1 00:00:05,900 --> 00:00:09,000 But for the once a podcast, this is your host Jack gains. 2 00:00:09,400 --> 00:00:12,700 When CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and 3 00:00:12,700 --> 00:00:16,200 brings in people who are current or former military diplomats 4 00:00:16,300 --> 00:00:19,000 development officers and field agents to discuss their 5 00:00:19,000 --> 00:00:21,500 experiences on ground with a partner Nations. 6 00:00:21,500 --> 00:00:25,000 People and Leadership our goal is to inspire anyone interested 7 00:00:25,000 --> 00:00:28,900 in working the last three feet of foreign relations to contact 8 00:00:28,900 --> 00:00:31,500 the show email us. Sat see a podcasting at 9 00:00:31,500 --> 00:00:34,900 gmail.com or look us up on the Civil Affairs association 10 00:00:34,900 --> 00:00:40,100 website at www.flcfs.org. I'll have those in the show 11 00:00:40,100 --> 00:00:42,400 notes. One in this guy said, hey, I 12 00:00:42,408 --> 00:00:46,300 want to get some background, he kept asking background stuff and 13 00:00:46,300 --> 00:00:48,600 it's like, okay, they knew where I was raised and what my 14 00:00:48,600 --> 00:00:50,600 favorite food was, but we never talked about anything 15 00:00:50,600 --> 00:00:54,800 substantive. Well, I would love to start with 16 00:00:54,800 --> 00:00:57,600 your conflict, negotiations background. 17 00:00:57,900 --> 00:01:01,700 And then move into your Work as a law enforcement officer and 18 00:01:01,700 --> 00:01:06,200 then go into anti-corruption and illicit networks and Canada. 19 00:01:06,200 --> 00:01:09,200 How about that? Okay, sounds great. 20 00:01:10,000 --> 00:01:12,900 Today, we welcome Calvin Christie, a retired member of 21 00:01:12,900 --> 00:01:17,200 the RCMP who've worked conflict negotiation, with the UN and 22 00:01:17,200 --> 00:01:19,600 Canadian Armed Forces during the Bosnian war. 23 00:01:19,900 --> 00:01:23,200 After the conflict Calvin, used his skills to also conduct 24 00:01:23,200 --> 00:01:26,700 International hostage negotiations and then got into 25 00:01:26,900 --> 00:01:29,800 counter criminal and state-sponsored threat Networks. 26 00:01:30,700 --> 00:01:33,900 In this episode Calvin talks about his experience in conflict 27 00:01:33,900 --> 00:01:37,200 and hostage, negotiation, and shares tips and tricks to help 28 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:40,000 people in the field with relationship building and 29 00:01:40,000 --> 00:01:42,900 negotiations. So, please join me in welcoming 30 00:01:42,900 --> 00:01:46,200 Calvin to the show, we'll probably where I first 31 00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:50,700 professionally was engaged in Conflict negotiations, other 32 00:01:50,700 --> 00:01:58,900 than the average normal police function or with was was 33 00:01:58,900 --> 00:02:05,000 probably On my first tour with the UN in the former Yugoslavia 34 00:02:05,000 --> 00:02:10,199 at the height of the war in 1993, where I was employed as a 35 00:02:10,199 --> 00:02:14,000 peacekeeper was the mission. But in reality quickly learned 36 00:02:14,000 --> 00:02:17,300 it was peacemaking because there was no peace to keep at that 37 00:02:17,300 --> 00:02:22,600 time, it started off with a Serbian military officer and his 38 00:02:22,600 --> 00:02:26,000 father being abducted and kidnapped by the Croatian 39 00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:31,600 military and then quickly evolve to a Counter Corrections, 40 00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:37,000 military officer, and others being kidnapped, and the warring 41 00:02:37,000 --> 00:02:40,400 parties were looking for people to assist and support. 42 00:02:40,500 --> 00:02:46,200 I was approached by the families of the warring parties and the 43 00:02:46,200 --> 00:02:51,400 families of the hostages and quickly got immersed in the 44 00:02:51,400 --> 00:02:53,800 world of conflict. Negotiations. 45 00:02:54,200 --> 00:02:57,900 And my background on it other than human Source cultivation or 46 00:02:57,900 --> 00:03:02,700 in my other job that I held. I was a drug enforcement at that 47 00:03:02,700 --> 00:03:06,800 time in Vancouver focused at Target team looking at Mother 48 00:03:06,800 --> 00:03:10,600 Ship operations globally and working with the Us and other 49 00:03:10,600 --> 00:03:14,400 International agencies in the early 90s. 50 00:03:14,400 --> 00:03:18,800 So you've learned Hewitt from working, basically, with leads 51 00:03:18,800 --> 00:03:20,900 in, on the ground, to track motherships. 52 00:03:20,900 --> 00:03:24,100 Now, that was part of it, but I have worked significant amount 53 00:03:24,100 --> 00:03:27,100 of human work in a number of criminal settings. 54 00:03:27,100 --> 00:03:30,600 It quickly transformed when I was in there, the former 55 00:03:30,600 --> 00:03:33,900 Yugoslavia to be very useful because of the similar skill 56 00:03:33,900 --> 00:03:36,500 set. IE, Rapport building, trust 57 00:03:36,500 --> 00:03:40,700 building something that was virtually absent in these type 58 00:03:40,700 --> 00:03:45,200 of settings, and probably one of the top skilled probably 59 00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:48,300 required in that, and I did that time know how to spell the word 60 00:03:48,300 --> 00:03:50,300 negotiation. And I learned it from the School 61 00:03:50,300 --> 00:03:51,700 of Hard Knocks. Right. 