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This is identity at the center. 
Welcome to the Identity at the 

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Center podcast. 
I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. 

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Hey, Jim. 
Hey, Jeff, how are you? 

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Oh, not so bad herself. 
I'm doing great. 

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I'm so excited about today's 
episode. 

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Every once in a while you get a 
founder who really takes 

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technology and solves a real 
world problem. 

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I mean, you and I have been 
doing identity strategy for a 

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long time. 
And one of the things we always 

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say, how do you know who's 
calling the help desk actually 

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is who they say they are, right.
And like, it's how often do we 

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get a good answer? 
Hardly ever. 

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I think we'll talk about 
technology today that, you know,

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could turn that on his head. 
Yeah, exactly. 

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And I think this is a, a 
question that typically comes up

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is it's, it's, I've asked it so 
many times in our, you know, 

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client engagement, things like 
that and has never really been a

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good answer, but. 
This is a. 

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A a sponsored episode that I am 
actually very happy about 

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because not that I'm not happy 
about the other ones, but this 

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is one that solves a real world 
problem that I have seen come up

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multiple times. 
How do you know someone is 

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calling the help desk? 
And so to that end, we do have a

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sponsored episode today. 
It is with Trusona. 

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It is with the founder and CEO 
of Trusona, Ori Eisen. 

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So welcome back to the show, 
Ori, because this is actually 

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your second time being with us. 
Thank you for having me again. 

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I'm super honored and excited to
be here. 

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Yeah. 
So we're excited to have you 

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here, trusona.com/IDAC. 
We're going to have some content

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there that we're going to kind 
of talk about through this. 

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You were kind enough to give us 
a demo, So we might refer to 

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that as we go through the 
conversation here and it's 

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recorded there. 
So we have kind of our own 

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little IDAC spin on that into 
into the demo world that people 

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will be able to visit there. 
But I'm not going to ask you how

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you got into identity because we
already asked you that question 

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back in 2023, believe it or not.
So about a year and a half, 

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maybe almost two years ago, we 
were at the Authenticate 

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conference and he came in and 
sat down with us. 

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So what I want to find out is 
what's been happening since 

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2023. 
Tell us a little about Trusona 

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and then we're going to 
definitely we're going to get 

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into ATL Protect here in a 
minute. 

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What happened is after eight 
years of developing the no 

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passwords solution, as you can 
see, even my shirt is still 

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saying that many customers asked
a simple question. 

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What happens when someone calls 
in and says I lost my hardware 

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key, I lost my MFAI don't have a
device with the password list? 

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Let me in, hear me out. 
Even if you take every single 

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employee in a company and you 
completely retrofit them with 

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password less authentication, 
which I think is an amazing 

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idea. 
The problem that still exists is

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when hackers call in and say I 
don't have that thing you want 

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me to have. 
Now what? 

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So by talking to customers, we 
realize at your Sona that the 

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last hole, the last gaping hole 
in the hole password less 

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strategy is I don't have it. 
Help me. 

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And you can see that the call 
quickly turns to an identity 

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verification effort as opposed 
to authentication to be crisp 

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about that. 
If MFA works perfectly, you 

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don't need what I'm we're about 
to talk about because people get

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in and out of systems all day 
long. 

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But if you're on vacation and 
your phone falls in the ocean, 

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you just go to, let's just say, 
the Apple Store and you get a 

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new iPhone. 
You now need to get back to your

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business. 
However, you don't have that 

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thing that you need in order to 
get back in there. 

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Why would they give you access? 
How would you prove to them that

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it is you, Jeff or Jim or one of
our listeners here on the other 

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end? 
And when you add to it, what 

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happened two years ago that we 
have to insert into this 

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conversation is the word Jen AI.
When we sat at authenticate 2 

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years ago, I guess ChatGPT just 
started and people kind of 

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thought about it as a textual 
tool. 

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If you look at what Scattered 
Spider doing as we speak here, 

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as we're recording this episode,
simply are calling your IT help 

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desk, claiming to be the CSO 
even with your voice or your CEO

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with their own voice that they 
have sampled. 

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And good luck to the IT help 
desk agent to know is this the 

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CEO berating to reset their 
password or not? 

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That is what's new and 
different. 

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Well, as someone who's been on 
that call where, you know, 

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you've got people calling and 
it's like, OK, read it. 

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You're, you're trying to 
authenticate callers, etcetera. 

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I remember when you showed this 
to me and, and this is something

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you've actually been working on 
for I think maybe a year and a 

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half or, or something like that.
But I was kind of like, oh, this

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is kind of cool. 
So tell me a little bit about 

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what it is about Ato Protect. 
And when we say Ato, we're 

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talking about account takeover. 
And so the goal here is to yeah,

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know that it is Jim calling me 
and not someone to pretend to be

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Jim, etcetera. 
So my, my, my, my jaded See, so 

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hat tells me I've got so many 
security tools out there. 

