1 00:00:06,920 --> 00:00:10,000 Welcome to the One CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 2 00:00:10,440 --> 00:00:13,960 1C A is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings 3 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:17,200 in people who are current or former military diplomats, 4 00:00:17,400 --> 00:00:20,000 development officers, and field agents to discuss their 5 00:00:20,000 --> 00:00:23,200 experiences on ground with a partner nation's people and 6 00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:25,520 leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone 7 00:00:25,520 --> 00:00:28,720 interested in working the last three feet of Foreign Relations. 8 00:00:29,540 --> 00:00:33,900 To contact the show, e-mail us at capodcasting@gmail.com or 9 00:00:33,900 --> 00:00:36,980 look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at 10 00:00:36,980 --> 00:00:41,180 www.civilaffairsassos.org. I'll have those in the show 11 00:00:41,180 --> 00:00:44,700 notes. So basically we developed a 12 00:00:44,700 --> 00:00:49,540 research study, yeah, with the Center for International Private 13 00:00:49,580 --> 00:00:55,180 Enterprise to document what has been developed after or during 14 00:00:55,180 --> 00:00:57,340 the COVID-19 to fight up the corruption. 15 00:00:58,680 --> 00:01:01,840 Today we have Mr. Carlos Diaz from Global Integrity who 16 00:01:01,840 --> 00:01:04,640 interviewed me on anti corruption programs that I've 17 00:01:04,640 --> 00:01:08,400 been working on for Civil Affairs and DoD overall a couple 18 00:01:08,400 --> 00:01:10,520 of times. I also turned the tables on him 19 00:01:10,760 --> 00:01:14,040 to discuss current events and his experiences growing up on 20 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:16,080 the border of Colombia and Venezuela. 21 00:01:16,840 --> 00:01:19,120 This episode is a little different because I'm the one 22 00:01:19,120 --> 00:01:22,160 being interviewed, but I thought it would make a great show, so 23 00:01:22,160 --> 00:01:26,600 let's get started. Most of my anti corruption work 24 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:31,590 is foreign facing. And it's looking at adversaries 25 00:01:31,590 --> 00:01:36,270 and their use of corruption as a foreign policy tool to displace 26 00:01:36,270 --> 00:01:42,070 the US national security infrastructure and either place 27 00:01:42,470 --> 00:01:44,870 a illicit. Structure in order for. 28 00:01:44,870 --> 00:01:49,310 Them to be oligarchs and rob a country of all its resources, or 29 00:01:49,310 --> 00:01:52,230 to? Displace international rule of 30 00:01:52,230 --> 00:01:56,670 law in order to build out their own rule of law to where they 31 00:01:56,990 --> 00:01:59,350 make the rules and laws and everyone else follows them. 32 00:02:00,070 --> 00:02:03,150 And The thing is. My work is mostly taking things 33 00:02:03,150 --> 00:02:07,750 like Global Magnitsky and not only using it in the standard 34 00:02:07,750 --> 00:02:10,229 traditional way than name and shame and and sanction. 35 00:02:10,470 --> 00:02:15,830 I try to use it in a way where I give people an option that they 36 00:02:15,830 --> 00:02:19,420 can't refuse. I try to freeze assets. 37 00:02:19,420 --> 00:02:22,660 I try to freeze their financial structures. 38 00:02:22,660 --> 00:02:25,500 I try to go after their families, financial structures, 39 00:02:25,900 --> 00:02:28,700 their friends, anything in their administration that they are 40 00:02:28,700 --> 00:02:32,300 hiding money through. Go after intermediaries. 41 00:02:32,340 --> 00:02:35,060 If they're in a place where I can indict them and remove them 42 00:02:35,060 --> 00:02:39,300 from the playing field so that the oligarch or autocrat are 43 00:02:39,300 --> 00:02:43,300 isolated and then say, hey, actually you can have all this 44 00:02:43,300 --> 00:02:45,780 stuff back if you leave the country and. 45 00:02:46,270 --> 00:02:48,750 And here's a series of reforms we want you to incur so that no 46 00:02:48,750 --> 00:02:51,430 one behind you gets the same idea. 47 00:02:51,830 --> 00:02:56,470 So that's what I worked on during the COVID era, and I sent 48 00:02:56,470 --> 00:03:01,390 you a packet that I had created. It's actually Trafficking 49 00:03:01,390 --> 00:03:03,430 Counter Illicit Trade Task Force. 50 00:03:03,550 --> 00:03:08,790 It was designed for C J's TF HOA, which is in Djibouti. 51 00:03:08,910 --> 00:03:10,870 It's a tactical task. Force underneath. 52 00:03:11,230 --> 00:03:14,910 US Africa Command. And I'll have some time to look 53 00:03:14,910 --> 00:03:17,670 into that. OK the reason I think this is 54 00:03:17,670 --> 00:03:22,990 important is that state has its way of targeting anti corruption 55 00:03:23,270 --> 00:03:25,630 and sometimes it works and. USA is. 56 00:03:25,630 --> 00:03:30,590 Building out a new process where they're trying to energize their 57 00:03:30,590 --> 00:03:34,630 networks, Promoting investigative journalism and 58 00:03:34,670 --> 00:03:40,030 NGO's in a country to feed any instances of. 59 00:03:40,600 --> 00:03:42,840 Corruption. But at least the people who are 60 00:03:42,840 --> 00:03:46,760 entrenched, like when South Sudan broke away from Sudan, one 61 00:03:46,760 --> 00:03:48,360 thought it was a great thing. It was going to be an 62 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:52,000 opportunity to use that oil to develop the nation, build up the 63 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:55,760 education, economic structure. But the military leader came in 64 00:03:55,760 --> 00:03:58,880 and took it over, which happens almost every time you have a 65 00:03:58,880 --> 00:04:03,560 revolt. And there's got to be a way to 66 00:04:03,560 --> 00:04:08,520 shape those people, and usually it's by mapping their intent. 