The regime is dying a death by 1000 cuts, anyone of which could
prove fatal. It could subside, but it could
very easily tip over. I see the Islamic Republic still
very much in command and control.
Is this part of maybe a cycle of protests that can eventually
become revolutionary? I think so, But I certainly
don't think that the system is going to just fall overnight.
Will Donald Trump intervene militarily, as he has threatened
to do? Yes or no?
Hello and welcome to the forecast.
Iran is in the grip of its most intense unrest in years.
What began in Tehran's bizarre over soaring prices and the
collapsing currency has spread across 27 provinces, with
inflation above 50% and the government's struggling to
contain anger over corruption and falling living standards.
Human rights groups now say that at least 25 people have been
killed, more than 1000 arrested as police move into
universities. And the judiciary warns that any
period of concessions is now over.
And into this crisis, just a few days after U.S. military strikes
against Caracas and the abduction of President Maduro
and his wife, comes fresh intervention from Donald Trump,
vowing that the US, yes, the US will defend Iranian protesters,
prompting Tehran to accuse Trump of psychological warfare.
Well, joining me now to discuss all this is Professor Ali
Ansari, a leading voice in Iran's modern history, and
Doctor Salam Vakil, Director of Middle East and North Africa
Programme at Chatham House. Welcome to you both.
Let's try and first of all, get some sort of idea of what's
going on inside Tehran, inside Iran.
There's other 27 provinces. Ali, first to you.
How serious is this and compared to the unrest of a few years ago
when people descended on the streets of the big cities?
In terms of, of, of numbers involved, they're probably not
as large as they were in 2022 or indeed in 2019, but they seem to
be broader. They certainly became much more
violent much earlier than they had in, in previous occasions.
And you, you, you know, you certainly get the, the, the mood
music is, is, is turning again. It, this is not a sort of a
call, this is a, this is a, a protest that's erupted from
economic obviously discontent, but it's rather swiftly turned
into a political, you know, political challenge to the
regime. And it's just yet another, you
know, cycle of protests that the regime is having to cope with.
And it's, it's, you know, every time these protests emerge, it
gets weaker and weaker. I mean, it, it, it has less room
for manoeuvre. It has less capabilities to deal
with things. And, you know, the real problem
for the regime here is that now it's decided now is the time to
reform in the middle of a fully fledged sort of like political
crisis. And, you know, most of us
observing Iran would have thought that the time for
serious structural reform would have been much, much earlier,
certainly several years ago and and not now.
So the threat to the regime really is that its own response
to what's going on, its inability to respond in some
ways or, or its unwillingness to respond is actually going to
make matters much, much worse. And so, you know, I, I often use
this phrase that the regime is dying a death by 1000 cuts and
anyone of which could prove fatal.
So this is the way I I, I tend to look at things that it it
could subside, but it could very easily tip over.
Salam. I remember from my very vaguely,
from my Iranian revolutionary history that in the revolution
in 79, it was the Bizarres, the merchant class of big cities
like Tehran turning against the Shah that made all the
difference. Is that what we're seeing right
now? And explain to us the the
context of this economic crisis. Sure.
Well, happy to be with you for this important discussion.
Let's start first with the revolution because you reference
the importance of the bazaar. And I think certainly strikes
and the support of the bazaar has been important for the
revolutionary momentum going into 1979.
But the principal protests that began were actually 1977 and
19781979 was the sort of end of the Shaw's monarchy and the
beginning of what was an unknown for Iran.
I think the protests that we're seeing are being very much
instigated by a huge pressure on Iranians from an economic
crisis, currency collapse, if you will.
Inflation is above 50% week by week.
Prices of basic staples from eggs to milk to rice are just
increasing in extraordinary ways.
And, and this just is making life incredibly hopeless, if not
sort of at a dead end for Iran. And I think that's what
precipitated that. What began as strikes quickly
spread into universities and then spread out into small
towns, primarily on the western side of Iran, but not solely.
And, you know, I think there are different dynamics at play.
But what's driving the protests are economic issues,
hopelessness, people that feel like they have nothing to lose.
And this, the system, the Iranian elected and unelected
system, have taken a new approach.
The Ali referred to trying to acknowledge that they've made
mistakes, trying to appeal for mediation, engaging in some
important subsidy reform and currency exchange rate
unification. But those measures on their own
aren't real solutions. Iran's problem is structural,
its systemic, and it requires the Iranian political
establishment to align, to unify, and to agree on
negotiations with the US administration.