62 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:56,300 And you also had experienced some really traumatic moments. 63 00:03:56,800 --> 00:03:58,600 I remember in our last conversation, you're talking 64 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:02,000 about executions. Front of you and other events 65 00:04:02,000 --> 00:04:04,900 that were happening as you're trying to build trust with these 66 00:04:04,900 --> 00:04:07,500 groups. Yeah, I mean in this particular 67 00:04:07,500 --> 00:04:11,400 setting, there were significant exposure to traumatic situations 68 00:04:11,400 --> 00:04:15,900 because we were being used by the warring parties as a trust 69 00:04:15,900 --> 00:04:20,000 mechanism, in such things as missing persons which equate to 70 00:04:20,000 --> 00:04:23,700 mass Graves. So we were being used in shuttle 71 00:04:23,700 --> 00:04:27,700 diplomacy at that time. I was the first un person 72 00:04:27,700 --> 00:04:31,300 allowed and detention centers in the A war, like the military 73 00:04:31,300 --> 00:04:35,200 Detention Center going into those settings. 74 00:04:35,400 --> 00:04:39,800 Obviously, there was a significant issues farting 75 00:04:39,800 --> 00:04:44,300 torture and other type of situations and then when I 76 00:04:44,300 --> 00:04:47,900 wasn't in the detention centers, we were doing body exchanges 77 00:04:47,900 --> 00:04:52,400 which wasn't the most Pleasant type of negotiations I've ever 78 00:04:52,400 --> 00:04:53,400 done. And that was basically 79 00:04:53,400 --> 00:04:57,600 truckloads of bodies being swapped for truckloads of bodies 80 00:04:57,600 --> 00:04:59,900 on the other side. And I don't mean to drag you. 81 00:04:59,900 --> 00:05:03,000 Through all that, I apologize. No, that's okay. 82 00:05:03,000 --> 00:05:05,900 I'm fine with it. Well, the exposure, though. 83 00:05:06,000 --> 00:05:10,000 I know that's tough. But also, why were they dragging 84 00:05:10,000 --> 00:05:11,600 you into that type of negotiation? 85 00:05:11,600 --> 00:05:14,900 Was it to shock you or to see if you would break or to build 86 00:05:14,900 --> 00:05:18,200 trust what was going on the warring parties. 87 00:05:18,200 --> 00:05:23,000 In this particular case were genuinely interested in looking 88 00:05:23,000 --> 00:05:28,100 for people that could assist them to deal with this very 89 00:05:28,700 --> 00:05:33,200 acute. Lying perpetuating intense 90 00:05:33,200 --> 00:05:38,500 intractable conflict which again I reference the u.s. experience 91 00:05:38,500 --> 00:05:40,300 in. Vietnam, probably the one of the 92 00:05:40,300 --> 00:05:44,900 most aggravating open wounds of a war. 93 00:05:45,300 --> 00:05:49,000 Is that poww issue and the guy we're dealing with. 94 00:05:49,000 --> 00:05:52,800 I think we're genuinely knowing that they needed a third party 95 00:05:52,800 --> 00:05:55,400 to do it. I was a really young guy at that 96 00:05:55,400 --> 00:05:58,900 time. I was 29 years old and I came 97 00:05:58,900 --> 00:06:03,900 into that war of A year into it. There was a tens of thousands of 98 00:06:03,900 --> 00:06:07,000 un folks in it, but there weren't that many people that 99 00:06:07,000 --> 00:06:11,700 were stepping into this Arena full of atrocity and a lot of 100 00:06:11,700 --> 00:06:15,400 unpleasant experience. And so I think there was a 101 00:06:15,400 --> 00:06:17,200 genuine interest from the warring parties. 102 00:06:17,400 --> 00:06:20,200 They realized me that they trusted mechanism for shuttle 103 00:06:20,200 --> 00:06:23,500 diplomacy between the two different sides where they could 104 00:06:23,500 --> 00:06:27,100 build some trust amongst each other by sharing some very dark 105 00:06:27,100 --> 00:06:29,300 secrets that were going to put them in jeopardy. 106 00:06:29,800 --> 00:06:32,400 In terms of an international court and what we're going to 107 00:06:32,400 --> 00:06:36,600 get them jammed up or into a situation politically. 108 00:06:36,700 --> 00:06:39,400 Yeah, that's a tough role to be in the middle of. 109 00:06:39,800 --> 00:06:42,800 Yeah, it was a really tough role in it to be quite honest. 110 00:06:42,800 --> 00:06:49,000 It seems very surreal. I still reflect back on it and 111 00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:53,500 that's 30 years ago and it still seems not a little too, real 112 00:06:53,500 --> 00:06:56,100 completely surreal. Sure somebody growing up in 113 00:06:56,100 --> 00:06:59,200 Canada, the us or otherwise it's really hard to Fathom. 114 00:06:59,200 --> 00:07:02,700 Those type of Situations unless you have lived through them. 115 00:07:02,700 --> 00:07:05,400 And I I still even though I've lived through them I'm still 116 00:07:05,400 --> 00:07:07,000 kind of reflect on. Was that a dream? 117 00:07:07,500 --> 00:07:10,300 Yeah, I can. Imagine that it goes off into 118 00:07:10,300 --> 00:07:14,100 the back corners of your mind as this isn't really real. 119 00:07:14,100 --> 00:07:17,600 This is more of a Dreamscape than actually facing that 120 00:07:17,600 --> 00:07:20,400 reality. So and I apologize again for 121 00:07:20,400 --> 00:07:22,800 dragging you through it. I I just wanted to get some 122 00:07:22,800 --> 00:07:26,000 context about it. They Jackie, it's something. 