1 00:00:02,400 --> 00:00:04,600 Welcome to the YMCA podcast. This is Jack. 2 00:00:05,300 --> 00:00:07,900 Today, we are bringing in a special episode from The 3 00:00:07,900 --> 00:00:12,000 Irregular Warfare podcast. Also a special shout-out to 4 00:00:12,000 --> 00:00:14,000 Benjamin web for helping make this happen. 5 00:00:14,600 --> 00:00:18,500 Episode 66 is called Slow Burn. How US security cooperation 6 00:00:18,500 --> 00:00:21,900 shapes operational environments, it has a great discussion 7 00:00:21,900 --> 00:00:25,400 between retired lieutenant general Mark, hertling Professor 8 00:00:25,500 --> 00:00:29,200 Derrick reveron from the US Naval War college and host been 9 00:00:29,200 --> 00:00:33,000 web and barrette. Elias episode is full and uncut 10 00:00:33,100 --> 00:00:35,800 and I wanted to share it because it's relevant to the last three 11 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:39,800 feet of foreign policy and to introduce our listeners to The 12 00:00:39,800 --> 00:00:43,400 Irregular Warfare podcast and its sponsor the Modern Warfare 13 00:00:43,400 --> 00:00:55,200 Institute. Enjoy you can't search trust is 14 00:00:55,200 --> 00:00:58,500 the old phrase that you have to build that trust throughout. 15 00:00:58,500 --> 00:01:01,700 And so we have we are training. Earning together, if we are 16 00:01:01,700 --> 00:01:05,000 working together, when an international crisis does occur, 17 00:01:05,099 --> 00:01:07,600 we can deploy together because we're interoperable. 18 00:01:10,100 --> 00:01:13,400 And when you're talking about this security cooperation, you 19 00:01:13,400 --> 00:01:17,600 have to consider a push and a pull system in Afghanistan. 20 00:01:17,600 --> 00:01:21,200 It was a push system. We were pushing things to them, 21 00:01:21,500 --> 00:01:25,000 they wanted us to fight for them and Ukraine. 22 00:01:25,000 --> 00:01:31,400 It's been a full system. Welcome to episode 66 at The 23 00:01:31,400 --> 00:01:33,200 Irregular. Warfare podcast. 24 00:01:33,400 --> 00:01:36,300 I'm your host Ben Jeb and I'm pleased to introduce today's 25 00:01:36,300 --> 00:01:40,100 special guest host. Dr. Barbara Elias, today's 26 00:01:40,100 --> 00:01:43,200 episode, explores irregular warfare in the context of 27 00:01:43,200 --> 00:01:47,000 European security, cooperation. Our Guest today Begin by 28 00:01:47,000 --> 00:01:48,900 addressing. Why the US military? 29 00:01:48,900 --> 00:01:52,500 Adopt the global strategy of security cooperation, they then 30 00:01:52,500 --> 00:01:55,300 examine the range of activities that fall under the umbrella 31 00:01:55,300 --> 00:01:58,600 term of security cooperation and compare and contrast. 32 00:01:58,700 --> 00:02:02,200 Last building partner capacity, conventional operations, first 33 00:02:02,200 --> 00:02:05,400 irregular, warfare activities. Finally, they invite talking 34 00:02:05,400 --> 00:02:08,600 about how past military cooperation efforts, have shaped 35 00:02:08,600 --> 00:02:11,100 today's Regional environment in Eastern Europe. 36 00:02:11,200 --> 00:02:14,300 What America can do to optimize its approach to security 37 00:02:14,300 --> 00:02:18,200 cooperation in the future. Tenants General, Mark hertling 38 00:02:18,400 --> 00:02:22,200 is a national security and Military analyst for CNN overs, 39 00:02:22,200 --> 00:02:25,100 38-year long career, in the military lieutenant, general 40 00:02:25,100 --> 00:02:28,600 hurtling served or commanded at every level from the tomb. 41 00:02:28,700 --> 00:02:33,100 Field Army in 2013, he retired from the military is a 42 00:02:33,100 --> 00:02:35,100 Commanding General of US Army Europe. 43 00:02:35,700 --> 00:02:38,000 The kind of Journal grilling graduated from West Point in 44 00:02:38,000 --> 00:02:42,300 1975 and holds Advanced degrees from Indiana University, 45 00:02:42,500 --> 00:02:45,300 National Defense University and Rowland's college. 46 00:02:47,100 --> 00:02:50,500 Professor Derrick, reverend in the chair of National Security 47 00:02:50,500 --> 00:02:54,100 Affairs at the US, Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island. 48 00:02:54,400 --> 00:02:57,300 He is also a reserve. Naval officer who has testified 49 00:02:57,300 --> 00:02:59,800 before the house armed services. His committee on security 50 00:02:59,800 --> 00:03:02,800 cooperation programs and has published multiple books and 51 00:03:02,800 --> 00:03:05,900 research articles on US. Military cooperation, efforts 52 00:03:05,900 --> 00:03:09,700 around the world. The second edition of his 2016 53 00:03:09,700 --> 00:03:13,000 book exporting, security serves as the anchor for today's 54 00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:16,200 conversation, you are listening to The Irregular Warfare 55 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:18,300 podcast. A joint production of the 56 00:03:18,300 --> 00:03:21,300 Princeton empirical studies of conflict project and the Modern 57 00:03:21,300 --> 00:03:23,800 War Institute. At West Point, dedicated to 58 00:03:23,808 --> 00:03:26,600 Bridging, the Gap between Scholars and practitioners to 59 00:03:26,600 --> 00:03:28,500 support the community of irregular warfare. 60 00:03:28,700 --> 00:03:31,000 Professionals. Here's our conversation with 61 00:03:31,000 --> 00:03:34,100 Lieutenant General Mark hertling and Professor Derrick reveron 62 00:03:35,700 --> 00:03:38,900 General hurtling, dr. Ron thanks for joining us on the 63 00:03:38,908 --> 00:03:41,400 irregular warfare podcast today, it's great to have you on the 64 00:03:41,400 --> 00:03:43,600 show. Hey, it's great to be here. 65 00:03:44,000 --> 00:03:46,100 It's really good to be with you Ben and thanks so much for 66 00:03:46,100 --> 00:03:50,300 having us Dr. Reverend you've literally written the book on 67 00:03:50,300 --> 00:03:52,800 security cooperation. So I was hoping you could 68 00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:57,200 explain and its most basic form what security cooperation is and 69 00:03:57,200 --> 00:03:59,600 what is the logic that undergirds building the military 70 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:02,400 capacity of America's Partners around the world? 71 00:04:02,900 --> 00:04:06,100 Yeah, I think simply security cooperation is really just 72 00:04:06,100 --> 00:04:10,200 military-to-military relations and there's probably four basic 73 00:04:10,200 --> 00:04:12,000 Dimensions as I think through it. 74 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:15,600 You know, first is just relationship building and that 75 00:04:15,600 --> 00:04:18,899 could be everything from hosting Ting officers from other 76 00:04:18,899 --> 00:04:21,899 countries at our professional military schools like the naval 77 00:04:21,899 --> 00:04:25,900 war college and West Point also just key leader engagements so 78 00:04:25,900 --> 00:04:28,800 when our military leaders throughout the ranks, just 79 00:04:28,800 --> 00:04:32,500 engage with other officers and ncos throughout the world. 80 00:04:32,500 --> 00:04:35,600 A second, I think often has to do with access. 81 00:04:35,600 --> 00:04:40,000 The u.s. is a global power. Its defense strategy has very 82 00:04:40,000 --> 00:04:41,900 much been characterized by, right? 83 00:04:41,900 --> 00:04:45,300 Forward engagement, at least since World War Two and probably 84 00:04:45,300 --> 00:04:48,700 even go before then. And so, we were Rely on our 85 00:04:48,700 --> 00:04:53,400 partners to provide critical base access host access to 86 00:04:53,400 --> 00:04:56,800 facilitate us defense strategy and I think us defense strategy 87 00:04:56,800 --> 00:05:00,200 is very much intertwined with our relationships, whether it's 88 00:05:00,200 --> 00:05:03,800 in Europe in the UK, Germany, Italy, and other countries, or 89 00:05:03,800 --> 00:05:06,800 in Asia, and Japan, South Korea, Australia. 90 00:05:07,200 --> 00:05:10,100 I think a third dimension. And probably what most people 91 00:05:10,100 --> 00:05:12,700 think about is really sort of the hardware part that 92 00:05:12,700 --> 00:05:16,700 capability and Congress provides a lot of support to many 93 00:05:16,700 --> 00:05:18,700 countries around the world. World through foreign military 94 00:05:18,700 --> 00:05:20,900 financing. So this enables a country for 95 00:05:20,900 --> 00:05:25,000 example, like Israel to buy F-35 and to improve their air defense 96 00:05:25,000 --> 00:05:27,500 perspective and then developing capacity. 97 00:05:27,500 --> 00:05:30,300 And so the types of things that components lead. 98 00:05:30,300 --> 00:05:32,600 So General hurtling when it was Army component commander in 99 00:05:32,600 --> 00:05:36,000 Europe, doing our exercises, bilateral multilateral with our 100 00:05:36,000 --> 00:05:40,300 European Partners to and able to deploy those forces in 101 00:05:40,300 --> 00:05:44,100 operations where they're often in Coalition and in terms of the 102 00:05:44,100 --> 00:05:47,400 logic, you know, I sort of see two basic things that kind of, 103 00:05:47,407 --> 00:05:50,700 uh, Gerd all this, you know, one is a term I use just security 104 00:05:50,700 --> 00:05:53,700 deficit. So this is when a country cannot 105 00:05:53,700 --> 00:05:57,300 meet its National Security obligations without us 106 00:05:57,300 --> 00:05:59,300 assistance. And so this can be up at the 107 00:05:59,300 --> 00:06:03,000 high end, you know, for example, the US and Japan partner and 108 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:07,300 many dimensions and in Japan seeks to deter Chinese 109 00:06:07,300 --> 00:06:10,800 aggression and it could be a more traditional lens, you know, 110 00:06:10,800 --> 00:06:13,900 supporting counterinsurgency counterterrorism operations in 111 00:06:13,900 --> 00:06:17,100 Nigeria or in Colombia. So security deficit is sort of 112 00:06:17,108 --> 00:06:19,500 my first Explanation. And then maybe my second one, 113 00:06:19,700 --> 00:06:21,900 the more pragmatic and this always gets into the questions 114 00:06:21,900 --> 00:06:24,500 about how do we know this stuff works in the assessment? 115 00:06:24,500 --> 00:06:27,000 I think, you know, Coalition, Warfare is a norm. 116 00:06:27,300 --> 00:06:32,400 And so when I start looking out and saying, how effective is, as 117 00:06:32,400 --> 00:06:36,500 I look at the wars, the US has been engaged in Afghanistan 118 00:06:36,500 --> 00:06:39,400 Iraq. Smaller operations in Syria in 119 00:06:39,400 --> 00:06:42,500 East Africa. And I say are those countries 120 00:06:42,500 --> 00:06:44,700 that we partnered with trained with? 121 00:06:44,700 --> 00:06:49,000 Are they serving with us in our Listen combat formations. 