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:17,600 particularly difficult. And the next thing was a letter 318 00:19:17,600 --> 00:19:23,480 in the post inviting me for a full week assessment which was 319 00:19:23,480 --> 00:19:26,440 in Portsmouth. And as a result of doing that, 320 00:19:26,520 --> 00:19:31,160 I, I got a scholarship, which meant all I had to do was get 2A 321 00:19:31,200 --> 00:19:35,760 levels and then I would be able to go to Dartmouth, which is 322 00:19:36,600 --> 00:19:40,760 still the Royal Navy's officer training location. 323 00:19:42,040 --> 00:19:48,680 So that's what happened. I got my got my A levels and the 324 00:19:48,680 --> 00:19:52,880 next minute I was just 18. Only a couple of weeks into 325 00:19:52,880 --> 00:19:57,120 being 18I arrived at Dartmouth. I'm not going to say a lot of it 326 00:19:57,120 --> 00:20:00,880 for me was was absolute fascination and curiosity 327 00:20:00,880 --> 00:20:05,320 because immediately you were exposed to a very different sort 328 00:20:05,320 --> 00:20:08,760 of lifestyle. But also very quickly it was to 329 00:20:08,760 --> 00:20:11,240 do with boats. You were on the river Darts and 330 00:20:11,240 --> 00:20:16,920 you you were learning about boats and warships and being 331 00:20:16,920 --> 00:20:19,520 able to sail and mess around in boats. 332 00:20:20,360 --> 00:20:24,440 And much as you're saying, I found this very enjoyable and 333 00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:27,560 I'll add. I was fascinated at that time by 334 00:20:27,560 --> 00:20:32,000 the number of people that bailed out the training and I found 335 00:20:32,000 --> 00:20:35,720 this astonishing because some people decided after two weeks 336 00:20:35,920 --> 00:20:41,400 that they'd had enough and I couldn't understand why they 337 00:20:41,400 --> 00:20:44,080 would leave at that point because I thought you haven't 338 00:20:44,080 --> 00:20:49,760 seen enough. But they did on subsequent as 339 00:20:49,760 --> 00:20:53,240 the calls progressed and faces got blacked out on the 340 00:20:53,240 --> 00:20:57,440 photographs. And until, you know, we passed 341 00:20:57,440 --> 00:21:01,280 out and that's the terminology we qualified. 342 00:21:01,360 --> 00:21:07,200 And it was about that time that the Navy suddenly announced that 343 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:09,840 it was looking for people to go to university. 344 00:21:10,520 --> 00:21:14,720 And I'd made a specific decision in my head that I wanted to join 345 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:16,200 the military. I didn't want to go to 346 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:19,320 university. And suddenly here was the Navy 347 00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:23,360 pushing and pushing and pushing for these newly qualified 348 00:21:23,560 --> 00:21:29,160 midshipmen to go to university. And I ended up sort of asking 349 00:21:29,280 --> 00:21:34,040 some advice from, from some of the staff and they all said, 350 00:21:34,040 --> 00:21:36,600 well, you know, it's an incredible opportunity because 351 00:21:36,600 --> 00:21:40,040 you're going to be in, in London, you're going to be paid 352 00:21:40,520 --> 00:21:43,120 and you get a degree and this can't be bad. 353 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:47,440 So in the end, I, I took it. And that meant that I went from 354 00:21:47,640 --> 00:21:52,800 from the traditional training route through to university, got 355 00:21:52,800 --> 00:21:57,160 the degree, had a lot of fun, got the degree, just came back 356 00:21:57,160 --> 00:22:01,160 into the Navy then to start the training properly and 357 00:22:01,160 --> 00:22:04,160 eventually, you know, you join the fleet at sea. 358 00:22:06,120 --> 00:22:11,280 So even my training periods, there were these big changes 359 00:22:11,280 --> 00:22:17,320 happening because prior to that you'd had the system of young 360 00:22:17,320 --> 00:22:25,760 boys, 12 through till 12 through to probably 17, doing a sort of 361 00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:29,320 cadet ship with, with the Navy, and then they would become 362 00:22:29,320 --> 00:22:31,920 midshipmen. And then at that stage they go 363 00:22:31,920 --> 00:22:36,120 to Dartmouth. And so that was a very, a very 364 00:22:36,120 --> 00:22:39,200 long introduction to a career in the military. 365 00:22:39,360 --> 00:22:44,080 And many of those young men that did it, you know, we were going 366 00:22:44,160 --> 00:22:49,480 to the, let's say, up, up and into the 1930s came from 367 00:22:49,480 --> 00:22:52,480 military families where their parents been in the military for 368 00:22:52,480 --> 00:22:54,680 a long time. So you had this inherent 369 00:22:55,240 --> 00:22:58,000 understanding of what the military was about. 370 00:22:58,560 --> 00:23:02,200 And when I got to Dartmouth, I'd come to a grammar school. 371 00:23:02,200 --> 00:23:05,320 But when I got to Dartmouth, that was a very different system 372 00:23:05,320 --> 00:23:08,840 of training. But previously you had 373 00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:12,520 youngsters had gone through a system and they were very 374 00:23:12,720 --> 00:23:15,520 knowledgeable by the time they got to Dartmouth. 375 00:23:16,160 --> 00:23:19,960 So what am I trying to describe? I'm trying to describe that 376 00:23:20,120 --> 00:23:25,120 looking back, I can see that I already joined the system where 377 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:30,560 the strength of families being involved with the military and 378 00:23:30,560 --> 00:23:35,000 people getting engaged with the military at a young age, that 379 00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:39,480 was being pushed aside. And to me, I couldn't, I could 380 00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:44,320 easily see that this was depriving the military of a lot 381 00:23:44,320 --> 00:23:49,120 of inherent strength from, from the amount of time that people 382 00:23:49,120 --> 00:23:52,520 had spent training. It was ingrained in them. 383 00:23:52,640 --> 00:23:56,720 And this is very powerful thing. This is what makes good troops. 384 00:23:57,120 --> 00:24:00,080 When it's not, They're just there for a career. 385 00:24:00,600 --> 00:24:02,280 It's something they really want to do. 386 00:24:02,280 --> 00:24:04,000 They're very knowledgeable on the subject. 387 00:24:04,440 --> 00:24:08,680 So I find that very interesting that you also did a scholarship 388 00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:12,000 like that. Yeah, I mean, well, this is it. 389 00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:15,400 I think. You know, you're right, the way 390 00:24:16,120 --> 00:24:22,720 which these things have changed and and you know, the view. 391 00:24:22,720 --> 00:24:28,280 Therefore from the outside, I mean, I think you know, going 392 00:24:28,280 --> 00:24:33,040 back to the the type of people that that are drawn towards this 393 00:24:33,040 --> 00:24:35,360 or do do this. I'm actually very interested to 394 00:24:35,360 --> 00:24:39,200 hear about the number of people that dropped out that that was 395 00:24:39,200 --> 00:24:43,600 not maybe exceptions. That certainly wasn't the case 396 00:24:44,160 --> 00:24:48,280 in my era at Santos. There were, there were there 397 00:24:48,280 --> 00:24:51,320 were very small number of people who decided not to. 398 00:24:51,320 --> 00:24:55,120 Some people physically weren't up to it and therefore left. 399 00:24:55,120 --> 00:24:59,080 But by and large people stayed. And and actually just to just to 400 00:24:59,080 --> 00:25:04,400 again further qualify the the situation with the sort of the 401 00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:06,280 people element, which I think is so important. 402 00:25:06,280 --> 00:25:11,880 I, I well, remember the opening address that we had from what 403 00:25:11,920 --> 00:25:15,640 Well, Sant has this split up on what would I suppose be a 404 00:25:15,640 --> 00:25:18,560 regimental basis, but they're, they're colleges say, well, you 405 00:25:18,560 --> 00:25:21,480 start off in old college and therefore you have a commander 406 00:25:21,680 --> 00:25:26,040 who is a sort of seasoned Lieutenant Colonel. 