Welcome to the Wynn. See a podcast.
This is Jack. Today, we have a special treat
from The Irregular Warfare podcast.
The episode is called the Columbia plan, then Jeb and call
at well interview. Dr. David Spencer from the
National Defense University and Alberta Jose.
Maria Ferraro the former commander of the military forces
of Colombia a discuss, how the u.s. and Colombia work together
to end the Insurgency and bring stability to the region.
Ian. It's a really terrific episode.
I think you're going to like it. So enjoy.
At the very beginning because of force protection measures most
of the Americans, they could only be and very safe locations
and they couldn't really be in forward locations in a more
difficult environment. But after a couple of years, the
US government allowed them to go there.
And in my opinion that really transform the relationship.
Cuz now the picture is were owned by the two sides.
Any people kill or injure in action, we the two sides were
suffering. So I think what really makes a
difference is when you have a partner that is really
determined to win their own War, then the United States and come
in and we can help them or enhance their ability to win
their own. And I think that's fundamental
and I think it's often missed when we discuss you know,
Insurgency and irregular warfare.
Welcome to episode 54 of the irregular warfare podcast.
I am Kyle at well and I am your host today.
Along with Ben. Jeb, today's episode is on the
topic of plan Colombia which was a United States initiative to
assist the Colombian government in its fight against drug
cartels. And insurgents plan Colombia has
been described as a model of successful counterinsurgency at
a time when large Footprints in Iraq.
And Afghanistan have had mixed results, our guests reflect on
their extensive first-hand, experience to outline, the key
components of plan Colombia, Mia and more broadly to discuss its
successes and shortcomings. As a model for counterinsurgency
in the future, Alberto Jose Mejia, Pharaoh served as the
general commander of the military forces of Colombia, the
senior military officer in the country.
He also served as the commander of the Colombian Army and as the
Colombian ambassador to Australia, General Mejia has
worked closely with American forces throughout the duration
of his career, and he provides a unique perspective on foreign
internal defense and Military advising from the perspective of
the supported country. Dr. David Spencer is a professor
at the William James Perry Center for hemispheric defense
studies at the National Defense University.
He has worked for think tanks, and in government as a policy
expert on South America, in 2016, he co-authored a great,
perhaps Columbia conflict, and Divergence which Chronicles, the
evolution of plan, Colombia, and serves as the basis.
For today's conversation, you are listening to The Irregular
Warfare podcast. Joint production of the
Princeton empirical studies of conflict project and the Modern
War Institute, at West Point, Dental, Dedicated to Bridging,
the Gap between Scholars and practitioners to support the
community of irregular warfare professionals.
Here's our conversation with General Mejia and Professor
Spencer, General Mejia. Dr. David Spencer.
Welcome to The Irregular Warfare podcast.
We're excited to have you here today.
Thanks, it's going to be here. Thank you very much, Kyle.
It's an honor to be here. So today we're going to discuss
what lessons for the future of irregular.
Warfare. We can take from plan Colombia.
This is particularly relevant as plan.
Colombia has generally been viewed as its put in your book
David as a quote shining success story for both Columbia but also
for how the u.s. can build partner capacity.
And conduct foreign internal defense before we get into the
meat of analyzing what work and did not work during plan
Colombia, it'll be helpful to provide a quick overview of what
plan Colombia was. And why it's a topic worth
knowing about David. You've written extensively and
lived plan Colombia, can you outline the very broad Strokes
of, you know what it was to help frame the conversation?
Plan Colombia was originally the dress Pastrana government
strategy, to deal with both narcotics and gorillas under
that plan, the United States had a solely counter-narcotics
focus. In fact, we did a lot of things
to separate our involvement in Colombia, in counter-narcotics
from the war, against the farc and the other Insurgent groups,
what time period is that we started focusing on kind of
Narcotics, 1999, is when plan Colombia started.
And I think some people Think the plan Colombia is kind of
still going, but I would say 2016 when the peace agreement
was signed with farc although you know residuals I think keep
on going, it kind of started as a Counter Narcotics Focus even
though there was this Insurgency going on in the background,
correct. In fact, we were very determined
not to get involved with the Insurgency right to focus on
counter-narcotics and our justification for doing without.
It was the, you know, the Cold War had ended.
We were no longer in the business of counterinsurgency,
obviously this Pre Iraq. And also we rationalized it by
saying that we knew that farc was receiving, a lot of funding
through narcotics and actually all of the enemies of the state
and Columbia. We're getting a lot of money
from counter-narcotics. And so we rationalize it by
saying if we focus on doing counter-narcotics then this will
contribute to Bringing General piece across the country and of
course that evolved over time then by the end of plan
Colombia, really was more of a whole-of-government approach to
look at all of corn. Be has problems too.
