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As soon as we took our foot off 
the gas coming back off 

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ultimately withdrew from Iraq. 
Now, he was remarkably fast that

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the Islamic State kind of Rose 
Up From the Ashes and it's a 

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cautionary tale. 
I think when you look at the 

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money that was best resources, 
allocated, but the intensity of 

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the campaign that we took 
against al Qaeda in Iraq. 

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As soon as you stop, those games
are not Consolidated, but her 

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see what you're doing. 
Yes, be linked up much more 

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effectively with other arrests. 
Hi, welcome to the one. 

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See a podcast. 
My name is John Miguel. 

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Get your host for today's 
episode. 

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We're joined by dr. 
Nicholas. 

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Crowley who is a consultant and 
researcher. 

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He's the founder of front-line 
advisory and the author of the 

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death of the medi Army, the rise
fall and Revival of Iraq's. 

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Most powerful militia, Nick 
specializes in first-hand 

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examination of localized, 
dynamics of conflict development

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and urbanization in the 
developing World. 

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He's working whines strategic 
plans. 

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Local realities and equips 
Frontline. 

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Operational personnel with the 
skill sets and local insights 

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necessary for Success. 
Nick had previously served as a 

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social scientist with the human 
terrain system. 

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He also contributed to various 
NATO initiatives to integrate 

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social cultural information into
military planning and 

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operational processes, and he 
was instrumental in designing 

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and delivering research, 
planning and collection, 

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training for the UK's defense, 
cultural specialist unit. 

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Nick has PhD and Ma degrees from
King's College, London, and a ba

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from Yale University. 
His book, The Death of the Mahdi

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Army was excerpted in foreign 
affairs, reviewed, and Millie's.

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Quarterly as quote, the best 
recent book on Iraq and 

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shortlisted by our USI, for the 
Duke of westminster's metal as 

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book of the year in the field of
international relations and 

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Military studies. 
Dr. Nick Kroll. 

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We thank you for being the one. 
See a podcast and welcome. 

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Thank you. 
Thanks for having me. 

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Now. 
You're calling from London. 

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And where you're currently 
residing. 

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And you've got your own firm. 
Where can people go to find out 

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more information about front 
lawn. 

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Yeah, if you look up front line 
advisory.com, there's a whole 

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overlay of business and what we 
do and how we do. 

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That's great. 
And where are you doing some of 

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your work now. 
So our work varies, we're doing 

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some work at Fort Bragg with CA 
around the concepts will talk 

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about today. 
We're also doing some very 

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similar work in Iraq, with the 
Iraqi government. 

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So we're looking to develop 
bilities along these lines. 

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Then there's a commercial side 
of the business and if you think

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about the skill sets of human 
terrain analysis, the idea of 

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helping the military, go into an
unfamiliar environment and make 

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sense of what's happening on the
ground. 

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We do a version of that for 
Western companies going into the

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Middle East and Africa, how do 
they take a local view of what 

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matters about the human terrain?
The landscape around them 

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socially culturally dealing with
things like labor issues, 

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security issues. 
Community relations. 

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That's perfect. 
That's great. 

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And so that's built on your 
background of working in that 

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area of operations that right. 
Yeah, so it's based around, you 

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know, personal experience in the
Middle East and North Africa 

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principally. 
And also my work with the Army 

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was formative in terms of How we
think about entering into 

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difficult environments. 
And the way we take a view on 

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what's Happening and what 
matters my time with human 

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terrain system. 
What was definitely a formative 

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experience? 
Just trying to go into an 

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environment like Iraq and figure
out. 

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Where do we start to? 
Look? 

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What questions do we ask? 
How do we ask them? 

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And then how do we integrate 
those answers into a practical 

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decision making process? 
Right? 

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So, you know the the lessons I 
took from that early experience 

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back in. 2008 has shaped what 
I've done since then, you know 

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on the military side from a 
training standpoint and on the 

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commercial side providing 
advisory Services, that's 

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awesome. 
And so you've referred to some 

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of the questions that we're 
going to get into. 

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So want to tell listeners about 
the article that sparked the 

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interest in talking to you 
today. 

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It was published by the modern 
award stood at West Point that's

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part of use month. 
It's entitled moving beyond, 

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post 9/11 Manhunt Translate. 
Tactical winds into strategic 

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success and it sounds to me very
similar to what we're talking 

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about and see a community about 
Consulting gains. 

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You made some progress on 
influencing the human population

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for the commander's intent and 
moving towards some of the lines

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of effort and integrating civil 
information, for example, but 

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how that can be translated to a 
higher level for strategic 

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success? 
And I think that's the gist of 

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what you're talking about in 
this article. 

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Is that right? 
Yeah. 

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Immigration is key and all this 
and yo, you get on that right? 

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There. 
Is how do we get all these 

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different lines of effort joined
up and the article looks at, you

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know, some of the the issues 
we've had where we develop 

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extraordinary capabilities than 
the article itself. 

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Focuses on non-lethal targeting.
We have this amazing capability,

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but how well are we actually 
joining it up with the other 

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lines of efforts that have to 
compliment it so that we can 

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achieve a result. 
Yeah, so we'll talk about that. 

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That you talk about you, you 
argue that despite how the US 

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military has incredible 
efficiency in hunting and 

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killing enemy targets. 
The US government is just 

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failing to turn. 
These tactical winds into 

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strategic success. 
And you argue that lethal 

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targeting largely through drone 
strikes, is something that's 

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here to stay. 
And that's could just continue 

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to evolve as new technologies 
emerge. 

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One article stuck out to me that
you wrote, quote, a growing 

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Reliance and lethal targeting as
a core instrument of foreign 

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policy should be. 
Whirring, why is that the case? 

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Yeah, the short answer to that 
is because it hasn't worked in 

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terms of delivering a strategic 
result. 

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The legal targeting approach 
with you. 

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Talk about drones. 
We talk about direct action. 

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It's here to stay. 
I think. 

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Because, at first glance at 
least, it's a pretty good or 

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pretty appealing solution to a 
lot of the asymmetric threats 

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were looking at in the Middle 
East and Africa and elsewhere, 

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its low profile. 
It's an expensive. 

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Comparatively. 
And we can romanticize this idea

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of sort of a surgical approach 
to counterterrorism, surgical 

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approach counter-narcotics, even
aspects of stabilization, you 

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know, the problem is that you 
have to find a way to link it up

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elsewhere. 
We look at this. 

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This idea that we can go in with
Kinetic action, lethal action, 

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and Achieve certain effects and 
you look at how good we are 

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doing this and the technology 
and of all the people involved, 

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their incredible. 
There but think about the 

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theaters in which we've applied 
it. 

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You know, let's think about one 
where it's actually delivered a 

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result. 
That's commensurate to our 

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proficiency and you just don't 
see it. 

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And I don't see a break away 
from this as an element or a 

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core element of our approach. 
When you look at the frustration

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and the disillusionment, the 
return on investment, we got 

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from all the development and 
capacity building work, done it 

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like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Billions of Dollars spent to 

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very limited effect, you know, I
was in Baghdad in September and 

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go around that City and 
challenge yourself to find the 

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legacy of serp spending. 
You know, how many billions of 

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dollars were spent. 
And you know, the lingering 

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effect of that are concrete 
tools. 

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It really wasn't as effective as
it ought to have been and we can

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look back to, well, the Vista 
didn't work and is expensive. 

