As the Ukraine war passes its thousandth day, things are
greatly increasing in pace and scale with reports of ICBM
attacks from Russia on the Ukrainian city of Nipro.
And as we recall this yesterday, the Kremlin having apparently
announced that British and American military targets within
the UK and USA may be on the target list.
To discuss the escalation and potential resolution of the
Russia Ukraine conflict, I am joined today by three extremely
experienced retired senior military officers from India and
from the United Kingdom. In alphabetical order, Major
General Gagandeep Bakshi, Major General Chip Chapman and
Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Grant, who as viewers will see as we go
on, have overlapping areas of expertise.
They have a core shared specialism in counterterrorism,
but they have gone on to develop that respectively towards
information and psychological operations in Major General
Bakshi's case, in Chip Chapman's case, security policy at the
Ministry of Defence, and in Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Grant's
case, framing of defense legislation and modernization
and training of Eastern European military structures.
You're all very welcome, gentlemen.
And for the first of the three themes that we're going to
discuss today, I would like to address Chip Chapman In the
first instance we have seen in this week, in late November
2024, in which we record this ICBM attacks.
I don't think that they're disputed now by either side by
vehicle borne Russian ICBM systems on a large weapons
production facility in the Ukrainian industrial center of
NEPRO. We have then seen the Kremlin up
the ante once again with threats to the United Kingdom and United
States homelands. I would like to ask, first of
all, Chip Chapman's assessment, and then the other two of you
can contribute as you see fit on what exactly the likelihood of
further escalation is in the very short term, perhaps a month
or two. And leading on from that, which
commentators each of you would particularly value?
And if you wish, to be frank, whom you would not particularly
value as astute observers of the realities on the battlefield.
Chip Chapman. Well, the first thing I'd say at
the tactical level is I think Ukraine is losing slowly.
And that's a term that we've had before.
And interestingly, the first time I came across that was in
June 22 when it was a term used by Mike Waltz, who's now going
to be part of Trump's government.
Then, of course, the Ukrainians equalized the battlefield by the
introduction of High Mars and more American artillery.
So I do think the Russian proverb of the chicken pecks,
grain by grain is evident at the moment, particularly in on the
Donets front towards Pop Rosk, which if they do lose that I
think would be operationally significant in the way that a
lot of the other commentary throughout the last two years
about what has been operational, operationally significant has
not been. And of course you sequence
tactical battles for operational effect in support of strategic
objectives. So what I think has happened in
the last week or so is an attempt to equalize the
battlefield in the deep battle. Now, of course the deep battle
is that outside the the contact zone.
And I think that was done for three reasons in terms of the A
Tacoms and Storm Shadow being used across the border.
Firstly, in the short term, I think it's a trying to trump
proof Ukraine for the next two months.
Secondly, I think it's a reaction to the introduction of
the North Koreans. And again, a lot of commentators
have said that the introduction of the North Koreans is a sign
of weakness. I don't take that.
So the view, I take the view that if your total means is
increased and your strength of will is there, your power
resistance is elevated. Now, what the reciprocity, what
the Russians are trying to do, I think with their attacks, which
happened on the 17th in terms of the gain, trying to hit the
electricity grid and the infrastructure, which of course
used 120 missiles, both cruise and ballistic, and 90 drones.
And there's no doubt that a number of those were Iranian.
So, you know, there's always been Iranian technology and
Iranian capability being used. So I do think that the Russians
are trying to break the will of the Ukrainian people on the
third autumn and winter. And I also think it's probably
wrong that we're saying all the time that we're doing this to
get ourselves to a negotiating position.
That's only one potential strand of that.
I think the other strand is that a lot of the commentary from
Russia would suggest that Russia is not interested in any peace
initiatives. That they do see that the
submission and submission of Ukraine and destruction of
Ukraine and a surrender peace is what they really want to achieve
on the maximalist objective. And thirdly, that they don't
necessarily see any need for Putin wrong for Trump as a peace
broker. Now it's in relation to that
that we need to then look at what happened with the use of
the Arushnik missile yesterday. Now I don't think it is an ICBM,
it's the Russian, the American intelligence suggests it's
either an MRBM or a or short or short range ballistic missile,
doesn't really matter. In a sense, it's the novel
delivery vehicle which is the most important thing and it's
potential range which gives it this the strategic flavour.
However, I wouldn't go towards again this position which most
of the mainstream media and social media go to that were
necessarily heading for World War 3 for three reasons.
The first one is that the Americans actually knew about
the possibility of this experimental missile being used.
The second one is that the US were notified beforehand about
the launch and of course the reason for that is because
through the nuclear risk reduction channels.
And the reason for that is to avoid any miscalculation because
if you use an offset ballistic missile from range, then that's
going to set a long bells ringing.
But thirdly, I think in terms of the American response, it is
still that they are not going to be deterred by the what the
Russians have done. And I think I always take the
line here of Lord Robertson, who's former NATO Secretary
General and also involved in the British Strategic Defence Review
at the moment, that Putin will only be forced to retreat from
Ukraine by an absence of Western caution.
To answer your final question, Alex, about what sources do I
look at? I think it would be wrong of me
to give you any of the sources that I use.
But what I would say is anything that I analyse, I do through the
prism of the seven deadly sins of an analyst in the
intelligence community, including framing bias,
confirmation bias, group think and all those sorts of things.
So I'm trying to discriminate between what is realistic and
credible and what is incredible and unrealistic.
From a parachute officer we turn to an infantry officer.
Both of you have had counterinsurgency experience and
perhaps that's more relevant to the battlefield now than it may
seem. I turn them to Major General
Bakshi to respond to what he's heard from Chip Chapman.
How much of it do you concur with, Sir?
And in particular, I'm a keen to know what sources from India or
elsewhere outside the Euro American sphere where most of
our sources inevitably come from.
Where are you looking at for reliable commentary and
analysis? You know, there are information
warfare narratives in play, propaganda narratives in play.
And we did feel for a, you know, at a particular stage of this
early stages of this war that the propaganda narratives have
become so dominant that, you know, the objective reality on
the battlefield was one thing. And the propaganda narrative was
a different meta universe altogether.
And we did find there was a tendency in the West to believe
your propaganda narrative, you know, to to act as if it were
true. The simple fact is that the
Russians started this offensive, you know, with a very curiously
restrained, you know, policy given the standard Russian
military doctrine that relies on mass and scale, right, First
echelon, second echelon, third echelon, operational manoeuvre
group. I mean, that's the kind we had
seen in the Second World War. So what we find found here was a
curious tension between the Gerasimov hybrid war doctrine
and the standard Russian war doctrine of going on mass on
mass scale, not just in terms of manpower, but in terms of
technology, right? Waves after waves as we we were
used to. So we were quite surprised by
this false restriction. And then I had the occasion to,
you know, the military attache, Russian military attache here in
Delhi came over to me to discuss some of these things.
