It is extremely dangerous because what is happening in the
world now reminds me of the 1930s.
That's an alarming comparison. Some people would say that's
exaggerated when you consider how that ended.
I certainly think that this is not exaggerated in worse
situation now, because all of this populism and other things,
it captured good part of Europe. Now the populism, the rise of
the authoritarian tendencies, US is right in the centre of that.
So for Europe, is the plan to to wake up?
Putin has done a lot of nuclear Sabre rattling.
Yes. Is he serious?
Hello and welcome to the forecast.
As Donald Trump and Vladimir Zelensky's latest meeting
reportedly descended into another shouting match behind
closed doors, the war in Ukraine feels as volatile as ever, and,
according to some, more dangers for the world than at any time
since the Cold War. Our guest today is Sehi Prachi,
professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University and author
of The Nuclear Age. He warns that fear is once again
driving nations towards the bomb and that we could soon see
dozens more nuclear armed states.
So it's about stumbling into new nuclear era.
And what does that mean for global security and indeed for
Ukraine's fight to survive? Sahi, good to see you again.
It's a pleasure. Let's start with the news, kind
of the topical news this Budapest summer, which seems
quite an extraordinary idea when it was first mooted last week.
Is it going to happen, do you think?
I would say it's 5050, but I would say that probably 90
against Stan that probably it will not produce any
breakthrough if it happens because the positions, in
particular the position of Russia is still the same.
They want to keep whatever they got on the battlefield and they
also want Ukraine to surrender additional territories.
So I go back in history at, at any sort of peace deal or
ceasefire that the norm is that it goes along the existing front
lines. So I I don't think that this is,
this is the position that really suggests that we are going to
witness the end of hostilities anytime soon.
But if Putin says no to the Budapest summit, which is 1 hell
of a gift, is he being a bit greedy here?
Because it's in Budapest, hosted by Viktor Orban, who is the
closest thing that Putin has to a real friend in the European
Union. It's a kick in the teeth for the
European Union. Trump will be there.
Zelensky, as far as he knows, is not going to show up.
We know that in the last meeting between Zelensky and Trump,
Trump more or less represented Vladimir Putin at the table.
Well, they had President Trump and and Putin had meeting in
Alaska. So having meeting doesn't mean
solving the issue. Solving the problem so.
But it's a diplomacy. It looks good for Putin, doesn't
it? Or the summit in red.
Carpets. The the the red carpet in
Alaska. Yes, exactly that.
That looked exceptionally good for Putin.
It means that he is back on the international arena.
He can go to the United States and not be arrested.
And now going to Budapest means that he can go to Europe as
well. So, yeah, it would be absolutely
being whatever the, the the outcome of the Budapest summit
would be. So we don't know.
We don't have the date yet. They haven't agreed on that.
And what we see now from the Russian side, the the statements
come in that the the only condition on which Russia is
prepared to stop fighting, it's when Russia gets more territory.
And it's not just more territory, it's urban
conglomerate and, and, and towns and cities in highly
industrialized on bus area, which is apart from value, apart
from people. It's also the the position that
is very difficult to to take. It's not, it's not a field.
So yeah, it would be a strategic, strategic defeat of
major proportions for Ukraine, for the West and for the for the
future of Europe, for. Sure.
So just to be clear, say what you're saying is that the things
that Putin can't get on the battlefield where the front
lines have been frozen for quite a long time?
More or less he. Thinks he can get from Trump as
a concession. That is the, the, the, the, that
is certainly the plan that that is certainly the, the position.
And it's more than just negotiation position from which
he starts. That's what he says again and
again that he wants to get. So.
So the new battlefield in this war is actually inside Trump's
head. Certainly, certainly that's what
is happening. The the the battle is for the
position of the United States, for the position of the US
president. And as we know that Frontline is
moving back and forth quite often, so.
Hard to keep up. One, one day it's the Russia
winning, another day it's Ukraine backed by the European
leaders, which are a very important, very important
participants in that battle, not just in the battle on the on the
in, on Ukraine frontline, but also American frontline.
So after last Friday's meeting in the Oval Office between Trump
and Zelensky, things seem to be relatively positive.