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We want to do this anymore. 
You know, the US isn't in the 

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nation building. 
Us anymore and it's tempting or 

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is it's it's kind of sexy as 
well to fall back upon this 

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direct action approach. 
This legal targeting approach to

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just surgically managing threats
worldwide through Special 

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Operations, forces through 
drawers, drugs, Etc, but there's

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there's danger in that because 
again, we haven't seen a result 

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from it. 
And there are some examples in 

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the article about, you know, 
instances in which, you know, 

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you just didn't deliver. 
And you know what, you wind up 

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doing? 
Yo, in the best case scenario. 

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It's just a never-ending 
whack-a-mole exercise where 

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you're disrupting that works 
like we did in Iraq during The 

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Surge and you're keeping the 
enemy off balance, but it works,

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you know, you can have all kinds
of unintended consequences, 

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civil Affairs is very much in 
the second and third order 

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effects business, right? 
And you can run these campaigns,

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and I talked about Mexico in the
article. 

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They read an incredibly 
efficient people targeting 

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campaign targeting, the cartels,
which Monstrous unintended 

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consequences and we can talk 
about that a bit a bit later if 

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you want. 
I'm rich. 

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I'm thinking back to a book that
I wrote a red called the mission

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of Enemy by people over and he's
a former Green Beret who wrote 

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about some of his experience in 
training and he talked about the

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need to always have a guy or gal
on the ground and despite the 

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drone strikes, that may have 
been called in. 

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He felt like you needed to have 
someone on the ground to confirm

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or deny intelligence and to 
assist with the targeting. 

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But to get a sense of what enemy
Have been like and whether the 

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local population is for or 
against you and you just can't 

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win things remotely all the 
time. 

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Right. 
What has been your experience 

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about having a guy or gal on the
ground relating to the human 

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terrain team or the work that 
you're doing. 

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Now, what's the value added of 
that? 

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I think having that that human 
being on the ground. 

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He's absolutely essential and 
this is something that's a big 

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theme in the work that I do. 
And I was over at the Staff 

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College here in the UK 
yesterday, actually, talking 

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about this to a group. 
There. 

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There's a big push towards, you 
know, the technology station, I 

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guess to make up a word of 
analysis intelligence. 

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This idea that we can remotely 
understand what's happening to 

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these various sensors systems, 
remotely man, drones cetera, and

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just going to keep our hands 
clean to a certain extent. 

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My point of view. 
Is that local? 

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I is absolutely essential and 
you need someone on the ground 

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to ask the right questions to 
look at what's happening to make

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sense of why things are 
happening because, you know, 

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technology and the systems we 
have can give us, you know, the,

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the All-Seeing Eye, you can have
a built on coverage of all these

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different things, but nothing in
that whole system or that system

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of systems enables us to make 
sense of it. 

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What does it mean? 
Yeah. 

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We see these things happening. 
We see troop movements, you 

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know, we have various data 
streams on Economic activity 

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instances of violence, Etc. 
What does it mean, you know the 

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technology in the rest and show 
us correlation, they can 

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identify patterns, but it can't 
explain any of it. 

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And the challenge is to have 
someone on the ground for with 

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access to people on the ground, 
to get into it. 

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Now, you know, that's the first 
step to my mind and, you know, 

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it's easy I think to not along 
to that if you think that way 

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where it gets difficult is 
executing and this is where I 

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00:11:40,000 --> 00:11:44,300
remember reading the coin, 
manual back. 2007, where you can

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00:11:44,300 --> 00:11:47,100
read that and you can read the 
new CIA manual. 

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00:11:47,100 --> 00:11:50,600
I found it to be a very similar 
document or you can read it and 

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00:11:50,600 --> 00:11:53,600
agree and there's all these 
different, you know, assess this

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understand that, you know, 
remain cognizant of this monitor

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that these sort of statements of
intent of things to do. 

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00:12:01,600 --> 00:12:05,100
But how do you pivot from Theory
to action? 

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You know, what do I do with you?
I can sit there and think I have

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you been trained as a decisive 
Terrain in the population has to

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say Owner of gravity and all 
these great quotes. 

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But if I'm there, you know, in 
Yemen, on a Thursday afternoon, 

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what do I do with that? 
You know, that's a big place 

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where the humans rain system 
fell down, is that it didn't 

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have a systematic answer that 
question. 

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You know, what is the process? 
What is the method through which

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you know, when were there on the
ground? 

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We figure out what matters 
because you know, one of the 

230
00:12:34,608 --> 00:12:38,600
huge challenges of any human 
terrain, type Endeavor, or 

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00:12:38,600 --> 00:12:40,900
silver reconnaissance, whatever 
you want to call these 

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00:12:40,900 --> 00:12:44,000
variations the same. 
It is where you start. 

233
00:12:44,800 --> 00:12:47,500
If you think about a place like 
Yemen or even a city, I think of

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00:12:47,508 --> 00:12:50,600
a city like mosul in Iraq, this 
is something I talked with the 

235
00:12:50,600 --> 00:12:54,700
araki's about, yo, how do you go
into that environment and figure

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00:12:54,700 --> 00:12:57,500
out what matters? 
All right, you know, how do you 

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00:12:57,500 --> 00:13:01,200
go in and take a view of the 
fundamentals of the human 

238
00:13:01,200 --> 00:13:02,900
terrain? 
What are the different things? 

239
00:13:02,900 --> 00:13:05,900
We have to be aware of? 
How do they relate to different 

240
00:13:05,900 --> 00:13:08,000
objectives? 
How do they relate to the 

241
00:13:08,000 --> 00:13:09,300
campaign? 
The enemy? 

242
00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:14,100
There's so much going on. 
Knowing where to start to having

243
00:13:14,100 --> 00:13:17,100
a process to follow. 
He's absolutely critical. 

244
00:13:17,100 --> 00:13:20,400
And that's been, you know, that 
was the biggest takeaway for me 

245
00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:24,300
for my time with the human 
terrain system is operational 

246
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terms. 
He said, we had to develop on 

247
00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:30,000
the fly a process and a method, 
our own system. 

248
00:13:30,900 --> 00:13:35,200
And then, you know, refining 
over time by doing this is 

249
00:13:35,200 --> 00:13:37,800
something that, you know, 
looking around, you know, 

250
00:13:37,800 --> 00:13:41,800
internationally Military 
Intelligence, law enforcement. 

251
00:13:42,000 --> 00:13:45,900
No, I'm not aware of any human 
terrain, tight capability. 

252
00:13:46,700 --> 00:13:49,100
That's really been satisfactory.
That's really done. 

253
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What people wanted to do in the 
right way. 

254
00:13:51,200 --> 00:13:54,000
Yeah. 
And a big piece of that has been

255
00:13:54,400 --> 00:13:56,500
the same underlying question of,
where do we start? 

256
00:13:56,500 --> 00:13:58,200
And what questions were supposed
to ask? 

257
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And how do we go from this? 
Huge broad view of a dynamic 

258
00:14:02,100 --> 00:14:03,700
environment? 
Where all these things happening

259
00:14:03,700 --> 00:14:08,100
at once or we're connected in 
this theoretical concept that 

260
00:14:08,100 --> 00:14:09,800
all of this matters in this 
pivotal. 

261
00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:14,100
Now, what how do we actually 
Into tactical level action. 

262
00:14:14,500 --> 00:14:17,200
And that's the big Focus for me.
And that's what's at the heart 

263
00:14:17,200 --> 00:14:20,000
of held up the conversations in 
the work. 

264
00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:23,500
We're doing to see a and with 
your, a keys as well. 

