You're listening to the reversing climate change,
podcast by the team at Nori. The carbon removal Marketplace.
This is a show about the innovators and entrepreneurs
developing solutions to climate change.
Hello and welcome to the reversing climate change
podcast. I'm Ross Kenyan I am the
creative editor at Nori. The carbon removal Marketplace
today, I have with me dr. Kevin Valley, a associate
professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University
and author of Of the new book trust in a polarize age.
Hey, Kevin, I Ross has a gun is going well, I'm glad to have you
here. It's a very well good timing,
because I think if we had spoken a week earlier, you might have
had different thoughts. But the inauguration was
yesterday, you write about trust.
Why politics feels like war must?
It be War. As one of your previous books is
called? Why is it like this, does it
have to be like this? Why, why is everyone so angry
all the time as it may be layperson way of asking it?
Yeah. So um I'll talk about the
particular circumstances and then the kind of broader
picture. So I work on the different
topics of trust and political polarization and I work on two
kinds of trusts one is, what's called social trust?
Your trust in most people in your Society usually trust in
strangers as a whole and political trust which is trust
in institutions particular institutions, like different
parts of government like Congress or the president or
particular people who occupy those Al's political
polarization is a term that is a lot more familiar to most people
than social and political trust. And it's typically thought to be
the idea that people are moving further apart from one another,
in terms of their political views but that actually isn't
the only thing we're talking about when we talk about
polarization, we sometimes talk about a thick base polarization
where people are coming to dislike people in the other
party or other group more. So polarization involves both
changes in issues and More negative affect.
We've got more effective polarization than we have
issue-based polarization. There's also the phenomenon of
sorting and sorting is you're not changing your views or
attitudes, but you're associating with like-minded and
dissociated from the on like-minded.
So, really what I talk about is those those four different
phenomenon that are different things, me my polarization.
Okay, so hopefully we've given your listeners these Concepts.
I think their cost. Only connected.
So the idea is that the more polarized, we get the less
trusting, we get of other people in our society that are on the
other team and the leaders of those people and then when they
run the institutions, we trust those less as well as so
polarizations driving distrust. And I think distrust is driving
polarization because I think they'll last, you trust people,
the more you're inclined to see their disagreements with you as
cause for disliking them because you're more likely to attribute
their Differences with you to some sort of fault in them.
I call this the illusion of culpable dissent in the book.
So we think that their descent is their fault.
Because their Dom or evil, or both only a moron or a bad
person could think X, Y and Z. So, we're in a doom Loop between
falling trust and polarization. Now, I thought until the last
two weeks that we were seeing a slow linear decline in trust and
a slow linear increase in polarization.
Ation. But the thing about the last two
weeks that my friend Ryan Muldoon points out is that
sometimes social indicators and social norms don't change in a
linear fashion, sometimes they change in an exponential fashion
and I think that what has happened is that trust in
institutions particularly the Democratic process collapsed,
very, very fast on one side of the aisle and it led to revolt
and that Revolt has In some ways exacerbated, political
polarization. Although I think it's also
highlighted, the cost of it, which is good at least.
So, going from the general bits of trust and polarization.
That's how I would analyze the current situation as a decline
in trust in the Democratic process leading to a Revolt that
continues to crystallize and further deepen divisions.
In fact now that Biden and the inaugural talked about fighting
domestic terrorism, I'm a little worried that we're going to have
a politicized. Sized new institution a bit like
the way we handled foreign terrorism which was, you know,
extremely poor, and oppressive and terrible.
So you know, that's where I kind of think we are.
We have a lot of lower and lower trust in institutions in each
other more and more polarization of all these varieties and it
creates a flammable environment and indeed, Trump is better at
lighting that flame. That anyone does so deliberately
and repeatedly and ingeniously in order to benefit.
Shelf. And it finally blew up in his
face and hopefully his permanently disgraced him.
I'm sorry. I've been very black pulled on
Trump over the last couple of weeks.
Usually, I kind of try to be more even-handed, but I'm like
not in the mood for that which is kind of weird for me like
kind of pride, myself on it, but, but trying to be
even-handed, but I'm not there right now.
I think this is just hideous Behavior, so I feel similarly,
if there's one criticism, someone listening could make of
this show and I would be like touche, it's that there's more
generosity to ideas that do not deserve them sometimes.
Yeah, being to charitable too much steel.
Manning is happening, and it's hard hard.
But necessary questions do not get asked and it might look like
politeness but it could be cowardice as well.
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Is it actually worse than it has
been historically? I don't know what the data show
about this, but are we actually more polarized and suspicious of
each other? The Divide also splits between
Progressive and conservative, broadly, maybe you would frame
it differently but have these factions always been so strong?
No, I mean, what's interesting is we've really only been
measuring trust levels via surveys for the past, say about
60 years. The political distrust measures
are actually a bit older. Go back into the 50s.
So the survey data only goes back about 50, 60 years.
So, we don't really, Ali know if there were periods of lower
trust, my suspicion, is that growing up in a world where two
or we work together to defeat, an obviously evil Foe and didn't
see any real damage drone country or division over.
This was a big trust increasing event for us.
However, there's also been trust declines in a lot of European
countries, but not very much. We were weird.
We're the only established democracy that seen this big
big, big decline in Social, trust for instance, but have
things been worse. So trust is hard to say.
It's the worst things have been since polling began but there's
been a Slowdown in the collapse over the last decade or two
political polarization however is something that we can measure
a little bit better particular but primarily at the elite
level. So there's the nominate index
created by Nolan McCarty at Princeton that looks at
Congressional votes and measures polarization based on that and
roll call votes. So we were this politically
polarized during the Civil War. Or and just before it.
But we haven't been this polarized since then.
So on the polarization index at the elite level, we haven't been
this polarized. But then the question is, what
about most people? And it turns out that issue
based polarization decreases. I think as your education level
decreases, but the Highly Educated, highly connected are
very politically partisan and very politically engaged.
And from what I can tell the more that people get into
politics in the More educated. They are the more this
phenomenon, the more this phenomenon hits them.
So you know probably the maximally polarized people in
high political office with the decrease in moderates.
