1 00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:06,560 You're listening to the Reversing Climate Change podcast 2 00:00:06,560 --> 00:00:09,080 by the team at NORI, the Carbon Removal Marketplace. 3 00:00:09,560 --> 00:00:11,720 This is a show about the innovators and entrepreneurs 4 00:00:11,720 --> 00:00:13,520 developing solutions to climate change. 5 00:00:15,360 --> 00:00:17,800 Hello and welcome to the Reversing Climate Change podcast 6 00:00:17,800 --> 00:00:19,160 with Nori. I'm Ross Kenyon. 7 00:00:19,160 --> 00:00:21,600 I'm one of the cofounders of Nori and the Head of Creative 8 00:00:21,600 --> 00:00:24,800 and Marketing here. I'm happy to introduce you to 9 00:00:24,800 --> 00:00:28,120 our new CEO, Matt Trudeau. Matt recently joined the 10 00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:30,040 company. Debating about when we should 11 00:00:30,040 --> 00:00:32,479 have Matt on, because then a little bit earlier and had you 12 00:00:32,479 --> 00:00:35,680 been extremely green in the horn mat, we could have waited a 13 00:00:35,680 --> 00:00:38,240 little bit longer. And have you been a seasoned 14 00:00:38,240 --> 00:00:40,760 carbon removal veteran, salty and grizzled? 15 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:43,240 And I think we we chose somewhere in between. 16 00:00:43,680 --> 00:00:48,040 So I'm liking this exact moment in time to do this on September 17 00:00:48,040 --> 00:00:50,200 12th. Good to finally have you here. 18 00:00:51,240 --> 00:00:52,480 Thanks. It's great to be here. 19 00:00:52,600 --> 00:00:55,720 And after a little more than three months, I do feel kind of 20 00:00:55,720 --> 00:00:58,940 grizzled and seasoned. Already you already have the 21 00:00:58,940 --> 00:01:03,100 1000 yard stare. It's it's it's pretty intense, 22 00:01:03,180 --> 00:01:05,260 both inside and outside. Nori in the industry. 23 00:01:06,860 --> 00:01:12,900 I I when I interview people for for jobs at Nori, the both the 24 00:01:12,900 --> 00:01:17,100 threat and the encouragement to work at Nori's, that is a place 25 00:01:17,100 --> 00:01:20,020 that is intellectually very demanding. 26 00:01:20,020 --> 00:01:22,540 There's a lot of uncertainty to the right kind of person. 27 00:01:22,540 --> 00:01:25,850 That's a lot of fun. It seems like to you that was a 28 00:01:25,850 --> 00:01:30,770 fun offer and now you're you're seeing just how chaotic and 29 00:01:30,770 --> 00:01:33,450 difficult working in a new industry like this is. 30 00:01:33,450 --> 00:01:36,410 Although you've also done that for other industries too, so 31 00:01:36,410 --> 00:01:38,890 maybe maybe you're just used to this and this is just normal. 32 00:01:41,530 --> 00:01:43,930 Well, it's it's too late to go back now, isn't it? 33 00:01:44,250 --> 00:01:47,250 Don't say that, would you? You wouldn't do that though. 34 00:01:47,250 --> 00:01:49,210 No, absolutely not. No, it's been great. 35 00:01:49,210 --> 00:01:52,410 No, it's the the first three months been a tremendous amount 36 00:01:52,410 --> 00:01:53,930 of fun. It's been great getting to know 37 00:01:53,930 --> 00:01:58,330 the team, learning about the industry, fascinating, really 38 00:01:58,330 --> 00:02:01,570 intellectually interesting challenges, opportunity. 39 00:02:02,010 --> 00:02:04,330 And you're right. It is one of the things that 40 00:02:04,330 --> 00:02:08,210 attracted me to Nori into this industry the the the voluntary 41 00:02:08,210 --> 00:02:13,270 carbon markets is that it looks and feels a lot like other 42 00:02:13,270 --> 00:02:16,150 things that I've done in the past in terms of this the state 43 00:02:16,150 --> 00:02:19,470 of the market. And if I reflect back on my 44 00:02:19,470 --> 00:02:22,710 career and look at the the time and places that I've had the 45 00:02:22,710 --> 00:02:25,910 most enjoyment and and probably the most success. 46 00:02:25,910 --> 00:02:30,350 It's in the early stages of the formation of a new market where 47 00:02:30,350 --> 00:02:32,790 things are starting to coalesce. You've you've got some of the 48 00:02:32,790 --> 00:02:35,630 foundational infrastructure in place there. 49 00:02:35,630 --> 00:02:40,120 There's some interesting commercial players and and 50 00:02:40,120 --> 00:02:42,200 things are starting to take shape, but the winners haven't 51 00:02:42,200 --> 00:02:44,000 been decided yet. The market hasn't reached 52 00:02:44,000 --> 00:02:46,880 breakout yet and things are still evolving very quickly. 53 00:02:46,880 --> 00:02:49,640 So you have to be nimble to be able to participate. 54 00:02:49,640 --> 00:02:53,880 And so that's all what attracted me about Nori and the industry. 55 00:02:53,880 --> 00:02:56,520 And in the three months that I've been here, both Nori and 56 00:02:56,520 --> 00:02:59,720 the industry have delivered on, on all of that potential 57 00:02:59,720 --> 00:03:02,840 excitement. What are some of those other 58 00:03:02,840 --> 00:03:05,680 markets that you've interacted with and and helped to develop 59 00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:08,680 and how does that inform your work about choosing to to work 60 00:03:08,680 --> 00:03:10,990 at Nori? Sure. 61 00:03:10,990 --> 00:03:15,790 So I look we'll rewind back about 25 years. 62 00:03:16,110 --> 00:03:19,790 I'll go through the vast version spare you guys the the full 25 63 00:03:19,790 --> 00:03:23,470 year detailed history. But I I got my start in capital 64 00:03:23,470 --> 00:03:26,390 markets and electronic trading about 25 years ago. 65 00:03:26,510 --> 00:03:31,110 I started in in 2000 with a company called Cyber Trader and 66 00:03:31,110 --> 00:03:34,790 it was almost immediately after the company had been acquired by 67 00:03:34,790 --> 00:03:39,300 Charles Schwab. And at that time it was really 68 00:03:39,300 --> 00:03:42,820 the run up to the.com bust. So we're still in the.com boom 69 00:03:42,980 --> 00:03:47,140 and suddenly through a combination of technology 70 00:03:47,140 --> 00:03:51,980 advancements and Internet connectivity, you suddenly had 71 00:03:52,020 --> 00:03:57,980 software in the hands of retail investors that had really up 72 00:03:57,980 --> 00:04:00,900 until very recently been only available to professional 73 00:04:00,900 --> 00:04:04,780 traders and and even recently only been made available to 74 00:04:04,780 --> 00:04:07,800 professional traders. So it was electronic trading was 75 00:04:07,800 --> 00:04:11,560 a pretty new thing both for Wall Street and for Main Street. 76 00:04:12,440 --> 00:04:15,920 And so we built really sophisticated day trading 77 00:04:15,920 --> 00:04:18,959 technology with charting and smart order routing and things 78 00:04:18,959 --> 00:04:21,920 that that really hadn't been seen before. 79 00:04:22,760 --> 00:04:27,720 And in in the context of that environment with the rapid 80 00:04:27,720 --> 00:04:30,920 change in technology and business practices, you then had 81 00:04:30,920 --> 00:04:32,600 regulations that needed to catch up. 82 00:04:32,600 --> 00:04:35,520 And so there was just a lot of change in a very short period of 83 00:04:35,520 --> 00:04:37,720 time and it was really interesting. 84 00:04:37,720 --> 00:04:40,920 So that was my, those are my formative years in electronic 85 00:04:40,920 --> 00:04:44,080 trading. And then through just several 86 00:04:44,080 --> 00:04:50,640 opportunities from that time I was able to participate in other 87 00:04:50,640 --> 00:04:52,720 market transformations. So a lot of what happened in the 88 00:04:52,720 --> 00:04:57,960 US in the late 90s, early 2000s subsequently went on to happen 89 00:04:57,960 --> 00:05:00,360 in other markets as they electronified. 90 00:05:01,320 --> 00:05:02,920 And a good example of that is in Canada. 91 00:05:02,920 --> 00:05:07,330 So I was able to spend 2 years up in Canada, up in Toronto, 92 00:05:07,330 --> 00:05:10,450 launching a marketplace that at the time was called CHI X 93 00:05:10,450 --> 00:05:14,810 Canada, it's now NASDAQ Canada. And it it really is the same 94 00:05:14,810 --> 00:05:17,810 kind of of technology and regulatory changes that unfolded 95 00:05:17,810 --> 00:05:21,730 in the US, unfolded in Canada. But in that instance I had the 96 00:05:21,730 --> 00:05:24,810 benefit of of the hindsight and knowledge and experience of 97 00:05:24,810 --> 00:05:29,660 having participated, albeit as a much more junior guy, but having 98 00:05:29,660 --> 00:05:33,420 participated in that in the US, so had seen to some extent the 99 00:05:33,420 --> 00:05:36,700 movie before. Is this regulation about 100 00:05:36,740 --> 00:05:40,100 protecting retail investors? Is it like what's detailed in 101 00:05:40,740 --> 00:05:43,860 Flash Boys, which you make an appearance in by Michael Lewis, 102 00:05:43,860 --> 00:05:47,940 about high frequency trading and about how disadvantaged retail 103 00:05:47,940 --> 00:05:51,280 people are? Is it something else regulation 104 00:05:51,280 --> 00:05:55,800 primarily related to yes. And and so to answer the second 105 00:05:55,800 --> 00:05:58,760 question for us, some of these, this was the early stages of 106 00:05:58,760 --> 00:06:02,080 some of what was described in terms of the market structure in 107 00:06:02,080 --> 00:06:03,480 the Michael Lewis book Flash Boys. 108 00:06:03,720 --> 00:06:09,560 So so yes, but at the time it was regulation relating to. 109 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:14,000 So you'll have to indulge me here for for just a couple 110 00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:17,240 moments as I get into a little bit of the wonkish market 111 00:06:17,240 --> 00:06:22,570 microstructure discussion. So prior to you know call it 112 00:06:23,090 --> 00:06:27,330 late 90s, early 2000s, stocks that were companies that were 113 00:06:27,330 --> 00:06:32,530 listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ could only 114 00:06:32,530 --> 00:06:35,490 trade really on one market. And I'm oversimplifying it here, 115 00:06:35,610 --> 00:06:38,330 but there's there's too much detail to getting to otherwise. 