265
00:14:24,000 --> 00:14:27,500
And with a few other clients is 
establishing a process and a 

266
00:14:27,508 --> 00:14:29,300
method. 
So we can take all these ideas 

267
00:14:29,800 --> 00:14:33,200
and put them into action in a 
way to deliver his practical 

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00:14:33,200 --> 00:14:34,200
results. 
Right? 

269
00:14:34,700 --> 00:14:37,500
So after the break, I want to 
get into this case studies that 

270
00:14:37,500 --> 00:14:41,300
you had about Iraq and Mexico, 
but before then you talk about 

271
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the human tree. 
Team and you served as a social 

272
00:14:44,100 --> 00:14:46,200
scientist working on that system
in Iraq. 

273
00:14:46,200 --> 00:14:48,700
Right? 
Right, you talk a little bit 

274
00:14:48,708 --> 00:14:54,000
about why it didn't pick up. 
Why was the system shutdown? 

275
00:14:54,000 --> 00:14:56,100
And what do you think the Civil 
Affairs? 

276
00:14:56,100 --> 00:14:58,700
Regiment can learn from those 
ups and downs of that human 

277
00:14:58,700 --> 00:15:00,600
terrain system. 
Yeah. 

278
00:15:01,500 --> 00:15:06,100
There's a story kind of the rise
and fall of him through a system

279
00:15:06,700 --> 00:15:09,000
and there's been some pretty 
difficult but a lot of not very 

280
00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:10,900
good, very useful things written
about it. 

281
00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:13,400
They were pretty political 
whatever you think of these 

282
00:15:13,400 --> 00:15:15,000
dies, and a lot of the 
commentary on. 

283
00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:18,800
It hasn't been that insightful. 
There are a few good things 

284
00:15:18,800 --> 00:15:20,700
written. 
There's a guy called Chris Simms

285
00:15:20,700 --> 00:15:23,300
who wrote his Doctorate about 
it, which is published. 

286
00:15:23,300 --> 00:15:28,100
I think the US Army war College,
that's out there online, but, 

287
00:15:28,100 --> 00:15:31,500
you know, the biggest takeaway 
for caa's point of view, you 

288
00:15:31,500 --> 00:15:34,700
know, if I were sitting in, you 
know, inside your organization 

289
00:15:35,400 --> 00:15:40,800
is a two-part, surf lesson 
learned one is that CA has all 

290
00:15:40,800 --> 00:15:43,900
too. 
Intellectual Firepower, it needs

291
00:15:43,900 --> 00:15:46,900
to do this job. 
I've spent a good bit of time 

292
00:15:46,900 --> 00:15:51,900
with CA I spent in a number of 
years and human terrain system. 

293
00:15:52,300 --> 00:15:55,500
I work in corporate, second. 
Emia, all the rest, you know, 

294
00:15:55,800 --> 00:15:58,400
CIA has plenty of talent. 
They have all the people they 

295
00:15:58,400 --> 00:16:02,000
need all the resources. 
They need to do this job and 

296
00:16:02,000 --> 00:16:04,000
what they need. 
What about the key part of it is

297
00:16:04,000 --> 00:16:06,700
what I was talking about earlier
is to have process and to have 

298
00:16:06,700 --> 00:16:13,000
met because you have to find a 
way to Be reliable when you do 

299
00:16:13,000 --> 00:16:16,000
this work, and that's one of the
big knocks on inventory analysis

300
00:16:16,000 --> 00:16:18,600
as a discipline, no matter who's
doing, whether it's the human 

301
00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:22,800
terrain system or its noise. 
J-2x type is that you'll you get

302
00:16:22,800 --> 00:16:24,400
a lot of stuff. 
It's nice to know. 

303
00:16:24,500 --> 00:16:27,700
It's interesting, interesting, 
instead of the kiss of death 

304
00:16:27,700 --> 00:16:29,000
work right now. 
It's interesting. 

305
00:16:29,000 --> 00:16:33,000
But when someone says that if 
you typically means, what thanks

306
00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:34,800
for telling me, but I have no 
idea what to do with. 

307
00:16:35,100 --> 00:16:39,400
That was really hard it time and
time again, right? 

308
00:16:39,400 --> 00:16:40,500
Yeah. 
Thanks, okay. 

309
00:16:41,300 --> 00:16:43,900
Well not along to this for your 
15-minute brief. 

310
00:16:43,900 --> 00:16:45,800
But yeah, I'm not going to read 
this again. 

311
00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:49,700
And you know, I may get back to 
my real work now and make 

312
00:16:49,700 --> 00:16:51,400
whatever decision I have to 
make. 

313
00:16:51,700 --> 00:16:56,800
That's been the real challenge 
for that discipline the whole 

314
00:16:56,800 --> 00:16:58,900
Endeavor of human terrain 
analysis. 

315
00:16:58,900 --> 00:17:04,599
How are you reliably relevant? 
And that's where, you know, what

316
00:17:04,599 --> 00:17:08,300
the human terrain system 
couldn't quite do is to get all 

317
00:17:08,300 --> 00:17:12,000
that worked out in time. 
Lessons Learned From that 

318
00:17:12,000 --> 00:17:16,300
process is there's a body of 
knowledge to draw from interval 

319
00:17:16,300 --> 00:17:18,300
from what the British did in 
their own way. 

320
00:17:19,000 --> 00:17:22,300
And what, you know, in the New 
York Police Department, had an 

321
00:17:22,300 --> 00:17:26,300
effort, quite controversial to 
do something very interesting. 

322
00:17:26,500 --> 00:17:30,100
I don't lie Pretty illegal, but 
the other demographics unit is 

323
00:17:30,100 --> 00:17:32,200
the case study were looking at. 
And that's something we talked 

324
00:17:32,200 --> 00:17:37,600
about when we teach this stuff. 
This was an effort to use CCTV 

325
00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:40,300
undercover officers, you know, 
human sources. 

326
00:17:40,700 --> 00:17:44,500
To do a clandestine version of 
the human terrain system and a 

327
00:17:44,508 --> 00:17:47,300
map out areas of interest in the
Muslim communities in New York. 

328
00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:51,500
Yeah, there's no all kinds of 
lessons to draw out from what's 

329
00:17:51,500 --> 00:17:54,700
been done before. 
And again that the key to it all

330
00:17:54,900 --> 00:17:58,500
is to have structure and to have
process so that you can be 

331
00:17:58,500 --> 00:18:01,300
reliable. 
And that's what I kind of drill 

332
00:18:01,300 --> 00:18:03,700
home whenever I talk about this 
stuff. 

333
00:18:03,900 --> 00:18:05,800
Yeah, and it sounds like you 
need to have a champion or 

334
00:18:05,800 --> 00:18:09,400
political cover for it as well. 
Otherwise, it's not cooked in 

335
00:18:09,400 --> 00:18:10,600
you. 
Yeah. 

336
00:18:11,100 --> 00:18:14,600
Human terrain system had a great
story to tell in the right time 

337
00:18:14,600 --> 00:18:18,400
in the right place when 
counterinsurgency was on the 

338
00:18:18,400 --> 00:18:21,200
rise, and they tapped into that,
or they were really a byproduct 

339
00:18:21,200 --> 00:18:24,800
of that and they were able to 
capitalize and, you know, there 

340
00:18:24,800 --> 00:18:27,100
was some great work done within 
that system. 

341
00:18:27,400 --> 00:18:32,400
But ultimately, first of all, it
was expensive, very expensive 

342
00:18:32,600 --> 00:18:34,500
and you all listen, learn to 
Cas. 

