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You're listening to the identity
of the center podcast, this is 

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the show that talks about 
identity and access management 

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and making sure you know who has
access to what let's get 

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started. 
Welcome to the identity of the 

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sender podcast I'm Jeff and 
that's Jim. 

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Hey Jim hey Jeff, how are you? 
Oh not too bad yourself. 

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I'm doing good. 
Just kind of thinking about this

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week we did a little more 
traveling and I'm wondering how 

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you're enjoying small airport. 
Life, you move from Chicago to 

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Asheville, Chicago. 
You can fly direct to pretty 

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much everywhere in the world. 
Actually, you can pretty much 

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fly direct to nowhere and the 
world. 

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That's not true. 
We have like Non-Stop. 

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UPS to like seven different 
places on on airlines that I 

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don't travel with so you know 
it's fine I think it's I liked 

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it for the most part and here's 
why security is so easy. 

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I mean I can park or if I'm 
getting dropped off I can 

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literally be at the gate in like
30 seconds. 

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You know, nine times out of 10, 
there is like no weight at all 

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to get through the TSA PreCheck 
line. 

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So I'm satisfied with that. 
I mean, it's a smaller port, 

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five gates, It's my real airport
is really Atlanta just because 

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that's the hub for Delta. 
So and then from there, you get 

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kind of anywhere but it's all 
bit of a change. 

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The worst thing is the parking 
situation. 

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The Asheville parking Asheville 
Airport. 

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Parking is not great. 
So hopefully that'll get fixed 

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sooner rather than later, but 
it's fine. 

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Yeah, yeah. 
I find that what you said is is 

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spot on, except I think the 
biggest risk is that they cancel

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or Early delay, The Hop from 
Atlanta to you know, from The 

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Hub to your smaller airport. 
It happens a lot. 

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It happened to me this week, but
I guess the thought that I was 

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having is really around 
traveling, it makes it more 

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challenging when you're in the 
throes of, you know, driving a 

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project. 
And what I think the real key is

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to success as having a team of 
people and being able to trust 

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those people. 
So I think kind of the career 

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progression and identity access 
management, right? 

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As you become like a star 
performer, then the question is 

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like if you take that next level
step to managing other people 

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who have to perform, right? 
It's to become like that. 

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Next level is just not becoming 
a star performer on more 

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projects or like taking on more 
work. 

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It's now how do you get things 
done with the team? 

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You know. 
For trust to those folks. 

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And I think a big part of that, 
right, is having the right team.

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I'm sure you're having a lot of 
thoughts. 

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I just want to throw one more 
thing in there, which is that, 

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you know, right now on my 
project I have like an All-Star 

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cast of players who are not only
doing an awesome job on the 

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projects in the scope that were 
responsible for, but also, kind 

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of like, stepping up to that 
next level to help the client. 

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Point where we're finding 
deficiencies with the other 

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teams are working with which are
mostly not the clients 

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resources, at their other 
consulting firms that are, you 

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know, they're pretty much just 
working within their box and 

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refusing to go outside of their 
scope. 

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And so, you know, we're doing 
everything we can everything 

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within our power, to try to help
the client because to us like 

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the success of the client is 
that is the most important 

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thing. 
And so from my perspective, I 

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keep Driving those messages like
do, what's right for the client 

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do what's right for the client, 
you know, even if it causes us 

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to, you know, go above and 
beyond kind of our scope. 

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Obviously, we have to watch that
we're not like intruding on 

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other people scope and things 
like that. 

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But so, anyway, a lot of 
thoughts are. 

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I'm sure you have some, some 
things you want to share. 

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I mean, yeah, there was a lot to
cover their. 

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I definitely Echo having a 
strong team, which is why, which

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is why you're here with me. 
It's not it. 

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So I can so I can I can get on a
plane and go do stuff, you know,

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I try to simplify things as much
as I can life is already hard. 

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Why make it harder for other 
people? 

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As well, as yourself, you know, 
there's one rule when it comes 

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to Consulting in my head when it
comes to anything, as long as 

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the customers happy everything's
fine, right? 

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So if it means you need to do 
you know XYZ or if there's other

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things and if it's reasonable 
you can get it done. 

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Just do it. 
I mean it's not rocket science. 

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So surely gotta like, do you 
know, balanced budgets and 

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margins and all this other stuff
that you do when you're part of 

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a Consulting practice. 
But, you know, this is probably 

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like boring for people who are 
not in Consulting. 

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But, you know, it's, it's part 
of the job. 

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I think that you and I kind of 
do in day out, we do this for 

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years now, is we've been pretty 
fortunate to work with great 

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clients have be surrounded by 
great people. 

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We're trying to continue that 
Trend and so far been successful

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in this. 
This new role that each of us 

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has with our SM and Yeah, we do 
have a great team really smart 

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people, you know, I can hop on a
plane and feel like, yeah, Jim's

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got it right whether or not you 
actually do have it. 

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You do a pretty good job of 
Faking it which is which is 

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enough to give me confidence 
that things are going well but 

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you know the end the day the 
customers are happy and that's 

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all really matters. 
So yeah well I think this was 

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applicable Beyond Consulting 
because they think the clients 

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that we see be the most 
successful are the ones where 

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they've got a good team. 
And the, the leaders can 

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delegate And are confident in 
their own people. 

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I think the other thing that I 
just wanted to mention is 

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something we've talked about. 
I know in past episodes, which 

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is kind of the win-win scenario.
So we feel more confident 

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stepping up and helping the 
client go that extra mile if we 

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know we're in as a win-win, 
right? 

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So that, you know, hey, if we do
go the extra mile and maybe, you

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know, it's a little bit too 
much, we're not going to get our

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hands on. 
Op too hard. 

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It's just kind of the give and 
take, and we're all in it there 

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and they want us to be 
successful. 

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And that helps us, you know, 
Drive their success more as 

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well. 
Yep. 

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I mean, it's be nice. 
So that hard I mean, doesn't 

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cost you anything. 
Speaking of nice, we're going to

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be at octane in a couple weeks 
so for folks listening to this 

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when it goes live it'll be 
October 31st which is Halloween.

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We definitely Some topics for 
today, we're going to go over. 

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I am horror stories that we've 
got, but before that will be an 

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octane November 8th to the 10th.
In San Francisco, want to give a

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shout-out to the Octo folks, as 
well as specialist even strong. 

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Definitely hooking us up. 
We actually have a spot to 

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record on the sort of show for, 
I guess, have I've seen 

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schematics. 
So I'm not exactly sure exactly 

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how it'll be laid out but from 
from our Vantage box, when we 

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see it seems like it's gonna be 
pretty cool spot. 

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At least will be, you know, out 
there. 

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And visible for folks. 
And we might even have a logo or

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something like that on our 
little spot. 

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So it's very cool. 
Looking forward to getting some 

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folks. 
I know you been looking at 

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getting some some guests lined 
up for episodes and I think I 

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think what I'm thinking is it'll
probably very similar to what we

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did for Gartner's. 
I am Summit and the authenticate

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conference where, you know, 
record several episodes and sort

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of try to release them on a 
daily Cadence to kind of cover 

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what we're seeing and hearing 
those days as well as the 

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conversation. 
We're having with the really 

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smart identity, folks there. 
So, I've got, I've also got to 

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say, like, you know, yes, shout 
out to Stephen. 

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I think, have we made this 
request three years ago though. 

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I mean, the, the podcast was, 
you know, not as well-known. 

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Let's just say that I've gotten 
to the point where, when I reach

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out to people to be guests on 
the podcast, I've rarely get a 

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know. 
The only time people say no is 

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like if their corporation or Or 
I guess their PR department 

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forbids them from doing media. 
I'm like, oh yeah, that's right.

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We are media. 
Yeah it's really weird to hear 

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like you're somebody at Gartner 
called as journalists and like 

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journalists and like very big 
quotation marks. 

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Like I don't consider myself 
one. 

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Like, I'm just an idiot talking 
about identity. 

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Yes, yeah, I mean that's really 
but, you know, now that I mean, 

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a lot of people download the 
podcast and it's becoming pretty

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well-known. 
It's very cool. 

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Definitely appreciate folks, who
listen, if you fear. 

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Listen to this. 
Now take a moment hit that 

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thumbs up or subscribe or rape 
button, whatever it is. 

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It definitely helps when we get 
that kind of stuff done. 

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So you know just helps us 
continue to to bring 

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conversations and you know, stay
event as vendor-neutral and 

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agnostic as we can and you know 
we're still commercial-free. 

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So all that little stuff kind of
helps us continue to doing 

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things like this. 
Yeah, absolutely. 

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So, what I would jump right into
a Jeff. 

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I mean, you know, this was kind 
of like my crazy Oddball idea 

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and we had a few folks who would
very much appreciate you took 

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the time to kind of record audio
and the, I the question was, can

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you share an? 
I am Horror Story. 

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And you know, these aren't like 
slasher movies. 

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It's like where I am. 
Has gone bad or you had to end 

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up working in entire weekend to 
kind of clean up a mess. 

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That's the kind of horror 
stories that we generally have 

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an I am. 
But yeah, if you have come 

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through and I was like these are
good stories and then you know, 

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at the end what we're going to 
do is kind of share our her 

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stories. 
Yeah so we've got four audio 

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clips that will play here and 
kind of listen to and reacts in 

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disgust, I've got a written one 
from a new member of our team 

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here. 
And then yeah, You and I will go

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and then we'll end on a lighter 
note and I get things done. 

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So let's go ahead and start with
our friend Alec fry AKA for 

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identity. 
He's been on the show a couple 

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times and here's what he has for
his Horror Story. 

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Jesse and Jim for identity here.
Why Horror Story here and I am 

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was a long time ago in the late 
90s, when RSA security tokens 

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were all the rage my colleague 
and I were on site doing an 

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upgraded, a customer's 
environment and the right at the

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key time. 
I'd said to my colleague, now 

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when I say, I want you to delete
the master database because 

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there was a master and a slave 
or I guess we should Now call 

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them primary and secondary 
server. 

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But I said when I say Delete the
data bison. 

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He tap on the keyboard said yet 
done I said no no, I said when I

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say because it was some 
background noise he didn't hear 

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me say that. 
So we both looked at each other 

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and very quickly. 
Profuse sweat started pouring 

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down our faces and I realized we
had anywhere between about 15 

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seconds and five minutes before 
that change was permanent and 

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all users had been deleted from 
the system. 

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So luckily I realized very 
quickly If we stop the server, 

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make a copy of the database and 
started again, which we did, 

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then the system was or ignorant.
All systems were unaccessible, 

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for a total of about five to 
eight seconds. 

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So making it making sure we 
could recover really quickly was

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lucky, because there, the 
network was down from that 

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perspective, only for about five
to eight seconds, but once that 

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was done, we were able to just 
copy the master database back 

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and recover from it. 
But the most fun part of that 

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story was right when we're in 
the To live that if that 

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realization in the sweat was 
pouring down. 

