1 00:00:04,600 --> 00:00:06,100 Welcome to the Wynn. See a podcast. 2 00:00:06,100 --> 00:00:08,800 This is Jack. Today, we have a special treat 3 00:00:08,800 --> 00:00:11,000 from The Irregular Warfare podcast. 4 00:00:11,200 --> 00:00:15,000 The episode is called the Columbia plan, then Jeb and call 5 00:00:15,000 --> 00:00:17,300 at well interview. Dr. David Spencer from the 6 00:00:17,308 --> 00:00:20,200 National Defense University and Alberta Jose. 7 00:00:20,200 --> 00:00:23,700 Maria Ferraro the former commander of the military forces 8 00:00:23,700 --> 00:00:27,100 of Colombia a discuss, how the u.s. and Colombia work together 9 00:00:27,100 --> 00:00:29,900 to end the Insurgency and bring stability to the region. 10 00:00:30,000 --> 00:00:31,900 Ian. It's a really terrific episode. 11 00:00:31,900 --> 00:00:34,700 I think you're going to like it. So enjoy. 12 00:00:41,000 --> 00:00:45,800 At the very beginning because of force protection measures most 13 00:00:45,800 --> 00:00:49,800 of the Americans, they could only be and very safe locations 14 00:00:49,900 --> 00:00:53,900 and they couldn't really be in forward locations in a more 15 00:00:53,900 --> 00:00:58,500 difficult environment. But after a couple of years, the 16 00:00:58,500 --> 00:01:00,600 US government allowed them to go there. 17 00:01:00,600 --> 00:01:05,500 And in my opinion that really transform the relationship. 18 00:01:05,600 --> 00:01:09,600 Cuz now the picture is were owned by the two sides. 19 00:01:09,800 --> 00:01:14,400 Any people kill or injure in action, we the two sides were 20 00:01:14,400 --> 00:01:20,900 suffering. So I think what really makes a 21 00:01:20,900 --> 00:01:23,700 difference is when you have a partner that is really 22 00:01:23,700 --> 00:01:27,100 determined to win their own War, then the United States and come 23 00:01:27,100 --> 00:01:30,900 in and we can help them or enhance their ability to win 24 00:01:30,900 --> 00:01:33,300 their own. And I think that's fundamental 25 00:01:33,700 --> 00:01:36,300 and I think it's often missed when we discuss you know, 26 00:01:36,300 --> 00:01:38,300 Insurgency and irregular warfare. 27 00:01:41,500 --> 00:01:45,100 Welcome to episode 54 of the irregular warfare podcast. 28 00:01:45,300 --> 00:01:47,300 I am Kyle at well and I am your host today. 29 00:01:47,300 --> 00:01:50,500 Along with Ben. Jeb, today's episode is on the 30 00:01:50,500 --> 00:01:53,800 topic of plan Colombia which was a United States initiative to 31 00:01:53,800 --> 00:01:56,600 assist the Colombian government in its fight against drug 32 00:01:56,600 --> 00:01:59,200 cartels. And insurgents plan Colombia has 33 00:01:59,200 --> 00:02:02,100 been described as a model of successful counterinsurgency at 34 00:02:02,100 --> 00:02:03,600 a time when large Footprints in Iraq. 35 00:02:03,600 --> 00:02:07,300 And Afghanistan have had mixed results, our guests reflect on 36 00:02:07,300 --> 00:02:09,900 their extensive first-hand, experience to outline, the key 37 00:02:09,900 --> 00:02:13,200 components of plan Colombia, Mia and more broadly to discuss its 38 00:02:13,200 --> 00:02:16,500 successes and shortcomings. As a model for counterinsurgency 39 00:02:16,500 --> 00:02:20,400 in the future, Alberto Jose Mejia, Pharaoh served as the 40 00:02:20,400 --> 00:02:23,100 general commander of the military forces of Colombia, the 41 00:02:23,100 --> 00:02:25,000 senior military officer in the country. 42 00:02:25,300 --> 00:02:28,100 He also served as the commander of the Colombian Army and as the 43 00:02:28,100 --> 00:02:31,400 Colombian ambassador to Australia, General Mejia has 44 00:02:31,400 --> 00:02:34,000 worked closely with American forces throughout the duration 45 00:02:34,000 --> 00:02:36,900 of his career, and he provides a unique perspective on foreign 46 00:02:36,900 --> 00:02:40,000 internal defense and Military advising from the perspective of 47 00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:43,100 the supported country. Dr. David Spencer is a professor 48 00:02:43,100 --> 00:02:45,700 at the William James Perry Center for hemispheric defense 49 00:02:45,700 --> 00:02:47,900 studies at the National Defense University. 50 00:02:48,300 --> 00:02:51,000 He has worked for think tanks, and in government as a policy 51 00:02:51,000 --> 00:02:55,100 expert on South America, in 2016, he co-authored a great, 52 00:02:55,100 --> 00:02:58,900 perhaps Columbia conflict, and Divergence which Chronicles, the 53 00:02:58,900 --> 00:03:01,600 evolution of plan, Colombia, and serves as the basis. 54 00:03:01,700 --> 00:03:04,500 For today's conversation, you are listening to The Irregular 55 00:03:04,500 --> 00:03:06,500 Warfare podcast. Joint production of the 56 00:03:06,500 --> 00:03:09,200 Princeton empirical studies of conflict project and the Modern 57 00:03:09,200 --> 00:03:11,900 War Institute, at West Point, Dental, Dedicated to Bridging, 58 00:03:11,900 --> 00:03:14,400 the Gap between Scholars and practitioners to support the 59 00:03:14,400 --> 00:03:16,700 community of irregular warfare professionals. 60 00:03:17,100 --> 00:03:19,600 Here's our conversation with General Mejia and Professor 61 00:03:19,600 --> 00:03:25,800 Spencer, General Mejia. Dr. David Spencer. 62 00:03:25,800 --> 00:03:27,800 Welcome to The Irregular Warfare podcast. 63 00:03:27,800 --> 00:03:29,200 We're excited to have you here today. 64 00:03:29,900 --> 00:03:32,600 Thanks, it's going to be here. Thank you very much, Kyle. 65 00:03:32,700 --> 00:03:36,300 It's an honor to be here. So today we're going to discuss 66 00:03:36,300 --> 00:03:38,300 what lessons for the future of irregular. 67 00:03:38,300 --> 00:03:40,300 Warfare. We can take from plan Colombia. 68 00:03:40,700 --> 00:03:42,800 This is particularly relevant as plan. 69 00:03:42,800 --> 00:03:46,100 Colombia has generally been viewed as its put in your book 70 00:03:46,100 --> 00:03:50,500 David as a quote shining success story for both Columbia but also 71 00:03:50,500 --> 00:03:52,400 for how the u.s. can build partner capacity. 72 00:03:53,000 --> 00:03:56,300 And conduct foreign internal defense before we get into the 73 00:03:56,300 --> 00:03:59,000 meat of analyzing what work and did not work during plan 74 00:03:59,000 --> 00:04:01,800 Colombia, it'll be helpful to provide a quick overview of what 75 00:04:01,800 --> 00:04:04,500 plan Colombia was. And why it's a topic worth 76 00:04:04,500 --> 00:04:07,600 knowing about David. You've written extensively and 77 00:04:07,600 --> 00:04:11,200 lived plan Colombia, can you outline the very broad Strokes 78 00:04:11,200 --> 00:04:14,200 of, you know what it was to help frame the conversation? 79 00:04:15,200 --> 00:04:18,800 Plan Colombia was originally the dress Pastrana government 80 00:04:18,899 --> 00:04:23,700 strategy, to deal with both narcotics and gorillas under 81 00:04:23,700 --> 00:04:27,500 that plan, the United States had a solely counter-narcotics 82 00:04:27,500 --> 00:04:29,500 focus. In fact, we did a lot of things 83 00:04:29,500 --> 00:04:33,900 to separate our involvement in Colombia, in counter-narcotics 84 00:04:33,900 --> 00:04:37,300 from the war, against the farc and the other Insurgent groups, 85 00:04:37,900 --> 00:04:40,000 what time period is that we started focusing on kind of 86 00:04:40,000 --> 00:04:43,400 Narcotics, 1999, is when plan Colombia started. 87 00:04:43,500 --> 00:04:46,100 And I think some people Think the plan Colombia is kind of 88 00:04:46,108 --> 00:04:50,200 still going, but I would say 2016 when the peace agreement 89 00:04:50,200 --> 00:04:53,300 was signed with farc although you know residuals I think keep 90 00:04:53,300 --> 00:04:56,800 on going, it kind of started as a Counter Narcotics Focus even 91 00:04:56,800 --> 00:04:59,200 though there was this Insurgency going on in the background, 92 00:04:59,600 --> 00:05:02,700 correct. In fact, we were very determined 93 00:05:02,700 --> 00:05:06,300 not to get involved with the Insurgency right to focus on 94 00:05:06,300 --> 00:05:09,500 counter-narcotics and our justification for doing without. 95 00:05:09,500 --> 00:05:11,700 It was the, you know, the Cold War had ended. 96 00:05:11,700 --> 00:05:14,300 We were no longer in the business of counterinsurgency, 97 00:05:14,300 --> 00:05:18,500 obviously this Pre Iraq. And also we rationalized it by 98 00:05:18,500 --> 00:05:21,900 saying that we knew that farc was receiving, a lot of funding 99 00:05:21,900 --> 00:05:24,700 through narcotics and actually all of the enemies of the state 100 00:05:24,700 --> 00:05:26,400 and Columbia. We're getting a lot of money 101 00:05:26,400 --> 00:05:28,500 from counter-narcotics. And so we rationalize it by 102 00:05:28,500 --> 00:05:32,700 saying if we focus on doing counter-narcotics then this will 103 00:05:32,700 --> 00:05:36,700 contribute to Bringing General piece across the country and of 104 00:05:36,700 --> 00:05:39,300 course that evolved over time then by the end of plan 105 00:05:39,300 --> 00:05:42,700 Colombia, really was more of a whole-of-government approach to 106 00:05:42,700 --> 00:05:44,900 look at all of corn. Be has problems too. 107 00:05:45,000 --> 00:05:47,800 To include narcotics and insurgents and that's what it 108 00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:49,900 ended up being. And so most people usually when 109 00:05:49,900 --> 00:05:52,700 they think plan Colombia the think of what it ended up being 110 00:05:52,700 --> 00:05:55,900 and not what it started out as so if I understood correctly 111 00:05:55,900 --> 00:05:58,200 you're saying that plan Colombia started out as an effort to 112 00:05:58,200 --> 00:06:00,600 Counter Narcotics and then kind of morphed into more of a 113 00:06:00,600 --> 00:06:03,600 counterinsurgency fight which is fascinating in its own, right. 