He didn't get his Tomahawk missiles.
You know, Trump wasn't particularly friendly towards
Zelensky. But then we heard afterwards
that behind closed doors, the meeting was almost as ugly as
the public. You know, disaster back in
February. Well, that, that means that
there probably in the future will be more ups and downs in,
in, that's in, in those relationships.
It also indicates that Zelensky was not intimidated.
And from what we can tell from the previous story of
relationship between the two leaders, the, the, the, the
quarrel today doesn't mean that there can be some sort of
understanding tomorrow and, and vice versa.
So that, that that's a roller coaster.
And I was in September in Ukraine for two weeks.
People there take this really hard.
So the, the at stake is, of course, the survival of the
country, their personal survival.
And this news, they don't, they don't help it.
It goes back and forth, back and forth.
The hopes are going up. And then, then suddenly,
suddenly there is a major, major disappointment.
But even but in the back and forth, and, you know, one day
Trump says that Ukraine could win all this territory back and
then the next day says they should suck it up and deal with
their losses. Do you think that Trump
fundamentally understands what Putin wants, which is for
Ukraine to stop existing as an independent nation state, and
what the Ukrainians insist on, which is their survival as an
independent nation state? From the public pronouncements,
I don't think that there is. I don't see that there is an
understanding that. Trump doesn't get it.
Or his advisors, if they get that they, they, they, they keep
it as, as, as a deepest secret. So it's, it's not, it's not
certainly in the public, it's not in the pronouncements.
And it's very much the whole thing is about the territory.
And, and, and at stake is of course not, not, not just
territory or any territory. It's it's the survival of
Ukraine. How do you think future
historians will interpret victory in this war?
Looking at the region and its tough neighborhood in which
Ukraine is, Ukraine now goes through the process of really
establishing its independence in face of the resurgent empire.
And this is the story, this is the situation in which Poland
and and Romania and other East and Central European countries
were before that. None of them really stayed in
the borders in which it was born or emerged after World war.
The border shift, the border shift in the region.
Yeah, the border shift in the region.
But what is important, important is sovereignty, the survival and
sovereignty. So that's.
The sense of nationhood. You know, the Poles have a very
strong sense of Polish nation, despite the fact that their
border ceased to exist in the 19th century.
Exactly, exactly. So that's that's assurance of
survival and that assurance also of success, political but also
economic. Look at at Polish, Polish
economy today, how again the the the entire country was shifted
after the World War 2, acquiring some territories, losing others.
So my position was that the victory for Ukraine is survival,
survival as a sovereign state. If that doesn't happen, then it
is not a victory. But it hopes to survive as a
sovereign state inside secure borders, even if they've shifted
somewhere. Exactly, security.
Security is the core is is is is extremely important.
So think of adding that it. It's always puzzled me that
Europe, an economy 10 times the size of Russia's, you know, a
fragmented but very healthy arms industry and A, and a very
particular cause which most European member states seem to
buy into, that this is European and Western values at stake
here, that they've not stood up to Vladimir Putin, you know, in
a most robust way, especially when they say this is
existential not just for Ukraine but also for us, right.
What, in essence do you think is going on there?
Well, certainly the EU has a difficulty of really translating
and transforming its economic power into first political will
to defend itself, to defend values, to defend the the, the
type of the of the economy, to defend the level of prosperity.
And the reason for that is that Europe really didn't function as
1 Organism almost ever. And after 1945, it relied really
on the United States to provide protection.
And what is happening now, it's a very, very difficult and
challenging process for for Europe, finding enough unity,
finding enough ways of how, how to survive together.
Because on their own European countries can survive E European
countries who were under or most of them who were under the
Russian control, under the Soviet control before that
understand that the Finland countries, countries in northern
Europe understand that. But talking to Germany, it's
already becomes difficult. France and and Spain again, they
are on board. But for them it's, it's it's
more a theoretical threat than than a real one.
Ukraine, by heroically, really fighting back, buys time for
Europe to put it's act together because in the new world you're
really now, you can't be sure that the United States will show
up when it matters and Europe has to find a way to protect
what it got. So this is, at the end of the
day, this really is as far as you're concerned about the
survival of Europe. It is, it is because we already
see that Putin goes there and bribes individual leaders and
countries and Slovakia and, and Hungary already are playing, it
doesn't look like on European team on, on, on many issues.