343
00:18:34,700 --> 00:18:37,300
You don't need, you know, a 
whole bunch of expensive 

344
00:18:37,300 --> 00:18:40,800
Outsiders plugged into you. 
You know, human traces and spent

345
00:18:40,800 --> 00:18:43,800
a lot of money on Tech. 
That really wasn't fit for 

346
00:18:43,800 --> 00:18:47,000
purpose. 
You know, I do most of my work, 

347
00:18:47,000 --> 00:18:49,900
you know, pen and paper. 
He'll your field notes. 

348
00:18:51,000 --> 00:18:54,100
You don't need fancy systems. 
If you have a thing like balance

349
00:18:54,100 --> 00:18:57,100
here, by all means, use its 
great resource, but there have 

350
00:18:57,100 --> 00:18:59,900
been a lot of people, you know, 
spending a whole lot of money to

351
00:18:59,900 --> 00:19:05,700
develop ways to make this 
Technology based Endeavor, and I

352
00:19:05,700 --> 00:19:07,200
think that's the wrong direction
as well. 

353
00:19:08,200 --> 00:19:09,300
Don't even listen to an 
interview. 

354
00:19:09,400 --> 00:19:12,000
With dr. 
Nick Carly when we come back, 

355
00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:15,800
we'll talk about case studies 
stuff that he's found in Iraq 

356
00:19:15,800 --> 00:19:18,300
and Mexico. 
And also asked some questions 

357
00:19:18,300 --> 00:19:23,100
about how to translate this into
success for civil Affairs and 

358
00:19:23,100 --> 00:19:25,800
what he thinks about a scope and
permissive will be right back. 

359
00:19:35,500 --> 00:19:37,500
If you haven't seen it yet, 
you're missing out. 

360
00:19:37,600 --> 00:19:40,900
The special Warfare magazine has
dedicated an entire issue to the

361
00:19:40,900 --> 00:19:44,600
Civil Fair Centennial. 2018 
marked 100 years since the 

362
00:19:44,608 --> 00:19:47,500
beginning of a modern civil 
Affairs capability, in the US 

363
00:19:47,500 --> 00:19:51,500
Army in that span of time, civil
Affairs, created a Heritage that

364
00:19:51,500 --> 00:19:54,800
deserves to be remembered and 
celebrated articles inside the 

365
00:19:54,808 --> 00:19:57,200
special issue, include civil 
Affairs. 

366
00:19:57,200 --> 00:19:59,600
The first 100 by dr. 
Troy is a kitty. 

367
00:20:00,400 --> 00:20:03,900
It also includes transformation 
training a focus on governance 

368
00:20:04,300 --> 00:20:08,800
by Major Jennifer Jancy 
Schechter major James ontiveros 

369
00:20:09,100 --> 00:20:12,700
has written megacities and 
dense, urban areas challenges in

370
00:20:12,700 --> 00:20:14,400
the future operating 
environment. 

371
00:20:14,900 --> 00:20:18,600
Check out the article for Morgan
K, titled shaping Authority, and

372
00:20:18,600 --> 00:20:21,000
the human domain. 
Transforming civil Affairs, 

373
00:20:21,000 --> 00:20:24,900
aperture on governance. 
Mr. Mike Dottie has written the 

374
00:20:24,900 --> 00:20:28,700
article, entitled civil Affairs 
force of the future empowering 

375
00:20:28,700 --> 00:20:31,900
and optimizing. 
The future Force rounding out. 

376
00:20:31,900 --> 00:20:34,200
The special issue is an article 
entitled. 

377
00:20:34,500 --> 00:20:37,300
Civil Affairs, warrant officers 
Bridging the technical 

378
00:20:37,300 --> 00:20:40,000
capabilities Gap written by 
Colonel Thomas house. 

379
00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:43,500
Key Chief Warrant Officer. 
Three, Chris Ludwick and first 

380
00:20:43,500 --> 00:20:47,400
sergeant, Chris. 
Krez to access a PDF copy of the

381
00:20:47,400 --> 00:20:50,000
special Warfare magazine 
dedicated to civil Affairs and 

382
00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:52,000
its Centennial. 
Go to the Civil Affairs 

383
00:20:52,000 --> 00:20:54,900
association website. 
It's civil Affairs associate 

384
00:20:54,900 --> 00:21:03,600
org. 
Welcome back to the once your 

385
00:21:03,600 --> 00:21:04,800
podcast. 
We're here with. 

386
00:21:04,800 --> 00:21:07,900
Dr. Nick Kroll e, he's the 
author of a paper titled moving 

387
00:21:07,900 --> 00:21:11,600
beyond the post 9/11 Manhunt 
translating tactical winds into 

388
00:21:11,600 --> 00:21:13,900
strategic success. 
Nick. 

389
00:21:13,900 --> 00:21:17,200
I wanted to ask you about the 
case study in Iraq first, 

390
00:21:18,100 --> 00:21:21,400
describe what you found in Iraq,
and we talked about the paper. 

391
00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:27,400
The argument in the paper rolls 
what we did during the search as

392
00:21:27,700 --> 00:21:33,500
a great insight into sort of the
But also the limitations of this

393
00:21:33,500 --> 00:21:38,100
lethal Target approach and set 
this up and I've got a bit of a 

394
00:21:38,600 --> 00:21:41,900
call it a dissenting view on 
what the surge was really all 

395
00:21:41,900 --> 00:21:46,000
about and to situate that. 
I spent the second half of the 

396
00:21:46,000 --> 00:21:51,800
search 2008 in East Baghdad, 
working on Maddie Army special 

397
00:21:51,800 --> 00:21:56,000
groups as a social scientist. 
So the whole hearts and Minds 

398
00:21:56,000 --> 00:22:00,000
non-lethal engagement side of 
counterinsurgency was squarely 

399
00:22:00,100 --> 00:22:02,100
my job. 
That's what we were supposed to 

400
00:22:02,100 --> 00:22:04,200
be doing. 
And there's a wider narrative, 

401
00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:07,100
that still gets a lot of play 
that, you know, what, we 

402
00:22:07,100 --> 00:22:09,800
achieved in the search, which is
extraordinary, which was to 

403
00:22:09,800 --> 00:22:14,100
stabilize and effectively pacify
Baghdad, over a two-year period.

404
00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:14,900
Yeah. 
Clear. 

405
00:22:14,900 --> 00:22:17,200
Hold build. 
It was it was incredible thing 

406
00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:20,900
that was done and there's a 
general narrative out there and 

407
00:22:20,900 --> 00:22:24,800
it's sort of echoed again in the
big studies just come out that 

408
00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:28,200
this was, you know, on the one 
hand there was a case of driven 

409
00:22:28,200 --> 00:22:31,200
targeting effort going after the
networks that were behind. 

410
00:22:31,700 --> 00:22:35,100
Most of the violence. 
So Al Qaeda in Iraq, Maddie Army

411
00:22:35,100 --> 00:22:38,700
special groups, but, you know, 
held up as an equal partner in. 

412
00:22:38,700 --> 00:22:42,900
This is the whole bottom up 
security development governance,

413
00:22:42,900 --> 00:22:46,500
Outreach Brigade, combat teams 
for running out, you know into 

414
00:22:46,500 --> 00:22:51,000
the AO on the ground to the 
Grassroots element of this. 

415
00:22:51,700 --> 00:22:55,100
And you know from my point of 
view of someone who did the 

416
00:22:55,100 --> 00:22:59,500
Grassroots version of it. 
I never saw any evidence that 

417
00:22:59,500 --> 00:23:01,400
what we were doing was the 
driving force. 