122 00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:51,100 And so to me, that's kind of a really important assessment 123 00:06:51,100 --> 00:06:55,700 tool, that was an unbelievably, strong definition, and hit every 124 00:06:55,700 --> 00:06:58,800 aspect of it. What I would say, you know, when 125 00:06:58,800 --> 00:07:02,500 we're talking to an army audience, most younger officers 126 00:07:02,500 --> 00:07:06,900 and ncos have no idea, the amount of effort that goes into 127 00:07:06,900 --> 00:07:11,500 security cooperation, building, partners and alliances, but it's 128 00:07:11,500 --> 00:07:15,000 one of those kind of things. You can't wait for a conflict to 129 00:07:15,000 --> 00:07:18,400 start to begin building it, and it's all, About truthfully 130 00:07:18,400 --> 00:07:21,800 generating, trust generating an understanding of each other's 131 00:07:21,800 --> 00:07:26,100 way of conducting operations. And having an understanding of 132 00:07:26,100 --> 00:07:30,000 just the way an organization works from leadership to 133 00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:35,300 maneuver, to Logistics support intelligence-sharing completely 134 00:07:35,300 --> 00:07:38,100 down the line. So, I think is there just said, 135 00:07:38,100 --> 00:07:40,400 you know, a lot of people get the feeling that it's mainly 136 00:07:40,400 --> 00:07:43,700 just partnering. But as the Commander in Europe, 137 00:07:43,700 --> 00:07:47,400 I did not realize this until I became the G3 of Europe and 138 00:07:47,600 --> 00:07:50,900 2005. But the component commanders 139 00:07:50,900 --> 00:07:55,400 also have an unbelievably strong connections with the defense 140 00:07:55,400 --> 00:07:59,400 attache is in every country because of Acquisitions because 141 00:07:59,400 --> 00:08:03,500 of the selling of equipment and how the embassy staff literally 142 00:08:03,500 --> 00:08:05,100 works with the foreign government. 143 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:09,100 It's fascinating to me that is both the G3 and the commander of 144 00:08:09,100 --> 00:08:12,100 US Army Europe. I was almost spending more time 145 00:08:12,100 --> 00:08:16,500 with embassies and ambassadorial Country teams than I was with 146 00:08:16,500 --> 00:08:19,400 soldiers on the train. In ground because you do have to 147 00:08:19,400 --> 00:08:22,600 sort of divvy up responsibilities to work with 148 00:08:22,600 --> 00:08:24,700 other countries as well as other armies. 149 00:08:24,900 --> 00:08:28,400 There was a great book written by a former boss of mine who now 150 00:08:28,400 --> 00:08:32,000 runs his own, Think Tank, the Quincy Institute Andrew 151 00:08:32,000 --> 00:08:34,400 bacevich. His very first book was entitled 152 00:08:34,400 --> 00:08:38,700 diplomats and khaki and what he talks about is the military, 153 00:08:38,700 --> 00:08:42,600 literally building the strength of not only foreign armies, but 154 00:08:42,700 --> 00:08:45,400 often times foreign governments and I hope we talk about that a 155 00:08:45,408 --> 00:08:47,900 little bit today. I would say that we Need to come 156 00:08:47,900 --> 00:08:49,300 back to. These are foreign policy 157 00:08:49,300 --> 00:08:52,000 programs right there. Foreign policy programs that 158 00:08:52,000 --> 00:08:55,700 have a defense character because many countries face a security 159 00:08:55,700 --> 00:08:58,700 dilemma, you know, both from internal and external threats 160 00:08:58,700 --> 00:09:01,500 and all that assistance is coordinated through the US 161 00:09:01,500 --> 00:09:04,500 ambassador and I know we'll talk about Ukraine in a little while. 162 00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:07,000 And certainly the secretary state blinken has been very much 163 00:09:07,000 --> 00:09:10,600 out front on this ensuring that the u.s. and the 50 or so 164 00:09:10,600 --> 00:09:13,900 countries are well organized to support Ukraine. 165 00:09:14,300 --> 00:09:17,000 So, it seems like security cooperation is an umbrella term 166 00:09:17,000 --> 00:09:20,400 that covers Purrs a vast array of activities, it covers 167 00:09:20,400 --> 00:09:23,300 traditional warfighting Concepts but also addresses military 168 00:09:23,300 --> 00:09:26,400 education efforts to professionalize the officer and 169 00:09:26,400 --> 00:09:29,600 NCO Corps and even delves into humanitarian assistance in 170 00:09:29,600 --> 00:09:31,300 governance. So dr. 171 00:09:31,300 --> 00:09:34,200 Reverend could you provide us with a brief field survey of the 172 00:09:34,200 --> 00:09:36,700 different domains covered under security cooperation? 173 00:09:37,900 --> 00:09:41,100 So the landscape is pretty big, so we could start with Hardware 174 00:09:41,100 --> 00:09:44,400 because it often gets like the most attention and as I think 175 00:09:44,400 --> 00:09:48,700 about the comparative advantage, the United States has in the 176 00:09:48,700 --> 00:09:53,100 defense industry is huge. If you are Japan and you wanted 177 00:09:53,100 --> 00:09:56,800 to buy a fifth-generation fighter, your choices of where 178 00:09:56,800 --> 00:10:01,200 to do that are pretty slim and so you look to the US and then 179 00:10:01,200 --> 00:10:05,300 you look at a program like F-35 which you know has been derided 180 00:10:05,300 --> 00:10:07,600 for decades is the most expensive. 181 00:10:07,800 --> 00:10:11,200 Single program in the defense department, but the program has 182 00:10:11,200 --> 00:10:13,600 been internationalized. I think it's about up to 15 183 00:10:13,600 --> 00:10:16,500 countries with Finland, maybe the latest country kind of 184 00:10:16,508 --> 00:10:20,400 adding on to it. And so the US defense sector is 185 00:10:20,400 --> 00:10:24,100 significant in the world and so Hardware, exports are critical 186 00:10:24,700 --> 00:10:28,200 second training and I hope to hear more about the time. 187 00:10:28,200 --> 00:10:32,100 General hurtling spent at Grafton ver because US military 188 00:10:32,100 --> 00:10:35,400 are really well. Trained and professional in this 189 00:10:35,400 --> 00:10:39,700 goes throughout the ranks and I Think the ncos that we develop 190 00:10:39,700 --> 00:10:43,000 in the United States are somewhat unique and many 191 00:10:43,000 --> 00:10:46,700 countries, look to model on how we do NCO development. 192 00:10:46,800 --> 00:10:50,500 And in addition to just regular combat training so our training 193 00:10:50,500 --> 00:10:54,400 base is significant and very important and admired. 194 00:10:54,500 --> 00:10:57,200 So you have Hardware, you've got the training that goes related 195 00:10:57,200 --> 00:11:00,800 to that and then I would say, you know, just the cooperation 196 00:11:00,800 --> 00:11:02,800 that happens on a day-to-day basis. 197 00:11:02,900 --> 00:11:06,700 So if I start with Coalition Warfare as a norm and general 198 00:11:06,700 --> 00:11:09,800 hurtling highlights, Something to the effect, you can't surge 199 00:11:09,800 --> 00:11:12,900 trust is the old phrase that you have to build that trust 200 00:11:12,900 --> 00:11:15,500 throughout. And so if we are training 201 00:11:15,600 --> 00:11:18,900 together, if we are working together, when an international 202 00:11:18,900 --> 00:11:21,800 crisis does occur, we can deploy together because we're 203 00:11:21,800 --> 00:11:25,300 interoperable, we speak the same language, we can communicate on 204 00:11:25,300 --> 00:11:28,200 the same frequencies and we understand how to work together. 205 00:11:28,800 --> 00:11:31,000 Those are all really fascinating points. 206 00:11:31,000 --> 00:11:34,200 One of the things that I keep going back to the, you can't 207 00:11:34,200 --> 00:11:37,700 surge trust. I was, unfortunately, the The 208 00:11:37,708 --> 00:11:40,800 latter part of my career involved in the downsizing of 209 00:11:40,800 --> 00:11:44,300 forces in Europe and we thought we had come up to a model. 210 00:11:44,300 --> 00:11:47,200 Based on the direction we had been given in terms of the 211 00:11:47,200 --> 00:11:51,800 amount of forces we were keeping their but as the war continued 212 00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:55,600 in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we realized that as countries were 213 00:11:55,600 --> 00:11:58,800 going as part of either, the I say F force or the Coalition 214 00:11:58,800 --> 00:12:01,600 force in Iraq. First of all, point to point out 215 00:12:01,600 --> 00:12:05,200 too. By the way, that any 6% of the I 216 00:12:05,200 --> 00:12:09,300 say F Force leveled off. Mostly from European countries. 217 00:12:09,500 --> 00:12:13,200 And that was a direct result. I think of folks coming to my 218 00:12:13,200 --> 00:12:16,900 boss early on when I was the training center Commander graph, 219 00:12:16,900 --> 00:12:19,400 and beer and saying, hey, look, we're fighting 220 00:12:19,400 --> 00:12:22,200 shoulder-to-shoulder with all of these partners coming out of 221 00:12:22,200 --> 00:12:25,400 Europe but they don't have the same training capacity. 222 00:12:25,400 --> 00:12:28,700 We do they don't understand how to conduct counterinsurgency 223 00:12:28,800 --> 00:12:30,900 Warfare. So you all have to help us 224 00:12:30,900 --> 00:12:34,400 before sending them over and training them up to our 225 00:12:34,400 --> 00:12:36,800 standards in terms of the train it gets directly. 226 00:12:36,800 --> 00:12:39,500 What doctor ever owned? Was saying, about not only the 227 00:12:39,500 --> 00:12:42,200 officers who were in charge of these units. 228 00:12:42,200 --> 00:12:45,800 But primarily in my view, the ncos were the most important 229 00:12:45,800 --> 00:12:48,300 part. And again, I can tell War story 230 00:12:48,300 --> 00:12:50,700 after were story about some of the things we did. 231 00:12:50,800 --> 00:12:53,700 But I think one of the more interesting things that occurred 232 00:12:53,700 --> 00:12:57,100 when I was the commander of the training center was we posited 233 00:12:57,100 --> 00:13:00,800 an idea to our CG of Europe who at the time was General. 234 00:13:00,800 --> 00:13:05,600 Bell about opening up our NCO Academy at graph endure, and it 235 00:13:05,600 --> 00:13:10,400 got to the point where we An opportunity for about 200 236 00:13:10,400 --> 00:13:14,500 soldiers in every class. But because of the downsizing in 237 00:13:14,500 --> 00:13:17,000 Europe, we were not filling the classes. 238 00:13:17,400 --> 00:13:20,400 So I kind of came to the boss and said, what if we started 239 00:13:20,400 --> 00:13:25,600 inviting some of our allies and partners to the course, to start 240 00:13:25,600 --> 00:13:28,500 building their NCO Corps and their leadership at the junior 241 00:13:28,500 --> 00:13:30,900 level. And you have to understand that 242 00:13:30,900 --> 00:13:35,400 most armies in Europe, do not have a professional NCO Corps, 243 00:13:35,400 --> 00:13:38,700 some of the bigger ones. Do Germany, France, A ously but 244 00:13:38,700 --> 00:13:42,400 back in those days in two thousand, four and five armies 245 00:13:42,400 --> 00:13:47,700 like Poland, Ukraine Romania, the Czech Republic, none of them 246 00:13:47,700 --> 00:13:51,900 had professional ncos so our requirement was you can send X 247 00:13:51,900 --> 00:13:56,300 number of bodies and we kind of Dole them out to our primary 248 00:13:56,300 --> 00:13:58,800 leader development course. At the time later the warrior 249 00:13:58,800 --> 00:14:03,100 leader course wlc and it not only established that Bond and 250 00:14:03,100 --> 00:14:06,900 that relationship at the sergeant level but more than 251 00:14:06,900 --> 00:14:09,100 anything it is Others. The kind of standards that 252 00:14:09,100 --> 00:14:11,700 foreign armies would go by. And what I would tell you, I 253 00:14:11,708 --> 00:14:14,900 don't have the data from the research for this statement. 