407 00:25:26,040 --> 00:25:28,480 So it's kind of chief executive role, I guess. 408 00:25:29,080 --> 00:25:34,880 And I, I remember David Hill, he was who spoke to us and said the 409 00:25:34,880 --> 00:25:37,880 first thing he said was, was welcome. 410 00:25:39,680 --> 00:25:43,720 You have joined that group of society that picks up other 411 00:25:43,720 --> 00:25:48,360 people's rubbish. And it was, it was very good. 412 00:25:48,440 --> 00:25:53,840 And I know the word integrity has, has, has difficult 413 00:25:53,840 --> 00:25:57,160 connotations for, for UK column because of the integrity 414 00:25:57,160 --> 00:25:59,520 initiative. But, but if we forget that for 415 00:25:59,520 --> 00:26:01,880 one minute, it wasn't him that said it. 416 00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:04,560 But it was always said that because, because you know, this 417 00:26:04,560 --> 00:26:07,640 old idea of ethos and all that kind of thing, but integrity was 418 00:26:07,640 --> 00:26:11,480 always the big one. And to, to put out that theme a 419 00:26:11,480 --> 00:26:15,760 little further, integrity is, was always described as being, 420 00:26:16,720 --> 00:26:19,360 picking up other people's rubbish when no one's watching. 421 00:26:19,880 --> 00:26:25,280 And, and, and I think it is a point worth making because there 422 00:26:25,280 --> 00:26:31,000 are two elements to it. 1 Is this idea that the the military 423 00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:36,000 shapes the person as opposed to the person having the aptitude, 424 00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:40,760 all that system and therefore fitting into it well, adapting 425 00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:42,680 to it and getting the most out of it. 426 00:26:42,680 --> 00:26:45,080 There will always be debate on that, but my view is that 427 00:26:45,080 --> 00:26:49,360 predominantly people of a certain bent, of a certain 428 00:26:49,360 --> 00:26:54,440 character will be drawn towards a particular organization and I 429 00:26:54,440 --> 00:26:58,520 think the military expressly because ultimately it might lead 430 00:26:58,520 --> 00:27:00,480 to your death. So you have to be quite sure 431 00:27:00,480 --> 00:27:02,400 about whether or not you want to do it. 432 00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:04,760 So that's one side of it. The other side of it is that 433 00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:11,240 there is AI can totally understand why, but but there is 434 00:27:11,240 --> 00:27:14,600 a regard that people once they've joined the armed forces, 435 00:27:14,600 --> 00:27:16,360 they are in effect trained killers. 436 00:27:16,360 --> 00:27:19,480 That's really all they're about which yes, OK, that is true 437 00:27:19,480 --> 00:27:21,960 because you're not really going to be of much use in an armed 438 00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:25,960 force if you're not doing that bit or able to do that bit. 439 00:27:25,960 --> 00:27:30,760 That is part and parcel of it. But that absolutely goes 440 00:27:30,760 --> 00:27:36,320 alongside the, the litter picking bit in that the, the 441 00:27:36,320 --> 00:27:39,720 system simply doesn't work if people don't behave with 442 00:27:40,120 --> 00:27:42,760 terrific respect for one another. 443 00:27:42,920 --> 00:27:47,640 And, and any, any breach in that, any failure of that is, is 444 00:27:47,760 --> 00:27:50,200 catastrophic. And, and you know, it's always 445 00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:54,400 the, the, the service test was always the, the, the determining 446 00:27:54,400 --> 00:27:57,520 factor in, in how the situation was looked at, which was does 447 00:27:57,520 --> 00:28:00,960 it, does the, the situation, if there's been a breakdown in 448 00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:04,320 communications or discipline or whatever, does it fail the 449 00:28:04,320 --> 00:28:07,200 service test, which is, does it, does it compromise your 450 00:28:07,240 --> 00:28:11,280 operational effectiveness? And, and I, I think there are 451 00:28:11,480 --> 00:28:15,080 two don't get dragged too much down the kind of military ball 452 00:28:15,080 --> 00:28:19,640 thing, but there are so many really, really positive sort of 453 00:28:19,640 --> 00:28:23,320 universal elements from the way those systems were managed 454 00:28:23,320 --> 00:28:26,320 between people that could, I think could and should be 455 00:28:26,320 --> 00:28:30,200 transposed in a, in a completely non military sense, but into the 456 00:28:30,880 --> 00:28:32,840 civilian environment. And you know, this goes back to 457 00:28:32,840 --> 00:28:34,920 what you're talking about where, where that there is this sort of 458 00:28:34,920 --> 00:28:39,000 intentional breakdown and that the idea of the sort of the 459 00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:42,440 service family thing being stopped and, and all that. 460 00:28:42,440 --> 00:28:44,080 And I totally agree. And I think I think the 461 00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:47,680 consequence for society as a whole has been terrific. 462 00:28:47,920 --> 00:28:52,960 And and actually, if I may just use one anecdote, I can remember 463 00:28:53,920 --> 00:28:57,200 about 15 years ago, there was a very, very cold winter. 464 00:28:57,200 --> 00:29:02,240 It was the winter 2010 eleven. Climate change obviously hasn't 465 00:29:02,400 --> 00:29:05,960 started by that stage. So there was terrific, terrific 466 00:29:05,960 --> 00:29:10,400 guys at the time, I was living in a village that had a Ford in 467 00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:12,560 the road that went out of the village. 468 00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:15,240 So, so you went down a relatively steep descend through 469 00:29:15,240 --> 00:29:18,880 the Ford, not the other side, but because nobody had bothered, 470 00:29:19,480 --> 00:29:22,040 there was a huge amount of ice high side of it. 471 00:29:22,040 --> 00:29:24,000 Basically people couldn't get in and out. 472 00:29:24,600 --> 00:29:29,720 And, and I, I, you know, OK, it wasn't something that I'd 473 00:29:29,720 --> 00:29:31,120 actually need to do for those reasons. 474 00:29:31,280 --> 00:29:37,320 But when it did become necessary to be able to clear that ice, I 475 00:29:37,320 --> 00:29:40,440 went down, you know, it was, it was -10 outside. 476 00:29:41,040 --> 00:29:47,040 And I started sorting the, the tracks and smashing it away with 477 00:29:47,040 --> 00:29:50,360 a, with a shovel and whatnot. Was one other bloke who arrived 478 00:29:50,360 --> 00:29:52,080 more or less at exactly the same time. 479 00:29:52,600 --> 00:29:55,200 And he was a private soldier from the Parachute Regiment. 480 00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:58,200 He'd just been shot in the leg and was recovering. 481 00:29:58,200 --> 00:30:01,960 He'd been through heading court. There was some rehabilitation 482 00:30:01,960 --> 00:30:06,560 thing and there we were, stripped down T-shirts, pouring 483 00:30:06,560 --> 00:30:10,280 this sweat and -10 clearing the path for this village. 484 00:30:10,280 --> 00:30:11,280 I don't say that. So why? 485 00:30:11,320 --> 00:30:13,520 You know how amazing? But the point is that it was 486 00:30:13,840 --> 00:30:17,600 that it was two people who were, who were both active servicemen 487 00:30:17,600 --> 00:30:20,560 who just decided to do something that a village of, I don't know, 488 00:30:20,640 --> 00:30:22,800 300 people hadn't, hadn't thought to do. 489 00:30:22,800 --> 00:30:23,880 And neither of us. Sorry. 490 00:30:23,880 --> 00:30:27,040 The point is that we were both sort of visitors. 