114 00:06:03,600 --> 00:06:05,800 But I was wondering if you could break it down a little further, 115 00:06:06,200 --> 00:06:09,100 did it involve sending a transferring military equipment 116 00:06:09,200 --> 00:06:12,200 or actually deploying US troops to trans curity forces and 117 00:06:12,200 --> 00:06:15,400 enhance the Colombian military Doctrine or It was some 118 00:06:15,400 --> 00:06:18,500 combination of, you know, cross-section of approaches, 119 00:06:19,100 --> 00:06:23,500 these comprehensive plan. It was really a mix of different 120 00:06:23,500 --> 00:06:27,500 approaches different strategies. It did have an economic 121 00:06:27,500 --> 00:06:30,700 approach, a fiscal and financial strategy. 122 00:06:31,000 --> 00:06:36,100 Also it intended to support the peace process approach. 123 00:06:36,200 --> 00:06:39,700 But at the same time, it really had a big impact over the 124 00:06:39,700 --> 00:06:43,300 military force and the National Police restructuring, our forces 125 00:06:43,300 --> 00:06:46,100 and also help it anymore. Modernization programs. 126 00:06:46,400 --> 00:06:49,600 One piece that it was very, very important was the judicial 127 00:06:49,600 --> 00:06:53,300 piece, which was very, very strong on human rights. 128 00:06:53,600 --> 00:06:57,700 Of course, content Architects, alternative development, which 129 00:06:57,700 --> 00:07:02,900 in my view is still one of the most difficult pieces of content 130 00:07:02,900 --> 00:07:05,100 narcotics. And we're still struggling are 131 00:07:05,100 --> 00:07:09,200 not being very successful in trying to replace illegal crops 132 00:07:09,200 --> 00:07:14,800 by legal agriculture, also strong social strategy. 133 00:07:15,400 --> 00:07:21,900 Which in my view, brought our basic Civic action Doctrine into 134 00:07:21,900 --> 00:07:25,300 a higher level, what we call integral action, which is very 135 00:07:25,300 --> 00:07:29,500 important and finally human development strategy, which also 136 00:07:29,500 --> 00:07:32,100 tended to help, education, and health. 137 00:07:32,400 --> 00:07:36,800 And finally, the tenth piece of these comprehensive approach is 138 00:07:36,900 --> 00:07:39,900 international strategy, Columbia, try to reach other 139 00:07:39,900 --> 00:07:43,400 partners in Europe, other countries in the region to help. 140 00:07:43,800 --> 00:07:48,000 But at the very end, We were left with our greatest and only 141 00:07:48,000 --> 00:07:52,900 Ally in these, the US. So overall, the plan was 142 00:07:52,900 --> 00:07:55,700 supposed to be a 7.5 billion dollar plan. 143 00:07:55,700 --> 00:07:57,100 I think over three or five years. 144 00:07:57,100 --> 00:07:59,000 I can't remember the exact number of years. 145 00:07:59,500 --> 00:08:03,200 And the only part of that plan that got fully funded, was the 146 00:08:03,200 --> 00:08:06,200 United States part was focused on counter-narcotics. 147 00:08:06,400 --> 00:08:09,600 But I think one of the most important elements of that plan, 148 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:13,800 was the helicopter program we put in, I think about 900 149 00:08:13,800 --> 00:08:17,500 million dollars worth of hardware, and then another 200 150 00:08:17,500 --> 00:08:20,700 million worth of other things to support the air component. 151 00:08:21,000 --> 00:08:23,800 And the reason that's important is all of that air power was 152 00:08:23,800 --> 00:08:27,200 designed to go after narcotics, but it ended up being a very 153 00:08:27,200 --> 00:08:29,800 important plank. Once the plan was expanded 154 00:08:29,800 --> 00:08:33,900 Beyond counter-narcotics to a more holistic counterinsurgency 155 00:08:33,900 --> 00:08:36,600 and National development type of program. 156 00:08:36,900 --> 00:08:40,299 So yes, the plan was holistic, it was ambitious, but in the end 157 00:08:40,299 --> 00:08:43,100 plan Colombia, least the initial plan under President under this 158 00:08:43,100 --> 00:08:46,900 plus Donna didn't get off the ground in the comprehensive way 159 00:08:46,900 --> 00:08:51,300 that generally he just described and that came later Or that came 160 00:08:51,300 --> 00:08:54,900 later under prison president. When he, he was a mommy? 161 00:08:54,900 --> 00:08:56,700 No. Such difficulties for the 162 00:08:56,700 --> 00:08:59,800 country. Let's go back a little bit to 163 00:08:59,800 --> 00:09:02,600 the whole region. Having a static look at what was 164 00:09:02,600 --> 00:09:07,700 happening after the railing. What went down most institutions 165 00:09:07,800 --> 00:09:12,200 in Latin America disappear and the only Insurgency that 166 00:09:12,200 --> 00:09:17,200 continues to present a challenge against democracy was farc and 167 00:09:17,200 --> 00:09:22,500 Columbia near Lane especially and perhaps all Because of the 168 00:09:22,500 --> 00:09:25,900 economic support and financial support of narco-trafficking. 169 00:09:26,300 --> 00:09:29,700 So it was a big challenge for the US are the production 170 00:09:29,700 --> 00:09:32,500 narcotics was increasing because of these. 171 00:09:32,900 --> 00:09:36,800 And, of course, you can imagine the impact of this production. 172 00:09:36,800 --> 00:09:39,900 In Central America, the Caribbean Venezuela, and of 173 00:09:39,900 --> 00:09:43,600 course, the u.s. So South come in my view in my 174 00:09:43,600 --> 00:09:49,000 military perspective. Play a vital role in reading. 175 00:09:49,000 --> 00:09:52,100 This is static environment. Aunt and the Colombian 176 00:09:52,100 --> 00:09:56,700 relationship with Socom is really, really very tight. 177 00:09:57,200 --> 00:10:00,800 Of course, they are not part of our military organizations, but 178 00:10:01,000 --> 00:10:05,400 this partnership, it goes from planning processes from 179 00:10:05,400 --> 00:10:09,700 exchanges from constant exchange of intelligence, and almond 180 00:10:09,700 --> 00:10:13,100 other aspects. So, these relationship between 181 00:10:13,100 --> 00:10:16,700 South command, the Colombian military helps in a way to, to 182 00:10:16,700 --> 00:10:19,700 have a better understanding of the problem and politically 183 00:10:19,700 --> 00:10:23,100 speaking. Pastrana a Henry Way the two of 184 00:10:23,100 --> 00:10:26,000 them they were very close to the US government. 185 00:10:26,300 --> 00:10:30,800 The two of them have a strong tights with very important 186 00:10:30,800 --> 00:10:33,000 senators and politicians in the US. 187 00:10:33,400 --> 00:10:39,500 So the whole environment in my view was you know perfectly 188 00:10:39,500 --> 00:10:43,100 organized to serve these comprehensive study. 189 00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:46,000 Don't forget David. One thing that you mentioned in 190 00:10:46,000 --> 00:10:49,900 your papers is Colombia also invested three billion dollars 191 00:10:50,000 --> 00:10:52,900 of his own body. Budget in support of all these 192 00:10:52,900 --> 00:10:55,700 strategies. There are two things that I 193 00:10:55,700 --> 00:10:58,500 think are fundamental to understanding Columbia. 194 00:10:58,700 --> 00:11:02,300 Number one, this is really kind of the first major Insurgency in 195 00:11:02,300 --> 00:11:04,600 Latin America, maybe in the world as well. 196 00:11:04,900 --> 00:11:08,300 It's kind of the transition between the Cold War Dynamic to 197 00:11:08,300 --> 00:11:12,000 this post Cold War, where your Insurgency is being funded by 198 00:11:12,000 --> 00:11:14,500 illicit economies, right? Because prior to that it was 199 00:11:14,500 --> 00:11:18,100 really the Soviets and their allies that were funding and 200 00:11:18,100 --> 00:11:20,100 funneling money to a lot of these organizations. 201 00:11:20,100 --> 00:11:23,000 So this is a real important transition from kind of the 202 00:11:23,000 --> 00:11:26,000 classic Model, two things. That we're more familiar with 203 00:11:26,000 --> 00:11:28,200 day. The second thing that I think is 204 00:11:28,200 --> 00:11:31,800 really important to emphasize and it can't be overstated. 205 00:11:31,800 --> 00:11:34,500 Is the Synergy that existed between the Colombians and the 206 00:11:34,508 --> 00:11:37,200 Americans? I started going down there 207 00:11:37,300 --> 00:11:41,600 really getting involved in this conflict in 1996 and I just 208 00:11:41,600 --> 00:11:43,300 always felt like I was part of the Colombian team. 209 00:11:43,300 --> 00:11:46,400 I never felt like I was a foreigner working with another 210 00:11:46,400 --> 00:11:48,200 Army. I just always felt like I was 211 00:11:48,600 --> 00:11:50,200 the way, they would say it in Spanish, is they say, but 212 00:11:50,200 --> 00:11:53,500 obviously Tapas which means own forces you're one of us. 213 00:11:53,500 --> 00:11:56,800 And I always felt that That way. And I've had multiple friends in 214 00:11:56,800 --> 00:12:00,300 the US Military and the other us Services, it was just very easy 215 00:12:00,300 --> 00:12:03,000 to walk into a Colombian headquarters or, you know, 216 00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:05,200 Colombian unit and just start working with them because they 217 00:12:05,200 --> 00:12:08,200 immediately accepted you and the development of Doctrine and 218 00:12:08,200 --> 00:12:11,900 processes since the 1950s had been so synergistic with us, 219 00:12:11,900 --> 00:12:13,700 that it was very easy, just to fit in. 220 00:12:13,900 --> 00:12:16,400 And I think, almost anybody at work down, there would say the 221 00:12:16,400 --> 00:12:18,300 same thing. It was really extraordinary 222 00:12:18,300 --> 00:12:20,300 more. So than El Salvador, which is 223 00:12:20,300 --> 00:12:23,500 where I was before. David when considering lessons 224 00:12:23,500 --> 00:12:26,300 for the future of a regular Warfare from playing Columbia, 225 00:12:26,500 --> 00:12:29,300 how relevant of a comparison is, is to Iraq and Afghanistan. 226 00:12:29,500 --> 00:12:32,000 Some have argued that in the Middle East, large Footprints of 227 00:12:32,000 --> 00:12:35,900 US troops, was a huge mistake compared to the kind of lighter 228 00:12:35,900 --> 00:12:38,400 approach to using Columbia. You think that's a fair 229 00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:40,400 assessment of US policy and intervention. 230 00:12:41,400 --> 00:12:43,600 I think that's the wrong element to focus on. 231 00:12:44,000 --> 00:12:46,300 I think every war has its own requirements. 