67 00:04:09,080 --> 00:04:14,120 What their wants are and then holding up for ransom basically 68 00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:18,079 kind of in a it's not extortion, it's reverse extortion because 69 00:04:18,079 --> 00:04:22,160 they're stealing minerals and they're laundering money and 70 00:04:22,480 --> 00:04:25,000 they're doing everything that illicit actors do. 71 00:04:25,000 --> 00:04:29,040 They're selling anything they can to make money, human 72 00:04:29,040 --> 00:04:34,480 trafficking, doing human slavery, everything, drugs, 73 00:04:34,560 --> 00:04:36,320 whatever they can do. But they're doing it for a 74 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:37,760 reason. They have an intent, and if you 75 00:04:37,760 --> 00:04:40,720 can target that intent, then you can shape the behavior of that 76 00:04:40,720 --> 00:04:43,760 actor. Most of them are not reasonable 77 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:46,520 people. These guys know that any day 78 00:04:46,520 --> 00:04:50,960 they could be dead or gone. So they're porting as if it's 79 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:53,520 the last day of their life in that job. 80 00:04:53,560 --> 00:04:55,680 And so you have to go after that behavior. 81 00:04:56,160 --> 00:04:58,040 You have to go after the things they want. 82 00:04:58,760 --> 00:05:00,960 And once you capture them, then you dangle them and say, okay, 83 00:05:00,960 --> 00:05:03,240 these are the behaviors we want. You're caught. 84 00:05:03,240 --> 00:05:05,750 You know you're going away. This is what we want. 85 00:05:06,230 --> 00:05:10,510 We want you to be the last ruler like this in the country and 86 00:05:10,510 --> 00:05:11,990 you're going to become the Great Reformer. 87 00:05:11,990 --> 00:05:15,950 And we want you to put in these reforms and make it to where no 88 00:05:15,950 --> 00:05:18,150 one else can do what you did, what you achieved. 89 00:05:18,590 --> 00:05:20,870 You played that ego. I'm pretty sure they're showing 90 00:05:20,870 --> 00:05:25,350 you tricks to make sure that no one else can take power, you 91 00:05:25,350 --> 00:05:29,070 know, circumvent the legal system, circumvent the financial 92 00:05:29,070 --> 00:05:31,870 system, and they become a partner and actually reforming 93 00:05:31,870 --> 00:05:33,830 the country. Then they become a hero. 94 00:05:34,490 --> 00:05:36,850 While they take their money and run and that's what I'm trying 95 00:05:36,850 --> 00:05:39,690 to do, I'm trying to weaponize anti corruption so that we can 96 00:05:39,690 --> 00:05:42,650 start using them more effectively against autocrats. 97 00:05:42,650 --> 00:05:46,690 Because right now countries like Russia are having a much better 98 00:05:46,690 --> 00:05:51,250 job at finding corrupt people and placing them in positions 99 00:05:51,250 --> 00:05:56,330 authority versus our ability to find honest people and place 100 00:05:56,330 --> 00:06:02,060 them in positions of authority. The tactic and the angle that 101 00:06:02,580 --> 00:06:05,180 you're laying out, because I haven't heard that right. 102 00:06:05,820 --> 00:06:09,900 And so my question for you and the work that you do is how do 103 00:06:09,900 --> 00:06:13,620 you identify new Windows of opportunity for the corruption 104 00:06:13,620 --> 00:06:15,540 efforts during that COVID-19 time? 105 00:06:15,940 --> 00:06:19,500 Well, the biggest shift I saw with COVID was the movement over 106 00:06:19,500 --> 00:06:23,740 to a digital workspace and digital exchanges because no one 107 00:06:23,740 --> 00:06:27,340 wanted to touch many and yet we all needed food, but we didn't 108 00:06:27,340 --> 00:06:29,220 want to touch anyone or get too close. 109 00:06:30,060 --> 00:06:35,980 And I think that that accelerated both good and bad. 110 00:06:35,980 --> 00:06:40,420 I mean, accelerated remote work to where people can be in more 111 00:06:40,420 --> 00:06:43,460 comfortable spaces and do their job more effectively. 112 00:06:43,620 --> 00:06:47,260 But it also opened up avenues for things like rampant 113 00:06:47,260 --> 00:06:52,140 cryptocurrency that was so far ahead of regulation that it was 114 00:06:52,140 --> 00:06:55,920 just a Ponzi scheme. Digitization of the global 115 00:06:55,920 --> 00:06:59,400 marketplace and people really accelerated and that's been a 116 00:06:59,400 --> 00:07:02,720 great thing, but now we got to catch up with the regulations. 117 00:07:03,480 --> 00:07:07,520 You read that you identify with this opportunity to add 118 00:07:07,640 --> 00:07:11,600 corruption initiatives. The actions of the digital 119 00:07:11,600 --> 00:07:16,480 economy exposed a lot of the corrupt action practices. 