254 00:14:14,900 --> 00:14:19,100 But what I will tell you is I can name the armies that during 255 00:14:19,100 --> 00:14:23,300 about a three-year period made the determination to actually 256 00:14:23,300 --> 00:14:29,200 incorporate a professional NCO Corps, even to the point of for 257 00:14:29,200 --> 00:14:33,000 the first time in their lives appointing a sergeant major or 258 00:14:33,000 --> 00:14:36,400 First Sergeant's of units and something like that. 259 00:14:36,500 --> 00:14:40,100 I mean that's Ground for all of us in the US military. 260 00:14:40,100 --> 00:14:42,500 But when you go to a country, like, oh, I don't know. 261 00:14:42,500 --> 00:14:45,800 Let's say Romania or let's say Ukraine, because we're going to 262 00:14:45,800 --> 00:14:47,700 get to that. They did not have a professional 263 00:14:47,700 --> 00:14:50,000 NCO Corps, and they also had a conscript Army. 264 00:14:50,200 --> 00:14:52,400 And it was a huge success story for me. 265 00:14:52,400 --> 00:14:55,700 Personally, when about a year after I retired, I got a call 266 00:14:55,900 --> 00:14:59,300 from my former sergeant major. You sir, sergeant major Dave 267 00:14:59,300 --> 00:15:01,100 Davenport. He said, sir, you'll never guess 268 00:15:01,100 --> 00:15:04,200 what happened. He said after, so many times 269 00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:07,300 asking us to help them do this, the Ukrainian. 270 00:15:07,700 --> 00:15:11,100 You finally declared that, they would have a professional NCO 271 00:15:11,100 --> 00:15:15,400 Corps with ranks Associated to them in line with what the US 272 00:15:15,400 --> 00:15:17,700 Army does. These are the kind of Victories 273 00:15:17,700 --> 00:15:20,700 that mean a lot to people who are in the business of theater 274 00:15:20,700 --> 00:15:22,800 security. Cooperation, that are sort of 275 00:15:23,100 --> 00:15:26,000 under the wave tops of what most people understand, that it makes 276 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:28,100 a huge difference as we're seeing today. 277 00:15:28,700 --> 00:15:32,000 It seems like the armed forces are the default tool for a lot 278 00:15:32,000 --> 00:15:34,900 of different security problems, including Coalition, politics, 279 00:15:34,900 --> 00:15:37,100 and Trust building and critical alliances. 280 00:15:37,600 --> 00:15:41,200 He discussed the consequences for this on security and on the 281 00:15:41,200 --> 00:15:44,900 military is there a risk that the US military is just taking 282 00:15:44,900 --> 00:15:47,300 on too many different types of responsibilities. 283 00:15:48,700 --> 00:15:52,200 So I've been thinking about kind of this question, the military 284 00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:55,000 and foreign policy probably for a couple decades now. 285 00:15:55,000 --> 00:15:57,800 So, you know, when my first writing stored, it came out, you 286 00:15:57,800 --> 00:16:00,600 know my I think tagline was initially. 287 00:16:00,700 --> 00:16:03,800 Combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs is 288 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:07,100 warfighters. And this upset many people to 289 00:16:07,100 --> 00:16:09,800 say, why is the military engaged in policy? 290 00:16:09,800 --> 00:16:12,800 Making the general officer and flag officer level. 291 00:16:13,000 --> 00:16:17,700 Your job starts to become your more broadly representing DOD 292 00:16:17,700 --> 00:16:20,800 and the US Government. Not necessarily your particular 293 00:16:20,800 --> 00:16:23,400 service, let alone just the US military. 294 00:16:23,800 --> 00:16:27,500 So the danger that we often hear in Rosa Brooks book on. 295 00:16:27,500 --> 00:16:29,600 This is very good. You know, we're DOD becomes. 296 00:16:29,600 --> 00:16:32,500 I think she uses the Walmart metaphor DOD ends up having to 297 00:16:32,500 --> 00:16:35,600 do everything. I typically say DOD is more like 298 00:16:35,600 --> 00:16:38,300 Home Depot. You know, you can buy everything 299 00:16:38,300 --> 00:16:43,500 from Lumber to plans to power tools and everything that DOD is 300 00:16:43,500 --> 00:16:46,800 much more than warfighting. I think there's probably more 301 00:16:46,800 --> 00:16:49,100 non warfighting functions of DOD. 302 00:16:49,100 --> 00:16:52,100 Then we're fighting things like humanitarian assistance, 303 00:16:52,100 --> 00:16:55,800 tremendous Logistics capability. Probably the largest medical 304 00:16:55,800 --> 00:16:59,500 system for a military and so DOD can offer a lot. 305 00:16:59,500 --> 00:17:02,700 So I guess the danger and I was a part of project with Gordon 306 00:17:02,700 --> 00:17:06,000 Adams and shoot Murray down at American University and their 307 00:17:06,000 --> 00:17:07,800 Book Project was called Mission creep. 308 00:17:08,000 --> 00:17:10,800 And this was sort of the word back then and all the 309 00:17:10,800 --> 00:17:13,800 contributors we had probably a four month conversation on the 310 00:17:13,800 --> 00:17:16,800 title and it was just going to be Mission creep and then half 311 00:17:16,800 --> 00:17:19,500 of us, wanted a question mark. And the other half didn't 312 00:17:19,500 --> 00:17:21,099 because we couldn't quite determine. 313 00:17:21,099 --> 00:17:23,200 Is this really Mission creep or not? 314 00:17:23,400 --> 00:17:28,200 If these functions are foreign policy tool and DOD is much 315 00:17:28,200 --> 00:17:31,200 bigger than warfighting? I personally don't think it's 316 00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:32,900 Mission creep. I mean right, there are certain 317 00:17:32,900 --> 00:17:36,100 things that can go for a long time that can lead to this 318 00:17:36,100 --> 00:17:39,300 Mission creep idea. But DOD is a very large 319 00:17:39,300 --> 00:17:42,500 organization and I sort of think even at what think we're going 320 00:17:42,500 --> 00:17:45,100 to look at the defense budget close to 800 billion plus 321 00:17:45,100 --> 00:17:47,800 nuclear weapons. We should be able to prepare for 322 00:17:47,800 --> 00:17:49,500 war. And especially if war is going 323 00:17:49,500 --> 00:17:52,100 to be coalition in nature. All of these security 324 00:17:52,100 --> 00:17:55,300 cooperation programs, I think are essential to that because we 325 00:17:55,300 --> 00:17:58,500 do not fight alone is to me at the end of the day, why we 326 00:17:58,500 --> 00:18:01,300 should do these engagement programs, even though they might 327 00:18:01,300 --> 00:18:06,700 seem very frustrating at times. Using that model of the defense 328 00:18:06,700 --> 00:18:09,700 budget, I think one of the things a lot of Americans don't 329 00:18:09,700 --> 00:18:13,400 understand is that business concept of return on investment 330 00:18:13,400 --> 00:18:17,000 for Alliance building and the reason they don't see it as 331 00:18:17,000 --> 00:18:20,300 clearly as some of us. That work the projects do every 332 00:18:20,300 --> 00:18:24,500 day is because you don't get the return on the investment after 333 00:18:24,500 --> 00:18:27,700 the exercise. You get it when the nations are 334 00:18:27,700 --> 00:18:30,200 called to conduct operations together. 335 00:18:30,500 --> 00:18:34,700 So again, I don't want to steal your thunder and but people will 336 00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:38,500 talk about Ukraine and how much we are buying in terms of 337 00:18:38,500 --> 00:18:42,100 equipment, but I would suggest that not just in Ukraine, but 338 00:18:42,100 --> 00:18:45,200 several other countries within the European footprint because I 339 00:18:45,208 --> 00:18:48,200 know them the best are as good as they are not. 340 00:18:48,300 --> 00:18:51,000 Because of high Mars which everyone is proclaiming, 341 00:18:51,000 --> 00:18:53,400 although that certainly contributed quite a bit but 342 00:18:53,400 --> 00:18:56,000 there is good as they are because we have been training 343 00:18:56,000 --> 00:19:00,400 with them for the last 14 years or so and you don't get that 344 00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:04,300 return on an investment of capabilities in a foreign force 345 00:19:04,500 --> 00:19:08,000 that is actually helping us security interest by being 346 00:19:08,000 --> 00:19:12,100 prepared to go it alone in this case or as part of an alliance. 347 00:19:12,500 --> 00:19:15,900 So it's sort of like why our universities paying so much to 348 00:19:15,900 --> 00:19:18,200 build gymnasiums or wire hospitals in. 349 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:22,600 As did in building gyms and the pre-injury stuff that comes 350 00:19:22,600 --> 00:19:25,600 along with physical fitness. Well, you understand that once 351 00:19:25,600 --> 00:19:28,400 you are injured or have a disease that you can rebound a 352 00:19:28,408 --> 00:19:32,000 lot quicker if you do have that base, which is what security 353 00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:35,800 cooperation is all about. And if I could follow up to back 354 00:19:35,800 --> 00:19:39,200 to Barbara's, point is there's been a lot of failure in these 355 00:19:39,200 --> 00:19:42,300 programs to and this is what I think policymakers. 356 00:19:42,300 --> 00:19:45,500 Find frustrating is if we were having this conversation a year 357 00:19:45,500 --> 00:19:49,000 ago, we wouldn't sort of have the aura of the Ukrainian Armed 358 00:19:49,000 --> 00:19:51,900 Forces successes. Today we would have sort of the 359 00:19:51,900 --> 00:19:55,900 aura of the fall of Kabul and so there's a lot of failure in 360 00:19:55,900 --> 00:19:59,200 these programs to, which I think caused right for pause in this 361 00:19:59,200 --> 00:20:00,800 program that I mentioned Mission creep. 362 00:20:00,800 --> 00:20:03,100 But I really do think it is a political scientist. 363 00:20:03,100 --> 00:20:04,900 It's frustrating. Because the cases tend to be 364 00:20:04,900 --> 00:20:08,800 unique, it's hard to say, well, why did the rebuild in South 365 00:20:08,800 --> 00:20:11,400 Korea? Post 1953 work? 366 00:20:11,800 --> 00:20:16,500 But not in South Vietnam, for example, probably similar 367 00:20:16,500 --> 00:20:18,200 people. So why is? 368 00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:22,100 Crane having these great successes but Afghanistan didn't 369 00:20:22,300 --> 00:20:27,300 very hard to explain how has the relationship between the US and 370 00:20:27,300 --> 00:20:29,300 Israel. Been managed in spite, its very 371 00:20:29,300 --> 00:20:31,900 high level of military-to-military Engagement 372 00:20:31,900 --> 00:20:34,900 with some consequences, but I would kind of put it in that 373 00:20:34,900 --> 00:20:37,600 larger context, but I think it does require everybody to do 374 00:20:37,600 --> 00:20:40,500 their jobs, right? That OSD needs to make sure 375 00:20:40,500 --> 00:20:42,700 they're giving the uniform the right direction. 376 00:20:42,800 --> 00:20:45,300 Because to me, that's a key piece of the civilian control, 377 00:20:45,500 --> 00:20:48,200 and then at the country Team level, that anything. 378 00:20:48,300 --> 00:20:51,400 She is proposing is supportive of broader us objectives, and 379 00:20:51,400 --> 00:20:53,500 those countries. I'm sure that like many 380 00:20:53,500 --> 00:20:56,400 bureaucracies the us as well as other branches of the 381 00:20:56,400 --> 00:21:00,200 government, were somewhat resistant to the idea of making 382 00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:02,700 security, cooperation is centerpiece of its military 383 00:21:02,700 --> 00:21:06,000 strategy, and Doctor. Reverend, you commit an entire 384 00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:08,800 chapter of your book to addressing this resistance. 