232 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:50,100 I think the real difference between Colombia El Salvador, 233 00:12:50,100 --> 00:12:53,900 Iraq and Afghanistan. Is National will in Colombia. 234 00:12:53,900 --> 00:12:57,500 We had a partner that wanted to win and they were going to do it 235 00:12:57,600 --> 00:13:00,500 with or without us in some ways and obviously with us, it was 236 00:13:00,500 --> 00:13:02,900 better. And so large Footprints. 237 00:13:02,900 --> 00:13:06,100 I think sometimes are indicative of the lack of Will on the 238 00:13:06,100 --> 00:13:07,900 locals to solve their own problem. 239 00:13:08,100 --> 00:13:11,300 So I think what really makes a difference is when you have a 240 00:13:11,300 --> 00:13:14,400 partner that is really determined to win their own War, 241 00:13:14,500 --> 00:13:18,300 then the United States can come in and we can help them or 242 00:13:18,300 --> 00:13:21,100 enhance their ability to win their own war and I think that's 243 00:13:21,100 --> 00:13:24,400 fundamental Oh, and I think it's often missed when we discuss 244 00:13:24,400 --> 00:13:26,200 Insurgency and irregular warfare. 245 00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:30,700 They do conflict, even though the two of them, they could be 246 00:13:30,700 --> 00:13:33,800 called irregular. Conflicts are, of course, very 247 00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:36,300 very different. In the case of Columbia. 248 00:13:36,400 --> 00:13:39,900 You have here. Not only an army and all 249 00:13:39,900 --> 00:13:44,100 services of the different name, military forces but you have 250 00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:48,200 Democratic institutions already establish. 251 00:13:48,400 --> 00:13:52,300 Remember that our relationship, really, really changed since the 252 00:13:52,300 --> 00:13:55,800 Korea War. When we were part of two 253 00:13:55,800 --> 00:13:58,600 different Army divisions During that conflict. 254 00:13:59,000 --> 00:14:03,000 After that, our relationship, the level of exchanges between 255 00:14:03,000 --> 00:14:05,400 the two countries was really, really very high. 256 00:14:05,900 --> 00:14:09,800 One thing that we never mentioned today was the impact 257 00:14:09,800 --> 00:14:13,300 of the Panama Canal Zone. You know, all our military for 258 00:14:13,300 --> 00:14:19,500 decades, we used to send their units and individuals and ncos 259 00:14:19,500 --> 00:14:22,500 officers. Many people, we all went to 260 00:14:22,500 --> 00:14:26,600 three times their to train to learn and to really build 261 00:14:26,600 --> 00:14:31,200 perhaps The same kind of doxing between Colombia and the US. 262 00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:37,800 So in my opinion, these DNA serve at the end, the purpose of 263 00:14:37,800 --> 00:14:42,400 being able to work together and to share a common goal, of 264 00:14:42,400 --> 00:14:45,700 course, political will. It was really, really very 265 00:14:45,700 --> 00:14:47,800 important. Our presidents. 266 00:14:47,800 --> 00:14:53,200 Our society and the Armed Forces, at this point in which 267 00:14:53,200 --> 00:14:56,800 our democracy was completely challenge because of the 268 00:14:56,800 --> 00:15:00,800 presence of The park, we were able to get together and to 269 00:15:00,800 --> 00:15:03,400 design a policy that will confront this Challenge. 270 00:15:03,400 --> 00:15:08,000 And of course, at the same time, we were able to find the perfect 271 00:15:08,000 --> 00:15:12,100 partner to do this. Because during four decades, 272 00:15:12,100 --> 00:15:15,900 especially before President Uribe, our politicians, our 273 00:15:15,900 --> 00:15:19,800 governments in order to invest, in Social aspects, such as 274 00:15:19,800 --> 00:15:24,000 Education Health among others, invest in security investment. 275 00:15:24,000 --> 00:15:27,200 On the Armed Forces was the last priority plant:. 276 00:15:27,300 --> 00:15:31,000 India in a way help to change this presently. 277 00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:34,700 We came into Power by offering. Colombians look, if we want 278 00:15:34,700 --> 00:15:37,500 better health better roads, better infrastructure, more 279 00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:41,100 tourism, etc, etc, etc. We need to have a stronger 280 00:15:41,100 --> 00:15:44,200 security. So that is why the nature of 281 00:15:44,200 --> 00:15:48,600 what was happening was completely different of what you 282 00:15:48,600 --> 00:15:50,900 have to confront in Iraq or Afghanistan. 283 00:15:51,400 --> 00:15:53,800 The reason we're kind of pushing on this is that there have been 284 00:15:53,800 --> 00:15:57,600 comparisons of Columbia and Iraq and Afghanistan and One of the 285 00:15:57,600 --> 00:15:59,800 kind of Assessments that came out of it, it's highlighted, but 286 00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:01,800 what you said? Albert, those, that Columbia was 287 00:16:01,800 --> 00:16:05,100 essentially an easier case of foreign internal defense or 288 00:16:05,100 --> 00:16:07,700 counterinsurgency because it was a pre-existing democracy, 289 00:16:07,700 --> 00:16:10,700 because the foundation's were there for good governance. 290 00:16:10,700 --> 00:16:13,900 And yet, it wasn't easy from a counter Insurgent perspective 291 00:16:13,900 --> 00:16:17,000 because if I understand correctly, the farc was 292 00:16:17,000 --> 00:16:21,100 surrounding the capital city of Columbia at the time when the 293 00:16:21,100 --> 00:16:23,400 kind of u.s. ramp up its support, I guess that's one of 294 00:16:23,408 --> 00:16:25,900 the questions is, was this kind of an easier case of counter 295 00:16:25,900 --> 00:16:27,500 Insurgency? Or is it just that it Every 296 00:16:27,500 --> 00:16:30,200 fight is unique. Well, I think there's a bit of 297 00:16:30,200 --> 00:16:31,100 both, right? I think. 298 00:16:31,100 --> 00:16:34,400 Yes, it was easier and I think Alberto, you know, highlighted 299 00:16:34,400 --> 00:16:36,900 some of the reasons why I think another reason that really 300 00:16:36,900 --> 00:16:40,500 distinguishes Colombia from Iraq and Afghanistan, we've said it. 301 00:16:40,500 --> 00:16:43,900 But I want to make it explicit is that we had a long-standing 302 00:16:43,900 --> 00:16:47,600 relationship with Colombia and with their the institutions that 303 00:16:47,600 --> 00:16:50,500 had to carry out the counterinsurgency, a lot of 304 00:16:50,500 --> 00:16:53,600 books that talk about plan Colombia start with 1999, which 305 00:16:53,600 --> 00:16:55,100 is kind of, when the whole thing started. 306 00:16:55,300 --> 00:16:59,100 But my book starts in 1982, The reason I started in 1982 is 307 00:16:59,100 --> 00:17:02,200 that's really when the United States started, providing 308 00:17:02,300 --> 00:17:05,500 counter-narcotics assistance to Columbia and getting involved in 309 00:17:05,500 --> 00:17:07,900 their internal struggle. That just shows there's a whole 310 00:17:07,900 --> 00:17:12,599 history there prior to 1999, which made it an ideal platform. 311 00:17:12,599 --> 00:17:15,400 Then build on to, then do this counterinsurgency effort. 312 00:17:15,400 --> 00:17:20,099 That didn't exist in Afghanistan and Iraq, gentlemen, I'd be 313 00:17:20,099 --> 00:17:22,300 interested to know how we measure success in plan 314 00:17:22,300 --> 00:17:24,099 Colombia. What objectives did we actually 315 00:17:24,099 --> 00:17:26,900 accomplished and where and how did the US and Colombia come up, 316 00:17:26,900 --> 00:17:27,599 short? Short. 317 00:17:28,600 --> 00:17:31,800 I'm going to start by mentioning that in these kinds of or 318 00:17:32,200 --> 00:17:35,300 irregular worst. There are some really key 319 00:17:35,300 --> 00:17:39,300 aspects in which, the government really should focus. 320 00:17:39,800 --> 00:17:44,700 One of them, is what we call in Colombia territorial control in 321 00:17:44,700 --> 00:17:47,600 Colombia. If you want to know in the past 322 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:52,500 and present where these illegal activities are happening, you 323 00:17:52,500 --> 00:17:57,400 just have to build the map and find out where the Coca crops 324 00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:01,500 are located. Where is illicit extraction of 325 00:18:01,500 --> 00:18:05,400 minerals is happening and at the same time, especially in the 326 00:18:05,400 --> 00:18:10,300 borders were these Contraband, for example, Contraband of fuel 327 00:18:10,400 --> 00:18:13,000 between Venezuela and Colombia is happening. 328 00:18:13,000 --> 00:18:16,300 Yes, to mention one thing. So, there are these criminal 329 00:18:16,300 --> 00:18:21,700 economists that growth in these very, very far away locations. 330 00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:25,200 It was very difficult, especially for policy makers. 331 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:28,300 And for Colombian citizens, in general, to really see. 332 00:18:28,400 --> 00:18:31,500 Uh, the dangers of what? All these cancers because 333 00:18:31,500 --> 00:18:34,800 normally in the series people wasn't seeing that. 334 00:18:35,200 --> 00:18:39,600 Their life was kind of normal. They had go to theater to movies 335 00:18:39,600 --> 00:18:43,100 to restaurants Etc while very far from them. 336 00:18:43,400 --> 00:18:49,400 We have like small bit Noms burning so that was very, very 337 00:18:49,400 --> 00:18:51,300 difficult. So to measure success for 338 00:18:51,300 --> 00:18:56,600 somebody's how you take control of these areas and in there, not 339 00:18:56,600 --> 00:19:00,500 only that you go there to destroy Coca crops to destroy 340 00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:06,100 collapse but by two are doing that with your own population. 