491 00:30:27,560 --> 00:30:29,360 Neither of us was actually living there full time. 492 00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:30,840 So I mean, it just. Yeah. 493 00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:34,480 And if you if you stop the system from working properly, 494 00:30:34,480 --> 00:30:37,680 then society doesn't have that sort of dividend as it were 495 00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:42,360 returned to it. Yeah, it's a very interesting 496 00:30:42,360 --> 00:30:48,000 area and for me, very well. You saw this very quickly on 497 00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:51,480 board a ship because the ship does not function if people are 498 00:30:51,480 --> 00:30:57,520 not working together and you have all sorts of risks around 499 00:30:57,520 --> 00:30:59,360 you. So that, you know, that could be 500 00:30:59,360 --> 00:31:03,720 fire or it could be flood or it could be the explosion Ship is, 501 00:31:03,760 --> 00:31:07,720 is a, is a pretty dangerous mix of things because you've got 502 00:31:07,720 --> 00:31:13,520 people in a steel box with fuel and explosive in large 503 00:31:14,480 --> 00:31:17,920 quantities. And so there's an inherent need 504 00:31:17,920 --> 00:31:22,560 for people to be professional and reliable and trustworthy in 505 00:31:22,560 --> 00:31:25,120 order to survive in that environment. 506 00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:30,320 And you add to it, you know, if a ship goes to sea in very rough 507 00:31:30,320 --> 00:31:35,520 weather, it requires that ship to work properly and to be 508 00:31:35,520 --> 00:31:38,680 sufficiently robust that you're going to come out the other side 509 00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:44,000 of, of the storm. And so you've got this, this 510 00:31:44,440 --> 00:31:49,240 wonderful environment of people who have been, who were very 511 00:31:49,240 --> 00:31:53,440 well trained. And also they were, they'd built 512 00:31:53,440 --> 00:31:59,440 up a camaraderie together where people could rely on each other. 513 00:31:59,680 --> 00:32:03,560 They'd looked out for each other and on top of that, the thing I 514 00:32:03,560 --> 00:32:07,720 remember of of the Navy was a very quiet working environment. 515 00:32:08,320 --> 00:32:11,760 Most people were asked if they would do something. 516 00:32:12,520 --> 00:32:16,240 Occasionally they were told, but generally it was put across in a 517 00:32:16,240 --> 00:32:20,880 very soft way. And I always laughed when I 518 00:32:20,880 --> 00:32:26,000 started to see some of the BBC documentaries about the Navy and 519 00:32:26,320 --> 00:32:29,200 certainly if I saw BBC documentaries about the holding, 520 00:32:29,200 --> 00:32:31,880 because people were always shouting at each other. 521 00:32:32,280 --> 00:32:35,800 And this was something I'd never, I'd never encountered, 522 00:32:36,760 --> 00:32:41,600 you know, maybe once or twice in a serious situation where 523 00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:44,920 somebody needed to shout because we're in the open air and you 524 00:32:44,920 --> 00:32:48,920 needed to get water across. The rest of the time it happened 525 00:32:49,280 --> 00:32:54,520 in a very quiet, measured way. And the interesting thing is, is 526 00:32:55,360 --> 00:32:58,920 and I, I think it is still the same today, but if you, if you 527 00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:03,080 then went to the submarine service where the danger was 528 00:33:03,080 --> 00:33:06,160 even greater because you're in a steel box with fuel and 529 00:33:06,160 --> 00:33:11,040 explosive nuclear radiation and you're under the water, 530 00:33:11,880 --> 00:33:14,760 everybody has to know what they're doing. 531 00:33:15,560 --> 00:33:19,280 And yet the working environment is even quieter and the 532 00:33:19,280 --> 00:33:23,560 relationship much softer between offices and and the normal 533 00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:27,400 ranks. And why was it like that? 534 00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:30,320 Because everything was running very smoothly. 535 00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:38,040 And, and the other bit so bad to it is, is conversations that I 536 00:33:38,040 --> 00:33:42,080 remember and usually the best conversations in the Navy always 537 00:33:42,080 --> 00:33:45,560 do during the night watches. Because if you were officer of 538 00:33:45,560 --> 00:33:49,920 the watch, you're up on the bridge and you, you had two or 539 00:33:49,920 --> 00:33:55,360 three the ship's company with you as lookouts or steering. 540 00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:58,040 And you would have conversations, very normal 541 00:33:58,040 --> 00:34:02,800 conversations about families and holidays and cars and whatever 542 00:34:02,800 --> 00:34:07,160 it was always with a sense of humour. 543 00:34:08,040 --> 00:34:12,480 And and so this idea that, as you say, that the military is 544 00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:16,400 just this way of ingraining in people that they're, they're 545 00:34:16,400 --> 00:34:19,840 going to become trained killers, that was absolutely not what I 546 00:34:19,840 --> 00:34:22,920 saw. Were you expected to do your 547 00:34:22,920 --> 00:34:25,280 job? Which ultimately, you know, if 548 00:34:25,280 --> 00:34:29,400 we were at war that does involve killing people, But the but the 549 00:34:29,400 --> 00:34:36,480 actual day-to-day Society of the military was, was very relaxed 550 00:34:36,480 --> 00:34:39,560 and personable and it was based on people skills. 551 00:34:39,639 --> 00:34:40,960 Yeah, I mean, I mean, I totally agree. 552 00:34:40,960 --> 00:34:45,400 I, I, I agree with you, in fact, trying to find a documentary 553 00:34:45,440 --> 00:34:48,400 about the army in which anyone actually speaks rather than 554 00:34:48,400 --> 00:34:51,560 shouts, It's it's difficult. And, and having been 555 00:34:51,880 --> 00:34:54,600 specifically having been a Guardsman where you spent quite 556 00:34:54,600 --> 00:34:58,360 a lot of your time shouting on a parade. 557 00:34:59,240 --> 00:35:02,040 Yeah, it's, it's extraordinary. And of course, again, being 558 00:35:02,080 --> 00:35:06,520 infantry, most of what you're doing outside in an active sense 559 00:35:06,520 --> 00:35:09,600 involves shouting because of the the notes. 560 00:35:09,600 --> 00:35:11,400 But, but clearly there is another element to that. 561 00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:16,160 No, I mean my, my, my memory of, you know, all services behave 562 00:35:16,160 --> 00:35:18,760 differently for, for different reasons, but no, my memory was 563 00:35:19,000 --> 00:35:22,880 exactly the same that think things were conducted in in a, 564 00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:26,240 in a calm and rational manner. And, and actually this is this, 565 00:35:26,240 --> 00:35:28,200 this I think is such an interesting. 566 00:35:28,520 --> 00:35:31,960 It's not exactly a paradox, but but it these these two things 567 00:35:31,960 --> 00:35:36,800 that are very closely related, that we have this system in 568 00:35:36,800 --> 00:35:40,360 which people know their job absolutely inside out and can 569 00:35:40,360 --> 00:35:44,600 depend with their life upon the persons on either side of them. 570 00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:46,360 That's the only way in which it works. 571 00:35:46,360 --> 00:35:52,560 And we were talking recently about how different this can be 572 00:35:52,560 --> 00:35:55,440 in the civilian environment. And I and my own experience is 573 00:35:55,840 --> 00:36:00,680 subsequent to leaving the Army in terms of having spent any 574 00:36:00,680 --> 00:36:05,360 time either working within or in close proximity to large 575 00:36:06,360 --> 00:36:08,920 corporations. I have seen the exact opposite. 576 00:36:08,920 --> 00:36:13,040 I have seen the vast majority of people with no real idea of 577 00:36:13,280 --> 00:36:15,880 where the job begins and ends and what indeed they are 578 00:36:15,880 --> 00:36:19,240 supposed to do in that role. And actually, if the pressure 579 00:36:19,240 --> 00:36:22,240 increased, they would collapse because they don't get it. 580 00:36:22,920 --> 00:36:26,360 And there are lots of reasons why that might be the case. 581 00:36:26,360 --> 00:36:29,840 But ultimately, they're not going to die or get injured if 582 00:36:29,840 --> 00:36:34,600 they don't get it right. And yet we talk about the 583 00:36:34,920 --> 00:36:38,560 humanity, the, the human side of, of the armed forces. 