ISIS will be looking at the situation and trying to identify
any possibilities for having some sort of a resurrection.
The. Kurds were doing, as it were,
The Dirty work for the worst, particularly the Americans.
The Kurds, they will see this as a huge blow.
Many of them do not want to be integrated completely into a
centralized Syrian state. I think there's a great danger
of continued guerrilla warfare. There isn't much of A call for
to improve conditions in these camps for people who are
regarded as terrorists, and without that, they have become a
breeding grounds for radicalization.
This has been a mistake repeated again and again, you know, in
our modern history. Hello and welcome to the
forecast. It was hoped the fall of Syria's
dictator Bashar al-Assad would usher in a period of stability,
unity and perhaps eventually democracy.
But now the country enters a new and unpredictable phase as
President Ahmed Al Sharah tightens his grip on power in
the North East. The Kurds were the West key ally
against Islamic State. Now their control in the region
is collapsing after days of fierce battles with government
forces. A tentative ceasefire is in
place but the fallout is far from clear, including the fate
of thousands of ISIS prisoners and their families who were in
Kurdish controlled camps. Regional players like Turkey and
Iran, as well as China, Russia and the West, are also jostling
for influence. Could these developments finally
bring a period of calm and stability in Syria or just open
the door to new dangers? I'm joined by our international
editor, Lindsay Hilsum, and by Lina Khatib, the principal
analyst at geopolitical foresight company Extrac.
Lina Khatib, First, that hope of a unified Syria.
How hopeless is that looking right now?
It's actually looking more likely than before.
For the longest time there was speculation that Syria could go
down the line of federalism, with, for example, a Kurdish
autonomous area in the North East becoming a permanent
feature of Syria. But since Ahmed Shara came to
power, there has been persistent messaging by the Syrian
government that decentralisation is not going to be acceptable,
that they want to centralise governance in Syria.
And now they are closer to that than ever.
And what has happened in the North East sends a message all
over Syria that the model for governance going forward is a
centralised 1. So, Lindsay, sum up for us, if
you would, the sort of military and political landscape right
now. Well, I think that Aslina says
the central government under Ahmad al Sharra is trying to
pull in everybody, the Alawites, the Druze and now the Kurds.
But from a Kurdish point of view, they held this area of
northeastern Syria called Rajava as a semi autonomous state in
the time of Bashar al-Assad. And that was something that they
wanted. And you look to Iraq and you
have Iraqi Kurdistan, which is semi autonomous and what has
been happening over the last few days, which is fierce fighting
between the Kurdish forces and the central Damascus forces and
which has resulted in most of that area, Rajava, being taken
over by the the central Syrian forces.
For many of the Kurds, they will see this is a huge blow.
Many of them do not want to be integrated completely into a
centralised Syrian state. They want to retain some
autonomy. And I think that they will see
this, as, you know, less and less possible.
And I'm not sure that they would all accept it.
I think there's a great danger of continued guerrilla warfare.
Exactly on that point lean, I mean, the idea of moving towards
unity doesn't actually happen if the Kurds don't accept this,
does it? It certainly will be difficult
because not everyone, as we heard, is on board.
And also the issue is not just about the Kurds.
There's other communities in Syria that we're hoping for
autonomy as well. And here we're mainly talking
about the Druze in the South, as well as perhaps some communities
are in coastal areas which come from the Alawite community.
So the Syrian governments way of handling the situation in the
northeast is meant to also be about those other communities
further down the line. And those communities in the
South, for example, food, also form groups that do not toe the
line of the government. And so there is the potential of
seeing not just guerrilla groups in the northeast, but guerrilla
groups and other areas in Syria as well.
And the challenge for the Syrian government here becomes twofold.
On the one hand, it's a security challenge.
When the security sector capacity of the new Syrian
government is quite reduced, it's still not very strong.
And 2nd, it's a political issue because solving all these issues
ultimately has to be through political inclusion.
And that is something that is not quite there in Syria at the
moment. There had been talk, you know,
with the the new government that there would be elections.
How likely is that now? Eventually there have to be
elections because this government is currently
presenting itself as legitimate on the basis that it's a
liberation government. But the Syrian people want to
see actual political representation going on with
genuine political participation by the people and we will see
whether President Sharia will deliver on his promises that in
few years time Syria will have elections.
Otherwise, I think masses of Syrians will be very
disappointed. Is that, you know, the latest
development sort of lightning move move movements over the
last couple of weeks that make elections less likely?