341 00:19:06,100 --> 00:19:10,000 So you have to be very careful. When we talk about human rights 342 00:19:10,400 --> 00:19:15,500 at the end, we do struggle between how many hectares of 343 00:19:15,500 --> 00:19:20,100 Coca, we destroy per year. How many laps we seized and 344 00:19:20,100 --> 00:19:26,000 burn, how many tons of cocaine we seized per year and we still 345 00:19:26,300 --> 00:19:30,100 confronting these challenges. Because every year we want to 346 00:19:30,100 --> 00:19:33,300 have higher numbers than the year before but at the same time 347 00:19:33,900 --> 00:19:38,600 I hear numbers represents that this strategy is not moving 348 00:19:38,600 --> 00:19:43,600 forward and sometimes you feel like you are in an ecstatic bike 349 00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:47,300 just paddling and paddling and paddling and no major changes 350 00:19:47,300 --> 00:19:51,500 are occurring in the field. So measuring success is very, 351 00:19:51,500 --> 00:19:56,200 very difficult, more difficult. Of course if you go into the 352 00:19:56,200 --> 00:20:00,600 body count has Barrel. Which in my opinion, there's 353 00:20:00,600 --> 00:20:05,000 many examples in history, that can bring military institutions 354 00:20:05,000 --> 00:20:08,100 to the other SIM and today, most difficult situations. 355 00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:13,600 But in general we tended to build combined measures with the 356 00:20:13,600 --> 00:20:18,500 United States in order to please our partners to, please US 357 00:20:18,500 --> 00:20:21,900 Congress and at the same time to please, of course, our own 358 00:20:22,000 --> 00:20:25,200 institutions. Yeah, let me just add to that. 359 00:20:25,400 --> 00:20:27,500 100% agree with what Alberto said. 360 00:20:27,700 --> 00:20:31,500 I think that militarily. And in terms of the police that 361 00:20:31,500 --> 00:20:35,400 Columbia was a great success. We're able to first stop the 362 00:20:35,400 --> 00:20:38,600 offensive, actions of the illicit groups and in that 363 00:20:38,600 --> 00:20:41,900 sense, we are able to stop their offensive, push them back. 364 00:20:42,000 --> 00:20:46,100 And in many ways defeat them militarily or at least make them 365 00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:49,200 so that they're only impact on the country was tactical versus 366 00:20:49,200 --> 00:20:50,500 strategic. I think that was a total 367 00:20:50,500 --> 00:20:53,000 success. The plan Colombia goals were to 368 00:20:53,300 --> 00:20:57,500 Troy 50% of the Coca crops in Colombia that was achieved. 369 00:20:57,500 --> 00:21:00,300 But the thing that we were never able to do was to get the 370 00:21:00,300 --> 00:21:03,400 civilians to step into the spaces that have been created. 371 00:21:03,400 --> 00:21:08,100 So militaries can open doors, they can open space so that the 372 00:21:08,100 --> 00:21:11,800 rest of the government can come in and establish governance and 373 00:21:11,800 --> 00:21:14,500 that has been much less successful in Colombia. 374 00:21:14,600 --> 00:21:19,000 The same place is where we were fighting the farc from 1999 to 375 00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:23,200 2000. 16 are the places where there is Coca and illicit groups 376 00:21:23,400 --> 00:21:28,500 Today, so governance was never established adequately, but the 377 00:21:28,500 --> 00:21:31,200 military was highly successful and because governance was never 378 00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:35,200 established adequately. The plan Colombia, successes 379 00:21:35,500 --> 00:21:38,700 were very fragile. So, I think the lesson is we 380 00:21:38,700 --> 00:21:42,700 know how to fight insurgencies. We know how to militarily defeat 381 00:21:42,700 --> 00:21:44,800 our enemies. We know how to find them, you 382 00:21:44,808 --> 00:21:46,900 know, how to kill them. We know how to stop them. 383 00:21:47,100 --> 00:21:51,100 I think we get wrong everywhere. Not just in Colombia, was we 384 00:21:51,100 --> 00:21:53,200 haven't figured out the non-military. 385 00:21:53,300 --> 00:21:57,100 Terry peace yet. We made some efforts towards it 386 00:21:57,100 --> 00:22:00,100 and we made some progress but I think we're not there yet 387 00:22:00,100 --> 00:22:03,200 because as soon as you stop the military effort as soon as you 388 00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:06,400 stop these massive amounts of AIDS as soon as the military 389 00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:08,800 withdraws, the enemies come right back. 390 00:22:10,100 --> 00:22:12,700 So earlier you mentioned that the u.s. address critical gaps 391 00:22:12,700 --> 00:22:15,200 by providing aerial reconnaissance platforms 392 00:22:15,200 --> 00:22:18,100 helicopters in the like and some other means to help track these 393 00:22:18,100 --> 00:22:20,700 ungoverned spaces. But in your opinion, what were 394 00:22:20,700 --> 00:22:23,000 some of the other key components that the u.s. provided to the 395 00:22:23,000 --> 00:22:24,700 Colombian government and Military? 396 00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:26,700 Help combat the ongoing Insurgency? 397 00:22:27,800 --> 00:22:31,000 They help us, are they operational levels? 398 00:22:31,100 --> 00:22:36,100 I mean Army Headquarters and Division and Joint Task forces 399 00:22:36,200 --> 00:22:38,600 level. They help us in. 400 00:22:38,600 --> 00:22:43,100 What to me is very dear to my heart which is planning campaign 401 00:22:43,100 --> 00:22:47,100 planning processes. In order to really, you know, 402 00:22:47,100 --> 00:22:50,400 have a broader perspective in order to be able to have a 403 00:22:50,500 --> 00:22:54,200 stronger interagency approach for example, in order to work 404 00:22:54,200 --> 00:22:57,700 with other services before plan Colombia are Every single 405 00:22:57,700 --> 00:23:02,300 service was fighting its War individually, but I'm Colombia 406 00:23:02,300 --> 00:23:06,200 in my opinion will help as a glue to bring together. 407 00:23:06,200 --> 00:23:09,600 Not only Army Air Force Navy. But also our national police 408 00:23:09,600 --> 00:23:13,400 which today is very, very dear to our heart and also the 409 00:23:13,500 --> 00:23:17,300 judicial Authority within the Army plan Colombia. 410 00:23:17,700 --> 00:23:22,900 And the u.s. approach in general was very strong in what you call 411 00:23:22,900 --> 00:23:26,000 in your Doctrine capabilities based planning. 412 00:23:26,100 --> 00:23:30,700 So you help us In areas, such as intelligence Special Operations, 413 00:23:30,800 --> 00:23:35,800 divining engineer's Civic action, among other areas user 414 00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:38,400 of fires. For example, in general not only 415 00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:40,900 are. But artillery fires, you help us 416 00:23:40,900 --> 00:23:44,800 to strengthen first, our Doctrine second, help us to 417 00:23:44,800 --> 00:23:48,600 change and transform organizations to have better 418 00:23:48,800 --> 00:23:53,700 technology and new material and Equipment personal training. 419 00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:58,400 In my opinion, was vital in all of these For example, today we 420 00:23:58,400 --> 00:24:02,700 have I don't know perhaps more than 1,000 2,000, black of 421 00:24:02,700 --> 00:24:06,300 Pilots all of them. They're used to go to training 422 00:24:06,300 --> 00:24:11,200 the u.s. to recertify in u.s. simulators and things like that. 423 00:24:11,200 --> 00:24:14,800 I did the same in a special forces and other areas and 424 00:24:14,800 --> 00:24:20,300 finally its strong impact of these capabilities on Military 425 00:24:20,300 --> 00:24:23,300 leadership, military Education and Training. 426 00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:28,800 And finally, one thing that for years, we really We're not very 427 00:24:28,800 --> 00:24:32,600 good at all. Was how to maintain all of these 428 00:24:32,600 --> 00:24:36,900 so capabilities based planning was like, other need. 429 00:24:37,200 --> 00:24:40,700 All of these plan Colombia and US efforts David. 430 00:24:40,700 --> 00:24:44,000 He mentioned a lot of important things, encouraging jointness 431 00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:46,100 specific capabilities that were effective, like, Special 432 00:24:46,100 --> 00:24:48,900 Operations forces. Rotary-wing a whole bunch of 433 00:24:48,900 --> 00:24:51,400 important things, I'd like to get your take on. 434 00:24:51,400 --> 00:24:53,900 What were the most important components from what the u.s. 435 00:24:53,900 --> 00:24:56,300 provided to Colombia. But also, what were some things 436 00:24:56,300 --> 00:24:59,200 that were not? Effective that the u.s. pursued. 437 00:24:59,700 --> 00:25:02,400 Probably for me, the biggest difficulty in Colombia has 438 00:25:02,400 --> 00:25:07,700 really been getting the services to act jointly at more than the 439 00:25:07,700 --> 00:25:10,900 Tactical and operational level certainly, they did improve a 440 00:25:10,900 --> 00:25:13,600 great deal, you know, particularly air-to-ground 441 00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:15,600 support. I remember in the early days, 442 00:25:15,700 --> 00:25:19,800 when I first went down there in the late 1990s, 1998 to 2002, 443 00:25:20,100 --> 00:25:23,100 get air support the troops, couldn't talk directly to the 444 00:25:23,100 --> 00:25:26,000 aircraft, basically, the aircraft and the troops were 445 00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:28,400 talking to the bird. Eight commander, who was then 446 00:25:28,400 --> 00:25:30,700 trying to coordinate the Tactical employment of an 447 00:25:30,700 --> 00:25:33,200 aircraft over. A specific piece of terrain by 448 00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:36,100 relying on secondhand information, he was receiving 449 00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:39,300 from the different forces and all the difficulties that that 450 00:25:39,300 --> 00:25:41,700 implied I remember one time there is a wounded man. 451 00:25:41,700 --> 00:25:45,200 It took 17 hours to get evacuated because of this lack 452 00:25:45,200 --> 00:25:47,600 of coordination. All of that stuff was solved 453 00:25:47,700 --> 00:25:50,800 through plan Colombia. So at the Tactical level and 454 00:25:50,800 --> 00:25:54,200 even at the operational level, there was very good joint 455 00:25:54,200 --> 00:25:56,700 coordination and even interagency coordination, but at 456 00:25:56,700 --> 00:25:58,400 higher A levels. We've never been able to 457 00:25:58,408 --> 00:26:01,500 implement that. And Kyle to compliment what 458 00:26:01,500 --> 00:26:03,900 David is saying. I agree with everything he 459 00:26:03,900 --> 00:26:07,300 mentioned. Remember we in Colombia we have 460 00:26:07,300 --> 00:26:12,200 ever developed a law like the Gulf Waters and Nichols act. 461 00:26:12,400 --> 00:26:16,100 That brought us forces to really work together that created 462 00:26:16,200 --> 00:26:18,600 opportunities in every chain of command. 