584 00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:43,280 But we cannot get away from the fact that ultimately, if they 585 00:36:43,280 --> 00:36:47,440 are exercised in the way that that they are currently and have 586 00:36:47,440 --> 00:36:50,560 been for hundreds of years, lives are lost. 587 00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:54,280 And what I'd be very interested in, in your perspective, is that 588 00:36:57,640 --> 00:37:02,320 in retrospect, obviously I, I don't believe there was any 589 00:37:02,320 --> 00:37:06,160 merit in any of the foreign interventions that were being 590 00:37:06,160 --> 00:37:09,760 conducted during the period of time that I spent in the Army. 591 00:37:10,120 --> 00:37:14,640 Quite the opposite. I think they were really 592 00:37:14,760 --> 00:37:20,080 disgraceful engagement. But but the difficulty is that 593 00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:24,600 people like me are still getting to want to belong to those sorts 594 00:37:24,600 --> 00:37:27,240 of organisations because of all the sorts of things that we're 595 00:37:27,240 --> 00:37:32,480 talking about. Do you remember how you felt 596 00:37:32,480 --> 00:37:37,200 about the sorts of operational theatres that were either being 597 00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:42,360 entered into or that were likely or, or you know, your point of 598 00:37:42,360 --> 00:37:48,520 view on whatever one calls it sort of foreign intervention? 599 00:37:48,520 --> 00:37:52,880 Because I because I find it's it's a very difficult thing to 600 00:37:52,920 --> 00:37:56,600 to be absolute about because of all the other it won't be 601 00:37:56,600 --> 00:38:01,440 positive attributes. It's, it's very interesting. 602 00:38:01,560 --> 00:38:03,440 This is a very interesting subject. 603 00:38:03,440 --> 00:38:08,440 I think I would have to say that for the first instance during my 604 00:38:08,440 --> 00:38:13,160 career, the the overwhelming thing was this was Cold War 605 00:38:13,160 --> 00:38:17,200 time. And so if everything was focused 606 00:38:17,240 --> 00:38:21,320 around the Cold War scenario, we still have the British Army of 607 00:38:21,320 --> 00:38:25,160 the Rhine. There was still major exercises 608 00:38:25,160 --> 00:38:30,360 taking place in in Germany, and that was all on the basis, of 609 00:38:30,360 --> 00:38:35,720 course, of the Soviet Union in invading the West and at sea. 610 00:38:37,760 --> 00:38:42,480 All of the exercises effectively were based on scenarios around 611 00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:49,040 for me locating and and tracking and ultimately destroying 612 00:38:49,040 --> 00:38:54,600 Russian submarines, Soviet submarines and the major 613 00:38:54,600 --> 00:39:00,600 exercises at sea used to be called the teamwork series. 614 00:39:00,680 --> 00:39:05,880 And they were based on first of all the American carrier groups 615 00:39:05,880 --> 00:39:11,320 moving across from from the United States principally into 616 00:39:11,320 --> 00:39:16,840 the North Atlantic and also up into the Norwegian Sea to 617 00:39:16,880 --> 00:39:25,600 project so projects US air power across Norway and protecting the 618 00:39:25,600 --> 00:39:30,560 northern flank and deterring the Soviet Air Force from moving 619 00:39:30,560 --> 00:39:37,120 down into the Norwegian Sea. the US carrier groups were the first 620 00:39:37,680 --> 00:39:43,200 role for the Royal Navy because we were to be part of the anti 621 00:39:43,200 --> 00:39:45,520 submarine screen for those units. 622 00:39:45,520 --> 00:39:47,400 And I think we did a pretty good job. 623 00:39:48,000 --> 00:39:51,800 But of course, the carriers were the full front of the supply 624 00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:55,800 ships coming across because nothing has changed from the 625 00:39:55,800 --> 00:39:58,480 Second World War. In order for a major war to be 626 00:39:58,480 --> 00:40:03,440 fought in Europe, the American industrial complex had to 627 00:40:03,440 --> 00:40:08,080 produce the munitions and the food and fuel and everything 628 00:40:08,080 --> 00:40:10,920 else. And that had to be transported 629 00:40:10,920 --> 00:40:14,040 in convoy across the North Atlantic. 630 00:40:14,640 --> 00:40:20,320 So for me, during the bulk of my time, it was it was clearly the 631 00:40:20,320 --> 00:40:25,280 Cold War and. I didn't really pay attention to 632 00:40:27,040 --> 00:40:31,800 specific deployments overseas, although I did, I did do one 633 00:40:32,560 --> 00:40:36,520 particularly boring patrol out in the Gulf when it, it, it's, 634 00:40:36,680 --> 00:40:39,240 it was getting a little bit serious out there. 635 00:40:39,240 --> 00:40:44,480 But none of that was a sort of major deployment for the, for 636 00:40:44,480 --> 00:40:47,520 the Royal Navy. The big thing for me was the 637 00:40:47,520 --> 00:40:52,240 Falklands and that was particularly of great 638 00:40:52,240 --> 00:40:55,840 significance to me because I just started my warfare 639 00:40:55,840 --> 00:40:59,840 training. The career in the, in my career 640 00:40:59,840 --> 00:41:04,280 in the Navy was that initially you work to train in basic 641 00:41:04,400 --> 00:41:08,680 navigation skills and then you work to get your bridge watch 642 00:41:08,680 --> 00:41:13,280 keeping ticket, which means you can, you are capable of holding 643 00:41:13,360 --> 00:41:15,920 a watch on the bridge on your own day and night. 644 00:41:16,720 --> 00:41:20,040 And then when you've got those skills then they start to move 645 00:41:20,040 --> 00:41:22,320 you forward to the warfare training. 646 00:41:22,920 --> 00:41:27,480 And so I went to HMS Dryad in Portsmouth to start that warfare 647 00:41:27,480 --> 00:41:30,040 training. And we were only a few weeks in 648 00:41:30,040 --> 00:41:34,400 when the Falklands started. And what came to the surface 649 00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:38,000 very quickly was that there was not enough warfare people at 650 00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:42,120 sea. And so I was, I can't remember 651 00:41:42,120 --> 00:41:44,880 how many of us there were, but they were, there was a 652 00:41:44,880 --> 00:41:48,560 relatively small number of us that were pulled off the course 653 00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:52,720 early, put on a ship and then sent down to the Falklands. 654 00:41:53,240 --> 00:41:58,640 So I didn't even go through the full warfare training course 655 00:41:59,440 --> 00:42:03,840 because the Falklands started and rapidly there was this major 656 00:42:03,840 --> 00:42:08,040 escalation and they were desperately short of certain 657 00:42:08,040 --> 00:42:09,680 people, including the warfare ones. 658 00:42:09,680 --> 00:42:14,560 So I was on board a frigate and sent off to the Falklands and I 659 00:42:14,560 --> 00:42:19,680 have to say I was very lucky because we got down there two 660 00:42:19,680 --> 00:42:25,400 days after the Armistice was signed and I then did a very 661 00:42:26,240 --> 00:42:27,720 well. Some of it was interesting. 662 00:42:27,720 --> 00:42:31,360 I was going to say very boring patrol down there and of course 663 00:42:31,480 --> 00:42:34,240 you were there having missed all the glory. 664 00:42:34,440 --> 00:42:40,040 So anybody you encountered had, who had been there was very keen 665 00:42:40,040 --> 00:42:42,840 to say what they've been doing, etcetera, etcetera. 666 00:42:43,520 --> 00:42:45,920 But we got down there after the fighting had stopped. 667 00:42:46,960 --> 00:42:50,760 So I have to be very thankful that I, I wasn't put in harm's 668 00:42:50,760 --> 00:42:54,120 way. Some of the people that I joined 669 00:42:54,120 --> 00:42:56,920 the Navy with died in the, in the Falklands. 