116 00:06:38,330 --> 00:06:40,050 So it's just for the sake of argument. 117 00:06:40,290 --> 00:06:42,690 If you were a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 118 00:06:42,690 --> 00:06:44,770 your shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 119 00:06:44,770 --> 00:06:48,150 If you were a company that was listed on NASDAQ, which wasn't 120 00:06:48,150 --> 00:06:51,190 even in exchange at this time, your shares traded on NASDAQ. 121 00:06:52,270 --> 00:06:56,230 In the late 90s, early 2000s, as technology emerged that made it 122 00:06:56,270 --> 00:07:01,430 easier for stocks to be traded on a computer rather than on a 123 00:07:01,430 --> 00:07:06,030 physical exchange floor, you had new businesses that were 124 00:07:06,030 --> 00:07:09,230 launched in the US. They were called electronic 125 00:07:09,230 --> 00:07:13,020 communication Networks or ECN's in in other parts of the world 126 00:07:13,020 --> 00:07:15,540 they're known as alternative trading systems or proprietary 127 00:07:15,540 --> 00:07:18,060 trading systems AT S's or PT S's. 128 00:07:18,860 --> 00:07:22,380 And what happened in the US is there was suddenly just an 129 00:07:22,380 --> 00:07:27,300 explosion of these EC N's that came online to try to compete 130 00:07:27,300 --> 00:07:31,260 with New York and NASDAQ using superior higher performance 131 00:07:31,260 --> 00:07:35,180 technology, lower pricing and direct market access where for 132 00:07:35,180 --> 00:07:37,700 example, retail traders could start to access the market 133 00:07:37,700 --> 00:07:42,050 directly from their desktops. And so with the increase in the 134 00:07:42,050 --> 00:07:46,850 power and capabilities of the technology, the regulations were 135 00:07:47,090 --> 00:07:51,290 were designed for a world in which people were filling out 136 00:07:51,290 --> 00:07:55,530 paper tickets, doing trading over the phone or physically on 137 00:07:55,530 --> 00:07:58,770 the floor of an exchange. And so as shares started to 138 00:07:58,770 --> 00:08:02,210 trade on all these different platforms, new problems emerged 139 00:08:02,210 --> 00:08:04,490 for the market. How do you determine what the 140 00:08:04,490 --> 00:08:07,970 best available prices if the shares are trading across four 141 00:08:07,970 --> 00:08:10,090 or five different platforms versus one? 142 00:08:10,650 --> 00:08:13,610 How do you ensure that brokers are routing their customers 143 00:08:13,610 --> 00:08:17,330 orders to the marketplace that has the best available price? 144 00:08:17,330 --> 00:08:20,890 And so all of the regulatory changes that were happening 145 00:08:20,890 --> 00:08:23,650 around that time were to deal with these new and emergent 146 00:08:23,650 --> 00:08:27,210 competing marketplaces. So you're coming out of a 147 00:08:27,210 --> 00:08:30,770 regulatory environment. I mean obviously the US equities 148 00:08:30,770 --> 00:08:35,250 market is probably the among the more regulated and more I don't 149 00:08:35,250 --> 00:08:37,460 even know how to say it. These are not one of the most 150 00:08:37,460 --> 00:08:40,500 credible financial institutions on the planet, which probably 151 00:08:40,500 --> 00:08:43,179 doesn't bode well since it's had so many problems. 152 00:08:43,620 --> 00:08:47,340 But you've seen it go from being pretty nascent interacting with 153 00:08:47,340 --> 00:08:51,020 the electronic environment to being something that is now 154 00:08:51,020 --> 00:08:53,940 pretty much, I imagine all trading is digital at this 155 00:08:53,940 --> 00:08:55,700 point. So you witnessed the changeover 156 00:08:55,700 --> 00:09:00,060 from 56 K basically to what it is now. 157 00:09:01,270 --> 00:09:02,190 Yeah. Yeah. 158 00:09:02,190 --> 00:09:05,470 Well, I can tell you that there, there were instances where I 159 00:09:05,470 --> 00:09:09,510 actually did take a paper ticket and slide it into the time stamp 160 00:09:09,510 --> 00:09:11,790 machine when I took a trade over the telephone. 161 00:09:12,190 --> 00:09:15,150 And there were pink tickets for cell orders and and green 162 00:09:15,550 --> 00:09:18,270 tickets for buy orders passed all both of them. 163 00:09:18,590 --> 00:09:21,710 I I don't know that that really functionally exists for the most 164 00:09:21,710 --> 00:09:23,830 part anymore. So it is I think essentially all 165 00:09:23,830 --> 00:09:26,790 electronic at this point but but I am old enough to remember 166 00:09:26,790 --> 00:09:31,120 paper tickets. So yeah, look the the if you 167 00:09:31,120 --> 00:09:35,800 start with with the compliments to the to the US equities 168 00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:39,960 markets, they are the most liquid in the world, most 169 00:09:39,960 --> 00:09:42,760 sophisticated in many ways the most efficient. 170 00:09:42,760 --> 00:09:46,600 And so the the proponents who who think that everything works 171 00:09:46,600 --> 00:09:49,460 just fine would say, look investors have never had it 172 00:09:49,460 --> 00:09:52,140 better. They can get a trade execution 173 00:09:52,140 --> 00:09:56,780 done in less than a second. So instantaneously essentially 174 00:09:56,780 --> 00:09:59,780 get the prices that they see on the screen there. 175 00:09:59,780 --> 00:10:01,900 There's greater liquidity than there ever has been. 176 00:10:01,900 --> 00:10:04,820 There's more participants than there ever has been and and by 177 00:10:04,820 --> 00:10:07,860 and large that's true. So when you look around the 178 00:10:07,860 --> 00:10:12,460 world, I I would say that the US equities markets are the leading 179 00:10:12,540 --> 00:10:14,700 equities markets in in many regards. 180 00:10:15,740 --> 00:10:18,060 On the other side and this is some of what's covered in 181 00:10:18,060 --> 00:10:24,420 Michael Lewis's book in the really arcane elements of the 182 00:10:24,420 --> 00:10:30,020 market at highly technical levels where milliseconds, 183 00:10:30,020 --> 00:10:34,260 microseconds, nanoseconds start to matter, there are some 184 00:10:34,260 --> 00:10:37,140 inefficiencies and some of those are structural inefficiencies 185 00:10:37,140 --> 00:10:41,860 that are persistent and some of that is actually a byproduct of 186 00:10:41,860 --> 00:10:44,220 the regulations. So you know, one thing that I've 187 00:10:44,220 --> 00:10:47,600 learned and operating in a variety of different regulatory 188 00:10:48,200 --> 00:10:51,280 environments with different rule sets and different market 189 00:10:51,280 --> 00:10:55,760 structures is that it's really, really hard to solve for 190 00:10:55,760 --> 00:10:58,520 everything. So you have to look at who is 191 00:10:58,520 --> 00:11:01,800 your who are your primary constituents, what are you 192 00:11:01,800 --> 00:11:05,080 optimizing for and what are you willing to trade off. 193 00:11:05,440 --> 00:11:11,160 And so while the US equities market is, is the most liquid, 194 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:14,320 probably the most efficient in the world, there definitely are 195 00:11:14,320 --> 00:11:16,520 some tradeoffs and there's always room for improvement. 196 00:11:16,560 --> 00:11:21,520 And so a lot of, I would say the work that I've done at least in 197 00:11:21,520 --> 00:11:24,520 the equities markets has been about creating more competition, 198 00:11:25,120 --> 00:11:27,760 price competition for the income and exchanges, technology 199 00:11:27,760 --> 00:11:30,640 competition, making things more transparent, more efficient. 200 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:33,720 And and I think that that a lot of the businesses that I've been 201 00:11:33,720 --> 00:11:38,560 a part of have been successful in, in those types of endeavors. 202 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:43,830 And the markets overall, I think, are arguably much more 203 00:11:43,830 --> 00:11:49,150 efficient today than they were 20 years ago, even with all of 204 00:11:49,150 --> 00:11:53,350 the emergence of technology. And in a market that's become so 205 00:11:53,350 --> 00:11:57,030 complicated that someone who you know is a trader in the 1970s, 206 00:11:57,030 --> 00:11:59,630 for example, might not even recognize the market today. 