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That was when the senior exec 
from that customer site, walked 

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past us. 
And said, how's it going guys? 

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Everything good. 
We post just looked at as best. 

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We could wait. 
Yes. 

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So luckily it turned out well 
and everything was fine, but it 

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was a huge scare. 
So from now on, I make sure that

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people don't tap keyboards and 
I, and they clearly hear me when

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I say when I say, go do this 
action. 

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Anyway, that's my story. 
Happy Halloween. 

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Okay, so I know I get your 
thoughts but immediately I have 

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Shivers around RS 80 and having 
been on the operation side, in 

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the logistics side of just 
trying to get those out there 

225
00:12:47,100 --> 00:12:50,600
and I'm thinking like okay you 
delete a master the master 

226
00:12:50,600 --> 00:12:54,300
database for the RSA server and 
you're going to have to go off 

227
00:12:54,300 --> 00:12:58,900
and re-enroll all those people 
potentially have to do token 

228
00:12:58,900 --> 00:13:01,500
swaps. 
Oh that is bad. 

229
00:13:02,000 --> 00:13:05,200
Yeah that's what that's like the
you just click. 

230
00:13:05,400 --> 00:13:09,700
Sudden an email and your this 
story sounded to me, like, you 

231
00:13:09,700 --> 00:13:12,700
just sent the email and you're 
like, oh no, did I send that to 

232
00:13:12,700 --> 00:13:15,900
the wrong person to go to check?
And you're like, oh my goodness.

233
00:13:15,900 --> 00:13:17,900
I didn't. 
But the way your heart would 

234
00:13:17,900 --> 00:13:19,900
like, pounding out of your 
chest. 

235
00:13:20,300 --> 00:13:25,700
I also was thinking as Alec was 
telling my story that, you know,

236
00:13:26,100 --> 00:13:28,800
most modern systems that are 
going to be cloud-based. 

237
00:13:28,800 --> 00:13:33,100
Probably don't you have the 
ability to delete the master 

238
00:13:33,100 --> 00:13:39,000
database, but if you do, Do 
might not be so easy to kind of 

239
00:13:39,300 --> 00:13:41,700
stop the stop, the problem on 
the spot, right? 

240
00:13:41,700 --> 00:13:45,700
You have less control over the 
system, so probably have a 

241
00:13:45,700 --> 00:13:49,200
harder time inflicting damage 
but also a harder time 

242
00:13:49,200 --> 00:13:52,000
recovering from damage. 
Yeah, that's the whole point, 

243
00:13:52,000 --> 00:13:53,000
right? 
Is you're in the cloud. 

244
00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:54,400
So you don't have to worry about
that kind of stuff. 

245
00:13:54,400 --> 00:13:57,900
So and it's not like you can 
just hey, you know, let's let's 

246
00:13:57,900 --> 00:14:01,700
bring down OCTA for everybody 
because like, that's not it. 

247
00:14:01,700 --> 00:14:03,300
That's not a, that's not a 
thing. 

248
00:14:03,300 --> 00:14:06,400
Sorry, yeah, yeah. 
That's a good one. 

249
00:14:06,400 --> 00:14:07,800
A like thanks for sending out 
one in. 

250
00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:11,400
Let's go to our next one. 
Another person who's been on the

251
00:14:11,400 --> 00:14:13,700
show, Andrew chant the phone. 
He's got a lot of exciting 

252
00:14:13,700 --> 00:14:16,000
things going on. 
I think he's gonna share some 

253
00:14:16,000 --> 00:14:17,200
news here in a little bit with 
us. 

254
00:14:17,200 --> 00:14:19,500
So we'll give kind of a sneak T 
sneaked. 

255
00:14:19,500 --> 00:14:22,300
He's hopefully so Andrew when 
you're ready to share that, you 

256
00:14:22,300 --> 00:14:24,000
know, let us know and we'll be 
happy to promote it. 

257
00:14:24,000 --> 00:14:29,200
But here is his or her story. 
Hey, Jim. 

258
00:14:29,200 --> 00:14:33,200
And Geoff Andrew here. 
And I want to give you a fun 

259
00:14:33,300 --> 00:14:38,500
Horror Story for your podcast. 
So I work for a company that had

260
00:14:38,500 --> 00:14:42,700
a shared passwords used across 
multiple departments and this 

261
00:14:42,700 --> 00:14:45,500
was a very common shared 
password that was actually 

262
00:14:45,500 --> 00:14:49,600
shared among a internal 
messaging system. 

263
00:14:49,700 --> 00:14:54,100
I won't name the message system 
and also has put on a t-shirt so

264
00:14:54,100 --> 00:14:56,000
which is scary and people knew 
it. 

265
00:14:56,500 --> 00:14:58,400
Well, I found out it made me 
sick. 

266
00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:03,600
Stomach as an IM person however 
we did get it to finally remove 

267
00:15:03,900 --> 00:15:08,400
the usage of this password 
across all areas, this password 

268
00:15:08,400 --> 00:15:12,700
was used for multiple things, 
such as shared accounts and also

269
00:15:12,800 --> 00:15:16,200
service accounts which is scary 
as it is. 

270
00:15:16,300 --> 00:15:20,400
But moved all those passwords. 
All the any scripting language 

271
00:15:20,400 --> 00:15:22,100
that uses that passwords do 
fault. 

272
00:15:22,200 --> 00:15:24,700
He took care of source no longer
being used but yeah, dumb 

273
00:15:24,700 --> 00:15:27,600
something that is a scary horse 
or a diet of the great for your 

274
00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:30,400
body cast. 
Thanks so much for taking my 

275
00:15:30,400 --> 00:15:34,300
Horror Story and pretty scary. 
See ya. 

276
00:15:35,300 --> 00:15:42,500
Okay, the path of a password 
made into a t-shirt. 

277
00:15:42,800 --> 00:15:46,400
I mean, come on man. 
Really yeah. 

278
00:15:46,400 --> 00:15:50,300
That was pretty bad. 
I also think, though it's 

279
00:15:51,300 --> 00:15:55,800
Somewhat because of the time 
frame, we know that Andrews not 

280
00:15:55,800 --> 00:15:59,400
like a old guy like me. 
And you I kind of was thinking 

281
00:15:59,400 --> 00:16:03,600
back to when I first started in 
it having the password 

282
00:16:03,600 --> 00:16:08,200
spreadsheet on a file share and 
somebody explains me. 

283
00:16:08,200 --> 00:16:10,900
I was fine. 
It's Pastor the spreadsheets 

284
00:16:10,900 --> 00:16:13,000
password-protected. 
Oh yeah and you can't break 

285
00:16:13,000 --> 00:16:16,000
Excel passwords. 
I mean no notoriously difficult.

286
00:16:16,200 --> 00:16:17,700
Yeah, yeah. 
It's not like there's like 

287
00:16:17,700 --> 00:16:20,800
shareware out there that you can
do it for free and no problem. 

288
00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:25,000
And yeah, it is said there were 
the service accounts that the 

289
00:16:25,000 --> 00:16:27,700
passwords never got changed. 
Everybody knew them. 

290
00:16:27,900 --> 00:16:30,300
I was like oh yeah well change 
them if somebody leaves. 

291
00:16:31,000 --> 00:16:36,200
Yeah, right, I mean I'm 
speculating here but this half 

292
00:16:36,200 --> 00:16:40,500
this has to have been like a 
really funny password or 

293
00:16:40,500 --> 00:16:44,700
something was inside joke. 
But I mean seriously like if 

294
00:16:44,700 --> 00:16:49,800
even if this was within the last
15 years, let's say like who 

295
00:16:49,800 --> 00:16:51,100
thought this was a good idea. 
Idea. 

296
00:16:51,100 --> 00:16:52,900
Hey, let's put our password and 
a t-shirt. 

297
00:16:54,200 --> 00:17:00,500
Yeah, I mean that's I'm sorry, 
but that is, I don't know 

298
00:17:00,508 --> 00:17:03,000
what's, I don't know what the 
right management term would be, 

299
00:17:03,000 --> 00:17:05,400
but would be like, someone's 
going on a performance 

300
00:17:05,400 --> 00:17:10,200
Improvement plan right away. 
Yeah, the very least if not 

301
00:17:10,200 --> 00:17:12,500
more, but okay, and her, that 
was a good one. 

302
00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:16,700
Let's go next to a row. 
He landed in a whole tree. 

303
00:17:17,099 --> 00:17:20,200
I know he's someone you've 
worked with in the past, but 

304
00:17:20,200 --> 00:17:24,800
let's listen to Everyone. 
This is Rohit at military and I 

305
00:17:24,808 --> 00:17:28,700
am a senior director of, I am at
a Fortune 100 company. 

306
00:17:29,200 --> 00:17:33,100
Both of these stories are about 
7, to 10 years old, when I was 

307
00:17:33,100 --> 00:17:35,700
working, as an architect in, I 
am domain. 

308
00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:39,500
So the first story goes like 
this, one of the companies that 

309
00:17:39,500 --> 00:17:44,100
I was working for was using 
Oracle identity manager, Why I 

310
00:17:44,108 --> 00:17:48,600
am was probably the hottest idea
tool in the Market at that time.

311
00:17:49,100 --> 00:17:52,200
And oh, I am uses SOA as their 
approval in je. 

312
00:17:53,300 --> 00:17:56,300
The approval workflows are 
deployed on the server as 

313
00:17:56,300 --> 00:17:59,700
Composites. 
When you deploy a new composite,

314
00:17:59,800 --> 00:18:02,400
you have to change the version 
else. 

315
00:18:02,400 --> 00:18:05,800
All in-flight request will be 
rendered invalid. 

316
00:18:06,900 --> 00:18:10,200
So this company moved from the 
waterfall model to Agile model 

317
00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:14,900
recently and the team was still 
getting used to And new devops 

318
00:18:14,900 --> 00:18:18,500
resources coming in. 
So there was a lot of chaos and 

319
00:18:18,500 --> 00:18:21,300
not all the processes work 
correctly, understood or 

320
00:18:21,300 --> 00:18:24,300
documented. 
So now the deployment team 

321
00:18:24,600 --> 00:18:28,000
during the build, did not update
the version in the properties 

322
00:18:28,000 --> 00:18:32,700
file and the composite was 
deployed over an existing 

323
00:18:32,700 --> 00:18:35,500
version. 
What that meant was there were 

324
00:18:35,500 --> 00:18:39,500
about 300, in-flight requests, 
all rendered invalid. 

325
00:18:40,300 --> 00:18:43,600
Some of these requests were 
raised by senior leadership The 

326
00:18:43,600 --> 00:18:48,400
c-suite, there was no time for 
automation for any correction. 