And I asked him, why are you so restrained?
Why are you not, you know, doing things as as is your doctrine in
mass and scale? So he, you know, very curiously,
he shocked and he said, Sir, you'll have to ask Putin that
because, you know, he believes Putin's.
I believe his anchor premise was that these are our cousins.
They are Slav cousins and therefore we should be
restrained in the usage of force.
In fact, he even objected to very heavy use of artillery,
which is standard God of War practice as far as the Russians
are concerned. So I told him tongue in cheek
that even the Pakistanis and we are cousins, but we fought 5
wars and you'll have to get over the cousin syndrome because it's
going to cost you. And frankly it did, though they
achieved their initial objectives in terms of securing
about 60% of Donbass, 90% of Luhansk, They secured the land
bridge to Crimea and of course Crimea was already with them.
So about 20% of Ukraine, most of the industrial portion, the
Russian speaking portion, that is what they secured.
And I do believe that that was their maximum objective because
they don't have the force levels.
Simple. If you want to go in for the
whole of Ukraine, you would need a force level about 10 times the
size of what you have. So initially they went in with
just 150,000 troops against the Ukrainian army.
That was 250,000 strong to start with and is over 550,000 after
mobilization. And then, you know, it was OK in
the offensive phase because people were a bit dazed by this
initial speed etcetera of the offensive.
But then it all ground down to a battle of attrition.
And then they had to hold 1000 kilometre front and you know,
their manpower gaps began to show through.
They the Ukrainians counter attacked in Kherson and they
pulled out troops on Kharkiv to reinforce Kherson and then the
the you are living in an area of battlefield transparency of
unprecedented levels. American satellites picked up
the gap in Kharkiv and they told the Ukrainians to go for it.
The Russians were withdrawing to the line of the Oskil and of
course their motorized infantry elements made a very grand
looking charge which looked like a Brit screen.
So the Russians were forced to mobilize much against Putin's
will. Politically, he has been
resisting mobilization from the word go.
He was taking their kicking and screaming by his generals.
So, you know, 300,000 they had to mobilize and then they built
the sort of work in line to defend what they have.
And in 2023, all the offenses that the Ukrainians launched to,
you know, throw the Russians out of that territory.
I thought that was a bit over strated.
That was overtly optimistic. All these offensives failed with
heavy losses to the Ukrainian, heavy losses to the Ukrainians.
And now the Russians are on the roll.
They have mobilized. But there were initial reports
that they had about 250,000 troops in reserve would be used
for an offensive either towards Kaiv or Odessa.
But they're bringing in the Ukrainian shows that they have
also reached the end of the battle unless they mobilize
again. And they are not really very
keen to throw in their conscripts because in 2022, the
conscripts suffered heavily, you know, But these short term
inductees suffer badly in war. They have suffered quite badly.
So Putin is loath to commit them to battle, though he has about
250 of them. So there is that force
constraint which is operative even more for the Ukrainians.
About 8 million Ukrainians have fled the country, but 1,000,000
plus have died or severely wounded horse the combat.
So be Ukrainian. Ukraine is really, really very
desperate for manpower. And now there is also the aspect
of when Donald Trump comes in, well, the weapon flowing will
also be severely curtailed. So they are running against
time. We find the Russians are now
making steady but relentless progress in the east.
The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk was designed to pull out Russian
forces from the east and force them to be redeployed for the
defence of Kursk. That doesn't seem to have
happened. That doesn't seem to have
happened though. I've recently read reports of
the 106th and another airborne division, you know, being
possibly troops being taken out there to reinforce Cusk.
But by and large the eastern offensive continues.
They're making progress towards Petrovsk.
They're they're also now in the Kuppians direction moving ahead
and it's a steady progress. They've been using their
dismounted infantry, they've been using infantry on
motorcycles. Very innovative use to get over
the drones. The drones have become caused
the revolution in military affairs.
Frankly, that's what we feel in India.
They've caused the revolution in military affairs in the, you
know, a $200 drone can knockout a Leopard tank or a, you know,
even an Abrams. And so many of them have gone.
So, so are the Ukrainians very adapted using drones.
In fact, both the sides are using drones and it is
interesting to see how both sides have innovative,
especially the Russians, they seem to have innovative quite
well. Now, where do we go from here?
That's the the critical question right now.
So I would reckon that the Ukrainian and the Russian
Eastern offensive is going to progress there at the
breakthrough point, at the turning point, more or less of
the war. And if they succeed, they might
try to break out towards the neighbor river, right?
And even if they don't, by and large, they would have captured
before Donald Trump takes charge a large amount of the balanced
territory in the Donbass, right? As far as Koosk is concerned,
they seem to be quite determined.
Their first assault after the Koreans came in have not really
made a breakthrough, but they are threatening the lines of
communication. So they are determined to snuff
that salient out. And we'll have to see how it
goes. But now with the use of the air
tag camps, you know, the ATA camps, President Joe Biden had
initially refused to allow these weapons to be used against
Russia a few months back. Now he has.
And there is a school of thought that seems to believe that tends
to believe that this is too complicated things for Donald
Trump. Donald Trump had made a very,
very clear assertion that he would like to bring peace to the
region. So there, there seems to be a
clear attempt to discomfort Donald Trump, to create problems
for him. And if you can shake up the plot
so much that it becomes impossible to try and achieve
peace, well, well, that's one narrative.
That's one narrative. We hope it's not true.
But that's the way it looks like right now.
And therefore, this round of escalation has started.
Now, Putin has also painted himself into a corner, right?
He had said that if you use Atacams, ETA camps can't be
fired unless the satellite data or the targets is given.
Unless the unless the coordinates are fed in by the
cryptologists who are only the American.
These, these crypto codes are not repeat, not with the
Ukrainians. So if you are going to fire a
Tac AMS, if you are going to fire storm shadows, you need
American and British experts on the ground, whether soldiers in
mufti or civil contractors, you have to have them on the ground.
And he had asserted that that means that United States and
United Kingdom are directly engaged in war with Russia.
That's a clear assertion that he has made and then he has gone
on, you know, with that up the, what shall I say, the escalation
ladder by firstly signing that nuclear doctrine revision which
says that in this kind of a contingency he can go for
nuclear first use, right? And, and then of course now he
has fired and ICBM, you can say that it was an intermediate
range ballistic missile or rather a medium range ballistic
missile. The R-26 supposedly has a range
of 6000 kilometers. So they fired from Astrakhan.