418
00:23:01,600 --> 00:23:06,000
Find anything my view on through
the non-lethal hearts and Minds 

419
00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:09,900
element of the surge. 
If it is stuff we did was able 

420
00:23:09,900 --> 00:23:13,700
to had was was possible because 
of the space created by legal 

421
00:23:13,700 --> 00:23:18,500
targeting and my view on our 
ability to stabilize and pacify 

422
00:23:18,500 --> 00:23:20,500
back. 
That is that that was 

423
00:23:20,600 --> 00:23:24,500
overwhelmingly the byproduct of 
lethal Target complemented by 

424
00:23:24,500 --> 00:23:28,500
just external factors of the 
fact that the, the she is sunny 

425
00:23:28,600 --> 00:23:30,800
Civil War has pretty much ended 
by then. 

426
00:23:31,500 --> 00:23:34,900
The sectarian fight was exciting
and he's networks for vulnerable

427
00:23:34,900 --> 00:23:37,600
and we went in and we went after
them from the top down. 

428
00:23:38,500 --> 00:23:42,000
And people like me who were 
tasked to go house to house, 

429
00:23:42,000 --> 00:23:45,900
door-to-door neighborhood to 
Neighborhood talking to people 

430
00:23:46,100 --> 00:23:48,800
and trying to build up local 
Grassroots support to help 

431
00:23:48,800 --> 00:23:52,200
consolidate that achievement, 
you know, we made very little 

432
00:23:52,200 --> 00:23:56,000
Headway and the areas in which 
we work open from being very 

433
00:23:56,000 --> 00:24:00,200
dangerous and very violent in 
2007, and there's a great book, 

434
00:24:00,200 --> 00:24:02,800
but no washing. 
Post journalist called the good 

435
00:24:02,800 --> 00:24:06,700
soldiers which is about the one 
of the battalion's that worked 

436
00:24:07,100 --> 00:24:11,600
the Far Eastern edge of Baghdad 
that captures, how difficult and

437
00:24:11,600 --> 00:24:16,800
how tense that AO was in 2007. 
And then in 2008 suddenly he was

438
00:24:16,800 --> 00:24:18,600
stable and it was peaceful. 
You can walk in these 

439
00:24:18,600 --> 00:24:20,500
neighborhoods. 
No problem. 

440
00:24:21,300 --> 00:24:23,800
And that was absolutely not the 
result of anything. 

441
00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:28,300
I was doing as social scientists
winning hearts and Minds this is

442
00:24:28,300 --> 00:24:32,200
because we have successfully 
gone after A fairly limited 

443
00:24:32,200 --> 00:24:34,200
networks that were behind most 
of the violence. 

444
00:24:35,300 --> 00:24:37,700
And, you know, when you talk 
about integrating the lethal and

445
00:24:37,700 --> 00:24:42,000
non-lethal, you know, for a 
whole range of factors that are 

446
00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:45,300
beyond our conversation here. 
You mentioned the book. 

447
00:24:45,300 --> 00:24:48,100
And the book that I wrote about 
the mighty armies, the story of 

448
00:24:48,100 --> 00:24:51,500
all this of why this happened, 
why the naughty Army grows up 

449
00:24:51,500 --> 00:24:54,400
and fell down? 
And it kind of goes against, I 

450
00:24:54,408 --> 00:24:56,600
guess. 
A bit of what most people talk 

451
00:24:56,600 --> 00:24:58,300
about when they talk about 
search. 

452
00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:02,600
Yeah, but we were out there 
engaging People to very limited 

453
00:25:02,600 --> 00:25:05,000
effect. 
We really weren't able not 

454
00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:07,100
through counterinsurgency 
malpractice. 

455
00:25:07,100 --> 00:25:10,500
But because of what our Act was,
and because of how Iraqi Society

456
00:25:10,500 --> 00:25:13,900
had been kind of brutalized 
through the years and yelled any

457
00:25:13,900 --> 00:25:15,900
of that. 
Well, before we are judged, we 

458
00:25:15,900 --> 00:25:18,200
weren't really able to Muster 
that local support and 

459
00:25:18,200 --> 00:25:21,700
consolidate those games. 
And so, you know, when the 

460
00:25:21,700 --> 00:25:26,800
search engine will be pulled out
and a few years later jsoc, and 

461
00:25:26,800 --> 00:25:29,900
the various task forces have 
been operating out of the 

462
00:25:29,900 --> 00:25:32,200
airport. 
And I see they took their foot 

463
00:25:32,200 --> 00:25:37,400
off the gas and very rapidly. 
The remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq

464
00:25:37,800 --> 00:25:42,200
reformed as the Islamic State 
and you see illegal targeting 

465
00:25:42,200 --> 00:25:46,200
approach can get you space and 
time. 

466
00:25:46,300 --> 00:25:49,600
It can disrupt a network but 
it's not going to take you much 

467
00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:51,500
beyond that. 
You're not going to destroy the 

468
00:25:51,500 --> 00:25:55,300
network and that way and you 
know that again, as soon as we 

469
00:25:55,400 --> 00:25:57,600
took our foot off the gas coming
back off. 

470
00:25:58,200 --> 00:26:01,300
Ultimately withdrew from Iraq. 
Now, he was remarkably. 

471
00:26:01,500 --> 00:26:07,300
Fast that the Islamic State kind
of Rose Up From the Ashes and 

472
00:26:07,700 --> 00:26:10,900
it's a cautionary tale. 
I think, when you look at the 

473
00:26:10,908 --> 00:26:13,800
money that we spend the 
resources, allocated the 

474
00:26:13,800 --> 00:26:18,400
intensity, the campaign that we 
took against al Qaeda in Iraq, 

475
00:26:19,100 --> 00:26:22,700
as soon as you stop, those gains
are not Consolidated by virtue 

476
00:26:22,700 --> 00:26:24,200
of what you've been doing. 
Yes. 

477
00:26:24,200 --> 00:26:27,000
He's Linked UP much more 
effectively with other assets 

478
00:26:28,100 --> 00:26:31,100
and this is where that sort of a
best-case scenario. 

479
00:26:31,100 --> 00:26:33,200
I think. 
Think for what people targeting 

480
00:26:33,200 --> 00:26:36,500
can do, it can buy you that 
space of time and it's an 

481
00:26:36,500 --> 00:26:39,400
incredible success, story of 
that discipline for what it 

482
00:26:39,400 --> 00:26:40,400
achieved. 
I think. 

483
00:26:41,500 --> 00:26:43,200
And I don't want to come off as 
though. 

484
00:26:43,200 --> 00:26:44,900
I'm trying to knock this as a 
discipline. 

485
00:26:45,900 --> 00:26:47,900
It's quite the opposite. 
It's very effective in doing 

486
00:26:47,900 --> 00:26:50,800
certain things. 
But we have to remain cognizant 

487
00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:53,700
of what the limits are in terms 
of what we can achieve. 

488
00:26:53,700 --> 00:26:58,200
And you know, that the Mexico 
example is all the more striking

489
00:26:58,200 --> 00:27:01,000
where if you look at the drug 
war there. 

490
00:27:01,500 --> 00:27:06,600
From 2006 over the following 10 
years or so the Mexicans ran a 

491
00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:10,000
you know, a Manhunt style 
targeting campaign and they took

492
00:27:10,000 --> 00:27:13,300
down a hundred and seven of the 
top hundred and twenty-two 

493
00:27:13,300 --> 00:27:15,100
high-value targets that 
identified. 

494
00:27:15,800 --> 00:27:20,800
This is an incredibly effective 
campaign and you can call 

495
00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:23,500
talking about people like the 
Sinaloa cartel and I'll Chapo 

496
00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:27,300
like El Chapo in the rest. 
They had a Target set and they 

497
00:27:27,300 --> 00:27:31,300
went after them and US was 
involved in this to a certain. 