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Cool Ori, like, why do I need 
another tool in my stack? 

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So tell me a little bit about 
more about Ato Protect 

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specifically and what do you 
think makes it different from 

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other solutions that are, you 
know, kind of trying to do the 

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same thing? 
Yeah, I, I love this and I love 

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this conversation as a 
practitioners talk, because you 

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should ask me and everybody else
who come on the show, do I 

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really need another tool? 
I mean, we have a toolarama 

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everywhere you go with so many 
beeps and bops and reports, it's

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actually becoming harder to know
what's going on because of all 

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the chaff, right, As opposed to 
the signal. 

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To answer your question, I'll 
say this. 

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Identity and authentication have
been close Friends, enemies, 

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frenemies, cousins. 
They were never thought of as 

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the same thing. 
Let me prove it to you. 

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You can sign up for a Gmail 
account today without them 

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really knowing if it's you or 
Jim. 

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They they just don't care to 
know. 

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As long as you have a unique 
handle, you can stay anonymous. 

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There's zero identity proofing 
or identity verification in 

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those kind of processes. 
Think about your net Netflix 

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account. 
If you paid with a credit card 

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that was prepaid and was 
anonymous, they would also not 

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know who you are. 
However, when you call an IT 

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help desk or we'll talk about 
other use cases that a company 

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could have. 
For example, you're interviewing

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somebody to come work for you. 
You want to make sure they are 

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who they say they are when a 
vendor calls your accounts 

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payable and say we changed the 
bank account, so send us the 

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next invoice to this new bank. 
Now it's not about 

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authentication, it's about, 
wait, who is telling me to do 

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this? 
Who is the true identity on the 

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other side? 
So the reason you might need 

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another tool is if we'll focus 
on the IT helpdesk, even though 

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you can see that there's other 
things around it. 

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When someone calls and they 
cannot authenticate perfectly, 

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you are turning the problem 
from, do you have the 

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credentials I gave you to? 
I need to know who you are 

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before I do anything. 
Anything could be reset that 

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password, reset your MFA, give 
you privilege access, or do 

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anything that is seriously risky
because I can't really tell 

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who's calling me. 
We have in our industry all 

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kinds of tools for account 
verification for our customers. 

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For example, if you're a bank 
and you open credit card 

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accounts or a DDA account, yeah,
you scan documents and you do 

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checks and liveness that you do 
all those things when you open a

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consumer account. 
I doubt that you do the same 

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things today with your 
employees, and I doubt that you 

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do the same thing when an 
employee comes in without MFA. 

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Yeah, it feels like I'm so 
interested to get your take on 

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this, but it feels like when 
Jeff and I would ask this 

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question 10 years ago in that 
workforce identity situation, it

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was something like, OK, how are 
you verifying people? 

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And it'd be like, well, we asked
them their badge number and then

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who did they sit next to? 
Like, like knowledge base. 

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So we say, OK, well, that's a 
big Rev X. 

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That's not good. 
But then you see organizations 

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that, well, we text them a 
special number, then ask them to

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read it off to us, or we e-mail 
that code to the e-mail address 

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we have on file in their HR 
system. 

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And so you say, OK, that's out 
of band. 

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It couldn't be broken probably. 
But you know, you'd have to be a

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super hacker today. 
I'm not Even so sure that that's

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true. 
Like give us give us your 

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perspective on that e-mail to or
SMS kind of scenario. 

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Is that good enough? 
Well, let's do this. 

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Anybody who listens to this 
podcast, I assume reads the news

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from the security world. 
If you don't just open your 

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favorite search engine, put in 
these two words Scattered Spider

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together to name off a 
Cybergang. 

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Pick up any article and go read 
their MO, their modus operandi, 

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and the answer will be there. 
Let me tell you what they're 

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doing and why the answer is 
absolutely not Jim. 

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Their favorite tactic is what's 
called SIM swap. 

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And what that means is they 
would call your telephone 

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company and and again, if 
there's no hackers in the 

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audience, you can derive who my 
telephone company is by the 1st 

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6 digits of my phone. 
It's not a secret. 

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You can tell if I'm with Verizon
or AT&T, Not a problem. 

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You would call my telephone 
company as a precursor to the 

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attack and basically tell them 
that you are me and you got a 

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new phone and you want to port 
the scene, you want to SIM swap 

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the phone. 
And what happens if they fall 

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for this? 
And let me explain to you why 

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they do all the time. 
All the text messages you're 

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about to send me, Jim will 
actually go to the bad guy, not 

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to me anymore. 
Let's take it slow. 

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The first step is to snip out 
the real customer from the 

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traffic so they're not even 
aware that the OTP, the one time

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passcode you just sent me did 
not reach them. 

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Now I'm going to take a step 
backward. 

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This is not, you know, don't try
this at home, kids. 