120 00:07:17,120 --> 00:07:21,800 It was harder for people to travel, therefore corrupt actors 121 00:07:21,800 --> 00:07:24,560 had to use. Intermediaries to get things 122 00:07:24,560 --> 00:07:28,440 done, but they became more visible because the digital 123 00:07:28,640 --> 00:07:32,960 footprint was a lot better because you couldn't just walk 124 00:07:32,960 --> 00:07:35,680 into a bank. And so it put a lot of exposure 125 00:07:35,680 --> 00:07:38,680 on the issue. So yeah, I found a lot of 126 00:07:38,680 --> 00:07:43,200 opportunity and it really helped to track foreign asset flows. 127 00:07:43,800 --> 00:07:46,840 It's given an advantage. The problem is to accelerated 128 00:07:47,120 --> 00:07:50,160 things like cartel financial systems to where now. 129 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:54,360 They move so much cash through casinos and into the digital 130 00:07:54,360 --> 00:07:57,120 currency world that it's a wildfire. 131 00:07:57,160 --> 00:07:59,520 It's amazing how much goes through those things. 132 00:08:00,080 --> 00:08:03,680 Yeah. And let me make an additional 133 00:08:03,680 --> 00:08:07,720 question on top of that. Was this more the way that you 134 00:08:07,760 --> 00:08:10,600 identify the opportunity? Was it more like in a gut 135 00:08:10,600 --> 00:08:15,120 feeling or do you have like a formal criteria to approach? 136 00:08:16,000 --> 00:08:19,640 A lot of it was interviews with people that I know that work in 137 00:08:19,640 --> 00:08:23,770 the trades. Folks that were financial assets 138 00:08:24,490 --> 00:08:27,930 and counter fraud and just talking to them, that's the 139 00:08:27,930 --> 00:08:30,890 majority of where I learned what was going on. 140 00:08:30,890 --> 00:08:34,610 And then listening to Bloomberg and Financial Times about some 141 00:08:34,610 --> 00:08:38,450 of the trends going on and and kind of doing it a cross 142 00:08:38,450 --> 00:08:42,929 reference between behaviors motive and current trends. 143 00:08:43,409 --> 00:08:46,490 That's when we started finding out about tumbling people would. 144 00:08:47,010 --> 00:08:51,130 Use tumblers to to wash their cryptocurrency from illicit 145 00:08:51,130 --> 00:08:53,490 trade and make it come out clean. 146 00:08:54,170 --> 00:08:57,570 But also, you know, by raising that issue, it allowed white hat 147 00:08:57,570 --> 00:09:00,810 hackers to actually crack those things and track where the 148 00:09:01,010 --> 00:09:05,370 illicit finances go. Let me just post another 149 00:09:05,370 --> 00:09:07,730 question. What type of factors do you 150 00:09:07,730 --> 00:09:10,730 think contributed to your ability to identify these 151 00:09:10,730 --> 00:09:15,290 opportunities to be? Understanding more of these new 152 00:09:15,290 --> 00:09:19,770 ways of corruption or how the funding was moving or as you 153 00:09:19,770 --> 00:09:22,530 mentioned, power dynamics in certain countries. 154 00:09:23,370 --> 00:09:26,890 In 2013, how was the State Department leave for counter 155 00:09:26,890 --> 00:09:29,690 Taliban influence? And part of that was 156 00:09:29,690 --> 00:09:34,010 understanding the networks that supported the Taliban and also 157 00:09:34,010 --> 00:09:38,650 building both counter governance model to break down the 158 00:09:38,650 --> 00:09:42,570 Taliban's efforts to build a shadow government but also. 159 00:09:43,170 --> 00:09:47,730 Build up the local government and local leaders so that they 160 00:09:47,730 --> 00:09:50,850 had good governance in the area. From that I. 161 00:09:50,930 --> 00:09:56,490 Went on to AFRICOM where I work, strategic communication and they 162 00:09:56,490 --> 00:10:02,410 spent a lot of time on things like Ebola and counter ISIS, but 163 00:10:02,410 --> 00:10:06,370 I also spent a lot of time at OECD, that kind of illicit trade 164 00:10:06,370 --> 00:10:09,690 and trafficking task force focusing on things like. 165 00:10:10,730 --> 00:10:14,010 Free trade zones and the question that goes through and 166 00:10:14,410 --> 00:10:18,090 how to respond to counterfeit products and trade practices, 167 00:10:18,970 --> 00:10:22,210 how financial movements were avoiding taxation and other 168 00:10:22,210 --> 00:10:26,570 things. So it's kind of the part of my 169 00:10:26,930 --> 00:10:31,130 style of forensics because I've just observed it for so long and 170 00:10:31,130 --> 00:10:33,810 and been a part of it. So that type of skills that you 171 00:10:33,810 --> 00:10:37,110 have. Definitely works well in 172 00:10:37,310 --> 00:10:39,910 different contexts because you're mentioning that you work 173 00:10:39,910 --> 00:10:43,910 with different country contexts and for that you need to connect 174 00:10:43,910 --> 00:10:48,070 with people on the ground and be strategic on the different type 175 00:10:48,070 --> 00:10:52,110 of trades or exchange of products to understand schemes. 176 00:10:52,430 --> 00:10:57,470 So definitely having that set of skills play, it's an ability to 177 00:10:57,470 --> 00:11:01,630 identify or take on an opportunity that opens. 178 00:11:02,250 --> 00:11:06,930 For instance, when elections come or power dynamics are, you 179 00:11:06,970 --> 00:11:08,650 know, doing their moves. Right. 180 00:11:09,130 --> 00:11:13,530 My job and and career is both communication and influence. 181 00:11:14,290 --> 00:11:19,490 So it's all about knowing what sways people where their intent 182 00:11:19,490 --> 00:11:23,850 is, whether their core values and then how I can work with 183 00:11:23,850 --> 00:11:26,250 them to align with their core values. 