327
00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:52,200
So I am operations. 
Team had to manually raise 

328
00:18:52,200 --> 00:18:56,800
multiple requests which was high
priority and face the backlash 

329
00:18:56,800 --> 00:19:01,100
for emails being sent out and 
overall confusion, it really 

330
00:19:01,100 --> 00:19:04,600
dented, everyone's trust in the 
IM team at that point and took 

331
00:19:04,600 --> 00:19:07,500
us some while for us to regain 
that confidence of all 

332
00:19:07,500 --> 00:19:10,900
stakeholders. 
But it did help in a way that it

333
00:19:10,900 --> 00:19:13,400
was a good learning experience 
for us. 

334
00:19:13,600 --> 00:19:19,600
No, that switching the models at
such a expedited way, was not 

335
00:19:19,600 --> 00:19:22,600
the best thing to do. 
Another horror story is with 

336
00:19:22,600 --> 00:19:26,700
regards to one of the consulting
firms that came in, I was a 

337
00:19:26,700 --> 00:19:31,400
developer at this farm and I was
tasked to create a custom engine

338
00:19:31,700 --> 00:19:35,900
for rule creation. 
So this for the custom UI on top

339
00:19:35,900 --> 00:19:38,000
of their existing identity 
engine. 

340
00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:43,000
A requester, can go in raise a 
request or create a request for 

341
00:19:43,000 --> 00:19:45,100
a new role, provide all the 
inputs. 

342
00:19:45,300 --> 00:19:48,700
It went through the approval 
process and, you know, the 

343
00:19:48,800 --> 00:19:50,600
generate approval workflow took 
place. 

344
00:19:51,400 --> 00:19:55,500
Most of these words today are 
being done in service now, but 

345
00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:57,900
it was what the client wanted at
that time. 

346
00:19:58,700 --> 00:20:03,300
So, while we were creating this 
engine for creating new roles, I

347
00:20:03,300 --> 00:20:09,200
consulting firm was hired. 
This consulting firm came in and

348
00:20:09,200 --> 00:20:12,700
they were tasked to create a 
role based access control 

349
00:20:12,700 --> 00:20:16,400
strategy in terms of what the 
nomenclature would be. 

350
00:20:16,800 --> 00:20:20,000
What the business rule? 
The birthright roll, the it roll

351
00:20:20,000 --> 00:20:24,700
the application roles would 
mean, but most importantly, how 

352
00:20:24,700 --> 00:20:26,900
will they be created? 
What would be the mining 

353
00:20:26,900 --> 00:20:30,400
strategy? 
So, this T came in and created a

354
00:20:30,408 --> 00:20:32,900
deck with all the buzz word 
bingos. 

355
00:20:34,300 --> 00:20:38,700
Also, an application was chosen 
for pilot for the about 30 

356
00:20:38,700 --> 00:20:43,000
entitlements, in 10 users. 
So this all went well until it 

357
00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:48,500
was time for real work. 
Now, what we realized was that 

358
00:20:48,500 --> 00:20:52,800
by strategy, did not scale There
was a patient's like create 

359
00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:57,700
metadata for each entitlement 
which was unachievable to see. 

360
00:20:57,700 --> 00:21:02,100
The least there was also no 
regards for complex 

361
00:21:02,100 --> 00:21:04,900
authorization systems like 
Mainframe. 

362
00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:11,200
The strategy was very flat, very
simplistic and not scalable. 

363
00:21:11,700 --> 00:21:15,300
Although the slides for very 
very pretty I would say that the

364
00:21:15,308 --> 00:21:19,600
strategy was not worth the 
paper, it was printed on now the

365
00:21:19,600 --> 00:21:23,700
higher management friend. 
Like all our team had to do was 

366
00:21:23,700 --> 00:21:27,200
done the model which was 
Northern Ireland feasible, nor 

367
00:21:27,200 --> 00:21:30,900
useful and we would be presented
with this set of brand new 

368
00:21:30,900 --> 00:21:34,300
shining rolls, which was not the
case. 

369
00:21:34,800 --> 00:21:38,900
So ultimately what happened was 
we had to go back to the drawing

370
00:21:38,900 --> 00:21:43,400
board, to create our are back 
strategy and we then created an 

371
00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:49,800
approach which was scalable and 
more importantly, feasible, it 

372
00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:52,500
was a good learning experience. 
Dance, for all of us, including 

373
00:21:52,500 --> 00:21:57,600
the strategy leadership and the 
developers as to how to employ 

374
00:21:57,600 --> 00:22:00,400
these consulting firms. 
Thank you for having me on the 

375
00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:01,900
show. 
Have a good day. 

376
00:22:02,900 --> 00:22:06,400
All right, so this one involves 
two of, probably what I think 

377
00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:08,800
are more the more challenging 
things to roll out access 

378
00:22:08,800 --> 00:22:12,200
requests and are back. 
Yeah. 

379
00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:15,500
I mean they're and their 
standard issue like everybody's 

380
00:22:15,500 --> 00:22:21,100
trying to do these things. 
All right I think bro hit first 

381
00:22:21,300 --> 00:22:27,700
that was a really well to really
well told stories and kind of my

382
00:22:27,700 --> 00:22:30,800
react. 
My initial reaction is I guess 

383
00:22:30,800 --> 00:22:35,100
I'm thinking like career-wise, 
you have to go through these 

384
00:22:35,100 --> 00:22:36,900
hard times. 
You have to go through these 

385
00:22:36,900 --> 00:22:40,100
mistakes. 
Otherwise, you know, you don't 

386
00:22:40,100 --> 00:22:41,600
know what to avoid. 
Be nice too. 

387
00:22:41,700 --> 00:22:45,500
I think that our careers 
building one success on top of 

388
00:22:45,500 --> 00:22:50,400
the neck success but the reality
is is like some spots on the way

389
00:22:50,600 --> 00:22:53,100
you have to fail. 
And if you don't go through 

390
00:22:53,100 --> 00:22:57,400
those failures, your you I say 
you learn more from your 

391
00:22:57,400 --> 00:22:59,600
failures than you do from your 
successes. 

392
00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:03,700
Well, there are definitely a 
powerful reminder on what got to

393
00:23:03,700 --> 00:23:05,400
be right. 
So you don't touch the hot 

394
00:23:05,400 --> 00:23:06,300
thing. 
Oh, okay. 

395
00:23:06,400 --> 00:23:07,900
And then you burn it in your 
hand, right? 

396
00:23:07,900 --> 00:23:10,400
Okay, yeah, I'm definitely not 
going to do that, you know, I 

397
00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:11,600
think I think you're totally 
right. 

398
00:23:11,700 --> 00:23:14,400
Right. 
I think, you know, learning 

399
00:23:15,100 --> 00:23:21,800
through mistakes is great, from 
a learning perspective. 

400
00:23:22,700 --> 00:23:25,700
It does not solve the problem of
the damage that can be done 

401
00:23:25,700 --> 00:23:28,500
though when it happens. 
I think this is something that 

402
00:23:28,500 --> 00:23:31,900
you know life is life is messy. 
Just like identity and access 

403
00:23:31,900 --> 00:23:34,200
management is you can have a 
great plan, it sounds like these

404
00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:35,800
you know. 
I'm not sure who the Consultants

405
00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:39,600
were came in and created this, 
you know, our back strategy and 

406
00:23:39,600 --> 00:23:41,600
yeah, it looks good on paper, 
right? 

407
00:23:41,700 --> 00:23:44,600
Very pretty slide which we love 
and Consulting, right? 

408
00:23:45,900 --> 00:23:48,900
But when it hit the real world, 
it fell flat on its face and 

409
00:23:48,900 --> 00:23:51,400
just didn't work. 
And I think that is, that is 

410
00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:55,000
something every I am program 
needs to be prepared for, right.

411
00:23:55,000 --> 00:24:00,300
You can go through planning and 
strategy and like, yeah. 

412
00:24:00,300 --> 00:24:03,800
We've got this great plan and, 
you know, when it collides with 

413
00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:06,900
the real world, you have to be 
prepared for things that that 

414
00:24:06,900 --> 00:24:09,600
just don't go, right? 
Maybe assumption was off, maybe 

415
00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:11,100
something changed in the 
business. 

416
00:24:11,700 --> 00:24:13,900
You know, parameters that cause 
it not to work anymore. 

417
00:24:13,900 --> 00:24:16,300
And this, you know, this isn't 
specific to just to our back, 

418
00:24:16,300 --> 00:24:18,000
which is notoriously difficult. 
Anyway. 

419
00:24:18,500 --> 00:24:20,200
It could be anything, right? 
You can go through all this 

420
00:24:20,200 --> 00:24:22,700
stuff and say, hey, we're gonna 
get this thing rolled out and 

421
00:24:22,700 --> 00:24:24,600
then all of a sudden, next 
thing, you know, you're waiting 

422
00:24:25,000 --> 00:24:28,000
a month because you still don't 
have a development environment, 

423
00:24:28,200 --> 00:24:29,600
right? 
Something like that. 

424
00:24:30,700 --> 00:24:34,900
It's it's interesting for sure. 
Yeah, I mean, you know, the 

425
00:24:34,900 --> 00:24:38,200
other reminder that comes from 
this is that there are certain 

426
00:24:38,500 --> 00:24:42,500
kind of core ingrained, I'll 
even call them T-they're not 

427
00:24:42,500 --> 00:24:47,100
really information security or I
am best practices and however, 

428
00:24:47,100 --> 00:24:51,400
you feel about that term. 
They're kind of the basics basic

429
00:24:51,400 --> 00:24:54,100
blocking and tackling of how to 
do ITT. 

430
00:24:54,300 --> 00:24:57,200
You don't take your sandbox 
environment and wire it to 

431
00:24:57,200 --> 00:25:01,000
production, that's one, right? 
Like we all agree with, you 

432
00:25:01,000 --> 00:25:06,700
know, yes, you shouldn't do that
and if you do, you are taking 

433
00:25:06,700 --> 00:25:09,200
preparing be prepared for the 
Fallout. 

434
00:25:09,300 --> 00:25:14,400
The other is, you know, over 
Communicate, you've got to make 

435
00:25:14,400 --> 00:25:16,200
sure that people know what's 
coming. 

436
00:25:16,500 --> 00:25:22,400
Another is try to pile it and, 
you know, roll out your system 

437
00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:26,100
to a small number of people who 
hopefully are representative of 

438
00:25:26,100 --> 00:25:30,200
the whole, but rather than 
impact, 100,000 people, with 

439
00:25:30,200 --> 00:25:34,700
your change, try to do it to 100
people, and then working on from

440
00:25:34,700 --> 00:25:38,900
there, Yeah, I think rolling a 6
out, take a small group, always 

441
00:25:38,900 --> 00:25:42,800
make sense, especially if you 
can, if you can tie that roll 

442
00:25:42,800 --> 00:25:45,100
out to a part of the business 
that you're trying to make 

443
00:25:45,100 --> 00:25:49,000
friends with, right? 
So it's if you, if they go into 

444
00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:50,700
this and say, hey, you know 
what, we're on this new, this 

445
00:25:50,700 --> 00:25:53,000
new technology, this new 
business process, whatever may 

446
00:25:53,000 --> 00:25:56,300
be, and we think it's going to 
solve a lot of problems. 