It's hardly 1000 kilometers, but it was a mobbed warhead and you
know as a demonstration as a demonstration.
What are the demonstrations you can do?
You can find a new you can test a nuke in your own territory to
send the signals around the message that don't thus far and
no further. But he started with this, the
lowest level of the deterrence by firing a medium range
ballistic missile, right, armed with the conventional weapons.
And even though the 200 KG blasts were not much damage done
is not so substantial, right? The fact is now, now what will
it deter the use of Atacams and Storm Shadows?
I I'm not very convinced because I think this will likely go on.
So what does Putin do? Does he tamely lose face or will
he escalate? That is the key question.
And I would be happy if my colleagues also, you know,
pushed in with the British perspective.
Thank you. And with discussion having
turned to the most sophisticated of artillery and missile
systems, who better to pick up this thread than Lieutenant
Colonel Glenn Grant, who has specialised in artillery for
much of his career? Indeed, he was leading the
British intelligence effort on artillery for a while.
Glenn Grant, I'm particularly keen to hear how much of what
you I've heard you concur with from these two speakers.
And as you have lived and worked in Eastern Europe for some years
now, there's hardly an Eastern European capital whose
ministries you have not assisted with defence reform in various
ways. What sources are you keen to
advise to us, particularly if there are English language
battlefield analysis sources from the region that we might
not be so familiar with? I agree almost completely with
my two general colleagues. I mean, it's a Tour de force
from both of them, if I may say. So to start the, the whole thing
off. But I have a couple of points
that that I would like to not argue with, but just make a sort
of my, my own feeling being different.
And that's with Chip's comment about the, the, the World War 3
coming. I think we're in World War Three
because I think that there's been a, there's been far too
much focus by everybody upon Ukraine, which I see as being
the, the, the fighting battlefield and far too little
understanding of what is going on that people, I think
erroneously call hybrid warfare. And so that, you know, that the
fact that, that, that the communication lines are being
damaged, that that Germany's had people trying to derail trains,
that I think 5 major, five major ammunition dumps over the years
have been blown up in Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Ukraine 5-6.
And, and that actually the war has been going on comfortably
against us since, I think at least we should say 2002, 2003,
something like that. And we just haven't woken up to
it. But now it's if you list all the
things that are called hybrid warfare, it's actually now it's
it's a full a four page of things all over the world.
And from what I hear from some of my better sources, there's a
lot more to come. So I would just say that on on
chip, everything else chip General chip said, I agree with
on, on, on on the actual attack point of of the the forces
coming in. Yes, Russia did come in with the
forces they had, but a point that is not actually grasped by
many people is that they came in in a different shape from
doctrine that they've been using previously.
In other words, they, they, they were actually brigades were
coming in and they had their own artillery and their own
logistics with them when they came in.
You can actually see this on the videos.
But the trouble was that the, the generals in the system, IE
the commanders had not gone away from, had not gone away from
centralization of, of fighting, which was their old way.
So in other words, you had troops coming in with a
different, with equipment in different shape, generals who
wanted centralization and, and a lot of people coming in who had
never actually ever been trained in doctrine because they'd never
been on exercise. They'd never done doctrine
because of the corruption in the 1st place that any money for
training was stolen. So many, many of the soldiers
coming in were simply and, and so you had all these mix UPS
plus this great belief that they were going to be met with
flowers, which of course they weren't.
They were met with a lot of individuals who had been out of
war since 2015 but who have got all their clothing and equipment
at home and who are waiting for Russia to come back.
So they were actually a lot of very quite high grade people
who'd fought in places like khaki in front of summy in front
of khaki who were actually nasty and ready and waiting, which the
Russians weren't expecting. And I think the last point
before moving on to the artillery was this thing about
this, the the nuclear doctrine revision.
Because I think that it's very often forgotten that paperwork
in Eastern Europe and in Russia is not actually anything to do
with decision making. It's to do with the gloriousness
of the paper itself. So you write a paper and it's
glorious. It's like a speech.
You do a speech and it's glorious.
And therefore what Putin is doing with his glorious paper is
showing that he is both glorious and he's in charge of it.
So the only way to be in charge of it and to get any benefit
internally is to change it. And of course, the only way to
change it is to make it harder. So he was left with no choice.
And I think this point about the the the general made about, you
know, what does he do next? He's he's boxing himself in.
The gloriousness of the paper is boxing him in as well.
But in the West, Gee whiz, how many people took this seriously?
I mean, Putin hasn't changed his views on how he's going to use
weapons since the beginning of the war.
He'll use them when he feels it's right to use them, not what
some piece of paper says or or or anybody else.
It's his program. And the one thing that comes to
my mind completely with this is that if, if he does go nuclear
and does do expand, go too far, he will lose all the gains he's
made. Because they're all these people
that are not really convinced about what they should do next
and how they should support would then be left with little
choice. They would either have to go
completely backwards and show total cowardly cowardliness for
their countries, or they would have to step forward alongside
Britain, Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, Poland and
actually do something. So I think that that this point
about Putin boxing himself in is actually quite significant.
But to play, if he goes more serious, he he loses, he loses
the gains, you know, the gain of Hungary, the gain of Slovakia,
the gain of president of Bulgaria and many other
countries that are half helping would be what I would say
missiles. I think it's just another step.
I don't think that the that the Ukrainians see this as being
anything worse because actually the bombs that have been thrown
at them on the front line and into some of the cities and near
the front line are actually quite significant.
I mean, they are making huge, huge craters.
They are destroying whole buildings.
So I don't think that they would see this as being any worse than
that which has already hit unless he goes nuclear.
But even then, two weeks ago in Ukraine, in Kiev, I had talking
to a couple of people and they said, well, if he goes nuclear,
there isn't anything worse he can do to us.
So there is already a mentality coming that that, you know,
we're expecting him to do this, but it's not going to matter
because we're not going to give in.
And with that, I turn to General Bakshi to kick off the second
round of questions on this very point of nuclear escalation.
You already addressed much of that, General Bakshi, in your
first set of comments. No doubt you will wish to
respond to what you have heard here from Glenn Grant.
And then more pointedly then for this middle round, I'd like to
ask what you understand, since you've spoken about Russia, as
has Glenn Grant, what you understand as being the United
States and to some extent NATO's and Britain's nuclear doctrine,
to some extent France's as well. Is that likely to change in the
Ukrainian theatre with regards to licensing of Ukrainians?
Obviously not to use nuclear weapons, but to use heavier
weapons with more direct Western support if low yield nuclear
weapons are launched first by Russia?
And what about the first use doctrine In reality, we've heard
from Glenn Grant, that's in Russia, many would argue in the
states as well. First use policy is not what it
is written up as being for public consumption.