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I'm not teaching you how to 
hack, but I just want you to 

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know why this happens and why 
you have 0 control over it. 

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If you're a CSO listening, you 
can't control AT and TS 

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processes. 
You can't control Verizon. 

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They will do whatever their 
script says in the call center 

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and unfortunately they might ask
me things like my mother's 

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maiden name and my last four of 
my social and my date of birth 

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to prove to them that I am Ori 
the telephone owner before they 

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SIM swap me. 
So good luck with that. 

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This is step one in how 
Scattered Spider get you to 

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operate as if you are sending it
to the real employee. 

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But you if you're not checking 
first. 

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Is this phone recently SIM 
swapped? 

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You're duped. 
You're none the wiser. 

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You're now sending all the stuff
directly to the bad guy. 

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I'll pause here. 
No, it's that's exactly. 

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And to think that that is that 
uncommon, I mean, when you hear 

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about these scattered spudger 
attacks, that's the exact 

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pattern that's used. 
And at least there's some really

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catastrophic data breaches and 
and beyond data breaches where 

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you get to the point where you 
can really have an operational 

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impact on a company. 
You know this, you know, given 

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that given that that kind of 
backdrop, because I'm not a true

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believer, this is not something 
that is some kind of far out, 

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yeah, that's never going to 
happen to me kind of scenario. 

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It very well could if you don't 
have the right projections. 

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And look, I don't want to say 
company names, but some of the 

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the household name breaches that
you've heard of, they started 

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very much in that way. 
Exactly. 

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I guess we have what I really 
want to ask you Ori is like how 

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does your Ato product, Ato 
protect product prevent that? 

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I mean, what can what can you 
guys do? 

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Let let me just go back a second
to answer your question about 

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e-mail. 
I just want to see what is the 

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pre step there. 
I already explained in the phone

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world, you do a SIM swap in the 
e-mail. 

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There's an easier path. 
If I imagine a bank that has 

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40,000 employees, I call one of 
them and say, hey, I'm calling 

225
00:12:55,920 --> 00:12:58,880
you from the IT department at 
the bank, I need to install 

226
00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:00,520
something so we can help you 
next time. 

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00:13:01,760 --> 00:13:04,880
Now how will the employee ever 
know if I'm really working at 

228
00:13:04,880 --> 00:13:08,200
the bank or not? 
So unfortunately, some people 

229
00:13:08,200 --> 00:13:11,320
take the lure, allow me to get 
complete access to their 

230
00:13:11,320 --> 00:13:14,320
computer and now I can get their
emails. 

231
00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:18,080
So if you sent me the e-mail in 
the chain we talked about 

232
00:13:18,080 --> 00:13:19,640
before, I'm now getting that as 
well. 

233
00:13:19,640 --> 00:13:22,600
I just want you to know how it's
done, Yes. 

234
00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:25,280
Am I foreshadowing what the Ato 
Protect does? 

235
00:13:25,280 --> 00:13:27,400
Yes. 
But I want you to understand the

236
00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:31,640
why because we've spoken to 
enough Csos and enough customers

237
00:13:31,640 --> 00:13:34,720
that told us all the different 
ways they were taken down. 

238
00:13:35,720 --> 00:13:40,400
And we've done a thing that is a
little bit to our detriment. 

239
00:13:40,400 --> 00:13:42,640
So I want to be very upfront 
about that. 

240
00:13:42,760 --> 00:13:46,520
When I speak to some of the 
analysts in our field, without 

241
00:13:46,520 --> 00:13:50,560
mentioning company names, they 
basically said you've created 

242
00:13:50,560 --> 00:13:54,440
something that is a Franken 
solution in the sense that it is

243
00:13:54,440 --> 00:13:58,160
not focused in any specific 
domain or expertise. 

244
00:13:58,520 --> 00:14:01,560
It is by taking five different 
domains and putting them 

245
00:14:01,560 --> 00:14:06,320
together that we are not really 
a fit to any Magic Quadrant, if 

246
00:14:06,320 --> 00:14:08,840
you want to think about it that 
way, because we're not like this

247
00:14:08,840 --> 00:14:11,800
one thing. 
So I'll go, I'll explain how we 

248
00:14:11,800 --> 00:14:15,520
do what we do, but the key is 
that we did not start with like,

249
00:14:15,520 --> 00:14:17,720
what are we good at? 
And let's try to convince you to

250
00:14:17,720 --> 00:14:20,800
buy that, which is unfortunately
how our world is. 

251
00:14:21,400 --> 00:14:24,320
It is taking 2 steps back. 
It was about 18 months ago. 