I mean it's I think McConnell May cooperate with the Democrats
simply because dealing with Trump for four years was
psychologically traumatic and various respects for our
politician who'd been used to so many such differences and he's
done buying a very long time. I think that helps but Generally
I think at the elite level people in DC, politicians
peoples, and politicians offices, very wealthy people,
very and highly, you know, people in the academy people and
Hollywood, you know, the high cultural Elites, those are the
most polarized. So what I would say is to the
extent that your Elite and high-level your polarized and
highly educated but that there isn't that much issue-based
polarization in the average American but Can be polarized
very easily. So I have thoughts as a lay
person on why polarization has increased and I want to say them
and I want you to tell me why they're wrong or incomplete.
Will you do that for me? Yes I think I've said this
before on the show but tend to be pretty favorable towards
markets. I think they're important and
worth preserving in many in many ways but I think the way that
media is monetized breaks this dynamic in a really dangerous
way where the best way to keep us engaged is oftentimes to get
us angry and you can look back to the origins of right-wing
talk radio and Rush Limbaugh and I feel like that trend has gone
through Fox News and social media.
I look at something like a vise article and they're almost
scientifically designed to make everyone mad and the whole
comments are mobile meta comments about how mad everyone
is and watching this disaster. I think it's the only way to get
attention is to piss everyone off and I think that is just
been bad. Capitalist feedback loop.
I think that's part of it. Am I onto something or no?
Well, I think you are. I mean the biggest regret I have
in the book is that I couldn't get very much into media
distrust. I talk about it in the empirics
but I wanted to talk about ways of restoring Trust in Media with
liberal institutions. And I don't know how to do it
without violating the First Amendment.
So I didn't have a chapter on it.
I talked about the liberal institutions that I thought
could be employed or What reformed or extended to increase
trust and reduce polarization those include associations,
freedom of Association, markets, some aspects of the welfare
state elections and parliamentary democracy, and the
rule of law. I had to cut the federalism
chapter. I think it would help but there
wasn't enough data. But with media, it's just so
difficult to think about what you would need to solve the
problem because they do feed outrage, but the bigger issue
isn't so much that people are Outrage.
Now it's that they have manifestly false beliefs and I
think this is a much worse problem on the right than the
left. I've become very convinced of
this recently. I read this nice book Network
propaganda and it made the case that the right-wing media
circuit is a lot simpler. Like, there are far fewer
outlets and it's easier for them to be a closed system.
So then it's much easier to propagate lies and false beliefs
like that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction or well.
They did find a few radioactive holes out.
Out there but nonetheless believing just falsehoods like
that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11.
So that was, that's when a lot of the really faults believe
started to take hold in the media, but trumpets, just on a
whole nother level promoting all kinds of conspiracy theories and
then punishing media that don't propagate it.
So if Fox News got critical of him, he started attacking Fox
News in their writings have gone down quite a bit.
Actually since he started doing that I went to like Our American
Network and YouTube and like yeah I want America.
And yeah, I mean, they're going to be who knows where they're
dispersing towards it's very disturbing.
This one of the reasons I hope that Trump is barred from future
office by the Senate. Yeah.
No punches pulled. Sorry, I should pull some, maybe
I should pull. So now I just speak, right?
It's fine. I well, I mean, I just think
that he's just such a master manipulator that he's able to
take advantage of Of the media. He's a because I don't think
anyone would dispute it. No no, no.
And it's his ability and willingness to punish reporters
in such a public way. I mean he destroyed Megyn Kelly
for instance and I suspect he'll start to set his sights on
people like Chris Wallace here, not too long so who knows what's
going to happen? You know, we took I don't think
I think he's too lazy to start his own party but he's been
talking about it. But yeah, so he's been a lot of
the problem now a lot of people say oh well the problems predate
him. Yes.
Yes, they do. But he, he has made things per
personally has made things. Worse deliberately to benefit
himself. I just want to say that because
I think it's manifest, but it is more important in general, to
pay more attention to institutions than two
individuals, because institutions Place enormous
limits on what individuals may do.
But so do social norms and if you have someone who I think
never feels guilt or shame, they'll flout norms.
And so, when people We'll try to punish them, they don't feel
remorse and so they don't stop. But that makes Trump a bit of a
unicorn because the vast majority of humans feel guilt
and shame and so they can be reined in.
Wow well maybe we should talk about institutions then if yes
please Focus Less on an individual's we're even start to
talk about institutions. Yeah so I mean there's two kinds
of Institutions, I think matter formal and informal and formal
or things like laws constitutions.
Administrative rules and regulations stuff that you know
there's usually some kind of like written code that's
enforced by courts and police informal Norms or things more
like social social norms, where there are expectations that
people follow the norms. And there's some kind of usually
social sanction or punishment when people don't follow them.
You know, we all think we ought to go along with them.
So you know there's a lot of well-known destructive social
norms, you know things like Chinese foot binding.
Or this is the most neutral way to use the term, but female
genital cutting, where a lot of people do it, but they don't
want to do it because they're worried about being punished if
they do it. We keep a lot of order with good
social norms, even though we often have bad ones, we have
developed some new Norms. Like, punishing people who use
racial epithets that reinforce certain kinds of racial
statements, but they usually involve Society responding with
punishment. Now, I think social media has
made it easier to over punish which is why a lot of people do.
The punishing don't understand canceled culture because they're
like, I'm just like chastising people who deserve it, but
because it gets Amplified and coordinated it.
The person being attacked is just it's disproportionate but
it's a spontaneous, it's disproportionate by a
spontaneous order. He doesn't just want actor.
So formal and informal Norms that I think of them both as
kinds of Institutions, there's a number of different things going
on but a lot of the polarization I think has to do with the way
that Congressional rules and the way our voting and for officials
and official voting. Like, when legislators vote is
structured, such that polarization creates a lot of
problems with with things like gridlock and a lot of really
basic stuff can be addressed. But then there's also just the
institutions that the media and their attempts to monetize
things and to violate social norms like against lying which
is decreased trusting media a lot, but they're still doing
just fine in terms of numbers, people think, once I can't be
trusted so they start trusting the other side which is Felicia.
But nonetheless, it's what happens.
And then you have just a lot of informal Democratic Norms, that
are being violated. That Trump has been violating
about, you know, not trying to get another country to dig up
dirt on your political opponent or lying about the Integrity of
the election process and so on. And those aren't you know
necessarily illegal but they're in their violations of informal
Norms. There are things that we all
think no one should do and that no one actually does do until
trunk does them. Them.
So anyway, I'm just trying to give examples of, I don't want
to get back to cold close towards Trump.
But yeah, there are informal Norms, informal norms and I
think we're seeing decay in in both.