463 00:26:18,600 --> 00:26:22,600 In order to be joint certify, I had the opportunity to go to 464 00:26:22,600 --> 00:26:24,800 Leavenworth and to the US Army war college. 465 00:26:24,800 --> 00:26:28,600 And they're disjoint part was really, really vital. 466 00:26:29,100 --> 00:26:33,800 And I was very Proud to be in a way like joint certify, I try 467 00:26:33,900 --> 00:26:37,500 and our institutions. They continue to try to work 468 00:26:37,600 --> 00:26:41,200 joint. We are trying to create the 469 00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:45,100 necessary adjustments, and especially the incentives for 470 00:26:45,100 --> 00:26:49,100 people to go from, for example, Army Navy Air Force Headquarters 471 00:26:49,100 --> 00:26:52,600 into a joint headquarters. So, I will say yes, we have a 472 00:26:52,608 --> 00:26:55,200 struggle, we have sometimes. For example, I remember when 473 00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:57,700 President Santos, he was the minister of defense and 474 00:26:57,700 --> 00:26:59,700 procedure. You was in charge of government 475 00:26:59,800 --> 00:27:04,000 Meant when they proposed for the first time to go. 476 00:27:04,100 --> 00:27:08,600 Very, very strong on jointness. I remember journals for example, 477 00:27:08,600 --> 00:27:12,200 resigning during those times because of that, imagine losing 478 00:27:12,200 --> 00:27:14,400 great people. Yes, because they don't get it, 479 00:27:14,400 --> 00:27:16,700 they don't understand that. We need to work together. 480 00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:20,900 All of that has really changed. I remember days in which we in 481 00:27:20,900 --> 00:27:24,100 the Army for something. We were shocked and amazed to 482 00:27:24,100 --> 00:27:28,600 see the police making an operation with bombing missions 483 00:27:28,600 --> 00:27:32,000 with Air Force support. And the Army not going about it. 484 00:27:32,100 --> 00:27:35,700 Of course, you want to be part of winning, you are who you want 485 00:27:35,700 --> 00:27:38,800 to be part of this Victory, against criminal organizations 486 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:43,500 and service organizations. But then when you take that as a 487 00:27:43,500 --> 00:27:48,100 listener, and you study what happened, you come to realize 488 00:27:48,100 --> 00:27:51,000 that within your chain of command within your own 489 00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:54,200 organization. There were people, not helping 490 00:27:54,600 --> 00:27:58,300 not facilitated, not pushing in the same direction because at 491 00:27:58,300 --> 00:28:01,000 the end, everything is around. Run by humans. 492 00:28:01,600 --> 00:28:03,300 You know, that said. So even though I've mentioned 493 00:28:03,300 --> 00:28:05,900 that Gap, I think particularly the Tactical and lower 494 00:28:05,900 --> 00:28:08,500 operational level Colombians actually did some pretty amazing 495 00:28:08,500 --> 00:28:10,600 things. So, for example, one of the 496 00:28:10,608 --> 00:28:13,900 issues that they had in Colombia was constant accusations of 497 00:28:13,900 --> 00:28:17,300 Human Rights abuses and a lot of it was because of the Gap that 498 00:28:17,300 --> 00:28:21,500 existed every combat operation in Colombia is a potential crime 499 00:28:21,500 --> 00:28:24,000 scene. They don't have a law of War so 500 00:28:24,000 --> 00:28:26,900 you have to stop and you have to secure the area and you have to 501 00:28:26,900 --> 00:28:30,300 bring in the judicial investigators to Eight, the 502 00:28:30,300 --> 00:28:33,200 scene, and make sure that procedures and processes were 503 00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:35,700 followed. But, you know, you're in combat. 504 00:28:35,700 --> 00:28:39,900 So securing those scenes isn't always the easiest thing to do, 505 00:28:39,900 --> 00:28:42,700 and there's things that happen and then that opens up room for 506 00:28:42,700 --> 00:28:44,400 accusations of Human Rights abuses. 507 00:28:44,700 --> 00:28:47,000 And so, they'd actually did some very creative things where there 508 00:28:47,000 --> 00:28:50,400 were embedded police and investigative and Technical 509 00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:54,100 investigators that because they were embedded with the unit 510 00:28:54,100 --> 00:28:57,800 could immediately get to the scene and process it before, it 511 00:28:57,800 --> 00:28:59,800 can be changed or things could be moved. 512 00:28:59,900 --> 00:29:02,600 And human rights accusations against the Colombian military, 513 00:29:02,600 --> 00:29:07,000 which were already low went down to essentially, zero a common 514 00:29:07,000 --> 00:29:09,500 through line of irregular warfare for the u.s. is working 515 00:29:09,500 --> 00:29:11,100 by with him through partner forces. 516 00:29:11,100 --> 00:29:12,800 And a lot of ink has been spilled discussing the 517 00:29:12,800 --> 00:29:15,600 challenges and opportunities working with partner forces and 518 00:29:15,600 --> 00:29:18,900 proxies from the lens of the donor, basically the u.s. lens, 519 00:29:18,900 --> 00:29:20,700 right? We'd like to take this 520 00:29:20,700 --> 00:29:23,200 opportunity with you, both here to discuss the lessons of 521 00:29:23,200 --> 00:29:26,600 working with partner forces from the perspective of the recipient 522 00:29:26,600 --> 00:29:29,800 of military assistance. So General Mejia, what were the 523 00:29:29,900 --> 00:29:32,700 Opportunities challenges and frustrations of working with 524 00:29:32,700 --> 00:29:34,900 Americans from a partner Force lens. 525 00:29:35,900 --> 00:29:40,400 The professional change between your officers and also your 526 00:29:40,500 --> 00:29:44,700 civilians working together. Not only in training areas but 527 00:29:44,700 --> 00:29:49,000 in operational areas was really, really, very important at the 528 00:29:49,000 --> 00:29:53,800 very beginning because of force protection measures most of the 529 00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:56,500 Americans. They could only be in very safe 530 00:29:56,500 --> 00:30:00,700 locations and they couldn't really be in forward locations 531 00:30:00,800 --> 00:30:04,800 in a more difficult environment. But after a couple of years, the 532 00:30:04,800 --> 00:30:08,400 US when we allow them to go there and in my opinion, that 533 00:30:08,500 --> 00:30:12,900 really transform the relationship because now the 534 00:30:12,900 --> 00:30:18,300 picture is were owned by the two sides, any people kill or injure 535 00:30:18,300 --> 00:30:22,200 in action, the two sides were suffering to me tactically. 536 00:30:22,200 --> 00:30:24,800 Speaking World, very important. Can I put you on that one? 537 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:26,800 A little bit because this is a really big point. 538 00:30:26,800 --> 00:30:29,700 We see with US forces all over the world, is this balance 539 00:30:29,700 --> 00:30:32,500 between, you know, the risk of putting US forces forward with 540 00:30:32,500 --> 00:30:35,100 Partners first, keeping them back and safer. 541 00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:37,400 Occasions. And it's a huge question. 542 00:30:37,700 --> 00:30:40,700 On the US side of, you know, what is the benefit of pushing 543 00:30:40,700 --> 00:30:43,100 these troops forward. So you're saying that there were 544 00:30:43,100 --> 00:30:45,600 benefits to that if you could explain that a little bit more 545 00:30:45,600 --> 00:30:48,500 but also be curious from the Colombian perspective where your 546 00:30:48,500 --> 00:30:51,200 subordinate commanders in Colombia, always willing to have 547 00:30:51,300 --> 00:30:53,400 American partners with them forward, where they seen as kind 548 00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:55,200 of a nuisance or a burden sometimes. 549 00:30:56,400 --> 00:31:00,500 No, we were always very, very often in some places. 550 00:31:00,500 --> 00:31:05,500 For example that are safer. They could go to civilian hotels 551 00:31:05,500 --> 00:31:08,700 or civilian places to stay or to leave their. 552 00:31:08,700 --> 00:31:13,400 That approach was not seen very well by the truth because the 553 00:31:13,400 --> 00:31:17,000 idea is chairing, the same difficulties the same 554 00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:21,300 restrictions and the same struggle, but the US was smart 555 00:31:21,300 --> 00:31:25,600 enough to change this very rapidly at the same time. 556 00:31:25,700 --> 00:31:30,200 We also invested Colombian resources and US resources to 557 00:31:30,200 --> 00:31:33,500 build infrastructure in this forward. 558 00:31:33,500 --> 00:31:37,400 Arias infrastructure with Force protection measures in order to 559 00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:40,500 save lives. There was chemistry, we love 560 00:31:40,500 --> 00:31:43,000 Americans. We like America's we always pray 561 00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:46,800 for them to be there with us but now the relationship was 562 00:31:46,800 --> 00:31:52,200 transforming and that person there was my friend my buddy and 563 00:31:52,200 --> 00:31:56,600 we were fighting against the same problem and he was P me to 564 00:31:56,600 --> 00:32:01,300 change my own operational or tactical capabilities. 