123 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:28,800 I think that really important for people to talk about, I talk 124 00:07:28,800 --> 00:07:30,800 about it all the time. Universities when it keeps 125 00:07:30,800 --> 00:07:33,800 negotiations and everybody goes hey how do you do all those real 126 00:07:33,800 --> 00:07:37,400 interesting cool things and that's but I did them through 127 00:07:37,400 --> 00:07:40,200 the School of Hard Knocks and there's no shortcuts doing it 128 00:07:40,300 --> 00:07:47,200 and although probably I would safe to say that probably some 129 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:49,400 of the darkest moments of my life. 130 00:07:49,600 --> 00:07:53,200 They were probably some of the most rewarding cherished moments 131 00:07:53,200 --> 00:07:56,300 of my life including lifelong friendships that came out of it. 132 00:07:56,300 --> 00:08:00,900 So more positive than good okay. And Do you have any 133 00:08:00,900 --> 00:08:04,000 recommendations for folks that are working in the field on 134 00:08:04,000 --> 00:08:08,100 negotiations? I hope most of the people on 135 00:08:08,100 --> 00:08:11,600 this podcast are not dealing with that level of violence, or 136 00:08:11,600 --> 00:08:15,800 extreme Behavior, but I'm sure you had some takeaways, it's 137 00:08:15,800 --> 00:08:18,300 actually a great question. Probably one that you didn't 138 00:08:18,300 --> 00:08:22,300 think about, but a very good intuitive question, because, as 139 00:08:22,300 --> 00:08:24,700 I mentioned, I didn't know how to spell the negotiation, and 140 00:08:24,700 --> 00:08:27,800 I've spent 30 years trying to figure out what made it so 141 00:08:27,800 --> 00:08:31,000 successful when I didn't know. Know, anything about negotiation 142 00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:34,400 strategies tactics or processes? What made me? 143 00:08:34,408 --> 00:08:38,000 So successful in those moments and during that context, if I 144 00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:40,600 was to go, hey, what's the top three things? 145 00:08:40,600 --> 00:08:42,200 And I'm quick writing a panic in my head. 146 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:43,400 Go, what are the top three things? 147 00:08:45,300 --> 00:08:51,000 One comes to mind is genuine part driven empathy. 148 00:08:51,700 --> 00:08:55,000 I care for people, I respect people. 149 00:08:55,200 --> 00:08:58,500 I think I learnt that my childhood from two great parents 150 00:08:58,500 --> 00:09:03,300 that instilled Right virtues principle values and belief 151 00:09:03,300 --> 00:09:07,100 systems upon myself. And that drove me through the 152 00:09:07,100 --> 00:09:10,300 adversity of those difficult negotiations. 153 00:09:11,100 --> 00:09:16,100 The second thing I would probably suggest was just being 154 00:09:16,900 --> 00:09:22,000 really humbled in the process. And again, I learnt this from my 155 00:09:22,000 --> 00:09:27,400 family background and I was looking at these people, unlike 156 00:09:27,400 --> 00:09:30,000 other people were looking at them and probably kind of was 157 00:09:30,100 --> 00:09:35,500 Tied into my humans background and that was really looking at 158 00:09:35,700 --> 00:09:40,400 the people as people and not thinking I was smarter than they 159 00:09:40,400 --> 00:09:46,900 were because I realized that, although they were perhaps 160 00:09:47,500 --> 00:09:53,400 Farmers from a war-torn country or they weren't Western 161 00:09:53,400 --> 00:09:58,800 Democratic country. I always was cautious in terms 162 00:09:58,800 --> 00:10:03,600 of thinking They may always be smarter than myself and I kept 163 00:10:03,600 --> 00:10:07,100 that at the back of mine that allowed me to analyze and 164 00:10:07,100 --> 00:10:11,400 anticipate problems and issues and impediments and challenges 165 00:10:11,400 --> 00:10:13,600 and risks within the negotiation process. 166 00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:18,400 And I think the last one would probably be again more about a 167 00:10:18,400 --> 00:10:23,000 principle and value in terms of the negotiation process and I 168 00:10:23,008 --> 00:10:26,100 took that when I was dealing with these people as well. 169 00:10:26,200 --> 00:10:29,500 So those should probably be the creepy thing empathy the 170 00:10:29,500 --> 00:10:33,800 humbleness Us and the respect. And the empathy was my 171 00:10:33,800 --> 00:10:38,100 motivator. The humility was my analyzer and 172 00:10:38,100 --> 00:10:40,900 my respect I think was my report Builder. 173 00:10:40,900 --> 00:10:44,400 Interesting. I've ever heard of dissected 174 00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:46,400 that way. I've never heard it that way. 175 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:52,100 Till you ask the question and it's really simple is similar to 176 00:10:52,100 --> 00:10:57,900 Chris Voss who was the FBI's hostage negotiator for a long 177 00:10:57,900 --> 00:11:00,100 time until he retired and started his own. 178 00:11:00,200 --> 00:11:02,600 Phone book called Never split the difference. 