So your thoughts on the possibility of nuclear
escalation in the next couple of months, please?
So to directly address that question, you see, I frankly do
not see it going to the level of nuclear escalation.
I don't think it suits Russia because if Donald Trump is going
to come in on 20th of January and he is quite committed to,
you know, winding this conflict down, then I think the Sena
strategy is for the Russians to, you know, steadily keep making
gains on the ground, ramp up the profession, the pressure
conventionally in terms of conventional tipped even heavier
missiles. There was some talk that, and in
fact there was a bit of a panic that one could sense that, you
know, American Embassy was being evacuated.
European embassies in cave were being evacuated because they
anticipated missile, hypersonic missile with a thermobaric
warhead or even, you know, heavier ICBM or MRBM with a
thermobaric warhead, which would do considerable amount of damage
to the American embassy. Now, American embassy is
sovereign space. You know, you're more or less
targeting the United States and that has its whole range of
ramifications. So we didn't see the attack on
Kaif with those thermobaric weapons, but we definitely saw a
lower level attack there, which quite obviously to me hasn't
sufficed to tamp down the American and British decision to
keep supplying or to to continue with the permission for Ukraine
to engage targets in Russia with attack amps with the cruise
missiles. The problem that we foresee is
Eastern loss of face. You see, there are too many red
lines of Putin that have been crossed, right?
And he's very conscious of his image back home.
If this red line is crossed with impunity, I'm afraid it is
putting Putin between a rock and a hard place.
And he's like, he's a very rational man, very calculating,
very methodical. And that's what kept the peace
so far. But but how long will that
continue? How long can he, you know, how
long can you rub his nose in the sand?
You can't go beyond the point. And at the end of it, there will
be pressure within the country for him to escalate.
And that can lead to accidental escalation.
I, I am convinced that you both sides may not want it, but in
such a, you know, escalation ladder which has been entrained,
it has been entrained. He's gone the lowest rung.
He's likely to go a few notches up there.
I'm sure they have worked it out.
It's not something which is, you know, caught them by surprise.
They had worked it out a few months back when there was so
much talk of this thing. So they have worked it out and
beyond the point they will have to react, they will have to
react. I think the way would be to up
the ante conventionally, right up the ante conventionally, then
going for a demonstration, demonstration nuclear test on on
soil and then possibly graduate to the use of tactical nuclear
weapons. Firstly, it could be in Kursk
itself. You have very nice juicy target
sitting there and ideal for tactical new use.
The point is then what happens? The point is then what happens?
What is the American Western response going to be?
And then what about Donald Trump's desire for peace?
His son has said they're trying to stymie my father's chance for
securing peace. And especially if then you we
keep pushing the envelope, I'm afraid you are going to lose the
global war of narrative first, right?
Because because, I mean, it doesn't sound quite right that
the Biden administration, which a few months back has said no to
attack us on the advice of the Pentagon, right?
On the advice of the Pentagon. He was not very happy with it.
But even when Prime Minister Straymer went to Washington, you
know, he was Jonathan. I mean, Joe Biden was, you know,
there was an outburst that he had on I'm in charge, I'm in
charge, etcetera. And because of the advice he got
from the Pentagon that, look, this could trigger escalation.
The Russians seem to be more serious.
So at this stage now, he has dismissed that advice that I
found was, you know, with the global audiences may not go down
too well. Doesn't paint the the Democratic
administration in very good light.
It paints them as, you know, seemingly as warmongers, you
know, bent upon trying to push the envelope till there is a
nuclear reaction. And a nuclear reaction doesn't
benefit anybody, not least the United States or Europe.
But let me be, you know, with tongue in cheek, World War One
happened in Europe, World War 2 happened in Europe.
And if this is the place at which we are going to go, I
wouldn't be too surprised if World War Three and a nuclear
Armageddon originates in Europe again.
So that's one aspect of it. The second aspect, very
interesting observations by my colleague.
You know, the fact of the matter is the era of low intensity wars
lasted was there in the last century.
They were asymmetric wars. I mean, United States invading
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, they were totally asymmetric
conflict. Now we've come to the era of
symmetric wars, wars between peer group armies and we found
that the, we have gone back to the level of lethality of end of
World War One, end of World War 2, most specifically end of
World War 2 when blitzkrieg had lost its steam and there were
brutal battles of attrition that were being fought.
So we are down to those levels of attrition.
And I mean, one finds the national stamina required is far
more. And I'm, I have my doubts, even
if the American European military industrial complex is
really geared up for these kind of wars.
I totally agree with my colleague who just spoke that
look, we've had a war going on in Ukraine for three years.
Over a million people on both sides have been killed, maimed,
wounded. You know, 8,000,000 have fled
Ukraine, right? In the Middle East, you have
about 200,000 killed. And it doesn't seem like it is
coming to an end. And if it escalates with Iran,
if if it escalates with Iran, you have a second hotspot,
right? And all these attack camps are
needed against against China, right?
The aircraft carrier battle groups now deployed to the
Middle East. There were two which were there.
They had to be taken out after a long time for rest and repeat.
Two more have gone. SO4 aircraft carrier battle
groups are out of the reckoning. If China tomorrow decides this
is the ideal opportunity to either, you know, mount, you
know, a siege of of Taiwan, a blockade of Taiwan or going for
a full-fledged defensive and achieve strategic surprise.
Everybody expects them to do it in 2027.
You do it in 2024-2025 and you have got strategic surprise and
you've done it at a point when there is you know, America is
heavily bogged down in Europe in Middle East and now we're third
spot. Coming up.
I will only quote Henry Kissinger.
It should be settled maxim of American policy never to take on
more than one major Asian power at a time.
Joe Biden in taking on firstly Russia in Ukraine.
I mean he undid the pivot towards Asia, pivot towards the
Indo Pacific. He's pivoted back to Europe.
Right? And I thought you have to define
who your primary threat is, who your long range long term threat
is economically, militarily. I mean now it is increasingly
China and we we are a little disconcerted with this pivot
back to Europe and the war with Russia.
Mir Shimer, Professor Mir Shimer, Henry Kissinger, I think
they have their advice has been very sagacious.
Don't choose your strategic direction and let it be 1
strategic direction. Let it be China or Russia.
It can't be both with the Middle East, you know a toss up thrown
in between. So I think we are living through
dangerous times. We are back to what it was in
World War 2. And may I just conclude World
War One there was a multi polar power equation in place.
World War 2 there was a multi polar power equation in place.
Today we are heading towards a multi polar power equation if we
are not already there. I mean that's a fact of life.
I think the unipolar moment is over.