When it comes to the impact of what we've just seen in
northeast Syria on the political trajectory of Syria when it
comes to elections, I think the move towards centralisation
actually makes it more likely that elections will happen
further down the line. Because now you can say Syrians
more or less all over the country will be able to
participate in those elections. Whereas until not too long ago,
the government could argue that there is one area of Syria that
is outside of its remit and therefore elections cannot
happen. And so hopefully things should
actually become a bit more positive in that regard.
But then a lot of that then on the conduct that it depends on
whether the different Syrian groups, where it's the Kurds,
the group we're looking at, or the Druze or the allies and so
on, except the authority of the central state and everything
comes down to that. And if it came to elections,
whether they felt free to elect their own representatives who
would inevitably represent their own communities and whether they
felt that those representatives would actually have an influence
over the central authorities. And I think that all of that is
still unclear at the moment. And whether that would allow
them still to push for this sort of autonomous region?
I don't think they're going to get their autonomous region, but
there is still negotiations going on about what kind of, you
know what, how that could work out because it's perfectly
possible to have a semi autonomous region or a federal
system or whatever. Now that is not what the Syrian
government is looking at at the moment, but those things are
still to be discussed and that is also something which would
come up in elections. And Lindsay, the Kurds are
particularly interesting in a way, aren't they?
Because they were pivotal allies against ISIS.
Yet it seems now they're being effectively abandoned by the
West. The Kurds are relearning A
brutal lesson. Loyalty means nothing.
They have no permanent friends. Well, and this goes back to the
the history of of the Kurds. So as you know, Kurdish people
up to 45,000,000 spread across four countries, not just Syria,
but also Iran, Iraq and Turkey. And they don't have their own
states. They don't have a Kurdish
country as such. And over the years they have
teamed up with the Americans particularly many times.
They teamed up with the Americans to try and overthrow
Saddam Hussein several times in in Iraq.
What happened nearly every time the Americans abandoned them,
the CIA abandoned them to their fate.
And many Kurds will be seeing exactly the same Now.
The Kurds were doing, as it were, The Dirty work for the
West, particularly the Americans.
I was there in Rajava, which is this Kurdish area of Syria,
several times between 2016 and 2019.
They were there, the Kurdish forces fighting on the
frontline, killing and dying in order to defeat Islamic State,
partly because they wanted to do that themselves.
They have a very different ideology from Islamic State.
They have women with female brigades in their armies.
They live a, you know, many of them are quite secular, not all
of them. They're still Muslims.
And they have a very leftist way of looking at at the world.
But they were doing it also on behalf of America and on behalf
of the West. And most significantly, they
have been guarding the ISIS prisoners, prisoners, male
prisoners who are in in ordinary prisons, as it were, and female
prisoners in camps. And here I'll just mention
Shamima Begum because that may be her name that's familiar to
many British people. She was a a young woman, aged
15, a child really, who fled her home and went to join ISIS.
And she ended up becoming very embroiled in that and she's
overheld, we think in a camp called Al Raj at the moment.
Now the Kurds, they were looking after those people or keeping
those people prisoner while Western countries refused to
have their own nationals back. And now, well, suddenly they're
not useful anymore. The Americans have decided that
Al Sharar and that government they can more or less look
overlook after the the prisoners say Kurds sorry about that.
Can I just add that one key reason why the Kurds were
fighting ISIS is not just because of course ISIS posed a
real threat to them, but also because they thought that if
they play this role, then they can eventually get autonomy.
Then the West would back them in this political goal of theirs.
And unfortunately, the situation has been one in which they were
simply being instrumentalized by the international community in
the fight against ISIS. And now the US envoy, Tom
Barack, has basically said that their role has ended.
That's it. Their role in fighting ISIS has
ended, and therefore their role as custodians of security in the
Northeast is over. You go back to Henry Kissinger,
don't you? Who was the one who said that
America has no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only
permanent interests? And so the Kurds acted in the
American interest. And now the Americans say, look
at it like that. And so you come back to another.
This is one, I'm afraid it's another cliche what the the
Kurds always say because they feel that they're always
betrayed. No friends but the mountains.
So Lena, what are what are the political, the geopolitical
consequences of the West in a sense letting down the Kurds
here? Well, one of the bigger issues
for the West, of course, is that of ISIS and what to do about
ISIS detainees. And what the US indicates doing
is moving reportedly 7000 of those ISIS detainees from the
prisons that the Kurds were overseeing to Iraq.