And I think the media outrage is people are willing to violate
social norms to make money and then those Norms degrade.
And so, everyone feels like they can be mean to each other,
because all the high status, people are being mean to each
other. And then, particularly Twitter
acts as a wild, amplifiers social punishment.
Such that it just builds and builds and builds and it can
ruin lives. Like I would rather go to jail
for a couple days. Then be the subject of a Twitter
mob. Maybe longer brief tangent here,
have you read Jon Ronson's? So, you've been publicly shamed?
No, I haven't tell me about it. I think you would very much like
it and it gives examples of both the left and the right and the
sort of gallows culture of the public execution, and ways in
which it's been used inappropriately.
He also has some examples where maybe it was just defied to, but
just sort of like the gleeful destruction of someone's life,
that people may be read like a single tweet.
I like cool. Well, we should cast this person
into outer Darkness then. Yeah, you're like wow your way
your way too eager to do that. But he's a he's a journalist
actually that he's covered. A lot of like weird conspiracy
cultures Fringe subcultures. It's good book.
I think you'd like it but oh great.
Okay. Yeah, that's very interesting.
Yeah. Okay.
Actually, real question now though, I think now that our
listeners have an understanding of what you mean by institutions
formal and informal. I think we should back up even
further and explain how you view liberalism because a big part of
this book is you sort of offering a vision of what
liberalism is / could be and why it's important why we maybe take
it for granted and how our institutional thoughts that you
just laid out might fit inside of that container.
So, what exactly is liberalism? Well, so all I'll start with the
a very general account and then get more specific in stages.
So the very very most broad account of liberalism is that it
is a political philosophy which says that persons are naturally
free and equal and should be treated as such by government.
And what that means is there's no natural hierarchies of
authority, meaning that everyone's in a sense, Born Free
and not under the authority of anyone but say their parents, so
they can make up their own minds about how to live and To be
treated equally, right? So that people don't aren't
naturally ahead of each other. And so, those Notions of
Liberty, and equality don't actually conflict.
Because originally in liberalism, there wasn't a
liberty, equality conflict. So, they're very, very much
basic form is Natural Freedom and equality.
If persons. Now, it's a quality in the moral
sense that everyone ought to be treated as equals or everyone
has equal dignity. Not that people are equal in
capacities or talents or anything like that.
So a lot of you know, Libertarians will Say, well,
people aren't equal but, you know, that's not what the people
saying we're equals typically, the more like me, like, a
Christian equality before God, something like that.
Yeah, cuz he starts off that way because liberalism, you know,
evolves out of out of Christianity, but it doesn't
have to be so you can be an atheist Global or Christian
liberal. But in terms of Origins, yeah I
think Christianity contributes greatly to the idea of equal
moral worth So that's the very broadest notion.
Now, there's a divide among liberals historically between
those who think that certain liberal values like freedom and
autonomy ought to be actively promoted by the state's.
You know, you find this, you know, the European continent
would like a lot of liberals want to suppress the Catholic
church or or suppress organized religion because they think it
undermines freedom. And this is more of what we
might call liberal perfectionism.
So on this view, people are free and equal but the state
Shouldn't be neutral. The state should promote liberal
values sometimes by force. But then there's another kind of
liberalism that I call at the very most General way liberal
neutralism and liberal neutralism says, look if people
are actually free and equal, we're going to be fair to them.
We can't just decide that one view is correct and impose it on
the rest. So this started off with
religion, where the thought was or released with variants of
protestantism where the thought was roughly that, you know, look
you know, we can't agree on religion and And we seem to have
different views that aren't going to go away.
And over time, they kind of start to look like different but
reasonable views. And so the thought is that, you
know, look the state shouldn't take a side on religious
matters. And then, you know, became a
question about whether the state should take the side of religion
at all or probably be secular and then liberalism's and
liberals disagree about whether neutrality.
Implies robust forms of secularism like getting religion
out of the Public Square like friendship.
France and lie CTA or a much more kind of open Public Square
where the state doesn't coercively establish religion,
but in allows all kinds of other religious expressions, like, in
the United States. So, there's little neutralism
and perfectionist, liberalism, I'm a little neutralist, and
then you can get even more specific with kinds of liberal
neutralism. So that would be like a natural,
right space liberalism that says these natural rights and you
establishment violates those rights or you can go in In for
the Contemporary variants of social contract, liberalism try
to justify the state, based on the free, and equal agreement
between persons may be an actual and maybe a hypothetical one,
but we're actually kind of beyond the consent analogy.
Now we're basically the thought is that you because people are
naturally free and equal, you can't coerce them if the
coercion isn't justifiable to them from their own perspective.
So the thought is that all coercion State, coercion or
power needs to be publicly justify that.
It's a To be justified to each person by their own lights.
And so this is what's called public reason liberalism.
It's a variant of neutrals liberalism because it says, the
state shouldn't coerce a matters of reasonable dispute.
Instead there has to be justifiability to multiple
perspectives. Rawls is an example of someone
who has this view my advisor. Jerry Gauss was had a version of
this view is very different than Rawls is, so we've got
liberalism neutralism and the perfectionism distinction, and
then we've got the more contemporary Version of liberal
neutrals and it's called public reason the Burleson.
And I'm a public reason liberals.
So there's your taxonomy. Hopefully that's helpful to
people to some degree. At least, I know what the Google
infer that we have detailed show notes.
Yeah, we actually know each other because I spent a year at
Arizona which is your alma mater for your PhD.
Yeah. And I decided against continuing
but was still very influenced by the public reason thinkers there
and post rawlsian is mm. I'm curious how Much I want to
give listeners but I imagine from the good place.
They at least know, some basic side this point but public
reason. Actually I want you to explain
in Greater detail what exactly is and the original position.
And so like the, you know, the 101 of Rawls, and then I can
explain what hurt my brain about it.
And one of the reasons why I left and then ways, your book
answers, some of my concerns. Would you be willing to do that
for us? Yeah, yeah.
Let me see how fast I can do it. So, this is a gigantic.
A question, Kevin I'm saying it is, but but I think I can do a
sequence of explanations. So the sort of standard sort of
social contract, liberalism's of like lat Rousseau and Kant fell
out of favor in the 19th century and favor of, you know, more
like communitarian and nationalist views and England to
utilitarian views, and to Marxism and socialism is of
various varieties, and this was even true to some degree.