It's over. And that's why we are seeing, I
mean the the historical patterns repeating themselves in national
security forecasting. There can be no single event
prediction model. The only model, as some American
scientists have said, is a pattern prediction model.
Patterns tend to persist and repeat themselves cyclically.
World War One multi polar, World War 2 multi polar and now when
we are on the brink of World War Three, we are on a multi polar
order and these are the power equations that tend to
accelerate conflict. Conflicts tend to spin out of
control because there are too many actors who are trying to
kick the ball at the same time. I would be happy to have the
reactions of my British colleagues.
Major General Chapman, we're getting into strategic planning
territory that's you can speak very interestingly to because of
course your Last Post in the Army was senior British military
Advisor to CENTCOM in the United States.
So what do you have to say about all that?
We've heard from Major General Bakshi and particularly on the
consensus that both of the the last speakers seem to have been
hinting at more than hinting at that there is a lot more
escalation that could come just from the current belligerent
powers, particularly on the Russian side, before we get to
the the stupefying nuclear launch.
I don't take that much of it, to be honest.
From the Ukrainian perspective, this is absolutely a total local
war. That is absolutely the case.
I don't think that you can make a case at all that the US are at
war with Russia. In fact it's only 10% of 1
year's worth of a defence budget in terms of support that they've
given to the sovereignty of Ukraine and it's supporting the
independent sovereignty of of Ukraine, which is the American
objective at the moment. I think the fastest way to lose
the narrative is to cross the nuclear taboo.
And I don't think that Russia would like to do that.
And indeed are are constrained by being the sort of junior
vassal to China. And indeed, China's 12 point
peace plan of February 23 warned against them doing that.
And there's also potentially they didn't go to the nuclear
case in September 22 because of that Chinese restraint and
indeed went to the mobilization paradigm instead.
So what I really think we're doing at the moment is Putin is
making maximus threats to induce a minimalist response from the
West, which is not working. And he's always had this
occasion when he makes these nuclear extortion and threats
the sort of back off or else we've had it not just on on the
nuclear side. We've had it on the green side,
we've had it on the energy side. And of course there's the risks
that skill kill people and the risks that scare people are two
different things. And people are are scared when
you mention the N word, but the the way I look at this is when
might they use them? And they certainly wouldn't use
them in cursed on Russian sovereign territory.
And what would we do if Russia use them?
Now the best articulation of this actually does come from one
one of my comrades in CENTCOM used to sit next to him, but he
was the head of the DIA Defence Intelligence Agency, one of the
18 parts of the intelligence community in in America.
When he said in the House, the House on Services Committee in
March 22, that Russia would make nuclear threats if the war drags
and we're in day 1003 to compel an adversary into pursuing
negotiations that might result in termination on the conflict
on terms favourable to Russia, or after the enemy has entry of
others into the conflict. Or when Russia offensive
progress looks like it might be reversed.
It's those that set the conditions for whether they
might use nuclear weapons. Then you would look at what the
Western response would be if Russia does that.
And NATO, of course, always uses scenario and war gaming to see
what the range of responses might be.
You know, the days of flexible response and countervailing
strategy are gone. But the bipartisan approach from
that, certainly from the Americans in early 23, both from
the Democrat side, with Blumenthal and Lindsey Graham on
the Republican side, was that it would be dire consequences for
the Russian military who would be destroyed in Ukraine in a
conventional approach. Glenn Grant, The view from
Eastern Europe for those who don't know among the viewers and
listeners, you have lived there for some years.
You heard the mention by General Bachi earlier of national
stamina and wars of attrition, familiar language for everyone
in that belt of countries from Estonia down to Georgia through
which you travel and advise your assessment of that national
stamina. Actually been there now for 26
years in Eastern Europe, which is, which is quite a long time.
I think the, the, the, I mean, the stamina in Ukraine is quite
high. I mean, in fact, it's really,
really high. I think it's, it's got the same,
it's got the same sort of feel to it as, as what one reads
about Britain during the Blitz. And, and in fact, it's not, it's
not unusual that people actually talk about the blitz and, and
how stubborn we were in Britain during that time.
And, you know, 88 million people have left Ukraine.
But I think that's something that, that both, both my two
generals will be surprised to, to hear is that there are 20
buses a day from Riga into Kiev and back.
And the, the number of buses from, from from Prague, which,
which is the sort of the, the joining point for people coming
from everywhere, everywhere else on the continent is huge.
So a lot of those eight millionaire coming in and out on
a on a regular basis for birthdays, for Christmas, for
school holidays and everything else.
So they're not people who've just run away and are not coming
back. They're keeping a quite strong
relationship and also providing a huge amount of money that goes
to the, that goes to the volunteer support for the army.
So I, I see the stubbornness in Ukraine every time I go there
and listen to it on the bus and, and, and, and hear it.
So, but, but also, I mean, if you actually look around the
other parts of Eastern Europe, Abkhazia at the moment, you
know, people are showing their unhappiness with the way that
Russia deals with them. Georgians have, Belorussians
have, they just didn't do a very good job of it because they're
too nice. And that's, that is genuinely
their problem. They're too nice.
They're not into going around and having a Maidan or, or a
Ceausescu moment. But, but the desire to, to live
in the West from all these people is extremely strong.
And I, I, I don't see any, any, any thoughts at all from people
in Ukraine of wanting to give up whatever happens.
So I think that that is the, the, the point I would make.
I can't add anything more on what the two generals have said
about, you know, put, put in a nuclear because I think that,
you know, it is as it is. My only view on that, that I've
been, I've been arguing for quite a long time is that we've
got to win this battle on the front line.
And that that deep attack is, is, is good.
But deep attack is the thing that is actually creating,
creating the problems that we're of escalation that we're
getting. What we haven't done is equip
the front line properly. And there are many soldiers who
are going into battle short on virtually everything, you know,
with no night sites with, with, with the wrong equip the wrong
clothing, the wrong equipment. And it is no wonder in many
cases that they're going backwards.
A point that was made about which I add to that, that the,
the, the, the, the, the them going backwards.
It's not a lack of manpower in Ukraine, it's a lack of belief
in the military system, in the leadership of the military
system, which because the upper echelons of the military system
are still fighting in an extremely Soviet way along the
lines that I once wrote of, You know, a small Soviet army can't
beat a large Soviet army. And unless you actually release
the soldiers to think and release the soldiers to actually
to, to, to soldier tactically and operationally, you just tell
them you've got to stay in that village and stay there and hold
it, then of course they're going to die, which they are.
And, and Russia will go over the top of them by sheer numbers,
sheer numbers of people, sheer numbers of ammunition.