And it can take 1 country one after another.
He he, he, he was very, very influential and tragically
continues to be in Germany, for example, and support for either
far right or far left, any anti anti system sort of political
forces. It's certainly the one of the
tools that he hasn't he uses. So yeah, Ukraine, Ukraine is, is
fighting not just for European values, which is true.
It wants to stay democratic. It wants to to to stay
sovereign, but it's also for Europe and interests of Europe.
What is the bigger factor in dividing Europe in its response
to Russia? Is it the constant potential of
a nuclear threat from Vladimir Putin?
Is it the fact that you know your perception of the Russian
threat recedes as your geography expands?
Is it internal politics? Or all three.
Geography matters when it comes to Europe and you see a
different reaction to Putin's actions, as I already said,
between let's say Poland and, and, and Spain or Portugal.
But geography becomes less important when it comes to
nuclear weapons course. And the biggest concern for
Putin using nuclear weapons in Ukraine was really registered
not in Europe, but in Washington.
So the, the, the potential and, and Trump keeps talk, you know,
at least till recently about the, whether Zelensky wants to
bring the third World War because everyone understands
that the third World War can be, can be only nuclear.
So nuclear kind of descends this, this geography and, and
geographic, geographic divisions.
And what I, what I write about in my book, it's, it's certainly
the history of the, of the nuclear age, starting with HG
Wells and imagining, imagining the, the nuclear war back in
1913, but it ends with the, with the war in Ukraine.
Apart from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, we have also
something that we never saw in history before.
That's so-called Atoms For Peace.
Nuclear power plants are turning into weapons for war as Russia
takes over Chernobyl first and then the Parisian nuclear plant.
And that is a real danger, isn't it, that these become massive
dirty bombs in the heart of Europe?
Exactly. Dirty bomb.
That's that that that's the term.
And I think it's a much more real possibility and threat than
the use of nuclear weapons, because use of nuclear weapons,
that means breaking the taboo that exists since the times of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and paying a political and economic
price because China is is not particularly keen on anyone
using nuclear weapons at this point, or India for that matter.
So Putin can lose the only allies or the biggest allies
that he has, but so-called accident of the nuclear power
plant when it's impossible to prove who, who's who was
responsible for what and what happened.
That's, that's, that's, that's. It seems to me a much more
immediate danger. Let's talk, you write in your
brilliant book about also nuclear Saber rattling.
Right. Putin has done a lot of nuclear
Saber rattling. He mentions the nuclear threat
periodically. Yes.
Is he serious? So far, certainly that was the
most successful Russian psychological operation of the
war because it certainly influenced thinking in
Washington during Biden administration.
That in in turn, influenced the question of how much Ukraine was
getting weapons. What sort of gap?
Don't give them anything too
powerful in case you provoke the nuclear bear.
Exactly because the the the the whole game was about at the
so-called red lines in the head of Putin, whether they existed
or not, where were they? And that there was general
agreement at that time that Crimea is one of them.
So the idea was give Ukraine enough to to hold the line, but
not enough to somehow be able to get into the Crimea.
But that's really important, isn't it?
Because if you're never going to give Ukraine more to actually
win this war, and if, if, if victory means pushing the
Russians back to the original borders and making sure they
never cross your front, your borders ever again, then you
have to engage with the possibility of a nuclear threat.
Because it's possible that that Putin would use.
It you, you, you have and in that sense, and again, that's
that's what I'm saying in in trying to argue in my book that
we have to relearn certain not just lessons, but also skills of
the Cold War because we survived the Cold War because of the
existence of thing that Winston Churchill defined as balance of
terror. And I write about that as
balance of fear, because Russia is not the only nuclear power in
the world. And if only the West is scared
of the of the Russian nuclear power and Russia is not scared
of the Western one we don't have.
You don't have a balance of fear you.
Don't have the? Balance.
You don't have deterrence. You don't, you don't have
deterrence exactly so. And it's, it sounds very kind of
reckless, what I am saying, But that's, that's the reality.