565 00:32:01,300 --> 00:32:06,700 For example, we were not seeing the enemy movements. 566 00:32:06,700 --> 00:32:11,900 Completely our intelligence was partial these American officers 567 00:32:11,900 --> 00:32:14,700 and ncos. They were able to call the 568 00:32:14,700 --> 00:32:19,700 Embassy to call South, come to call other commands and to bring 569 00:32:19,900 --> 00:32:22,200 the for example, satellite information. 570 00:32:22,300 --> 00:32:25,500 That at the end, save hundreds of lives. 571 00:32:25,700 --> 00:32:29,700 So his relationship was very, very important. 572 00:32:29,900 --> 00:32:33,400 You argue that holding US troops back to Safe locations. 573 00:32:33,400 --> 00:32:36,700 Was suboptimal would have been other difficulties. 574 00:32:36,700 --> 00:32:39,600 You have experience working with Americans over the past decades 575 00:32:39,600 --> 00:32:42,700 or things that the US has done with its forces. 576 00:32:42,700 --> 00:32:44,400 That you felt were less effective. 577 00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:48,600 One of the things that affected this relationship was, of 578 00:32:48,600 --> 00:32:52,900 course, constant rotation. Every time we have a rotation 579 00:32:53,200 --> 00:32:56,900 after the couple of months bringing a new Tina bringing you 580 00:32:56,900 --> 00:33:02,200 leaders on it's starting again all over was kind of difficult. 581 00:33:02,600 --> 00:33:06,700 It was so, especially because all these special forces are 582 00:33:06,700 --> 00:33:08,900 very, very flexible about very smart. 583 00:33:08,900 --> 00:33:12,000 So they have the ability to adapt to those organization but 584 00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:14,600 it was difficult. And the other thing is that I 585 00:33:14,600 --> 00:33:18,300 confronted them and push them very hard especially when 586 00:33:18,300 --> 00:33:23,600 talking about training because some teams that came back from 587 00:33:23,600 --> 00:33:27,900 Iraq and Afghanistan. They they try to undercover for 588 00:33:27,900 --> 00:33:34,600 son was to train our troops again in the basics but they 589 00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:38,900 were training. Professional Soldiers with 5070 590 00:33:38,900 --> 00:33:42,600 combines with missions and professional Soldiers with eight 591 00:33:42,600 --> 00:33:45,600 ten years of experience and our people didn't want it to 592 00:33:45,600 --> 00:33:48,500 continue to train only the basics. 593 00:33:48,500 --> 00:33:54,100 So when we push them very hard, that was with the support of 594 00:33:54,100 --> 00:33:58,000 course of your own chain of And that was in my opinion, 595 00:33:58,100 --> 00:34:01,700 tactically speaking, it turning point because they started to 596 00:34:01,700 --> 00:34:06,200 really train as in how to do long range, reconnaissance 597 00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:12,900 Patrol, how to do better direct action operations, how to really 598 00:34:12,900 --> 00:34:17,000 use in a better way intelligence and how to do, for example, 599 00:34:17,199 --> 00:34:20,100 intelligence planning of the battlefield in a better way. 600 00:34:20,500 --> 00:34:25,900 So, by pushing these things a little bit hard, we really Went 601 00:34:25,900 --> 00:34:30,300 from one level to the order. And in my opinion today, for 602 00:34:30,300 --> 00:34:35,000 example, Colombian Special Operation Forces are really hot 603 00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:39,199 at a very, very high level. Thanks to this incredible 604 00:34:39,199 --> 00:34:43,500 partnership with the US. El Salvador is another case 605 00:34:43,500 --> 00:34:47,300 study that I've looked into myself and there was a case 606 00:34:47,300 --> 00:34:51,500 where we sent small teams of us advisors out to partner with 607 00:34:51,500 --> 00:34:55,199 Salvador and brigades often the advisors felt like they had to 608 00:34:55,199 --> 00:34:58,000 prove value to their Salvador and partner forces because there 609 00:34:58,000 --> 00:35:01,400 was a perspective that the u.s. was just there to essentially 610 00:35:01,400 --> 00:35:03,200 spy and see if they were conducting human rights 611 00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:06,000 violations. Was there kind of this concern 612 00:35:06,000 --> 00:35:08,500 in Colombia that were the Americans here to actually 613 00:35:08,500 --> 00:35:10,500 support us or are they really just kind of like spies to 614 00:35:10,500 --> 00:35:12,700 report and track? Human rights violations? 615 00:35:13,100 --> 00:35:17,600 No, I never saw that. Never, they were our family, our 616 00:35:17,600 --> 00:35:21,100 partners, our bodies. They were never there to report 617 00:35:21,100 --> 00:35:25,300 or tasks and to tell you the truth on the contrary, I saw, 618 00:35:25,700 --> 00:35:30,800 I'm sorry what I'm going to say, but I saw many Americans going a 619 00:35:30,808 --> 00:35:34,500 little bit further from their own restrictions. 620 00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:38,300 For example, the farc attack, one of my Black Hawk 621 00:35:38,300 --> 00:35:42,200 helicopters, and they landed in the middle of a river. / between 622 00:35:42,200 --> 00:35:46,400 Ecuador and Colombia and around. Then we have a very, very big 623 00:35:46,400 --> 00:35:50,800 fight confronting like 200 Guerrilla Fighters, the 624 00:35:50,800 --> 00:35:56,000 helicopter was very, very badly damaged and I saw for example, 625 00:35:56,100 --> 00:36:01,000 American civilian mechanics. Call me mean, we're on Columbia 626 00:36:01,000 --> 00:36:06,000 mechanics and on their fire, they record that helicoptering. 627 00:36:06,400 --> 00:36:12,400 So when you see that and you realize that this People are 628 00:36:12,500 --> 00:36:16,500 really, really same block. Yes, I'm going back to El 629 00:36:16,500 --> 00:36:18,500 Salvador. Lot of the US Personnel. 630 00:36:18,500 --> 00:36:21,300 El Salvador did the same things. It would violate the rules but 631 00:36:21,300 --> 00:36:24,600 to show their work so that the Brigade commanders would respect 632 00:36:24,600 --> 00:36:25,800 them. Now, don't think we had that 633 00:36:25,800 --> 00:36:28,300 much of an issue in Colombia. I think there was a better 634 00:36:28,300 --> 00:36:32,200 relationship but if I can on back, do shows a Rosy picture 635 00:36:32,300 --> 00:36:34,100 which is mostly true. Mostly true. 636 00:36:34,200 --> 00:36:38,200 But I think Americans that came in and try to impose their 637 00:36:38,200 --> 00:36:42,200 knowledge and their experience on the Colombians Didn't do so 638 00:36:42,200 --> 00:36:45,200 well, the ones that did really well with the ones that came in 639 00:36:45,500 --> 00:36:48,500 and would Reserve judgment and would listen, you know, because 640 00:36:48,900 --> 00:36:52,200 as I'm about to said, a lot of the soldiers that the Americans 641 00:36:52,200 --> 00:36:55,500 were trying to train where men with up to 20 years, experience 642 00:36:55,600 --> 00:36:59,800 of combat, a constant combat that new tricks in the jungle or 643 00:36:59,800 --> 00:37:03,300 ways of doing things because it was the best way to solve the 644 00:37:03,300 --> 00:37:05,300 problem. And so those Americans that were 645 00:37:05,300 --> 00:37:10,200 able to kind of hold back watch and listen and then offer, you 646 00:37:10,200 --> 00:37:13,000 know, Solutions, A lot better than those that would come in 647 00:37:13,000 --> 00:37:14,700 and say oh I was in Iraq and Afghanistan. 648 00:37:14,700 --> 00:37:17,300 I was in the real war. Let me show you how it's done 649 00:37:18,300 --> 00:37:20,100 based on what you just said David. 650 00:37:20,100 --> 00:37:23,000 There seems to have been characteristics of some good 651 00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:25,500 advisers and then characteristics of less 652 00:37:25,500 --> 00:37:28,700 competent advisors Alberto from your perspective, what were the 653 00:37:28,700 --> 00:37:32,000 characteristics that made the best American Partners? 654 00:37:32,000 --> 00:37:34,500 Kind of an individual personality level or skills that 655 00:37:34,500 --> 00:37:36,600 level and what are some characteristics where you saw? 656 00:37:36,600 --> 00:37:39,800 It just didn't work out for that advisor that partner as you can 657 00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:42,500 imagine of course. Speaking, the language is really 658 00:37:42,500 --> 00:37:45,500 very, very important. Even though all of them are 659 00:37:45,500 --> 00:37:50,200 trained in how to speak Spanish, not all of them really have the 660 00:37:50,200 --> 00:37:53,900 ability to do it. So we tend to have more 661 00:37:53,900 --> 00:37:58,000 confidence with that Sergeant, their captor, that major, that 662 00:37:58,000 --> 00:38:01,400 really have the ability to express himself in Spanish. 663 00:38:01,700 --> 00:38:06,500 We have also English speakers, officers, or an ncos helping in 664 00:38:06,500 --> 00:38:10,500 their relationship. But in my opinion, and perhaps, 665 00:38:10,800 --> 00:38:15,600 because Such a difficult job temple in Iraq and Afghanistan. 666 00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:19,300 You have some teams that were looking to approach. 667 00:38:19,600 --> 00:38:24,300 Their course of action was to rest have a good time and 668 00:38:24,500 --> 00:38:28,200 accomplish the mission. And some of them that they have 669 00:38:28,200 --> 00:38:34,100 a higher dedication to the mission and less dedication to 670 00:38:34,100 --> 00:38:37,000 have a good time in different places of Columbia. 671 00:38:37,300 --> 00:38:41,100 I saw that I need really depends on leadership. 