It's still about 12:50 and 155 millimetre ammunition, for
example. Not to mention that in many
places, Russia is actually putting more drones in the field
than Ukraine can. So a few thoughts.
And we stay with Lieutenant Colonel Grant to start the final
round because we turn now to the philosophical and the resolution
aspects of the discussion. All three of you gentlemen,
particularly since retiring from active service in various ways,
have been involved in training and have considered in large
measure, no doubt in your own ways, what constitutes a just
war. Everyone has their own
philosophical, even religious understanding of what that is.
I suspect that yours, Lieutenant Colonel Grant, will be quite
strong in in favour of arguing that's Ukraine is entirely
facing a just war. And that's the Western allies,
the Northern Alliance, which I think you've had some hand in
shaping that's just been announced of the the Eastern
European and Scandinavian and British and Dutch militaries
standing with Ukraine. You would argue that that's
entirely justified all the means that are being used.
Particularly interested in what you said about Russia having
been effectively at war with the West for over 20 years.
Not many people date it that far back.
So I'm, I'm presuming, correct me if I'm wrong, that that's
what you'll argue is the realistic chance of victory
present as part of the the just war.
That's always been in various traditions, part of the equation
that you don't send men in these days, women to to a hopeless
death. And I think you've answered that
to some extent. And then as we turn it to the
other two gentlemen, I'll think we'll have more to ask about
alliances too. But in your case, particularly
the role of the Northern Alliance, as it's now being
dubbed, not the first in history, and the role of
European financial support When we record this, We have just had
summit in Warsaw hosted by the Foreign Minister of Poland,
Radek Sikorsky, in which his British, French, German and
Italian counterparts pledged to pick up the slack if Trump stops
funding the war. In large measure using all the
levers they can pull as part of their communique and innovative
financialization in order to keep funding the war.
I'm not a financial expert and don't know what that would mean.
So your thoughts really on the road to resolution and the
justness of the war? If I start with the Ukrainian
side first, it is quite clear, I think to, to, to most people
that, that, you know, Putin is determined to trash Ukraine, to
take it under, under complete control.
Or if he cannot actually trash it, the, the, the as general
solutione the, the ambassador in the ambassador in, in London
from Ukraine says that this is his method is destruction.
You just destroy and then you take it over and you move
forward, you destroy and you take it over, which is exactly
what we've seen whether that's Mariupol and whether it's all
the villages, Bachmot and, and other places.
So, so that is that is going to keep going Now, you know, is it
just to allow this sort of thing to happen for a country that
actually wants to be part of the democratic world?
And my answer to that is it cannot be because if we give in
to this and we give in to someone who, who, who decides
that they're going to take parts of the world and, and how many
more parts would he take then, then we, we, we're going back to
the days of Hitler and, and power and, and do what you like.
So I don't think we can afford to do that.
So that's going to be borne in mind that if we do, if we do
believe in this, then we have to fight for it.
And if, if the rest of Europe and Europe's values, you know,
the formation of what people want him within Europe, if, if
they don't believe in this and support it, then then Europe is
finished. It'll be the Europe of, of, of,
you know, leaders like that, like, like the, the president of
Hungary and things that we, we will just lose Europe in its, in
its form. So I think we have no choice but
to support it. I, I, I've no idea what Trump's
going to do. And I, and I shall say this
honestly, because really I've no idea what his values really are.
And in fact, if he's got any that that would actually apply
in this case. He says he wants peace and, and
let's hope he does. And that's his value.
But how he does that is, is, is, is extremely complex.
But he can't do it by not supporting Ukraine because if he
doesn't support Ukraine, then there is a complete break
between, you might call it, what do you call the Northern
Alliance and the other European leaders that want it.
And there will be a break between Trump and them.
So I don't believe that his even even some of his worst people
are going to realize that this is not a good idea.
But let's wait and see on on the Trump side, on the Russian side,
Russia is really complex at the moment because the, the, the,
you know, the, the great Russian soul has never been about what
people write about. You know, Russia has always been
a bit, bit of a, let's call it nice.
It's always been in a bit of a state.
It's not actually been a great, a great country, most of it.
And you know, you know, you, we all see the pictures of the
villages and the roads and, and, and people who earn very, very,
very little money in all sorts of parts of over Russia.
So anything that, that bolsters their, their current view of
themselves in the world, like Putin is doing, is going to
have, is going to have great resonance with them.
So the fact that more people are actually supporting Putin does
not surprise me because what else do you support?
If you're living in a hovel and, and, and you, you have no
toilets at all, not even a proper outdoor toilet.
Life is rough. And if someone offers you huge
amounts of money as well to go and fight for him, huge amounts
of money, you know, a year's worth of money a month, then
there is no choice for them but to go to the front line and
fight. So even even if Putin was lost,
even if Putin was lost, I'm pretty sure that there are one
or two others in his close coterie who would step up and
carry on the good work for the greatness of Russia.
So I don't see the greatness of Russia going away in its form
unless it is beaten, unless the empire is actually beaten as an
empire. Otherwise it's just going to
keep going because it, it actually has no other choice.
That's the problem. It has no other choice.
They've taught themselves over hundreds of years into this
state of mind, into this attitude of I'm trying to think
of the right word for it, but but indulgence, let's just call
it that indulgence state of mind of indulgence where you want
everything. And, and you know, you could see
this in, in, in when they attacked the outskirts of of
Kiev, but they were taking everything.
They were taking the toilets, they were taking the glass from
the windows, they were taking the, they took everything back
to Russia. And it's this indulgence of
stealing and it's ours. It's rightfully ours.
And that attitude is not only not, not going to go away
without it being beaten, it's getting worse.
So I see the two sides there. So how does one get peace from
this, where you either win or you accept that we've got a
problem that we can maybe maybe mitigate by NATO getting
stronger around the outside, But it's not going to go away in my
view, unless it's beaten. That's my thesis, short and
sharp. Major General Bakshi, your
Indian perspective on this, please, particularly on the
aspects of Russia increasingly using its own allies in a Pan
Asian arc from Korea to Iran, as you have previously adumbrated
how Indian security and policy makers view this, particularly
with China being the other massive presence in in your part
of the world. And also your thoughts on the
justness of prosecuting the war from the Russian perspective,
particularly given that it's certainly in international
institutions whenever this current war, which has just
passed its thousands today is mentioned, the Derrigger phrase
is contrary to international law.
To what extent do you see that as as as being the case that
Russia is unjustly or contrary to international law prolonging
this war? Well, I'm afraid I can't
entirely agree with that thesis because it's it's always useful
to understand the other perspective.
It's always useful to understand the others motivation.
