It's a moment of opportunity for the Israelis, and they've got
the president they want in the White House in their corner, so
they're gonna do as much damage as they can, I think, for as
long as they can. Iran and Israel are motivated by
this existential threat that they perceive.
And so that's what's dangerous. And that there could be a a
misstep, A miscalculation, and then we're climbing the
escalation ladder even faster and furiously in a way that we
can't now predict. How close do the international
agencies say Iran had got to being able to deliver a nuclear
weapon? Worryingly close.
Hello and welcome to the forecast as simmering tensions
between Israel and Iran explode in a barrage of missiles and
drones that have killed a number of Iranian nuclear scientists
and military leaders, including the head of the country's
powerful Revolutionary Guard. Nuclear enrichment facilities
were also targeted. Despite ongoing talks between
Iran and the US over its nuclear programme, President Trump said
he gave Tehran chance after chance and urged Iran to make a
deal. Iran retaliated with 100 drones
fired into Israel with more promise.
But so far, all of them seem to have been shot down.
So what is Israel's next move with Prime Minister Netanyahu
saying strikes could continue for as many days as it takes?
To discuss this, I'm joined by our very own Jonathan Rugman and
from the defense think tank RUSI, its senior research fellow
in Middle East security, Burju Oschelik.
Jonathan, first of all, what have they done?
How much damage did we think they have done to Iran's
infrastructure? Well, Prime Minister Netanyahu
of Israel is saying that this operation will take as long as
it takes. So it's still open-ended, which
means that the Israelis themselves have not assessed how
much damage has been done. As we speak, more targets are
being attacked. And I think the Prime Minister
of Israel views this almost as a once in a lifetime opportunity.
He's been talking about doing this for about 15 years.
And I remember during the 2012 Olympics in in in the UK,
British intelligence officials saying their biggest
geopolitical warriors far back as then was Israel attacking
Iran. So now it's happened.
It's a moment of opportunity for the Israelis because they've had
this critical report from the nuclear energy watchdog in in
Vienna and they've got the president they want in the White
House in their corner. So they're going to do as much
damage as they can, I think, for as long as they can.
And perhaps the only break on this won't be how Iran responds
militarily against Israel because it seems to have been
pretty ineffective so far. But the thing might be to watch
would be the oil price and what happens in the Gulf and whether
this becomes more of a global energy security issue.
But you while we wait to see the bomb damage assessment and work
out what they've hit and what they haven't hit yet, what what
we know they've done is they have taken out some very, very
senior figures in the Iranian military, in the Revolutionary
Guard. And these are big totemic
people. I mean, what's the impact of
that? I think the impact is
significant and the concern is that there could be more
targeted assassinations planned in the coming days or weeks.
My sense is that they're they're the planning, the coordination,
the intelligence gathering behind this operation has been
ongoing for quite some time. And this is not sort of a knee
jerk reaction by any means. There's been years in the making
and we've already seen in the scale and the geographic reach
of the, the targeted operation that began last night, a high
level of intelligence penetration, I think in country.
So the Iranians will have to get a sense of how this happened
from the from the inside. It is humiliating and the, and
Tehran will be under immense pressure domestically to to
retaliate, to respond effectively.
But again, there's very delicate balance there because if they
push too hard, if they go too far, how much more can Iran
take? How much more of an attack can
it absorb from from Israel I mean.
These are big, significant totemic people for for much of
the population in Iran. I mean, you know, when Soleimani
was killed, you know, huge outpouring.
You go there, there's a big statue and they've done it
several times over this time. So so I mean, there's the
political impact, but what is the sort of the military impact?
I mean, how important are they, those figures, head of the army,
the head of a Revolutionary Guard, to actually deciding what
Iran does? Well, it limits the strategic
decision making capability and the quick turn around that would
be required to act decisively in a moment like this.
There is the the, the, the prestige, the status, the
reputational issue, of course of losing key figures in the IRGC,
the military commander and deputies.
And we don't know how far Israel will continue to push, whether
there it could involve other political leaders.
And these are recognizable names on on the streets in Iran.