672 00:38:41,400 --> 00:38:46,200 And the character of Colombian and American leaders, a mature 673 00:38:46,200 --> 00:38:49,400 relationship in which you can come to the leader and tell him. 674 00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:53,600 Look, I don't like this. I think by breaking security and 675 00:38:53,600 --> 00:38:57,000 you going out you are exposing the troops Etc. 676 00:38:57,200 --> 00:39:01,500 So even the pens on that, but I saw that as you have many and 677 00:39:01,500 --> 00:39:05,200 many tours in Iraq and Afghanistan Colombia, anyway, 678 00:39:05,200 --> 00:39:09,600 became like a third priority. If I can say like that. 679 00:39:10,600 --> 00:39:13,400 So Gentlemen, We Touch on a lot of subjects today and what I'd 680 00:39:13,400 --> 00:39:16,200 really like to know is what are the implications from both your 681 00:39:16,200 --> 00:39:19,200 research and policy experience David and from your career in 682 00:39:19,207 --> 00:39:22,100 the military, General Mejia. What lesson should we take away 683 00:39:22,100 --> 00:39:24,000 from plan Colombia? Moving forward. 684 00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:27,800 From a policy point of view. I think the importance of the 685 00:39:27,800 --> 00:39:30,700 partner is key. You know, I was in the initial 686 00:39:30,700 --> 00:39:33,100 kind of counterinsurgency discussions in Iraq. 687 00:39:33,400 --> 00:39:36,500 I've been working in Colombia for five years and I said 688 00:39:36,500 --> 00:39:38,700 something that wasn't very popular at the time, but I think 689 00:39:38,700 --> 00:39:42,700 it holds true and that is I said, the United States cannot 690 00:39:42,700 --> 00:39:45,800 go in and win a counterinsurgency in a foreign 691 00:39:45,800 --> 00:39:48,500 country. The best we can do is help a 692 00:39:48,508 --> 00:39:53,400 host nation when their own war. And so the quality of the 693 00:39:53,400 --> 00:39:56,600 partner, Is vital. And I don't think that that 694 00:39:56,600 --> 00:39:58,600 means that any time. We have a low-quality partner 695 00:39:58,600 --> 00:40:00,300 that we can't go in and help them. 696 00:40:00,600 --> 00:40:02,900 I just think we need to understand that we're going to 697 00:40:02,908 --> 00:40:06,300 have to build up that quality in our partner at the same time 698 00:40:06,300 --> 00:40:07,500 that we're trying to fight the war. 699 00:40:07,900 --> 00:40:13,200 So I think the example of Columbia is the benefits or the 700 00:40:13,200 --> 00:40:17,100 positive impact that are really high quality partner has both in 701 00:40:17,100 --> 00:40:20,700 terms of political will in terms of their military quality. 702 00:40:20,700 --> 00:40:23,300 Because Columbia was a high-quality military, even if 703 00:40:23,300 --> 00:40:27,000 they were not Source button and other characteristics as well. 704 00:40:27,000 --> 00:40:30,600 I think the second thing that really sticks out to me in terms 705 00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:34,800 of Columbia and particularly when illicit economies drug 706 00:40:34,800 --> 00:40:38,300 trafficking, illegal Mining and other types of illicit economies 707 00:40:38,300 --> 00:40:41,600 are involved, is the fragility of the military Victory or the 708 00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:46,000 military success, and and less that's followed up by 709 00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:50,400 significant and important non-kinetic action, to establish 710 00:40:50,400 --> 00:40:54,900 governance and territorial control that the Situation, can 711 00:40:54,900 --> 00:40:58,400 very quickly slip back into a conflict mode, and sometimes 712 00:40:58,400 --> 00:41:01,000 even worse than the previous one, because now, the enemy has 713 00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:02,900 adapted and they've learned. Yeah. 714 00:41:02,900 --> 00:41:05,800 Because, again, we've taken Fark off the battlefield but they've 715 00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:10,100 been replaced by new actors who are more Savvy, who have learned 716 00:41:10,100 --> 00:41:12,800 the lessons, who are more difficult to fight. 717 00:41:13,000 --> 00:41:16,400 And so the importance of the non-kinetic component, which we 718 00:41:16,400 --> 00:41:18,500 have not gotten right in my opinion. 719 00:41:18,700 --> 00:41:22,000 I think one of the big problems with counterinsurgency is it? 720 00:41:22,000 --> 00:41:26,100 It still is regarded in most Those mines as a military 721 00:41:26,100 --> 00:41:30,000 Endeavor and it really is a state Endeavor with the military 722 00:41:30,000 --> 00:41:32,700 component. We need to change our mindset. 723 00:41:32,700 --> 00:41:35,200 That counterinsurgency is a military activity. 724 00:41:35,600 --> 00:41:37,800 For me. Those are kind of the big planks 725 00:41:37,900 --> 00:41:41,600 from the policy level. It's been a 442 makers. 726 00:41:41,900 --> 00:41:45,600 Of course, political involvement from the top is really, really, 727 00:41:45,600 --> 00:41:48,000 really important in Colombia for years. 728 00:41:48,300 --> 00:41:52,700 Preston's, they tend to leave these counterinsurgency task to 729 00:41:52,700 --> 00:41:54,200 the military. It was their mission. 730 00:41:54,300 --> 00:41:57,600 Action. So you on your own, see how you 731 00:41:57,600 --> 00:42:01,800 can be successful doing that. That approach proved 732 00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:06,200 historically to be very, very negative and at the very end it 733 00:42:06,200 --> 00:42:09,100 weakens democracy because of course, civilian control over 734 00:42:09,100 --> 00:42:13,000 the military is not there on the other side and especially with 735 00:42:13,000 --> 00:42:17,800 the US by partisans for was vital. 736 00:42:18,300 --> 00:42:22,400 We are very very proud to say that and we are very proud to be 737 00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:25,700 able to work with the side of the house and with the 738 00:42:25,700 --> 00:42:29,100 Democratic side of the house we should continue in that 739 00:42:29,107 --> 00:42:33,200 direction because it is very important and the US Congress 740 00:42:33,200 --> 00:42:37,000 and US government in general, they have been very very special 741 00:42:37,000 --> 00:42:43,200 in support of Columbia from both sides, civil-military approach 742 00:42:43,200 --> 00:42:48,100 of for the campaign is very important and they mentioned 743 00:42:48,100 --> 00:42:53,700 this we continue to struggle in Colombia because we haven't been 744 00:42:53,700 --> 00:42:58,400 able to to really bring what is called unified action into these 745 00:42:58,400 --> 00:43:04,300 areas of Columbia in many places of Columbia and Army Lieutenant. 746 00:43:04,300 --> 00:43:08,800 An army surgeon, an army captain or a marine Captain is the only 747 00:43:08,800 --> 00:43:13,600 presence of the state when you have that it is impossible for, 748 00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:18,400 you really to solve the problems for these people that are living 749 00:43:18,400 --> 00:43:22,600 on their, this criminal pressure and order this difficult, we 750 00:43:22,600 --> 00:43:25,900 already went into joint and Your agency Vision. 751 00:43:26,400 --> 00:43:29,300 But I really believe that even though we have done progress, 752 00:43:29,700 --> 00:43:34,000 especially the interagency, a piece is continues to be 753 00:43:34,100 --> 00:43:36,800 complicated to implement. Just let me give you one 754 00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:39,600 historical example. We were building sort of owner 755 00:43:40,100 --> 00:43:44,100 as part of the whole campaign organization. 756 00:43:44,300 --> 00:43:47,900 I proposed the creation of a civilian. 757 00:43:47,900 --> 00:43:51,900 Sorry for the campaign in support of military commanders. 758 00:43:52,300 --> 00:43:56,300 The idea was to have these star that could jump in different 759 00:43:56,300 --> 00:43:59,800 Ministries and bring different budgets and different support 760 00:43:59,800 --> 00:44:02,700 from mining Ministry, Transportation Ministry, 761 00:44:02,700 --> 00:44:07,000 Commerce, agriculture, Etc. And when I proposed that 762 00:44:07,100 --> 00:44:10,900 military leaders, they almost kill me because I was proposing 763 00:44:10,900 --> 00:44:15,500 to bring a civilian to the top leadership for this campaign. 764 00:44:15,900 --> 00:44:19,600 So, leadership in these policymaker, piece is very 765 00:44:19,600 --> 00:44:22,500 important. Alberto said something very 766 00:44:22,500 --> 00:44:26,100 important for 40 years. The conflict in Colombia was 767 00:44:26,100 --> 00:44:31,000 seen as essentially a contest between irregular actors farc, 768 00:44:31,000 --> 00:44:33,900 eln. Paramilitaries on the one hand 769 00:44:33,900 --> 00:44:37,200 and military and police on the other hand and they kept on 770 00:44:37,200 --> 00:44:39,400 talking about well, we want to separate the civilians from the 771 00:44:39,400 --> 00:44:41,700 war. So you guys go up there. 772 00:44:41,700 --> 00:44:44,100 You guys play in your sandbox but leave the rest of us alone 773 00:44:44,400 --> 00:44:47,500 and it wasn't until they had political leadership, 774 00:44:47,700 --> 00:44:50,400 particularly presently Bay, but starting with President Pastrana 775 00:44:50,600 --> 00:44:54,900 that Stood that this was really a whole of State activity and 776 00:44:54,900 --> 00:44:57,500 that it needed to be handled at the highest political and 777 00:44:57,508 --> 00:45:00,600 strategic level that things began to turn around. 778 00:45:01,100 --> 00:45:03,900 So there was a real Synergy that happened in Colombia. 779 00:45:03,900 --> 00:45:05,600 That was in some ways fortuitous. 780 00:45:05,900 --> 00:45:11,200 There had been a police reform between 1996 and 1998 1999. 781 00:45:11,400 --> 00:45:14,300 There was essentially a military reform that happened in the 782 00:45:14,300 --> 00:45:20,500 first years of plan Colombia between 1999 and 2001 the United 783 00:45:20,500 --> 00:45:23,800 States had Come in and gotten on board the population, which 784 00:45:23,800 --> 00:45:27,100 would be very divided and kind of mixed about the degree to, 785 00:45:27,100 --> 00:45:29,600 which you had to fight, or make peace with the Guerrilla 786 00:45:29,600 --> 00:45:32,700 organizations or hope these talks everybody wanted to make 787 00:45:32,700 --> 00:45:35,400 peace. You know, they'd seen the farc 788 00:45:35,600 --> 00:45:38,800 in particular, do some very terrible things and Colombians 789 00:45:39,000 --> 00:45:41,800 had unified on the topic of the that the state needed to come 790 00:45:41,800 --> 00:45:44,000 back the part and all the stuff kind of came together. 