670 00:42:57,440 --> 00:43:00,080 And a couple of them I only discovered recently when I was 671 00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:03,560 doing a bit of research and I was looking through the names of 672 00:43:03,560 --> 00:43:07,080 the, the deceased across the armed forces and I suddenly 673 00:43:07,080 --> 00:43:10,520 thought, Oh my goodness, I didn't realize he, he died. 674 00:43:11,000 --> 00:43:16,200 So, but the preparations for the full Falklands obviously were 675 00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:21,720 taken very seriously. And yes, I, I got the experience 676 00:43:21,720 --> 00:43:25,520 of gearing up for war. And then of course, you know, 677 00:43:25,520 --> 00:43:30,000 we, we started here, the reports of the, of the hits on the other 678 00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:35,680 ships, HMS Sheffield and Coventry and, and the Type 21 679 00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:39,760 frigates that were hit. And so as we were on our way 680 00:43:39,760 --> 00:43:43,560 down, we, we knew that if, you know, it was serious stuff and 681 00:43:43,560 --> 00:43:46,320 people were dying and, and being killed. 682 00:43:48,040 --> 00:43:51,080 So that, that was a pretty unique experience for me. 683 00:43:51,680 --> 00:43:56,640 And then after that I, I specialized in anti submarine 684 00:43:56,640 --> 00:43:59,920 warfare and that was, that was tracking the, the Russian 685 00:43:59,920 --> 00:44:03,960 nuclear submarines and bombers as they came out into the 686 00:44:03,960 --> 00:44:08,080 Atlantic. That was very good because it it 687 00:44:08,080 --> 00:44:10,120 was real. It wasn't that we were on a 688 00:44:10,120 --> 00:44:13,440 training exercise. We were, we were finding the 689 00:44:13,440 --> 00:44:17,440 real, the real deal, the Russian submarines. 690 00:44:19,520 --> 00:44:22,520 And that was a very enjoyable time because I got a lot of 691 00:44:22,520 --> 00:44:26,360 satisfaction about that work. And I would also add, we had 692 00:44:26,360 --> 00:44:30,040 huge respect for the Russian submariners because they were 693 00:44:30,040 --> 00:44:36,920 very capable people. And to answer your point, it was 694 00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:41,160 after that that I eventually ended up in the Fishery 695 00:44:41,160 --> 00:44:44,840 Protection Squadron where I had command one of the fishery 696 00:44:45,400 --> 00:44:51,920 protection vessels, HMS Orkney. And that is when I really 697 00:44:51,920 --> 00:44:55,880 started to think about what we were doing, because it quickly 698 00:44:55,880 --> 00:44:59,720 became apparent to me that though the role of the Fishery 699 00:44:59,720 --> 00:45:05,440 Protection Squadron had been to protect, at least with a very 700 00:45:05,440 --> 00:45:10,480 small P, British fishing boats at sea, what we were actually 701 00:45:10,480 --> 00:45:15,640 doing was imposing the European fisheries policy on those 702 00:45:15,640 --> 00:45:18,600 fishing. And the story that I've told in 703 00:45:18,600 --> 00:45:25,080 a lot of life talks over the years is that one very dark 704 00:45:25,080 --> 00:45:31,560 winter's night we boarded a Scottish fisherman of more or 705 00:45:31,560 --> 00:45:33,600 less the entrance to the Firth of 4th. 706 00:45:34,240 --> 00:45:38,160 And he he was breaking the rules for the size of his net. 707 00:45:38,680 --> 00:45:43,080 We weren't able to make a decision on the spot. 708 00:45:43,080 --> 00:45:49,240 We always had to refer to Ministry of Agricultural 709 00:45:49,800 --> 00:45:53,760 Fisheries as it was then. So there was a dedicated team 710 00:45:53,800 --> 00:45:57,320 and they told us very clearly that we were to come to 711 00:45:57,720 --> 00:46:02,920 confiscate his net. And the Scottish captain of that 712 00:46:02,920 --> 00:46:07,120 boat talked to me in some pretty colourful language that I was 713 00:46:07,120 --> 00:46:09,880 destroying his effing livelihood. 714 00:46:10,720 --> 00:46:13,480 And I knew that that was exactly true. 715 00:46:13,720 --> 00:46:18,040 And I also knew that when I was travelling around the the North 716 00:46:18,040 --> 00:46:22,280 Sea or up around the Shetlands and Falkland Islands doing the 717 00:46:22,280 --> 00:46:28,160 fishery patrols, we were seeing EU funded fishing boats for the 718 00:46:28,160 --> 00:46:32,200 French and the Spanish and the Germans in particular. 719 00:46:33,120 --> 00:46:38,120 Brand new boats paid for with European money that was simply 720 00:46:38,120 --> 00:46:42,720 wiping the oceans of fish and destroying the livelihoods of 721 00:46:42,720 --> 00:46:46,160 the British fishermen. And I started to feel deeply 722 00:46:46,160 --> 00:46:50,160 uncomfortable about that. And it was actually that 723 00:46:50,520 --> 00:46:54,200 experience that made me get to a point where I thought this is 724 00:46:54,200 --> 00:46:56,880 not for me. And and so I left. 725 00:46:56,880 --> 00:47:02,000 So, you know, ironically, it wasn't a military style 726 00:47:02,000 --> 00:47:05,960 requirement to the armed forces that that brought that home to 727 00:47:05,960 --> 00:47:09,400 me. I never experienced A 728 00:47:09,400 --> 00:47:13,680 deployment, you know, where we were operating in the waters of 729 00:47:13,680 --> 00:47:16,880 some foreign country where I thought, are we doing the right 730 00:47:16,880 --> 00:47:19,880 thing? It for me it was the fishery 731 00:47:19,880 --> 00:47:22,600 protection where I knew it was not the right thing. 732 00:47:23,480 --> 00:47:25,720 Yeah, I mean, I think, I think it's fascinating and, and again 733 00:47:25,720 --> 00:47:29,280 to the, well actually both military and civilian audience, 734 00:47:29,280 --> 00:47:32,000 I think, I think it's, you know, one of the things is that, that 735 00:47:32,000 --> 00:47:34,640 I prefer to quite a number of times on the news. 736 00:47:34,640 --> 00:47:37,720 And I think it's, it's safe worth bringing out, which is 737 00:47:37,720 --> 00:47:42,400 that all, all, all activities are governed by rules of 738 00:47:42,400 --> 00:47:45,920 engagement. You know, any, any, any 739 00:47:45,960 --> 00:47:48,840 operational deployment whatever that there are, there are set 740 00:47:48,840 --> 00:47:53,000 conditions under which you may or may not use force or you 741 00:47:53,000 --> 00:47:55,240 know, you return far or far upon. 742 00:47:55,240 --> 00:47:58,920 And, and I think it's, it is certainly understood and it's 743 00:47:59,280 --> 00:48:02,280 certainly not it, it was fairly confident. 744 00:48:02,280 --> 00:48:07,880 It was never expressly said in any of the laws of our conflict 745 00:48:07,880 --> 00:48:11,120 training that I undertook. But when you look at when you 746 00:48:11,120 --> 00:48:15,040 look at how it's written down, which is in joint services 747 00:48:15,040 --> 00:48:18,360 publication JSP 398 and you and you read what it says about 748 00:48:18,360 --> 00:48:25,320 rules of engagement, that the rules of engagement are the use 749 00:48:25,320 --> 00:48:27,760 of force as a political expression. 750 00:48:28,680 --> 00:48:32,640 It, it, it does just make you think about everything in a 751 00:48:32,720 --> 00:48:35,200 completely different way. Because in within that 752 00:48:35,200 --> 00:48:37,520 environment, whether it doesn't matter where you are, whether 753 00:48:37,520 --> 00:48:40,200 you know that there are for every situation, there are rules 754 00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:43,080 of engagement. They do, they do get changed, 755 00:48:43,080 --> 00:48:47,200 but you're always led to believe that that has come from within 756 00:48:47,320 --> 00:48:49,840 your command structure. And as they there is an 757 00:48:49,840 --> 00:48:52,800 appraisal of the situation and appraisal of what would be 758 00:48:52,800 --> 00:48:56,360 regarded as, you know, risk or threats or or whatever. 759 00:48:58,120 --> 00:49:01,600 But but actually that's not where it comes from. 760 00:49:01,840 --> 00:49:06,840 All of this is, is a political expression, a political fact. 761 00:49:07,400 --> 00:49:12,960 And this, this is, you know, where the, the difficulty lies. 762 00:49:12,960 --> 00:49:14,840 And that's why I thought, you know, find it so interesting to 763 00:49:14,840 --> 00:49:16,760 listen to you talk about these periods. 