179 00:11:03,400 --> 00:11:06,900 Yes, I mean Chris and I work together, I met Chris. 180 00:11:07,700 --> 00:11:13,000 After 9/11, coincidentally, the FBI had asked Chris as one of 181 00:11:13,000 --> 00:11:18,100 their negotiators to travel to Phoenix for a meeting after 9/11 182 00:11:18,500 --> 00:11:23,900 to develop best practices, Lessons Learned, better social, 183 00:11:23,900 --> 00:11:27,000 psychological theories to deal with terrorism. 184 00:11:27,400 --> 00:11:29,900 And at the same time, they ask Christy asked. 185 00:11:30,100 --> 00:11:34,600 Myself to attend the meetings, with Chris and we attended and 186 00:11:34,600 --> 00:11:36,600 met with dr. Roberts aldini. 187 00:11:36,600 --> 00:11:40,400 And that really gave us like unbelievable insight to the 188 00:11:40,600 --> 00:11:43,900 social psychology Laboratories and the research that I've done 189 00:11:43,900 --> 00:11:47,300 over several decades in the field of persuasion and 190 00:11:47,300 --> 00:11:51,600 influence, in negotiations with her tangentially, the names of 191 00:11:51,600 --> 00:11:54,100 his books, persuasion and influence. 192 00:11:54,100 --> 00:11:55,600 Yeah. Which I've read but they're 193 00:11:55,900 --> 00:12:00,000 terrific and insightful. The funny thing about it here, 194 00:12:00,200 --> 00:12:04,600 The books to document the practices of influence and 195 00:12:04,600 --> 00:12:07,000 persuasion. But when people read them, they 196 00:12:07,000 --> 00:12:10,000 flipped it to where they became the guidebook for creating 197 00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:12,100 influence and persuasion. Yes. 198 00:12:12,200 --> 00:12:15,000 And I think something that's not talked about those books for 199 00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:18,600 those that are interested in the field of negotiations and 200 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:22,100 conflict, almost like a curse. Because I had the benefit of 201 00:12:22,100 --> 00:12:27,000 studying it so much, you know, with the interaction with dr. 202 00:12:27,000 --> 00:12:29,500 Gel Deanie, and then subsequently. 203 00:12:30,100 --> 00:12:32,700 You know, traveling down there, taking courses through his 204 00:12:32,700 --> 00:12:36,200 research, more importantly, something that's not talked 205 00:12:36,200 --> 00:12:40,100 about it that much about them, which I think readers and many 206 00:12:40,100 --> 00:12:46,600 others would benefit is the ability to use his research for 207 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:51,000 defensive purposes. Not only offensive purposes, so 208 00:12:51,000 --> 00:12:55,200 he talks about how to use them to accelerate relationship, 209 00:12:55,200 --> 00:12:58,500 building and Trust building. But when you understand them, 210 00:12:58,800 --> 00:13:03,900 intimately, You can quickly identify and mitigate when 211 00:13:03,900 --> 00:13:10,300 others are using these methods against you in a non-genuine 212 00:13:10,300 --> 00:13:14,700 manipulative way, and try to very good defensive method. 213 00:13:14,700 --> 00:13:18,500 And sometimes it's a bit of a curse because you're having an 214 00:13:18,500 --> 00:13:20,600 interaction with somebody and they start doing it. 215 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:24,800 And all the sudden you start feeling as you're inside. 216 00:13:24,800 --> 00:13:27,800 Exact person starts going off your like, this guy's trying to 217 00:13:27,800 --> 00:13:29,300 work me. Yeah. 218 00:13:30,400 --> 00:13:33,200 Have you had that moment where you're in negotiations? 219 00:13:33,200 --> 00:13:37,100 And you're like, wait a minute. This guy's this guy's trying to 220 00:13:37,100 --> 00:13:39,900 push a button daily. I've got it. 221 00:13:39,900 --> 00:13:44,500 I've got a 16 year old stepson that tries to use them all the 222 00:13:44,500 --> 00:13:46,300 time. I read robbers books and he 223 00:13:46,300 --> 00:13:48,100 said, I'm going to try that one next. 224 00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:49,600 Yeah. Yeah. 225 00:13:50,500 --> 00:13:55,400 Where has the Walk of it? If you read some of the posts, 226 00:13:55,400 --> 00:13:59,200 you know, in the field of negotiations, there's built-in 227 00:13:59,500 --> 00:14:00,700 tackle. Generations. 228 00:14:00,700 --> 00:14:02,600 And some of the language is, sometimes I find. 229 00:14:02,600 --> 00:14:05,700 Yeah. I see all kinds of trigger words 230 00:14:05,700 --> 00:14:09,800 in posts as well as where they're trying to use emotive 231 00:14:09,800 --> 00:14:13,600 language in order to get you to sway one way or another, on an 232 00:14:13,600 --> 00:14:14,600 issue. Yeah. 233 00:14:15,200 --> 00:14:18,900 Okay. So this is where you were and 234 00:14:18,900 --> 00:14:22,700 now, you've been also working throughout Canada on spotting 235 00:14:22,900 --> 00:14:25,000 foreign malign influence. Yes. 236 00:14:25,000 --> 00:14:28,800 And Corruption, right? Yes, I did some back after 237 00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:31,900 several tours in the war. Or there and got involved with 238 