447
00:25:56,300 --> 00:25:59,200
May be that you're having, would
you be willing to help us test 

448
00:25:59,200 --> 00:26:03,000
this and be part of helping make
sure this goes well for the rest

449
00:26:03,000 --> 00:26:05,900
of the organization. 
I've never had a business unit. 

450
00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:10,000
I can say no, they always want 
to be part of this and it is 

451
00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:11,600
long as you set the appropriate 
expectation. 

452
00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:13,900
Like, yeah, we know that there 
may be some issues that come up 

453
00:26:13,900 --> 00:26:17,800
but we want you to help us make 
this right for the rest of the 

454
00:26:17,800 --> 00:26:19,500
organization. 
In addition to yourself. 

455
00:26:19,500 --> 00:26:22,100
Like I've never had anybody come
back and say, no, not 

456
00:26:22,100 --> 00:26:25,200
interested, here's one of the 
hardest ones I think. 

457
00:26:25,200 --> 00:26:28,100
Overall, if you're a 
practitioner anywhere and it, 

458
00:26:28,600 --> 00:26:32,200
you know, specifically I am 
sure, but it's when you have the

459
00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:35,800
executive pressure, like, here's
some artificial date. 

460
00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:37,900
Eight that this needs to be done
by. 

461
00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:41,600
And, you know, it's kind of like
you're under pressure to hit 

462
00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:43,800
some date. 
But, you know, in your heart of 

463
00:26:43,808 --> 00:26:47,600
hearts, that that's not going to
work or that's going to be very 

464
00:26:47,600 --> 00:26:49,800
bad, that's going to have some 
bad consequences. 

465
00:26:50,100 --> 00:26:52,200
What's the level of push back to
give? 

466
00:26:52,400 --> 00:26:55,500
And I think that this is like, 
where take some touch and take 

467
00:26:55,500 --> 00:26:59,500
some maturity. 
Because if you signed up for it,

468
00:26:59,800 --> 00:27:03,200
you're almost doomed to fail. 
And if you push back, you might 

469
00:27:03,200 --> 00:27:06,800
be seen as you're not a team 
player or you're just You know 

470
00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:12,900
to - to be, you know, able to 
move up the move up the ladder. 

471
00:27:14,600 --> 00:27:18,600
Yeah, I think you've got to be 
able to speak truth to power but

472
00:27:18,600 --> 00:27:24,500
that that spoken truth needs to 
be appropriately message through

473
00:27:24,500 --> 00:27:28,000
the appropriate channels in a in
the proper way. 

474
00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:33,500
And I what I mean by that is 
diplomacy tact thoughtfulness, 

475
00:27:33,700 --> 00:27:35,700
right? 
I think I was given a webinar 

476
00:27:35,700 --> 00:27:37,500
yesterday and I was really proud
of this analogy. 

477
00:27:37,500 --> 00:27:40,000
I came up with what it was like,
you know, not everything is an 

478
00:27:40,000 --> 00:27:42,900
Avengers level threat right 
there somewhere. 

479
00:27:42,900 --> 00:27:45,100
You can get A good with just 
Daredevil. 

480
00:27:45,100 --> 00:27:49,400
Sorry sorry Daredevil fans but 
he's not an Avenger since like 

481
00:27:50,100 --> 00:27:54,400
you've got to be able to like 
way what is the risk versus the 

482
00:27:54,400 --> 00:27:58,900
reward versus the potential 
impact and if you're constantly 

483
00:27:58,900 --> 00:28:02,000
saying this won't work and it's 
because it's like a 1% problem 

484
00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:04,600
or effects like 1% I think you 
got to make sure you bring on 

485
00:28:04,600 --> 00:28:05,900
your messaging so certainly 
speak. 

486
00:28:05,900 --> 00:28:09,800
Truth to power, do not be afraid
to bring up issues and you need 

487
00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:12,700
to have developed an. 
I am program that supports that,

488
00:28:12,800 --> 00:28:14,600
right? 
It can't just be Be well I'm the

489
00:28:14,600 --> 00:28:16,700
program manager. 
Everything I say goes and 

490
00:28:16,700 --> 00:28:19,700
everything that I say is the way
it's going to be and it's always

491
00:28:19,700 --> 00:28:22,100
going to be right. 
You've got to be able to take 

492
00:28:22,100 --> 00:28:25,100
input from all parts of the 
business, your own teams, 

493
00:28:25,100 --> 00:28:28,700
whatever may be. 
So have a, you know, a, an 

494
00:28:28,700 --> 00:28:31,100
environment where you where you 
do allow that. 

495
00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:34,300
And if you are the one speaking 
up, make sure you're doing it, 

496
00:28:34,300 --> 00:28:37,000
the right message, the right 
vehicle, right? 

497
00:28:38,500 --> 00:28:43,000
Have if you've got them stats 
figures, something right to help

498
00:28:43,000 --> 00:28:45,300
make the case. 
Yeah, I was thinking of a couple

499
00:28:45,300 --> 00:28:49,700
other tactics to one is, 
sometimes it's like, hey we're 

500
00:28:49,700 --> 00:28:52,800
going to roll out MFA to the 
entire organization by the end 

501
00:28:52,800 --> 00:28:55,500
of the year and here were 
sitting on November 1st, right? 

502
00:28:55,500 --> 00:28:59,400
You're like that's not realistic
but maybe we could have the MFA 

503
00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:02,700
capability built or we can 
select a product or we could do 

504
00:29:02,700 --> 00:29:09,900
something that isn't short of 
this audacious goal, but isn't 

505
00:29:09,900 --> 00:29:11,700
that? 
No, we can't do it, right? 

506
00:29:11,700 --> 00:29:13,700
It's just hey, we're going to do
it and I like it. 

507
00:29:13,800 --> 00:29:17,500
A stepwise fashion. 
The other tactic I was thinking 

508
00:29:17,500 --> 00:29:21,800
of is really to try to build 
support for your idea. 

509
00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:26,100
So if there are other peers in 
your organization who you can 

510
00:29:26,300 --> 00:29:29,700
kind of like hey I'd like to 
have coffee with you and talk 

511
00:29:29,700 --> 00:29:34,700
through this issue and here's 
what my challenges and you got 

512
00:29:34,700 --> 00:29:38,900
some other folks who have 
respect within your 

513
00:29:38,900 --> 00:29:40,200
organization. 
Maybe. 

514
00:29:40,500 --> 00:29:45,300
So maybe you report to CIO and 
you There's big audacious goal 

515
00:29:45,300 --> 00:29:48,500
is rolling downhill to you, but 
there are other folks who report

516
00:29:48,500 --> 00:29:51,800
to the CIO and you kind of like 
talk through it with them so 

517
00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:56,200
that when you go and you try to 
propose this less than, you 

518
00:29:56,200 --> 00:30:01,900
know, less than the full 
audacious goal that you have 

519
00:30:01,900 --> 00:30:06,500
some folks in the room who are 
kind of in support of your plan.

520
00:30:08,000 --> 00:30:08,800
Yeah. 
For sure. 

521
00:30:08,800 --> 00:30:11,100
I mean you don't want to be 
voted off the island because 

522
00:30:11,100 --> 00:30:13,700
you're by yourself, right? 
Dalliances? 

523
00:30:15,100 --> 00:30:16,900
All right, how about we get to 
our next one. 

524
00:30:17,300 --> 00:30:21,400
We've got Tom Malta. 
Another individual who's been on

525
00:30:21,400 --> 00:30:23,600
the show before and let's hear 
from him. 

526
00:30:24,500 --> 00:30:27,700
Hey, this is Tom Alta. 
I am, I am practitioner and the 

527
00:30:27,700 --> 00:30:31,000
space for over 22 years and of 
late. 

528
00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:32,500
I've been doing Financial 
Services. 

529
00:30:32,500 --> 00:30:36,500
Strategic advisory work for a 
number of companies and I'm here

530
00:30:36,500 --> 00:30:40,200
today to tell you a little About
a Halloween Horror Story, and I 

531
00:30:40,200 --> 00:30:43,500
am. 
So, this goes back to my first 

532
00:30:43,500 --> 00:30:47,500
implementation of I am, when I 
was running the global program 

533
00:30:47,900 --> 00:30:51,600
that could Goldman Sachs, and we
spent a lot of time building it 

534
00:30:51,600 --> 00:30:57,500
out and on the morning of the 
go-live, we were attached to the

535
00:30:57,500 --> 00:31:02,200
HR System, obviously pulling an 
identity events from them and 

536
00:31:02,200 --> 00:31:06,300
doing automation to remove 
Privileges and that night, the 

537
00:31:06,300 --> 00:31:12,100
HR team sent Over a file that 
had all of the London, security,

538
00:31:12,100 --> 00:31:17,000
guards in it. 
Essentially terminated and we 

539
00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:19,700
were scrambling that morning 
getting all sorts of calls from 

540
00:31:19,700 --> 00:31:22,700
the London office as to what 
happened and what broke down. 

541
00:31:23,200 --> 00:31:27,300
And obviously, later on, we 
found out that the file was 

542
00:31:27,300 --> 00:31:32,300
obviously a bad file and ever 
since that implementation one of

543
00:31:32,308 --> 00:31:35,600
the things, I always advise my 
clients and what I've done in my

544
00:31:35,600 --> 00:31:39,300
own program since then is to 
make sure That you have a good 

545
00:31:39,300 --> 00:31:44,000
Fail-Safe mechanism when you're 
attaching automation to any HR 

546
00:31:44,000 --> 00:31:47,900
System and not trusting a 
completely, because mistakes do 

547
00:31:47,900 --> 00:31:51,500
happen as in the case of this. 
And if she could imagine a 

548
00:31:51,500 --> 00:31:54,500
couple hundred security guards 
sitting out on the streets of 

549
00:31:54,500 --> 00:31:56,900
London trying to get into 
office, it wasn't a very 

550
00:31:56,900 --> 00:31:59,300
pleasant thing. 
So I hope that you can learn 

551
00:31:59,300 --> 00:32:02,000
from that. 
And I'm great to share this with

552
00:32:02,300 --> 00:32:06,600
my peers and colleagues at the 
idec broadcast team and to all 

553
00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:07,300
of you. 
Thank you. 

554
00:32:08,600 --> 00:32:10,500
Okay, so the first thing I'm 
thinking to me is London, 

555
00:32:10,500 --> 00:32:12,600
Calling by The Clash and then I 
actually get into. 

556
00:32:12,600 --> 00:32:18,700
I am I mean, it's a good one. 
I mean, for some reason, I 

557
00:32:18,700 --> 00:32:23,400
imagine the security guards at 
Buckingham Palace with the big 

558
00:32:23,400 --> 00:32:26,000
hats. 
Yeah, but yeah, I'm sure they 

559
00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:29,200
weren't happy but I think Tom 
brings up a great idea which is 

560
00:32:29,200 --> 00:32:32,500
like you know, plan for the 
unexpected. 