So this fact of the embarrassment, I think will not
be lost upon the people. Iranian public opinion is, as we
know, very divided. So we have the hardliners to use
that expression who will want a strong and decisive response and
others who are critical of the regime and may see this as an
opportunity, a window perhaps to push for political change
domestically. But we're not there yet in my
view. I mean, it's tempting to say,
OK, so Iran and Israel are at war, but that they're not really
at war, are they? Because what Iran has done so
far is very limited. Yes, and we found out last year
when Israel attacked Iran much less decisively and Iran
responded and did very little damage.
The drones achieved almost nothing inside and the missiles
inside Israel itself. And so the question we have to
ask ourselves is, is Iran now a paper tiger?
Is it now so weak that it can't really respond militarily in any
conventional sense? So what does it do?
It might think about asymmetric warfare.
It might have sleeper cells in Europe that it could activate,
attack Jewish civilian targets or embassies.
We just don't know. But the biggest card it has to
play is, I think, the energy card.
And it, and it, it, if it puts a chokehold on the Gulf, makes the
flow of energy to the world's major markets that much more
difficult, then we all start to feel it, you know, prices,
energy prices go up, inflation goes up.
Now, I'm not suggesting they're going to do that.
I don't know what they're going to do.
And they, they must be thinking about that right now.
But, but we don't yet, know, do we, whether Iran is incapable of
hitting back with ballistic missiles the way it did before
because Israel has taken them out effectively, or whether it
just has chosen not to because there's a, there's a calculation
here, isn't there? In that Iran, Israel has done
this by itself. It hasn't done this with
American military power joining in yet, but it obviously wants
the Americans to join in and for that to happen, I guess they are
hoping that there will be a bigger Iranian military
response. Well, that's assuming that
Israel is actually in the business of regime change and
and it really wants to go all the way.
I mean, my suspicion is that, you know, Israeli security
officials call this mowing the grass.
That's the phrase they use. So they're mowing the grass in
Iran. They are making this once in a
lifetime opportunity to do as much damage as possible over the
next few days, possibly into next week, and we don't know.
I don't think that necessarily means that the Israelis want the
ayatollahs to fall. And I don't think the Americans
want that. I don't think Donald Trump wants
that. He wants he wants a deal.
But Israeli weapons can't reach all of the Iranian nuclear
facilities at the moment, can they?
We don't know precisely what they can reach.
I mean, the, the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon last year
suggested that they now have the kind of military technology that
they didn't have a decade ago, which could penetrate, you know,
bunker busting bombs, get deep underground in the way that they
assassinated Sheikh Nasrallah, the, the, the leader of
Hezbollah. Now, the, the, the, the, the
danger for Israel, I suppose, is that this mowing the grass
operation doesn't achieve very much.
And I think that's why they will make it as prolonged as they can
to achieve as many targets as they can until President Trump
says enough is enough. So how, how close do the
international agency say Iran had got to being able to deliver
a nuclear weapon? Worryingly close.
I think the statement earlier this week was the, was the
harshest condemnation of of Iran in in in 20 years and.
We should have known this was coming because Israel was sort
of tweeting away those those reports furiously very much.
So As for. What they?
Were gonna do it, wasn't it? Wasn't a surprise, I think for
close watchers, I think the timing of the attacks raise some
questions because the the nuclear talks between the US and
Iran of selected by Oman, of course, have been ongoing.
The next round was due to take place this this weekend.
So the timing is perhaps surprising.
But again, we've been hearing for months now, if not years
that from the from Israel that this is a strategic window of
opportunity. It's an unmissable historic
moment. And I think President Trump
resisted the temptation to go along with this.
There is a sense at the moment that he could still be hoping
that this creates A leverage to bring Iran back to the table.
And they're really leaning it hard into this hard power
basically to to decimate Iranian the the military commands
potentially into humiliate the regime in front of the public.
When you say very close, I mean what do you mean?
I mean, you mean weeks? It's been hotly debated, hasn't
it? It's, it's weeks, months up to a
year, but it's close. And Prime Minister Netanyahu's
statements even as as recent as last night said that Iran could
be a year away from from from building the bomb.