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:35,200 Community complex. You know what I'm talking about, 239 00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:39,900 the violent kind of blockade, standoffs not as violent as 240 00:14:39,900 --> 00:14:42,900 Waco, but, you know, similar group dynamics, and then 241 00:14:43,200 --> 00:14:47,200 overseas dealing with a lot of terrorist incidents in terms of 242 00:14:47,200 --> 00:14:50,000 kidnappings, which you referred to earlier, in terms of the 243 00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:53,600 negotiations, where people were actually executed during the 244 00:14:53,600 --> 00:14:57,800 course of the negotiations. And then my work back here was 245 00:14:57,800 --> 00:15:02,200 in the investigative world. Essentially the majority of my 246 00:15:02,400 --> 00:15:08,400 career and then from about 2007 onward, involved transnational, 247 00:15:08,400 --> 00:15:12,900 organized crime activities, particularly with a focus on 248 00:15:13,000 --> 00:15:18,400 Chinese networks, Iranian networks, and cartel operations 249 00:15:18,400 --> 00:15:22,300 that continued until working intimately with the u.s. 250 00:15:22,300 --> 00:15:25,800 entities, including Special Operations, Division of the DEA, 251 00:15:25,800 --> 00:15:29,600 but also working with the FBI Homeland Security. 252 00:15:29,600 --> 00:15:32,600 And then In the broader context of the five eyes. 253 00:15:32,600 --> 00:15:40,900 And then in 2018, after working, in that space, I went into the 254 00:15:40,900 --> 00:15:46,600 private sector where I decided I had enough of the public sector. 255 00:15:47,100 --> 00:15:51,900 And I was about to try to Pivot into a new area that I quickly 256 00:15:51,900 --> 00:15:53,700 realized. I wasn't going to get social 257 00:15:53,700 --> 00:15:57,100 support from which was, I wanted to go be a bartender. 258 00:15:57,100 --> 00:15:59,900 And that lasted for about a day you got vetoed on being a 259 00:16:00,100 --> 00:16:02,300 Bartender, I got beat up for being a bartender. 260 00:16:03,000 --> 00:16:06,200 I didn't plan on retiring at all and you know, I thought I'd do 261 00:16:06,200 --> 00:16:08,600 another couple of years and then one day I just walked back to 262 00:16:08,600 --> 00:16:11,600 the office after the week of training with some young guys 263 00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:15,100 and I thought that was pretty enjoyable and then the next 264 00:16:15,100 --> 00:16:17,100 thought that went through my head was that that was fun. 265 00:16:17,100 --> 00:16:19,300 Working with the young guys, I never work with young guys, 266 00:16:19,300 --> 00:16:23,000 always work with these executive then I thought to myself, what 267 00:16:23,000 --> 00:16:25,600 the hell? I joined to have fun. 268 00:16:25,800 --> 00:16:29,000 What I'm doing is not fun anymore, dealing with freakin 269 00:16:29,000 --> 00:16:31,400 drama, and all this. Other stuff, I've done 270 00:16:31,400 --> 00:16:34,700 everything I've wanted to do right then there, I looked at my 271 00:16:34,700 --> 00:16:38,000 computer screen, turned it off. Back to my briefcase, never went 272 00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:43,500 back to work, just like that. I said to my wife, I am quitting 273 00:16:43,500 --> 00:16:47,400 RCMP and she goes, well, when taking a look at your weather, 274 00:16:47,800 --> 00:16:50,600 no, no. I'm sending the email tonight 275 00:16:51,100 --> 00:16:52,900 and it's so she says, well, what are you going to do? 276 00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:56,700 I says I got no fucking idea bartender. 277 00:16:57,200 --> 00:16:59,800 She Goes Over My Dead Body, you're not coming home at 4:00 278 00:16:59,800 --> 00:17:02,600 5:00 at night. You're you're an old bad you're 279 00:17:02,600 --> 00:17:06,900 not going to do that. That's you. 280 00:17:06,900 --> 00:17:08,800 Your boss is sitting at his desk right now. 281 00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:11,900 Looking at his watch going. I'll give him another 10 minutes 282 00:17:11,900 --> 00:17:14,200 on that break, and then I'm really going to call. 283 00:17:15,599 --> 00:17:19,200 Yeah, I wanted something completely different. 284 00:17:19,300 --> 00:17:22,500 I enjoy talking to people. Enjoy meeting new people and I 285 00:17:22,500 --> 00:17:25,800 enjoy Mixology. And Of Mescal and Tequila than 286 00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:27,900 that. But anyway, so I quickly then 287 00:17:27,900 --> 00:17:32,300 got dragged back into National Security, foreign State 288 00:17:32,300 --> 00:17:37,300 activity, transnational networks threats, risk and all of a 289 00:17:37,300 --> 00:17:40,000 sudden, I got out of it and it was back into on the private 290 00:17:40,000 --> 00:17:44,500 side with people being missed or disappearing in Syria. 291 00:17:44,900 --> 00:17:50,500 To then foreign operators, possibly targeting Canadian 292 00:17:50,500 --> 00:17:54,400 businessmen to illicit Finance issues, Etc. 293 00:17:54,400 --> 00:17:57,600 So I got involved in that in the private sector and it continued 294 00:17:57,600 --> 00:18:01,100 to be with the critical risk team, which is a collective 295 00:18:01,100 --> 00:18:06,000 group managed by three of us inclusive of my American 296 00:18:06,200 --> 00:18:08,900 business partner. I Mark far, he's former FBI out 297 00:18:08,900 --> 00:18:12,700 of Miami and the three of us are in this space. 