Until the second world war, you did have kind of liberalism
socialism liberal Democratic, socialism that gained in power,
where it's libertarianism, Classical liberalism, contracted
greatly. But one of the things that
happen in philosophy is that people had kind of moved away
from making moral claims at all. Thinking that they were say,
just expressions of emotion, that any sensible philosophical
disputes were based on things that needed to be able to be,
you know, empirically verifiable.
So, political philosophy had fallen on Hard Times.
Even when did people did political philosophy, it was
done in a kind of British utilitarian vain.
So Along Comes John, Rawls starting and the 50s, he's
finishing up, his education, late 40s, and he wants to create
a systematic alternative to utilitarianism for a variety of
reasons. But one of which is just the
thinks that very simply that utilitarianism does not respect
what he called the separateness of persons.
So, he wants to develop a kind of, he wants to develop a more
General theory of social contract theory, but getting it
what he thinks is really important about the idea.
And what's really important about the idea is that Justice
is a kind of fairness. And it's not just a fairness to
people of different races or nationalities.
It's also a matter of fairness to people who have different
faiths and what he called conceptions of the good in
general. And so, how would you figure out
how to treat different perspectives, and different
people fairly? Well, one thing you could do is
you can ask what principles of Justice.
They would choose. If they didn't know those
divisive or potentially divisive features of themselves.
And so Rawls construct, assists idea of the original position
and the veil of ignorance and the original position, you have
a whole bunch of abstract people that are in some sense taken to
represent real people but in a much more complicated way than
people typically know. If they know anything about
roles and he says okay look we're going to make people Only
and more than that rational, and choosing not just means, but
also to some degree choosing ends, but to make sure that
their choice is fair and reasonable, we're going to deny
them factors. That would bias them that are,
as he said irrelevant from a moral point of view and he
thought not just our race or nationality or whatever was
irrelevant from a moral point of view.
But so is our conception of the good.
And so we shouldn't know those factors or the parties to the
original position. Shouldn't know those factors
when they're trying to figure out what Justice.
Is the result would be a theory of justice that comported with
our ordinary moral intuitions about Justice, it would be
non-utilitarian and character that ultimately would Justify
both extensive protection for basic Liberties, but also equal
opportunities and lots of respects and that all social and
economic inequality should be organized to maximize,
additional least Advantage. So it's a very very left-leaning
liberalism that says that? Very hard to justify inequality.
You has to benefit everyone and the least advantage to the
maximum extent. Can I jump in here?
Kevin yep. Yep.
So that's that's rolls up to 1971.
Oh yeah. That's the that's the bits that
we can start sort of start with. Yeah I think that's a great
place to start to in my understanding of Rawls and
surely you know much much more than I do is that he was pretty
conservative with how he thought people would choose within the
original position. He thought if you didn't know
which person you it'd be in society, you would choose
egalitarian distribution. You wouldn't want there to be a
lot of rich people, out of poor people because you could be one
of the poor ones. But a lot of what came out of
Arizona and sort of what is deemed post rawlsian.
Was that actually rational people in the original position
could choose less equal outcomes?
People can disagree about the like what the outcome should be
coming out of the original position.
And that idea really mess with my head because it meant that
there is multiple, right? Answers or maybe even no, right,
answer to the original position in which case where do you go
from? There, is that as I understand
scrapped, yeah, actually, that's a very nice way of putting it.
So, one of the points that Jerri gasps made, it was my advisor.
And you took a course with. And I think you did take a
course with them. Right?
I did him and David Schmitz thought it together.
Yeah. And one of the themes that he
was stressing been and it's still, it's still a theme of his
work. Has his last book will come out
in July, they were getting through.
Ooh. And one of the things that he
says, is that social contract reasoning and itself is
inherently indeterminate. And the same thing is true of
all contracts, here in theories of Justice, including roles has
and that Rawls actually understood this early on in his
papers in the 50s. But he tried to resist it.
In a theory of Justice, by building in a whole bunch of
controversial assumptions than, of the choice scenario.
Stuff that, you know, many of his critics not only disagree
with, but Mock and sometimes he would say stuff like, Now if we
get the wrong answer, that's counterintuitive out of the
original position, we should just change the original
position. So it's like he was trying to
arrive at his own particular answer by rigging the system,
such as being for critics. It's such a chastity.
It is bait. Yes.
And so one of the things Yuri said was well actually look
there's going to be reasonable disagreement, not just about
like you know, what's good? And so there's going to be
reasonable disagreement about Justice.
And so people are going to be able to Have different
conceptions of Justice rank conceptions of Justice
differently. And so the original position,
reasoning will be what Jerry called indeterminate and
determined Now Jerry still kind of like social contract theory
and so a big thing of his work was how do we resolve
indeterminacy after we realized that impartial moral reasoning,
you know isn't going to tell us what Justice requires and in his
own work? What he does is he keeps this
idea conti and malls and idea. Of morality and Justice being
about some kind of impartial moral reasoning, reciprocal,
moral reasoning, but trying to find ways that real social
processes and social interactions could lead us to
coordinate on one of those options that would be
acceptable. So you try to delineate the set
of potential agreement points and then you say okay well how
do social institutions and social Evolution lead us to
arrive to actually practicing one of those agreements.
Eight points. And that's how I started to
introduce Hayek and Hume into the thought of Kant.
And Rawls by saying look, you know, a big part of justice is
how we conquer ties, the thing, how we bring it to Earth how we
institutionalize it, because the original position will help us
something like it will help us to reason impartially, but it
doesn't get us to a real actual morality that can is Ross's
resolve are competing claims. So, yeah, that was one.
Way that in the later project of political liberalism broke Noun.
So, one of the things that rolls realize is in the interim
between a theory of justice and then his other big book,
political liberalism is that he had assumed.
So one of the things we always wanted to argue is not just that
you come up with Justice but that Justice should structure a
well or it's what he calls, a relative society.
And the reason he cared about this is because it wasn't enough
for justice to just be Justice to be Justice, it had to also be
able to organize Society in a way that would be compatible
with people. Good, good, their own personal
good. And, and he also wanted to show
that Justice would be self-stabilizing like that.
If you you established it, it would it would keep itself in
effect. Do you mean something like in
contradistinction to something like let Justice rain though?
The heavens fall, that's not a viable option for right?
No, so his con thien ism is consequence sensitive.
So Rawls developed this idea of a well-ordered society and the
last third of theory of Justice which people don't look at but
in it, he assumed that people would agree.
Really about a great deal of what was good.