To include narcotics and insurgents and that's what it
ended up being. And so most people usually when
they think plan Colombia the think of what it ended up being
and not what it started out as so if I understood correctly
you're saying that plan Colombia started out as an effort to
Counter Narcotics and then kind of morphed into more of a
counterinsurgency fight which is fascinating in its own, right.
But I was wondering if you could break it down a little further,
did it involve sending a transferring military equipment
or actually deploying US troops to trans curity forces and
enhance the Colombian military Doctrine or It was some
combination of, you know, cross-section of approaches,
these comprehensive plan. It was really a mix of different
approaches different strategies. It did have an economic
approach, a fiscal and financial strategy.
Also it intended to support the peace process approach.
But at the same time, it really had a big impact over the
military force and the National Police restructuring, our forces
and also help it anymore. Modernization programs.
One piece that it was very, very important was the judicial
piece, which was very, very strong on human rights.
Of course, content Architects, alternative development, which
in my view is still one of the most difficult pieces of content
narcotics. And we're still struggling are
not being very successful in trying to replace illegal crops
by legal agriculture, also strong social strategy.
Which in my view, brought our basic Civic action Doctrine into
a higher level, what we call integral action, which is very
important and finally human development strategy, which also
tended to help, education, and health.
And finally, the tenth piece of these comprehensive approach is
international strategy, Columbia, try to reach other
partners in Europe, other countries in the region to help.
But at the very end, We were left with our greatest and only
Ally in these, the US. So overall, the plan was
supposed to be a 7.5 billion dollar plan.
I think over three or five years.
I can't remember the exact number of years.
And the only part of that plan that got fully funded, was the
United States part was focused on counter-narcotics.
But I think one of the most important elements of that plan,
was the helicopter program we put in, I think about 900
million dollars worth of hardware, and then another 200
million worth of other things to support the air component.
And the reason that's important is all of that air power was
designed to go after narcotics, but it ended up being a very
important plank. Once the plan was expanded
Beyond counter-narcotics to a more holistic counterinsurgency
and National development type of program.
So yes, the plan was holistic, it was ambitious, but in the end
plan Colombia, least the initial plan under President under this
plus Donna didn't get off the ground in the comprehensive way
that generally he just described and that came later Or that came
later under prison president. When he, he was a mommy?
No. Such difficulties for the
country. Let's go back a little bit to
the whole region. Having a static look at what was
happening after the railing. What went down most institutions
in Latin America disappear and the only Insurgency that
continues to present a challenge against democracy was farc and
Columbia near Lane especially and perhaps all Because of the
economic support and financial support of narco-trafficking.
So it was a big challenge for the US are the production
narcotics was increasing because of these.
And, of course, you can imagine the impact of this production.
In Central America, the Caribbean Venezuela, and of
course, the u.s. So South come in my view in my
military perspective. Play a vital role in reading.
This is static environment. Aunt and the Colombian
relationship with Socom is really, really very tight.
Of course, they are not part of our military organizations, but
this partnership, it goes from planning processes from
exchanges from constant exchange of intelligence, and almond
other aspects. So, these relationship between
South command, the Colombian military helps in a way to, to
have a better understanding of the problem and politically
speaking. Pastrana a Henry Way the two of
them they were very close to the US government.
The two of them have a strong tights with very important
senators and politicians in the US.
So the whole environment in my view was you know perfectly
organized to serve these comprehensive study.
Don't forget David. One thing that you mentioned in
your papers is Colombia also invested three billion dollars
of his own body. Budget in support of all these
strategies. There are two things that I
think are fundamental to understanding Columbia.
Number one, this is really kind of the first major Insurgency in
Latin America, maybe in the world as well.
It's kind of the transition between the Cold War Dynamic to
this post Cold War, where your Insurgency is being funded by
illicit economies, right? Because prior to that it was
really the Soviets and their allies that were funding and
funneling money to a lot of these organizations.
So this is a real important transition from kind of the
classic Model, two things. That we're more familiar with
day. The second thing that I think is
really important to emphasize and it can't be overstated.
Is the Synergy that existed between the Colombians and the
Americans? I started going down there
really getting involved in this conflict in 1996 and I just
always felt like I was part of the Colombian team.
I never felt like I was a foreigner working with another
Army. I just always felt like I was
the way, they would say it in Spanish, is they say, but
obviously Tapas which means own forces you're one of us.