498
00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:35,000
Set. 
And that's not really a story 

499
00:27:35,000 --> 00:27:37,200
that's spelled out, sufficiently
in the news. 

500
00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:40,400
But, yeah, you know, they'd 
write they were anise and pain 

501
00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:43,700
and it was enormously Successful
by its own terms. 

502
00:27:44,500 --> 00:27:48,000
But what was the result? 
The result was a disaster where 

503
00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:52,700
you had disruption of these 
networks, not Consolidated in 

504
00:27:52,700 --> 00:27:57,100
any way by any follow action and
creating just chaos, where you 

505
00:27:57,100 --> 00:27:59,500
had violence within these 
organizations. 

506
00:27:59,600 --> 00:28:01,300
When you do that, the head gets 
chopped off. 

507
00:28:01,900 --> 00:28:03,400
Different people fight to take 
over. 

508
00:28:04,100 --> 00:28:07,400
And as these organizations will 
destabilize, you had cartels 

509
00:28:07,400 --> 00:28:10,700
fighting each other over Turf. 
Because people know, they smell 

510
00:28:11,000 --> 00:28:13,400
vulnerability, they smell 
opportunity, right? 

511
00:28:13,400 --> 00:28:17,000
And the whole dynamic became 
exponentially more violent. 

512
00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:21,500
The murder rate shot up and 
everything got worse basically 

513
00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:25,800
based upon a very successfully 
executed targeted campaign. 

514
00:28:26,300 --> 00:28:30,100
They didn't really account for 
second and third order effects. 

515
00:28:30,100 --> 00:28:33,100
What comes next? 
How do we look down the road 

516
00:28:33,100 --> 00:28:34,600
done? 
And I'm not trying to show off 

517
00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:36,300
shoot the Mexicans. 
They haven't a staggering 

518
00:28:36,300 --> 00:28:39,700
Challenge on their hands, but 
for our purposes when you think 

519
00:28:39,700 --> 00:28:44,100
about, you know, hybrid Warfare 
and some of the literature. 

520
00:28:44,100 --> 00:28:47,200
And some of the thought on these
have next Generation threats, 

521
00:28:47,200 --> 00:28:53,500
that are part Narco part, 
terrorist part, political apart,

522
00:28:53,500 --> 00:28:57,100
legit economic part, social and 
media networks. 

523
00:28:57,400 --> 00:29:00,400
All rolled into one. 
There is a Hezbollah or Sinaloa 

524
00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:03,200
cartel. 
Looking at what the Mexicans did

525
00:29:03,600 --> 00:29:07,500
and how poorly it went for the 
Mexican people. 

526
00:29:07,500 --> 00:29:11,200
Most of all, there's Lessons 
Learned in there in a huge way. 

527
00:29:11,300 --> 00:29:13,800
Yeah, particularly as you know, 
we start talking about 

528
00:29:13,800 --> 00:29:17,100
designating the cartels, as 
terrorist organizations, and 

529
00:29:17,100 --> 00:29:20,400
that's the precursor to 
unleashing Arctic are targeting 

530
00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:22,000
capabilities there. 
Yeah. 

531
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:24,500
That's what that does Nation. 
Does listeners. 

532
00:29:24,500 --> 00:29:27,200
Want to check out a really cool?
Fictionalized version of this, 

533
00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:30,300
the Netflix Narco series, is 
pretty amazing. 

534
00:29:31,100 --> 00:29:33,300
Yeah, pretty good. 
Things about that. 

535
00:29:33,300 --> 00:29:35,900
Yeah, it tells you about the 
rods in the fall and the 

536
00:29:35,900 --> 00:29:39,000
politics of it all and the 
economic stress, fascinating, 

537
00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:41,500
right? 
And that continues today and in 

538
00:29:41,500 --> 00:29:43,700
Mexico, and Colombia and many 
countries. 

539
00:29:44,700 --> 00:29:49,200
Yeah, and this is where, you 
know, the point, I guess us the 

540
00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:51,500
article is, you know, how does 
this all tie together and we 

541
00:29:51,500 --> 00:29:54,600
talk about lethal targeting. 
We talk about, you can train 

542
00:29:54,600 --> 00:29:57,300
analysis. 
I mean, on the face of it. 

543
00:29:57,300 --> 00:29:59,600
These are two very different 
things done, by entirely 

544
00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:02,400
different types of people. 
No, it entirely different 

545
00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:06,900
locations, physically. 
You know, how did these two 

546
00:30:06,900 --> 00:30:12,800
match up and the argument I take
and the work that I do is based 

547
00:30:12,800 --> 00:30:15,100
on the premise that we have two 
disciplines here. 

548
00:30:15,400 --> 00:30:18,800
Both of which have tremendous 
importance, tremendous value, 

549
00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:22,400
tremendous potential, but their 
underperforming writer, I would 

550
00:30:22,400 --> 00:30:24,800
argue that, you know, for as 
good as we are, at least we'll 

551
00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:26,800
targeting at executing that 
process. 

552
00:30:27,300 --> 00:30:29,500
We should be getting more back 
from it, you know, we should see

553
00:30:29,500 --> 00:30:32,100
a better result. 
And if you look at human terrain

554
00:30:32,100 --> 00:30:34,800
analysis, lots of people can sit
around and agrees. 

555
00:30:34,800 --> 00:30:38,300
It is stuff is important. 
We have to take a view of it. 

556
00:30:38,700 --> 00:30:41,700
But how many people out there or
really satisfied with the 

557
00:30:41,700 --> 00:30:42,900
capability? 
They have. 

558
00:30:43,100 --> 00:30:46,300
And how many people are 
consistently going back to that 

559
00:30:46,300 --> 00:30:50,200
as a repository of information 
or as a key resource in the 

560
00:30:50,208 --> 00:30:54,900
decision-making process. 
And personally, I see that it 

561
00:30:54,900 --> 00:30:59,200
has two sides of the same coin. 
They on the targeting side. 

562
00:30:59,600 --> 00:31:02,000
We're having an issue. 
Not in the execution of a 

563
00:31:02,008 --> 00:31:05,400
process, but it in stead of the 
intelligence that feeds it. 

564
00:31:06,400 --> 00:31:09,100
And we talked about Network 
targeting, we talked about, you 

565
00:31:09,100 --> 00:31:12,800
know, things like palantir. 
And I to do you build these link

566
00:31:12,800 --> 00:31:17,300
analysis, charts that represent 
the enemy gets the Taliban or 

567
00:31:17,300 --> 00:31:20,700
it's, you know, an element of 
Islamic State in eastern Syria. 

568
00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:26,500
And yeah, I use the metaphor of 
we view it like a cloud, like a 

569
00:31:26,508 --> 00:31:28,900
molecule and suspension and 
isolated to thing. 

570
00:31:29,400 --> 00:31:32,500
And, you know, people in the 
target Business go after that 

571
00:31:32,500 --> 00:31:33,900
Network. 
As they see it. 

572
00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:37,700
As that kind of cloud, that's 
detached from the landscape and 

573
00:31:37,700 --> 00:31:43,100
they attack in various ways. 
And the problem for my point of 

574
00:31:43,108 --> 00:31:46,000
view is that we're missing a 
huge piece of what this network 

575
00:31:46,000 --> 00:31:51,400
is, you know, the, the Taliban 
is not some distinct entity, 

576
00:31:51,800 --> 00:31:54,200
that kind of floats above 
Eastern Afghanistan. 