207 00:12:02,150 --> 00:12:06,950 How do you solve for fairness in a case where the the book 208 00:12:06,950 --> 00:12:09,430 details You should read Flash Boys by Michael Lewis. 209 00:12:09,430 --> 00:12:11,910 If you haven't. It's a it's a really fascinating 210 00:12:11,910 --> 00:12:14,420 tale here. But there's an arms race for 211 00:12:14,420 --> 00:12:19,100 nanoseconds and high frequency traders, you know, are being 212 00:12:19,100 --> 00:12:21,700 able to extract rents essentially out of the financial 213 00:12:21,700 --> 00:12:23,740 system. Well, depends on how you view 214 00:12:23,740 --> 00:12:25,220 it, right? If you if you think that they're 215 00:12:25,580 --> 00:12:27,700 adding value, they're adding liquidity, they're being 216 00:12:27,700 --> 00:12:29,500 counterparty to many transactions that would 217 00:12:29,500 --> 00:12:31,260 otherwise have a much harder time being filled. 218 00:12:31,660 --> 00:12:35,140 And that's a valuable service. If you take a more grim view of 219 00:12:35,140 --> 00:12:38,660 it, they're basically creating phony transactions. 220 00:12:38,980 --> 00:12:41,900 That they're able to manipulate, basically just to extract money 221 00:12:41,900 --> 00:12:44,860 from the financial system to the tune of billions, maybe more, I 222 00:12:44,860 --> 00:12:47,820 don't even know, a lot of money. But you're trying to design a 223 00:12:47,820 --> 00:12:50,980 system that doesn't create an arms race dynamic like that. 224 00:12:50,980 --> 00:12:53,020 What are you trading off? Are you giving something up for 225 00:12:53,020 --> 00:12:57,180 fairness? So the the arms race part is an 226 00:12:57,180 --> 00:13:00,140 interesting question because I I do think that there there is 227 00:13:00,340 --> 00:13:03,180 undeniably an arms race and and even some of the high frequency 228 00:13:03,180 --> 00:13:06,020 trading firms and and I think this this is if I recall 229 00:13:06,020 --> 00:13:07,820 correctly was maybe a point that was made in the book. 230 00:13:08,450 --> 00:13:13,410 The exchanges would often offer what was called the New Port. 231 00:13:13,410 --> 00:13:15,610 So it's just a network connection port and it was a 232 00:13:15,610 --> 00:13:19,530 slightly faster port that shaved, you know in some 233 00:13:19,530 --> 00:13:22,130 instances maybe some milliseconds then later 234 00:13:22,130 --> 00:13:26,250 microseconds now probably nanoseconds off of the order and 235 00:13:26,250 --> 00:13:30,850 trade messaging time which to average people is a completely 236 00:13:30,890 --> 00:13:34,490 meaningless amount of time. To high frequency traders it can 237 00:13:34,490 --> 00:13:36,930 become an extremely important important amount of time. 238 00:13:37,710 --> 00:13:42,710 But you reach if everybody has the same type of network 239 00:13:42,710 --> 00:13:45,470 connection then there's no advantage and and everybody's on 240 00:13:45,470 --> 00:13:49,710 a on a level at least for that certain category of of trading 241 00:13:49,710 --> 00:13:53,510 firm that is directly connected via one of these network 242 00:13:53,510 --> 00:13:56,350 connections. But if the exchange offers a new 243 00:13:56,350 --> 00:13:59,630 network connection that's slightly faster, even if it's 244 00:14:00,070 --> 00:14:05,430 100 microseconds or 100 nanoseconds faster, if only one 245 00:14:05,430 --> 00:14:09,790 of those firms steps up and uses that slightly faster connection, 246 00:14:09,990 --> 00:14:13,710 they have an edge over everybody else, and then everybody's 247 00:14:13,710 --> 00:14:16,430 forced to step up. And this is an interesting 248 00:14:16,430 --> 00:14:20,230 dynamic, because the slightly faster connection that nobody 249 00:14:20,230 --> 00:14:24,830 actually really wants might be four times as expensive as the 250 00:14:24,830 --> 00:14:27,630 previous one. So, so long as one firm takes 251 00:14:27,630 --> 00:14:31,230 advantage of it and everybody then steps up, everyone's costs 252 00:14:31,230 --> 00:14:35,180 just went up and all they did is level is reach a new level of 253 00:14:35,220 --> 00:14:38,220 equilibrium. So they really in the long run 254 00:14:38,220 --> 00:14:42,260 get no advantage but but do increase their cost so. 255 00:14:42,380 --> 00:14:47,020 So that's that's one of the, I don't know that there's an easy 256 00:14:47,020 --> 00:14:49,020 answer to that question because exchanges are commercial 257 00:14:49,020 --> 00:14:51,580 entities and so of course they want to release new products and 258 00:14:51,580 --> 00:14:53,820 services that they can charge their customers for. 259 00:14:54,420 --> 00:14:58,460 And you know trading firms are are incentivized to try to get 260 00:14:58,460 --> 00:15:00,300 whatever advantage that they can in the market. 261 00:15:00,900 --> 00:15:05,050 But one thing that I do want to know which I think is really 262 00:15:05,050 --> 00:15:08,250 interesting and and it's one of the things that informs some of 263 00:15:08,250 --> 00:15:11,690 my thinking or at least my perspective as I am looking at 264 00:15:11,690 --> 00:15:16,050 and learning about the voluntary carbon market is some of what 265 00:15:16,050 --> 00:15:18,890 you touched on and and whether high frequency trading is good 266 00:15:18,890 --> 00:15:20,330 or bad. And I think some of that got 267 00:15:20,330 --> 00:15:23,690 lost in the whole conversation around the Michael Lewis book. 268 00:15:24,290 --> 00:15:30,610 But you really it's a nuanced discussion and in all of the 269 00:15:30,810 --> 00:15:34,810 market structure arguments in the US and around the world it 270 00:15:35,010 --> 00:15:39,730 there are camps and you know even tribes you might say and 271 00:15:39,730 --> 00:15:42,250 some people are very anti high frequency trading. 272 00:15:42,250 --> 00:15:44,810 Other people think it's the best thing that's ever happened to 273 00:15:44,810 --> 00:15:47,930 the markets and and then there's maybe a range of people in 274 00:15:47,930 --> 00:15:50,810 between. And I think it's really 275 00:15:50,810 --> 00:15:54,920 important and this was a lot of what I've tried to do and 276 00:15:54,920 --> 00:15:57,080 anything I've written or anytime that I've spoken about these 277 00:15:57,080 --> 00:16:02,120 subjects is to try to actually tease out what the different 278 00:16:02,120 --> 00:16:05,080 activities are that high frequency traders may engage in 279 00:16:05,080 --> 00:16:07,680 and what function and purpose they serve in the market. 280 00:16:07,680 --> 00:16:13,360 So true market making is is I think without doubt value add to 281 00:16:13,360 --> 00:16:16,000 the market. You have a firm, for example, 282 00:16:16,000 --> 00:16:19,600 that's providing a bid and an offer essentially all the time, 283 00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:23,270 providing liquidity, helping with price discovery. 284 00:16:23,510 --> 00:16:27,510 That's valuable. There are other practices like 285 00:16:27,510 --> 00:16:31,670 something called latency arbitrage where you just have 286 00:16:31,670 --> 00:16:34,470 firms that are just slightly faster than other firms and are 287 00:16:34,470 --> 00:16:38,830 able to, as the saying goes, quote UN quote, pick off slower, 288 00:16:38,830 --> 00:16:41,520 less informed traders and that's extractive. 289 00:16:41,520 --> 00:16:44,520 So there really isn't, you can't really necessarily argue that 290 00:16:44,520 --> 00:16:47,400 there is a lot of benefit being introduced to the market for 291 00:16:47,400 --> 00:16:49,400 those two practices. So you're essentially using the 292 00:16:49,400 --> 00:16:52,080 same computers. Could be this could be a single 293 00:16:52,080 --> 00:16:55,240 firm engaging in both of those different trading strategies, 294 00:16:55,240 --> 00:16:57,760 market making and latency arbitrage. 295 00:16:58,640 --> 00:17:02,520 And so if that level of discussion, the nuance becomes 296 00:17:02,520 --> 00:17:05,640 important because you got one firm doing two things, one value 297 00:17:05,640 --> 00:17:08,079 add to the market, one maybe extracted from the market. 298 00:17:08,859 --> 00:17:12,859 And when I look at a lot of the arguments now three months into 299 00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:16,260 the voluntary carbon market there there's a lot of 300 00:17:16,260 --> 00:17:19,540 similarities in terms of you know, different ideologies, 301 00:17:19,540 --> 00:17:21,140 different camps, different tribes. 302 00:17:21,660 --> 00:17:27,140 And a lot gets lost in these very sort of monolithic 303 00:17:27,140 --> 00:17:29,900 arguments where there isn't any opportunity for nuance or there 304 00:17:29,900 --> 00:17:32,380 isn't enough opportunity given to nuance. 305 00:17:33,020 --> 00:17:36,970 So I would say that now having traversed a number of different 306 00:17:36,970 --> 00:17:40,730 markets from equities to derivatives to commodities to 307 00:17:40,730 --> 00:17:46,170 now carbon, those themes seem to continuously reemerge in each of 308 00:17:46,170 --> 00:17:49,450 those markets around the lack of nuance and the tribal infighting 309 00:17:49,450 --> 00:17:53,330 which is is pretty unfortunate. How does it translate though 310 00:17:53,370 --> 00:17:56,250 that come from pretty mature markets, even if you're doing 311 00:17:56,250 --> 00:18:00,490 things that are immature within pretty established segments? 