And I always felt that That way. And I've had multiple friends in
the US Military and the other us Services, it was just very easy
to walk into a Colombian headquarters or, you know,
Colombian unit and just start working with them because they
immediately accepted you and the development of Doctrine and
processes since the 1950s had been so synergistic with us,
that it was very easy, just to fit in.
And I think, almost anybody at work down, there would say the
same thing. It was really extraordinary
more. So than El Salvador, which is
where I was before. David when considering lessons
for the future of a regular Warfare from playing Columbia,
how relevant of a comparison is, is to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Some have argued that in the Middle East, large Footprints of
US troops, was a huge mistake compared to the kind of lighter
approach to using Columbia. You think that's a fair
assessment of US policy and intervention.
I think that's the wrong element to focus on.
I think every war has its own requirements.
I think the real difference between Colombia El Salvador,
Iraq and Afghanistan. Is National will in Colombia.
We had a partner that wanted to win and they were going to do it
with or without us in some ways and obviously with us, it was
better. And so large Footprints.
I think sometimes are indicative of the lack of Will on the
locals to solve their own problem.
So I think what really makes a difference is when you have a
partner that is really determined to win their own War,
then the United States can come in and we can help them or
enhance their ability to win their own war and I think that's
fundamental Oh, and I think it's often missed when we discuss
Insurgency and irregular warfare.
They do conflict, even though the two of them, they could be
called irregular. Conflicts are, of course, very
very different. In the case of Columbia.
You have here. Not only an army and all
services of the different name, military forces but you have
Democratic institutions already establish.
Remember that our relationship, really, really changed since the
Korea War. When we were part of two
different Army divisions During that conflict.
After that, our relationship, the level of exchanges between
the two countries was really, really very high.
One thing that we never mentioned today was the impact
of the Panama Canal Zone. You know, all our military for
decades, we used to send their units and individuals and ncos
officers. Many people, we all went to
three times their to train to learn and to really build
perhaps The same kind of doxing between Colombia and the US.
So in my opinion, these DNA serve at the end, the purpose of
being able to work together and to share a common goal, of
course, political will. It was really, really very
important. Our presidents.
Our society and the Armed Forces, at this point in which
our democracy was completely challenge because of the
presence of The park, we were able to get together and to
design a policy that will confront this Challenge.
And of course, at the same time, we were able to find the perfect
partner to do this. Because during four decades,
especially before President Uribe, our politicians, our
governments in order to invest, in Social aspects, such as
Education Health among others, invest in security investment.
On the Armed Forces was the last priority plant:.
India in a way help to change this presently.
We came into Power by offering. Colombians look, if we want
better health better roads, better infrastructure, more
tourism, etc, etc, etc. We need to have a stronger
security. So that is why the nature of
what was happening was completely different of what you
have to confront in Iraq or Afghanistan.
The reason we're kind of pushing on this is that there have been
comparisons of Columbia and Iraq and Afghanistan and One of the
kind of Assessments that came out of it, it's highlighted, but
what you said? Albert, those, that Columbia was
essentially an easier case of foreign internal defense or
counterinsurgency because it was a pre-existing democracy,
because the foundation's were there for good governance.
And yet, it wasn't easy from a counter Insurgent perspective
because if I understand correctly, the farc was
surrounding the capital city of Columbia at the time when the
kind of u.s. ramp up its support, I guess that's one of
the questions is, was this kind of an easier case of counter
Insurgency? Or is it just that it Every
fight is unique. Well, I think there's a bit of
both, right? I think.
Yes, it was easier and I think Alberto, you know, highlighted
some of the reasons why I think another reason that really
distinguishes Colombia from Iraq and Afghanistan, we've said it.
But I want to make it explicit is that we had a long-standing
relationship with Colombia and with their the institutions that
had to carry out the counterinsurgency, a lot of
books that talk about plan Colombia start with 1999, which
is kind of, when the whole thing started.
But my book starts in 1982, The reason I started in 1982 is
that's really when the United States started, providing
counter-narcotics assistance to Columbia and getting involved in
their internal struggle. That just shows there's a whole
history there prior to 1999, which made it an ideal platform.
Then build on to, then do this counterinsurgency effort.
That didn't exist in Afghanistan and Iraq, gentlemen, I'd be
interested to know how we measure success in plan
Colombia. What objectives did we actually
accomplished and where and how did the US and Colombia come up,
short? Short.
I'm going to start by mentioning that in these kinds of or
irregular worst. There are some really key
aspects in which, the government really should focus.