I think from the Iranian perspective, being seen as a
nuclear threshold state, it's a it's a source of deterrence and
they wanted desperately to be able to hold on to that.
But how close they actually got we, we don't know.
We don't have enough visibility on it.
But the concern now is that with Iran potentially walking away
from the the non proliferation treaty, the NPT, there will be
less access by the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor,
to verify what Iran is doing, particularly the threat of
undisclosed sites, hidden sites across Iran, uranium enrichment
sites. We will have less insights now
potentially into what Iran is actually up to.
And this creates this lack of visibility, creates a new layer
of complexity going going forward.
So it very much is, I think, an issue of mowing the lawn.
And we have said that if Israel attacks Iranian nuclear
facilities, it will likely be unable to take dismantle the
program out completely, that this will require ongoing
persistent strikes over time. And what is the level of
commitment that the US is willing to to provide to that?
That is a big question now. And.
And, and the gamble that you have with the, you know, with
the, with hitting them every couple of years is that you, you
don't, as you say, really know how far along they are.
You don't know what their new sites deep underground are
achieving. And they could be a lot closer
to it than anybody thinks. And that's, that's the fear.
That's a great fear. So will this now this
embarrassment, this, this the attack on their reputation
regionally as well, will this now spur Iran on to accelerate
its program for a bomb? That's that's the question.
But at the same time, from the Israeli security perspective,
the point of view is we're not only trying to dismantle their
ability to become a nuclear state, but we're also taking out
their ability to retaliate, to hit us back hard.
Even this morning there were news stories about attacks on
Iranian air bases, ballistic missile sites, for example.
So it's not only the nuclear facilities that have been
targeted, but it's a political military leadership and also the
ballistic missile program. It's the ability of Iran to hit
back hard that that Israel is now targeting as well.
I. Mean they they may also have
targeted the them effectively politically because if the
Iranian leadership has been humiliated, key leaders have
been taken out, how close are they to igniting a home grown
rebellion and defiance of the regime?
And how? How feasible is that?
Well, Benjamin Netanyahu in his speech this morning sort of said
my war is not with the Iranian people.
And, and, you know, hopefully, I mean, he, he'd be more or less
said, you know, one day we hope that you, you overthrow your
leaders. I mean, he came pretty close to
saying that. I think it's, well, we've just
found out in Syria, haven't we, We, how unpredictable these
things are, how movements can spring up within a matter of
days. I think it's too early to say
how close that moment is. I mean, the revolution is long
in the tooth. It's been there since 1979, the
Islamic Revolution. And it's there's an enormous
amount of economic hardship in Iran.
And still a huge amount of suppression.
And. Of of all dissent.
And a huge amount of suppression.
So, but you know, what's the other way of looking at it is,
you know, what is going to unite Iranians might be actually what
Israel does in a way that internal dissent, you know, is a
is a different kettle of fish, if you see what I mean.
So I think, I think we just don't know.
How, how does Iran position itself in terms of why it wants
a nuclear weapon? I mean, Israel has always been
very, very clear that they view it as an existential threat
because they firmly believe Iran wants to wipe Israel off the
map. Now you go to Iran and they say,
well, no, we don't, we don't, you know, quite the opposite.
We don't want to destroy Iran. We Israel.
We want Israel to be a genuine democracy and to represent all
the people of the of of of the. Place well, it's a risk of a big
over generalisation. I think there is something quite
similar between the Israeli and Iranian psyches and that they
both have a a sense of great fear of being being annihilated.
I mean, it's it, it and both of them think that.
So I, I don't think it's. And I think therefore the
Iranian nuclear program springs from something that is as much
Iranian as anything else to do with with Israel.
It's been interesting to see the Saudis condemning these Israeli
attacks because there's no love lost between the Saudis and the
Iranians. But nevertheless, I mean, the
Saudis are quite capable of speaking out of both sides of
the mouth. They'll be, they'll be pleased
that the Iranian nuclear program has been set back as a potential
threat to Saudi Arabia. But at the same time, it's an
enormous, the front to, you know, peace and stability in the
region. I mean, just on that, what?