764 00:49:16,760 --> 00:49:19,240 But the only thing I was going to ask as a follow up is do you 765 00:49:19,240 --> 00:49:23,400 remember either at the time or afterwards, anybody ever 766 00:49:23,400 --> 00:49:29,160 questioning either what happened in the lead up to or in the 767 00:49:29,160 --> 00:49:34,480 Falklands or indeed in the activities concerning, you know, 768 00:49:34,520 --> 00:49:37,360 the the sort of monitoring of the great Soviet bear? 769 00:49:38,240 --> 00:49:43,600 Was there the sense that, you know, it was not quite as it was 770 00:49:43,600 --> 00:49:48,000 being? Sold, I'd say, I'd say not in 771 00:49:48,000 --> 00:49:52,200 this in the Soviet time. But then I'm going to say my 772 00:49:52,840 --> 00:49:56,040 perception of what was going on was, you know, I was very young 773 00:49:58,560 --> 00:50:03,320 and you're doing a particular job, doing a particular job. 774 00:50:04,080 --> 00:50:08,680 And just, you know, something that comes into my mind during 775 00:50:08,680 --> 00:50:15,000 the Cold War, one of the things that the the Soviets did, you 776 00:50:15,120 --> 00:50:19,400 know, the Soviet military exercises, they always talked 777 00:50:19,480 --> 00:50:23,720 with real place names. Whereas if NATO, when it's a 778 00:50:23,720 --> 00:50:29,200 size usually, well usually inevitably we, we would be 779 00:50:29,200 --> 00:50:31,680 running to some exercise scenario. 780 00:50:32,440 --> 00:50:36,800 And if there was a country defined or a power block, the 781 00:50:36,800 --> 00:50:43,320 breadth power block, you were talking about targets that were 782 00:50:43,320 --> 00:50:47,200 always given code names, no great code names. 783 00:50:47,520 --> 00:50:51,040 But when the Soviets were doing their exercises, they would be 784 00:50:51,040 --> 00:50:56,920 talking about advancing, you know, 30 miles further into West 785 00:50:56,920 --> 00:50:59,920 Germany and they will be talking about the the names of the 786 00:50:59,920 --> 00:51:01,680 places that they were going to be taking. 787 00:51:02,160 --> 00:51:06,320 Now, was that a bit of propaganda to put, put the West 788 00:51:06,320 --> 00:51:07,760 under pressure? Absolutely. 789 00:51:08,200 --> 00:51:12,920 But of course that that did make you think that their intent was 790 00:51:12,920 --> 00:51:15,000 real. So. 791 00:51:15,280 --> 00:51:18,840 So I'm going to say that Cold War period people were very 792 00:51:18,840 --> 00:51:25,120 heavily focused and there was there was a lot of deep concern 793 00:51:25,120 --> 00:51:29,600 about Soviet capability and of course strength in numbers 794 00:51:29,600 --> 00:51:34,200 because they had very big military and certainly very big 795 00:51:34,200 --> 00:51:37,920 submarine fleet. And so there was an inherent, 796 00:51:38,920 --> 00:51:42,680 I'll say fear with a small F about the bear. 797 00:51:45,400 --> 00:51:49,880 But no, I didn't, I didn't get any pushback. 798 00:51:49,920 --> 00:51:52,320 Don't see any better pushback about that period. 799 00:51:52,920 --> 00:51:58,240 The Falklands was mainly the push back actually was against, 800 00:51:58,480 --> 00:52:03,200 you know, UK because people knew very early on that we'd run into 801 00:52:03,200 --> 00:52:07,880 major problems in the Falklands because we hadn't got the ships 802 00:52:07,920 --> 00:52:12,000 or equipment. And very often it was clear that 803 00:52:12,240 --> 00:52:17,000 within the war Navy people had been warning and complaining 804 00:52:17,000 --> 00:52:20,360 about this for a long time. I mean, one of the key things is 805 00:52:20,360 --> 00:52:24,920 that ships started to appear, new design ships started to 806 00:52:24,920 --> 00:52:29,840 appear during the Cold War that had very few weapon systems on 807 00:52:29,840 --> 00:52:33,960 them. And, and the moment the Falcons 808 00:52:33,960 --> 00:52:37,040 blew up, everybody said, well, you're going to be facing 809 00:52:37,040 --> 00:52:40,480 fighter ground attack aircraft close to coastal areas. 810 00:52:40,800 --> 00:52:44,360 We need traditional weapons, we need 20 millimetre, 30 811 00:52:44,360 --> 00:52:47,080 millimetre guns and the ships didn't have them. 812 00:52:47,640 --> 00:52:53,640 So what then transpired was this rapid retrofitting of ships with 813 00:52:53,640 --> 00:52:58,280 anything they could find. And the frigate that I was on 814 00:52:58,280 --> 00:53:04,000 board HMS Sirius, which had four Exocet missiles. 815 00:53:04,000 --> 00:53:08,480 It had sea cap surface to air missiles which although old, 816 00:53:08,480 --> 00:53:11,920 proved that that missile system proved pretty capable. 817 00:53:11,920 --> 00:53:17,880 In the Falklands we had a couple of single 20 millimetres and 818 00:53:17,880 --> 00:53:21,960 they ended up fitting a twin 20 millimetre on the bridge. 819 00:53:22,360 --> 00:53:25,920 But that 2020 millimetre was not a modern weapon. 820 00:53:26,200 --> 00:53:31,360 It was it was a relic from the Second World War and so so ships 821 00:53:31,360 --> 00:53:36,680 went down there many of them I'll equipped for the battle 822 00:53:36,680 --> 00:53:40,440 that the Argentinians could bring you know again against the 823 00:53:40,440 --> 00:53:43,360 British and and we paid the price for that. 824 00:53:43,400 --> 00:53:49,320 And when, when you look back at good military analysis of the 825 00:53:49,320 --> 00:53:52,520 Falklands, we were very, very lucky. 826 00:53:53,400 --> 00:53:57,720 And the bombs not exploding in Borne Alley, when the 827 00:53:57,760 --> 00:54:01,440 Argentinian, the pilots dropped bombs and they, they didn't own 828 00:54:01,440 --> 00:54:06,880 properly, that was that was just unbelievable luck for the fleet. 829 00:54:07,680 --> 00:54:17,720 So I quickly saw from my my, my Falklands experience that the 830 00:54:17,760 --> 00:54:21,200 military power that was was looking after, sorry, the 831 00:54:21,440 --> 00:54:25,040 political power that was looking after the military was 832 00:54:25,520 --> 00:54:29,560 absolutely failing to provide what the military needed. 833 00:54:30,280 --> 00:54:36,120 And every year that I served, we were being, we were being told 834 00:54:36,120 --> 00:54:40,240 there were going to be further cuts in manpower and ships and 835 00:54:40,240 --> 00:54:42,800 training. That was one of the things that 836 00:54:42,800 --> 00:54:44,880 happened. And the other thing that 837 00:54:45,120 --> 00:54:49,600 happened with increasing frequency was some form of 838 00:54:49,600 --> 00:54:53,480 reorganization. And this might be the renaming 839 00:54:53,480 --> 00:54:58,360 of, of, of professional tasks within the military. 840 00:54:58,960 --> 00:55:03,120 It could be to do with absolutely stupid changes to the 841 00:55:03,120 --> 00:55:07,040 uniforms, it changes to the badges. 842 00:55:07,600 --> 00:55:11,560 So in in an organization, which I would say when it's working 843 00:55:11,560 --> 00:55:16,160 properly, there's inherent stability and people know not 844 00:55:16,160 --> 00:55:19,760 only the organizational structure, they they know what 845 00:55:19,760 --> 00:55:23,440 the systems and they know the training everyone's had that 846 00:55:23,440 --> 00:55:28,920 that became ever more turbulent and you could see the effects. 847 00:55:29,640 --> 00:55:35,480 So initially you just put it down to the people who who kick 848 00:55:35,480 --> 00:55:38,480 started these changes lacked common sense. 849 00:55:38,480 --> 00:55:40,520 That's what you mind told, told you. 850 00:55:41,360 --> 00:55:46,320 But later I started to come to the conclusion that these, these 851 00:55:46,320 --> 00:55:50,120 damaging changes were not a lack of common sense, they were 852 00:55:50,120 --> 00:55:54,920 orchestrated. And that's when, OK, that was 853 00:55:54,920 --> 00:55:57,920 before my time with the with the Fishery Protection Squadron. 854 00:55:57,920 --> 00:56:00,600 But that's why I started to think there's something 855 00:56:00,600 --> 00:56:04,160 malevolent at work. Yeah, and Ian, I think that's 856 00:56:04,160 --> 00:56:08,200 totally fascinating. And Julian Assange's words 857 00:56:08,200 --> 00:56:10,680 spring to mind with The Forever War. 858 00:56:10,760 --> 00:56:15,000 You know, the, the, the goal is not to have a successful war, 859 00:56:15,000 --> 00:56:19,600 but a but an endless 1. And it's fascinating and I, you 860 00:56:19,600 --> 00:56:22,320 know, although a sort of a different period, but this is 861 00:56:22,320 --> 00:56:25,880 exactly what I saw. You know, I was my point. 