One of them, is what we call in Colombia territorial control in
Colombia. If you want to know in the past
and present where these illegal activities are happening, you
just have to build the map and find out where the Coca crops
are located. Where is illicit extraction of
minerals is happening and at the same time, especially in the
borders were these Contraband, for example, Contraband of fuel
between Venezuela and Colombia is happening.
Yes, to mention one thing. So, there are these criminal
economists that growth in these very, very far away locations.
It was very difficult, especially for policy makers.
And for Colombian citizens, in general, to really see.
Uh, the dangers of what? All these cancers because
normally in the series people wasn't seeing that.
Their life was kind of normal. They had go to theater to movies
to restaurants Etc while very far from them.
We have like small bit Noms burning so that was very, very
difficult. So to measure success for
somebody's how you take control of these areas and in there, not
only that you go there to destroy Coca crops to destroy
collapse but by two are doing that with your own population.
So you have to be very careful. When we talk about human rights
at the end, we do struggle between how many hectares of
Coca, we destroy per year. How many laps we seized and
burn, how many tons of cocaine we seized per year and we still
confronting these challenges. Because every year we want to
have higher numbers than the year before but at the same time
I hear numbers represents that this strategy is not moving
forward and sometimes you feel like you are in an ecstatic bike
just paddling and paddling and paddling and no major changes
are occurring in the field. So measuring success is very,
very difficult, more difficult. Of course if you go into the
body count has Barrel. Which in my opinion, there's
many examples in history, that can bring military institutions
to the other SIM and today, most difficult situations.
But in general we tended to build combined measures with the
United States in order to please our partners to, please US
Congress and at the same time to please, of course, our own
institutions. Yeah, let me just add to that.
100% agree with what Alberto said.
I think that militarily. And in terms of the police that
Columbia was a great success. We're able to first stop the
offensive, actions of the illicit groups and in that
sense, we are able to stop their offensive, push them back.
And in many ways defeat them militarily or at least make them
so that they're only impact on the country was tactical versus
strategic. I think that was a total
success. The plan Colombia goals were to
Troy 50% of the Coca crops in Colombia that was achieved.
But the thing that we were never able to do was to get the
civilians to step into the spaces that have been created.
So militaries can open doors, they can open space so that the
rest of the government can come in and establish governance and
that has been much less successful in Colombia.
The same place is where we were fighting the farc from 1999 to
2000. 16 are the places where there is Coca and illicit groups
Today, so governance was never established adequately, but the
military was highly successful and because governance was never
established adequately. The plan Colombia, successes
were very fragile. So, I think the lesson is we
know how to fight insurgencies. We know how to militarily defeat
our enemies. We know how to find them, you
know, how to kill them. We know how to stop them.
I think we get wrong everywhere. Not just in Colombia, was we
haven't figured out the non-military.
Terry peace yet. We made some efforts towards it
and we made some progress but I think we're not there yet
because as soon as you stop the military effort as soon as you
stop these massive amounts of AIDS as soon as the military
withdraws, the enemies come right back.
So earlier you mentioned that the u.s. address critical gaps
by providing aerial reconnaissance platforms
helicopters in the like and some other means to help track these
ungoverned spaces. But in your opinion, what were
some of the other key components that the u.s. provided to the
Colombian government and Military?
Help combat the ongoing Insurgency?
They help us, are they operational levels?
I mean Army Headquarters and Division and Joint Task forces
level. They help us in.
What to me is very dear to my heart which is planning campaign
planning processes. In order to really, you know,
have a broader perspective in order to be able to have a
stronger interagency approach for example, in order to work
with other services before plan Colombia are Every single
service was fighting its War individually, but I'm Colombia
in my opinion will help as a glue to bring together.
Not only Army Air Force Navy. But also our national police
which today is very, very dear to our heart and also the
judicial Authority within the Army plan Colombia.
And the u.s. approach in general was very strong in what you call
in your Doctrine capabilities based planning.
So you help us In areas, such as intelligence Special Operations,
divining engineer's Civic action, among other areas user
of fires. For example, in general not only
are. But artillery fires, you help us
to strengthen first, our Doctrine second, help us to
change and transform organizations to have better
technology and new material and Equipment personal training.
In my opinion, was vital in all of these For example, today we
have I don't know perhaps more than 1,000 2,000, black of
Pilots all of them. They're used to go to training
the u.s. to recertify in u.s. simulators and things like that.
I did the same in a special forces and other areas and
finally its strong impact of these capabilities on Military
leadership, military Education and Training.
And finally, one thing that for years, we really We're not very
good at all. Was how to maintain all of these
so capabilities based planning was like, other need.