312 00:18:01,080 --> 00:18:04,200 And then you come to a space like carbon and Nori for a long 313 00:18:04,200 --> 00:18:06,320 time. And I would say even still, our 314 00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:09,360 vision has been that the way to scale carbon removal is at some 315 00:18:09,360 --> 00:18:12,960 point, when appropriate, to have commodity scale infrastructure 316 00:18:12,960 --> 00:18:17,040 so that huge amounts of carbon can be sequestered permanently 317 00:18:17,280 --> 00:18:18,720 and just put away and dealt with. 318 00:18:18,720 --> 00:18:20,240 And climate change can be reversed. 319 00:18:20,240 --> 00:18:22,400 Hence the name of the podcast, Reversing Climate Change. 320 00:18:23,120 --> 00:18:24,980 But. We're, I don't think we're 321 00:18:24,980 --> 00:18:27,340 anywhere close to that. Most of these deals behave more 322 00:18:27,340 --> 00:18:30,420 like over the counter financial transactions where they're like 323 00:18:30,420 --> 00:18:33,540 private bespoke deals. They're not taking place in 324 00:18:34,260 --> 00:18:37,060 large order books like you might have experience if you've traded 325 00:18:37,060 --> 00:18:41,340 crypto or if you've traded stocks on an electronic trading 326 00:18:41,340 --> 00:18:44,020 system. So what's the attraction here? 327 00:18:44,020 --> 00:18:45,780 Are you trying to get to that stage? 328 00:18:45,780 --> 00:18:48,140 Is it attractive because it's different and it's still much 329 00:18:48,260 --> 00:18:49,940 earlier than your previous experience? 330 00:18:49,940 --> 00:18:51,380 What's the, what's the link there. 331 00:18:53,100 --> 00:18:56,940 So I think it's probably all of that and I'll explain the market 332 00:18:56,940 --> 00:19:00,900 right now and and maybe just as a as a proviso. 333 00:19:01,460 --> 00:19:07,180 There is no one market structure that fits all assets in all 334 00:19:07,540 --> 00:19:11,100 environments and notwithstanding the availability of the 335 00:19:11,100 --> 00:19:14,460 technology today what what's called a matching engine which 336 00:19:14,460 --> 00:19:18,020 is the, the technology that exchanges run the, the matching 337 00:19:18,020 --> 00:19:20,020 model is called the central limit order book. 338 00:19:20,780 --> 00:19:24,820 That technology and that type of trade matching has now existed 339 00:19:24,820 --> 00:19:31,340 for call it 30 years and it's widely adopted in equities 340 00:19:31,340 --> 00:19:36,060 trading, derivatives trading, So Futures Trading, options 341 00:19:36,060 --> 00:19:41,620 trading, currencies trading. Where you see it less is for 342 00:19:41,620 --> 00:19:47,160 example in bonds and each asset and and also by the way for for 343 00:19:47,160 --> 00:19:50,240 shares and private companies there are a variety of assets 344 00:19:50,240 --> 00:19:54,320 where a central limit order book is just not the appropriate way 345 00:19:54,320 --> 00:19:57,560 to match orders. Sometimes it is more appropriate 346 00:19:57,560 --> 00:20:03,040 for it to be an over the counter bespoke product and trade where 347 00:20:03,160 --> 00:20:06,000 things do need to be configured or tailored based on the 348 00:20:06,000 --> 00:20:10,560 counterparties. So when I look at the the 349 00:20:10,560 --> 00:20:15,310 voluntary carbon market. The products and the type of 350 00:20:15,310 --> 00:20:18,910 trading today, it feels more like an online marketplace like 351 00:20:18,910 --> 00:20:23,150 an Amazon or eBay versus let's say like Chicago Board Options 352 00:20:23,150 --> 00:20:25,910 Exchange or New York Stock Exchange. 353 00:20:26,790 --> 00:20:28,750 That's the state of the market today. 354 00:20:28,830 --> 00:20:32,950 And I think that that's the the type of transactions that are 355 00:20:32,950 --> 00:20:40,100 being done are a function of A the maturity of the the markets 356 00:20:40,100 --> 00:20:44,060 and the technology deployed in the voluntary garden market. 357 00:20:44,500 --> 00:20:48,140 B the level of education and understanding of the buyers in 358 00:20:48,140 --> 00:20:50,580 the market and then see the products that suppliers are 359 00:20:50,580 --> 00:20:54,780 making available to them. So as I've looked at some of the 360 00:20:55,380 --> 00:20:59,780 the carbon credit projects that are available and and who's 361 00:20:59,780 --> 00:21:01,300 buying them and what what they're buying. 362 00:21:02,050 --> 00:21:04,850 It feels the comparison that I've made is it or the analogy 363 00:21:04,890 --> 00:21:07,370 I've made is it feels a little bit more like buying a piece of 364 00:21:07,370 --> 00:21:11,090 real estate than it does buying a more standardized tradable 365 00:21:11,090 --> 00:21:13,450 product. So there's it's almost like 366 00:21:13,450 --> 00:21:16,730 buying a house the the buyer kind of has to in some cases 367 00:21:16,730 --> 00:21:20,830 look at. At the Co benefits and it 368 00:21:20,830 --> 00:21:22,750 there's a a feel factor about it. 369 00:21:22,750 --> 00:21:24,910 Do I, you know, do I see myself living in this house? 370 00:21:24,910 --> 00:21:26,750 Do I want to make meals in this kitchen? 371 00:21:26,750 --> 00:21:29,630 Do I feel like sitting in this living room and and watching a 372 00:21:29,630 --> 00:21:31,390 movie? It's a little bit more like 373 00:21:31,390 --> 00:21:32,670 that. There's maybe a more of an 374 00:21:32,670 --> 00:21:36,110 emotional softer touch to it. Then I just want to trade this 375 00:21:36,230 --> 00:21:41,190 digital fungible standardized representation of carbon on a 376 00:21:41,190 --> 00:21:44,230 screen. So what's interesting to me in 377 00:21:44,230 --> 00:21:47,920 the part that's exciting is 1. It's a bit of a departure from 378 00:21:47,920 --> 00:21:49,240 stuff I've worked on in the past. 379 00:21:49,240 --> 00:21:53,560 So the majority of my experience is exchange traded standardized 380 00:21:53,680 --> 00:21:57,080 products, fungible products. So doing something that's a 381 00:21:57,080 --> 00:21:59,240 little more bespoke, a little more tailored is new and 382 00:21:59,240 --> 00:22:02,800 interesting to me. But two, I think that the market 383 00:22:02,800 --> 00:22:08,030 can evolve towards some more standardization and things that 384 00:22:08,030 --> 00:22:11,110 are more tradable. I think it'll be a process and I 385 00:22:11,110 --> 00:22:14,750 don't know that it necessarily means that those standardized 386 00:22:14,750 --> 00:22:17,510 tradable instruments will completely supplant what exists 387 00:22:17,510 --> 00:22:20,910 today in terms of maybe the more bespoke contracts and and 388 00:22:20,910 --> 00:22:25,390 projects and things. But the opportunity to create a 389 00:22:25,390 --> 00:22:28,830 new market, create products that are tailored to and suit the 390 00:22:28,830 --> 00:22:33,110 market as it exists today is fun and interesting, interesting 391 00:22:33,110 --> 00:22:37,250 challenge. And then thinking about how all 392 00:22:37,250 --> 00:22:41,210 of the knowledge, experience and expertise that I bring from more 393 00:22:41,210 --> 00:22:45,570 traditional capital markets to the team at Nori and and how we 394 00:22:45,570 --> 00:22:48,970 can combine, you know, graft that onto all the carbon markets 395 00:22:48,970 --> 00:22:52,090 knowledge that the team here has and envision what the future 396 00:22:52,090 --> 00:22:55,810 could look like in terms of the development of Nori's 397 00:22:55,810 --> 00:22:59,130 marketplace specifically. But then the voluntary carbon 398 00:22:59,130 --> 00:23:02,490 more carbon market more broadly. It's pretty exciting. 399 00:23:02,490 --> 00:23:05,610 It's a massive opportunity. There's a lot of really, I 400 00:23:05,610 --> 00:23:10,210 think, interesting white space that we have to operate in to 401 00:23:10,810 --> 00:23:15,370 define and design products and services to both meet the 402 00:23:15,370 --> 00:23:21,130 market's needs and then and help them transition to a new, more 403 00:23:21,130 --> 00:23:24,450 efficient, more transparent, higher integrity marketplace 404 00:23:24,450 --> 00:23:29,490 than maybe we have today. Well, as recently as today. 405 00:23:29,850 --> 00:23:34,370 You were joking. Even shared an XKCD comic about 406 00:23:34,370 --> 00:23:39,210 the proliferation of standards, and I'm curious if you've seen 407 00:23:39,730 --> 00:23:43,490 how standards have consolidated in other industries that you've 408 00:23:43,610 --> 00:23:45,690 worked in. Granted, I imagine some of these 409 00:23:45,690 --> 00:23:49,250 standards are actual proprietary financial products that are 410 00:23:49,250 --> 00:23:51,810 being designed by a forprofit companies. 411 00:23:51,810 --> 00:23:54,890 That dynamic is a little bit different than Carbon, but how 412 00:23:54,890 --> 00:23:59,170 do we deal with this within Carbon where there's 10s? 413 00:23:59,750 --> 00:24:02,430 Of different standards bodies that are all competing for 414 00:24:02,430 --> 00:24:05,910 influence for what kind of additionality or permanent 415 00:24:05,910 --> 00:24:09,510 standards should be codified for the entire carbon removal or 416 00:24:09,510 --> 00:24:12,070 even voluntary carbon market sector as a whole. 