385 00:21:09,200 --> 00:21:13,100 So could you explain how the US National Security establishment, 386 00:21:13,100 --> 00:21:16,500 overcame bureaucratic inertia and finally came around to 387 00:21:16,500 --> 00:21:19,500 investing in partner capacity. Cassity building effort. 388 00:21:19,500 --> 00:21:22,600 It's a great question and thanks for calling out that chapter and 389 00:21:22,600 --> 00:21:25,700 I'll admit to it's a chapter. I did not originally have in the 390 00:21:25,700 --> 00:21:28,400 book. And so during the peer review 391 00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:30,600 process, you know, the criticism was. 392 00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:33,400 Hey, you're too Rosie on these programs. 393 00:21:33,600 --> 00:21:36,600 Where's all the resistance? And so that's where that chapter 394 00:21:36,600 --> 00:21:38,600 came from. But when I thought about the 395 00:21:38,600 --> 00:21:42,000 resistance to security cooperation programs, I think it 396 00:21:42,000 --> 00:21:45,700 comes throughout many different levels people in the uniform 397 00:21:45,700 --> 00:21:51,200 military would say look. I didn't enlist to train Afghans 398 00:21:51,400 --> 00:21:54,300 in Marksmanship. That's not why I joined the 399 00:21:54,300 --> 00:21:59,200 military or in the Navy. I did not spend years training 400 00:21:59,300 --> 00:22:03,900 to conduct anti-submarine Warfare from ap8 to be, you 401 00:22:03,900 --> 00:22:07,100 know, supporting counter migrant operations or counterdrug 402 00:22:07,100 --> 00:22:09,300 operations. And so you sort of have that 403 00:22:09,300 --> 00:22:14,500 resistance at every time we partner we are taking time away 404 00:22:14,500 --> 00:22:17,900 from our core combat training. Mission. 405 00:22:18,200 --> 00:22:20,700 So that was serious. And so, you know, I got a lot of 406 00:22:20,700 --> 00:22:24,400 hate mail from my uniform friends on these points and then 407 00:22:24,400 --> 00:22:27,700 on the civilian that, you know, we started out is that old idea, 408 00:22:27,700 --> 00:22:29,400 right? If all we have is a hammer, 409 00:22:29,400 --> 00:22:32,400 everything is a nail. And that's where I say, well, 410 00:22:32,500 --> 00:22:34,100 DOD is much bigger than a hammer. 411 00:22:34,200 --> 00:22:37,900 It's got tremendous Logistics capability, tremendous planning 412 00:22:37,900 --> 00:22:42,700 capability, tremendous Intel capability that we're not using 413 00:22:42,700 --> 00:22:45,600 Special Forces officers to. I don't know. 414 00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:50,700 Dig wells in East Orca, it might be there but we're using Navy 415 00:22:50,700 --> 00:22:54,100 construction battalions. Their function is civil 416 00:22:54,100 --> 00:22:56,800 construction, projects and Military construction projects. 417 00:22:56,800 --> 00:22:59,500 So they're getting that training time anyway and then we're 418 00:22:59,500 --> 00:23:05,000 broadly is there is a concern. The US has a very black history 419 00:23:05,100 --> 00:23:08,600 with mil-to-mil training and it's pretty current and you look 420 00:23:08,600 --> 00:23:12,200 at the senator from Vermont. Pat Leahy has the amendment to 421 00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:15,000 the foreign assistance act to make sure the u.s. is not 422 00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:19,400 training people and units. Accused of Human Rights abuses 423 00:23:19,400 --> 00:23:22,100 because that's a real part of this history, going back to the 424 00:23:22,100 --> 00:23:24,300 1980s. And so we have to be really 425 00:23:24,300 --> 00:23:26,800 careful about that. So, I would say, one of the 426 00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:30,400 caveats to, you know, for me, then with all this in mind is, 427 00:23:30,700 --> 00:23:33,600 we always have to solve for US national interests. 428 00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:36,500 We've got too many examples, whether it was during the Cold 429 00:23:36,500 --> 00:23:38,600 War. If a country wanted assistance, 430 00:23:38,600 --> 00:23:41,400 they would say, hey there are communists in the jungle, and 431 00:23:41,400 --> 00:23:43,800 then they would label their political enemies communist, and 432 00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:46,300 then us would help. So, if that was sort of the Red 433 00:23:46,300 --> 00:23:48,500 Scare, I think probably the last 20 years, we have the green 434 00:23:48,500 --> 00:23:51,100 scare, right? There's Al Qaeda, there's Isis 435 00:23:51,100 --> 00:23:54,400 there and we have to be really careful because at the end of 436 00:23:54,400 --> 00:23:59,000 the day we're asking u.s. men and women in uniform to go do 437 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:01,700 these training missions and support our partner. 438 00:24:02,100 --> 00:24:04,800 And we have to make sure the partner's interests are aligned 439 00:24:04,800 --> 00:24:07,500 with the US interest. So we don't put people in these 440 00:24:07,500 --> 00:24:10,700 situations and make things worse, and we've got lots of 441 00:24:10,700 --> 00:24:13,400 examples where intervention actually makes things worse. 442 00:24:13,600 --> 00:24:15,600 And that's what makes this so hard. 443 00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:18,300 Deborah hurtling. I'd like to hear your 444 00:24:18,300 --> 00:24:21,500 perspective on something dr. Reverend mentioned regarding 445 00:24:21,500 --> 00:24:24,400 what kinds of interests between the u.s. and partners are the 446 00:24:24,400 --> 00:24:27,000 most important when there are so often. 447 00:24:27,000 --> 00:24:30,000 Disagreements and Divergent priorities between allies 448 00:24:30,000 --> 00:24:32,800 including the human rights issues doctor Reverend 449 00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:34,600 mentioned, could you speak to that a bit? 450 00:24:35,500 --> 00:24:37,700 Well, dr. Elias I'll introduce you to a 451 00:24:37,700 --> 00:24:40,000 term. The only graduates of the war 452 00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:42,600 College know. And that's dots that's another 453 00:24:42,600 --> 00:24:45,500 military acronym dots that stands for depends on the 454 00:24:45,500 --> 00:24:46,200 situation. Ation. 455 00:24:46,900 --> 00:24:50,700 So in Europe there were like I said 49 countries on the 456 00:24:50,708 --> 00:24:52,500 continent that I was working with. 457 00:24:52,500 --> 00:24:55,600 I'll go back to what dr. Reverend said about focusing on 458 00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:59,800 the countries because in the military context we have 459 00:24:59,800 --> 00:25:01,700 something called targeting cells. 460 00:25:01,800 --> 00:25:05,000 When you go to combat, you target something that you think 461 00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:09,100 the enemy has and you apply capabilities to destroy that 462 00:25:09,100 --> 00:25:12,900 Target or to disable it or whatever we expanded those 463 00:25:12,900 --> 00:25:15,800 targeting meetings to engagement with. 464 00:25:15,900 --> 00:25:19,600 Other countries and we use targeting the targeting 465 00:25:19,600 --> 00:25:23,100 methodology that you use in Military and combat to. 466 00:25:23,100 --> 00:25:28,400 How do we apply forces to achieve a specific objective 467 00:25:28,400 --> 00:25:32,200 with X country and every single one of them was different. 468 00:25:32,200 --> 00:25:35,600 So, when you're dealing with a country, like I'll pick one 469 00:25:35,600 --> 00:25:38,600 Romania. The objectives of that nation, 470 00:25:38,600 --> 00:25:43,100 in terms of their government and Military are very different than 471 00:25:43,100 --> 00:25:45,800 the objectives of a more democratic state. 472 00:25:45,900 --> 00:25:49,700 Like Germany that's been around for a while and it reflects in 473 00:25:49,700 --> 00:25:53,400 how you do theater security. Cooperation, I spent very little 474 00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:57,400 time as a commander in Europe with the German Army, I spent a 475 00:25:57,400 --> 00:26:01,900 whole lot of time with Romania. Bulgaria the Baltic countries, 476 00:26:02,000 --> 00:26:06,900 Croatia and each one of them had different ideas about what they 477 00:26:06,900 --> 00:26:09,700 want to do. Do in terms of their security 478 00:26:09,700 --> 00:26:13,200 forces. So you do push the US 479 00:26:13,200 --> 00:26:16,300 perspective certainly but one of the biggest Lessons. 480 00:26:16,300 --> 00:26:21,200 I learned as a senior Commander was, you have to understand what 481 00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:25,200 the Strategic Dynamics are in the country you're dealing with 482 00:26:25,400 --> 00:26:28,900 and you can't push too hard on what the United States. 483 00:26:28,900 --> 00:26:33,000 One, you have to really have a nuanced hand in terms of 484 00:26:33,000 --> 00:26:37,900 allowing things to occur through various levels of influence, and 485 00:26:37,900 --> 00:26:41,100 that takes leadership, as well as an understanding of what your 486 00:26:41,100 --> 00:26:44,500 National objectives are. If I can give you one small 487 00:26:44,500 --> 00:26:48,500 example, I got Got a call one Sunday afternoon from my 488 00:26:48,500 --> 00:26:51,500 counterpart in Croatia. And if you've ever been to 489 00:26:51,500 --> 00:26:53,900 Croatia Croatia, it is a gorgeous country. 490 00:26:53,900 --> 00:26:57,300 It has a great Sea Coast, great beaches, but it also has some 491 00:26:57,300 --> 00:26:59,700 great mountains. Well, they happen to get about 492 00:26:59,700 --> 00:27:03,100 three or four feet of snow in the mountain areas where most of 493 00:27:03,100 --> 00:27:06,300 their Farms were. I got a call from my Croatian, 494 00:27:06,300 --> 00:27:09,800 counterpart, a two star general in charge of their land forces. 495 00:27:10,100 --> 00:27:13,700 And he asked if I could help somehow because we had an 496 00:27:13,700 --> 00:27:17,400 aviation unit training in Croatia, Time at their training 497 00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:19,100 center. And there were a couple of 498 00:27:19,100 --> 00:27:22,200 ch-47f down there. The big helicopters, the twin 499 00:27:22,200 --> 00:27:25,800 bladed helicopters and he said, I sure could use some of those 500 00:27:25,800 --> 00:27:30,700 helicopters to move cows out of the mountain areas and get them 501 00:27:30,700 --> 00:27:33,800 from dying in the snow, because the farmers are really pushing 502 00:27:33,800 --> 00:27:36,300 my president heart. I said, okay, so I called the 503 00:27:36,308 --> 00:27:38,700 Aviation Brigade Commander. I said, let's turn this into a 504 00:27:38,700 --> 00:27:42,200 training Mission. They move something like 75 cows 505 00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:46,200 and a four-day period and the farmers thought that the Ation 506 00:27:46,200 --> 00:27:50,300 US military relationship was the best thing ever, that got to the 507 00:27:50,300 --> 00:27:53,000 Ambassador level. Got to the president of Croatia 508 00:27:53,000 --> 00:27:55,700 level and something as silly as moving. 