577
00:31:54,500 --> 00:31:58,800
It is a part of the human 
terrain that that cloud, he's in

578
00:31:58,800 --> 00:32:01,700
the cloud, any of the Comparison
raised. 

579
00:32:01,700 --> 00:32:05,200
And then the article is I think 
of it more like a tree where you

580
00:32:05,200 --> 00:32:08,300
have these branches and Limbs 
and that's the network that you 

581
00:32:08,300 --> 00:32:11,000
see in your current, like 
analysis chart. 

582
00:32:11,000 --> 00:32:13,400
Yeah, but there's also this 
massive root structure sinking 

583
00:32:13,400 --> 00:32:18,100
down into Afghan society and 
that's missing from the target 

584
00:32:18,100 --> 00:32:23,400
that's missing entirely from the
entire Viewpoint that underpins 

585
00:32:23,500 --> 00:32:26,500
our legal targeting process. 
Yeah, David combines real, a lot

586
00:32:26,500 --> 00:32:28,500
about it about being an 
organism. 

587
00:32:28,600 --> 00:32:31,600
So if you cut out, probably that
organism It's going to have to 

588
00:32:31,600 --> 00:32:35,100
adapt and they'll be something 
else to fill that void or you 

589
00:32:35,100 --> 00:32:36,700
have to see how it's all 
connected. 

590
00:32:37,100 --> 00:32:39,700
Exactly. 
And to kind of get in that 

591
00:32:39,700 --> 00:32:45,000
Desert, from Theory to action is
I personally think that you 

592
00:32:45,000 --> 00:32:48,800
know, the analytical processes 
of targeting are a great place 

593
00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:52,500
to any group that Viewpoint. 
So rather than viewing this 

594
00:32:52,500 --> 00:32:55,500
cloud or this molecule for our 
wiring diagrams. 

595
00:32:56,000 --> 00:32:59,500
We have to take a view, not just
of the network itself, but of 

596
00:32:59,500 --> 00:33:03,900
that root structure, Within the 
darting process to look at how 

597
00:33:03,900 --> 00:33:07,900
the whole thing connects into 
the, the soil into the human 

598
00:33:07,900 --> 00:33:11,800
terrain and this is where human 
terrain analysis fits in. 

599
00:33:11,800 --> 00:33:15,000
And, you know, the big knock 
we've talked about is the need 

600
00:33:15,000 --> 00:33:16,600
for structure. 
They need for Focus. 

601
00:33:17,100 --> 00:33:20,900
Where do you start? 
If you have the human terrain 

602
00:33:21,500 --> 00:33:25,000
analysis mandate in eastern 
Syria. 

603
00:33:25,300 --> 00:33:28,200
What are you looking at? 
There's no thousands of ways to 

604
00:33:28,200 --> 00:33:32,800
begin an inquiry and Yes, sir. 
I think are the way forward to 

605
00:33:32,800 --> 00:33:35,300
do. 
This is to structure it around 

606
00:33:35,300 --> 00:33:39,500
that view of an enemy Network. 
So, we have that that molecule 

607
00:33:40,000 --> 00:33:43,500
and we map these roots sinking 
down into the human terrain. 

608
00:33:43,900 --> 00:33:46,400
And we understand these 
relationships when where why, 

609
00:33:46,400 --> 00:33:49,000
and how this network has 
established. 

610
00:33:49,000 --> 00:33:52,200
This particular relationship to 
a particular Community, a 

611
00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:55,000
particular tribe particular 
element of the political 

612
00:33:55,000 --> 00:33:57,200
economy. 
That's a structured 

613
00:33:57,200 --> 00:33:59,600
investigation into something 
that matters. 

614
00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:02,400
It's absolutely Going to matter 
is absolutely going to be 

615
00:34:02,400 --> 00:34:06,000
operationally relevant and we 
look to conduct human train 

616
00:34:06,000 --> 00:34:07,900
analysis is now with growth has 
that. 

617
00:34:08,400 --> 00:34:11,699
So this network has established,
this local relationship. 

618
00:34:12,000 --> 00:34:13,900
Well y-you know what? 
Is it about? 

619
00:34:13,900 --> 00:34:16,800
The local economy? 
What is the about local Society?

620
00:34:17,199 --> 00:34:19,000
Are there cultural factors 
involved here? 

621
00:34:19,000 --> 00:34:22,600
Are there, you know, what 
exactly is happening that enable

622
00:34:22,600 --> 00:34:25,699
that relationship to be and that
is your guideline. 

623
00:34:25,699 --> 00:34:29,699
That's the the channel. 
You can follow to conduct human 

624
00:34:29,699 --> 00:34:33,300
terrain analysis that Fit 
together in a way where I think 

625
00:34:33,300 --> 00:34:39,000
both are better for local place.
Well, Nick, I wanted to ask you 

626
00:34:39,007 --> 00:34:42,000
this final question here about 
how we move ahead. 

627
00:34:42,300 --> 00:34:44,400
All right, so you provided some 
answers, but for the Civil 

628
00:34:44,400 --> 00:34:48,000
Affairs Community, for example, 
you describe a scope and khamisi

629
00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:51,300
Frameworks as fill in the blank 
and that we need a road map to 

630
00:34:51,300 --> 00:34:52,800
quick guide. 
Exploration. 

631
00:34:52,800 --> 00:34:55,500
Not in a local boxes to tick 
show. 

632
00:34:55,500 --> 00:34:56,800
How would the Civil Affairs, 
community? 

633
00:34:56,800 --> 00:34:57,600
And you're working with some of 
them. 

634
00:34:57,600 --> 00:35:00,600
Now, how would you suggest that 
they move ahead? 

635
00:35:00,700 --> 00:35:04,500
To develop more of that context,
and anticipating the second and 

636
00:35:04,500 --> 00:35:08,600
third order effects. 
Yeah, somebody to go back into 

637
00:35:08,600 --> 00:35:10,400
the question a bit Hasty. 
Open. 

638
00:35:10,400 --> 00:35:15,500
Tracy, I think work as a way to 
present information by we have 

639
00:35:15,500 --> 00:35:17,300
these boxes. 
We have these categories. 

640
00:35:17,700 --> 00:35:22,100
If I know a lot about Rocco and 
I'm being asked as the human 

641
00:35:22,100 --> 00:35:26,400
terrain guy or the as a CIA 
officer to feed into the 

642
00:35:26,400 --> 00:35:29,700
military decision making process
for a particular operation know 

643
00:35:29,700 --> 00:35:35,300
that that grid Is a perfectly 
useful, way of plotting out. 

644
00:35:35,300 --> 00:35:37,200
Here's what we know. 
Here's what's going on. 

645
00:35:38,400 --> 00:35:41,500
It's all neatly boxed up and you
can look where you need to look 

646
00:35:41,500 --> 00:35:45,400
and get quick answers. 
So as a presentation tool, I 

647
00:35:45,400 --> 00:35:49,400
think it's a perfectly good one.
The problem I have is that if I 

648
00:35:49,400 --> 00:35:52,900
go to raqqa, and I don't know 
what's going on and I'm trying 

649
00:35:52,900 --> 00:35:55,000
to collect information and 
investigate. 

650
00:35:55,900 --> 00:35:58,500
I don't think it's a 
particularly good framework to 

651
00:35:58,500 --> 00:36:03,100
explore and to get at answers. 
Because you do wind up with sort

652
00:36:03,100 --> 00:36:07,300
of boxes to fill in and it's 
sort of a reductionist approach 

653
00:36:07,300 --> 00:36:11,000
to figuring out what matters 
where you have this complex 

654
00:36:11,000 --> 00:36:15,500
system of systems operating and 
you're told to go find area, 

655
00:36:15,500 --> 00:36:17,400
structures, Etc. 
Once a political. 