561
00:32:32,500 --> 00:32:36,700
I mean if it especially in this 
day of artificial intelligence 

562
00:32:36,700 --> 00:32:41,600
to kind of look for something 
that just doesn't smell right? 

563
00:32:41,700 --> 00:32:45,900
And I guess you can imagine so 
many different scenarios but you

564
00:32:45,900 --> 00:32:50,400
know, a whole department Being 
terminated at once not a real 

565
00:32:50,400 --> 00:32:54,800
likely as maybe something that 
should kick off some kind of 

566
00:32:54,800 --> 00:32:59,700
human intervention I guess I 
mean that you know some of these

567
00:32:59,700 --> 00:33:04,500
things are probably tough to 
plan around but that's a great. 

568
00:33:04,500 --> 00:33:09,500
I am her story because like who 
you can just imagine five hours 

569
00:33:09,800 --> 00:33:14,300
earlier than I assume Tom was in
New York City office at this 

570
00:33:14,300 --> 00:33:16,700
time. 
So he's probably being woken up.

571
00:33:16,900 --> 00:33:19,300
Like yeah, nobody can get into 
the building. 

572
00:33:19,900 --> 00:33:23,900
Yeah, that's an F, no bueno. 
I guess, you know, score one for

573
00:33:23,900 --> 00:33:27,400
the people who test, right, make
sure that as part of your unit 

574
00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:30,400
testing or validation. 
It's like how, how many records 

575
00:33:30,400 --> 00:33:32,900
are going to be affected right 
by this change? 

576
00:33:33,500 --> 00:33:37,300
Is that number accurate, right? 
Is it, is it what you're 

577
00:33:37,300 --> 00:33:39,100
expecting? 
You know, I've seen that a few 

578
00:33:39,100 --> 00:33:42,900
times where you go to, like 
maybe update a Meta, Meta 

579
00:33:42,900 --> 00:33:46,000
attribute about somebody, or a 
certain area. 

580
00:33:46,000 --> 00:33:48,700
And you're like, oh, Shoot, I 
just did it to a whole bunch 

581
00:33:48,700 --> 00:33:49,800
more people. 
I thought it would be right? 

582
00:33:49,800 --> 00:33:53,000
And everyone now has like the 
same title or the same email 

583
00:33:53,000 --> 00:33:55,200
address domain subdomain order 
may be. 

584
00:33:55,200 --> 00:33:57,800
So, definitely something you 
want to think about when you're 

585
00:33:58,000 --> 00:34:03,800
when you're rolling stuff out is
is the scale of the change you 

586
00:34:03,800 --> 00:34:06,500
know, lining up with the 
expectations are supposed to be?

587
00:34:07,400 --> 00:34:11,199
Yeah, yeah, absolutely. 
All right, let's go to the next 

588
00:34:11,199 --> 00:34:13,199
one. 
This one is written from the 

589
00:34:13,199 --> 00:34:16,199
newest member of the Rockstar RS
M, IM team. 

590
00:34:16,199 --> 00:34:20,000
This is from Brian Lindstrom. 
He and I have worked several 

591
00:34:20,000 --> 00:34:22,400
years ago in the past. 
I don't think this is when we 

592
00:34:22,400 --> 00:34:23,600
were working at the same 
company. 

593
00:34:23,900 --> 00:34:28,500
I don't recall it but who knows?
Anyway well what's that? 

594
00:34:28,600 --> 00:34:31,500
It wasn't your fault, right? 
Yeah I will certainly not. 

595
00:34:31,500 --> 00:34:33,000
I mean he definitely is claiming
ownership here. 

596
00:34:33,000 --> 00:34:36,800
This is a good one too so he 
writes back in my early days I 

597
00:34:36,800 --> 00:34:39,800
was implementing an identity 
solution and I inadvertently 

598
00:34:39,800 --> 00:34:43,900
deleted about 1,000 active 
directory counts including my 

599
00:34:43,900 --> 00:34:46,600
own. 
I first realized this when I 

600
00:34:46,600 --> 00:34:49,699
said Lost access to various 
applications and network 

601
00:34:49,699 --> 00:34:52,900
resources. 
I tried rebooting my PC, hoping 

602
00:34:52,900 --> 00:34:56,100
that would fix my issue. 
But unfortunately I couldn't log

603
00:34:56,100 --> 00:34:59,800
back in and then picked my head 
above my cubicle, and start to 

604
00:34:59,800 --> 00:35:02,200
hear people complaining about 
losing access. 

605
00:35:02,700 --> 00:35:06,900
I slowly got up walked over to 
the active directory, guys, and 

606
00:35:06,900 --> 00:35:10,600
asked, if they could do a 
restore public shaming and sued 

607
00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:13,900
and a hard lesson was learned 
when making changes, make sure 

608
00:35:13,900 --> 00:35:15,900
you're not in a production 
environment. 

609
00:35:16,000 --> 00:35:17,400
So, congratulations. 
Relations, Brian. 

610
00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:20,000
That is a good horror story was 
going to say. 

611
00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:23,600
Yeah, we started off by saying 
these aren't / or stories but 

612
00:35:23,700 --> 00:35:26,700
that very easily could have 
turned into a slasher Story. 

613
00:35:27,200 --> 00:35:28,200
I mean. 
How good is that? 

614
00:35:28,200 --> 00:35:29,900
I mean, not it's not good, 
right? 

615
00:35:29,900 --> 00:35:33,200
Which is characterized it but 
from a like a outcome precise, 

616
00:35:33,200 --> 00:35:36,900
like I just deleted a thousand 
accounts including my own so I 

617
00:35:36,908 --> 00:35:40,600
can't even fix my own error. 
I've got to go to someone else 

618
00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:43,400
for help I mean that's the Walk 
of Shame right there it does. 

619
00:35:43,400 --> 00:35:46,400
Yeah I was thinking about that 
walk of shame kind of as we're 

620
00:35:46,400 --> 00:35:48,900
listening. 
Ro his story which was kind of 

621
00:35:48,908 --> 00:35:53,100
going back to Oracle identity 
manager, which kind of reminds 

622
00:35:53,100 --> 00:35:57,400
me of the days when you'd still 
have a lot of Mainframe people 

623
00:35:57,400 --> 00:36:00,300
or people who are like, from the
Mainframe days and you get the 

624
00:36:00,300 --> 00:36:02,600
statement. 
We never had to deal with this 

625
00:36:02,600 --> 00:36:06,500
with the Mainframe, as if the 
Mainframe was just so perfect. 

626
00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:08,400
And there were never any of 
these issues. 

627
00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:13,400
So, yeah, I'm sure that Brian 
may have heard that echoing 

628
00:36:13,400 --> 00:36:15,400
through the hallways, as well. 
We never had to deal with this 

629
00:36:15,400 --> 00:36:18,700
with the Mainframe. 
Yeah, I lack of the Mainframe 

630
00:36:18,700 --> 00:36:21,000
one. 
I shot out to Leslie who I love 

631
00:36:21,000 --> 00:36:22,900
very much. 
We used to work together a long 

632
00:36:22,900 --> 00:36:26,000
time ago and she was a rack F 
expert. 

633
00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:30,100
I was not, I was constantly 
going to her to fix my mistakes.

634
00:36:31,900 --> 00:36:34,000
Yeah. 
All right, let's wrap up with 

635
00:36:34,100 --> 00:36:36,500
horror stories for you and I 
want you go first. 

636
00:36:37,000 --> 00:36:40,200
Okay, so I was originally 
planning to tell the horror 

637
00:36:40,200 --> 00:36:47,300
story of my first big. 
I Am project where, you know, We

638
00:36:47,300 --> 00:36:50,300
estimated properly the number of
help desk calls are going to 

639
00:36:50,300 --> 00:36:54,800
have, but we didn't think they 
would all happen like 

640
00:36:54,800 --> 00:36:59,500
immediately on day one, but I've
already told that story once and

641
00:36:59,800 --> 00:37:03,300
you know, if anybody wants to 
hear it again, we could tell it 

642
00:37:03,300 --> 00:37:05,900
again on a future episode. 
Or I called again, but it 

643
00:37:05,900 --> 00:37:09,700
actually, they give like a true.
I am Horror Story. 

644
00:37:09,700 --> 00:37:15,600
So, when I was at in financial 
services, working for a client, 

645
00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:20,300
I won't say that the Any name 
we're implementing a new, I am 

646
00:37:20,300 --> 00:37:25,200
system and it was like a major 
deployment replacing, you know, 

647
00:37:25,200 --> 00:37:30,300
a lot of manual processes and 
replacing a basically. 

648
00:37:30,300 --> 00:37:33,600
One of the things that was 
unique about it was it was like 

649
00:37:33,600 --> 00:37:36,200
the brand-new version. 
We were the first big company 

650
00:37:36,500 --> 00:37:40,800
rolling in this brand new 
version of software and when we 

651
00:37:40,800 --> 00:37:44,600
got to the first goal, I was 
like, you know, Friday or 

652
00:37:44,600 --> 00:37:47,500
Saturday night like you know, 
middle of the We're going to go 

653
00:37:47,500 --> 00:37:52,100
live and as we're doing all 
kinds of sat and unit, testing 

654
00:37:52,300 --> 00:37:54,200
things for failing, left and 
right. 

655
00:37:54,300 --> 00:37:58,800
And so, we get to the point of 
the go/no-go decision and made a

656
00:37:58,800 --> 00:38:01,500
decision of no go. 
So in other words, he had to go 

657
00:38:01,500 --> 00:38:06,400
through our rollback plant. 
So this is why you make the full

658
00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:11,000
cut over plan with a cutback 
plan because you may have to use

659
00:38:11,000 --> 00:38:12,200
it. 
And so, we went through the 

660
00:38:12,200 --> 00:38:16,600
whole cut back plan, we were 
able to kind of survive winter. 

661
00:38:16,800 --> 00:38:22,100
Another month and like fix a lot
of these problems and we got to 

662
00:38:22,100 --> 00:38:25,500
the next go/no-go night. 
It was like a month later on a 

663
00:38:25,500 --> 00:38:28,300
Saturday night, going through 
the whole thing, some things are

664
00:38:28,300 --> 00:38:31,300
failing as a lot better than it 
was before, but some things are 

665
00:38:31,308 --> 00:38:37,300
still filing and like the the 
top consultant who's actually 

666
00:38:37,300 --> 00:38:40,900
like the CEO of the consulting 
firm that we were using was 

667
00:38:40,900 --> 00:38:44,300
like, and you've got to have 
some guts here and like, and go 

668
00:38:44,300 --> 00:38:47,100
forward with this thing and 
everybody was just like, You 

669
00:38:47,100 --> 00:38:50,500
know, looking at me because it 
was ultimately my decision and I

670
00:38:50,500 --> 00:38:53,500
made the decision like even 
though we were failing on some 

671
00:38:53,500 --> 00:38:55,800
of these things so it's just 
feeling so much. 