And he later comes to be dissatisfied with that
assumption that he thinks that, even in that model, people are
going to come to disagree about what's good.
And so the whole Theory had to be recast because people would
have to agree to his theory of Justice.
What he called, Justice is fairness from different
perspectives, about the good and so he said, okay, well look, I
mean, people are going to disagree about the good but
maybe they can still agree on on Justice.
This creates this problem which is that if we agree on Justice
from different perspectives, it's not going to be obvious to
each other, whether we've all endorsed it.
And we're going to need some public way to communicate that
to each other. And so, in order to stabilize a
diverse Society with different perspectives, on the good
different religions and to coordinate people around Justice
in the way roles wanted, you had to be able and be willing and
prepared to exchange what he called public reasons.
And these are reasons that are Some sense accessible or shared
and that would exclude and ultimately a quite subtle way,
not a ham-fisted way, religious reasons, or private reasons, or
reasons, for what he called, comprehensive doctrines.
So from this, he developed this idea of public reason, which
their doctrines of public reason earlier and political
philosophy, but he gave the term sort of currency.
And so, the thought was that the justifications for state power
and state action had to appeal to different perspectives and
that would only work. If you appeal to reasons that
were shared by those perspectives, in some sense.
So this is the way that public reason starts to impact the role
of religion in the Public Square because it says that we should
tend to keep religion out of it in various respects and that
created a gigantic controversy in the nadi's in this one
tonight and the 2000s and that's what I ended up.
Writing my dissertation on. Yeah, keeps philosophers
employed, it's great. Yeah, well, you know, it not
only that but it keeps people in religious studies political
Theory and constitutional law employed.
So it's a really big Kind of interdisciplinary.
Debates, pretty interesting. So the doctor of public reason
in Rawls kind of starts off that way but what really matters I
think for roles in the end is that principles of justice and
principles for organizing Society or Justified, to
multiple Regional perspectives. Now, another thing that took off
after you left, that really took off after you left what was
still going on when you were there.
When I was there was the idea of what we might call pluralism of
that Justice. Where, you know?
Yeah, people can I just disagree about the good, they can
disagree about Justice and so they can reasonably reject Rawls
has conception of justice. So if you want a society that
stable and will ordered you can no longer maintain that.
Rawls is theory of justice. Is the best way to do that.
Rawls admits this towards the end of his life and essentially,
here he's picking up on that theme where look reasonable
people can disagree about justice.
So, you know, we can't just insist on a procedure for
determining. What that is?
And Rawls kind of basically admits this.
In fact, in his letter to his editor, before the last edition
of political liberalism, he said that his theory of justice,
justice fairness now planes at best a small role and is his
broader. Thoughts on these topics, which
is a remarkable admission. So we get to a liberalism that
says, look, people aren't actually free and equals.
So we have to justify things to their diverse points of view,
and then there's and that it event says in a kind of
neutrality requirement. Cause you're not going to be
able to Fi I resume that takes a course of sidon something
controversial to the people who don't accept it, right?
So you end up with something kind of neutral, but one of the
interesting questions is, what is the status of capitalism in
under a, an order in an order of public reason.
So one place that Jerry Allison John Rawls disagreed about is
how large the state should be and how much should interfere
with markets? Where's Ross thought it should
interfere an enormous amount just a staggering amount and
watch more than the You know, people will make this obnoxious
remark that Rawls was trying to justify the Democratic party
platform of 1968. That's false.
He was much more left-wing than that.
Much more left wing. You know, but then Jerry's got a
kind of classical liberal View. And so that's another
interesting dispute among public reason, liberals, which is, you
know, how to regard markets, but Jerry thought they were
essential to any any free equal and mutually justifiable order.
Okay, I think you've given us super helpful Baseline for
understanding the rest of your book trust very might have
difficult conversations about climate change and Beyond.
But yeah, how exactly does liberalism work where we it
takes for, granted that it is legitimate for reasonable people
to disagree about things that are important to them?
How are we supposed to live together?
If we don't actually agree on a lot, I'm sure people feel that a
lot listening right now and the in America, the way the books,
the two books, trust books. I've done got Started was kind
of reflecting on the public reason project and particularly
Jerry's version of it, because one of the things that Jerry
says that Rawls does not make so clear, is that what one of the
things we really, really, really care about and Society?
Broadly isn't just social cooperation bear, social
cooperation, but it being able to have what Jerry called moral
relations between persons. Those included things like love
and friendship and trust. And so the thought was that you
No, in a free Society on. That's governed by the Norms of
Javed justification. It is easier to form and sustain
those moral relations. It's easier to have relations of
love and friendship across differences.
A liberal Society, you can make it connect.
You know, make an Interfaith marriage work, right?
You can be friends with people who have wildly different views
than you do. I mean, Jerry, and I disagreed
in terms of metaphysics about everything, but we still work
very well together and we're friends.
So the thought is that Liberal Society, affords people, the
opportunity to form more relations in a stable way, with
a very wide range of people. And that one of the things that
just about anyone says really matters in life is close
successful personal relationships.
So I got to thinking, well, you know, love and friendship or
like incredibly important, but they're not going to be the
basis for an entire social order because we can't sort of have
intimate relations of love and friendship with everybody.
Hey, have a Civic friendship but Jerry, I kind of developed
theories of love and friendship and some His very early work,
but you have a theory of trust. And so, my kind of thought was,
well, you know, maybe if we disagree about Justice, when we
disagree about the good, the most intimate social relation,
we can expect to have with one. Another is just to be able to
trust each other to generally do what we think to be the right
thing. So there's there's a core of
goodness and Justice that we can agree to but almost everything
else is going to be controversial.
And so the question is, can we land on a system of norms that
allows a diverse people to? See each other when we follow
them. So my thought was well, look
Norms that can be justified to each person's perspective,
informal and formal institutions.
Are those that will all have reason from our own perspective
to follow. And so, when we see one another
does, knowing our differences following the same rules, we
think. Okay, now we can count on them,
we can trust them. And they're doing this out of
some, kind of concern or respect for our well-being or something
like that. So I develop in the book must
politics be War. The purely philosophical
predecessor to this very empirical I'll book an account
or trust for the right reasons arguing that a liberal societies
unique and being able to provide a rational basis.
For trust, for people with diverse perspectives.
Any society, our state that takes sides was going to
engender reasonable distrust between those and control.
And those who are controlled between a hegemon in the
suppressed group because they don't accept each other's
values. So, the suppress group will
disagree, you know, would disagree with the hegemon.