509 00:27:55,700 --> 00:28:00,300 Cows out of a snowstorm had strategic effects in terms of 510 00:28:00,300 --> 00:28:03,100 our relationship with an emerging country that eventually 511 00:28:03,100 --> 00:28:06,400 was led into NATO. So question, I'd like to pose 512 00:28:06,400 --> 00:28:09,100 the both of you covers the difference between mil-to-mil 513 00:28:09,100 --> 00:28:11,400 cooperation over conventional capacity. 514 00:28:11,400 --> 00:28:14,100 Building versus security assistance to more irregular 515 00:28:14,100 --> 00:28:17,400 warfare activities. I know there's nothing easy 516 00:28:17,400 --> 00:28:21,400 about building partner capacity in any context, but is it may be 517 00:28:21,400 --> 00:28:24,500 somehow more straightforward to train forces on large 518 00:28:24,500 --> 00:28:26,900 conventional. Maneuver Warfare rather than 519 00:28:26,900 --> 00:28:30,800 addressing counterterrorism and unconventional warfare or maybe 520 00:28:30,800 --> 00:28:33,400 they're both equally difficult in their own way. 521 00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:36,500 I'm going to go back if you don't mind doctor and I'll take 522 00:28:36,500 --> 00:28:40,700 the first shot at this. Again, dots mean, when you talk 523 00:28:40,700 --> 00:28:44,300 about the Special Forces capability of the Baltic 524 00:28:44,300 --> 00:28:48,200 countries, relatively small countries, with relatively small 525 00:28:48,200 --> 00:28:51,600 militaries, that can't do much against a large Russian 526 00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:55,800 Onslaught as we're seeing now. And by the way, I mentioned Army 527 00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:58,600 Navy Air Force in my previous statement about theater 528 00:28:58,600 --> 00:29:02,100 security, cooperation, sock, your those Special Operations 529 00:29:02,100 --> 00:29:05,100 Command. Europe was Table in terms of the 530 00:29:05,100 --> 00:29:08,300 things they did with the special forces of various countries, 531 00:29:08,300 --> 00:29:11,600 primarily there in Road, was to get the counterinsurgency 532 00:29:11,600 --> 00:29:16,300 counterterrorism capability but they were also training things 533 00:29:16,300 --> 00:29:20,600 like leadership Supply at the small unit level and then I'll 534 00:29:20,600 --> 00:29:23,900 add one more capability. And that's the US National 535 00:29:23,900 --> 00:29:25,800 Guard. Both Air Force and army. 536 00:29:26,100 --> 00:29:29,800 There's a place in Ukraine that absolutely nobody knows about 537 00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:32,200 called. Yeah, bereaved, which was the 538 00:29:32,200 --> 00:29:36,300 Ukrainian training base. We took a sellout of graph and 539 00:29:36,300 --> 00:29:40,500 beer and put it in your favor, even 2011 to help them with 540 00:29:40,500 --> 00:29:44,800 their exercises, it formalized in 2014. 541 00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:48,200 After the invasion of Crimea and the donbas with something that 542 00:29:48,200 --> 00:29:52,900 is called the JMT gu joint multinational training group 543 00:29:52,900 --> 00:29:59,100 Ukraine and that was modeled after the JMT gr, which was the 544 00:29:59,100 --> 00:30:02,400 joint multinational training group Romania at a place called 545 00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:04,800 sink. Ooh, I know Another place drops 546 00:30:04,800 --> 00:30:08,600 Copa more ski in Poland. I mean I can name down a several 547 00:30:08,600 --> 00:30:13,200 more places where the US Army. In this case, literally had a 548 00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:16,600 hub-and-spoke concept with training centers, where both 549 00:30:16,600 --> 00:30:19,600 Special Operations, and conventional operations were 550 00:30:19,600 --> 00:30:21,900 trained. And then the special operators, 551 00:30:21,900 --> 00:30:27,000 the Green Berets basically, the special forces would dig deeper 552 00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:29,800 into the training of individuals and individual teams. 553 00:30:30,200 --> 00:30:34,200 One of the things that I think has prevented early on, Crane 554 00:30:34,200 --> 00:30:37,900 from doing, as well as they could is because from the years 555 00:30:37,900 --> 00:30:45,100 2014 to 2018, we were training them on conventional operations, 556 00:30:45,100 --> 00:30:49,200 up to the Battalion level. When you get above the Battalion 557 00:30:49,200 --> 00:30:52,100 level other things, come into play like Logistics 558 00:30:52,100 --> 00:30:58,000 intelligence, engineering things like that and the US military in 559 00:30:58,000 --> 00:30:59,600 yeah, bereaved in their training ground. 560 00:30:59,608 --> 00:31:03,600 Did not get to those things. So, whereas the conventional 561 00:31:03,700 --> 00:31:06,300 National forces in Ukraine are pretty good. 562 00:31:06,700 --> 00:31:09,700 When you get into the operational, level of war, with 563 00:31:09,800 --> 00:31:13,400 large scale units, doing large-scale things over big 564 00:31:13,400 --> 00:31:16,100 areas. That's when Logistics takes over 565 00:31:16,300 --> 00:31:19,600 and we never really got to that part because we were more 566 00:31:19,600 --> 00:31:22,300 involved in the conventional training at the Tactical level. 567 00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:27,400 I might add, I think people in the US National Security System. 568 00:31:27,400 --> 00:31:31,700 Don't always appreciate how much bigger the United States is 569 00:31:31,900 --> 00:31:35,100 relative to our partners. And so it often gets pitched is 570 00:31:35,100 --> 00:31:37,800 this trade-off. Well, I can do this in a regular 571 00:31:37,800 --> 00:31:41,400 I can do this in conventional and I did some quick Consulting 572 00:31:41,400 --> 00:31:44,200 here. So US Special Operations Command 573 00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:48,200 claims to have about 70,000 personnel with all the service 574 00:31:48,200 --> 00:31:51,600 right contributions. That's about 10,000 bigger than 575 00:31:51,600 --> 00:31:56,100 the German Army, just us. So calm, the Royal Navy for the 576 00:31:56,100 --> 00:31:59,700 United Kingdom. It's got about 35,000 according 577 00:31:59,700 --> 00:32:04,500 to my search, the US Navy Reserve is Fifteen thousand 578 00:32:04,500 --> 00:32:06,600 Personnel bigger than the Royal Navy. 579 00:32:07,100 --> 00:32:10,100 So I often think back to what general hurtling said earlier. 580 00:32:10,100 --> 00:32:13,100 It's trying to figure out, you know, from the partner countries 581 00:32:13,100 --> 00:32:18,500 perspective is what do they need shared interest and then we're 582 00:32:18,500 --> 00:32:21,700 in the dod structure can support that need. 583 00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:27,100 So whether it's a National Guard unit, a reserve unit or write a 584 00:32:27,100 --> 00:32:29,100 unit from another part of the world. 585 00:32:29,100 --> 00:32:31,900 It can help kind of meet those needs in their certain high, 586 00:32:31,900 --> 00:32:36,300 demand, low density asset, That, you know, do stress the system 587 00:32:36,300 --> 00:32:39,600 and probably with Special Operations training because I 588 00:32:39,600 --> 00:32:42,700 think many militaries in Europe and particular have right soft 589 00:32:42,700 --> 00:32:44,400 capability and they want to preserve that. 590 00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:47,700 And so, oftentimes, it's just trying to figure out who can do 591 00:32:47,700 --> 00:32:51,800 that and when, and in ensuring the training doesn't detract 592 00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:54,700 from their core skill set, one of the other things to I'd be 593 00:32:54,700 --> 00:32:57,900 remiss since Ben's interviewing us is one of the objections back 594 00:32:57,900 --> 00:33:00,800 to the resistance. Is this used to be just the 595 00:33:00,800 --> 00:33:04,900 domain of Special Forces. All this training stuff and then 596 00:33:04,900 --> 00:33:07,800 it became conventional and I have seen and receive that 597 00:33:07,800 --> 00:33:11,300 criticism from rsf officers. In particular saying, look, 598 00:33:11,300 --> 00:33:13,000 conventional forces, shouldn't be doing this. 599 00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:15,000 That's not what they're good at, they don't have the language 600 00:33:15,000 --> 00:33:17,000 skills, they don't have the maturity, right? 601 00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:20,300 All of those key things that make Special Operations forces. 602 00:33:20,300 --> 00:33:23,300 Special, there is a difference, but to the earlier point, I 603 00:33:23,308 --> 00:33:26,400 think we've all made, is there such a demand for US security, 604 00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:31,200 cooperation that so calm, no matter how big it 70,000, can't 605 00:33:31,200 --> 00:33:34,700 meet all of these demands. And then the final Point two is 606 00:33:34,700 --> 00:33:37,000 this came up I think when General hurtling was talking is 607 00:33:37,100 --> 00:33:39,900 the u.s. is not the only country out there doing security 608 00:33:39,900 --> 00:33:43,900 cooperation and this is what makes assessment of our programs 609 00:33:43,900 --> 00:33:47,100 really hard. You know did that coup in Mali 610 00:33:47,100 --> 00:33:51,000 occur because it was u.s. training or was it French 611 00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:54,900 training or was it you know Chinese training often times 612 00:33:54,900 --> 00:33:58,400 smaller countries are getting assistance on the security front 613 00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:01,300 from many different countries and this is where it makes it 614 00:34:01,300 --> 00:34:03,500 hard to say. Well why did this one work and 615 00:34:03,600 --> 00:34:05,900 not this one. Why did a coup happened there? 616 00:34:05,900 --> 00:34:08,600 Even though they went through our training program, but not 617 00:34:08,600 --> 00:34:10,500 there. We're not the only ones out 618 00:34:10,500 --> 00:34:14,000 there, they're in their own National context as well. 619 00:34:14,199 --> 00:34:16,500 And we sometimes think, well, if you come to the naval war 620 00:34:16,500 --> 00:34:20,400 college for a year, you will stop being your own nationality 621 00:34:20,400 --> 00:34:24,500 and you'll Embrace positive signal control, democracy, free 622 00:34:24,500 --> 00:34:27,699 enterprise, but you go back, that's not necessarily Your 623 00:34:27,699 --> 00:34:29,300 Country. And this is where we just need 624 00:34:29,300 --> 00:34:30,900 to be sort of careful and employee. 625 00:34:30,900 --> 00:34:33,500 The dots assessment. We don't say that Newport. 