672
00:38:55,800 --> 00:38:59,900
Pressure at that moment I said 
all right we'll go and so we 

673
00:38:59,900 --> 00:39:04,500
went and you know, some of the 
problems with like data 

674
00:39:04,500 --> 00:39:09,400
synchronization and provisioning
stuff like that and some of the 

675
00:39:09,400 --> 00:39:13,000
problems were like, you know, 
like the data wasn't actually 

676
00:39:13,000 --> 00:39:16,900
synchronizing and I mean, I was 
on like conference calls It's 

677
00:39:17,000 --> 00:39:21,500
like everyday. 
Just literally getting yelled at

678
00:39:22,300 --> 00:39:28,400
for about a month after that, we
were like rolling new code every

679
00:39:28,400 --> 00:39:31,400
weekend going through change 
control every weekend. 

680
00:39:31,600 --> 00:39:36,100
I literally was working like 80 
hours a week for like a month 

681
00:39:36,100 --> 00:39:39,700
straight and then even then I 
would say, like okay we I wasn't

682
00:39:39,700 --> 00:39:44,200
drowning at that point but it 
still was you know, tough Sally.

683
00:39:44,300 --> 00:39:46,600
So you know, that was that's 
true. 

684
00:39:46,900 --> 00:39:51,800
Lee was a horror horror story. 
I think what I learned from that

685
00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:58,300
is that, you know, one like if 
you don't feel like you can go 

686
00:39:58,300 --> 00:40:02,100
live, if you're in that go/no-go
decision and everybody's like 

687
00:40:02,100 --> 00:40:04,500
pressuring you got to go but you
know it's not the right 

688
00:40:04,500 --> 00:40:07,100
decision. 
You got to share the courage to 

689
00:40:07,100 --> 00:40:11,400
like say we are we're not going 
if this is Susan's mind to make,

690
00:40:11,400 --> 00:40:15,200
we are not going and because 
believe me that pain that I 

691
00:40:15,207 --> 00:40:19,200
lived through the next Or weeks 
and it wasn't just working the 8

692
00:40:19,200 --> 00:40:20,800
hours. 
It was like getting yelled at 

693
00:40:20,800 --> 00:40:25,300
and people think there was no 
way to pull a victory out of 

694
00:40:25,300 --> 00:40:27,500
that. 
Like it was going to be seen as 

695
00:40:27,500 --> 00:40:30,500
a failure, no matter how hard I 
worked. 

696
00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:33,300
Could you imagine that? 
We like, you're giving up family

697
00:40:33,300 --> 00:40:34,800
time? 
I had young kids and everything 

698
00:40:34,800 --> 00:40:39,700
and like, you know, working 80 
hours a week and, you know, it 

699
00:40:39,700 --> 00:40:43,200
just like your name is going 
through the mud so that that 

700
00:40:43,200 --> 00:40:46,300
truly was like my slasher. 
I am Horror Story. 

701
00:40:46,900 --> 00:40:50,200
That's yeah, that's a that's a 
good /, bad one for sure. 

702
00:40:51,900 --> 00:40:56,400
Yeah, that's a rough one man. 
I got questions. 

703
00:40:56,400 --> 00:41:00,600
So we're I guess how far along 
into your career where you is 

704
00:41:00,600 --> 00:41:03,300
this like a new Earth like when 
you're kind of newer or is kind 

705
00:41:03,300 --> 00:41:06,500
of middle, like how did you 
recover from this? 

706
00:41:06,500 --> 00:41:09,300
I mean, this can be sometimes 
seen as like a career sort of 

707
00:41:09,308 --> 00:41:11,300
limiting move, right? 
For some folks. 

708
00:41:11,600 --> 00:41:19,500
So it was like mid-career it was
probably the last time I was 

709
00:41:19,500 --> 00:41:24,900
practitioner before going into 
Consulting and it was by far the

710
00:41:25,400 --> 00:41:28,500
toughest one that I had here was
what happened was prior to the 

711
00:41:28,500 --> 00:41:36,400
first, you know, pull out. 
I was not the I am program lead 

712
00:41:36,900 --> 00:41:43,000
the lead quit, I think he saw 
the writing on the wall that 

713
00:41:43,000 --> 00:41:48,800
like this project was heading 
for a crash and so I was offered

714
00:41:48,800 --> 00:41:53,000
the job for me it was a major 
promotion but I also knew that 

715
00:41:53,300 --> 00:41:57,900
here in for some painful times I
took the promotion anyway and 

716
00:41:58,100 --> 00:42:00,400
now I'm responsible for this 
thing. 

717
00:42:01,100 --> 00:42:04,100
And we're heading for the crash 
and like fortunately. 

718
00:42:04,200 --> 00:42:06,700
At that point we hadn't pulled 
the plug yet. 

719
00:42:06,700 --> 00:42:10,200
So that was the time and like we
pulled the plug that we had to 

720
00:42:10,200 --> 00:42:12,500
work. 
Hard to still get the system 

721
00:42:12,500 --> 00:42:15,700
deployed but then on that second
one I should have had the 

722
00:42:15,700 --> 00:42:21,100
courage to pull the plug again, 
but I just felt like too much 

723
00:42:21,100 --> 00:42:22,700
pressure. 
Have to go live. 

724
00:42:22,800 --> 00:42:26,600
It was a big mistake. 
Yeah, it sounds like it, but I 

725
00:42:26,600 --> 00:42:27,900
guess. 
It worked out in the end. 

726
00:42:29,300 --> 00:42:33,700
I mean, I I think if we pulled 
the plug we could have solved 

727
00:42:33,700 --> 00:42:36,200
some of the issues but 
eventually we did have to rip 

728
00:42:36,200 --> 00:42:41,200
off the Band-Aid and go live and
then you know I think also being

729
00:42:41,200 --> 00:42:46,300
alive gave us more flexibility 
to address some of the changes. 

730
00:42:47,100 --> 00:42:50,100
I don't know. 
I mean it's definitely I learned

731
00:42:50,100 --> 00:42:53,000
a lot from it. 
One of the other things I 

732
00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:58,700
learned was do not. 
Stake your career on you know, 

733
00:42:58,700 --> 00:43:01,900
doing The Cutting Edge, latest 
version that nobody else has 

734
00:43:02,200 --> 00:43:05,000
rolled out yet. 
That's not that's not a good 

735
00:43:05,000 --> 00:43:07,800
career move. 
Yeah, you got to be really ready

736
00:43:07,800 --> 00:43:10,700
for bleeding edge pain. 
If you could have bleeding edge 

737
00:43:10,700 --> 00:43:12,600
technology. 
Yeah, that's a good one. 

738
00:43:12,600 --> 00:43:14,500
I'm sorry, man. 
That's that's, that's a that's a

739
00:43:14,500 --> 00:43:18,100
good horror story. 
Let's see, I've got to kind of 

740
00:43:18,100 --> 00:43:21,200
small ones that will close off 
with one is a story. 

741
00:43:21,200 --> 00:43:26,800
I think I've told before but it 
was New Year's Eve and I got 

742
00:43:26,800 --> 00:43:31,900
stuck creating like I do five or
600 manually creating five or 

743
00:43:31,900 --> 00:43:35,100
600 ldap accounts because I 
didn't have any Automation in 

744
00:43:35,100 --> 00:43:38,100
place and it was all stuff that 
I just saw coming. 

745
00:43:38,100 --> 00:43:41,800
I was like, you know, poor 
planning on the business side of

746
00:43:41,800 --> 00:43:45,500
things like, oh we'll just give 
it to it, operations, and I am 

747
00:43:45,500 --> 00:43:47,900
operations. 
Kind of fix for us, was 

748
00:43:47,900 --> 00:43:49,800
contract. 
Related is like last-minute 

749
00:43:49,800 --> 00:43:51,900
stuff. 
I just remember, you know, 

750
00:43:51,900 --> 00:43:54,800
Christine and myself Christine 
was my counterpart on the 

751
00:43:54,800 --> 00:43:58,100
business side. 
And I was on the, I Am side and 

752
00:43:58,100 --> 00:44:03,600
just getting stuck proofreading 
and validating like 500, or 600 

753
00:44:03,600 --> 00:44:07,100
meters 5, or 5 or 600. 
I think lines on a spreadsheet 

754
00:44:07,100 --> 00:44:10,900
of people who needed these ldap 
accounts because the contract 

755
00:44:10,900 --> 00:44:13,200
said they needed him by January 
1st. 

756
00:44:13,500 --> 00:44:16,500
I just meant being stuck at 
home, running through these 

757
00:44:16,500 --> 00:44:19,400
spreadsheets and flying through 
these ldap creations. 

758
00:44:19,400 --> 00:44:23,500
I mean that was, you know, this 
is this is years of video game 

759
00:44:23,500 --> 00:44:27,800
practice on mouse and keyboard 
and And dexterity, right? 

760
00:44:27,900 --> 00:44:30,700
It's like alt tab, copy paste, 
you know, move things around 

761
00:44:30,700 --> 00:44:35,000
really quickly but that was 
painful just because I knew it I

762
00:44:35,000 --> 00:44:37,500
was very it was very early on in
my I am career I think I was 

763
00:44:37,500 --> 00:44:39,900
probably a maybe it might have 
been a team lead at that point 

764
00:44:39,900 --> 00:44:43,700
or something and I saw it coming
down the pipeline and couldn't 

765
00:44:43,700 --> 00:44:45,500
stop it. 
So it was really frustrating 

766
00:44:45,500 --> 00:44:48,100
because both Christine and I 
both saw it coming and couldn't 

767
00:44:48,100 --> 00:44:50,600
stop it. 
So that's one. 

768
00:44:50,900 --> 00:44:53,600
The other one is more of a 
night. 

769
00:44:54,800 --> 00:44:58,000
It all sound like a nightmare 
for Some people, it wasn't for 

770
00:44:58,000 --> 00:44:59,600
me and I'll tell you and I'll 
tell you why. 

771
00:44:59,600 --> 00:45:03,300
As I explained is, we were 
rolling on an IGA product and 

772
00:45:03,300 --> 00:45:05,800
one of the first steps that you 
go through when you're doing 

773
00:45:05,800 --> 00:45:09,400
that is you do this thing called
identity mapping or count 

774
00:45:09,400 --> 00:45:12,400
mapping where you're basically 
taking all the accounts from one

775
00:45:12,400 --> 00:45:15,900
system and you're trying to 
correlate them to whatever your 

776
00:45:15,900 --> 00:45:18,800
identity sources, right? 
Say okay, here's Jeff and here's

777
00:45:18,800 --> 00:45:22,200
Jeff's account on this 
application, coincidentally? 