It's only through a protracted negotiations that Iran can solve
its economic crisis by time with its population that is deeply
frustrated and had enough, as well as of course address it's
regional and geopolitical challenges.
I mean, Ali, you mentioned 1000 cuts there.
And, you know, we've been talking to people inside Iran
all day long, you know, on the phone.
And what they're basically telling us is that this is the
final store. They put up with so much, you
know, nonsense over the years with so much repression, so many
kind of failed opportunities, so many limited horizons.
And along comes this, you know, renewed version of a long
standing economic crisis. And they've simply had enough.
Is that accurate? And and when it does boil over,
you know when that thousandth cut appears, is it decisive?
Well, I think it, I think it could tip.
I mean, this, this, this is the issue.
I mean, it could have tipped earlier.
They've, they've managed to sort of to contain previous protests.
But the fact is, you know, Sanam was saying earlier, they haven't
actually dealt with any of the serious structural issues that
that affect the, the Iranian political economy.
And I mean, there's massive corruption.
And of course they will always look abroad and say, well, we
have a lot of pressure from abroad and the sanctions and of
course that doesn't help. But I don't myself see it as the
central cause behind the, the, the, the problem in, in Iran,
which is, which is essentially that you have an exemplary case
of bad governance. I mean, it's, it's enormously
bad. And they, they've managed
somehow to sort of maintain a, a, a sort of an ideological, I
suppose, a conviction among among those core supporters to
keep them going. But I think you're quite right.
And it's the sense I get from people often, you know, not very
politically minded people, but they've just had enough.
And there's a huge amount of anger among people now.
Some will go out and demonstrate, Others will just
sit tight and wait to see what happens.
Others may go on strike. I mean, I think we have to keep
an eye out for the strike. And I think ultimately you have
to see what happens with the security services and, and, and,
and those, those tools that the regime has to keep matters
suppressed. We know, for instance, in the
Massa Amini demonstrations and protests that in some cases, you
know, there was a lot of reluctance among some elements
to actually indulge in some of the repression going on.
So we have to watch closely and see what happens now.
And I think the longer this drags out with everything else
that's going on. And, you know, we mentioned
earlier, the international environment isn't terribly good.
You know, it, it's a you know, it, it, it's, it doesn't bode
well. And we should add here also, and
I mean, I know this is a, it's certainly interesting.
As a historian, I can tell you that there's a huge amount of
pack of nostalgia going on in the air.
And it is nostalgia. For the family, the former
shark. Yes, I mean, so basically they
they, they, they've been fed a steady diet over the last 10 or
15 years of sort of films and other things of what was going
on prior to 1979. And, you know, obviously this
has, you know, told a younger generation generation, you know,
the, the, the younger generations that they that life
could be different. You know, it's as simple as
that. It's it's a visual treat.
And of course, you know, what you're seeing 46 years after the
revolution, a chance that I think many of us would never
have really thought would be heard again in Iran, which is,
you know, Long live the king. I mean it, it's quite
extraordinary. But it's a very sad indictment,
I have to say, if you pulled to look at it that way, or a poor
indictment on the way in which the Islamic Republic has run
affairs. SO22 questions.
The first one is briefly do you think repression still works in
as it did a couple of years ago? Absolutely.
The repression and the repressive capacity of the state
is very much underway. You yourself outlined the very
many tragic deaths that we are learning about the detention and
arrests of of over 1000 people so far.
I expect it to go higher. What the Islamic Republic has
developed through decades of managing protests is a crackdown
playbook, and they are using it. And with every protest they
learn and they adapt and at the same time they round up
dissenters from within the system itself.
So I fully expect that repression to still be an
important tool for the system survival.
And without all of the features of a revolution, which include a
breakdown of the elite, shifts from the army or the security
services, I I see the Islamic Republic still very much in
command and control. And while this protest is indeed
threatening and I think was certainly inevitable, I don't
think that this is the one that everyone is hoping for.
Is this part of maybe a cycle of protests that can eventually
become revolutionary or lead to a change in the regime?
I think so. But it's not going to be the one
that necessarily leads to the collapse of the Islamic
Republic. I think that is something we're
living through and witnessing, but I certainly don't think that
the system is going to just fall overnight.