So these prisoners are being moved to Iraq.
Why is this happening? It's because now that area, the
northeast, is under the control of the Syrian government.
And as I was saying earlier, unfortunately the Syrian
government's security sector capacity is still quite weak.
So they will not be able to really hold that area
effectively, especially as ISIS will be looking at the situation
and trying to identify any possibilities for releasing some
of their prisoners and having some sort of a resurrection.
So the US is trying to play safe by moving these detainees to
Iraq. Now here, of course, we have
another situation, which is the presence now for the first time
of the Syrian government's forces at the Iraqi boulder.
Until very recently, it was the Kurds who were present in a
security capacity. So now the Iraqi authorities
will have to coordinate with this new government in Syria,
which is going to be also a bit of a delicate political
situation considering the varied political leanings that are
present in Iraq compared to Syria.
And here I'm talking mainly about the still very influential
role for Iran in the Iraq, influencing many of the militias
that are present in that area. And so they will also, these
Iraqi militias be seeing in this new movement in Syria a bit of a
threat to their own authority as well.
So, Lindsay on on how the Syrian government react to all of this,
I mean, how does Ahmed al Shara's government differ regime
differ from Bashar al Assad's? Well, look, it's hugely
different. I mean, obviously, he comes from
an Islamist background. And I think that that is one of
the reasons that many people look on his forces taking over
these camps and prisons and think, are they really seeing
themselves as the enemies of the men and women inside?
Or would they actually like to release some of them because
they could they could be partners in the future.
And that is that is an open question.
But clearly he represents, you know, ethnically, religiously, a
majority in Syria, which is Sunni Muslims, unlike Bashar
al-Assad who was an Alawite, which was a minority.
So arguably that gives him an advantage.
The other advantage that he has, I think, is that there is a lot
of goodwill towards Ahmed Al Sharah, and that primarily comes
from the Gulf countries. And one of the reasons, I think
that all the main reason that we've seen this big change in
American policy and this big support for him, even though he
does come from this Islamist background, is because the Gulf
country has said to, to President Trump, look, you've
got to support this man. This man has a chance of uniting
Syria, of pulling Syria together as one country, not as a broken,
fragmented state. You've got to lift sanctions,
which Donald Trump did, and you've got to give him all the
the backing you can. So that is the policy that the
Americans are following very much after the the lead of the
Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
And if I can add one key thing about Sharaf's political
positioning, which relates to my point earlier on Iran, is that
he is vehemently anti Iran. Obviously the Syria situation
under Bashar al-Assad was was really optimal for Iranian
influence in the Middle East. And with the fall of Assad, that
situation changed radically for Iran.
It lost a huge advantage when it comes to its strategic influence
in the region with the fall of Assad.
So now you have Sharia, who's anti Iran.
But another thing about him is obviously as the previous leader
of, he also fought with his factions against ISIS because
they were political rivals. So for a while you had rivalry
between, hey, Atahrid Sham under a shadow and he was known at the
time as Abu Muhammad al Julani and ISIS.
They were arguing over power and fighting bitterly and hey
Atahrid Sham prevailed. And so in this sense, Haiah
Pahri, the Sham, still sees ISIS as a threat and as a rival and
as an enemy and vice versa. And so this situation with the
prisoners, I don't think personally is going to lead to
more cooperation between the Syrian government and some of
the prisoners. I think it's the opposite.
I think they are concerned about their own security when the
situation might present openings for ISIS.
And Lindsay, of course, President Erdogan in Turkey, it
must be pretty delighted at how things are panning out for the
Kurds. Oh, he's crowing because
President Erdogan in Turkey is the Kurdish separatist movement
was see it was his biggest enemy.
Now he did a sort of deal with them, which is kind of stalling
at the moment. It's not completely clear what
exactly is happening on them. But to see their autonomous area
reduced and potentially crushed in Syria, that's a big advantage
to to President Erdogan. And that may be another reason
that the Americans have withdrawn their support for the
Kurds in order to, you know, to, to reinforce that connection
with, with Erdogan and Turkey, which is a which is a NATO
member. But can we just, I just want to
bring it for a moment back to the human side of this, because
I visited those camps. And one of the things I think is
really important is you have all these women in those camps and
all these children. And these children have been
brought up without an education and they have been radicalized
because many of the women in the camps a fanatical ISIS
supporters. It was extraordinary being
there. They were so angry and the fury
at me because I just wore a headscarf and didn't cover my
face. I mean, these kind of feelings
and beliefs are very prevalent in the camps.