778
00:45:22,200 --> 00:45:25,500
Another ldap system. 
So we were going through that 

779
00:45:25,500 --> 00:45:29,800
process, For a few hundred 
thousand employees and 

780
00:45:29,800 --> 00:45:33,200
consultants. 
And I remember sitting in a room

781
00:45:33,200 --> 00:45:37,900
with our identity integrator at 
the time and there was this 

782
00:45:37,900 --> 00:45:41,300
system that had like everybody 
in the company had this account 

783
00:45:41,300 --> 00:45:46,300
and and then some so there was a
high-volume system and he was 

784
00:45:46,400 --> 00:45:50,800
giving me the bad news of how 
many orphaned accounts that they

785
00:45:50,800 --> 00:45:55,900
found out of this platform which
had I want to say probably 250. 

786
00:45:56,100 --> 00:45:59,100
Maybe 300,000 accounts. 
Which, for me at the time was 

787
00:45:59,100 --> 00:46:00,800
massive. 
I mean, I was just the sheer 

788
00:46:00,800 --> 00:46:04,900
number of accounts and, you 
know, he's sitting there and 

789
00:46:04,900 --> 00:46:07,600
he's like, like so, here's went 
through the count mapping 

790
00:46:07,600 --> 00:46:09,300
correlation. 
We tried to find as many things 

791
00:46:09,300 --> 00:46:15,200
as we could to try and map this 
up and we have 90,000 orphaned 

792
00:46:15,200 --> 00:46:19,600
accounts that need to be figured
out. 

793
00:46:19,700 --> 00:46:22,400
Are they legitimate? 
Do they, you know, should they 

794
00:46:22,400 --> 00:46:24,100
be in the system stuff like 
that. 

795
00:46:24,100 --> 00:46:28,400
And I remember sitting there and
I was like, Holy crap. 90,000 

796
00:46:28,500 --> 00:46:31,800
orphan accounts on just one 
system that need to be resolved 

797
00:46:32,400 --> 00:46:35,300
and wait and Wayne was the 
first. 

798
00:46:35,300 --> 00:46:37,800
I was working with me, he and I 
chat about the still to this 

799
00:46:37,800 --> 00:46:41,200
day. 
He was shocked when I said, oh, 

800
00:46:41,600 --> 00:46:45,700
that's not that bad. 
Because in my head I was like 

801
00:46:45,700 --> 00:46:48,300
there's no way we'll be able to 
correlate half of these. 

802
00:46:48,300 --> 00:46:50,700
So I was like, okay I was 
prepared for like a number of 

803
00:46:50,700 --> 00:46:54,700
like 150 200 thousand accounts, 
like something like that. 

804
00:46:54,900 --> 00:46:59,200
And when he said, 80,000. 
I was happy that there are 

805
00:46:59,207 --> 00:47:01,800
90,000 and he was like, you're 
crazy. 

806
00:47:01,800 --> 00:47:03,900
I like, what do you mean? 
There's 90,000. 

807
00:47:03,900 --> 00:47:06,000
I, of course, is a bad number 
and we ended up working through 

808
00:47:06,000 --> 00:47:08,700
it and kind of resolve some of 
that, but there were a lot of 

809
00:47:08,700 --> 00:47:11,500
Orphan accounts on that system 
that definitely need to be 

810
00:47:11,500 --> 00:47:14,000
cleaned up. 
There are like real orphans 

811
00:47:14,000 --> 00:47:18,300
like, oh, yeah. 90,000 how many 
we say were true orphans versus 

812
00:47:18,300 --> 00:47:22,300
you just couldn't correlate 
them, because you, whatever 

813
00:47:22,300 --> 00:47:24,200
rules you are using weren't good
enough. 

814
00:47:24,700 --> 00:47:30,200
I think probably between like 50
to 60,000 were definitely like 

815
00:47:30,200 --> 00:47:33,700
those are not, those are not 
valid accounts because this was 

816
00:47:33,700 --> 00:47:37,000
a retail environment. 
And at the time, the retail 

817
00:47:37,000 --> 00:47:39,800
environment was allow that you 
could create your own accounts 

818
00:47:40,100 --> 00:47:41,900
and you can use whatever name 
you wanted. 

819
00:47:42,200 --> 00:47:46,700
And because those retail, we had
a lot of, you know, people early

820
00:47:46,700 --> 00:47:49,000
on, in their careers, or just 
didn't care where they would 

821
00:47:49,000 --> 00:47:51,100
come up with just weird names 
for accounts. 

822
00:47:51,100 --> 00:47:54,700
Some of them not safe for work, 
you know? 

823
00:47:54,700 --> 00:47:57,700
Some would be copyrighted. 
For example, maybe famous people

824
00:47:57,700 --> 00:48:01,000
or care of famous, characters of
whatever. 

825
00:48:01,400 --> 00:48:04,500
So, we kind of started looking 
over, as like, oh, I'm pretty 

826
00:48:04,500 --> 00:48:06,300
sure we're not employing, Mickey
Mouse. 

827
00:48:06,300 --> 00:48:10,100
You know, for example, right. 
Or Frodo Baggins right. 

828
00:48:10,100 --> 00:48:12,600
Things like that. 
So, but we had to go through 

829
00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:16,600
each of those and sort of figure
out, okay, who are the real 

830
00:48:16,600 --> 00:48:17,900
ones? 
Who are the not real ones? 

831
00:48:17,900 --> 00:48:20,900
Some were kind of, you know, 
whatever, what do we do, about 

832
00:48:20,900 --> 00:48:25,300
the ones that were clearly, you 
know, not suitable for work. 

833
00:48:25,700 --> 00:48:28,300
And What were the repercussions 
going to be for the person who 

834
00:48:28,300 --> 00:48:30,700
created it? 
Like stuff like that and I 

835
00:48:30,700 --> 00:48:32,800
highlighted a few different lack
that controls where. 

836
00:48:32,800 --> 00:48:34,900
Yeah, there was just like this 
open system, you could call it 

837
00:48:34,908 --> 00:48:37,000
whatever you want, you could 
change your name to whatever you

838
00:48:37,000 --> 00:48:40,300
want basically in the system and
there was no like, no validation

839
00:48:40,300 --> 00:48:43,600
around it. 
And store employees did not 

840
00:48:43,600 --> 00:48:48,200
necessarily have, you know, HR 
on mind when they were, when 

841
00:48:48,200 --> 00:48:53,200
they were naming some accounts, 
I think one of the things that 

842
00:48:53,200 --> 00:48:57,600
you have to do to truly say 
you're an, I am M is open up a 

843
00:48:57,600 --> 00:49:01,200
file that is like Annex shares 
like an Excel icon. 

844
00:49:01,200 --> 00:49:06,200
So it's CSV or some other you 
know, data format. 

845
00:49:06,500 --> 00:49:10,100
And Excel can open is like too 
many rows because I think the 

846
00:49:10,100 --> 00:49:14,900
Excel limit was like 32 thousand
rows or something like that. 

847
00:49:14,900 --> 00:49:17,900
Time to go to 64 bits. 
Exactly. 

848
00:49:18,700 --> 00:49:21,500
Yeah, that is definitely. 
I remember requesting a ram 

849
00:49:21,500 --> 00:49:25,300
upgrade at the time because I 
think I had like a 4, MB MB RAM 

850
00:49:25,300 --> 00:49:27,900
and I just couldn't open these 
files anymore. 

851
00:49:28,200 --> 00:49:31,200
It was like, all right, time to 
go to eight able gigabytes of 

852
00:49:31,200 --> 00:49:33,300
memory. 
Yeah, I'm gonna have so many 

853
00:49:33,300 --> 00:49:35,100
spreadsheets. 
So many SQL queries are going to

854
00:49:35,100 --> 00:49:38,000
get done. 
All right, let's go ahead and 

855
00:49:38,000 --> 00:49:39,800
wrap up this episode. 
We're going to we were thinking 

856
00:49:39,800 --> 00:49:41,400
about how we're going to add on 
a lighter note. 

857
00:49:41,400 --> 00:49:43,200
Do you want to go with your idea
or my idea? 

858
00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:46,800
We can see both. 
Okay, you go first. 

859
00:49:47,100 --> 00:49:52,100
Okay, so my topic was today's 
halloween or the day that people

860
00:49:52,100 --> 00:49:54,700
will be listening to. 
This is Halloween. 

861
00:49:55,300 --> 00:50:00,400
What is the best Halloween 
trick-or-treat, candy item or 

862
00:50:00,400 --> 00:50:04,400
non candy to give away your door
and think of this Through The 

863
00:50:04,400 --> 00:50:08,400
Eyes of like 10 or 12 year old 
kid. 

864
00:50:08,600 --> 00:50:11,000
What is it that you'd want to 
receive? 

865
00:50:12,800 --> 00:50:18,200
Well, I am always happy to 
receive a Snickers bar that has 

866
00:50:18,200 --> 00:50:21,300
been my poison for years. 
I don't know about 10 or 12 

867
00:50:21,300 --> 00:50:22,600
years old. 
I think I've been just happy 

868
00:50:22,600 --> 00:50:27,100
about any any sort of candy, but
if you're going to give away 

869
00:50:27,100 --> 00:50:29,400
candy, I mean, give away the 
full bar, right? 

870
00:50:29,400 --> 00:50:32,700
Like the full-size instead of 
those, you know, snack or 

871
00:50:32,700 --> 00:50:33,500
Halloween. 
I get it. 

872
00:50:33,500 --> 00:50:34,900
There's Financial things around 
there. 

873
00:50:34,900 --> 00:50:39,200
But if you got like a full candy
bar for Halloween, you're like 

874
00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:43,200
in the money, right? 
Yeah, as he To give away the 

875
00:50:43,200 --> 00:50:47,700
full candy bar, then avoid the 
ones that people might not like,

876
00:50:47,700 --> 00:50:51,700
like I love coconut. 
So if you do like Almond Joy, 

877
00:50:51,900 --> 00:50:54,200
Almond Joy. 
I would be happy with that, but 

878
00:50:54,200 --> 00:50:56,300
I wouldn't give that away 
because you're probably going to

879
00:50:56,300 --> 00:50:59,600
have like 50 percent of the 
population of people who are in 

880
00:50:59,600 --> 00:51:03,500
be like, this thing is gross. 
So I think the, the way to goes 

881
00:51:03,500 --> 00:51:06,000
a full-size Reese's, Peanut 
Butter Cup. 

882
00:51:06,500 --> 00:51:08,600
Yeah, that's a pretty, pretty 
safe one. 

883
00:51:08,700 --> 00:51:11,200
I think like, if you go to Jim's
house, like he's given away like

884
00:51:11,200 --> 00:51:12,800
Almond, Joy and like, Don't 
know. 

885
00:51:13,300 --> 00:51:15,100
Black licorice or something like
that. 

886
00:51:16,700 --> 00:51:21,100
Your choices is full so you know
king-size Almond Joy or this 

887
00:51:21,100 --> 00:51:24,200
little Snickers bar which would 
you like to have and then I'll 

888
00:51:24,200 --> 00:51:26,500
end the night with a whole box 
of Almond Joy. 