I think it's important to walk through what is and was is not
possible for Iranians. I think certainly there's
nostalgia, but I think that nostalgia isn't necessarily
based on reality. It's it's based on sort of myth.
Young people clearly haven't opened their history books and
perhaps they should read 1 of Professor Ali Ansari's history
books to remind themselves of life under the Palavi monarchy.
A Palavi monarchy that was certainly more secular and
certainly socially liberal, but one that also had a security
force that was quite brutal and arrested and and detained plenty
of students. A Pan Levy monarchy actually.
Also, I'd like to remind people in the region of the Middle East
that are also nostalgic for the Pan Levy's.
Pan Levy monarchy didn't just sit tight within Iran's borders.
Pan Levy monarchy supported proxy groups in Kurdistan and in
southern Lebanon. The Pan Levy monarchy took the
islands from the UAE in 1971 and also laid claim to Bahrain in
1969. At questions that I've also
asked Reza Panavi himself. But if we talk about Reza Panavi
himself, it's important to think about his biography, what he
brings to the table. There was an opportunity after
the Masa Amini protests to bring together a group of the Iranian
diaspora that very much fell apart because of competition,
because Reza Pandavi didn't want to work as part of a team.
And I'll be very honest, as someone who is regularly trolled
by monarchists who can't stand that, I would like to see a more
democratic Iran rather than a monarchical Iran.
I find the people around Reza Pandavi to not really reflect or
demonstrate the values and principles that are needed in a
sort of new governance structure that would come after the
Islamic Republic. So I I refuse to think that he
is the best and the brightest. And I certainly think that Iran
and Iranians that have exported themselves across the world have
definitely produced more sound and capable people than someone
who's sat in the in Bethesda for 46 years really actually not
developing his credentials. OK.
Ali, do you think, is there any evidence at all that the Trump
administration is talking to the son of the late Shah about a
possible transition? I mean, it's it, it is
interesting because you do get, you know, the odd commentary
coming out of the Trump White House.
But on the other hand, it seems to be also they, they, they are
alert enough to the notion that any change or any significant
change will come from within the country.
And I think most people are, are, are aware of that.
I mean, the, the nostalgia is, is, is really developed on the
back of, you know, in the sense of Salam says, the sort of
social and economic development of the country of the 50 years
prior to, prior to the revolution.
And, and of course, the revolution basically inherited a
fairly powerful state. I mean, we, we shouldn't, we
shouldn't underestimate that. And, you know, it took both the
good and the bad of that state and, and, and basically, I think
May, may discarded the good and made the bad very, very much
worse. But it's, it's, it's, you know,
that there are clear indications for people, as we were saying
earlier, who are quite desperate about, you know, what's going
on. You know, the, the, the general
economic, the, the situation of Pahlevi Iran is, is, is, is
obviously attractive to them. And, and you know, those, those
were the days, for instance, in a very simple way that the
Iranian passport could get you to many different countries
without a visa, for instance. I mean, now it's, it's basically
impossible. So there's all that.
But I also agree that, you know, I think that Reza Pahlavi would
make his would, would, would make his position considerably
stronger, shall we say, if he actually developed a good
constitutional platform and a democratic platform in which he,
you know, in, in which he wanted to pursue.
And of course, you know, we haven't really seen any of that
so far. So I mean, it, it doesn't, you
know, I think the nostalgia is precisely that it's a sort of a
rather vague notion of the fact that, well, things were better
once. And, and as I said, it's, it's,
it's a reflection really of how bad things have become.
So let's get on to Donald Trump then.
I mean, is it, is it possible, do you think that he will come
good on his threats first to you, Ali, of some kind of
intervention in Iran? And if he does so, will he do it
through his proxies in the form of Benjamin Netanyahu?
Because that is the other thing that's changed in the last few
years. We had that mini 12 day war
between Israel and Iran with American intervention.
I mean, it's certainly very possible, but I mean, I think
the most important thing here is that he's he's basically said in
only the way that he can say it, it has to be said that, you
know, we're we're watching and, you know, obviously he says then
we'll take action. And I think that probably has
done quite a bit in Tehran. I mean, particularly after the
whole Maduro business that, you know, people have realised here
that there is there is a, you know, we have to remember that
when President Trump was first elected, there was quite a lot
of enthusiasm in Iran about the fact that they thought they
could do business with a businessman.