417 00:24:12,550 --> 00:24:16,870 There's sort of a a really huge amount of these things and even 418 00:24:16,870 --> 00:24:19,430 as someone who works in this space, I find it difficult to 419 00:24:19,430 --> 00:24:22,310 keep up with all of them and all of the details of all that. 420 00:24:22,310 --> 00:24:24,950 I mean, frankly, it's a fulltime job or the fulltime job of an 421 00:24:24,950 --> 00:24:28,830 entire department to participate in and set these standards. 422 00:24:29,340 --> 00:24:33,540 So what might you predict for such a proliferation, given your 423 00:24:33,540 --> 00:24:35,740 experience in other parallel industries? 424 00:24:37,260 --> 00:24:39,300 Sure. So I'll give maybe a couple of 425 00:24:39,300 --> 00:24:41,340 examples. One where I think the industry 426 00:24:41,340 --> 00:24:44,020 managed to get it together globally and and develop a 427 00:24:44,020 --> 00:24:49,100 common standard that really has functioned extremely well 428 00:24:49,420 --> 00:24:52,420 globally. And then and then maybe some 429 00:24:52,420 --> 00:24:58,170 examples of some, some either standards that are in the 430 00:24:58,170 --> 00:25:00,970 process of being developed or situations where I don't know 431 00:25:00,970 --> 00:25:03,530 that you'll ever see a common international standard. 432 00:25:03,530 --> 00:25:08,290 So one standard that that is pretty common internationally 433 00:25:08,290 --> 00:25:12,250 across virtually, I think all financial markets at this point 434 00:25:12,730 --> 00:25:15,610 is something called the Financial Information Exchange 435 00:25:15,610 --> 00:25:18,370 protocol or FIX in the industry parlance. 436 00:25:18,850 --> 00:25:25,490 And so FIX protocol.org is a nonprofit, and they publish A 437 00:25:25,490 --> 00:25:29,750 specification. It describes how computers 438 00:25:29,750 --> 00:25:32,830 essentially via API can talk to each other in the financial 439 00:25:32,830 --> 00:25:34,630 markets. So trading firms talking to 440 00:25:34,630 --> 00:25:37,630 their brokerages, brokerages talking to the exchange, so how 441 00:25:37,630 --> 00:25:39,870 the computers communicate back and forth with each other. 442 00:25:40,470 --> 00:25:46,550 And going back to that early stage of the development of the 443 00:25:46,550 --> 00:25:50,110 electronic markets that I was talking about earlier, when you 444 00:25:50,110 --> 00:25:53,470 have this proliferation of markets when they first started 445 00:25:53,470 --> 00:25:57,080 up and there was no standard, each of those different Ecn's or 446 00:25:57,080 --> 00:26:00,360 alternative trading systems and and the exchanges themselves all 447 00:26:00,360 --> 00:26:02,680 had different API specifications. 448 00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:06,920 And so and some of them were proprietary and they had IP 449 00:26:06,920 --> 00:26:09,240 around them and if you wanted to use them, you might have to 450 00:26:09,240 --> 00:26:13,800 license them and pay a royalty. So if you rewind back to that 451 00:26:13,800 --> 00:26:18,160 state of the market, if you were some sort of actor in that 452 00:26:18,160 --> 00:26:23,310 market that needed to trade on multiple different venues, that 453 00:26:23,310 --> 00:26:27,470 meant that your technology team had to read, understand and 454 00:26:27,470 --> 00:26:31,190 implement each specification for each of those training 455 00:26:31,190 --> 00:26:36,630 counterparties that was heterogeneous and that just 456 00:26:36,630 --> 00:26:40,670 created inefficiency and operational overhead and cost 457 00:26:41,190 --> 00:26:44,630 for for everybody. And the only firms that really 458 00:26:44,630 --> 00:26:47,910 benefited from that were the incumbents that you sort of had 459 00:26:47,910 --> 00:26:51,410 to, you had no choice, you had to go and use their protocol 460 00:26:51,410 --> 00:26:55,530 because you had to access that market for either the products 461 00:26:55,530 --> 00:26:57,690 that traded there or to access the liquidity. 462 00:26:58,410 --> 00:27:03,450 And so the industry finally just decided to get together and try 463 00:27:03,450 --> 00:27:06,010 to deal with that and they created this thing called FIX 464 00:27:06,210 --> 00:27:08,970 and now pretty much every financial exchange in the world 465 00:27:08,970 --> 00:27:12,370 and and banks and brokerage firms that everyone uses FIX to 466 00:27:12,370 --> 00:27:15,210 talk to each other. And I just created a common set 467 00:27:15,210 --> 00:27:17,490 of standards that removed all that inefficiency. 468 00:27:18,010 --> 00:27:21,610 That's great. That's global and it's an 469 00:27:21,650 --> 00:27:26,770 arguably amazing success. If we look at maybe some 470 00:27:26,770 --> 00:27:32,930 examples where we haven't seen such such success, one that is, 471 00:27:32,970 --> 00:27:36,050 is you know maybe more mature, but it's pretty clear that 472 00:27:36,050 --> 00:27:38,330 you're not going to get to a common standard is it's just the 473 00:27:38,330 --> 00:27:40,690 the rules around equities trading. 474 00:27:40,690 --> 00:27:44,330 So equities are a pretty well known and understood type of 475 00:27:44,330 --> 00:27:46,220 product today. There are you know there have 476 00:27:46,220 --> 00:27:49,140 been, there's been equity ownership and and stocks now for 477 00:27:49,140 --> 00:27:51,420 what a good 600 years or something like that. 478 00:27:52,420 --> 00:27:55,020 And so you know equity shares have come a long way. 479 00:27:55,780 --> 00:27:59,380 But if you look at if you were to try to point to a global 480 00:27:59,380 --> 00:28:04,380 standard for equities rules and regulations, there is no such 481 00:28:04,380 --> 00:28:07,980 thing. Just in Canada you have the 482 00:28:07,980 --> 00:28:10,940 different, each of different provinces has their own rules. 483 00:28:11,300 --> 00:28:14,180 In the US, you've at least got one regulator, the SEC. 484 00:28:14,780 --> 00:28:17,860 In other markets you have, but but in the US you also have the 485 00:28:17,860 --> 00:28:20,020 CFTC. So you have two different, you 486 00:28:20,020 --> 00:28:23,460 have two different federal regulators that that regulate 487 00:28:23,460 --> 00:28:26,940 different parts of the market. You have other markets where you 488 00:28:26,940 --> 00:28:30,860 have one regulator that regulates equities, derivatives, 489 00:28:31,180 --> 00:28:35,540 so multiple different products. And then the rules across even 490 00:28:35,540 --> 00:28:39,780 within let's say, Canada, across the different provinces may not 491 00:28:39,780 --> 00:28:42,300 be 100% aligned. Across countries they're 492 00:28:42,300 --> 00:28:46,960 definitely not 100% aligned And so there really is no notion of 493 00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:50,880 a global set of standards around equities regulation. 494 00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:56,000 There are international organizations, ones called IOSCO 495 00:28:57,040 --> 00:29:00,280 and that's a a group of you can think about that as like a a 496 00:29:00,560 --> 00:29:04,200 meta regulator group where all of the national regulators get 497 00:29:04,200 --> 00:29:07,560 together and and talk and try to develop standards and create 498 00:29:07,560 --> 00:29:09,240 efficiency. So there is some effort to 499 00:29:09,240 --> 00:29:15,060 coordinate, but there definitely is not a a universal standard. 500 00:29:16,660 --> 00:29:18,900 I don't think that's going to change anytime soon. 501 00:29:18,900 --> 00:29:21,780 There are just too many competing interests, different 502 00:29:21,780 --> 00:29:24,020 histories and peculiarities in each of the markets. 503 00:29:24,580 --> 00:29:28,060 So for anyone operating on an international basis, they, as 504 00:29:28,060 --> 00:29:31,340 you noted, they have to have a team that's familiar with all 505 00:29:31,340 --> 00:29:33,740 the rules and regulations in each of the markets that they 506 00:29:33,740 --> 00:29:35,940 want to operate in. And that's just the cost of 507 00:29:35,940 --> 00:29:40,420 doing business. Then if we take maybe one more, 508 00:29:40,580 --> 00:29:44,690 let's say more recent example, just just Prior to joining nor, 509 00:29:44,690 --> 00:29:49,210 I spent four years building ACFTC regulated futures exchange 510 00:29:49,210 --> 00:29:53,090 and clearinghouse for derivatives of futures contracts 511 00:29:53,170 --> 00:29:57,770 on crypto commodities. So Bitcoin is an example and and 512 00:29:57,770 --> 00:30:04,370 either is another example. And in the US, the crypto spot 513 00:30:04,370 --> 00:30:09,570 market for Bitcoin, let's say, is not regulated by the CFTC or 514 00:30:09,570 --> 00:30:14,660 the SCC. If you want to operate a Bitcoin 515 00:30:14,660 --> 00:30:18,180 exchange, you have to go from state to state and get what's 516 00:30:18,180 --> 00:30:21,100 called the money transmission license and register with 517 00:30:21,100 --> 00:30:22,980 Fincent as a money services business. 