889
00:51:26,500 --> 00:51:27,500
Yeah. 
And a whole bunch of 

890
00:51:27,500 --> 00:51:30,300
disappointed children. 
Who may egg your house or snag 

891
00:51:30,300 --> 00:51:33,300
my house and and put toilet 
paper on it? 

892
00:51:33,800 --> 00:51:37,300
Yeah, exactly. 
All right here's mine and here's

893
00:51:37,300 --> 00:51:41,500
what I want you to come up with 
is what is the scariest I am 

894
00:51:41,800 --> 00:51:44,400
identity and access. 
Management costume that you can 

895
00:51:44,400 --> 00:51:47,800
come up with. 
I'd say it would have to be like

896
00:51:47,800 --> 00:51:54,900
the salesman costume, the person
who like calls you over and over

897
00:51:54,900 --> 00:52:00,800
again to see if you have some 
need for their product or 

898
00:52:00,800 --> 00:52:05,600
service that you have no need 
for and for some reason you keep

899
00:52:05,600 --> 00:52:07,700
accidentally answering it. 
So yeah. 

900
00:52:07,700 --> 00:52:11,200
That's pretty scary get up. 
Yeah yeah. 

901
00:52:11,900 --> 00:52:14,000
That's a That's a good. 
I just imagine like the 

902
00:52:14,000 --> 00:52:15,700
nightmare. 
It's like a whole bunch of like,

903
00:52:15,700 --> 00:52:18,600
LinkedIn messages. 
That you curly haven't responded

904
00:52:18,600 --> 00:52:21,600
to, like not getting the hint. 
You know, it's the emails that 

905
00:52:21,600 --> 00:52:24,000
you're not responding to its 
the, I don't know how it 

906
00:52:24,000 --> 00:52:26,100
happens. 
But some people have, like, I do

907
00:52:26,100 --> 00:52:30,500
have legitimately, I am vendors,
who call me on the phone on my 

908
00:52:30,500 --> 00:52:33,100
personal cell phone and leave me
voicemails. 

909
00:52:33,600 --> 00:52:36,900
I can guarantee you that. 
If you do that to me, I'm never 

910
00:52:36,900 --> 00:52:40,000
calling you back, right? 
Exactly. 

911
00:52:40,300 --> 00:52:41,700
I don't know how I got that. 
Number is probably on my 

912
00:52:41,707 --> 00:52:43,500
signature somewhere. 
Just you know, had one number 

913
00:52:43,500 --> 00:52:44,600
four years and that's fine, 
right? 

914
00:52:44,600 --> 00:52:47,100
It's easy enough. 
These days to block it but I 

915
00:52:47,100 --> 00:52:50,100
mean who makes a phone call 
these days right? 

916
00:52:50,100 --> 00:52:51,500
It's all email. 
Yeah. 

917
00:52:51,500 --> 00:52:55,600
Well the other thing is like 
okay we're I am you know 

918
00:52:55,600 --> 00:53:00,000
strategy develop at least my 
LinkedIn profile speech to I'm a

919
00:53:00,008 --> 00:53:04,300
consultant and people will hit 
me up and say you know desirous 

920
00:53:04,300 --> 00:53:10,200
em need like email filtering. 
Yeah I don't know, did you read 

921
00:53:10,200 --> 00:53:15,300
my profile and think that I'm a 
decision maker for email 

922
00:53:15,800 --> 00:53:21,100
filtering for our SM because if 
you did you're not too smart but

923
00:53:21,100 --> 00:53:24,500
the reality is you probably just
saw our SM or I showed up in 

924
00:53:24,500 --> 00:53:28,300
some, you know, spreadsheet that
you got and leave me alone. 

925
00:53:28,800 --> 00:53:33,400
Yeah, my favorite is when I get 
the Mainframe, the the contract 

926
00:53:33,400 --> 00:53:37,600
Mainframe position, six months, 
we'll get her back, F expert all

927
00:53:37,600 --> 00:53:40,200
because I somewhere have in my 
background like, you know, 

928
00:53:40,200 --> 00:53:42,300
administrated rack F IDs or 
something like that. 

929
00:53:42,500 --> 00:53:46,200
And I'm in a database somewhere.
It's like, yes, I would totally 

930
00:53:46,200 --> 00:53:49,200
interested in a six-month 
contract in, like, northern 

931
00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:53,800
Idaho in the middle of nowhere 
to do Mainframe rack F. 

932
00:53:54,400 --> 00:53:56,800
Yeah, work or something but I'm 
not even qualified for like I 

933
00:53:56,808 --> 00:53:59,500
would not I would not hire me 
for rack F work. 

934
00:53:59,900 --> 00:54:03,000
If you're on the run from the 
FBI, be the perfect job for you.

935
00:54:03,100 --> 00:54:05,900
This is true and I Den, it's not
that Idaho is not a bad place, 

936
00:54:05,900 --> 00:54:08,500
is a beautiful place, really? 
I don't know if I would 

937
00:54:08,500 --> 00:54:10,300
necessarily just want to work 
there for six months on a 

938
00:54:10,308 --> 00:54:13,000
contract. 
Do Ring worker. 

939
00:54:13,000 --> 00:54:14,600
I hate for no idea how to do 
anymore. 

940
00:54:14,900 --> 00:54:16,100
Yes. 
There you go. 

941
00:54:16,300 --> 00:54:21,100
So, was that those that top your
answer in terms of scariest 

942
00:54:21,100 --> 00:54:23,100
costume it dies? 
Because I was thinking, I was 

943
00:54:23,100 --> 00:54:25,500
like, I, you know, I it's funny.
I asked the question I didn't 

944
00:54:25,500 --> 00:54:27,800
really have like a good answer. 
I was kind of taking it down, 

945
00:54:27,800 --> 00:54:31,100
like the technical wrote like 
some sort of like interface or 

946
00:54:31,100 --> 00:54:35,700
it's like, you know, file not 
found or, you know, syntax error

947
00:54:35,700 --> 00:54:38,300
or something like that of like 
trying to figure out like why 

948
00:54:38,300 --> 00:54:45,700
things aren't working but I love
/ hate / of The persistent sales

949
00:54:45,700 --> 00:54:50,200
sales, angle of identity. 
So the other potential scary 

950
00:54:50,200 --> 00:54:54,500
costume would be The Insider 
threat person so that person 

951
00:54:54,500 --> 00:54:59,300
would either look like, you 
know, it would be like the 

952
00:55:00,200 --> 00:55:03,900
person with a trench coat and a 
hat and like, Shadow over their 

953
00:55:03,900 --> 00:55:06,000
face. 
So you couldn't even see them or

954
00:55:06,000 --> 00:55:09,100
they would be wearing that mask.
Which I don't even know what you

955
00:55:09,100 --> 00:55:10,600
call. 
It was like the black and white 

956
00:55:10,600 --> 00:55:13,400
mask in the guy with like the Hi
Fox. 

957
00:55:14,200 --> 00:55:16,400
There you go. 
Yep, you know, it would be one 

958
00:55:16,400 --> 00:55:19,100
of those two and that person 
would be basically trying to 

959
00:55:19,500 --> 00:55:22,200
hack through your network, even 
though you work for the same 

960
00:55:22,200 --> 00:55:24,500
company. 
You're like, stop trying to 

961
00:55:24,508 --> 00:55:27,700
break our stuff. 
That's a very Niche scary. 

962
00:55:27,700 --> 00:55:30,600
I am Halloween costume. 
It's like, do that, like a sea 

963
00:55:30,600 --> 00:55:32,400
so convention or something like 
that. 

964
00:55:32,800 --> 00:55:34,100
Yeah. 
If you're walking around your 

965
00:55:34,100 --> 00:55:38,000
neighborhood, just like that, 
like, yeah, they might not, they

966
00:55:38,000 --> 00:55:41,400
might not realize what you're 
dressed up as a might 

967
00:55:41,400 --> 00:55:45,000
misconstrue that So, maybe not a
good idea, exactly. 

968
00:55:46,100 --> 00:55:47,200
All right. 
Let's go ahead and wrap it up 

969
00:55:47,200 --> 00:55:48,400
for this week. 
This was a lot of fun. 

970
00:55:48,400 --> 00:55:51,300
Talking through Halloween stuff.
We did it again, almost a full 

971
00:55:51,300 --> 00:55:55,200
hour of Halloween identity talk.
You were probably thinking at 

972
00:55:55,200 --> 00:55:56,500
home. 
There's no way they'll come up 

973
00:55:56,500 --> 00:55:58,600
with more than 30 or 45 minutes.
Well, guess what? 

974
00:55:58,600 --> 00:56:01,400
We did it anyway. 
So we'll go ahead and leave it 

975
00:56:01,400 --> 00:56:04,500
for this week. 
You can find us on the internet 

976
00:56:04,600 --> 00:56:06,600
identity at the center.com. 
That's where all of our shows 

977
00:56:06,600 --> 00:56:09,600
are including our fancy new 
search engines, you can type in 

978
00:56:09,600 --> 00:56:12,300
a keyword and find all the 
episodes. 

979
00:56:12,400 --> 00:56:15,100
We talk around a different 
topics if you're looking for you

980
00:56:15,100 --> 00:56:18,100
know, something on zero trust or
MFA or ring. 

981
00:56:18,100 --> 00:56:20,800
And I am program, just type a 
couple words into the into the 

982
00:56:20,800 --> 00:56:23,900
search at identify center.com on
the listen page and you'll be 

983
00:56:23,900 --> 00:56:26,100
able to find episodes of relate 
back to that. 

984
00:56:26,400 --> 00:56:31,100
And then, of course, we're on 
the newly Twitter, owns or 

985
00:56:31,100 --> 00:56:35,100
sorry, Elon Musk owned Twitter 
at idac podcast. 

986
00:56:35,100 --> 00:56:38,700
So interesting to see if what, 
if anything changes on that 

987
00:56:38,700 --> 00:56:42,300
platform but we are still there.
And yeah, I think. 

988
00:56:42,500 --> 00:56:45,900
That if there is a other 
identity and access management 

989
00:56:45,900 --> 00:56:49,500
costumes that are scurrying that
you want to either ping us on 

990
00:56:49,500 --> 00:56:52,200
Twitter with or drop us a note 
on LinkedIn, would be happy to 

991
00:56:52,207 --> 00:56:54,900
bring those up in future 
episodes or just have a good 

992
00:56:54,900 --> 00:56:56,700
chuckle you know offline with 
folks. 

993
00:56:56,700 --> 00:56:59,400
So with that we'll go ahead and 
leave it for this week. 

994
00:56:59,600 --> 00:57:02,300
Thanks everyone for listening 
and we'll talk with you all in 

995
00:57:02,300 --> 00:57:06,800
the next one. 
Thanks for listening to the 

996
00:57:06,800 --> 00:57:09,600
identity at the center podcast. 
If you like what you heard, 

997
00:57:09,600 --> 00:57:12,900
don't forget to subscribe and 
visit us on the web and identity

998
00:57:12,900 --> 00:57:13,800
at the center.com.