Because, I mean, you're a big Saudi watcher.
I mean, Saudi's been very, very close to the United States.
But it seems, as you say, to have improved its relationship
with Iran recently to the point to which it is a, you know, it
is condemning these Israeli strikes despite Saudi Arabia and
Israel having quite a long history in recent years of
trying to improve their relationship.
What's going on? I mean this is 3 dimensional
chairs. Yeah, I think, I think the war
in Gaza has has completely scuppered any attempt at
reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and and and Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Israel, Saudi Arabia still doesn't recognize Israel.
Normalization with Israel is still a very long way off.
And actually what's happened with Iran may even make that an
even longer process. And so in terms of Trump looking
around the globe and thinking about the deals that he can
strike, you know, Ukraine not going well, Gaza not going well
now, you know, a, a, a nuclear disarmament deal with Iran
arguably not going well either. I mean, the big question is
will, will the Iranians do what Trump wants and fall into line
and, and actually say we are, you know, effectively say we are
now such a paper tiger. We, we are now so powerless that
we will do what you want just to stop a, a, a much wider
conflict. But there's an enormous pressure
from inside the country to do the opposite and to strike back.
What do you make of that? Well, just on the point about
Saudi Iran normalization, which has been underway for for some
time, this matters a great deal. And it's also a natural barrier
or serves as a restraint on Iranian retaliation that would
involve Gulf energy installations or the OR the
Strait of Hormuz, for example. Saudi and other Gulf countries
are firmly opposed to being dragged into this direct
military confrontation between Iran and Israel.
So this matters a great deal. If Iran were to go there, I
think it would be a matter of last resort that they are so
cornered that there are no alternatives because to blow up
the energy infrastructure in the Gulf would be to destroy the
relationship with Saudi Arabia. At a time when Israel is viewed
to be extremely diplomatically isolated in the region and is
acting on its own, it's been described by by many in the
region as as now a rogue state. What's really fascinating is
that both Iran and Israel are motivated by this existential
threat that they perceive. And so that's what's dangerous
and that there could be a misstep, A miscalculation, and
and then we're climbing the escalation ladder even even
faster and furiously in a way that we can't now predict.
But in terms of Iran Gulf normalization, this means that
Iran's options are limited, are more limited than they would
have been a few years ago because there will be backlash
against the Iranian regime if they were to attack, if they
were to damage energy, energy infrastructure and and the price
of oil would would escalate. It hasn't yet.
Thus far, energy prices have not spiked.
They did, but then they then they retreated.
So I think this is the initial reaction.
Now markets are waiting to see what will happen over the next
few days and just how bad the scenario can can can develop.
Now, as Jonathan says, I mean, Netanyahu has been wanting to do
this for years and years and years, and other Israeli leaders
have as well. But there are lots of domestic
political reasons and actually diplomatic reasons why Netanyahu
would want to do this right now, aren't there?
Yes, certainly. What's interesting is that both
Israel and Iran face stiff domestic resistance and and
opposition. From Netanyahu's point of view,
this is a long standing almost, I won't say fixation, but it's
certainly seen as an issue of national interest that is deeply
connected to Netanyahu's own political ambitions, but also
exceeds them in a way as well. Taking out nuclear, Iran's
nuclear ambitions is a long standing Israeli desire, the way
that they define their national interests.
In terms of timing, of course there's the the 60 day deadline
that Trump had set that passed this week.
And I think from the Israeli perspective, they are now
defending that timeline and it has passed.
And so this is now a call to action that is seen as as being
justifiable. But it's very unclear as to
whether this will push the Iranians back to the negotiating
table. But, but I mean, Netanyahu knows
that both his internal critics and his external critics will
tend to see the Iran issue and the Gaza issue, around which
he's drawing huge amounts of criticism, is very, very
different. And and while he's he's under
fire from former prime ministers, political opposition,
his his own population who wanted to settle that war
quickly, and he's under pressure from Britain and France and
Canada over Gaza. This is an issue around which
all of those critics suddenly go, oh, OK, fine.