184 00:11:26,890 --> 00:11:30,330 Do you find more or less opportunities to implement? 185 00:11:31,130 --> 00:11:33,730 And corruption efforts done before the COVID-19. 186 00:11:34,370 --> 00:11:37,730 I found it was hard at first because everyone was locked 187 00:11:37,730 --> 00:11:42,570 down. It was early on and most people 188 00:11:42,570 --> 00:11:45,810 were taking shelter and just figuring out what's going on. 189 00:11:46,290 --> 00:11:49,250 The corrupt practices also slowed down because people 190 00:11:49,770 --> 00:11:51,890 couldn't get banking done, they couldn't get international 191 00:11:51,890 --> 00:11:55,490 transactions done. It all kind of lulled, but then 192 00:11:55,490 --> 00:12:00,190 as the restrictions loosened up. Things like cryptocurrency, as 193 00:12:00,190 --> 00:12:02,510 I've already mentioned, and illicit trade and trafficking, 194 00:12:02,510 --> 00:12:08,230 and now nations that have part of their foreign policy, illicit 195 00:12:08,230 --> 00:12:13,270 trade, trafficking or part of their economic structure really 196 00:12:13,430 --> 00:12:15,870 put it into practice. The PRC. 197 00:12:16,070 --> 00:12:18,910 To me, their economic model is not the same as ours. 198 00:12:18,910 --> 00:12:21,390 We should not be comparing GNP to GNP. 199 00:12:21,830 --> 00:12:26,790 They have a whole arm of government solely focused on. 200 00:12:27,150 --> 00:12:30,630 Fentanyl, precursor production and distribution, money 201 00:12:30,630 --> 00:12:34,750 laundering, human trafficking. John Cassara has a great book 202 00:12:34,750 --> 00:12:38,430 that has about 7 different indictments of what China has 203 00:12:38,430 --> 00:12:41,030 been doing. The problem is we don't compare 204 00:12:41,030 --> 00:12:44,270 that part of their GNP to the rest of it. 205 00:12:44,270 --> 00:12:48,470 We don't add it together to see what their total global economic 206 00:12:48,470 --> 00:12:52,070 income is, because I think they're actually on par with us 207 00:12:52,070 --> 00:12:55,990 if you add that on. So that's where I see that, 208 00:12:55,990 --> 00:12:59,210 COVID. Has kind of reshuffled the deck 209 00:12:59,210 --> 00:13:04,010 for a lot of countries, Myanmar COVID allowed the military 210 00:13:04,010 --> 00:13:07,530 government to stay in power a lot longer because there wasn't 211 00:13:07,530 --> 00:13:10,370 an international response. But it was hard to get 212 00:13:10,370 --> 00:13:14,690 international pressure on that nation because of COVID. 213 00:13:15,170 --> 00:13:20,090 And so it allowed them to build PRC, supported fentanyl 214 00:13:20,130 --> 00:13:23,170 precursor factories in the country, and start building up 215 00:13:23,450 --> 00:13:26,010 casinos right there on the Chinese border. 216 00:13:26,990 --> 00:13:30,830 And it allowed that nation to rulers to get a step ahead of 217 00:13:30,870 --> 00:13:34,030 the international community. It just depends on each country 218 00:13:34,030 --> 00:13:35,870 and its players. Yeah. 219 00:13:36,150 --> 00:13:39,310 So I was just going to say that did you find more or less 220 00:13:39,310 --> 00:13:42,670 opportunities? I think the answer was less 221 00:13:42,670 --> 00:13:45,470 opportunities in the beginning, but more opportunities later on. 222 00:13:46,350 --> 00:13:51,390 Yeah, it went rampant later on. And how do you prioritize or 223 00:13:51,390 --> 00:13:53,630 determine which opportunity to pursue? 224 00:13:53,950 --> 00:13:56,270 By the most risk to the international. 225 00:13:56,630 --> 00:14:00,790 Rules based order. So what is the most risk to the 226 00:14:00,790 --> 00:14:04,870 international rules based norms Drug cartels launder their money 227 00:14:04,870 --> 00:14:07,790 through? China to me is the biggest 228 00:14:07,790 --> 00:14:14,710 financial risk to international rules based norms because it 229 00:14:15,390 --> 00:14:20,070 takes networks that are both governmental and criminal and 230 00:14:20,070 --> 00:14:24,940 ties them together and. Those networks run through every 231 00:14:24,940 --> 00:14:28,740 country in the world, which means that those networks can 232 00:14:28,740 --> 00:14:35,820 also transport weapons, people and resources to where you don't 233 00:14:35,820 --> 00:14:37,460 know what's going on in a country. 234 00:14:37,860 --> 00:14:42,660 And we've seen some of this in places like Transnistria, where 235 00:14:43,140 --> 00:14:46,980 Russian illicit networks were bringing in supplies and support 236 00:14:46,980 --> 00:14:50,780 for troops in case the Russians went into that area during the 237 00:14:50,780 --> 00:14:54,410 war. So it's that whole global mafia 238 00:14:54,410 --> 00:15:01,810 network that is just under visibility but is everywhere 239 00:15:01,810 --> 00:15:06,610 it's permeating that gives me concern because it can displace 240 00:15:06,610 --> 00:15:11,050 the global financial system. Well, moving away from the tales 241 00:15:11,090 --> 00:15:14,770 in the China, I just want to know how do you prioritize the 242 00:15:14,770 --> 00:15:17,330 way of pursuing an opportunity? Geez. 243 00:15:18,210 --> 00:15:19,290 It's hard. It depends on. 244 00:15:19,290 --> 00:15:21,890 Where I've got. Access and and influence. 245 00:15:22,050 --> 00:15:23,970 I mean, there's a lot of great opportunities. 