791 00:45:44,000 --> 00:45:46,600 And then you had the leader, the right leaders. 792 00:45:46,900 --> 00:45:49,700 In this case, who do you say? And in the case of the military 793 00:45:49,700 --> 00:45:53,400 you had generals Tapia. In general mortar, who had come 794 00:45:53,400 --> 00:45:56,600 from the counterinsurgency fight, who understood that the 795 00:45:56,600 --> 00:45:59,800 mission that the military's Mission needed to be the fight 796 00:45:59,800 --> 00:46:02,200 in the past had been kind of an ad hoc Mission. 797 00:46:02,500 --> 00:46:04,900 You know, is kind of something that you did on the side. 798 00:46:04,900 --> 00:46:08,700 While you focus your institution on kind of normal development of 799 00:46:08,700 --> 00:46:12,300 conventional forces. I said, no, this is the focus of 800 00:46:12,300 --> 00:46:14,300 the military. This is what we need to do. 801 00:46:14,700 --> 00:46:17,800 This is our fight and all our efforts going to be guided 802 00:46:17,800 --> 00:46:20,500 towards that. All those things came together 803 00:46:20,800 --> 00:46:23,100 in. A very happy coincidence that 804 00:46:23,100 --> 00:46:25,000 then helped turn the situation around. 805 00:46:25,400 --> 00:46:28,700 And so in some ways it was quite incidental and fortuitous. 806 00:46:29,100 --> 00:46:33,300 But I think you know, trying to recreate those conditions in 807 00:46:33,300 --> 00:46:37,600 future conflicts would be very important Alberto, we're about 808 00:46:37,600 --> 00:46:40,600 to end the conversation but I want to see if you have any 809 00:46:40,600 --> 00:46:43,400 other thoughts from your extensive experience working 810 00:46:43,400 --> 00:46:46,300 with United States that you'd like to share before we do. 811 00:46:46,300 --> 00:46:53,100 So the only thing I will add is look the US Strategy in general. 812 00:46:53,300 --> 00:46:55,800 What one of the tools do you use when you use? 813 00:46:55,800 --> 00:47:00,800 This is called a I met program and thanks to the iPad program. 814 00:47:01,600 --> 00:47:06,800 We have been able to send to the US military schools in thousands 815 00:47:06,800 --> 00:47:13,400 of officers and ncos and this training these curses and this 816 00:47:13,400 --> 00:47:18,700 certification processes have really changed the lives of 817 00:47:18,800 --> 00:47:23,100 many. Many of Our people in our 818 00:47:23,100 --> 00:47:26,300 military institutions, these people, when they come 819 00:47:26,300 --> 00:47:29,900 certifying, how to do, for example staff planning 820 00:47:29,900 --> 00:47:34,100 processes, how to be Cavalry or artillery? 821 00:47:34,100 --> 00:47:38,800 Using the different elements that we have here in Colombia. 822 00:47:38,800 --> 00:47:41,800 They are good in how to do that because they were trained and 823 00:47:41,808 --> 00:47:44,800 certified it. But at the very end all these 824 00:47:44,800 --> 00:47:49,100 people they continue to progress in our chain of command and then 825 00:47:49,100 --> 00:47:54,100 they go back to more Courses. So what I'm trying to say is 826 00:47:54,100 --> 00:47:59,500 that all these educational and training process that is either 827 00:47:59,500 --> 00:48:05,100 way invisible to the conflict is very, very important because the 828 00:48:05,100 --> 00:48:08,900 same officers that had, for example, in a sponsor in the US 829 00:48:09,500 --> 00:48:13,200 are now here in Colombia is sponsoring u.s. officers and 830 00:48:13,200 --> 00:48:19,200 ncos there's an officer that. So how kind are you with 831 00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:22,200 foreigners and with Ally officer He's in the u.s. in the 832 00:48:22,200 --> 00:48:26,000 different courses are the ones here, you know, providing for 833 00:48:26,000 --> 00:48:29,900 the protection of US, Special Forces in places like to myko 834 00:48:29,900 --> 00:48:34,300 San Jose, what we re Moko and some other team, who some other 835 00:48:34,300 --> 00:48:38,400 very hard places. So in my opinion this training 836 00:48:38,400 --> 00:48:43,700 and education programs are not only Waters but we need to 837 00:48:43,700 --> 00:48:48,100 continue to expand that thanks to what we learned there. 838 00:48:48,600 --> 00:48:51,100 We have been able to continue to move. 839 00:48:51,200 --> 00:48:56,000 Worry, even though plan Colombia and it for our military, we had 840 00:48:56,000 --> 00:48:59,300 the ability to continue to fly Blackhawks to continue to 841 00:48:59,300 --> 00:49:02,200 strengthen our special operations to continue to have 842 00:49:02,200 --> 00:49:05,000 to be more technological in the way that we do. 843 00:49:05,000 --> 00:49:08,100 The mining all over the country for example as a result of the 844 00:49:08,100 --> 00:49:11,200 peace process. So at the end we are more 845 00:49:11,200 --> 00:49:15,500 professional is one of the reasons why we became Global 846 00:49:15,500 --> 00:49:19,600 Security partners of NATO which for us is very important and now 847 00:49:19,600 --> 00:49:23,400 we have access to Different Excellence, training centers in 848 00:49:23,400 --> 00:49:26,900 Europe. For example, we have now in 80 849 00:49:27,000 --> 00:49:30,800 certify Excellence training center in Colombia, in 850 00:49:30,800 --> 00:49:33,800 ptolemaida, in demining operations. 851 00:49:34,100 --> 00:49:38,000 So now we are training people that are coming directly from 852 00:49:38,000 --> 00:49:41,200 Europe to train here and to be certified here, we are very 853 00:49:41,200 --> 00:49:45,500 proud of that and recently, President Biden announced that 854 00:49:45,500 --> 00:49:50,800 Colombia will become an Especial partner is the take a line on 855 00:49:50,800 --> 00:49:52,600 Nate. Though, is that alive? 856 00:49:52,700 --> 00:49:56,100 Correct me if I'm wrong with it with the major non-nato Ally? 857 00:49:56,300 --> 00:50:00,400 Exactly. So, all of that is because we 858 00:50:00,400 --> 00:50:05,700 have been able to carry these weight because you teach us and 859 00:50:05,700 --> 00:50:08,600 you help us understand how to do that. 860 00:50:09,100 --> 00:50:13,600 And in my opinion, we have been able to prove that we have the 861 00:50:13,600 --> 00:50:17,900 ability at the leadership and the professional capability to 862 00:50:17,900 --> 00:50:22,100 move in that direction. Gentlemen, unfortunately we have 863 00:50:22,100 --> 00:50:24,200 run out of time. This has been a great 864 00:50:24,200 --> 00:50:27,100 conversation and I want to thank you for taking the time to join 865 00:50:27,100 --> 00:50:28,500 us today. On the irregular warfare 866 00:50:28,500 --> 00:50:30,400 podcast. You're welcome. 867 00:50:31,100 --> 00:50:39,100 Thank you very much Kyle. Thanks again for joining us for 868 00:50:39,100 --> 00:50:42,200 episode, 54 of the irregular warfare podcast. 869 00:50:42,300 --> 00:50:45,800 We release a new episode, every two weeks in our next episode 870 00:50:45,900 --> 00:50:47,400 lower. And Kyle have a conversation 871 00:50:47,400 --> 00:50:50,200 with Michael Kaufman and Kent. Benedictus on both Russia and 872 00:50:50,200 --> 00:50:53,500 Ukraine sees of irregular warfare from the 2014 annexation 873 00:50:53,500 --> 00:50:56,700 of Crimea to Russia has 2022, invasion of Ukraine. 874 00:50:57,800 --> 00:51:00,700 After that, Laura and Shana discussed the bin Laden papers 875 00:51:00,800 --> 00:51:03,200 and more broadly, the evolution of Al Qaeda with dr. 876 00:51:03,200 --> 00:51:07,400 Nelly, lahood and General David Petraeus, If you like today's 877 00:51:07,400 --> 00:51:10,300 conversation please be sure to subscribe to The Irregular 878 00:51:10,300 --> 00:51:13,000 Warfare podcast so you do not miss an episode. 879 00:51:13,400 --> 00:51:16,500 Also please consider leaving a review and comment on Apple 880 00:51:16,500 --> 00:51:18,800 podcast. This really helps to increase 881 00:51:18,800 --> 00:51:21,700 awareness of the podcast and to drive new listeners from the 882 00:51:21,707 --> 00:51:25,700 community to this resource. The Irregular Warfare podcast is 883 00:51:25,700 --> 00:51:27,600 part of the irregular warfare initiative. 884 00:51:27,700 --> 00:51:29,300 We're an all-volunteer organization. 885 00:51:29,300 --> 00:51:32,700 That provides resources for the IW, professional Community to 886 00:51:32,700 --> 00:51:35,100 include written articles conference has a monthly 887 00:51:35,100 --> 00:51:39,000 newsletter at fellows, More you can follow and engage with us on 888 00:51:39,000 --> 00:51:42,600 Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and YouTube. 889 00:51:43,300 --> 00:51:46,000 One last note. What you heard in this episode 890 00:51:46,000 --> 00:51:48,000 are the views of the participants and do not 891 00:51:48,000 --> 00:51:51,500 represent those of Princeton West Point or any agency of the 892 00:51:51,500 --> 00:51:54,600 US government. Thanks again, and we will see 893 00:51:54,600 --> 00:52:03,400 you next time. Thank you, Ben. 894 00:52:03,400 --> 00:52:06,600 Jeb, Kyle at well and the irregular warfare podcast team 895 00:52:06,600 --> 00:52:10,700 for sharing the episode 1, CA is production of the Civil Affairs 896 00:52:10,700 --> 00:52:14,300 Association, we aim to bring you interviews and discussions about 897 00:52:14,300 --> 00:52:17,300 military Affairs, diplomacy development and field 898 00:52:17,300 --> 00:52:20,500 operations, and use those stories and lessons to inspire 899 00:52:20,500 --> 00:52:23,200 you to go out and achieve. The last three feet of foreign 900 00:52:23,200 --> 00:52:25,600 policy. We have a lot of great 901 00:52:25,600 --> 00:52:27,400 discussions and interviews coming up. 902 00:52:27,700 --> 00:52:30,200 So stay tuned for the next episode of the wannsee a 903 00:52:30,200 --> 00:52:31,100 podcast.