862 00:56:25,880 --> 00:56:30,760 Naomi coincided with two in terms of tech 2 significant 863 00:56:30,760 --> 00:56:35,160 changes. One was the digitization of all 864 00:56:35,160 --> 00:56:40,320 radio comms from the Klansman system, which was absolutely 865 00:56:40,320 --> 00:56:43,000 brilliant because it worked absolutely everywhere. 866 00:56:43,000 --> 00:56:46,640 It didn't matter how many bogs and puddles and whatever you 867 00:56:46,640 --> 00:56:50,840 dropped it in, it still worked to Boatman, which was, I don't 868 00:56:50,840 --> 00:56:53,720 know whether people consider that it works now, but it was 869 00:56:53,720 --> 00:56:55,600 absolutely hopeless at the start. 870 00:56:55,600 --> 00:56:59,680 And would the the all comms would drop all the time and it 871 00:56:59,680 --> 00:57:04,040 took forever to to reinitialize. And you can imagine in a yeah, 872 00:57:04,880 --> 00:57:08,200 battlefield context that is that is just not workable. 873 00:57:08,840 --> 00:57:11,480 So that so those two things were changed. 874 00:57:11,680 --> 00:57:13,760 Oh, sorry, that one thing was changed and that had a, you 875 00:57:14,480 --> 00:57:17,160 know, I would say a very detrimental effect, not least 876 00:57:17,160 --> 00:57:19,320 because in actual fact, the other thing was that it required 877 00:57:19,320 --> 00:57:22,400 considerable skill to understand how to use that technology. 878 00:57:22,400 --> 00:57:25,960 So it wasn't that was there was not a universality in that in 879 00:57:25,960 --> 00:57:27,920 the way there was. And just just to explain to 880 00:57:27,920 --> 00:57:30,320 people that it's sort of the difference between a push button 881 00:57:30,320 --> 00:57:32,400 and a smartphone. The push button thing, you kind 882 00:57:32,400 --> 00:57:35,640 of know what what it's going to do in the way that the log radio 883 00:57:35,640 --> 00:57:38,840 thing just was a radio with dials and you just clicked a 884 00:57:38,840 --> 00:57:40,400 battery onto it. There were lots of different 885 00:57:40,680 --> 00:57:43,480 types as opposed to it all being digital and having to have 886 00:57:43,480 --> 00:57:47,480 complicated process attached. And the other thing was supposed 887 00:57:47,480 --> 00:57:50,520 personnel management system. All personnel stuff was running 888 00:57:50,520 --> 00:57:56,520 from Glasgow and they went on to a system JPA, it was called 889 00:57:56,520 --> 00:57:58,120 joint personnel administration, I think. 890 00:57:58,160 --> 00:58:02,400 And again, it just didn't work and and and going back to 891 00:58:02,720 --> 00:58:05,320 Assange's thing and and exactly what we're describing in the 892 00:58:05,320 --> 00:58:10,680 Falklands. If the armed forces capability 893 00:58:10,720 --> 00:58:13,360 and I and I say this with all the we don't even NATO summit, 894 00:58:13,360 --> 00:58:16,120 recent NATO summit in mind, defence review and all this kind 895 00:58:16,120 --> 00:58:18,040 of stuff. But if it if it can absolutely 896 00:58:18,040 --> 00:58:22,880 do what it is supposed to do. And we are to to imagine that 897 00:58:22,880 --> 00:58:27,200 there is a sort of justifiable conflict and we really were able 898 00:58:27,200 --> 00:58:30,480 to deliver the effects that we promise it would be over within. 899 00:58:30,600 --> 00:58:35,760 By hampering the capability, it means that it can be extended to 900 00:58:35,760 --> 00:58:38,080 the enormous benefit of the war industry. 901 00:58:38,080 --> 00:58:41,120 And we need look at the security, sorry, the strategic 902 00:58:41,120 --> 00:58:43,160 defensive review and the national security strategy to 903 00:58:43,160 --> 00:58:46,600 see that that is nothing more than a business plan for these 904 00:58:46,600 --> 00:58:48,120 industries. And when you do start to think 905 00:58:48,120 --> 00:58:51,480 about it like that, so much more of it makes sense, you know, to, 906 00:58:51,480 --> 00:58:54,680 to sort of keep the system going, but continually hamstring 907 00:58:54,680 --> 00:58:57,800 it in order that you get your forever wars. 908 00:58:57,800 --> 00:59:00,200 I know that might seem like a terribly cynical way to look at 909 00:59:00,200 --> 00:59:02,800 it, but I think when you've gone through the system, it's very 910 00:59:02,800 --> 00:59:04,240 hard to consider it in another way. 911 00:59:04,240 --> 00:59:08,200 Because I saw exactly the same thing with, let's say with Iraq, 912 00:59:08,200 --> 00:59:11,360 but Afghanistan in particular, the the the advent of what we're 913 00:59:11,360 --> 00:59:15,640 called urgent operational requirements, which was the sort 914 00:59:15,640 --> 00:59:21,160 of the ven process of, you know, just fixing the 30 mil cannon to 915 00:59:21,160 --> 00:59:23,160 to the front. It wasn't, but it was just 916 00:59:23,160 --> 00:59:26,360 buying off the shelf kit that wasn't in the budget that no one 917 00:59:26,360 --> 00:59:28,200 had training on. I mean, it was, it was chaos. 918 00:59:28,200 --> 00:59:31,160 It was absolutely chaos. And and therefore it meant that 919 00:59:31,160 --> 00:59:33,640 the effect on the ground was not what it should have been because 920 00:59:33,640 --> 00:59:35,600 of it. And, you know, don't tell me 921 00:59:35,600 --> 00:59:37,280 that no one could have seen that coming. 922 00:59:37,400 --> 00:59:39,920 And then, you know, we go back to well, things. 923 00:59:40,480 --> 00:59:42,720 Yeah, my experience was people did see these. 924 00:59:42,720 --> 00:59:45,640 Things coming and they were constantly talking about it. 925 00:59:46,120 --> 00:59:50,400 And we, we could go a strategic scale, we could go very small 926 00:59:50,400 --> 00:59:54,520 scale. But for a strategic thing, there 927 00:59:54,520 --> 00:59:57,720 was the announcement, whatever year it was that they're going 928 00:59:57,720 --> 01:00:01,040 to get rid of Royal Navy's aircraft carriers. 929 01:00:01,800 --> 01:00:05,080 And everybody said, you know what, what are you talking 930 01:00:05,080 --> 01:00:06,760 about? Because those aircraft carriers, 931 01:00:06,760 --> 01:00:13,320 apart from anything else, invariably formed the task group 932 01:00:13,520 --> 01:00:18,320 that that the Royal Navy. Produced in order to integrate 933 01:00:18,320 --> 01:00:22,280 with the American carrier battle groups we, we were part of the 934 01:00:22,280 --> 01:00:26,920 outer screen and and our carriers carrying anti submarine 935 01:00:26,920 --> 01:00:32,440 helicopters or ASW planes were part of that outer screen. 936 01:00:32,440 --> 01:00:38,280 So, so people started to, you know, question this decision and 937 01:00:38,280 --> 01:00:41,480 of course it trickled down through the the Navy structure 938 01:00:42,040 --> 01:00:46,960 and there was a sufficient backlash that they were known as 939 01:00:46,960 --> 01:00:51,200 the through deck cruisers. This was a new proposal design 940 01:00:52,040 --> 01:00:55,960 and people worked hard enough to say, well, actually the through 941 01:00:55,960 --> 01:01:00,320 deck cruiser should be trying to changed to make it aircraft 942 01:01:00,320 --> 01:01:05,440 carrier life. And I think we were, we were 943 01:01:05,440 --> 01:01:09,480 grateful that we did get these new small aircraft carriers, but 944 01:01:09,480 --> 01:01:12,560 of course they didn't have an angled flight deck, they didn't 945 01:01:12,560 --> 01:01:16,960 have a catapult system and therefore they were very limited 946 01:01:16,960 --> 01:01:19,200 in the aircraft they could carry. 947 01:01:20,120 --> 01:01:23,360 They could carry the Harrier. The Harrier did very well during 948 01:01:23,360 --> 01:01:26,920 the Falklands. But if we had had carrier 949 01:01:26,920 --> 01:01:31,480 launched airborne early warning aircraft, which of course the 950 01:01:31,480 --> 01:01:34,040 Americans had, and we had previously with the old 951 01:01:34,040 --> 01:01:38,520 carriers, a lot of the damage in the Falklands wouldn't have 952 01:01:38,520 --> 01:01:41,160 happened. But somebody made a decision 953 01:01:41,160 --> 01:01:42,800 that we were going to get rid of carriers. 