You gotta well. Up to a point, Chris, I mean,
it's interesting that Benny Gantz, 1 of Netanyahu main
rivals has come out with full support for Netanyahu.
So you're right. There's, you know, this, this is
a, if it's an existential threat that we're talking about.
Existential threats tend to bring people together, don't
they? But on the international front,
it's an interesting one for the UK because last year British
jets were involved in protecting Israel from Iranian attacks.
Are they going to get involved this time?
Well, they've said no. They've they've, they've
explicitly said that they weren't involved in defending
Israel. Haven't they?
Not so far. But, you know, we don't know
whether there's going to be an intensification of, of the
attacks that perhaps the Iranians didn't launch last last
year or in fact, whether the Iranians have shown that they
don't have very much the damage that they can do.
And I think it will be quite possible for the for the Brits
to sit this one out in the sense that I mean, these the Israelis
have already proved what, what they can do ostensibly on their
own. No doubt there was some U.S.
intelligence involved, certainly US more than US awareness,
because every time Israel does anything in the Middle East, the
Americans have to be informed for the safety of U.S. troops,
US aircraft carriers and so on. So arguably this the point of
sort of maximum pressure from the Brits over the Gaza issue.
Yes, it's possible the Brits get sucked into defending Israel
from Iran. Well, we've already seen Macron
sort of flipping the script. You know, he's been hugely
critical of Israel over Gaza, but he comes around on side when
it comes to Iran. Yes, and, and, and, you know,
Netanyahu is often several steps ahead of everybody else in in, I
think thinking through how these things are going to play out.
What, what does this tell us about the relationship with
America as well? I mean, what, what we've seen in
reality is American president after American president unable
to really tell Netanyahu what to do.
Is that what's happened here again?
Well, the issue is that, you know, over the past few weeks,
we've been hearing a lot about there being this divide between
Netanyahu and Trump, that they had fallen out, that Trump
wasn't pleased with the way in which Netanyahu was handling
Gaza, that there was a lack of a ceasefire on the ground, that
the situation was deteriorating rapidly and, and, and, and Trump
wanted to end it because, I mean.
Trump said openly this week he didn't want Israel to hit Iran.
That's right. But at the same time, Trump is
is also restrained in that he has his own base is divided into
the MAGA camp, right. And in terms of the
isolationists and those who are more hawkish with respect to
Iran policy. And so there will be those who
not publicly but discreetly are in favour of humiliating Iran in
this way of dismantling or at least eroding its nuclear
program significantly and buying time.
A weaker Iran is dangerous because it's it's more
unpredictable. But also could it open the door
for negotiations? I think it's too soon to tell.
We don't have any idea of what an off ramp would look like for
any type of face saving measure for Iran to walk back from this.
The argument could be made that the regime is is doing it in
favor in for the sake of avoiding all out regional
escalation. But at the same time the
pressure to act domestically. On the US side though, I think
again very divided, much like the domestic, the constituencies
in in Israel and Iran, the US base is also divided as to where
they stand on, on Israel and Iran.
Yeah. I mean, I think the Iranians are
really in a corner now because they've got to be seen to be
doing something. But what?
And do they really want to escalate the situation into an
attack on Israel, which is so successful?
If it is successful, that brings America in to a wider conflict.
And so we're still in the situation we've been in for
really quite a long time, I think, which is that nobody
really wants a wider war. Israel wants to reduce Iran's
nuclear capability to a point where it will take years and
years and years for it to be restored.
And it seems to be saying go hang to diplomacy, go hang to
monitoring facilities, which has been going on for years.
And and you know, we're going to do this militarily.
And the risk for in all of this is is a miscalculation that that
we know we have AUS president who says he doesn't want wars.
He's there to stop wars, but nevertheless, he acts in such an
unpredictable way. And so suddenly he flips and he
said one minute and he says, you know, he doesn't want war with,
with Iran. And the next minute he says,
well, kind of the Iranians had this coming.
We tried to negotiate and be prepared for even tougher
attacks to come in the in the days ahead.
So in the same way that on tariffs, he changed his mind,
he, he prevaricated, he, he tried to negotiate.