626 00:34:33,900 --> 00:34:36,500 We do the depends, but I'm going to bring in dots now. 627 00:34:36,500 --> 00:34:39,100 So we'll be more joint that's good. 628 00:34:39,100 --> 00:34:41,800 And, by the way, I want to comment too because you said 629 00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:43,699 something very important that just struck to me. 630 00:34:44,100 --> 00:34:47,600 Yes, training of foreign militaries was normally the 631 00:34:47,600 --> 00:34:50,600 domain of Special Forces. That's what they were set up to 632 00:34:50,600 --> 00:34:54,100 do what we found in Europe, kind of a counter to. 633 00:34:54,100 --> 00:34:58,500 That was all of the new NATO Nations, all of the new allies 634 00:34:58,500 --> 00:35:02,500 after the fall of the wall and lowering of the curtain, all the 635 00:35:02,500 --> 00:35:06,500 new nations wanted Special ops guys, just like everybody that 636 00:35:06,500 --> 00:35:10,100 goes to see a movie, you know, SEAL Team Six wants to wear 637 00:35:10,100 --> 00:35:12,200 camouflage gear around the street. 638 00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:15,900 I mean, I'm kidding about it to a degree, but the cool thing for 639 00:35:15,900 --> 00:35:20,000 a country is Special Operations and I'm not denigrating them, 640 00:35:20,100 --> 00:35:24,200 they're cheap to build, they're small, they're relatively highly 641 00:35:24,200 --> 00:35:27,200 trained, but you can do that with a lack of money, 642 00:35:27,600 --> 00:35:29,700 conventional forces, not so much. 643 00:35:29,900 --> 00:35:32,300 I think that's what's hurting some part of Ukraine. 644 00:35:32,300 --> 00:35:35,700 Right now, they spent a lot of Time wanting to spend money on 645 00:35:35,700 --> 00:35:39,900 Special Forces because they saw how capable they were, but you 646 00:35:39,900 --> 00:35:42,200 can't win a war with special forces. 647 00:35:42,500 --> 00:35:45,100 Just like you can't win a war with f-16s. 648 00:35:45,100 --> 00:35:48,200 I mean, you've got to have all of those kinds of forces to play 649 00:35:48,200 --> 00:35:51,100 together. So I think that's a good segue 650 00:35:51,100 --> 00:35:54,100 to discuss European theater security, cooperation directly 651 00:35:54,100 --> 00:35:57,600 lieutenant-general hurtling. How did the Ark of build partner 652 00:35:57,600 --> 00:36:00,600 capacity activities? Change over time in Europe? 653 00:36:00,600 --> 00:36:02,700 I know that as a field grade officer. 654 00:36:02,700 --> 00:36:05,900 You were stationed in Europe during the Cold War and then 655 00:36:05,900 --> 00:36:08,100 kind of return to Europe episodically over your career. 656 00:36:08,100 --> 00:36:12,400 And I would imagine military cooperation in the 1980s was 657 00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:16,100 different than efforts in 2008 or 2011 or even today. 658 00:36:16,100 --> 00:36:19,200 I would almost say that it was security cooperation. 659 00:36:19,600 --> 00:36:23,400 In per se was non-existent in the 1980s. 660 00:36:23,400 --> 00:36:28,100 What we had in the 1980s and before that was more alliances. 661 00:36:28,600 --> 00:36:31,800 And there was the expectation that other countries would train 662 00:36:31,800 --> 00:36:34,100 their Force. So sometimes when you came 663 00:36:34,100 --> 00:36:37,200 together back in the days, the hottie days of the Cold War, 664 00:36:37,500 --> 00:36:40,900 what you saw is what you got. There was no training together, 665 00:36:40,900 --> 00:36:44,100 there was a lot of exercising together, but I think what 666 00:36:44,100 --> 00:36:47,800 happened at least where I saw changing was, as a result of 667 00:36:47,800 --> 00:36:51,600 9/11 and some renewed. Emphasis on NATO, as a governing 668 00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:53,800 body. What some people are now calling 669 00:36:53,800 --> 00:36:57,200 NATO 2.0. The change from, you know, what 670 00:36:57,200 --> 00:37:00,900 they did during the Cold War to defend against a Soviet invasion 671 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:05,300 to Preparing forces to train in Iraq and Afghanistan. 672 00:37:05,800 --> 00:37:09,100 And what really drove that like I said before, a lot of the 673 00:37:09,100 --> 00:37:12,000 combatant commanders are the Commander's on the ground in 674 00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:15,000 Afghanistan and Iraq. We're coming to the Department 675 00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:18,200 of the Army, in the Army's case and saying, hey, these guys are 676 00:37:18,200 --> 00:37:23,300 coming from XYZ country and they can't fight alongside of us. 677 00:37:23,700 --> 00:37:27,700 So that trickled down to, at the time, my boss in Europe. 678 00:37:27,700 --> 00:37:30,700 Who said to me, we've got to train them before they get to 679 00:37:30,700 --> 00:37:33,700 Iraq Afghanistan. And what we were finding is not 680 00:37:33,700 --> 00:37:38,500 only were we training other forces for working with ours in 681 00:37:38,500 --> 00:37:41,500 Iraq and Afghanistan. But we were learning an awful 682 00:37:41,500 --> 00:37:45,900 lot of lessons to from them. It was amazing how much we were 683 00:37:45,900 --> 00:37:49,500 taking away from working with the Czech Republic. 684 00:37:49,600 --> 00:37:52,400 I remember one day, I'd first sergeant told me that his unit 685 00:37:52,400 --> 00:37:56,100 had lost the capability for making range cards because they 686 00:37:56,100 --> 00:37:58,400 had been in Iraq. So many times, when the Czech 687 00:37:58,400 --> 00:38:01,300 Republic came in and dug their foxholes and made their range 688 00:38:01,300 --> 00:38:04,500 plan, their range cards. It's something his soldiers had 689 00:38:04,500 --> 00:38:07,400 never seen before from an old Cold War perspective, that's 690 00:38:07,400 --> 00:38:12,300 unfathomable to me, but we had lost a lot of capability in 691 00:38:12,300 --> 00:38:16,600 2011, when I first became commander of US Army Europe, the 692 00:38:16,600 --> 00:38:20,300 secretary of the army came over to visit and he Take Lee said he 693 00:38:20,300 --> 00:38:23,100 wanted to go see a foreign training event. 694 00:38:23,300 --> 00:38:26,300 This was 2011. So the only thing that was going 695 00:38:26,300 --> 00:38:30,100 on during his visit was an exercise called rapid Trident 696 00:38:30,100 --> 00:38:34,100 being held at the robbery of training area in Ukraine. 697 00:38:34,600 --> 00:38:37,600 So it on our flight up there. He asked me, he said, why are we 698 00:38:37,600 --> 00:38:40,300 doing exercises with Ukraine? He said, tell me about the 699 00:38:40,300 --> 00:38:43,000 Ukrainian Army. I said, well, they're corrupt, 700 00:38:43,000 --> 00:38:45,700 but they're getting better. And the Ukrainian government is 701 00:38:45,700 --> 00:38:49,500 extremely corrupt but the Army can drive an illumination of 702 00:38:49,600 --> 00:38:52,800 Corruption and he says, well why are we playing with corrupt, 703 00:38:52,800 --> 00:38:55,700 armies? And I said because there's the 704 00:38:55,700 --> 00:38:59,200 potential there when we got there what he saw was not just 705 00:38:59,200 --> 00:39:03,700 us, Ukrainian forces training, but this rapid Trident event had 706 00:39:03,700 --> 00:39:09,100 16 other nations there it was in everything but name a NATO 707 00:39:09,100 --> 00:39:12,300 training event. So the secretary of the army saw 708 00:39:12,300 --> 00:39:18,800 Canadian British German Ukrainian Italian, all jumping 709 00:39:18,800 --> 00:39:22,100 out of eating out of airplanes and a major drop zone and he got 710 00:39:22,100 --> 00:39:24,400 to talk to him. And he walked away with a 711 00:39:24,400 --> 00:39:27,800 different perspective of what was going on there, from both 712 00:39:27,800 --> 00:39:30,700 the unit and the command level in terms of coordination these 713 00:39:30,700 --> 00:39:33,200 exercises. And by the way, that exercise of 714 00:39:33,200 --> 00:39:37,300 Rapid, Trident was a yearly thing that continued on until 715 00:39:37,900 --> 00:39:40,600 last year when the Russians invaded Ukraine. 716 00:39:41,200 --> 00:39:43,900 So, we've discussed the critical importance of appreciating the 717 00:39:43,900 --> 00:39:48,500 context of each partnership AKA dots, and Doctor, Reverend 718 00:39:48,500 --> 00:39:52,400 you've mentioned Partner willpower discussing Russia 719 00:39:52,400 --> 00:39:57,200 Ukraine, as well as Afghanistan saying mentioning that we the 720 00:39:57,200 --> 00:40:01,500 u.s. can't want Victory anymore than partner forces wanted. 721 00:40:01,700 --> 00:40:04,100 So, where does partner will power come from? 722 00:40:04,500 --> 00:40:07,000 Why are the ukrainians overcoming corruption and 723 00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:10,100 organizational issues? For example, where our Afghan 724 00:40:10,100 --> 00:40:13,800 Partners failed to do? So it's a great question and so 725 00:40:13,800 --> 00:40:16,800 for all those in graduate school looking for a topic, I mean, I 726 00:40:16,808 --> 00:40:19,400 think a great one would be to kind of do a nice. 727 00:40:19,600 --> 00:40:22,500 Comparative study between International assistance and 728 00:40:22,500 --> 00:40:25,700 support the Afghan forces and international assistance to 729 00:40:25,700 --> 00:40:27,900 support the Ukrainian forces. Because I think it's 730 00:40:27,900 --> 00:40:30,500 fascinating, it is right? It's too soon to say, you know, 731 00:40:30,500 --> 00:40:34,200 what explains at least today as we're recording relative, 732 00:40:34,200 --> 00:40:39,900 success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, integrating Western you 733 00:40:39,908 --> 00:40:44,500 know, not only us but Spanish air defense, German air defense. 734 00:40:44,700 --> 00:40:48,000 Also write French artillery all across the board about 50 735 00:40:48,000 --> 00:40:52,100 countries are supporting you. Crane on this one of the ones is 736 00:40:52,100 --> 00:40:54,800 I think to me, you know, the bigger lesson that I took away 737 00:40:54,800 --> 00:40:58,000 out of Afghanistan is we can't want it more than they want it 738 00:40:58,300 --> 00:41:02,000 and I think in this case clearly the ukrainians are fighting for 739 00:41:02,000 --> 00:41:05,000 their lives literally and they want it, right? 740 00:41:05,000 --> 00:41:08,600 They have to succeed if they don't succeed then we know what 741 00:41:08,600 --> 00:41:11,500 will happen but probably the technical Dimensions to 742 00:41:11,500 --> 00:41:15,300 operating major air defense networks is significant. 743 00:41:15,400 --> 00:41:18,500 It's not like giving somebody a stinger and relatively fast but 744 00:41:18,500 --> 00:41:21,800 if you want to set up So, nay Sam's, The Joint system between 745 00:41:21,800 --> 00:41:24,900 the u.s. and Norway and then I saw the Brits are kicking in 746 00:41:24,900 --> 00:41:29,300 about 1000 missiles to kind of. Fill it out, Spain, releasing 747 00:41:29,300 --> 00:41:32,500 the hawk missiles and Sam batteries. 748 00:41:32,500 --> 00:41:35,500 Same thing, the u.s. old Avenger systems, I don't know, the last 749 00:41:35,500 --> 00:41:38,300 time an Avenger was activated, but it's got to be a long time 750 00:41:38,300 --> 00:41:41,300 ago, the Germans with their Iris system. 751 00:41:41,500 --> 00:41:44,400 It's an observation, I think from a Ukrainian perspective, it 752 00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:47,100 could be a criticism because they wanted everything 753 00:41:47,200 --> 00:41:49,500 immediately and I can't really explain. 754 00:41:49,600 --> 00:41:52,200 I mean, why those things became slowly? 755 00:41:52,200 --> 00:41:55,300 Some of it is just having those equipment being made available. 