Will be quote untrustworthy, with respect to those values
when they can get away with it. And the subverted group won't
trust the hegemon. Because again, there's just
you're not following the kind of common Norms, freely from their
own perspective, they're imposing alien values.
So then I thought, okay, well It's really needs to be two
books because there's two questions.
One is can a liberal Society in general sustained trust in
principle so that you could even have a stable level order,
right? But then there's like the
imminently practical question which is that can liberal
institutions create real trust in a reasonably.
Clearly just way from where we are and the aim of this book was
to synthesize the empirical Just literature's in political
science and economics with the public reason tradition.
So that we can actually bring social science to bear on trying
to figure out when our institutions are Justified.
So a very kind of gaussian theme of very kind of theme within the
new movement, of philosophy, politics, economics, what I'm
trying to contribute as the integration of the study of
trust, into liberal, political thought.
And so what this book does, is it tries to argue that liberal
institutions can create real trust in the real world and in
fact, do and happen. So I run through a lot of the
trust literature and I look at the institutions that I think
can help to establish trust even under highly polarized
conditions. So in essence, what I'm saying,
is the liberal order. If we rely on liberal
institutions in the policy tools within liberal Democratic
capitalism that we can restore trust and we can reduce
polymerization. There are a lot of complications
though when this comes to policy making and I was just talking
with someone. Last night about whether a
public reason, how public reason view would approach carbon tax
or carbon emission restrictions its complex.
I think you can publicly justify them but it's sort of it's sort
of complicated because there's so much we don't know about.
I mean I can run through it for you because I know you'll be
interested obviously with the name of the podcast but
different people model the world differently economically and
socially. And they so they develop
different models. And they have different
predictions for outcomes. And this makes it difficult to
publicly justify. Because people think the same
policy will have really different effects and they have
models of complex systems that are decent.
But that usually don't have a lot of predictive power because
we're dealing with macro-level complexity and it's just
extremely hard to model and predict such systems.
Sometimes it's impossible and in climate change and you might
just say, well, you know, people disagree about how bad, you
know, the warming is, and what the consequences will be.
But I think there's a pretty compelling argument that all
perspectives, should be worried about it, particularly
libertarian. Perspectives because a lot of
climate change is going to violate a lot of property rights
or lead to a lot of property rights violations, like Wars and
conflicts now, the reasonable libertarian position is, I think
the kind of Matt Ridley, I think Libertarians should basically be
with a natural scientists are, but if you wanted to get on the
outer bounds, you'd be a mooc warmer like, Matt Ridley and
think that the we are causing some climate change through
human activity, but it's going to remain in a 2 degree Celsius.
Here's the problem with that argument suppose there's an 80%
chance that it's true suppose there's a 10% chance.
We go over four degrees Celsius and warming.
That's going to be a catastrophe.
We have no idea how bad it's going to be.
Even if we see the clouds, we're going to have massive ocean
acidification thinning of permafrost methane, you know,
explosions, massive extinctions of animals, people still put a
b. So the thought is that it's,
there's a massive risk aversion argument.
For restricting carbon plus Libertarians tend to be very
optimistic about Innovations on the market.
So they're anticipated costs for carbon taxes.
And carbon emissions, take that into account, it might be the
case that we're able to innovate around it.
Not unlike we did with CFCs, right?
So, you know, we were able to bring that problem under a lot
of control. Now reducing carbon emissions is
going to be tough but you know, suppose we tell Exxon hey we're
going to replace, you know your corporate tax rate with a carbon
tax. Acts and the less carbon you
omit the last actual pay and get all your scientists on it.
Because, you know, if you figure out how to get to zero carbon,
you'll never pay taxes again or something you won't pay taxes
for a generation or something like that.
Just give them the dang incentive to figure out how to
do it and I think that can clearly be publicly Justified
because carbon emissions are a negative externality.
Their threats to property rights, a Libertarian
perspective. Every other perspective is open
to carbon emission controls in principle, there may be some
cost of growth but the If we go over 4 degrees Celsius, they're
going to be big cost to growth because, you know, we could even
have really, massive death, heat waves more natural disasters.
The destruction of a lot of, you know, being able to have viable
sea life that can survive in areas where people were too
reliant upon. So basically, you know, kind of
where I am is arguing that you can publicly justify
restrictions on carbon emissions, you can justify to
multiple perspectives on the ground of avoiding man.
Sieve risk. So even if it's low probability
so maybe the libertarian can say well 10% chance we go over 4 °C
nightmarishly bad if we do that, right?
So I think that's going to be sufficient reason to be able to
justify it even to libertarian perspective.
So there's my public reason argument for carbon emissions
restrictions. Well you back let a little bit
but I'm glad you did because I wasn't sure we were going to
make it to climate change and sometimes this No runs the risk
of not, sometimes I abused the name of the show a little bit.
But okay, I do want to talk about this climate stuff before
it gets too far away. I still want to ask foundational
questions about liberalism. Yeah.
Is it actually neutral for instance?
I think of like marxian Scholars, making the claim that
liberalism presupposes neutrality but it's smuggles in
things like property rights that are not actually neutral.
This is a way of protecting the bourgeoisie.
It's a society dominated by moneyed interests.
Isn't neutral. This Is A Lie.
This is sort of an anyone who doesn't believe it is a victim
of false consciousness. That's maybe a classical Mark,
seen interpretation of liberalism.
What do you say to something like that?
Well, I mean, the difficulty that marks have is the status of
moral theory and their view. So if you're really classical
Marxist, you're going to have to be a kind of moral relativist,
animal, constructivist and even maybe in the mall nihilist.
So when you push marxists to actually give more foundations
of their view, they Oftentimes, we'll go perfectionist.
So the effectively say, well, socialism is about promoting
human well-being, but then you can just ask the question.
Well, Marxist, you're all about equality.
So what do you do when people disagree about well-being?
And then, they could say one or two things if they say, well,
we're going to go ahead, then you can say, well, that's some
dominating others, even by your own lights, but if they say no,
then we got the liberal hook in them and can bring them over.
And so, then the question is, well, what about, you know, if
you decide that you're not just Going to take a sectarian stand
for one Doctrine. Can you be completely neutral
between views? No.
Liberals ever said, we can be
completely neutral. In fact, it's not even clearly
coherent and I know a lot of critics of liberalism says yeah
you came actually neutral so it's an incoherent ideal.