252
00:14:24,320 --> 00:14:28,360
Jim, listen to all the MOS, all 
the attack vectors that are 

253
00:14:28,360 --> 00:14:33,400
happening after The MGM breach 
and say if you were to sell the 

254
00:14:33,400 --> 00:14:37,200
solution to the Cecil, not a 
point of I can do this or that, 

255
00:14:37,200 --> 00:14:40,280
What would that look like? 
It forced us to be good at 

256
00:14:40,280 --> 00:14:46,280
document scanning telcos, DMVS, 
different data brokers, 

257
00:14:46,480 --> 00:14:49,440
realizing that there was a man 
in the middle attack perpetrated

258
00:14:49,440 --> 00:14:52,480
a second ago. 
All these things together. 

259
00:14:52,480 --> 00:14:55,200
Plus, did somebody call your 
employee without you even 

260
00:14:55,200 --> 00:14:59,240
knowing right? 
Have amalgam into this Ato 

261
00:14:59,480 --> 00:15:02,720
protect because it really 
protects from AT OS in the 

262
00:15:02,720 --> 00:15:04,800
different permutations they can 
take. 

263
00:15:05,760 --> 00:15:10,840
So I'll let you ask the next 
question, but the key is that if

264
00:15:10,840 --> 00:15:13,880
Trusona started its journey by 
saying we need to go password 

265
00:15:13,880 --> 00:15:17,240
less, and I still think the 
world should, and at the end of 

266
00:15:17,240 --> 00:15:19,840
that journey realized, Oh my 
God, if everybody had password 

267
00:15:19,840 --> 00:15:21,960
less, but the bad guy just needs
to say it. 

268
00:15:21,960 --> 00:15:23,200
Well, I don't have the password 
less. 

269
00:15:23,200 --> 00:15:26,480
Let me in. 
We are now solving that issue. 

270
00:15:26,920 --> 00:15:30,560
But I want you to realize that 
it's not a single disciplined 

271
00:15:30,560 --> 00:15:34,440
area to focus because scattered 
Spider and the calm and black 

272
00:15:34,440 --> 00:15:37,880
Cat are so well organized. 
I don't want to say 

273
00:15:37,880 --> 00:15:41,880
sophisticated because deep, deep
down, everybody who listens to 

274
00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:43,440
this call can commit these 
crimes. 

275
00:15:43,760 --> 00:15:45,560
It's not like you need to be a 
rocket scientist. 

276
00:15:45,560 --> 00:15:50,320
You just need to have your moral
compass at the set wrong because

277
00:15:50,320 --> 00:15:52,760
they can come to you at all 
these different angles. 

278
00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:56,520
We have to be good at all these 
different angles to protect. 

279
00:15:56,880 --> 00:16:00,760
I'll pause here. 
So I think that idea of the man 

280
00:16:00,760 --> 00:16:03,640
and middle attack is sort of how
things kind of get started. 

281
00:16:03,640 --> 00:16:06,120
I don't want to get too far 
along here because I don't know 

282
00:16:06,120 --> 00:16:08,680
if we have really talked about 
how this works. 

283
00:16:09,200 --> 00:16:12,840
So I'm curious or if you could 
just take me step by step if, if

284
00:16:12,840 --> 00:16:16,120
someone's, if I'm a security 
analyst, a help desk person, 

285
00:16:16,120 --> 00:16:17,600
whatever it is. 
And I might be responsible for 

286
00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:19,920
taking a phone call. 
And we'll just pick on Jim here.

287
00:16:19,920 --> 00:16:22,480
So Jim calls me, but it's not 
really Jim, right? 

288
00:16:22,480 --> 00:16:24,800
It's bizarro Jim. 
We'll call him. 

289
00:16:26,200 --> 00:16:30,240
How does Ato protect work? 
So I, I go to the website and 

290
00:16:30,240 --> 00:16:32,080
then what? 
Take me step by step because I 

291
00:16:32,080 --> 00:16:34,240
think that'll help maybe make it
a little bit clearer as to what 

292
00:16:34,240 --> 00:16:36,480
we're going to get into next. 
Cool. 

293
00:16:37,080 --> 00:16:39,920
I'll, I'll start by saying for 
those of you who will stick 

294
00:16:39,920 --> 00:16:43,200
around until the end of this 
episode, there is a page that 

295
00:16:43,200 --> 00:16:46,640
the Jeff and Jim were very kind 
to record me show how this 

296
00:16:46,640 --> 00:16:48,440
works. 
So if it interests you after 

297
00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:52,360
you're done with your job, there
is a video that you can go watch

298
00:16:52,360 --> 00:16:54,080
all this. 
I'll try to describe it 

299
00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:58,880
verbally. 
Let's call the actors by their 

300
00:16:58,880 --> 00:17:00,800
name. 
Jeff, you would be the agent 

301
00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:03,880
like the IT help desk agent and 
Jim will be the caller. 

302
00:17:04,440 --> 00:17:07,720
And of course you can replace IT
help desk with HR department, 

303
00:17:07,720 --> 00:17:10,000
finance department, whoever gets
the call. 