And I wonder what is going to happen to those children now,
because now for many years, you know, sort of 5-6, what is it
7-8 years they've been brought up without an education.
And with this radicalization, how are they ever going to be
integrated into a new into a new Syria?
And what about, you know, the suffering of all those people?
And I think that one of the things is also worrying when you
look at the the Kurds, they have, there has been a certain
under the autonomous region, there has been a certain amount
of freedom for women. And many of them will fear that
despite Ahmed al Shahra's declaration that women are
equal. And so they will fear being
reintegrated into Syria because they will fear losing some of
those freedoms. I don't know, Lena, whether you
think that those those fears are justified or not.
Well, I was in Syria in December and one thing I noticed and that
was my first visit since before the conflict, so 15 years, and I
did not see explicit signs in Damascus regarding increased
Islamization, however. Behind closed doors there were
quite a few concerns expressed by people that there were
informal things happening that they saw as leading society down
that particular route. So I think these concerns that
you are talking about are not baseless.
And, and the point is, I suppose, that there isn't much
of A call for to improve conditions in these camps for
people who are regarded as terrorists, their families.
And without that, as Lindsay says, Lena, you know, they have
become people say, breeding grounds for radicalization.
And unfortunately, this has been a mistake repeated again and and
again, you know, in our modern history that we in the
international community become so concerned with immediate
security measures and we don't think long term about causes of
instability. And right now I'm seeing, for
example, the movement of detainees, let's say, from Syria
to Iraq, but I'm not seeing plans for what to do about the
children and the women that Lindsay has been talking about.
Where is the solution to try to de radicalize these individuals?
This means that, yes, for now, we may be able to deal with the
problem by keeping them locked up.
But this is not going to be a long term solution.
And unfortunately, we keep seeing the same mistakes
repeated. And this was one of the reasons
why ISIS rose, you know, around a decade or so ago.
It's because people at the time also did not pay enough
attention to the root causes and.
They're not small in number, the people being held, the women,
the children. Now, I don't know the exact
number, I don't know if you do need it, but just our whole camp
had 24,000 in it the last time I looked.
So we are talking about a lot of, we're talking about a lot of
people. And that's one of the is, it's
the worst because, you know, the Kurds dealt with them as best
they could with some money, but not a lot.
And, you know, Western countries refused to take back a lot of
their own nationals and didn't want to put money into the
education and upkeep of these of these people.
But whether they are being held by the Kurds or now by the
Syrian authorities and possibly again by the Iraqi authorities,
this is just passing the buck from one person to 1.
You know, organization or one place to another is not actually
looking at the root cause. And it's continuing to create
further anger amongst those people.
And one day, one day that's going to break out in some way
or another. And you know, as we look ahead,
I hesitate to say this, but all roads often lead to President
Trump or certainly he he believes that the Americans role
in this. What key difference, if any,
might it make? Well, the US has shown that what
the US wants is basically what happens in the Middle East.
And we have seen a huge change in the region, partly as a
result of changes under the Trump administration.
And here we have explicit support as well as implicit
support for the administration of Ahmed El Shadda.
We are seeing increased partnership between the US and
Saudi Arabia. We are seeing close coordination
between the US and Israel, which I expect will eventually lead to
significant change in Iran as well.
So the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is changing,
partly because of the way the US is dealing with the region.
So I expect that ultimately no regime is going to be acceptable
to the United States in the Middle East unless it's a regime
that is find one way or another with US interests.
Lindsay, last word to you. Well, one of the things which
the the Americas and the Israelis disagree on actually is
Syria, because Israel is controlling a small section of
Syria saying that they're there to support the Druze.
And that actually is a point of friction.
But I agree with Lena, I think that the future of the region is
very looks very different now from how it did say 2-3 years
ago. And that is primarily because of
Donald Trump's close association both with the Gulf monarchies
and with Israel. And I think that as we look in
the coming years, those are the places which are going to
dictate what happens and we see declining power for Iran and for
any countries which are allied with Iran.
Lindsay Leena Khatib, thank you so much for joining us.
That is it from this episode of THE FORECAST.
Until next time, goodbye.