All of these plan Colombia and US efforts David.
He mentioned a lot of important things, encouraging jointness
specific capabilities that were effective, like, Special
Operations forces. Rotary-wing a whole bunch of
important things, I'd like to get your take on.
What were the most important components from what the u.s.
provided to Colombia. But also, what were some things
that were not? Effective that the u.s. pursued.
Probably for me, the biggest difficulty in Colombia has
really been getting the services to act jointly at more than the
Tactical and operational level certainly, they did improve a
great deal, you know, particularly air-to-ground
support. I remember in the early days,
when I first went down there in the late 1990s, 1998 to 2002,
get air support the troops, couldn't talk directly to the
aircraft, basically, the aircraft and the troops were
talking to the bird. Eight commander, who was then
trying to coordinate the Tactical employment of an
aircraft over. A specific piece of terrain by
relying on secondhand information, he was receiving
from the different forces and all the difficulties that that
implied I remember one time there is a wounded man.
It took 17 hours to get evacuated because of this lack
of coordination. All of that stuff was solved
through plan Colombia. So at the Tactical level and
even at the operational level, there was very good joint
coordination and even interagency coordination, but at
higher A levels. We've never been able to
implement that. And Kyle to compliment what
David is saying. I agree with everything he
mentioned. Remember we in Colombia we have
ever developed a law like the Gulf Waters and Nichols act.
That brought us forces to really work together that created
opportunities in every chain of command.
In order to be joint certify, I had the opportunity to go to
Leavenworth and to the US Army war college.
And they're disjoint part was really, really vital.
And I was very Proud to be in a way like joint certify, I try
and our institutions. They continue to try to work
joint. We are trying to create the
necessary adjustments, and especially the incentives for
people to go from, for example, Army Navy Air Force Headquarters
into a joint headquarters. So, I will say yes, we have a
struggle, we have sometimes. For example, I remember when
President Santos, he was the minister of defense and
procedure. You was in charge of government
Meant when they proposed for the first time to go.
Very, very strong on jointness. I remember journals for example,
resigning during those times because of that, imagine losing
great people. Yes, because they don't get it,
they don't understand that. We need to work together.
All of that has really changed. I remember days in which we in
the Army for something. We were shocked and amazed to
see the police making an operation with bombing missions
with Air Force support. And the Army not going about it.
Of course, you want to be part of winning, you are who you want
to be part of this Victory, against criminal organizations
and service organizations. But then when you take that as a
listener, and you study what happened, you come to realize
that within your chain of command within your own
organization. There were people, not helping
not facilitated, not pushing in the same direction because at
the end, everything is around. Run by humans.
You know, that said. So even though I've mentioned
that Gap, I think particularly the Tactical and lower
operational level Colombians actually did some pretty amazing
things. So, for example, one of the
issues that they had in Colombia was constant accusations of
Human Rights abuses and a lot of it was because of the Gap that
existed every combat operation in Colombia is a potential crime
scene. They don't have a law of War so
you have to stop and you have to secure the area and you have to
bring in the judicial investigators to Eight, the
scene, and make sure that procedures and processes were
followed. But, you know, you're in combat.
So securing those scenes isn't always the easiest thing to do,
and there's things that happen and then that opens up room for
accusations of Human Rights abuses.
And so, they'd actually did some very creative things where there
were embedded police and investigative and Technical
investigators that because they were embedded with the unit
could immediately get to the scene and process it before, it
can be changed or things could be moved.
And human rights accusations against the Colombian military,
which were already low went down to essentially, zero a common
through line of irregular warfare for the u.s. is working
by with him through partner forces.
And a lot of ink has been spilled discussing the
challenges and opportunities working with partner forces and
proxies from the lens of the donor, basically the u.s. lens,
right? We'd like to take this
opportunity with you, both here to discuss the lessons of
working with partner forces from the perspective of the recipient
of military assistance. So General Mejia, what were the
Opportunities challenges and frustrations of working with
Americans from a partner Force lens.
The professional change between your officers and also your
civilians working together. Not only in training areas but
in operational areas was really, really, very important at the
very beginning because of force protection measures most of the
Americans. They could only be in very safe
locations and they couldn't really be in forward locations
in a more difficult environment. But after a couple of years, the
US when we allow them to go there and in my opinion, that
really transform the relationship because now the
picture is were owned by the two sides, any people kill or injure
in action, the two sides were suffering to me tactically.
Speaking World, very important. Can I put you on that one?
A little bit because this is a really big point.
We see with US forces all over the world, is this balance
between, you know, the risk of putting US forces forward with
Partners first, keeping them back and safer.