304
00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:13,680
The way it works is this. 
There are two modalities. 

305
00:17:13,680 --> 00:17:16,480
One of them when there is a 
human taking call, that is the 

306
00:17:16,480 --> 00:17:19,200
most common thing we do. 
The other modality is when 

307
00:17:19,200 --> 00:17:21,680
there's self-service. 
You call an IVR or you go to a 

308
00:17:21,680 --> 00:17:24,760
web page and you say I need to 
change my password. 

309
00:17:24,760 --> 00:17:27,599
We can do exactly the same thing
without a call. 

310
00:17:28,880 --> 00:17:34,320
When I call or Jim calls you 
rather, Jeff, you will tell them

311
00:17:34,320 --> 00:17:38,240
first, please get your ID ready,
literally just like if you were 

312
00:17:38,240 --> 00:17:41,960
stopped by a policeman and say, 
OK, show me your driver license 

313
00:17:41,960 --> 00:17:45,600
and you know, insurance. 
We believe that in most 

314
00:17:45,600 --> 00:17:49,080
countries that need to do this, 
you have access to your ID even 

315
00:17:49,080 --> 00:17:51,360
though you might not carry it 
like in the United States, but 

316
00:17:51,360 --> 00:17:55,960
you have access to it when you 
need to do something risky or if

317
00:17:55,960 --> 00:17:58,280
you're traveling, you should 
have your passport or something 

318
00:17:58,280 --> 00:18:00,360
else. 
You've shown the border control,

319
00:18:00,360 --> 00:18:02,000
so you should have something 
like that. 

320
00:18:03,000 --> 00:18:06,160
The second thing is you would 
tell the caller that none of 

321
00:18:06,160 --> 00:18:09,560
this data will be stored. 
Pretty important because we 

322
00:18:09,560 --> 00:18:11,160
don't want to become part of the
problem. 

323
00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:14,640
And the third thing is you'll 
ask the caller how would you 

324
00:18:14,640 --> 00:18:17,360
like to get this URL? 
That will help you with your 

325
00:18:17,400 --> 00:18:19,680
mobile browser begin the 
journey. 

326
00:18:20,680 --> 00:18:23,720
You can ask why. 
Why reduce it all to a URL? 

327
00:18:23,960 --> 00:18:26,080
I'll go back to what I said 5 
minutes ago. 

328
00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:29,240
If you're on a vacation 
somewhere in the world and your 

329
00:18:29,240 --> 00:18:33,240
phone drowned in the ocean, what
we can expect you to have is a 

330
00:18:33,240 --> 00:18:36,920
new phone out-of-the-box with 
Wi-Fi connected to it. 

331
00:18:37,680 --> 00:18:42,000
And if you can get an e-mail to 
it or a URL to it, you should be

332
00:18:42,000 --> 00:18:46,360
able to do this. 
It is specifically designed to 

333
00:18:46,360 --> 00:18:49,840
have the minimum viable 
technical know how or ability 

334
00:18:50,120 --> 00:18:53,600
because if I'll require you to 
log into our network to do this,

335
00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:56,360
it's a catch 22. 
You don't have the very thing 

336
00:18:56,360 --> 00:18:58,880
you need to get it and that is 
what causes the issue to begin 

337
00:18:58,880 --> 00:19:01,720
with. 
So you would ask me, do I want 

338
00:19:01,720 --> 00:19:05,520
to get an SMS, an e-mail or 
literally just like in a video 

339
00:19:05,520 --> 00:19:08,600
call like this? 
You can paste the link into chat

340
00:19:09,000 --> 00:19:12,560
or if there is a video call you 
can show me AQR code that I will

341
00:19:12,560 --> 00:19:16,240
scan with any camera and 
essentially bring the caller, 

342
00:19:16,400 --> 00:19:19,520
Jim in this example to a page 
that will allow him to 

343
00:19:19,520 --> 00:19:23,000
self-service himself. 
Scan the document. 

344
00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:26,760
What your Sona will do there is 
verify, for example, if you sent

345
00:19:26,760 --> 00:19:29,480
him a text that the phone has 
not recently since swapped. 

346
00:19:30,160 --> 00:19:33,160
If you sent him a text that he 
is really the owner of this 

347
00:19:33,160 --> 00:19:35,120
number and not just lying to you
about it. 

348
00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,200
When they scanned their 
document, we would go to 

349
00:19:38,320 --> 00:19:42,680
numerous authoritative databases
such as in the United States. 

350
00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:47,080
We can ping the DMVS to ask did 
you issue this document as 

351
00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:51,600
opposed to is the font looking 
good or is the template correct?