As far as the Russians are concerned, you know, they've
been saying, and there are a number of, you know, very, what
shall I say, very bright people in the United States who's been
echoing the Russian viewpoint that at the time of, you know,
when Russia collapsed with the Soviet Union collapsed, you
know, it had been promised to the Russians that not one inch
eastward expansion of NATO. You know, the Russians said it
was given in writing the of course there are different views
on that. But the fact of the matter is
then the world has seen a relentless eastward expansion of
Russia, of, of NATO to the borders of Russia.
And then the Russians turned around and said, look, our last
two red lines are Georgia and Ukraine.
So the moment there was that coup, that Maidan, I mean, that
colored revolution kind of a thing in Georgia, Will the
Russians intervene? 2008, they intervene.
And before you could say in four days, it was all over, right?
Then in 2014, there was the Maidan coup in Ukraine, right?
And Victoria Nuland played a pretty active part in in
instigating that colored kind of a revolution and overthrow of a
duly elected government. I mean, that is the Russian view
and that's some of it sounds the reasonable right.
And therefore the Russians had no option now but to go in for
they, they went in for Crimea because they felt it was far too
the only warm water port, too strategically important.
And they took it because they said, well, it is basically us.
I mean, that history is there. After all, Ukraine has come into
existence only about a couple of decades back, right?
No, Sir. No.
It came into existence about 1000 years ago, Sir.
No, no. Well, well, well, you know.
But Ukraine is also may I, may I.
And Ukraine is also the seat, the spiritual seat of the
Orthodox Christian dispensation, the Orthodox Christian religion.
Most of the Russian Orthodox Christian institutions, their,
their, their, their home is cave, their home escape.
So that is the other, the other narrative, and therefore the
narrative is that the Russian narrative, if you may, if I may
say so. And it is always useful to have
that at the back of our mind to understand motivations for
actions, motivations for action. The Russian narrative is we've
been pushed into hitting out before we were taken and before,
you know, the maximal damage was done to us.
So it from their side, it is a defensive, offensive reaction.
They tried to preempt what they felt was the Ukraine takeover of
the Donbas, complete takeover of the Russian speaking areas of
Donbas, where they felt the Russian people were being badly
discriminated against, the Russian language, the culture
was being suppressed, right? And that actually that story
goes back. Now, as a military historian,
let me be quite clear to the German invasion of Russia, to
Reinhard Gelen, the head of the AB Waher, the military
intelligence of Germany. He had, you know, Bandera and
this entire groupings of people whom they had used to fight
against the Russians at the end of the World War, they handed
over these to the United States. And Bandera and this entire gang
go back date back to the time when Nazi Germany was invading,
invading Russia. That is the Russian viewpoint.
And I think we need to be cognizant of that viewpoint
because if we ignore that viewpoint, then I mean, there is
no meeting ground then, then, then there is no resolution
towards the conflict. So the simple fact is that that
is the Russian narrative. And if you believe the Russian
narrative, they'd say that, look, we were poked in the eye
till we were forced to invade, just like we are being poked in
the eye to go nuclear now, right?
And because we had no option, so we had to hit out in a
offensive, defensive kind of a way, virtuous defence as the
Russians like to call it. So that is apropos the the
philosophical issue of whether it is a just war who has justice
in his side just and below, you know, just and 'cause just an
execution etcetera. That is the philosophical side
of it. What the Russian narrative is
that this was we were poked in the eye till we were forced to
invade. There was a playbook ready.
There was a playbook ready and the playbook was to accuse us of
aggression and to enforce economic sanctions to a level
that would cause bring about a collapse of Russia, as in 1990,
the Soviet Union had been caused to collapse, go into a black
hole, right? And that economic war, it was
the basic war was the economic war.
The proxy war is the front, but the basic war was the economic
war to destroy Russia economically, bring about the
regime change. We heard that quite a lot.
Putin is about to flee Moscow, the plane is ready and stuff
like that. But the fact of the matter is
that Russia has emerged from that war.
Let's be practical. Let's see things on the ground.
Let's be objective and not subjective, right?
What I would like to see is different.
What is happening on the ground is what we need to focus on.
So what has happened on the ground is that Russia has
emerged economically stronger from this war.
The countries that have economically suffered hell of a
lot, other countries of Europe, even the American economy has
gained because they've been selling the arms to everybody.
But the fact of the matter is the European economies,
economies of France, Germany, have taken a big hit.
They've taken a big hit. So now can Europe on its own
sustain the war? Let us say, if Donald Trump says
sorry, I'm cutting off the tap. The Americans have given about
$175 billion arms and economic aid.
The Europeans total, I understand, is $134 billion,
right? So can they make up the
shortfall? At what economic cost to
themselves? And they sustain this war alone?
Those are the questions I'd like to ask you.
And Russia, is it really, you know, the narrative is that if
you don't stop them in Ukraine, well, you know, then the 9 pins
will start falling all over Europe and Latavia will be next
or Moldova will be next. And does Russia have that
manpower? The fact that they brought the
North Korean, it clearly indicates that they don't have
that manpower. Look from a smaller population
base in World War 2, the Russians had fielded 12 million
soldiers, 12 million soldiers and they've taken the heaviest
losses in that war. You know, the Great Patriotic
War from their side, World War 2 from our side.
You see the, But the simple factor today, the population
base of the Russians is larger, but because of the nature of the
regime there, Putin is not capable.
He's very worried about a full scale mobilization of that
order. So I don't think he's even
capable of taking the whole of Ukraine.
I think what he wanted is what he's got and he's quite content
with this. I, I, I don't see him now trying
to take the whole of Ukraine at best till the line of the
denipar. If he's pushed too hard, maybe
he'll try for more Kaivar Odessa, but that's about it,
That's about it. He's not got the capacity,
capability to take on other countries, take on the whole of
NATO, etcetera. I think we are exaggerating that
threat, and in exaggerating that threat we are imputing
motivations which are perhaps not there.
Well, general motivations, there are his motivations, the things
that he has said. So if you believe the other
things that you've said, then you have to believe what he is
saying now. And that is?
And that is that Baltic stakes are next.
You can go back and read. Well, I think.
We. Could.
And nobody is suggesting, general, that he would fight all
the way across Ukraine. He would want political control
and that's the the main aim. It tried to actually to get the
politics to change which which is what he was trying to do with
Yanukovych. To an extent I agree because if
he takes Kaif, that was that was what he attacked Kaif for
originally because I thought it was a regime change that he was
after I. Think he was I.
Thought it was a regime change that he was after and and what
the Russians say now. Let me give you the Russian
perspective here again. They say that in March, April
2022, they had negotiations in, you know, mediated by Belarus
with the Ukrainians and then by Turkey.