298 00:18:12,800 --> 00:18:17,000 Working in the private sector with c-suite Executives law 299 00:18:17,000 --> 00:18:22,400 firms investing companies ngos. But a lot of our work is in that 300 00:18:22,400 --> 00:18:28,800 space of the Contemporary risks and threats posed for an 301 00:18:28,800 --> 00:18:33,000 actor's, not all. But a fair amount of our work is 302 00:18:33,000 --> 00:18:35,700 in that space and we're very Boutique and we've got people 303 00:18:35,700 --> 00:18:38,600 from our intelligence backgrounds, from military, 304 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:41,400 backgrounds, and ourselves, and police backgrounds, obviously, 305 00:18:41,500 --> 00:18:43,700 working in that space with our clients. 306 00:18:43,800 --> 00:18:47,400 And from that, you started to see criminality in Canada, 307 00:18:47,400 --> 00:18:52,700 right? I started seeing those State 308 00:18:52,700 --> 00:18:56,700 actors in that high level stuff back in 2007 and continued to 309 00:18:56,700 --> 00:18:59,000 see it. Till the time I left the federal 310 00:18:59,000 --> 00:19:03,300 police force, then I went into the private sector and I 311 00:19:03,300 --> 00:19:08,100 thought, you know, I'm going to miss that Intrigue and insight 312 00:19:08,100 --> 00:19:11,900 relative to what's going on in the after dark, so to speak. 313 00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:15,400 And then I got involved in the private side and I realized 314 00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:18,800 quite quickly. My visibility on the private 315 00:19:18,800 --> 00:19:23,700 side was equal to to what I was seeing on the government side 316 00:19:23,700 --> 00:19:28,000 because so much of as to what was going on in the cities and 317 00:19:28,008 --> 00:19:32,100 the communities in the corporate board rooms in the law, offices 318 00:19:32,100 --> 00:19:36,100 was concerning in terms of foreign State actors and the 319 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:40,200 illicit activities that were taking place, but nobody was 320 00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:43,400 talking to the government or the police about it because of the 321 00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:46,600 reputational risk issue. So it was this almost 322 00:19:46,600 --> 00:19:50,500 underground track environment. This invisible wall between 323 00:19:50,500 --> 00:19:52,500 government. The private sector in this 324 00:19:52,500 --> 00:19:54,200 space. Yeah, there's definitely a wall 325 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:56,300 between private practice and the government. 326 00:19:57,300 --> 00:20:00,200 Do you want to talk a little bit about global competition from 327 00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:03,900 your perspective in Canada? Yeah, the lens here is very 328 00:20:03,900 --> 00:20:06,800 clear. We are the fourth largest port 329 00:20:06,800 --> 00:20:12,600 in North America, Long Beach, La New York, then Vancouver. 330 00:20:13,200 --> 00:20:17,700 The reality is in terms of illicit activities, and 331 00:20:17,700 --> 00:20:22,800 Cornbread, actives are equal to Any of those large cities and 332 00:20:22,800 --> 00:20:27,400 maybe even greater than New York greater than LA and greater than 333 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:28,800 Long Beach. Why? 334 00:20:29,900 --> 00:20:37,500 Because in Long Beach LA and New York, you have the FBI, you've 335 00:20:37,500 --> 00:20:43,800 got the homeland security, you've got DEA, you have all the 336 00:20:43,800 --> 00:20:49,600 other federal agencies you have a very robust legal system and 337 00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:54,300 authorities compared to what We have here and our legal system, 338 00:20:54,600 --> 00:21:00,700 constrains us significantly. So what we see here particularly 339 00:21:00,700 --> 00:21:05,900 in Toronto and Vancouver is the convergence of the threat 340 00:21:05,900 --> 00:21:11,200 activities, and the threat actor was from the Iranian networks, 341 00:21:11,300 --> 00:21:17,500 and from the Chinese that are collaborating with the cartel 342 00:21:17,900 --> 00:21:22,000 and when I watch Netflix, when I push, Just came out the show. 343 00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:23,600 Narcos, yes. Okay. 344 00:21:23,600 --> 00:21:27,000 When I came home to watch it it was like the continuation of my 345 00:21:27,000 --> 00:21:30,300 working day, the same names, the same family. 346 00:21:30,300 --> 00:21:33,100 The people were flying in the people were flying out. 347 00:21:33,100 --> 00:21:36,800 I don't mean that just the same part tells I'm not talking about 348 00:21:36,800 --> 00:21:41,100 just the Sinaloa, not just the Guadalajara, not just the Zetas, 349 00:21:41,100 --> 00:21:42,300 or whatever. I'm talking about. 