246 00:15:24,290 --> 00:15:28,170 Like I've recently tried to help kick start the Ukraine 247 00:15:28,170 --> 00:15:33,290 reconstruction planning and NGO support and I keep getting the 248 00:15:33,290 --> 00:15:36,610 door slammed in my face. It's just so early that a lot of 249 00:15:36,610 --> 00:15:40,370 people don't see the value in planning for Ukraine 250 00:15:40,370 --> 00:15:44,330 reconstruction while others are holding their cards so close 251 00:15:44,330 --> 00:15:46,490 because they don't know what a right step is. 252 00:15:47,010 --> 00:15:49,650 That they're not taking calls, they're not discussing and 253 00:15:49,650 --> 00:15:53,210 planning opportunities. So to me that missing an 254 00:15:53,210 --> 00:15:58,290 opportunity to build a country out after the conflict ends to 255 00:15:58,290 --> 00:16:01,010 where it's very structure doesn't need corruption. 256 00:16:01,010 --> 00:16:05,450 It'll be so wealthy and empowered and financially 257 00:16:05,450 --> 00:16:09,450 stable, politically stable, that corruption is not necessary. 258 00:16:09,450 --> 00:16:11,370 Everyone has a good job, everyone's getting paid well, 259 00:16:11,370 --> 00:16:14,250 the taxes are going into the coffers, structure is running 260 00:16:14,250 --> 00:16:16,210 great. But. 261 00:16:17,120 --> 00:16:21,200 I'm afraid that we're going to all fight inwardly about who's 262 00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:25,560 going to be the lead and who's going to be the funder, and 263 00:16:25,560 --> 00:16:28,520 we're going to end up waiting till the last second and it's 264 00:16:28,520 --> 00:16:31,960 going to be this crazy rush to rebuild Ukraine. 265 00:16:31,960 --> 00:16:36,640 It's going to look like hell. Well, yeah, it's a tough one. 266 00:16:37,120 --> 00:16:41,480 Especially because I sort of disagree on the length of the of 267 00:16:41,480 --> 00:16:43,560 the conflict. Just a small parenthesis 268 00:16:43,560 --> 00:16:46,060 because. Each party thinks they're going 269 00:16:46,060 --> 00:16:50,340 to win some point. They feel like they're doing the 270 00:16:50,340 --> 00:16:53,540 part, but I don't see any. Well, that's a different 271 00:16:53,540 --> 00:16:56,820 conversation. But so going back to to what 272 00:16:56,820 --> 00:17:01,060 what you were saying, Jack. So definitely it depends on the 273 00:17:01,060 --> 00:17:05,099 access or refills that you have on on an opportunity. 274 00:17:05,300 --> 00:17:10,700 Let me ask you in the COVID-19, let's say from 2020 to 2022. 275 00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:17,460 That was the case, right? So if you took action and thing 276 00:17:17,460 --> 00:17:21,540 that you were doing for work, it depended on the influence or the 277 00:17:21,940 --> 00:17:24,700 information or access to that information, right? 278 00:17:25,500 --> 00:17:30,100 Yeah, the paper I sent you, it's a real page Turner, but the 279 00:17:30,100 --> 00:17:33,620 concept behind that in the slides are what I've been 280 00:17:33,620 --> 00:17:37,420 working on the entire time and then supporting other efforts 281 00:17:37,420 --> 00:17:40,860 like. Editing documents from OECD USA 282 00:17:40,980 --> 00:17:43,940 just to help spot risks in their concepts that they weren't 283 00:17:43,940 --> 00:17:46,660 looking at. But yeah, my prime has been the 284 00:17:46,780 --> 00:17:48,100 reverse. Extortion. 285 00:17:48,220 --> 00:17:50,820 Oligarch targeting or kliptocrat targeting. 286 00:17:50,820 --> 00:17:53,220 It's been my effort. OK. 287 00:17:53,700 --> 00:17:54,980 Definitely. I'll take a look. 288 00:17:55,020 --> 00:17:58,060 Sorry if I that's OK. I have it here. 289 00:17:58,140 --> 00:18:01,660 And yeah, it definitely highlights transnational way of 290 00:18:01,980 --> 00:18:03,260 doing things. Sure. 291 00:18:04,280 --> 00:18:06,760 I mean, it's written for the Army, so I apologize for. 292 00:18:08,040 --> 00:18:10,400 It's pretty interesting, the things that you're saying around 293 00:18:10,400 --> 00:18:15,080 the laundry money cartels, because I live in Columbia and 294 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:18,440 I'm from a small town really next to Venezuela. 295 00:18:20,280 --> 00:18:22,560 Yeah, definitely. Networks are connected. 296 00:18:22,960 --> 00:18:26,200 They end up running most part of the system, basically. 297 00:18:26,760 --> 00:18:29,800 Yeah, well, the thing about Colombia, it's a good news 298 00:18:29,800 --> 00:18:32,160 story. The violence has reduced. 299 00:18:33,170 --> 00:18:37,210 And there is cooperation now, it seems, between the government 300 00:18:38,090 --> 00:18:41,410 and the FARC, but also with the cartels that are still running 301 00:18:41,410 --> 00:18:45,850 cocaine out of the country to where they know that if they 302 00:18:45,850 --> 00:18:48,210 start getting into violence again, it's going to bring in 303 00:18:48,210 --> 00:18:52,410 international response. So kind of like Mexico, they've 304 00:18:52,410 --> 00:19:00,210 learned to keep everything down below and whenever a a local guy 305 00:19:00,370 --> 00:19:04,320 or woman gets. Into the business and they start 306 00:19:04,520 --> 00:19:07,280 becoming too aggressive. They're they're doing a good job 307 00:19:07,280 --> 00:19:12,480 of policing their own and making sure that the locals are treated 308 00:19:12,480 --> 00:19:14,320 decently. And this is what I'm finding. 