352
00:19:52,480 --> 00:19:54,800
I'll state the obvious. 
I'm sorry for everybody who 

353
00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:59,280
might get hurt, but Jenny I 
deepfake have robbed us as an 

354
00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:03,160
industry from the ability to 
look at documents and say oh 

355
00:20:03,160 --> 00:20:06,040
this looks fishy now. 
When I used to be the head of 

356
00:20:06,040 --> 00:20:09,400
Frisk in the large credit card 
company, I relied on this tool. 

357
00:20:10,920 --> 00:20:15,160
But that was a world before chat
GPD and before mid journey. 

358
00:20:16,600 --> 00:20:20,760
Today I can mimic your voice, 
your video image to that effect 

359
00:20:20,800 --> 00:20:25,440
that unfortunately it is not 
simple for AI to detect it and 

360
00:20:25,440 --> 00:20:27,320
definitely not for the human 
eye. 

361
00:20:27,880 --> 00:20:29,920
That was Orion, just so you 
know, I'm starting to get the 

362
00:20:29,920 --> 00:20:33,000
hang of this. 
So all this to say, Jeff and 

363
00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:38,800
Jim, when a call comes in, you 
ask the person to get ready to 

364
00:20:38,840 --> 00:20:43,000
identify themselves and you 
simply share with them a URL. 

365
00:20:43,280 --> 00:20:47,640
And from there on, the tool does
what it does, including checking

366
00:20:48,120 --> 00:20:50,520
if the link has been forwarded. 
But I'll pause here. 

367
00:20:50,520 --> 00:20:53,800
We'll get into that later on 
because that's another MO of the

368
00:20:53,800 --> 00:20:55,720
bad guy, which is man in the 
middle attacks. 

369
00:20:56,760 --> 00:21:00,520
So when I log into this thing, 
I, I have two options, right? 

370
00:21:00,560 --> 00:21:03,280
Or a couple options I could say.
So I can send it, SMSI can send 

371
00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:05,920
an e-mail, I can send a link. 
What are the IDs that work? 

372
00:21:05,920 --> 00:21:08,760
Because I see options here for 
driver's license and for 

373
00:21:08,760 --> 00:21:11,200
passport. 
So I think that covers most 

374
00:21:11,200 --> 00:21:13,120
government documents. 
And then what you're doing 

375
00:21:13,120 --> 00:21:15,240
behind the scenes, as I 
understand, is you're querying 

376
00:21:15,360 --> 00:21:18,960
DMVS in the United States or 
other, you know, I guess 

377
00:21:19,280 --> 00:21:21,600
registries of that sort of data 
around the world. 

378
00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:24,560
What are the limitations when it
comes to driver's license and 

379
00:21:24,560 --> 00:21:25,880
passport? 
Like where? 

380
00:21:26,920 --> 00:21:28,720
What doesn't work? 
Yes. 

381
00:21:28,760 --> 00:21:33,840
So if after this podcast you 
will take our challenge which 

382
00:21:33,840 --> 00:21:37,400
again we will unveil at the end 
of going to try that trusona.com

383
00:21:37,400 --> 00:21:44,400
or trusona.com/identity at the 
center IDAC, we will invite you 

384
00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:46,400
to play with the demo. 
The demo has the following 

385
00:21:46,400 --> 00:21:48,720
options. 
A driver license in the US and 

386
00:21:48,720 --> 00:21:52,360
Canada, a passport from any 
country in the world. 

387
00:21:52,360 --> 00:21:55,760
So that covers every country. 
And then a few documents from 

388
00:21:55,760 --> 00:21:58,400
India, that is what we give 
people to play with for free 

389
00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:00,600
because those are the most 
common in the UK. 

390
00:22:00,600 --> 00:22:04,920
Driver license we have that. 
We have 2500 additional 

391
00:22:04,920 --> 00:22:06,920
documents from many different 
countries. 

392
00:22:06,920 --> 00:22:08,840
So Philippines, China, Costa 
Rica. 

393
00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:13,000
We just don't put it in the 
default demo because then the 

394
00:22:13,000 --> 00:22:15,160
combo box will just be, you 
know, endless. 

395
00:22:15,560 --> 00:22:18,920
We have customers who are using 
up to 20 countries at the same 

396
00:22:18,920 --> 00:22:22,120
time. 
The question is, Jeff, not where

397
00:22:22,120 --> 00:22:25,320
we can scan a document that we 
can do in any country because 

398
00:22:25,320 --> 00:22:27,040
passwords by design are in any 
country. 

399
00:22:27,600 --> 00:22:31,320
The question is, where can you 
verify that this is legit? 

400
00:22:31,320 --> 00:22:35,320
So I'll go slow. 
Let's take the United States, 

401
00:22:35,320 --> 00:22:37,440
which is the best country to do 
this in. 

402
00:22:37,720 --> 00:22:40,000
It is still not perfect. 
Why? 