That's how we survived the Cold War.
But how did we end up in a point where the Russians are not
afraid of the nuclear threat from the West, whether it's the
United States or indeed France and and Britain?
Well, because on some point we really believed in the idea that
history came to an end. Maybe not in Fukuyama's
understanding of the victory of liberal democracy, but the end
of the big wars, the brutal force and other things.
And new generations came, politicians, new electorate
showed up, and so on and so forth.
So we, we assumed that that eternal peace actually arrived.
And now we know with the war in Ukraine, which is the largest
war in Europe since 45, potentially the largest war in
the world, that that was a moment that was a peace, peace
period that unfortunately as as everything in the world, good
and bad comes to an end. It came to an end.
But you're what you're arguing in your book is that the reason
why we had the peace is because there was this balance of fear.
The very existence of nuclear weapons was so unimaginable as a
military tool on the battlefield that we had this balance of
fear. And if we had no global war,
plenty of regional wars, no global wars for almost 8
decades. Yes, yes, I'm not.
I'm not the first one to argue that, of course, certainly, but,
but, but certainly I'm I my own research demonstrates that I
don't have any other explanation for why we have this the
longest, probably the peace in the modern history.
I mean global peace. Of course there are original
wars. So have we become flabby in the
West, in Europe? Have we become complacent
because we didn't think that those global wars could ever
happen again? We got used to nuclear
deterrence. Yes, yes.
And anyone who was talking about, let's say investing in
the defences was considered to be a war monger and and and so
on and so forth. So people, people focused on
different things and but again, the, the, the, the peace benefit
of the fall of the Berlin Wall came to an end.
So we have we have to learn the lessons of the Cold War because
for for generations historians of the Cold War were asking
question how did it happen that the grand airlines of World War
2 deteriorated in this horrible thing called.
Cold War, which is a good question to ask and discuss, but
now I think much more important for our own survival is the
question, what did we do right during the Cold War that we are
still around and have this conversation today and, and go
back and try to to distill that and then and then try to use it
to implement in this new. And what did we do right?
First of all, we got lucky in, in cases like the Cuban Missile
crisis. But the other thing was that
again, thinking about the Cuban missile crisis, the position of,
of President Kennedy that he, he decided that he, he, he, he
can't retreat because what was there was Khrushchev's blackmail
by moving those missiles there, you, you, you take a strong
stand and you, you indicate that you, you are, you are prepared
to respond in kind. That's, that's again, as I say,
especially in the new environment created by the last
30 years. That's sounds that as most
irresponsible thing to be said. But, but as a historian, that's,
that's how I see the Cold War and that's how I see where was
the secret that there was no, no beacon global war between 1945
in 1991 or 1989, depending on how you how you look at the end
of the Cold War. So considering the fact that we
have an actual and very bloody war happening in Europe right
now, considering the fact that I'm sorry, Mr. Putin, we know
who the aggressor is and it's. You the the fact.
That we've got Trump in the White House who's not holding a
firm line. How dangerous is that for us?
Well, it is it is extremely dangerous because we are in the
new world on in many ways, the what is happening in the world
now reminds me of the 1930s Great Depression, Great
Recession, the rise of populism, nationalism, aggression, use of
the minorities card and nationality card.
So the the the that's. An alarming comparison.
Some people would say that's exaggerated when you consider
how that ended, but you would say no.
I, I, I, I certainly think that this is not exaggerated.
And the, the question is how we can preclude it from going
where, where it is going. It, it looks like we know where
it can end. So that, that, that's, that
that's, that's an alarm bell that we should take seriously
and not dismiss that as so. But but where, where I was
heading with all of that, that to a degree, we're in worse
situation now than we were back in the 1930s because all of this
populism and other things, it captured good part of Europe.
But US was saved to a degree by Atlantic Ocean or by, by, by
something else. Now, the populism, the rise of
the authoritarian tendencies, US is right in the center of that.
And that is really challenge for Europe, but also opportunity for
Europe. So it's time, it's time to grow
up and it it's time to start thinking and relying on on
Europe and European enormous economic, economic potential to
find the way how to defend Europe in the situation where
there are clear signs that that US tries to retreat on the
other, on the other side of the Atlantic.