Occasions. And it's a huge question.
On the US side of, you know, what is the benefit of pushing
these troops forward. So you're saying that there were
benefits to that if you could explain that a little bit more
but also be curious from the Colombian perspective where your
subordinate commanders in Colombia, always willing to have
American partners with them forward, where they seen as kind
of a nuisance or a burden sometimes.
No, we were always very, very often in some places.
For example that are safer. They could go to civilian hotels
or civilian places to stay or to leave their.
That approach was not seen very well by the truth because the
idea is chairing, the same difficulties the same
restrictions and the same struggle, but the US was smart
enough to change this very rapidly at the same time.
We also invested Colombian resources and US resources to
build infrastructure in this forward.
Arias infrastructure with Force protection measures in order to
save lives. There was chemistry, we love
Americans. We like America's we always pray
for them to be there with us but now the relationship was
transforming and that person there was my friend my buddy and
we were fighting against the same problem and he was P me to
change my own operational or tactical capabilities.
For example, we were not seeing the enemy movements.
Completely our intelligence was partial these American officers
and ncos. They were able to call the
Embassy to call South, come to call other commands and to bring
the for example, satellite information.
That at the end, save hundreds of lives.
So his relationship was very, very important.
You argue that holding US troops back to Safe locations.
Was suboptimal would have been other difficulties.
You have experience working with Americans over the past decades
or things that the US has done with its forces.
That you felt were less effective.
One of the things that affected this relationship was, of
course, constant rotation. Every time we have a rotation
after the couple of months bringing a new Tina bringing you
leaders on it's starting again all over was kind of difficult.
It was so, especially because all these special forces are
very, very flexible about very smart.
So they have the ability to adapt to those organization but
it was difficult. And the other thing is that I
confronted them and push them very hard especially when
talking about training because some teams that came back from
Iraq and Afghanistan. They they try to undercover for
son was to train our troops again in the basics but they
were training. Professional Soldiers with 5070
combines with missions and professional Soldiers with eight
ten years of experience and our people didn't want it to
continue to train only the basics.
So when we push them very hard, that was with the support of
course of your own chain of And that was in my opinion,
tactically speaking, it turning point because they started to
really train as in how to do long range, reconnaissance
Patrol, how to do better direct action operations, how to really
use in a better way intelligence and how to do, for example,
intelligence planning of the battlefield in a better way.
So, by pushing these things a little bit hard, we really Went
from one level to the order. And in my opinion today, for
example, Colombian Special Operation Forces are really hot
at a very, very high level. Thanks to this incredible
partnership with the US. El Salvador is another case
study that I've looked into myself and there was a case
where we sent small teams of us advisors out to partner with
Salvador and brigades often the advisors felt like they had to
prove value to their Salvador and partner forces because there
was a perspective that the u.s. was just there to essentially
spy and see if they were conducting human rights
violations. Was there kind of this concern
in Colombia that were the Americans here to actually
support us or are they really just kind of like spies to
report and track? Human rights violations?
No, I never saw that. Never, they were our family, our
partners, our bodies. They were never there to report
or tasks and to tell you the truth on the contrary, I saw,
I'm sorry what I'm going to say, but I saw many Americans going a
little bit further from their own restrictions.
For example, the farc attack, one of my Black Hawk
helicopters, and they landed in the middle of a river. / between
Ecuador and Colombia and around. Then we have a very, very big
fight confronting like 200 Guerrilla Fighters, the
helicopter was very, very badly damaged and I saw for example,
American civilian mechanics. Call me mean, we're on Columbia
mechanics and on their fire, they record that helicoptering.
So when you see that and you realize that this People are
really, really same block. Yes, I'm going back to El
Salvador. Lot of the US Personnel.
El Salvador did the same things. It would violate the rules but
to show their work so that the Brigade commanders would respect
them. Now, don't think we had that
much of an issue in Colombia. I think there was a better
relationship but if I can on back, do shows a Rosy picture
which is mostly true. Mostly true.
But I think Americans that came in and try to impose their
knowledge and their experience on the Colombians Didn't do so
well, the ones that did really well with the ones that came in
and would Reserve judgment and would listen, you know, because
as I'm about to said, a lot of the soldiers that the Americans
were trying to train where men with up to 20 years, experience
of combat, a constant combat that new tricks in the jungle or
ways of doing things because it was the best way to solve the
problem. And so those Americans that were
able to kind of hold back watch and listen and then offer, you
know, Solutions, A lot better than those that would come in
and say oh I was in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I was in the real war. Let me show you how it's done
based on what you just said David.