309 00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:18,840 And especially in areas where there's not a lot of governance. 310 00:19:19,720 --> 00:19:23,200 In areas that have a lot of governance, there seems to be 311 00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:25,680 some weird cooperation under the table. 312 00:19:26,000 --> 00:19:29,440 And I can't speak a lot about Colombia, but from what people 313 00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:33,140 have told me though. Is that it does seem to be much 314 00:19:33,140 --> 00:19:36,780 more calm and stable and people are able to do their lives 315 00:19:36,780 --> 00:19:38,820 without getting hit up on all the time. 316 00:19:39,300 --> 00:19:41,700 Is that a reasonable position? Definitely. 317 00:19:42,060 --> 00:19:47,260 It's just that after the peace process half of the guerrilla 318 00:19:47,260 --> 00:19:54,220 FARC turning their guns and the other stay arm and and yeah, but 319 00:19:54,220 --> 00:19:59,340 because, I mean they're motivated by trading coke with 320 00:19:59,340 --> 00:20:04,060 the cartels. And right now there is another 321 00:20:04,620 --> 00:20:08,860 peace accords moving on with ELNLANA. 322 00:20:09,220 --> 00:20:13,780 Yeah, that's difficult to manage because there is no cease of 323 00:20:13,780 --> 00:20:18,540 fire during the those talks. So it's every every week we 324 00:20:18,540 --> 00:20:23,220 heard attempts to kill police or army. 325 00:20:23,660 --> 00:20:26,780 So it's kind of like a tense environment, but the peace 326 00:20:26,780 --> 00:20:29,500 process is still moving on, for instance yesterday. 327 00:20:30,450 --> 00:20:35,570 A really big head of the rights. How do you call that out of the 328 00:20:35,610 --> 00:20:37,810 fences? It's like really right movements 329 00:20:38,530 --> 00:20:43,930 that partner with army that they were in the illegal side of 330 00:20:43,930 --> 00:20:47,090 things. They started talking about their 331 00:20:47,090 --> 00:20:49,610 their connections with the government and the really 332 00:20:49,610 --> 00:20:51,570 powerful families in the government here. 333 00:20:52,730 --> 00:20:56,290 And that's like blowing people's minds because you know it's. 334 00:20:57,000 --> 00:21:00,600 People telling the truth and you know, that's the the way of 335 00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:02,560 things. They were in the 90s, you know. 336 00:21:03,400 --> 00:21:05,160 Yeah. People that have power of 337 00:21:05,240 --> 00:21:10,160 defending themselves by financing illegal groups to 338 00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:14,200 fight the other illegal groups. So, but yet again, yes, 339 00:21:14,400 --> 00:21:17,760 situation is much better. I mean you sort of feel like a 340 00:21:18,200 --> 00:21:21,720 different environment for tourism and investment despite 341 00:21:21,720 --> 00:21:24,260 all things, you know. And also, you live on the border 342 00:21:24,260 --> 00:21:28,980 of Venezuela, so you've probably had a few refugees come over as 343 00:21:28,980 --> 00:21:31,180 well A. Few thousand, yes. 344 00:21:31,380 --> 00:21:35,220 I lived there for a while so yeah it's it's it is pretty 345 00:21:35,220 --> 00:21:39,460 tense and also that they moved to Colombia and then down South 346 00:21:40,060 --> 00:21:43,100 to Chile and then up north to Mexico trying to cross the 347 00:21:43,100 --> 00:21:47,380 border. Sure you US is sending airplanes 348 00:21:47,500 --> 00:21:50,590 full of migrants. You know, they're defenseless. 349 00:21:50,590 --> 00:21:52,910 They don't have money. They're all papers. 350 00:21:53,430 --> 00:21:57,510 The ones with money made it in. There's whole hotels in Miami 351 00:21:57,510 --> 00:22:01,110 full of Venezuelans that are living there, just waiting for 352 00:22:01,790 --> 00:22:04,150 the coup or whatever to stabilize. 353 00:22:04,510 --> 00:22:07,710 The funny thing is, I think COVID actually has extended the 354 00:22:07,710 --> 00:22:13,230 life of or Maduro. Also, I think Ukraine conflict 355 00:22:13,230 --> 00:22:16,210 has benefited. Venezuela, because they have 356 00:22:16,210 --> 00:22:19,050 oil, and even though their infrastructure is terrible, 357 00:22:19,050 --> 00:22:23,130 because all the money is being tucked away in people's pockets, 358 00:22:23,210 --> 00:22:25,850 it's a resource that is vital right now. 359 00:22:26,410 --> 00:22:29,410 Yes. And our government is hearing 360 00:22:29,770 --> 00:22:32,530 and approaching Venezuela. As you know, they were best 361 00:22:32,530 --> 00:22:35,530 friends. So, yeah, president of Colombia 362 00:22:35,530 --> 00:22:40,010 was recently with Biden trying to bridge the relationship 363 00:22:40,010 --> 00:22:42,520 there. Yeah, the things are moving 364 00:22:42,600 --> 00:22:47,760 around that and as fellow president that he's willing to 365 00:22:47,760 --> 00:22:51,960 stay for a long time. So going back to one answer, you 366 00:22:51,960 --> 00:22:57,000 said that you did not act on a particular window opportunity. 