And again, we can say, OK, this is this is President Trump.
But the reorientation of American foreign policy toward
the Pacific started under Obama that those were also hopes and
expectations of President Biden. But then of course the war in
Ukraine started, so we are witnessing a major shift on the
international arena. So for Europe is the time to to
wake up and not to dismiss parallels with 1930s as as just
pure exaggeration. So to be clear, you've got in
Russia an actual aggressor, you know, against the sovereign
European territory. You've got in China a an
opportunistic at best, confrontational worst former
ally and market that is being decoupled.
You've got in the United States, you know, an Uncle Sam who's
become rogue, let's put it this way, unreliable who may not show
up. So what you're left with is the
survivors club of liberal democracy in the the European
Union in in Europe. You put it exceptionally well.
Yeah, I, I, I Thank you. I've been thinking about it a
lot like you. And so this survivors club is
divided, right? It's possible that some of the
most powerful nations in this club are going to be run by far
right wingers, the Afd in Germany, Ras Oblomo Nacional in
France, who are flirting with authoritarianism themselves.
Yes, the, the, the, this is what is happening.
And again, the, I think as a historian, what that reminds me
about is 1930s. So what that means is that the
frontline, we were talking about the, the frontline in Ukraine,
the frontline in the US in, in President Trump's head.
So for Europe, the frontline is not only there where Ukrainians
are keeping, keeping the Russian forces or where the, the Poles
are trying to shoot down the Russian drones or, or the, the
intercept the, the, the, the planes are trying to intercept
the, the Russian jets in, in Northern Europe.
The frontline is within, within each individual country itself.
And that's the frontline between democracy and whatever forces
are that presents threat to that democracy.
Again, it's, it's, it's, it maybe sounded as, as a
exaggeration, but again, what, what you are saying and that
that's what certainly I, I, I see when and what I, what I read
and, and what, what I feel being in Europe that is that that is
the reality. There is more than more than one
frontline. And thank God the one within
within European Union is political.
Are we sleepwalking in Europe towards catastrophe?
I hope not, because at least the, the language that is being
used is the right language, including in Germany.
The, the pronouncements that are being made in, in support of
Ukraine are, are, I think, very real and strong.
So the, the task is really to match the, the, the rhetoric
and, and, and, and, and, and deeds.
Because again, at this point, US stopped supplying Ukraine with
the, the weapons and it's now Europe that is, that is buying
those weapons. So that's already the act that
demonstrates that at least on certain level, there is
serialization How, how dangerous it is.
So I hope we are not sleepwalking.
But just briefly. I mean, Trump has been much more
hostile towards Zelensky than towards Putin in public at
least. He's been much more hostile
towards the European Union as a body then he has been even to
Zelensky. He's called it a way of fleecing
the United States. This isn't helpful for the
survival of Europe. Well, it is.
Or maybe it is. Exactly it.
Depends. Maybe it's concentrating
European minds. OK.
So is the rhetoric like that because that's a great power
rhetoric toward a smaller or medium, medium sized countries?
Well, that's maybe what what Europe needs the the that sort
of wake up call not not just coming from Russia, but also
from the United. So in if you're going back to
the 1930s, we had an emerging Winston Churchill, right?
You know, we had, you know, the Charles de Gaulle.
We had, you know, FDR in the United States.
Who are the Churchills of today? Well, I'm, I'm, I'm looking
around. I, I, I, I, I don't see many of
them, but I, I'm sure that the, the, really the situations like
that, the, the, the, the times of, of trial, they produce
leaders. They produce leaders.
So I hope within a year another maybe electoral cycle, we we'll
see that. And there is the, there is some
hope in Germany now there is some hope in, in other places as
well. So I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm sure
the leaders, if there is a demand for, for, for a
particular leader, that leader will show up.
I hope we have enough time for that.
I hear what you're saying, but you're not going to make me
sleep any better. That say, hey Ploy, Professor
Ploy, thank you very much indeed.
My pleasure. That's it for this episode of
The Forecast. Hope you enjoyed it.
Sobering stuff. Until next time, goodbye.