There seems to have been characteristics of some good
advisers and then characteristics of less
competent advisors Alberto from your perspective, what were the
characteristics that made the best American Partners?
Kind of an individual personality level or skills that
level and what are some characteristics where you saw?
It just didn't work out for that advisor that partner as you can
imagine of course. Speaking, the language is really
very, very important. Even though all of them are
trained in how to speak Spanish, not all of them really have the
ability to do it. So we tend to have more
confidence with that Sergeant, their captor, that major, that
really have the ability to express himself in Spanish.
We have also English speakers, officers, or an ncos helping in
their relationship. But in my opinion, and perhaps,
because Such a difficult job temple in Iraq and Afghanistan.
You have some teams that were looking to approach.
Their course of action was to rest have a good time and
accomplish the mission. And some of them that they have
a higher dedication to the mission and less dedication to
have a good time in different places of Columbia.
I saw that I need really depends on leadership.
And the character of Colombian and American leaders, a mature
relationship in which you can come to the leader and tell him.
Look, I don't like this. I think by breaking security and
you going out you are exposing the troops Etc.
So even the pens on that, but I saw that as you have many and
many tours in Iraq and Afghanistan Colombia, anyway,
became like a third priority. If I can say like that.
So Gentlemen, We Touch on a lot of subjects today and what I'd
really like to know is what are the implications from both your
research and policy experience David and from your career in
the military, General Mejia. What lesson should we take away
from plan Colombia? Moving forward.
From a policy point of view. I think the importance of the
partner is key. You know, I was in the initial
kind of counterinsurgency discussions in Iraq.
I've been working in Colombia for five years and I said
something that wasn't very popular at the time, but I think
it holds true and that is I said, the United States cannot
go in and win a counterinsurgency in a foreign
country. The best we can do is help a
host nation when their own war. And so the quality of the
partner, Is vital. And I don't think that that
means that any time. We have a low-quality partner
that we can't go in and help them.
I just think we need to understand that we're going to
have to build up that quality in our partner at the same time
that we're trying to fight the war.
So I think the example of Columbia is the benefits or the
positive impact that are really high quality partner has both in
terms of political will in terms of their military quality.
Because Columbia was a high-quality military, even if
they were not Source button and other characteristics as well.
I think the second thing that really sticks out to me in terms
of Columbia and particularly when illicit economies drug
trafficking, illegal Mining and other types of illicit economies
are involved, is the fragility of the military Victory or the
military success, and and less that's followed up by
significant and important non-kinetic action, to establish
governance and territorial control that the Situation, can
very quickly slip back into a conflict mode, and sometimes
even worse than the previous one, because now, the enemy has
adapted and they've learned. Yeah.
Because, again, we've taken Fark off the battlefield but they've
been replaced by new actors who are more Savvy, who have learned
the lessons, who are more difficult to fight.
And so the importance of the non-kinetic component, which we
have not gotten right in my opinion.
I think one of the big problems with counterinsurgency is it?
It still is regarded in most Those mines as a military
Endeavor and it really is a state Endeavor with the military
component. We need to change our mindset.
That counterinsurgency is a military activity.
For me. Those are kind of the big planks
from the policy level. It's been a 442 makers.
Of course, political involvement from the top is really, really,
really important in Colombia for years.
Preston's, they tend to leave these counterinsurgency task to
the military. It was their mission.
Action. So you on your own, see how you
can be successful doing that. That approach proved
historically to be very, very negative and at the very end it
weakens democracy because of course, civilian control over
the military is not there on the other side and especially with
the US by partisans for was vital.
We are very very proud to say that and we are very proud to be
able to work with the side of the house and with the
Democratic side of the house we should continue in that
direction because it is very important and the US Congress
and US government in general, they have been very very special
in support of Columbia from both sides, civil-military approach
of for the campaign is very important and they mentioned
this we continue to struggle in Colombia because we haven't been
able to to really bring what is called unified action into these
areas of Columbia in many places of Columbia and Army Lieutenant.
An army surgeon, an army captain or a marine Captain is the only
presence of the state when you have that it is impossible for,
you really to solve the problems for these people that are living
on their, this criminal pressure and order this difficult, we
already went into joint and Your agency Vision.
But I really believe that even though we have done progress,
especially the interagency, a piece is continues to be
complicated to implement. Just let me give you one
historical example. We were building sort of owner
as part of the whole campaign organization.
I proposed the creation of a civilian.
Sorry for the campaign in support of military commanders.