656
00:36:17,400 --> 00:36:20,300
What's military, Etc. 
You're breaking things down into

657
00:36:20,300 --> 00:36:25,000
pieces Without Really knowing 
what's going on here. 

658
00:36:25,000 --> 00:36:28,500
How does it connect? 
What is important and why? 

659
00:36:29,300 --> 00:36:34,300
So what I think the The Way 
Forward is to keep a scope. 

660
00:36:34,300 --> 00:36:39,300
Keep may see as I get a reliable
perfectly functional way to 

661
00:36:39,300 --> 00:36:43,600
input information into the 
military decision, process into 

662
00:36:43,600 --> 00:36:47,300
the strategic planning process, 
but to get to that depth 

663
00:36:47,300 --> 00:36:51,200
information, there's a need for 
different processes, different 

664
00:36:51,200 --> 00:36:56,400
methods, looking at the CIA 
manual, there are guidance by 

665
00:36:56,400 --> 00:36:59,500
saying, effectively understand 
this assess this, and, you know,

666
00:36:59,500 --> 00:37:04,200
that the methodology be He's 
starting to assess, you know, go

667
00:37:04,200 --> 00:37:07,200
out and figure this out how that
fit missing pivot. 

668
00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:11,300
I think is the step between 
Theory and appreciate the 

669
00:37:11,300 --> 00:37:14,300
importance of all this and 
acting on it through practical 

670
00:37:14,300 --> 00:37:17,900
steps. 
And what I think is the way 

671
00:37:17,900 --> 00:37:20,100
forward is to implement these 
steps. 

672
00:37:20,100 --> 00:37:22,200
So here's how we go through this
process. 

673
00:37:22,600 --> 00:37:27,200
Here are the kinds of questions 
we ask and when you look to kind

674
00:37:27,200 --> 00:37:31,200
of narrow the view of human 
terrain analysis or The network 

675
00:37:31,200 --> 00:37:33,800
engagement. 
And when you look to narrow the 

676
00:37:33,800 --> 00:37:37,900
view of how do we conduct civil 
reconnaissance with particular 

677
00:37:37,900 --> 00:37:42,300
objectives in mind, you know, 
for me, it comes back to using 

678
00:37:43,000 --> 00:37:46,400
the targeting process and our 
view of a particular enemy as 

679
00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:49,700
that anchor, and building out 
steps and layers of analysis 

680
00:37:49,700 --> 00:37:52,600
from there. 
That, I think offers a clear 

681
00:37:52,600 --> 00:37:55,700
structured way to start 
someplace, where we're 

682
00:37:55,700 --> 00:37:58,700
comfortable, where we know how 
to understand, we know how to 

683
00:37:58,700 --> 00:38:01,800
analyze. 
We don't we Looking for mapping 

684
00:38:01,800 --> 00:38:03,800
out. 
What a particular enemy network 

685
00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:07,400
is and we gradually build out 
from there by looking at the 

686
00:38:07,400 --> 00:38:09,500
shape of this network. 
How its structured, why it's 

687
00:38:09,500 --> 00:38:11,800
structured a certain way. 
That's going to tell us certain 

688
00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:14,100
things about its its 
connectivity. 

689
00:38:14,100 --> 00:38:16,700
It is a local environment. 
Then we look at that root 

690
00:38:16,700 --> 00:38:19,800
structure. 
How has the Islamic State 

691
00:38:19,800 --> 00:38:22,700
developed particular 
relationships, you know, in and 

692
00:38:22,700 --> 00:38:26,600
around mosul in around raqqa. 
What does that look like? 

693
00:38:26,600 --> 00:38:31,200
And then from there, you're 
developing not boxes to fill in.

694
00:38:31,200 --> 00:38:34,800
But lines of inquiry where we 
have certain Dynamic, certain 

695
00:38:35,000 --> 00:38:37,100
indicators. 
We know are important and we're 

696
00:38:37,107 --> 00:38:40,000
going to empower people with the
skill set and a process to go 

697
00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:41,500
investigate them. 
Right? 

698
00:38:42,000 --> 00:38:44,900
And it is something where y'all 
from the very beginning of my 

699
00:38:44,900 --> 00:38:48,100
work with the military. 
Yeah, II time. 

700
00:38:48,100 --> 00:38:51,600
And time again, find this sort 
of frustrating experience of 

701
00:38:51,600 --> 00:38:54,500
there, being a lot of 
intellectual creativity, a lot 

702
00:38:54,500 --> 00:38:57,900
of brain power. 
But systems and processes that 

703
00:38:57,900 --> 00:39:03,200
don't really Empower soldiers 
officers to go and use that. 

704
00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:06,600
And it doesn't harness the 
talent that's out there as 

705
00:39:06,600 --> 00:39:10,600
effectively as it could. 
And, you know, I'd love to see a

706
00:39:10,600 --> 00:39:14,900
road map, but a process and a 
method that equip see a 

707
00:39:14,900 --> 00:39:18,200
Personnel in a deployed 
environment to really be 

708
00:39:18,200 --> 00:39:21,800
investigators and to have again,
if you're anchored in that 

709
00:39:21,800 --> 00:39:24,000
process and in that method, 
right? 

710
00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:26,400
You can take on that. 
That intellectual creativity. 

711
00:39:26,400 --> 00:39:29,300
You can really investigate not 
with your, a scopa me, see 

712
00:39:29,300 --> 00:39:32,500
chart. 
But, you know, with kind of the 

713
00:39:32,500 --> 00:39:36,600
mindset somewhere between an 
intelligence officer and, you 

714
00:39:36,607 --> 00:39:39,000
know, an anthropologists 
sociologists type, but you're 

715
00:39:39,000 --> 00:39:43,000
really digging into things and 
exploring in a way that, you 

716
00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:45,400
know, from the very beginning. 
He's going to give you the 

717
00:39:45,400 --> 00:39:47,800
results that matter because of 
the questions you're asked, 

718
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:49,500
right? 
Because the lines of inquiry 

719
00:39:49,500 --> 00:39:51,700
raft. 
Well, Nick, I think you lay down

720
00:39:51,700 --> 00:39:54,800
a challenge here. 
I think this is a really good 

721
00:39:54,800 --> 00:39:56,700
chance. 
Is that I think the same 

722
00:39:56,700 --> 00:40:00,500
Community can rise to dr. 
Nicholas curly, great and waited

723
00:40:00,500 --> 00:40:01,600
up man. 
You've been there, you've done 

724
00:40:01,600 --> 00:40:04,400
that and I think I hope the 
people listen to what you have 

725
00:40:04,400 --> 00:40:11,300
to say here. 
Yeah, this is great. 

726
00:40:11,300 --> 00:40:14,500
Dr. Nicholas Corley, consulted 
researcher founder of for on 

727
00:40:14,500 --> 00:40:18,200
advisory and author of death of 
the muddy Army, sir. 

728
00:40:18,200 --> 00:40:20,100
Thank you very much for being 
the once a podcast. 

729
00:40:20,500 --> 00:40:22,000
Thank you all of us. 
Take care. 

730
00:40:27,200 --> 00:40:30,100
Thank you for spending some time
with us, please subscribe, and 

731
00:40:30,100 --> 00:40:33,800
come back for another 
installment of 1ca, until then. 

732
00:40:33,800 --> 00:40:35,600
Be safe and secure the victory.