Basically that here was a Republican who didn't give two
hoots about human rights and, you know, and he was a
businessman. So, you know, the art of the
deal sold very well in Persian translation, it has to be said.
So initially they had some quite positive notions and of course
when they were dealing with Witkoff and others prior to the
prior to the war, there were a lot of very positive voices
coming out of Tehran about the Trump administration and rather
less complimentary commentary coming about the Europeans.
Now I think they've sort of realised that that just isn't,
you know, that isn't going to happen.
And, and I think, you know, that the whole Trump intervention is
just another problem for them to try and accommodate and to try
and sort of factor into their decision making, which I have to
say at the moment, I mean, they, they, I still think they're, as
someone said to me, you know, badly concussed after the 12 day
war and they still really haven't decided what they're
doing so. Salim one of the things, of
course, one of the reasons why this the 12 Day war was for the
ostensible reason was to try and contain Iran's nuclear program.
And then, of course, Donald Trump got very huffy and puffy
when it was suggested to him that actually not all the
nuclear capability had been totally obliterated as he
claimed. What do we know about Iran's
nuclear program since the the June war?
You know, had they started rebuilding?
Had they started to regroup? Do we know?
Well, what we we do know is that the US and intelligence agencies
more broadly agree that Iran has halted enrichment and the, the,
the program as we knew it is, is frozen.
Obviously, we don't know if there's anything incendiary
happening underground, but certainly I would imagine that
Israel and the US are, of course, keeping track and, and
using satellites to monitor these facilities.
Fordo hasn't been touched and the International Atomic Energy
Agency hasn't gone back into Iran to examine the facilities
as well. So for the time being, Iran is
actually playing ball and and appeasing Trump with this
narrative, whether it's true or untrue that the nuclear program
is is frozen in time. But that isn't on its own going
to prevent perhaps another strike or another round between
Israel and Iran because Prime Minister Netanyahu Yahoo was in
Mar a Lago and even prior to that making a case that Iran is
recapitalizing its ballistic missiles.
And indeed, of course, the Islamic Republic is preparing
building back its defense capabilities for what it is
calculating will be a more deadly but perhaps a needed
round to create balance between a Tehran and Tel Aviv.
But also to create the conditions for talks, which is
ultimately what Tehran needs. Iran is calculating that it has
the ability to withstand a longer fight than the Israelis
do. That's one.
And two, they think that, you know, obviously they can survive
and come out less bloody. That would create a more level
playing field for negotiations. But you know, this is the year
where that could certainly play out.
The Israelis might be misreading the protests in Iran and and
think that the system is weak and thereby this is a great
opportunity to weaken it further.
Right. I interviewed the Iranian
foreign minister who died in that helicopter crash a few
years ago. And my final question to him,
and he didn't like it, was are you more afraid of a Donald
Trump election? Or your own people.
And he said, you know, we're afraid of the people love us,
we're a great democracy, and we are not afraid of Donald Trump
whatsoever. I wonder, Salaam, if Trump were
to repeat his threats, if you're an oppositional figure inside
Tehran, is that helpful or is that unhelpful?
It's a tricky 1. I think that, you know, Donald
Trump's threats and what we have seen over the past few days in
Venezuela is a cautionary tale for the Islamic Republic and for
Iranians, for the opposition, for those aspiring for something
different. If, you know, certainly with
young people out on the streets and really have had enough,
yeah, maybe they feel more emboldened and they think Trump
could be on their side. But I wouldn't trust Trump too
much because at the same time, removing Ali Khamenei without
actually sort of dismembering the structure of the Islamic
Republic isn't going to provide or or, you know, give Iranians
maybe what they seek. And so I think that we should be
arguing for a more nuanced approach, nuanced analysis.
Obviously, whatever change in the regime that is going to come
through the death of Khamenei or the agency of Iranians
themselves should come actually not with just thinking about
getting rid of them, but thinking more deeply about what
comes next. Right, Ali.
I mean, we haven't talked to Al Khamenei, the supreme leader, at
all. He is a very old man by all
accounts. He is a very frail man.
And he's come out of his, you know, summer bunker during the
war looking even more frail. You know, are his days literally
numbered? Is there a succession plan?
And if there isn't 1 is that an opportunity for the regime to
fall and the then, you know, the opposition to take over?