403
00:22:41,000 --> 00:22:44,320
For all kinds of reasons, states
like California and New York 

404
00:22:44,640 --> 00:22:49,880
have decided not to allow 
vendors like Trisona to ping 

405
00:22:49,880 --> 00:22:54,320
them and verify identities. 
They allow the Social Security 

406
00:22:54,320 --> 00:22:57,520
Administration to do it. 
So the data is there, but they 

407
00:22:57,520 --> 00:22:59,280
don't allow it for commercial 
use. 

408
00:22:59,400 --> 00:23:03,800
So in the United States, we can 
verify literally with the, with 

409
00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:07,760
the authoritative data sources, 
about 80% of the population. 

410
00:23:07,960 --> 00:23:11,440
Pretty good what we do for the 
other 20. 

411
00:23:11,440 --> 00:23:14,560
So if you do come to us with a 
driver license from California, 

412
00:23:15,240 --> 00:23:18,600
we triangulate it differently. 
We still scan the document 

413
00:23:18,600 --> 00:23:23,040
because it's hard to mimic the 
PDF 417. 

414
00:23:23,040 --> 00:23:27,560
And for the uninitiated it is 
the 2D barcode on the back of 

415
00:23:27,560 --> 00:23:30,800
your driver license that has a 
machine readable payload. 

416
00:23:31,760 --> 00:23:35,200
And instead of asking the 
California DMV, hey did you 

417
00:23:35,200 --> 00:23:36,680
issue this? 
Is this real? 

418
00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:39,960
We would ask you for your mobile
number and then ask the 

419
00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:43,960
telephone company. 
Is this identity of Jim Stedman 

420
00:23:43,960 --> 00:23:47,640
with this date of birth and 
address matching whoever owns 

421
00:23:47,640 --> 00:23:50,000
this phone? 
So we're replacing the 

422
00:23:50,000 --> 00:23:53,240
authoritative source with the 
next best thing. 

423
00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:57,320
In India or the UK. 
We replace the DMV with 

424
00:23:57,480 --> 00:24:00,560
LexisNexis with one of our data 
providers. 

425
00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:03,720
And of course, we can add more. 
In India, you can go to some 

426
00:24:03,720 --> 00:24:06,560
government databases. 
In Costa Rica you can query the 

427
00:24:06,560 --> 00:24:08,840
voter ID database. 
There are different 

428
00:24:08,840 --> 00:24:13,080
configurations. 
The key is that you will not be 

429
00:24:13,080 --> 00:24:14,560
blind. 
Meaning what? 

430
00:24:14,880 --> 00:24:18,760
When Jim calls you today before 
you have Ato protect, he can 

431
00:24:18,760 --> 00:24:21,960
just social engineer you and 
tell you I am who I say I am 

432
00:24:22,560 --> 00:24:26,920
because you have no semblance of
control as to is he telling me 

433
00:24:26,920 --> 00:24:29,920
the truth. 
But when you start scanning 

434
00:24:29,920 --> 00:24:32,600
documents and you have the 
triangulation and then we have 

435
00:24:32,600 --> 00:24:36,320
the device information telling 
us what time zone this device is

436
00:24:36,320 --> 00:24:39,760
configured in, and I can ask Jim
to click on a button we added 

437
00:24:39,760 --> 00:24:42,200
that gives his GPS location with
permission. 

438
00:24:42,840 --> 00:24:47,080
All these pixels create a 
picture of is it likely to be 

439
00:24:47,080 --> 00:24:51,320
Jim at his house begging me to 
get him in, or it's somebody all

440
00:24:51,320 --> 00:24:55,160
over the world who's just trying
to masquerade who they really 

441
00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:57,840
are. 
So I see as an admin or whoever 

442
00:24:57,840 --> 00:25:00,600
logged into this, I see a bunch 
of these pieces of information. 

443
00:25:00,600 --> 00:25:03,040
The goal here is to give me 
enough pieces of information to 

444
00:25:03,040 --> 00:25:08,560
say, do I think this is really 
Ori or Jim calling versus maybe 

445
00:25:08,560 --> 00:25:10,480
someone else? 
And so as I have these 

446
00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:11,960
combinations of pieces of data, 
right? 

447
00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:14,720
So I'm looking at the screen 
right now and it's, you know, 

448
00:25:14,720 --> 00:25:18,080
the IP address, the country, the
IP region, you know, the 

449
00:25:18,080 --> 00:25:20,080
browser. 
But in addition to that, I see 

450
00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:24,040
literally a map that shows me 
where things are coming from. 

451
00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:28,880
And then I see, you know, 
different parts of the data that

452
00:25:28,880 --> 00:25:33,120
you've checked from either DMV 
or LexisNexis or even the MVO, 

453
00:25:33,120 --> 00:25:35,400
the mobile network operator, 
right, MMVO. 