That is wrong Critics on the right, like to make this claim
to, it's not, that's correct. And it is an exaggeration of a
Liberal site. When I say that I'm a
neutralist, I see that. I'm a contextual neutralist.
So, what you do is you look at the series of view, Is that you
think a respectable exercises of practical, theoretical,
rationality, right? People would kind of part of a
tradition of thought. They're thinking the spoon and
honest way, they're living by the norms and values of their
communities or groups. And the idea is you try to find
institutions that are neutral between those groups.
Not that are neutral in every sense of the term, but they can
be justified to each perspective but that's going to vary based
on the society. So you know what public
justification is going to look like in a society, where
everyone's a socialist is one thing more.
Everyone's the Libertarians going to be the other.
However, people are not going to agree about whether
libertarianism or socialism is true.
I'm sorry, Libertarians, listening.
I'm sorry, socialist listening, you're never going to convince
everybody. You will probably never convince
a majority Marxist came to power through a North Korean revolt
and Rule and for an oppression and Libertarians have never come
to power at all in any significant way but in the
modern era, maybe Gladstone was like kind of libertarian or
something. So, So if we're never going to
agree about the good and we're about, you know, the Divinity of
Christ, whom we're never going to disagree, about agree about
natural property rights. We're never going to agree
about, you know, this class based analysis is a society,
whether history is a history of class struggle or something like
that. How do we resolve our
differences? Well, why do I to resolve?
Our differences is to have Democratic choice, we just get
together and we vote. But the problem here is that
it's pretty clear that sometimes the votes go wrong and we do
have Some kind of standard for saying, when we got the vote
wrong, and the mother problem is just incredibly difficult for
Democratic deliberation, to lead to agreement.
And so, to find a way to kind of govern our Collective lives so
that we are respecting, our freedom and equality, and the
concerns of public justification.
So, one of the arguments Jerry makes is that the way that we
actually resolve a lot of insuperable collective disputes
is to devolve disputes to the individual.
And group level to have way called jurisdictional rights.
So instead of, you know, collectively deciding on how
we're all going to live in our houses, you know, just having
one big government on housing complex right fighting over what
the rules are whether we can smoke or not or what kind of
carpet we can have right? We decentralize those choices,
right? And the key to decentralization
and to people being able to reconcile with their different
uses of their partition of social space, is the Private
property and exchange. So the rationale for democracy
and the rationale for private property are basically the same,
which is that there are ways of reconciling people with
different perspectives, sometimes we have to make
Collective decisions, sometimes we can make our own decisions
and so Democratic capitalism is actually kind of neutral because
it's the way of resolving disputes between those who
disagree about the good, and who disagree about Justice, it's on
maximally neutral, nothing is, but that's fine because that
wasn't the point. Aunt, what do we do when we do
disagree, though? I imagined idea that we should
decentralize and allow a group like white nationalist to have
their own private Idaho, just like the Gus Van Sant movie.
I guess that works. Is that allowed?
Should we allow something like that?
Or how should we disagree in a productive way?
Another thing that's important is that even if certain abstract
rights are publicly Justified, like say freedom of speech, the
details of how those apply are going to be controversial.
And so that's why many We have to use democracy, you know, or
the Judiciary to resolve disputes about rights and that's
how those institutions get publicly publicly Justified is
that we have reasonable conflicting interpretations of
our basic rights and so those have to be resolved through some
kind of collective decision procedure.
There's also the option of using federalism just to allow people
polities to very, although Federalism is very very very
under discussed in the public reason, literature.
Hell Even I had to cut that chapter out of my book, boy,
that I'm going to talk about it. I know you have a lot in there
about how like, I wish I could, but there's just not enough
data. It's something like this, right.
That's right. That's right.
So that's kind of the story. I mean I know there's a number
of different steps but I think they connect, we can publicly
justify abstract rights when we're aware that we disagree
about Justice in the good because we want to be able to
trust each other anyway because the benefits of social trust are
staggering and the result is That some institutions that
people don't think our ideal even ideally just but ones that
they can live with ones that they can live with.
That's what's key. I think.
So you're thinking of that the type of federalism I described
would not be publicly Justified and we shouldn't accept it.
Yeah. I mean if we think that these
centralization is going to lead to a majority violating the
human rights, the basic human rights of the minority, then
that's a reason against Ization. So, like one of my views is
this? Like we should have way more
states rights, but racial policy should be Federal.
So the big worry in decentralisation is it a lot of
the Southern States in particular?
We'll just go back to racist Moore's very quickly.
But that doesn't mean we can't decentralized drug policy,
doesn't mean we can't be centralized health.
Insurance policy doesn't mean we can't decentralize education
which we already do to a large extent.
It just means that when it comes to racial Equity, maybe the feds
have to step in. And, you know, securing voting
rights and those kinds of things.
So, you know, that's what I would say in the United States,
you know, we do have a systemic racism problem.
It is hard to know exactly how much it is because these are
very difficult questions measures or controversial.
But, you know, if we're worried about bigotry and a small part
and we think that the big part can correct the bigotry in the
small part. Then, you know, you can keep
those things centralized. And I think in the way that the
United Knighted states works is that the federal government
tends to be less bigoted than the state governments?
It might be the reverse, right? I mean, it potentially and then
which case, then we would want a decentralized to protect racial
minorities, but the circumstances in the United
States, who decides to wear that just hasn't historically been
the case. So, and indeed black Americans
trust the federal government more than they trust.
Most people 17 percent of black Americans say, most people can
be trusted as opposed to 46 percent of whites.
Wow, that's that's quite a statistic.
It's very, very sad and it's something I'm going to we're
going to be studying empirically because it's both to some extent
Justified. But it's also very very harmful
because when you were low trust, there's a lot of opportunities
you miss. So, there's is a kind of what in
philosophy. We call epistemic Injustice,
against the black community, because there are grounds for
distrust, but the distrust harms them in a way that's unjust.
So, it's a double blind. Yeah.
So for listeners, we've been pretty high falutin here.
Talking, you know, graduate-level philosophy,
Rawls. And in some degree of detail.
If they care about rebuilding trust, what are some avenues
that you think might be productive?
Besides the generic stuff of trying to allow for more freedom
of Association to have stable protections for markets and lots
of areas of making sure that the welfare state is efficient and
as addressing very deep set. Need trying to preserve the
Integrity of the election process, reducing corruption,
the legal system particular in the police.