Well, I think he's, he's definitely frail.
I mean, in, in, in the sense that, you know, sooner or later,
obviously the, the succession will have to, to kick in.
I mean, it's, and, and it's been a bad year.
I mean, it's been a bad year for him.
And he's, and he's suddenly, certainly when you, when you
listen to him, he's, he's less sure footed than he has been in
the past. Even in these current protests,
for instance, you know, the, the, the crackdown and the
violence that took place, took place well before he even got a
word in. I mean, normally he comes out
and he says something, he has said something since, but
originally, you know, obviously decisions were made without, you
know, him, him actually making any public statements on it.
I've always felt, and I've said this very clearly in the past,
that I think he, his, his preferred succession is to hand
over to his son. But I, I have to say, I think
it's, it's probably less likely now.
I mean, I, I think there are many people probably looking at
the Islamic Republic and the whole concept of the, the, the,
the supreme leader and probably thinking that when harmony dies,
that might be the opportunity for some sort of serious change.
Now, how easy that would be absent any other sort of
development. And I'm, you know, I'm less
convinced that the Islamic Republic is as stable as, as, as
maybe Sanam suggested earlier. I mean, I, I think they're much,
much more fragile than that. So depending on the decisions
they make and how they go forward, yes, I mean, I, I think
there could be an opportunity on his, on his passing for some,
you know, some of the internal opposition, if you will, to come
forward and, and, and, and, and start to provide an alternative.
It's going to be painful, by the way.
I mean, this is the problem. These deep structural sort of
problems that Iran has are not going to be solved overnight.
And I, I draw attention to the fact, you know, that we haven't
really talked about that the environmental crisis hitting the
country, which is enormous. I mean, it's far more
catastrophic than I think people realize.
And you had this. What do you mean by?
That essentially they're running out of water.
I mean, they're, you know, they, they have so mismanaged the
water resources, which has been something that Iranian states
from ancient times to the present have always been.
You know, basically it's their primary task is to manage the
water resources of the Iranian plateau and basically the
Islamic Republic through over farming, poor planning, building
dams in the wrong place, so on and so forth, has basically
drained much of the aquifers underneath the Iranian plateau.
So, and they're in a very serious problem of being unable
to supply many of the major cities with water not on on a
regular basis. And and we came precariously
close to what people call day 0 where they were actually going
to be running out of water in total in some of the major
cities. Now they've had a period of sort
of snow and rainfall in others. But again, it's part of the
fallacy I think that occurs even within Iranian, you know,
governmental outlet that they think that, you know, a couple
of weeks of rainfall are going to solve the problem.
It just isn't. It might delay the problem, but
it's not solving the problem. And even those, you know,
insiders such as Callantadi, who is the old minister of
agriculture, I mean, he's basically done a mea culpa and
basically said, you know, we screwed up.
I mean, we screwed up very badly.
And we should have planned 20 years ago for various sort of
like environmental projects, dam building, irrigation and others,
which we didn't do. And the aquifers are now down
and they will not recover, he said.
They will not recover to their previous levels.
Interesting. Salam, let's talk a little bit
about Iran's friends. I mean, George Bush used to have
this phrase the axis of evil, and Iran was very much part of
that. You know, are they getting a lot
of support from the Russians? I know they've been providing
the Russians with drones. Are they getting a lot of port
from the support from the Chinese?
I know the Chinese have been buying Iranian oil.
You know, what's that relationship like?
And are those friends of Iran motivated enough to support what
could be a crumbling regime? I think the the the foreign
relationships are certainly interesting to watch.
I mean, I think the principle network of friends are Iran's
counterweight to the axis of evil.
It was called the axis of resistance.
The the terminology developed in reaction to George W Bush's sort
of cute phrasing. And the axis of resistance is
the Iran sort of backed and built network of States and non
state actors that support resistance against Israel and
resistance against the United States.
That's included Hezbollah, the Houthis groups in Iraq, and
there have been serious setbacks.
And they've all been massively weakened by the Israelis,
haven't they? And the Israelis have really
destroyed Iran's kind of regional empire, if you like.
Weekend, I wouldn't say destroyed.
And so this is where I think the nuance is a little important.
Certainly there have been huge setbacks.