The idea was to have these star that could jump in different
Ministries and bring different budgets and different support
from mining Ministry, Transportation Ministry,
Commerce, agriculture, Etc. And when I proposed that
military leaders, they almost kill me because I was proposing
to bring a civilian to the top leadership for this campaign.
So, leadership in these policymaker, piece is very
important. Alberto said something very
important for 40 years. The conflict in Colombia was
seen as essentially a contest between irregular actors farc,
eln. Paramilitaries on the one hand
and military and police on the other hand and they kept on
talking about well, we want to separate the civilians from the
war. So you guys go up there.
You guys play in your sandbox but leave the rest of us alone
and it wasn't until they had political leadership,
particularly presently Bay, but starting with President Pastrana
that Stood that this was really a whole of State activity and
that it needed to be handled at the highest political and
strategic level that things began to turn around.
So there was a real Synergy that happened in Colombia.
That was in some ways fortuitous.
There had been a police reform between 1996 and 1998 1999.
There was essentially a military reform that happened in the
first years of plan Colombia between 1999 and 2001 the United
States had Come in and gotten on board the population, which
would be very divided and kind of mixed about the degree to,
which you had to fight, or make peace with the Guerrilla
organizations or hope these talks everybody wanted to make
peace. You know, they'd seen the farc
in particular, do some very terrible things and Colombians
had unified on the topic of the that the state needed to come
back the part and all the stuff kind of came together.
And then you had the leader, the right leaders.
In this case, who do you say? And in the case of the military
you had generals Tapia. In general mortar, who had come
from the counterinsurgency fight, who understood that the
mission that the military's Mission needed to be the fight
in the past had been kind of an ad hoc Mission.
You know, is kind of something that you did on the side.
While you focus your institution on kind of normal development of
conventional forces. I said, no, this is the focus of
the military. This is what we need to do.
This is our fight and all our efforts going to be guided
towards that. All those things came together
in. A very happy coincidence that
then helped turn the situation around.
And so in some ways it was quite incidental and fortuitous.
But I think you know, trying to recreate those conditions in
future conflicts would be very important Alberto, we're about
to end the conversation but I want to see if you have any
other thoughts from your extensive experience working
with United States that you'd like to share before we do.
So the only thing I will add is look the US Strategy in general.
What one of the tools do you use when you use?
This is called a I met program and thanks to the iPad program.
We have been able to send to the US military schools in thousands
of officers and ncos and this training these curses and this
certification processes have really changed the lives of
many. Many of Our people in our
military institutions, these people, when they come
certifying, how to do, for example staff planning
processes, how to be Cavalry or artillery?
Using the different elements that we have here in Colombia.
They are good in how to do that because they were trained and
certified it. But at the very end all these
people they continue to progress in our chain of command and then
they go back to more Courses. So what I'm trying to say is
that all these educational and training process that is either
way invisible to the conflict is very, very important because the
same officers that had, for example, in a sponsor in the US
are now here in Colombia is sponsoring u.s. officers and
ncos there's an officer that. So how kind are you with
foreigners and with Ally officer He's in the u.s. in the
different courses are the ones here, you know, providing for
the protection of US, Special Forces in places like to myko
San Jose, what we re Moko and some other team, who some other
very hard places. So in my opinion this training
and education programs are not only Waters but we need to
continue to expand that thanks to what we learned there.
We have been able to continue to move.
Worry, even though plan Colombia and it for our military, we had
the ability to continue to fly Blackhawks to continue to
strengthen our special operations to continue to have
to be more technological in the way that we do.
The mining all over the country for example as a result of the
peace process. So at the end we are more
professional is one of the reasons why we became Global
Security partners of NATO which for us is very important and now
we have access to Different Excellence, training centers in
Europe. For example, we have now in 80
certify Excellence training center in Colombia, in
ptolemaida, in demining operations.
So now we are training people that are coming directly from
Europe to train here and to be certified here, we are very
proud of that and recently, President Biden announced that
Colombia will become an Especial partner is the take a line on
Nate. Though, is that alive?
Correct me if I'm wrong with it with the major non-nato Ally?
Exactly. So, all of that is because we
have been able to carry these weight because you teach us and
you help us understand how to do that.
And in my opinion, we have been able to prove that we have the
ability at the leadership and the professional capability to
move in that direction. Gentlemen, unfortunately we have
run out of time. This has been a great
conversation and I want to thank you for taking the time to join
us today. On the irregular warfare
podcast. You're welcome.
Thank you very much Kyle. Thanks again for joining us for
episode, 54 of the irregular warfare podcast.
We release a new episode, every two weeks in our next episode
lower. And Kyle have a conversation
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