756 00:41:55,700 --> 00:41:58,900 Second, is the training that's involved in the maintenance 757 00:41:58,900 --> 00:42:03,100 that's involved in those systems so so far so good. 758 00:42:03,200 --> 00:42:05,100 So maybe the criticism is too slow. 759 00:42:05,100 --> 00:42:08,100 I think that Legacy of corruption, I'm not sure. 760 00:42:08,200 --> 00:42:11,400 In terms of the perception of President solinsky, I think if 761 00:42:11,400 --> 00:42:15,000 you go back to probably maybe December a couple months before, 762 00:42:15,000 --> 00:42:18,200 the war started, you know, his perception was yes. 763 00:42:18,200 --> 00:42:19,400 Use elected on a counter corruption. 764 00:42:19,500 --> 00:42:23,100 Option campaign but I think the perception was well as he really 765 00:42:23,100 --> 00:42:26,900 serious leader, you know, given his background as an actor and a 766 00:42:26,900 --> 00:42:31,000 comedian and he's proven to be a great leader in really leading 767 00:42:31,000 --> 00:42:33,100 his country in the defense of his country. 768 00:42:33,200 --> 00:42:36,000 So I know that's a lot but curious General hurtling how he 769 00:42:36,000 --> 00:42:39,700 kind of thinks about these issues to the corruption issue. 770 00:42:39,700 --> 00:42:44,000 It's interesting because America has now latched on to phrases 771 00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:47,500 like Javelin and high Mars. And there was a time period 772 00:42:47,500 --> 00:42:50,600 where people were saying we need to give them. 400 High Marsh. 773 00:42:50,600 --> 00:42:54,300 Well there are not 400. High Mars in the system, what 774 00:42:54,300 --> 00:42:58,300 Ukraine really wants right now and I love Ukraine train with 775 00:42:58,300 --> 00:43:00,700 them. I have good friends there but 776 00:43:00,700 --> 00:43:03,600 sometimes I've been accused of being the naysayer because I 777 00:43:03,600 --> 00:43:07,100 say, no, you can't give them these things because either they 778 00:43:07,100 --> 00:43:12,000 don't exist or it requires a long time to train or the 779 00:43:12,000 --> 00:43:15,900 maintenance and repair requirements is just off the 780 00:43:15,900 --> 00:43:18,500 charts that you don't understand, you just don't drop 781 00:43:18,500 --> 00:43:20,800 something in the middle. And say go for it. 782 00:43:20,900 --> 00:43:22,600 I'll get to the tanks in a minute. 783 00:43:22,800 --> 00:43:26,200 But what was interesting? Because I do know, a little bit 784 00:43:26,200 --> 00:43:30,600 of a background. What was going on between 2011 785 00:43:30,600 --> 00:43:34,900 and 2013? 18 or 19 was corruption was 786 00:43:34,900 --> 00:43:37,200 still rampant in the Ukrainian government. 787 00:43:37,300 --> 00:43:40,700 They wanted a new military but they didn't want to pay for it. 788 00:43:40,900 --> 00:43:46,200 And truthfully are giving of equipment is not the norm, it's 789 00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:49,300 usually selling of equipment after a lot of checks. 790 00:43:49,600 --> 00:43:53,200 Into place. So what Ukraine wants and now 791 00:43:53,200 --> 00:43:55,600 what most of America wants because they don't understand 792 00:43:55,600 --> 00:43:58,600 these things is for us to just create them a new 793 00:43:58,600 --> 00:44:02,400 technologically, advanced Army, and do it right now. 794 00:44:02,800 --> 00:44:06,000 The polls went through this process and it took about 14 795 00:44:06,000 --> 00:44:10,400 years and the first delivery of M1A1 tanks was to them about a 796 00:44:10,400 --> 00:44:14,300 year ago as well as F-16. So it's just a matter of. 797 00:44:14,300 --> 00:44:17,700 How do you pay for these very expensive Weapons Systems and 798 00:44:17,700 --> 00:44:19,400 for America to give these things? 799 00:44:19,500 --> 00:44:22,600 The president has the unfortunate requirement of 800 00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:26,200 actually getting the money from Congress and it's a lot of 801 00:44:26,200 --> 00:44:28,500 money. I mean we spent close to 20 802 00:44:28,500 --> 00:44:32,700 billion dollars and that's a drop in the bucket based on what 803 00:44:32,700 --> 00:44:35,400 Ukraine would like to have or what they need. 804 00:44:35,700 --> 00:44:38,900 But truthfully, they couldn't handle it right now and I would 805 00:44:38,900 --> 00:44:41,000 say that to any Ukrainian that's pushing. 806 00:44:41,100 --> 00:44:43,900 These kind of things right now. So far dr. 807 00:44:43,900 --> 00:44:47,500 Aaron said the javelins and The Stingers and the high Mars are 808 00:44:47,500 --> 00:44:50,300 relatively easy. Field. 809 00:44:50,400 --> 00:44:52,100 It doesn't take that much training. 810 00:44:52,400 --> 00:44:54,700 I was in grafenwoehr about a month ago. 811 00:44:54,700 --> 00:44:57,400 I was in Germany about a month and a half ago and I was 812 00:44:57,400 --> 00:45:01,400 watching some ukrainians trading train on the 120, mm mortar. 813 00:45:01,800 --> 00:45:05,000 That's a good piece of equipment takes a long time to train on it 814 00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:06,600 and that's one of the easier ones. 815 00:45:07,000 --> 00:45:11,500 So again it has to do with none of these things can provide a 816 00:45:11,500 --> 00:45:16,800 quick fix and that's why as we started the conversation trust 817 00:45:16,800 --> 00:45:19,400 and building relationships over the long term. 818 00:45:19,500 --> 00:45:24,200 ERM is critically important and we get fixated on hardware for 819 00:45:24,200 --> 00:45:25,700 whatever reason. I think it's easier to 820 00:45:25,700 --> 00:45:29,700 understand, nice demonstration videos and I think again, the 821 00:45:29,700 --> 00:45:33,700 big lesson, why of the ukrainians been successful is 822 00:45:33,800 --> 00:45:35,900 their will to fight is really strong. 823 00:45:35,900 --> 00:45:37,800 Their leadership is really strong. 824 00:45:38,000 --> 00:45:41,300 We haven't seen videos of what a Ukrainian Command Center looks 825 00:45:41,300 --> 00:45:43,200 like. But we have seen those releases 826 00:45:43,200 --> 00:45:45,700 of high Mars launches but to me, right? 827 00:45:45,700 --> 00:45:48,600 As you know, your general and certainly, that's where the real 828 00:45:48,600 --> 00:45:50,600 work and success. It's coming on, it's the 829 00:45:50,600 --> 00:45:54,100 leadership, it's the planning, it's the implementation and you 830 00:45:54,107 --> 00:45:56,900 can't capture that in a short video or a photo. 831 00:45:57,100 --> 00:45:59,000 And that's where I think the ukrainians have been right. 832 00:45:59,100 --> 00:46:01,800 Extremely successful is employment of all these 833 00:46:01,800 --> 00:46:05,600 equipment following up on a point made by General hurtling 834 00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:08,400 on the importance, not only of material in Ukraine, but 835 00:46:08,400 --> 00:46:11,500 long-standing partner, assistance efforts, I'd like to 836 00:46:11,500 --> 00:46:14,700 ask both of you in what ways has u.s. partner assistance, been 837 00:46:14,700 --> 00:46:17,700 most helpful in Ukraine. And what are the limits of that 838 00:46:17,700 --> 00:46:19,500 help? Is there a tendency for For 839 00:46:19,500 --> 00:46:22,900 Americans to take credit for Ukrainian organization, agency, 840 00:46:22,900 --> 00:46:26,100 and efforts to combat Russia. Yeah, I hate just give the 841 00:46:26,100 --> 00:46:30,500 generic leadership matters, but leadership matters and so I'll 842 00:46:30,500 --> 00:46:33,000 sort of offer three examples that I sort of thing. 843 00:46:33,000 --> 00:46:35,000 Change it to positive and one negative. 844 00:46:35,100 --> 00:46:39,900 So first Columbia, you know what explains why plan Colombia in 845 00:46:39,900 --> 00:46:43,800 the early 2000s was effective? I think it was good leadership. 846 00:46:43,800 --> 00:46:46,800 You know, starting at the top with president or Ebay because 847 00:46:46,800 --> 00:46:49,300 there were previous efforts for the u.s. 848 00:46:49,500 --> 00:46:53,500 Support Columbia against the farc Insurgency was decades-old. 849 00:46:53,700 --> 00:46:57,500 Why did plan Colombia work? I think, you know, a number of 850 00:46:57,500 --> 00:47:00,300 restraints Congress imposed strict limits of how many 851 00:47:00,300 --> 00:47:02,700 uniform people could be in the country at any one time. 852 00:47:03,000 --> 00:47:05,700 So this kind of held back I think you know, the American 853 00:47:05,700 --> 00:47:08,600 tendency is we want to write help everybody and solve their 854 00:47:08,600 --> 00:47:12,300 problems and we want it more than they do, but it was all 855 00:47:12,300 --> 00:47:15,300 about the Colombians and I think starting with president or Ebay, 856 00:47:15,300 --> 00:47:17,300 you know, very effective against the farc. 857 00:47:17,600 --> 00:47:19,300 The larger question is still open. 858 00:47:19,400 --> 00:47:23,800 And on The Afghan question, I think the US did want it more 859 00:47:23,800 --> 00:47:26,600 than the Afghans. And certainly I was in meetings 860 00:47:26,600 --> 00:47:31,100 and Kabul during, you know, 10 and 11 in the search and I'd 861 00:47:31,100 --> 00:47:34,200 often walked away from those meetings in the Afghans would 862 00:47:34,200 --> 00:47:35,800 almost. I don't know if they explicitly 863 00:47:35,800 --> 00:47:38,500 said this or I walked away in the meetings of yeah this is all 864 00:47:38,500 --> 00:47:41,900 on you America. If we succeed or fail it's all 865 00:47:41,900 --> 00:47:45,700 on you and somehow we had all convinced ourselves that the 866 00:47:45,700 --> 00:47:49,100 u.s. was more important to the situation than the Afghans were. 867 00:47:49,500 --> 00:47:51,600 And I think on the Ukrainian side, obviously, you know, 868 00:47:51,600 --> 00:47:54,100 outside the US Embassy in kyiv is there. 869 00:47:54,300 --> 00:47:57,600 But, you know, there is not kind of an industrial scale Network 870 00:47:57,600 --> 00:47:59,900 that was created to support the Ukrainian. 871 00:47:59,900 --> 00:48:03,100 Some of it is just time, I mean I think as we start to sort of 872 00:48:03,100 --> 00:48:06,100 regular eyes and normalize, you know, what is US, assistance 873 00:48:06,100 --> 00:48:08,400 International assistance. Look like from a bureaucratic 874 00:48:08,400 --> 00:48:11,700 organizational perspective. Say, you know, six months from 875 00:48:11,700 --> 00:48:14,400 now does that get back into that old adage right? 876 00:48:14,400 --> 00:48:18,000 Bureaucracy, does its thing and that could be good and bad but 877 00:48:18,000 --> 00:48:19,300 you know, again I think the will too. 878 00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:23,700 Fight, partly comes from the leadership, zielinski Deluge 879 00:48:23,700 --> 00:48:27,500 knee, all down the list. Reznikov, doing great work. 880 00:48:27,700 --> 00:48:32,400 And then the context that if the ukrainians do not succeed, they 881 00:48:32,400 --> 00:48:34,500 will die. And I think the other thing, 882 00:48:34,500 --> 00:48:36,200 too, we've kind of neglected, a little bit. 883 00:48:36,200 --> 00:48:38,400 Is we focused on security cooperation? 