518 00:30:23,580 --> 00:30:28,460 And so you have a heterogeneous set of rules and regulations in 519 00:30:28,460 --> 00:30:30,180 the different States and territories that you have to 520 00:30:30,180 --> 00:30:35,500 comply with. The SCC has taken a view that a 521 00:30:35,500 --> 00:30:40,070 lot of crypto assets are securities, but there aren't and 522 00:30:40,070 --> 00:30:43,110 and there's been a lot of enforcement actions and there's 523 00:30:43,110 --> 00:30:46,870 been some settlements. But, but the one of the main 524 00:30:46,870 --> 00:30:49,470 arguments in the crypto world right now is that that the rules 525 00:30:49,470 --> 00:30:52,950 are not clear enough and different people take different 526 00:30:52,950 --> 00:30:54,310 views on that. Some people think they're pretty 527 00:30:54,310 --> 00:30:55,590 clear. Other people think they're not 528 00:30:55,590 --> 00:30:58,870 clear at all. And there's been no shortage of 529 00:30:58,870 --> 00:31:02,430 draft legislation. I think there's four or five 530 00:31:02,430 --> 00:31:05,590 different proposals at this point working their way through 531 00:31:05,590 --> 00:31:10,130 Congress to try to create clarity or or and even within 532 00:31:10,130 --> 00:31:13,090 the regulators has to 1st. For example, if the SEC is 533 00:31:13,090 --> 00:31:16,890 proposed as an environment where it would be essentially like a 534 00:31:16,890 --> 00:31:21,850 sandbox pilot type program. So it's just another example of 535 00:31:21,850 --> 00:31:24,610 an industry that there's new technology, new business 536 00:31:24,610 --> 00:31:28,090 practices, new products, regulations trying to catch up. 537 00:31:28,530 --> 00:31:33,010 And there is no current standard either within the regulatory 538 00:31:33,010 --> 00:31:35,250 environment or at a policy level. 539 00:31:36,660 --> 00:31:38,540 And you just have a lot of different people with different 540 00:31:38,540 --> 00:31:41,660 views trying to help solve that problem. 541 00:31:41,660 --> 00:31:44,580 And and so there are a variety of industry groups that have 542 00:31:44,580 --> 00:31:47,420 formed in the cryptocurrency world where commercial actors 543 00:31:47,420 --> 00:31:51,180 have gotten together and said Okay since since no one is 544 00:31:51,180 --> 00:31:56,860 defining this formally in terms of the the federal regulators or 545 00:31:57,220 --> 00:31:59,620 or even Congress, we're just going to set out a set of 546 00:31:59,620 --> 00:32:02,660 principles or a set of rules that we all agree to voluntarily 547 00:32:03,220 --> 00:32:07,400 contribute to and and adhere to. And that's all well and good, 548 00:32:07,400 --> 00:32:10,400 but it doesn't create any sort of regulatory clarity. 549 00:32:10,400 --> 00:32:14,040 And I definitely have seen some of that in the voluntary carbon 550 00:32:14,040 --> 00:32:18,240 market in terms of just efforts to to try to create some sort of 551 00:32:18,560 --> 00:32:24,840 standard but without any, I would say formal blessing that 552 00:32:24,840 --> 00:32:27,520 ensures that companies can confidently operate in 553 00:32:27,520 --> 00:32:32,200 accordance with the standard and and not face regulatory or or 554 00:32:32,200 --> 00:32:36,870 commercial risk. It's there, it's hard to support 555 00:32:36,870 --> 00:32:39,310 any one of those. And then finally, I would just 556 00:32:39,310 --> 00:32:43,230 say I've I've seen some calls for we need a global regulatory 557 00:32:43,230 --> 00:32:48,590 framework for carbon. And given the experience with 558 00:32:48,750 --> 00:32:53,150 other asset classes and the the, you know, either internal 559 00:32:53,230 --> 00:32:57,510 disagreement within countries across regulators or then 560 00:32:58,150 --> 00:33:02,910 disagreement across countries. I find that to be a pretty, in 561 00:33:02,910 --> 00:33:05,910 some ways naive point of view that we're going to get a global 562 00:33:05,910 --> 00:33:07,270 regulatory standard for carbon, so. 563 00:33:08,710 --> 00:33:11,310 Many different angles to go with, but I guess I'll go with 564 00:33:11,510 --> 00:33:14,830 the most recent here. I also have the thought that 565 00:33:14,990 --> 00:33:18,990 maybe too much standard setting can ruin some potential for 566 00:33:18,990 --> 00:33:21,470 innovation. I think when you're in a room 567 00:33:21,470 --> 00:33:26,670 and too many people agree too much, I feel called as my duty 568 00:33:26,670 --> 00:33:30,510 to maybe throw a little bit of a monkey wrench and try and say 569 00:33:30,510 --> 00:33:33,680 like actually here's a. Counter example or here's a spot 570 00:33:33,680 --> 00:33:37,080 where these ideas, while they sound good in this case, don't 571 00:33:37,080 --> 00:33:39,320 work as well here. I think if you get everyone in a 572 00:33:39,320 --> 00:33:43,400 room to agree about everything, that's part of I'm going to make 573 00:33:43,400 --> 00:33:45,560 a most Ross of Ross connections here. 574 00:33:45,560 --> 00:33:49,680 Is that not like the UN Security Council where, you know, Russia, 575 00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:51,800 China and the US are never always going to agree, 576 00:33:51,800 --> 00:33:55,200 especially not right now. So they just veto the proposals 577 00:33:55,200 --> 00:33:58,440 of the other countries and there's really not a process of 578 00:33:59,080 --> 00:34:01,720 like agreeing to something in some cases maybe be worthwhile. 579 00:34:02,150 --> 00:34:03,870 To have different spheres of influence. 580 00:34:03,870 --> 00:34:06,110 God, am I just reinventing the Cold War right now? 581 00:34:06,310 --> 00:34:08,310 But surely that might work better, at least for decision 582 00:34:08,310 --> 00:34:11,469 making, than just having a Security Council where everyone 583 00:34:11,469 --> 00:34:15,389 has that same type of authority? How did I just get myself into? 584 00:34:15,389 --> 00:34:18,429 Good luck, Matt. Yeah, you. 585 00:34:18,510 --> 00:34:23,370 So you happily find yourself comfortably at home in a lot of 586 00:34:23,370 --> 00:34:26,530 the debate in other regulatory circles. 587 00:34:26,530 --> 00:34:30,370 So there are really I I I think if you distill it down there 588 00:34:30,370 --> 00:34:33,090 probably two different approaches to regulation. 589 00:34:33,530 --> 00:34:37,250 One is called a rules based approach and the other is the 590 00:34:37,250 --> 00:34:39,330 other is called the principles based approach. 591 00:34:40,130 --> 00:34:43,090 Rules based approach is fairly prescriptive. 592 00:34:43,170 --> 00:34:47,969 So you know the the rules are written pretty specifically 593 00:34:49,050 --> 00:34:53,710 highly descriptive in some cases about what you can and can't do. 594 00:34:54,429 --> 00:35:00,550 And then principles based is less prescriptive and really 595 00:35:00,550 --> 00:35:03,710 lays out a set of things that the market is trying, the rules 596 00:35:03,710 --> 00:35:05,710 are trying to achieve or trying to prevent. 597 00:35:06,310 --> 00:35:10,270 And there's a lot more latitude in in that case for actors to 598 00:35:10,270 --> 00:35:14,030 decide what adheres to those those principles. 599 00:35:14,510 --> 00:35:18,870 The problem with the rules based approach is that one it it 600 00:35:18,870 --> 00:35:22,150 creates a lot of constraints and and so there's less room for 601 00:35:22,150 --> 00:35:25,550 creativity. But almost counterintuitively it 602 00:35:25,550 --> 00:35:28,310 does create some room for creativity because if you do 603 00:35:28,310 --> 00:35:31,150 something that isn't explicitly prohibited by the rules, you can 604 00:35:31,150 --> 00:35:33,550 say, well there was no rule that you can point to that says I 605 00:35:33,550 --> 00:35:35,430 can't do that, so therefore I can. 606 00:35:36,190 --> 00:35:39,790 And unfortunately that happens often enough when you have 607 00:35:39,790 --> 00:35:42,070 really smart people that spend a lot of time thinking about the 608 00:35:42,070 --> 00:35:46,570 rules and how to game them or or circumvent them, especially if 609 00:35:46,570 --> 00:35:48,770 there is an edge in there and they can make money doing it. 610 00:35:49,250 --> 00:35:52,850 So you have to create ever more rules to make it ever tighter 611 00:35:52,850 --> 00:35:55,610 and ever more explicit and and then that just, you know, 612 00:35:55,890 --> 00:35:59,650 creates less and less room for innovation and creativity. 613 00:36:00,170 --> 00:36:04,930 On the other hand, if it's more principles based, you may have a 614 00:36:04,930 --> 00:36:09,330 lot more of a Gray area, but a lot more room for creativity And 615 00:36:09,330 --> 00:36:14,500 and maybe to come back to just a concrete example where you can 616 00:36:14,500 --> 00:36:18,060 see the consequences of let's say a rules based environment. 617 00:36:18,380 --> 00:36:22,020 I would characterize the US equities market is a rules based 618 00:36:22,020 --> 00:36:26,020 environment and it's very constraining around what 619 00:36:26,020 --> 00:36:29,060 exchanges can and can't do from a pricing standpoint, from an 620 00:36:29,060 --> 00:36:33,300 access standpoint, from the type, the ways in which they're 621 00:36:33,780 --> 00:36:36,900 the exchange can operate, what order types they're permitted to 622 00:36:36,900 --> 00:36:41,330 allow or not allow. And so if you look at the way 623 00:36:41,370 --> 00:36:46,650 exchanges compete in the US equities market, it really isn't 624 00:36:46,730 --> 00:36:49,010 anymore about a lot of creativity. 