So that's added, you know, a fairly High restricting kind of
rent seeking and stuff at the federal level.
But those are very high level. So maybe we could talk about.
I'll talk about some more specific stuff.
One of the things I'm banging on about a lot is housing reform of
making housing cheaper to build primarily through markets, but
there are some ways, maybe housing doctors could be used
for that. Well, but really ending a lot of
the not in my backyard zoning. That makes them possible people
to live in cities. Here's why a lot of trust in
government is based on two different assessments, how much
economic inequality there is because a lot of people on the
left, think that's just an itself, a sign of unfairness.
So do some on the right but also economic growth, people think
it's one of the functions of government to make sure that
they're economically prosperous and increasingly.
So so you want more broad-based growth.
But housing restrictions are really, really bad.
For growth in inequality one they for growth, they hold back
the division of labor because workers can't move into cities
and further extend the division of labor and cities, you know, a
lesson we've known since Adam Smith at least but it's also the
case, that it hurts economic equality because rich people,
essentially redistribute upward by controlling land and who can
build, we're probably, you know, Matt broglie estimated in
response the Pekingese top that about two-thirds of the
increase, inequality in the United States which due to real
estate, not due to income. So if If we lower the price of
housing, we had zoning reform, real estate zoning reform.
We can increase growth and increasing economic equality at
the same time. That's very hard to do, but it's
something that I think would it. Strengthen trust in institutions
from multiple perspectives, do people feel like they can't get
a foot on the ladder because of this.
And then there's, that's right support that their government is
not being responsible. And I even think that kids often
times at can't prove this yet that kids feel like their
parents. Raishin hasn't done their job by
leaving them with huge amounts of debts and expenses.
So I think one source of distrust is I think that
Millennials distrust Boomers. Yeah, there's a lot of that
going around. Yeah.
Oh so many Express attacks in the culture.
I mean it is from a place of resentment and mistrust in the
sense that the Boomers lived it up and ate the seed corn.
Yeah. Do you think the more basic
quotidian, join the Elks Lodge, go to your neighborhood church,
know your neighbors names and their kids names stuff like that
helps to yeah, I do particularly passing on your children.
So, you know, I like to think of this analogy, you know, the
image of someone, you know, coming to talk to a parent and
the kids kind of hiding behind them because they're shy and not
sure how to react that happens in my think that sometimes.
Yeah, yeah. So, you know, It happens to my
three kids, you know, they, someone new comes in the house
and they hide and, you know, until they see how we interact
and they gradually come out and warm up.
So kids learn to trust from how their parents interact with
strangers. Is it going Theory?
And if you're interacting with strangers, a lot and you're
interacting with people, they don't necessarily know a lot
like in an association like a church or a lodge or something
like that, and you're particularly doing say service
work through a church or you're interacting with the poor and
things like that, that can be trust-building.
Kids and that can over time race trust.
So the practice of freedom of Association, not just the bare
having of it, but the exercise of that, right, particularly
with institutions that are integrated and networked in the
community can build social cost. I think it also builds trust in
government, does people learn to interact with it and learn to
affect it for the good? So, you know, I think that is
very, very important. I think that probably has a
pretty big effect on kids. It doesn't look like it has an
effect on the adults, but Social trust, doesn't seem to be that
affected by anything among adults because social trust
attitudes tend to be things that seem to be fixed in early
adulthood and childhood. I know you have to run here
pretty soon. I'm wondering if you could take
the temperature of the country. Do you think there's good
reasons to hope for increase trust or you still pretty Grim?
I'm grim and hopeful so I'm Graham in the sense that I think
trust is going to remain pretty low.
I'm hopeful and then I think Biden is going to slow its
decline. Bye.
Or maybe pause it restoring. It's going to take a long time.
Millennials are extremely distrusting.
So we're going to have to build circumstances where the Next
Generation can become more trusting because falling trust
is like a cohort effect, like the you know the silent
generation, you know, it's more trusting the Boomers she's more
trusting than genetics, who's more trusting than Millennials
and those attitudes from the lock-in and adulthood.
So we have to create a more trusting younger generation and
I'm not quite sure how we're going to do that, so that's
difficult. Her, if there's less manifest
corruption and people who are powerful getting away with a lot
of garbage that will help trust in the system.
So, one of the things I'm hoping will happen, is it?
I think that even though people who were fans of trump, we need
to punish powerful officials for basic more violations.
They have to punish your leads for violations.
So that the sense is that everyone's following the basic
Norms because I believe stop following the Norms.
They rode the norms, and that makes trust harder, because then
it's well, People aren't following the Norms that exist.
So why should I can't count on? So, one thing I think that's
going to be important. In the immediate term is simply
punishing. Those who violate basic Norms to
reinforce those Norms. So, those Norms are the basis
for people learning to trust. Each other is the powerful can
just do whatever they want. I think it's a problem for trust
because it arose, the basis of trust, which is norm compliance.
Okay. Tentative nuanced answer.
But it really Justified if you wanted to steer someone to your
work and to follow up. I think this this new book is
where you would want them to go. Yes, yes, that's right.
That's right, I've written it so that it can be read by non
philosophers so the more philosophical stuff there's an
asterisk next to those sections. So I think a lot of people you
know any I think anyone with a college degree can get through
it pretty easily. If you're you know graduate I'm
at it's not hard at all. So I think anyone can benefit
from it. I would say everyone could
benefit. I think a lot from I worked
really hard on the second chapter, which is an overview of
thousands of papers in the trust literature.
Not all of which I've read, but I've read meta-analyses, and
different areas. I'm very proud of that chapter.
I think people would like to be able to just see that chapters
just pretty big, but it's a great reference.
The beginning of the book, I talk a lot about trust and
polarization in the epilogue, I talk.
About how to restore trust. There's discussions of trust in
institutions throughout, so it's not just a work of philosophy.
It's also a work of political science and economics.
So I think a lot of different perspectives could be
interested. I think so too.
It's amazing literature review. There's a, the bibliography
here, the works cited, massive useful.
If you care about this topic, if you made it this far, you
probably do it would help you, it would sit well in your
library and thanks for being here.
Kevin. Well, thanks so much for having
me. It was, it was a lot of fun.
We got a little bit of climate change and I'm really happy.
You just went for it. And maybe we should talk more
about it in the future. There's a lot more to do and if
we don't have trust I don't think action on climate.
Change is really going to work very well.
That's right, that's right. But thank you so much for
listening. If you like the show, please
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