367 00:22:57,000 --> 00:23:01,120 So the first question was if you identify windows of opportunity 368 00:23:01,120 --> 00:23:05,480 and you say yes because of the context and but when we asked in 369 00:23:05,480 --> 00:23:08,480 the survey if you took action or not. 370 00:23:09,570 --> 00:23:12,530 To take advantage of those windows of opportunity opening, 371 00:23:12,970 --> 00:23:16,010 you said no. Yeah, the only thing I did was 372 00:23:16,010 --> 00:23:23,290 write about the White House his memo on corruption as a threat 373 00:23:23,290 --> 00:23:27,490 to national security. I revised an older article I had 374 00:23:27,490 --> 00:23:33,130 written with Jodi Vatori and published it again to highlight 375 00:23:33,170 --> 00:23:37,690 the memo and how that is opening up opportunities for. 376 00:23:38,190 --> 00:23:42,590 The agencies to build out a formal anti corruption platform 377 00:23:42,870 --> 00:23:46,470 that targets foreign policy which is what I'm still working 378 00:23:46,470 --> 00:23:48,950 on. That's actually why I'm building 379 00:23:49,350 --> 00:23:54,830 these weaponized systems for DoD so that it can be involved. 380 00:23:55,030 --> 00:24:00,230 And now that state and aid have got plans for on ground field 381 00:24:00,230 --> 00:24:04,790 operations, DoD needs to do the same thing so that then. 382 00:24:05,170 --> 00:24:08,770 We can all start to plan together on using either AIDS 383 00:24:08,770 --> 00:24:13,850 model of atmospherics and reporting or states model of 384 00:24:13,850 --> 00:24:18,530 negotiations or sanction, or then Dod's model for the really 385 00:24:18,530 --> 00:24:22,010 sticky characters of influence and leveraging. 386 00:24:22,610 --> 00:24:25,970 Can you hold on a second? Sorry, give me a seizure. 387 00:24:27,420 --> 00:24:30,980 Hey, sorry, my wife is going to an Alicia Keys concert. 388 00:24:32,740 --> 00:24:35,020 Congratulations. That sounds great. 389 00:24:35,380 --> 00:24:41,180 Just asking me for money. I don't carry cash anymore. 390 00:24:41,780 --> 00:24:44,100 No, no one does. See, that's what COVID did. 391 00:24:44,100 --> 00:24:47,180 It moved us closer to what Japan does, where you can take your 392 00:24:47,180 --> 00:24:50,980 phone and wave it in front of a Coke machine and it'll pop out a 393 00:24:50,980 --> 00:24:52,850 soda for you. Right. 394 00:24:52,970 --> 00:24:55,890 I'm sorry, I interrupt you. So you you were basically saying 395 00:24:56,450 --> 00:25:02,050 that you as a way of acting, write down an article help DoD 396 00:25:02,050 --> 00:25:04,290 to, you know, build this platform, right? 397 00:25:04,570 --> 00:25:09,170 But I was ranting on reflecting, reflecting, reflecting. 398 00:25:09,210 --> 00:25:10,570 That's a great way to say ranting. 399 00:25:11,690 --> 00:25:16,370 No, I was just saying that this is attempt to become more 400 00:25:16,370 --> 00:25:19,930 effective in the field, just like aid and state are starting 401 00:25:19,930 --> 00:25:21,840 to do. They're realizing that you can't 402 00:25:21,840 --> 00:25:26,240 just sit at the policy level and send out dictums on 403 00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:30,680 antichruption and and make a difference because they go to 404 00:25:30,880 --> 00:25:33,760 the embassies and the embassies passing to the partner nation. 405 00:25:33,760 --> 00:25:36,200 They go, yeah, this sounds great, we'll run it through 406 00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:39,160 parliament, They run it through parliament, they pass a piece of 407 00:25:39,160 --> 00:25:43,160 paper and then they stick it on a wall and they do nothing with 408 00:25:43,160 --> 00:25:45,480 it. So we're all realizing you can't 409 00:25:45,480 --> 00:25:47,700 just. Do big thought victims. 410 00:25:47,700 --> 00:25:52,180 We actually have to do actual accountability and tracking and 411 00:25:52,180 --> 00:25:56,380 influence to get things done. And what do you think about the 412 00:25:56,380 --> 00:25:58,860 enablers that I? Had a nice conversation with an 413 00:25:58,860 --> 00:26:04,460 enabler from Zimbabwe. He talked about he he's a banker 414 00:26:04,460 --> 00:26:10,530 financier guy who does. Cryptocurrency for Zimbabwe. 415 00:26:10,530 --> 00:26:14,570 And he runs money and he's got companies around the world for 416 00:26:14,930 --> 00:26:19,370 handling financial assets. And he was a perfect target. 417 00:26:21,850 --> 00:26:25,170 He was exactly what I was, you know, I've been browsing about 418 00:26:25,170 --> 00:26:29,970 for about these enablers who hide under the covers and enable 419 00:26:30,130 --> 00:26:35,810 dictators to keep power because they don't have the limelight 420 00:26:35,810 --> 00:26:38,090 that causes the target to be placed on them. 421 00:26:38,440 --> 00:26:42,480 They're they're business people, so usually you can turn them, 422 00:26:42,680 --> 00:26:45,760 you know, for me and law enforcement, I see them as an 423 00:26:45,760 --> 00:26:49,480 opportunity to have a meeting with them and give them an offer 424 00:26:49,480 --> 00:26:52,680 to start turning over evidence quietly so that they can keep 425 00:26:52,680 --> 00:26:55,360 the wealth they have and normally they'll do it. 426 00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:58,520 If they won't, then you can start freezing their assets and 427 00:26:58,520 --> 00:26:59,920 finding a way to stick them in jail. 428 00:27:00,670 --> 00:27:04,670 Something related to getting closer to the outcomes of 429 00:27:04,670 --> 00:27:06,630 actually fighting cat corruption. 