884 00:48:38,400 --> 00:48:40,200 Which is nice. But there's also the broader 885 00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:43,100 effort that's been going on within Europe and the US to 886 00:48:43,100 --> 00:48:46,100 provide economic support just for regular government 887 00:48:46,100 --> 00:48:50,800 operations and then, the massive refugee, Settlement or at least 888 00:48:50,800 --> 00:48:54,300 support in Poland and in other countries in Europe. 889 00:48:54,400 --> 00:48:57,500 You know, again I have to imagine as a deployed sailor, I 890 00:48:57,500 --> 00:49:00,100 want to focus on my job. I don't want to worry about my 891 00:49:00,100 --> 00:49:04,200 family and so I think the type of support that European 892 00:49:04,200 --> 00:49:06,900 governments have been providing for Ukrainian families. 893 00:49:07,100 --> 00:49:11,100 Is also enabled the Ukrainian soldiers and Airmen and, you 894 00:49:11,107 --> 00:49:13,800 know, a few Sailors and Marines out there to be able to do their 895 00:49:13,800 --> 00:49:15,900 job and kind of restore their country. 896 00:49:17,000 --> 00:49:18,800 General hurtling. What are some policy 897 00:49:18,800 --> 00:49:21,800 considerations that policymakers should take into account, to 898 00:49:21,800 --> 00:49:24,300 better optimize America's theater security, cooperation 899 00:49:24,300 --> 00:49:27,800 strategy, and Derek based on today's conversation. 900 00:49:28,000 --> 00:49:30,000 What are the implications for practitioners? 901 00:49:30,000 --> 00:49:33,300 Who are tasked with implementing the United States is approach to 902 00:49:33,300 --> 00:49:37,300 security cooperation? We're already starting our 903 00:49:37,300 --> 00:49:41,800 after-action, reviews of what's going on in Ukraine, as well as 904 00:49:41,800 --> 00:49:44,300 we continually do the status of our theater security, 905 00:49:44,300 --> 00:49:46,100 cooperation, plans around the world. 906 00:49:46,100 --> 00:49:49,600 That's It's a yearly update. Then each combatant commands 907 00:49:49,600 --> 00:49:52,200 office. What I've learned from the 908 00:49:52,200 --> 00:49:55,600 campaign in Ukraine, as well. As some of the other things I 909 00:49:55,600 --> 00:49:58,900 experienced as a commander in Europe was and it reared, its 910 00:49:58,900 --> 00:50:03,200 ugly head as Derek said before, they got to want it more than we 911 00:50:03,200 --> 00:50:05,100 do. That's a recurring theme in many 912 00:50:05,100 --> 00:50:08,100 countries and when you're talking about this security 913 00:50:08,100 --> 00:50:11,100 cooperation, you have to consider a push and a pull 914 00:50:11,107 --> 00:50:14,900 system in Afghanistan. It was a push system. 915 00:50:14,900 --> 00:50:19,700 We were pushing Things to them, they wanted us to fight for them 916 00:50:20,200 --> 00:50:22,500 in Ukraine. It's been a pull system. 917 00:50:22,900 --> 00:50:26,100 They've wanted assistance. They've seen the opportunities 918 00:50:26,100 --> 00:50:28,500 that they have to protect their sovereignty and their 919 00:50:28,500 --> 00:50:31,800 territorial integrity. And when you consider the 920 00:50:31,800 --> 00:50:36,900 implications of where we do business, a lot of stuff is laid 921 00:50:36,900 --> 00:50:42,400 on the intelligence Community, both CIA Dia, the various combat 922 00:50:42,400 --> 00:50:45,100 commands Intel section which is all good. 923 00:50:45,300 --> 00:50:49,400 But even that's um what stove-piped I'm going to go back 924 00:50:49,400 --> 00:50:54,300 to the evaluation of countries. We work with an old thought of 925 00:50:54,300 --> 00:50:57,900 if you want a new idea, read an old book and I keep going back 926 00:50:57,900 --> 00:51:01,700 to Old Dead Carl clausewitz who said for a nation to be 927 00:51:01,700 --> 00:51:05,800 successful, they have to have the Holy Trinity as it were have 928 00:51:05,800 --> 00:51:09,900 to have a performing and capable Military Support of government 929 00:51:09,900 --> 00:51:14,200 and a people that understand what the military is fighting 930 00:51:14,200 --> 00:51:17,300 for it to win their conflicts and when they're And increase 931 00:51:17,300 --> 00:51:19,900 security. If you look at those three areas 932 00:51:19,900 --> 00:51:23,600 capable Military, Support of government and not corrupt 933 00:51:23,600 --> 00:51:26,800 government and a people that understands what the military 934 00:51:26,800 --> 00:51:30,800 does, those clausewitz and principles may be a pretty good 935 00:51:30,800 --> 00:51:34,700 approach to security cooperation, as opposed to just 936 00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:40,000 wanting to sell things or wanting to build allies because 937 00:51:40,000 --> 00:51:44,000 allies live up to those three elements of the Holy Trinity or 938 00:51:44,000 --> 00:51:47,300 they don't. So those should be The durations 939 00:51:47,300 --> 00:51:51,400 of I'm going to say commanders, but I'm talking about policy 940 00:51:51,500 --> 00:51:53,800 folks. As opposed to just what the 941 00:51:53,800 --> 00:51:56,700 Intel Community is feeding them, which is all very good. 942 00:51:56,700 --> 00:51:59,500 And I don't mean to denigrate the Intel Community, but it has 943 00:51:59,500 --> 00:52:02,700 to be bigger than that. Some really great points. 944 00:52:02,700 --> 00:52:05,600 So I'm a professor at the naval war college. 945 00:52:05,600 --> 00:52:08,300 And so even though these are my personal views, you know, some 946 00:52:08,300 --> 00:52:11,800 of the things that I really like to emphasize with everybody is 947 00:52:11,800 --> 00:52:14,800 you know, first know the history, how did we get here? 948 00:52:15,100 --> 00:52:19,600 And so we have Looking at these programs and we've been a part 949 00:52:19,600 --> 00:52:24,100 of these programs for decades. So, if you find yourself, you 950 00:52:24,100 --> 00:52:27,100 know, back my sort of first foray into this was really 951 00:52:27,100 --> 00:52:30,900 looking at the former Yugoslavia and Bosnian particular, there's 952 00:52:30,900 --> 00:52:34,100 a deep history that undergirds everything. 953 00:52:34,200 --> 00:52:38,700 And if you walk into another country trying to quote help and 954 00:52:38,700 --> 00:52:41,400 you do not appreciate the history, you will probably fail 955 00:52:41,500 --> 00:52:43,700 and do harm. So maybe that's kind of the 956 00:52:43,700 --> 00:52:45,900 second, right? Is remember, you're supposed to 957 00:52:45,900 --> 00:52:47,800 be there to help. Help not do harm. 958 00:52:48,400 --> 00:52:52,100 Second, I think is know the limits of the US military. 959 00:52:52,400 --> 00:52:56,300 I think fundamentally, we can create time and space for 960 00:52:56,300 --> 00:53:00,700 policymakers for negotiations, for diplomats to try to bring 961 00:53:00,700 --> 00:53:03,900 apart some resolution because I think the overall goal the u.s. 962 00:53:03,900 --> 00:53:06,700 always has is to sort of return to some peaceful State bring 963 00:53:06,700 --> 00:53:09,700 stability. And so you know in sure what 964 00:53:09,700 --> 00:53:12,200 we're doing is supporting those efforts. 965 00:53:12,600 --> 00:53:15,600 Know what US interests are with that country and then you have 966 00:53:15,600 --> 00:53:17,700 to be careful. A balance, what our partners 967 00:53:17,700 --> 00:53:20,300 interests are with us, interests, and remember who you 968 00:53:20,300 --> 00:53:21,900 work for, is probably the key thing. 969 00:53:21,900 --> 00:53:25,200 And then the final thought is all these programs are foreign 970 00:53:25,200 --> 00:53:28,100 policy programs. And so it's a key aspect of 971 00:53:28,100 --> 00:53:30,900 foreign policy. And so I think always keeping in 972 00:53:30,900 --> 00:53:33,500 mind. What are you doing to advance 973 00:53:33,500 --> 00:53:36,000 and defend? Foreign policy is important. 974 00:53:36,000 --> 00:53:40,300 I mean, I really try to drop away from the notion of the US. 975 00:53:40,300 --> 00:53:42,800 Military's job is to fight and win our nation's Wars. 976 00:53:43,300 --> 00:53:47,400 That's a part of it, but it's also a part of of larger foreign 977 00:53:47,400 --> 00:53:50,200 policy and we have to understand what those are. 978 00:53:50,200 --> 00:53:53,600 And so I hope to see some of the listeners in classrooms in 979 00:53:53,600 --> 00:53:56,300 Newport Rhode Island at the naval war College, where you can 980 00:53:56,300 --> 00:54:00,000 find all our syllabi online and you can do your own self study. 981 00:54:00,700 --> 00:54:02,800 Well, Lieutenant General Mark, hertling, dr. 982 00:54:02,800 --> 00:54:05,200 Derek Rev Run. Thanks again for coming on the 983 00:54:05,200 --> 00:54:08,400 irregular warfare podcast. I was a fascinating conversation 984 00:54:08,500 --> 00:54:10,900 about European theater security cooperation. 985 00:54:11,800 --> 00:54:14,100 Thank you both for having me and general hurtling. 986 00:54:14,100 --> 00:54:16,300 Enjoy the conversation. Same! 987 00:54:16,500 --> 00:54:18,600 I learned a lot from dr. Reverend, thank you. 988 00:54:18,600 --> 00:54:21,200 And dr. Elias and then I was fun. 989 00:54:21,500 --> 00:54:25,800 Thanks for having both of us. Thank you again for joining us 990 00:54:25,800 --> 00:54:29,200 for episode. 66 of the irregular warfare podcast. 991 00:54:29,700 --> 00:54:32,000 We release a new episode every two weeks. 992 00:54:32,200 --> 00:54:35,800 Next episode, Kyle, and Ben will discuss the implications for us 993 00:54:35,800 --> 00:54:38,300 credibility in the wake of America's withdrawal from 994 00:54:38,300 --> 00:54:41,700 Afghanistan following that. Laura and Jeff will explore the 995 00:54:41,700 --> 00:54:44,600 opportunities. And risks of are advising with 996 00:54:44,600 --> 00:54:48,100 Colonel Tobias Switzer, be sure to subscribe to the regular 997 00:54:48,100 --> 00:54:50,600 Warfare podcast so you don't miss an episode. 998 00:54:51,100 --> 00:54:54,000 The podcast is a product of the irregular warfare initiative. 999 00:54:54,400 --> 00:54:57,600 We are a team of all-volunteer practitioners and researchers 1000 00:54:57,900 --> 00:55:00,000 dedicated to Bridging. The Gap between Scholars and 1001 00:55:00,000 --> 00:55:03,000 practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare 1002 00:55:03,000 --> 00:55:06,100 professionals. 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And one last note, what you hear 1011 00:55:34,200 --> 00:55:37,100 in the episode of the views of the participants and do not 1012 00:55:37,100 --> 00:55:40,300 represent those a Princeton West Point or any agency of the US 1013 00:55:40,300 --> 00:55:43,000 government, thanks again. And we'll see you next time. 1014 00:55:48,800 --> 00:55:50,900 Well there you have it, a special. 1015 00:55:50,900 --> 00:55:53,700 Thank you to The Irregular Warfare podcast and Modern 1016 00:55:53,700 --> 00:55:55,800 Warfare Institute, I appreciate you sharing. 1017 00:55:56,400 --> 00:55:58,800 This is a one c. A podcast special episode. 1018 00:55:58,800 --> 00:56:01,900 I'm your host Jack gains. Thanks for listening and have a 1019 00:56:01,900 --> 00:55:50,600 great day. Well there you have it, a 1020 00:55:50,607 --> 00:55:52,000 special. Thank you to The Irregular 1021 00:55:52,000 --> 00:55:55,300 Warfare podcast and Modern Warfare Institute, I appreciate 1022 00:55:55,300 --> 00:55:57,200 you sharing. This is a one c. 1023 00:55:57,200 --> 00:56:00,200 A podcast special episode. I'm your host Jack gains. 1024 00:56:00,700 --> 00:56:02,400 Thanks for listening and have a great day.