I think the primary set back has been in the context of Syria,
where for over 4 decades Iran cultivated a relationship with
the Assad regime and with the assets now hanging in a Dasha
and Moscow, Iran has, you know, lost all of that investment.
What's happened also in Venezuela with Maduro, you know,
obviously being removed is another other loss for Iran
because that was a relationship that Iran cultivated in EU, s s
Western Hemisphere. So there have been real setbacks
in in that grouping. But to answer your question more
specifically, ties with Russia and China are humming along.
They're neither overwhelming, but they Iran has not been
abandoned by these partners either.
China continues to provide these sort of economic lifeline for
the Islamic Republic. And there have been some
suggestions that China has helped Iran recapitalize its
ballistic missile program since the war last year.
And the Russians are important, more important than are is often
reported in security, intelligence and military ties.
And of course the economic nature of the relationship is
limited, but that's still 1 where the two countries
collaborate. Let me just add one more thing
about the region. While Iran's non state based
relationships have certainly been less beneficial for Iran,
Iran has improved its ties with almost all countries across the
Middle East and North Africa and that has been a positive.
Iran's normalization with the Arab world is in a stronger
footing than it has ever been. I just want to ask you both, you
know, to do something outrageous, which is a little
prediction. I'm going to give you a couple
of nuanced possibilities. So first, you, Ali, do you think
by the end of the year we're going to see regime change in
Iran brought about either by Donald Trump's intervention by
the people uprising against the regime as we're seeing bits of
happening right now, or will the regime carry on, perhaps
rebooted by some kind of deal concocted by Steve Witkoff?
Ali Well, on, on the qualification that historians
never predict, Matt. So I, I, I want to put that
caveat in there very clearly. I mean, I think, I think your
former is more likely than the latter.
But I want to be quite specific about the notion of regime
change or regime collapse. I mean, I think that there is a
serious possibility that there's going to be an economic collapse
and that economic collapse will, will bring all sorts of things
along with it. Whether that entails a, a, a
sort of an element of sort of very direct regime change.
You know, that that's a little bit more debatable because you
know, those within the system will fight to the last minute, I
suspect. But it could lead to a sort of
a, an internal collapse of one sort or another.
Not I should say, and let me emphasize this of the country
per SE, but more of the system. It's the political system really
that I'm thinking about. And, and one of the things we
have to be very careful when we discuss these things, I think is
to make clear, you know, what we're, what we're defining here.
Because I think too many people conflate Iran with the Islamic
Republic And, and the Islamic Republic is a political system.
I don't think the the political system of the Islamic Republic
as it is currently configured has a future.
Salam What about you? I would say we could most likely
see a change in the regime. Neither regime change I I don't
see that as viable, but a change in the regime.
A rebooting. A regime reboot.
Well, it could be a reboot, but it depends on who comes up in
the reboot. The international order and
leaders around the world seem to be quite comfortable with
pliable, amenable and sort of rebranded leaders.
We saw that in 2025. And I think that that could very
likely be a scenario we might see in Iran where, as you know,
an Egypt model or a Syria model could work out as well for for
Iran. But I do think that talks are
still out there as a viable solution.
I'm not sure the Islamic Republic is able or capable to
deliver a deal they're good at. They're or they're supposedly
good at negotiating. But I think we have to bend that
idea at this point. And but I, you know, the talks I
think are still a possibility for this year as well.
And now that I've broken the ice and got you both into the
prediction game, one final line. Will Donald Trump intervene
military literally on behalf of the protesters, as he has
threatened to do? Yes or no Saddam?
No. OK.
What about you, Ali? I think actually he's set
himself a red line and he's very likely going to have to deliver
on it, either through himself or his or his allies.
Are you Israel? So that's a.
Yes. I mean, I think if they continue
in this way, he will, he will find himself having to deliver
something. Now what that means, you know, I
who knows? But yes, I mean, I think he
he's, he's laid down a red line very clearly there and he'll
look very silly if he does nothing.
But we've got you both on the record, and we will get back to
you if and when it is necessary. Hope.
Sanam is right. OK, well, who knows?
Thanks very much to both of you. Sanam Bakil, Ali Ansari, it's
been a pleasure speaking to you. It's a really big issue at the
moment. We're all focused on Venezuela,
but this is this is another gathering storm.
We can't take our eyes off it. Thanks to all of you for
listening to the forecast. That's it from us here in
Washington today. See you next time.