430 00:27:06,990 --> 00:27:09,830 We have used it and it was effective and. 431 00:27:10,310 --> 00:27:13,230 That model anymore? I've written it up, but I've 432 00:27:13,310 --> 00:27:16,390 never seen it used again. Basically there was an election 433 00:27:16,390 --> 00:27:19,710 for a major African country, the president, he was going to throw 434 00:27:19,710 --> 00:27:24,910 the election and stay in power. And the US Treasury and the UK 435 00:27:24,910 --> 00:27:28,720 Treasury went to. The ruler and his administration 436 00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:31,360 had basically made an offer, said we're going to freeze your 437 00:27:31,880 --> 00:27:35,320 billion dollars in personal assets and all your abilities to 438 00:27:35,320 --> 00:27:39,760 exchange commodities unless you run peaceful, free and fair 439 00:27:39,760 --> 00:27:43,600 elections, lose the election and have a peaceful transition out 440 00:27:43,600 --> 00:27:46,160 of the country. And so the the guy, his 441 00:27:46,160 --> 00:27:49,120 administration took the money and they had a peaceful, free 442 00:27:49,120 --> 00:27:51,080 and fair election and transition. 443 00:27:52,160 --> 00:27:53,960 Everyone was waiting for the other shoe to drop. 444 00:27:53,960 --> 00:27:56,660 It never did because. There was an agreement under the 445 00:27:56,660 --> 00:28:02,020 table like most power brokers do in these countries that were for 446 00:28:02,020 --> 00:28:04,860 the benefit of the country versus the benefit of a 447 00:28:04,860 --> 00:28:09,500 particular person. You know, commercial companies 448 00:28:09,500 --> 00:28:12,900 do this all the time. What I'm proposing is we stopped 449 00:28:12,900 --> 00:28:16,660 looking at those things from a high handed position and 450 00:28:16,660 --> 00:28:21,500 realized that the world does run that way and we need to start 451 00:28:21,780 --> 00:28:25,020 performing at that level as well if we want the outcomes. 452 00:28:25,710 --> 00:28:31,190 That we want, which is stable governments, stable regions, an 453 00:28:31,190 --> 00:28:35,150 accountable economic system. Then we have to get dirty. 454 00:28:35,150 --> 00:28:37,430 We have to get down there. We have to make sure that what 455 00:28:37,430 --> 00:28:41,710 happens in the the back door also is reasonable and doesn't 456 00:28:41,710 --> 00:28:44,590 allow for somebody from the military to take over our 457 00:28:44,590 --> 00:28:47,590 country and just run it for their personal gain. 458 00:28:48,550 --> 00:28:52,310 You mentioned in the survey that you felt somewhat confident 459 00:28:52,630 --> 00:28:56,390 related to a positive outcome after efforts being done during 460 00:28:56,390 --> 00:28:59,390 COVID-19. So could you tell us why you 461 00:28:59,390 --> 00:29:02,270 feel this way? I felt that way because the 462 00:29:02,270 --> 00:29:05,790 White House released that memo on corruption as a threat to 463 00:29:05,790 --> 00:29:11,710 national security, and the US Helsinki Commission expanded the 464 00:29:11,870 --> 00:29:15,310 Magnitsky Act and then also implemented the Global Magnitsky 465 00:29:15,350 --> 00:29:19,690 Act additionally. The UK started doing 466 00:29:19,810 --> 00:29:24,530 transparency laws to make it to where shell companies had to 467 00:29:24,530 --> 00:29:26,570 reveal who their beneficial owner was. 468 00:29:27,010 --> 00:29:29,370 Canada and the US started looking at that as well. 469 00:29:29,690 --> 00:29:34,010 So there was a real groundswell of accountability that would 470 00:29:34,010 --> 00:29:39,250 help with the national security side of corruption, foreign 471 00:29:39,250 --> 00:29:42,570 actors who use corruption as a national security weapon. 472 00:29:43,410 --> 00:29:46,050 And so I was, I was feeling confident about that. 473 00:29:46,540 --> 00:29:50,940 As these tools grow and mature, now we need to bring in the more 474 00:29:50,940 --> 00:29:53,500 tactical things, which is what I'm trying to build. 475 00:29:56,660 --> 00:30:00,820 Thanks so much Jack. I mean it has been a wonderful 476 00:30:00,820 --> 00:30:03,780 talk and and thank you for sharing your experiences and and 477 00:30:03,780 --> 00:30:06,580 insights. Appreciate and and yeah but so 478 00:30:06,580 --> 00:30:09,100 far thank you for your contributions and and looking 479 00:30:09,100 --> 00:30:11,180 forward to to share with you these findings. 480 00:30:11,420 --> 00:30:12,540 Yeah. Does that mean any time? 481 00:30:13,140 --> 00:30:14,340 Thank you. Take care. 482 00:30:15,320 --> 00:30:17,920 Okay bye. Thanks for listening. 483 00:30:18,200 --> 00:30:21,520 If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show 484 00:30:21,680 --> 00:30:23,280 on your favorite podcast platform. 485 00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:26,880 Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an 486 00:30:26,880 --> 00:30:30,880 episode, e-mail us at capodcasting@gmail.com. 487 00:30:31,560 --> 00:30:34,480 I'll have the e-mail and CA association website in the show 488 00:30:34,480 --> 00:30:38,240 notes and now most importantly to those currently out in the 489 00:30:38,240 --> 00:30:41,560 field working with a partner, nations, people or leadership to 490 00:30:41,560 --> 00:30:44,580 forward US relations. Thank you all for what you're 491 00:30:44,580 --> 00:30:47,260 doing. This is Jack, your host. 492 00:30:47,940 --> 00:30:51,500 Stay tuned for more great episodes, One CA podcast.