625 00:36:49,810 --> 00:36:53,770 It's about pricing in ever finer sub penny increments and 626 00:36:53,770 --> 00:36:57,330 creating really complicated fee structures with all kinds of 627 00:36:57,330 --> 00:37:01,290 different complicated tiers that create economic incentives. 628 00:37:01,290 --> 00:37:05,050 I mean the exchanges have economists on staff who spend a 629 00:37:05,050 --> 00:37:08,450 lot of time designing these really complicated pricing 630 00:37:08,450 --> 00:37:11,690 schemes and and that's where innovation happens in these 631 00:37:11,690 --> 00:37:16,130 really complicated pricing schemes or at the level that I 632 00:37:16,130 --> 00:37:19,490 was describing earlier where you're talking about shaving now 633 00:37:19,490 --> 00:37:23,330 nanoseconds off of order and trade message time response 634 00:37:23,330 --> 00:37:24,770 times. So. 635 00:37:24,770 --> 00:37:29,450 So that's what really amounts to innovation and creativity in the 636 00:37:29,450 --> 00:37:32,490 US equities markets and and that's that's not great. 637 00:37:32,490 --> 00:37:35,650 It's harder to to come up with something new. 638 00:37:35,890 --> 00:37:39,580 It's not to say that that no one can and obviously if you've read 639 00:37:39,580 --> 00:37:42,500 Flash Boys you know that I EX did come up with the new 640 00:37:42,500 --> 00:37:48,580 invention that was within the constraints of the rules. 641 00:37:50,060 --> 00:37:53,620 But it was really precisely targeted. 642 00:37:53,620 --> 00:37:57,980 And even at that there, there was some resistance to and and 643 00:37:58,540 --> 00:38:01,620 in an argument that some of what I X was doing was not compliant 644 00:38:01,620 --> 00:38:04,300 with the rules and and that was a big part of the battle of the 645 00:38:04,300 --> 00:38:05,700 i.e. X exchange application. 646 00:38:06,380 --> 00:38:11,060 So I don't know that there is really it's it's all a matter of 647 00:38:11,060 --> 00:38:14,260 trade-offs and what are you trying to optimize for. 648 00:38:14,260 --> 00:38:20,620 So you know the the state of the UN and and post Cold War you 649 00:38:20,620 --> 00:38:24,100 don't have uniformity of opinion then that may or may not be 650 00:38:24,100 --> 00:38:26,940 desirable depending on where you sit and I would say the same 651 00:38:26,940 --> 00:38:31,580 applies for regulation. Yeah, those trade-offs are 652 00:38:31,580 --> 00:38:35,620 really profound. A rulesbased regime seems to 653 00:38:35,620 --> 00:38:39,540 assume an end of history almost where there's probably not a lot 654 00:38:39,540 --> 00:38:43,220 of room left for innovation and the job of the regulator is to 655 00:38:43,620 --> 00:38:47,740 manage the existing system. I mean, how much room is there 656 00:38:47,740 --> 00:38:49,780 for innovation still in the equities market? 657 00:38:49,780 --> 00:38:53,940 I know those are famous last words, but also, are we not at 658 00:38:53,940 --> 00:38:55,980 that point? Like how much could really be 659 00:38:55,980 --> 00:38:57,100 done? That would really blow 660 00:38:57,100 --> 00:38:59,620 everyone's minds. But I know everyone who has ever 661 00:38:59,620 --> 00:39:02,620 predicted that usually has to eat their words within a couple 662 00:39:02,620 --> 00:39:05,490 years at least. So is that not? 663 00:39:05,570 --> 00:39:08,130 Is it just not appropriate to to be rules based? 664 00:39:08,130 --> 00:39:10,290 Are there places that were pretty much done innovating and 665 00:39:10,290 --> 00:39:14,530 can just settle into a technicianbased view of the law 666 00:39:14,570 --> 00:39:16,170 and people are just administering it? 667 00:39:17,370 --> 00:39:19,850 Well, I I don't know, I guess it, you know, in the world of 668 00:39:19,850 --> 00:39:22,370 science. Wasn't it maybe the late 1800s, 669 00:39:22,370 --> 00:39:25,050 early 1900s, when they thought that pretty much all major 670 00:39:25,050 --> 00:39:27,690 discoveries had happened and there wasn't much more to learn? 671 00:39:28,010 --> 00:39:30,010 As it's coming out of my mouth, I'm like, this is such an 672 00:39:30,010 --> 00:39:32,010 obvious thing to just dunk on, but dunk away. 673 00:39:32,730 --> 00:39:34,900 Go ahead. Plate tectonics is pretty recent 674 00:39:34,900 --> 00:39:36,220 too. It's like only a couple decades 675 00:39:36,980 --> 00:39:45,900 exactly. So the I would say it presumes 676 00:39:45,900 --> 00:39:50,500 that one regulators can know everything and that the market 677 00:39:50,500 --> 00:39:52,980 static and that technology doesn't evolve or business 678 00:39:52,980 --> 00:39:56,900 practices don't evolve and that's just not ever going to be 679 00:39:56,900 --> 00:40:00,270 true. I think it also fails to 680 00:40:00,270 --> 00:40:02,630 recognize that there are different actors in the markets 681 00:40:02,630 --> 00:40:07,150 who have different objectives. A an asset manager or pension 682 00:40:07,150 --> 00:40:10,310 fund has a different set of priorities and a different set 683 00:40:10,310 --> 00:40:12,150 of objectives than a market maker. 684 00:40:13,310 --> 00:40:15,670 But both of those are important actors in the market. 685 00:40:15,670 --> 00:40:20,070 And so if you're an exchange or regulator and you're trying to 686 00:40:20,070 --> 00:40:23,030 design A market, who are you designing it for? 687 00:40:23,030 --> 00:40:25,870 You designing it for the end investor, you deciding it who 688 00:40:25,870 --> 00:40:27,830 who has a certain set of objectives and. 689 00:40:28,330 --> 00:40:31,050 And certain preferences or you designing it for the market 690 00:40:31,050 --> 00:40:33,330 maker that has a completely different set of objectives and 691 00:40:33,330 --> 00:40:36,730 preferences. And the art and I think 692 00:40:36,970 --> 00:40:40,130 challenge for regulators is that you have to try to strike that 693 00:40:40,130 --> 00:40:44,290 balance thoughtfully and some everybody's going to be nobody's 694 00:40:44,290 --> 00:40:47,570 ever 100% happy in that negotiation, which I guess you 695 00:40:47,570 --> 00:40:49,410 know is the definition of a good outcome. 696 00:40:50,970 --> 00:40:53,450 But it but it's just it's an ongoing battle. 697 00:40:53,450 --> 00:40:56,810 In fact right now there's a new set of proposals really 698 00:40:56,810 --> 00:41:00,650 fundamentally proposing a pretty fundamentally change US equities 699 00:41:00,650 --> 00:41:03,970 market structure and there's a lot of people very upset about 700 00:41:03,970 --> 00:41:04,970 that. There's some people are very 701 00:41:04,970 --> 00:41:07,610 happy about it and think it's you know 20 years overdue. 702 00:41:08,170 --> 00:41:15,090 So it's you take all of that and then recognize that regulation 703 00:41:15,090 --> 00:41:18,650 by definition has to be a slow and and conservative process and 704 00:41:18,650 --> 00:41:22,590 and almost you know Hippocratic Oath do no harm type of 705 00:41:22,590 --> 00:41:26,190 environment and it's just really hard when technology and 706 00:41:26,190 --> 00:41:29,870 business practices evolve pretty quickly but then you can look 707 00:41:29,870 --> 00:41:32,950 for opportunities to to innovate in different ways And I would 708 00:41:32,950 --> 00:41:37,870 say if we want to point to a concrete example of that the 709 00:41:37,870 --> 00:41:41,430 exchange traded fund or ETF is a relatively new invention. 710 00:41:41,430 --> 00:41:43,790 So that's you know that doesn't have anything to do with the way 711 00:41:43,790 --> 00:41:46,510 exchanges match orders and create trades. 712 00:41:46,950 --> 00:41:52,620 It's a new product that can list on an exchange and it you know 713 00:41:52,620 --> 00:41:55,300 in the case of let's say the SPIDERS ETF that allows an 714 00:41:55,300 --> 00:41:59,260 investor to get access to the entirety of the S&P 500 index 715 00:41:59,660 --> 00:42:04,180 through one share or one type of share rather than having to buy 716 00:42:04,180 --> 00:42:06,820 individual shares and all the individual constituent companies 717 00:42:06,820 --> 00:42:08,500 that that's an interesting innovation. 718 00:42:09,060 --> 00:42:13,580 Another would be the GLDETF for the the the goal it's the the 719 00:42:13,580 --> 00:42:16,700 gold ETF. So prior to the invention of 720 00:42:16,700 --> 00:42:19,700 GLD, if you wanted to own gold, you could buy bars and store 721 00:42:19,700 --> 00:42:22,530 them at a vault. You could order coins, have them 722 00:42:22,530 --> 00:42:25,450 shipped to your house and put them in your safe or bury them 723 00:42:25,450 --> 00:42:28,690 in your backyard. When GLD was invented, suddenly 724 00:42:28,690 --> 00:42:33,010 you could buy shares that were ownership, partial ownership of 725 00:42:33,010 --> 00:42:37,650 a trust that held gold and you could buy those in the context 726 00:42:37,650 --> 00:42:41,290 of your your, your typical brokerage account be that you 727 00:42:41,290 --> 00:42:45,400 know, E*Trade or fidelity. And so it does feel like there's 728 00:42:45,400 --> 00:42:48,360 still opportunities for innovation, you know just it may 729 00:42:48,360 --> 00:42:53,080 come from places that you don't necessarily expect and that's 730 00:42:54,160 --> 00:42:56,480 it's. So taking this all back to some 731 00:42:56,480 --> 00:43:00,280 of the things I find really exciting about voluntary carbon 732 00:43:00,280 --> 00:43:05,200 market is we don't have really clearly defined regulations. 