350 00:21:42,300 --> 00:21:46,300 The real people and characters and leaders of the cartel, or 351 00:21:46,500 --> 00:21:49,600 their brother, or their wife, or their daughter, or whatever 352 00:21:49,600 --> 00:21:52,700 else, right they can. Urgency of for transshipment. 353 00:21:52,700 --> 00:21:54,900 So the world's largest New Market. 354 00:21:55,400 --> 00:21:57,900 So what are you gonna do? Throw it on a whole bunch of 355 00:21:57,900 --> 00:22:01,600 trucks. 2,000 trucks, a day coming across the border and 356 00:22:01,600 --> 00:22:02,900 three or four them, or five of them. 357 00:22:02,900 --> 00:22:04,100 Are going to have something on it. 358 00:22:04,600 --> 00:22:07,600 That was the whole strategy rather than doing a large 359 00:22:07,600 --> 00:22:10,600 shipments. Guzman took the answer mentality 360 00:22:10,800 --> 00:22:13,900 and sent 2010. If we pick off, you know, one 361 00:22:13,900 --> 00:22:17,200 answer to answer every couple of weeks or a month, it really 362 00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:20,400 wasn't going to have any negative impact in terms of risk 363 00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:22,000 considerations. Options for himself and his 364 00:22:22,000 --> 00:22:25,500 operations in the both. The load is a lot more but it's 365 00:22:25,500 --> 00:22:28,100 very similar to smurfing. Yeah, cool. 366 00:22:28,100 --> 00:22:33,000 Very, very wise intelligence risk management strategy, on 367 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:36,200 behalf of the cartels and then it had the two networks that 368 00:22:36,200 --> 00:22:39,600 were desperately interested in collaborating, and that was the 369 00:22:39,600 --> 00:22:43,000 Chinese networks and the Iranian networks. 370 00:22:43,000 --> 00:22:49,200 So the illicit criminal networks, the Chinese mobs, your 371 00:22:49,200 --> 00:22:52,200 rainy ins and probably the North Answer sounds like have some 372 00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:56,900 connection with the cartels. Yeah, we saw in Vancouver and 373 00:22:56,900 --> 00:23:01,900 Toronto, significant Iranian networks, and Chinese networks 374 00:23:01,900 --> 00:23:06,100 with the cartels. And we saw that in the narcos, 375 00:23:06,100 --> 00:23:10,400 fear the money laundering domain and now, the interconnectivity, 376 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:15,100 between these Narco issues and illicit Finance issues and I 377 00:23:15,100 --> 00:23:17,900 reference a book that squinted at least being in front of me 378 00:23:17,900 --> 00:23:20,900 called willful blindness written by Sam Cooper. 379 00:23:20,900 --> 00:23:25,200 A documented this and then it got into the political foreign 380 00:23:25,200 --> 00:23:29,500 interference, the corruption, the Espionage, the fentanyl 381 00:23:29,900 --> 00:23:33,900 issues on and on and on and a lot of people don't realize the 382 00:23:33,900 --> 00:23:37,600 fentanyl to actually took place on the streets of Vancouver 383 00:23:37,600 --> 00:23:41,200 before anywhere else. When we first started seeing it, 384 00:23:41,200 --> 00:23:44,200 there was hardly anything in the US. 385 00:23:44,600 --> 00:23:49,000 And when you look at the main players globally in the world, 386 00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:54,600 you'll see that a lot. Them have ties to Vancouver in 387 00:23:54,600 --> 00:23:57,600 terms of the top Triads. And coincidentally, we were 388 00:23:57,600 --> 00:24:01,300 seeing a lot of family members of the top cartel folks hanging 389 00:24:01,300 --> 00:24:06,500 out here regularly, the approach is incongruent with the needs to 390 00:24:06,500 --> 00:24:11,800 deal with the threats, right? So do you see it as a risk to 391 00:24:11,800 --> 00:24:13,900 them? Being in the five eyes? 392 00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:18,700 Yeah, the conversations I've had inside and now, I can safely say 393 00:24:18,700 --> 00:24:21,600 I'm sorry. There has been in a growing 394 00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:25,700 increasing concern with Canada within the five eyes. 395 00:24:25,800 --> 00:24:29,500 And I think we saw, you know, the response to that with the 396 00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:31,900 security pact. Because this. 397 00:24:31,900 --> 00:24:36,000 Yeah, and, you know, there was a lot of suggesting that it was 398 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:40,900 just a, some packed when most other people already anticipated 399 00:24:40,900 --> 00:24:43,800 in suspected. It was much more and then as its 400 00:24:43,800 --> 00:24:47,100 evolved in a very short time in the last whatever it is year or 401 00:24:47,100 --> 00:24:50,800 less, you know, Quantum came into being another technology. 402 00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:54,100 These are going to have huge huge impact on National 403 00:24:54,100 --> 00:24:59,300 Security. I think Canada sadly got pendant 404 00:24:59,300 --> 00:25:05,100 on China, not only financially but politically right it becomes 405 00:25:05,100 --> 00:25:07,200 undeniable to the infrastructure. 