954 01:01:43,400 --> 01:01:46,440 Then when the new carriers came in, there was a gap. 955 01:01:46,800 --> 01:01:49,120 And that means you're losing the training, of course. 956 01:01:49,840 --> 01:01:54,160 And this was something you you saw happening time and time 957 01:01:54,160 --> 01:01:57,080 again. And the other one I'll just 958 01:01:57,080 --> 01:02:00,880 mention was that that at one stage when I got a lot of 959 01:02:00,880 --> 01:02:04,720 experience in the particular sonar systems that we were using 960 01:02:04,720 --> 01:02:09,360 to track the Russians, this is a long toad array. 961 01:02:10,280 --> 01:02:15,240 So it's like a hose pipe full of microphones and you're listening 962 01:02:15,800 --> 01:02:19,320 to sounds in the water and you can detect the sounds of vessels 963 01:02:19,320 --> 01:02:23,040 and submarines. But we had a particular sonar, 964 01:02:25,280 --> 01:02:29,360 it was produced by by Marconi. They were very excited when they 965 01:02:29,360 --> 01:02:33,880 produced it was taken to sea for tests and it's performance was 966 01:02:34,200 --> 01:02:36,600 outstanding. Nobody had ever seen anything 967 01:02:36,600 --> 01:02:38,920 like it. And so eventually this 968 01:02:38,920 --> 01:02:43,920 particular signal set was fitted in the frigate squadron that 969 01:02:44,040 --> 01:02:48,760 that I was part of. And then we very quickly started 970 01:02:48,760 --> 01:02:54,000 to go to sea on on these real life detection trips to find the 971 01:02:55,880 --> 01:03:00,320 Russian nuclear submarines. Well, eventually we were told 972 01:03:00,320 --> 01:03:04,680 that the Admiralty Research Department was going to create 973 01:03:04,920 --> 01:03:10,160 an update of this sonar system. And because computer technology 974 01:03:10,160 --> 01:03:15,280 had moved on the cabinets for it instead of being the size I'll 975 01:03:15,280 --> 01:03:20,240 say if you if you know the size of a double door fridge, an 976 01:03:20,240 --> 01:03:25,520 American double door fridge. The cabinet to drive my sonar 977 01:03:25,520 --> 01:03:28,040 system was three of those side by side. 978 01:03:28,960 --> 01:03:35,320 And the Admiralty Research Organization said they could 979 01:03:35,320 --> 01:03:39,840 produce computer that would do the same job about the size of 980 01:03:39,840 --> 01:03:42,960 your average domestic fridge, big domestic fridge. 981 01:03:44,200 --> 01:03:49,840 When the new sonar system was fitted, it very quickly became 982 01:03:49,840 --> 01:03:53,640 apparent it it wasn't as good or it wasn't as performing well. 983 01:03:54,280 --> 01:03:59,240 And eventually I was sent to sea with two ships, one with one 984 01:03:59,240 --> 01:04:03,240 system, one with the other system where we did a controlled 985 01:04:03,240 --> 01:04:05,800 trial to, you know, see what was going on. 986 01:04:05,800 --> 01:04:09,080 Was was it the equipment of fault or was it the training of 987 01:04:09,080 --> 01:04:12,240 the operators? And it quickly became apparent 988 01:04:12,240 --> 01:04:15,400 that the old system was better than the new one. 989 01:04:15,920 --> 01:04:18,400 So what did they do? They took out all the old 990 01:04:18,400 --> 01:04:21,760 systems and replaced it with a with a new signal. 991 01:04:22,560 --> 01:04:25,760 And it was at that point that I realized that whoever was 992 01:04:26,360 --> 01:04:31,680 controlling the operation was not interested in in you doing 993 01:04:31,680 --> 01:04:36,320 the the job or in your lives. Because if they're giving you 994 01:04:36,320 --> 01:04:38,800 deaf equipment, they don't care what happens to you. 995 01:04:39,840 --> 01:04:46,480 And so that was my one of my key examples of realising that the 996 01:04:46,480 --> 01:04:50,200 machinery driving the military wasn't everything we thought it 997 01:04:50,200 --> 01:04:52,720 was. And I and I, I think anyone. 998 01:04:52,840 --> 01:04:54,920 Anyone. Listening to who has any 999 01:04:54,920 --> 01:04:57,680 military experience will, I'm sure, have have an example of 1000 01:04:57,680 --> 01:04:59,360 exactly that just brings to mind, yeah. 1001 01:04:59,360 --> 01:05:04,160 As to completely commonplace, I think we might be nearly out of 1002 01:05:04,160 --> 01:05:05,600 time. But what I would say is that 1003 01:05:05,600 --> 01:05:08,320 there's so much more to talk about that I think we should 1004 01:05:08,320 --> 01:05:10,800 definitely do this again because I think we need to sort of bring 1005 01:05:10,800 --> 01:05:15,240 ourselves into the the more recent present day. 1006 01:05:15,240 --> 01:05:17,360 Yeah, I think so. So we should drop the. 1007 01:05:17,440 --> 01:05:20,640 Agenda for It's been an interesting experiment because. 1008 01:05:20,720 --> 01:05:23,440 You know, there is a big difference in our time frames 1009 01:05:23,440 --> 01:05:28,440 for serving in the military because I left in 93 so well 1010 01:05:28,440 --> 01:05:32,640 before you joined. But it hasn't been difficult to 1011 01:05:32,640 --> 01:05:37,080 have a a conversation where we know what we're talking about, 1012 01:05:37,120 --> 01:05:41,000 even though you're from an Army background and I'm from a Navy 1013 01:05:41,000 --> 01:05:43,120 background. And I find that I find that very 1014 01:05:43,120 --> 01:05:44,720 interesting. Yeah, I said, well, and I think 1015 01:05:44,720 --> 01:05:46,560 and I think that's that. Absolutely. 1016 01:05:46,560 --> 01:05:48,320 It's a generational thing. I mean, always think, you know, 1017 01:05:48,680 --> 01:05:54,800 to, for again, for, for the sort of civilian audience I've always 1018 01:05:54,800 --> 01:05:57,800 taken enormous pleasure in talking to, to the old and bold 1019 01:05:57,800 --> 01:05:59,800 as we fondly refer to them. But you know, regimental 1020 01:05:59,800 --> 01:06:02,880 gathering, speaking to people of previous generations by some 1021 01:06:02,880 --> 01:06:04,840 margin. And, and finally, you absolutely 1022 01:06:04,840 --> 01:06:07,160 speak the same language in that case across services as well. 1023 01:06:07,160 --> 01:06:09,960 And I think that's, I think that is absolutely fantastic. 1024 01:06:09,960 --> 01:06:14,120 But it but it is, you know, it's, it's not a surprise, but 1025 01:06:14,120 --> 01:06:17,040 to find that there is that much common ground between our 1026 01:06:17,040 --> 01:06:20,120 experiences. It's still sort of amazing until 1027 01:06:20,120 --> 01:06:24,240 you start to consider that that absolutely these things are all 1028 01:06:24,720 --> 01:06:28,600 done with intent and and those people making these decisions 1029 01:06:28,600 --> 01:06:33,960 are are by and large doing doing that for the same set of 1030 01:06:33,960 --> 01:06:36,480 reasons. Just just a final comment from 1031 01:06:36,480 --> 01:06:38,440 me. And perhaps this shouldn't come 1032 01:06:38,440 --> 01:06:42,000 up from, but there was no planned structure to this, so 1033 01:06:42,080 --> 01:06:44,840 so. Very, very unmilitary. 1034 01:06:46,680 --> 01:06:50,920 Several so I think I think. It's much better because we've 1035 01:06:50,920 --> 01:06:54,160 weaved around we wouldn't have done that exactly structure. 1036 01:06:54,760 --> 01:06:58,280 But I just wanted to say that we're having a conversation 1037 01:06:58,280 --> 01:07:02,280 where we are starting to get a bit critical about matters to do 1038 01:07:02,280 --> 01:07:04,320 with the difference in the military. 1039 01:07:04,720 --> 01:07:10,320 And I think it's important to say that I and I know for you, 1040 01:07:10,320 --> 01:07:14,200 we still have great respect for the people who are are serving. 1041 01:07:14,680 --> 01:07:18,160 And I think it's such a huge shame that many of the people 1042 01:07:18,160 --> 01:07:25,520 serving today are doing so within the system, which is 1043 01:07:25,520 --> 01:07:29,880 rapidly being exposed as a lie. I think that's the best way I 1044 01:07:29,880 --> 01:07:31,840 can get it. And I won't add to that. 1045 01:07:31,840 --> 01:07:34,040 I think that's a very good. Note to the bottom which to end 1046 01:07:34,040 --> 01:07:36,400 and we will go back and revisit exactly that theme. 1047 01:07:36,520 --> 01:07:38,640 Yeah, brilliant. Thank you very much, Charles.