He could switch again within a matter of days.
He could say, you know, say to the Israelis, it really is time
for this to stop. And I think, however bad the
relationship between Netanyahu and Trump is, I think Netanyahu
really believes that Trump is the best American president
Israel has ever had and would probably do what he was told in
the final analysis. In in the build up to military
action last year, it was all about how Iran had become the
regional power and was able to cause trouble on multiple
fronts, whether it was Yemen, Syria, Gaza, what, what's the
reality of the power of, of Iran now?
I mean, has it been massively degraded in terms of what it can
achieve? You know, there are still
missiles being fired by the Houthis regularly as Israel, and
they get shot down after the sky.
So can they actually do any damage?
Well, it's the paper tiger argument, but the question is,
have we overestimated Iran's military capabilities over time,
or has the Israeli assault been so effective that they have been
downgraded significantly? I think what Iran has done quite
problematically is use the the territory of neighboring Arab
states as launching pads of attacks against against Israel
in those countries, those domestic populations that have
suffered as a result because of Iran's use of its forward
deterrence policy. And it's leaning into these
armed non state actors that has significantly been eroded over
the course of the war, since the start of the war in Gaza.
And without that, in the absence of it, where does that leave
Iranian capabilities is, is the question.
And that we will I think have an answer to in the coming hours,
in the coming days, contingent on how Iran responds.
We've, we've heard a lot about tracking Iran's ballistic
missile program, its armed drone program, but will it be able to
use these to high effect? Or is the ongoing assault that
the Israelis are now conducting to limit the retaliatory strike
capability? Will that mean that Iran is is
now cornered? There's already talk in regional
media in Turkey and in many Arab countries, you know, questioning
how it was that Iran wasn't able to respond last night to deter
these attacks. Where is the intelligence
failure coming from? So there's some serious internal
questioning going on as well. Or we can expect to see that
and. What an amazing night for
Mossad. I mean, I mean, we've had years
of assassination attempts on and successful attempts on
Revolutionary Guard commanders, nuclear scientists.
But this, this, I mean, this the last 24 hours.
And, you know, we thought the walkie-talkie attack on, on
Hezbollah members in Lebanon was, was of a different league.
But to take out, to use a crude phrase, at least six nuclear
scientists, the head of the army, the head of the
Revolutionary Guard, I mean, every man who takes on that job
is, is a dead man walking. I mean, because, you know, the
Iranians have, the Israelis have shown that they are so capable
now of penetrating, you know, the, the upper echelons of the
Iranian elite. Yes, I mean it's a striking
contrast with the massive failure incompetence around Gaza
on October the 7th and the threat right on their doorstep
by comparison to the one in in Tehran.
Just finally, I mean, because the other thing I think, you
know, people will be worried about watching this is if you're
right and Iran's military capability is significantly
degraded, it may well turn to asymmetric warfare supporting
terrorism. What do we know about their sort
of ongoing ability to do that? Well, obviously there have been
various cases in the UK of Iranian journalists targeted,
followed, threatened. I think the Iranians have had
sleeper cells in Europe for a long time.
They've in the past shown the ability to attack museums or
attack Jewish tourists. But I think the risk for them is
that asymmetric warfare, if it's waged by Iran, will reap more
symmetric warfare from the Americans themselves.
I think that's that's the risk for them.
My guess is they don't want to go there.
You know, there there are various soft targets, museums
across Europe, embassies perhaps What?
We just have to hope that doesn't happen.
I would add to that the possibility of an Iranian LED
cyberattack on critical national infrastructure in Europe, in the
United States, depending on Tehran's strategic calculus as
to whether to target West, the West or to keep it more limited
to Israel. So cyberattacks, potential
states supported terrorism. And also I think we need to keep
in mind that the the Houthi threats in in Yemen and the Red
Sea in terms of maritime security is, is very much live.
And could that then draw in the US and the UK and allies and
defending the Red Sea and that strategic checkpoints there?
I think that is something to watch as well.
Thank you both very much indeed. That's it for this episode of
The Forecast. Until next time, bye bye.