406 00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:11,300 I really don't think that there's a real good public 407 00:25:11,300 --> 00:25:16,700 dialogue in Canada from anyone everybody I look at that's 408 00:25:16,700 --> 00:25:20,800 engaged in this seems to be influence and compromise. 409 00:25:20,900 --> 00:25:24,200 We based on where their funding sources are, you know, and 410 00:25:24,200 --> 00:25:28,100 that's that that includes even the ngos and there's an 411 00:25:28,100 --> 00:25:33,500 increasing concern with, in some Circles of Academia and think 412 00:25:33,500 --> 00:25:37,000 tanks that. Even some of the ngos have been 413 00:25:37,000 --> 00:25:39,700 influenced to take a term out there. 414 00:25:39,700 --> 00:25:42,400 I don't think there is such a term, but I'll make it up today 415 00:25:43,000 --> 00:25:47,500 to vanilla lie. The Narrative on the degree of 416 00:25:47,500 --> 00:25:49,900 concerns and thread activities in Canada. 417 00:25:50,200 --> 00:25:53,200 Sure. This is one of the challenges we 418 00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:57,300 promote interdependency because we're trying to keep a global 419 00:25:57,300 --> 00:26:01,400 economic system afloat, but we do it in a way to where we try 420 00:26:01,400 --> 00:26:05,600 to leverage Partners in order to gain foreign policy goals. 421 00:26:05,900 --> 00:26:09,000 But it's a double-edged sword because countries like China and 422 00:26:09,000 --> 00:26:11,900 Russia. They also know the skill of 423 00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:17,400 diplomacy and inner tangling of economics and politics and it 424 00:26:17,400 --> 00:26:23,200 can be just as impactful to us. And it's a challenge to try to 425 00:26:23,200 --> 00:26:26,600 keep that balance. It is a particularly, with our 426 00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:29,500 political systems, you know where we're on these 4-year 427 00:26:29,500 --> 00:26:33,500 cycles and these other people are on these 10, 15 years 428 00:26:33,500 --> 00:26:35,800 Cycles. They just let themselves in the 429 00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:38,600 power for as long as they want. Yeah. 430 00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:41,800 And they're in the game of chess and we're in the game of 52 431 00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:44,700 Pickup. Everything that we're doing is 432 00:26:44,700 --> 00:26:48,500 reactionary. Extremely concerned about it. 433 00:26:48,700 --> 00:26:52,800 Yeah, I can see why. Good strategy, you can't compete 434 00:26:52,800 --> 00:26:56,600 with another person strategy. I was explaining to a friend of 435 00:26:56,600 --> 00:27:02,000 mine about Taiwan and that is, if their narrative only focuses 436 00:27:02,000 --> 00:27:07,300 on their relationship to China, then China has already won until 437 00:27:07,300 --> 00:27:11,700 Taiwan builds. Its own Narrative of how it 438 00:27:11,700 --> 00:27:15,300 positions itself in the world and its relationship to the 439 00:27:15,300 --> 00:27:19,000 International Community. It will never overcome the 440 00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:20,700 conditions that it's in right now. 441 00:27:20,900 --> 00:27:27,000 Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, we are almost up to an 442 00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:29,600 hour. Is there any last thoughts? 443 00:27:31,100 --> 00:27:33,700 Well, I don't know if it fits. I can make it fit, but I guess 444 00:27:33,700 --> 00:27:37,800 I'm the editor. Throw it out and probably 445 00:27:37,800 --> 00:27:40,000 because it ties back to the original part of the 446 00:27:40,008 --> 00:27:43,900 conversation. You know, if that we all take 447 00:27:43,900 --> 00:27:47,600 the time to reflect and ensure that we're doing our due 448 00:27:47,600 --> 00:27:51,200 diligence and making efforts to do the right thing to protect 449 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:54,700 the interest of the Next Generation like others before us 450 00:27:54,700 --> 00:27:56,400 did. I said, that's an excellent 451 00:27:56,400 --> 00:27:58,100 close. I appreciate that. 452 00:28:00,700 --> 00:28:03,200 Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like 453 00:28:03,200 --> 00:28:06,400 And subscribe, and rate the show on your favorite podcast 454 00:28:06,400 --> 00:28:09,100 platform. Also, if you're interested in 455 00:28:09,100 --> 00:28:12,600 coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at see a 456 00:28:12,608 --> 00:28:16,500 podcasting at gmail.com? I'll have the email and see 457 00:28:16,500 --> 00:28:18,600 association website in the show notes. 458 00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:21,900 And now most importantly to those currently out in the 459 00:28:21,900 --> 00:28:25,200 field, working with a partner Nations, people or leadership to 460 00:28:25,200 --> 00:28:28,200 forward us relations. Thank you all for what you're 461 00:28:28,200 --> 00:28:31,800 doing. This is Jack your host, stay 462 00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:35,200 tuned for more great episodes. 1, c a podcast. 463 00:28:29,700 --> 00:28:34,500 Jack your host, stay tuned for more great episodes. 1, c a 464 00:28:34,500 --> 00:28:35,200 podcast.