And they had come to a peace treaty which they say when Boris
Johnson flew in into Kaif, he torpedoed that treaty and the
Americans said no, you will fight on.
But that that was he had agreed to withdraw from the gates of
Kaif and that in the propaganda organs information warfare teams
was built up agreement. Istanbul agreement were actually
only four. The six parts were there and it
was to have a surrender piece for Ukraine.
That is not true that it was an equitable piece or a piece that
Ukraine could have lived with. Yeah.
And the the people who went were also were not, were not properly
elected officials in some case and were also people who went
there only with their own mandate.
They didn't go there with a mandate from the Ukraine, if you
know what I mean. The the, the fact of the matter
is that that agreement, if it had come through, you know, I
think a lot of lot of killing, maiming of people would have
possibly been avoided it. Would not have changed anything,
Sir. It wouldn't have changed
anything. The army would have fought on.
The army was not going to the public was not going to let
Russia take ground for a peace agreement.
They wouldn't have done it. I was there at the time.
So I know listening to people that the army would not have
allowed. It just would not happen because
because they they've they've been the country has been
devastated by Russia too many times before the whole lot of
more, you know, all about that previous times when they when
they've been, you know, mass murders in Ukraine and the
general line in Ukraine is enough is enough.
We cannot pass this down to our children, which is what will
happen. If I may, if I may, I have
greatest respect for the Ukrainian, their soldiers,
they're same Slavs talk and they're very tenacious fighters.
Both of them. In the Second World War, the
Russian, the Soviet Union had the maximum casualties, you
know, almost about I think 15,000,000 plus casualties of
the civilians and about 10 million military casualties.
I think they bore the brunt of that war till that time when,
you know, the invasion at Normandy took place etcetera.
They had been fighting alone on the continent.
So they are tenacious fighters, both of them.
Slavs are good fighters and have the greatest of respect for all
the soldiers that have fallen from both sides.
But the fact of the matter is today the Ukrainian armed
forces, what they started with, have been destroyed about three
times over. Their economy has been
absolutely ruined. Today, every single Ukrainian
city is in rubble, right? And their their their
infrastructure. Has been not even a tiny.
Bit so so I'm not very sure if if Ukraine, if Ukraine has
gained at the end of the day, if they had, you know, look for a
peace and if that same peace is enforced on them by Donald
Trump, what then Will there you think there'll be a coup in the
Ukrainian army? Sir Donald Trump cannot enforce
the peace on the Ukrainian people.
It's not going to. Happen well, I think at a
particular time, they'll have to be pragmatic and cut the losses
for their people. Would you, you know, a leader
has to be, has to be cognizant of the suffering that is people
are going through. Let us now move to Chip Chapman.
As for the final contribution, I'm keen to hear your response
to what you've heard in this this back and forth, which is
precisely what we wanted this discussion for.
And you know, as it's the closing round.
Also to give us a perhaps a more optimistic note, you had the
honor of being the man who effectively wound up Operation
Banner as well. So you you ended the British
Army's regular large manpower presence in Northern Ireland
because a multi generational conflict of a different nature
and order had come to an end. That's what the other two
gentlemen contributing are talking about, reaching a just
resolution. Well, I think the first thing
you need to look at is why the wars end and they end either in
decisive military victory. Probability of that is quite
low, the improbability of victory, the probability that is
quite high, that is there is no decisive military victory.
Or the third reason, which is I think Russia is still pursuing
is because because the cost, see the population, economic
infrastructure, whatever are too great.
And if they're too great for both sides, then you get to a
negotiating position. So it's not whether this is a
just war, it's what sort of peace should we go to.
And if we look at what Donald Trump says, it's far more
nuanced than most people tend to think.
So the first piece of evidence we have for him, which may not
very not look very good, is his town hall meeting in May 23,
when he said he doesn't look through the prism of winning or
losing or victory. He looks through the prism of
stopping the killing. Now, one might say that is a
humanitarian piece. As you know, the Indian general
would have said, you know, stopping the killing is an
honourable thing because human security needs include staying
alive. That's a decent thing to do.
But of course that potentially rewards the aggressor.
That is the problem with it. The second way of looking at
this is that Donald Trump had actually said through his
national security advisors, particularly Keith Kellogg in
the run up to the election, that he would stop the war.
And I don't think he can do it in one day, of course, because
the great man theory of international relations doesn't
really apply by saying to Zelensky, come to the table or I
won't support you. But at the same time saying to
Putin, come to the table or I'll support Ukraine with everything.
Now, of course, it's what's on the table, which is the real
issue, which leads you to the notion of do you go for a frozen
peace, a land for peace? Which I think is absolutely
flawed because also what Putin desires is the exclusive
economic zone and to stop any coastal potential for Ukraine in
the future to make it a landlocked country.
Do you go for a neutral peace? And neutrality in history has
always had three parts as well. The ability to trade space for
time, very large armed forces and a security guarantee.
Now Ukraine already had a security guarantee, they
potentially had three of them. Firstly, through the UN Charter
Article 2 brackets 4 you only go to war authorized by either
Article 51 or UN Security Council resolution and by the
Helsinki Final Agreement in 1975 led to the OSUESOSUE.
There should be no boundary changes in Europe by war or by
the the Budapest Memorandum in 1994.
Ukraine's sovereign independence of 1991 guaranteed by Russia, UK
and the USSR. So what we're often talking
about and what Putin wants is a surrender piece.
He wants the dismemberment of Ukraine.
One of his grand strategic objectives is to regain
territory and lost fears of influence.
I think there will be a negotiated piece at some time,
but I think it will be through strength because the final bit
of evidence for Trump is the Helsinki Commission in September
this year, led by a Republican Senator, Joe Wilson from South
Carolina. That Trump will realise that
Putin is not an honest broker in negotiations when they get to
any table. And there you would quote
Kayakala's lines all the time, quoting Gramico from the past,
that Russia will always demand the maximum, they will always
make threats. And the real worry, because the
theory of victory is that the West will just lose interest and
won't want to continue, is that there were useful idiots in the
West who will give you something and then you'll have and pocket
1/2 or 1/3 of something you didn't have before.
That's why we need to continue to support those resilient
Ukrainians so they're not sold down the river by that sort of
Grimico paradigm for the future. I would like to thank all three
of you gentlemen for keeping it cordial in the midst of an
impassioned discussion. It's notable that we moved from
very substantial consensus in battlefield analysis to very
substantial disagreement when we came to what's inside Putin's
and Trump's heads. So perhaps there's a lesson in
there for students of international relations and
military analysts and more besides.
Thank you very much indeed. And above all, we do, of course,
hope that we will not have to repeat this discussion at the
two 2000 day mark of the war. Thank you.