733 00:43:06,080 --> 00:43:11,800 There is a lot of room for commercial innovation, creation 734 00:43:11,800 --> 00:43:16,640 of standards, development of new products, market structure can 735 00:43:16,640 --> 00:43:21,720 evolve and we don't have that really prescriptive rules based 736 00:43:21,720 --> 00:43:26,160 set of constraints right now. So that creates a lot of 737 00:43:26,160 --> 00:43:29,600 opportunity for flexibility and creativity and that's fantastic. 738 00:43:30,080 --> 00:43:35,840 The risk is that it also creates the opportunity for bad actors 739 00:43:36,000 --> 00:43:40,850 and we've definitely seen some of that in terms of some of the 740 00:43:40,850 --> 00:43:43,650 double counting issues or some of the issues about even 741 00:43:43,650 --> 00:43:46,450 outright fraud and carbon credits and so. 742 00:43:48,090 --> 00:43:51,010 So again it's it's a set of trade-offs, so you know you want 743 00:43:51,010 --> 00:43:53,610 to be careful what you wish for. If you wish for regulation, and 744 00:43:53,610 --> 00:43:57,130 it comes very quickly and thoughtfully, you may end up 745 00:43:57,130 --> 00:43:59,770 with a cure that's worse than the disease. 746 00:44:00,330 --> 00:44:03,770 But at the same time, if the industry doesn't to some degree 747 00:44:03,770 --> 00:44:08,520 police itself, then you create an opportunity for bad actors 748 00:44:08,520 --> 00:44:10,880 that can sully the reputation of the entire industry. 749 00:44:11,280 --> 00:44:16,000 So neither of those two ends of that spectrum are are places 750 00:44:16,000 --> 00:44:20,960 that you want to be. You could just give me something 751 00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:24,720 easy to walk away with. You got to give me some, some 752 00:44:24,720 --> 00:44:28,640 Gray middle ground Hell, I have to carry around with me, Matt. 753 00:44:30,740 --> 00:44:34,020 But well, if if you want to work in market structure, I think you 754 00:44:34,020 --> 00:44:37,540 have to be, you have to have a high tolerance for pain and an 755 00:44:37,540 --> 00:44:41,900 ambiguity, yeah. There's so many layers of of 756 00:44:41,900 --> 00:44:45,820 ambiguity and trying to design a product here that makes sense. 757 00:44:45,820 --> 00:44:49,340 And I think trying to design something that is perfect on 758 00:44:49,340 --> 00:44:52,100 every metric. I think we said in carbon 759 00:44:52,100 --> 00:44:54,260 markets too, if you want everything to be perfectly 760 00:44:54,540 --> 00:44:57,220 additional, perfectly permanent and all these things, that means 761 00:44:57,220 --> 00:45:00,100 your scale is. Pretty, pretty small and is 762 00:45:00,100 --> 00:45:04,660 likely to remain pretty small for for a while and inexpensive. 763 00:45:05,140 --> 00:45:07,260 So you can have everything you want, you just have to pay a 764 00:45:07,260 --> 00:45:09,260 price on it on a different dimension than maybe you 765 00:45:09,260 --> 00:45:12,140 expected. You can be a little bit more 766 00:45:12,140 --> 00:45:14,500 openended on on how much those other things matter and to what 767 00:45:14,500 --> 00:45:17,700 extent, and you will have a corresponding updating of those 768 00:45:17,700 --> 00:45:20,900 other sliders, but it doesn't just seem like you can get 769 00:45:20,900 --> 00:45:23,640 everything you want. For a cheap price and great 770 00:45:23,640 --> 00:45:26,880 availability at all times, it seems like one has to choose 771 00:45:26,880 --> 00:45:30,000 what is actually important here to reverse climate change. 772 00:45:30,000 --> 00:45:32,400 And it really isn't that simple. I think people have good faith 773 00:45:32,640 --> 00:45:34,760 can disagree about where those sliders should be. 774 00:45:36,200 --> 00:45:39,040 I think that is an absolutely critical point. 775 00:45:39,080 --> 00:45:43,320 You can reach what you might define as perfection that 776 00:45:43,320 --> 00:45:47,680 becomes utterly irrelevant, and so you can have your perfect 777 00:45:47,680 --> 00:45:49,640 precious little thing that nobody cares about. 778 00:45:50,720 --> 00:45:53,950 That's not a good outcome and it's someone who's a relative 779 00:45:53,950 --> 00:45:58,230 newcomer to this market. I can say that, you know, not 780 00:45:58,230 --> 00:46:00,990 that it's unique to the market, the arguments and and the 781 00:46:00,990 --> 00:46:04,630 different tribal battles and things that are going on. 782 00:46:04,630 --> 00:46:09,110 But the industry should ask itself what is that doing for 783 00:46:09,110 --> 00:46:11,630 people like me who are relative newcomers. 784 00:46:11,630 --> 00:46:14,550 Now I've decided to join a company and and jump in with 785 00:46:14,550 --> 00:46:18,430 both feet. But if I'm someone sitting at a 786 00:46:18,430 --> 00:46:22,980 real economy corporation and I'm starting down the path of the 787 00:46:22,980 --> 00:46:26,540 carbon journey and trying to understand what the challenges 788 00:46:26,540 --> 00:46:29,900 are, what the the opportunities are, what the products are, what 789 00:46:29,900 --> 00:46:35,580 the solutions are, and you know, I, I open up the the cover to 790 00:46:35,580 --> 00:46:37,940 the market and to see a bunch of people screaming at each other 791 00:46:37,940 --> 00:46:42,940 about highly technical, arcane topics, is that something that 792 00:46:42,980 --> 00:46:46,420 is going to invite me to to come in and want to participate? 793 00:46:46,420 --> 00:46:49,940 Probably not. So for the market. 794 00:46:50,570 --> 00:46:54,250 I think one of the things that we if the goal of the market is 795 00:46:54,250 --> 00:46:59,490 to remove carbon from the atmosphere, stabilize the 796 00:46:59,490 --> 00:47:05,730 climate, reverse climate change, then we would need to bring as 797 00:47:05,730 --> 00:47:07,810 many people into the tent as possible. 798 00:47:08,170 --> 00:47:11,450 We want to have a big tent approach here and you can't do 799 00:47:11,450 --> 00:47:13,650 that. If everybody's infighting and 800 00:47:13,650 --> 00:47:17,090 arguing and one upping it, it just doesn't work. 801 00:47:17,690 --> 00:47:22,010 So if we just start from the standpoint of we want to assume 802 00:47:22,010 --> 00:47:24,730 good intent, we want to identify the good actors, we want to 803 00:47:24,730 --> 00:47:27,370 support each other. Let's grow the market. 804 00:47:27,370 --> 00:47:30,010 Let's make it easier for people to interact with the market, to 805 00:47:30,010 --> 00:47:31,890 navigate it, to understand the products. 806 00:47:31,890 --> 00:47:37,130 Let's be creative about removing points of friction and make the 807 00:47:37,130 --> 00:47:41,820 market big and important and then we achieve the impact that 808 00:47:41,820 --> 00:47:45,100 everybody I think that's that's spending a good portion of their 809 00:47:45,100 --> 00:47:47,860 time and careers in this this new market is trying to 810 00:47:47,860 --> 00:47:51,100 accomplish. And and that would be you know 811 00:47:51,100 --> 00:47:53,740 that's just that's my frame of mind when I come into this. 812 00:47:53,740 --> 00:47:56,500 I want to meet people. I want to learn more about the 813 00:47:56,500 --> 00:48:00,220 market and want to be collaborative and and not 814 00:48:00,220 --> 00:48:01,660 ideological or tribal. It's. 815 00:48:03,180 --> 00:48:05,620 A good goal, definitely a good starting point. 816 00:48:06,190 --> 00:48:07,630 Well, we're really glad you're here with us. 817 00:48:07,630 --> 00:48:10,110 You bring so much interesting experience for us and the 818 00:48:10,110 --> 00:48:12,950 industry as it scales. Thanks for being here, Matt. 819 00:48:12,950 --> 00:48:15,990 And if you like the show, by the way, we're going to be doing 820 00:48:15,990 --> 00:48:19,270 another episode with Matt here that's more applied and with a 821 00:48:19,350 --> 00:48:22,550 special guest coming soon. So thank you again, Matt. 822 00:48:23,820 --> 00:48:25,780 Thanks for having me, Ross. It's been a pleasure to be here 823 00:48:25,780 --> 00:48:27,940 and it's been a pleasure the last three months with the team 824 00:48:27,980 --> 00:48:32,100 here. Thank you so much for listening. 825 00:48:32,180 --> 00:48:34,340 If you could please subscribe and give us a great rating and 826 00:48:34,340 --> 00:48:37,260 review on Apple Podcast or a rating on Spotify, that'd be 827 00:48:37,260 --> 00:48:39,580 much appreciated. It helps us get our content out 828 00:48:39,580 --> 00:48:41,420 to more people. You can sign up for our 829 00:48:41,420 --> 00:48:44,180 newsletter at nori.com. Follow us on social media. 830 00:48:44,220 --> 00:48:45,420 We will catch you next time.