454
00:25:36,640 --> 00:25:39,760
So all of this combined kind of 
gives me a picture to say, oh, 

455
00:25:39,760 --> 00:25:44,720
OK, I have pretty reasonable 
assurance based on this that I 

456
00:25:44,720 --> 00:25:48,240
have the right person on the 
phone that I'm transacting in a 

457
00:25:48,560 --> 00:25:52,400
relatively secure way. 
The man in the middle, if I was 

458
00:25:52,480 --> 00:25:55,640
outside of that. 
So let's say I, you know, did 

459
00:25:55,640 --> 00:25:58,120
something and I am got two 
people on the phone. 

460
00:25:58,120 --> 00:26:00,080
We're going to try and trick Ori
out of his money. 

461
00:26:00,520 --> 00:26:02,800
You know, I call Ori up and I 
say, hey, I'm the help desk. 

462
00:26:02,800 --> 00:26:06,240
And then maybe Jim's got 
something else on the line and 

463
00:26:06,240 --> 00:26:08,000
I'm just like, give me the code,
right? 

464
00:26:08,000 --> 00:26:09,840
That I'm going to send you 
'cause this is the common way 

465
00:26:09,840 --> 00:26:12,760
they do it is they say I'm going
to send you a code and then you 

466
00:26:12,760 --> 00:26:15,080
read the code. 
And then despite every single 

467
00:26:15,080 --> 00:26:18,160
SMS and vendor out there saying 
we will never ask if your code, 

468
00:26:18,160 --> 00:26:21,040
what do people do? 
They read the code to the person

469
00:26:21,040 --> 00:26:22,760
that's going to, you know, take 
their money. 

470
00:26:23,240 --> 00:26:27,200
So when I read that code in now,
it's coming in from a different 

471
00:26:27,200 --> 00:26:30,160
IP source, right? 
Or a different Geo location. 

472
00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:33,120
And so I see this on the map and
this is something again, 

473
00:26:33,400 --> 00:26:37,400
trisona.com/idac, go watch the 
demo there that I see that 

474
00:26:37,400 --> 00:26:41,200
information and now I can start 
to raise some reasonable doubt 

475
00:26:41,480 --> 00:26:44,120
around whether this is 
legitimate or not. 

476
00:26:44,200 --> 00:26:47,560
Is that a fairway to put this? 
It's absolutely a fairway. 

477
00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:52,720
I'll give you 2 more anecdotes. 
1 is iPhones use what's called 

478
00:26:52,720 --> 00:26:55,080
private relay. 
It's a type of AVPN. 

479
00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:58,400
And even though Jim called you 
and say, hey, I'm at my house, 

480
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:00,480
his phone will tell you he's not
at his house. 

481
00:27:01,160 --> 00:27:05,240
So for cases like that, even 
though the IP, you know, a la 

482
00:27:05,240 --> 00:27:09,120
carte would not reveal the 
truth, you can ask Jim to click 

483
00:27:09,120 --> 00:27:11,480
on this extra button with 
permission to say, hey, tell me 

484
00:27:11,480 --> 00:27:15,040
where your phone really is. 
And then if that is within 100 

485
00:27:15,040 --> 00:27:18,320
feet of where the driver license
of your home address is, let me 

486
00:27:18,320 --> 00:27:21,400
tell you, Jeff, he is at his 
house because you can't be 

487
00:27:21,600 --> 00:27:26,680
elsewhere doing this. 
The second is the man in the 

488
00:27:26,680 --> 00:27:30,920
middle works when people get the
payload, let's just say from the

489
00:27:30,920 --> 00:27:33,960
bank and they cannot respond to 
it because they're not the real 

490
00:27:33,960 --> 00:27:36,560
customer. 
Now, they put the bank on hold. 

491
00:27:36,560 --> 00:27:39,400
Let me give you the most common.
I use that in the demo. 

492
00:27:39,400 --> 00:27:41,600
The most common excuses we hear 
on calls. 

493
00:27:42,000 --> 00:27:44,720
My baby is crying. 
I, I, I, I'll be back. 

494
00:27:44,960 --> 00:27:47,600
My dog is barking like always 
play something else. 

495
00:27:47,920 --> 00:27:50,360
And the latest one is Amazon is 
knocking at my door. 

496
00:27:50,360 --> 00:27:53,480
I'll be right back. 
But all these are just excuses 

497
00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:58,280
to put the call on mute so the 
bank or the IT help desk doesn't

498
00:27:58,280 --> 00:28:01,240
hear that you are now 
puppeteering someone else. 

499
00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:04,160
And you basically call the 
victim and say hi, I'm calling 

500
00:28:04,160 --> 00:28:06,440
you from the bank. 
We think there's fraud in your 

501
00:28:06,440 --> 00:28:08,960
account. 
I'm going to forward you this 

502
00:28:08,960 --> 00:28:11,840
link that you got. 
It's just that you can't act on 

503
00:28:11,840 --> 00:28:13,520
it. 
Could you please load it in your

504
00:28:13,520 --> 00:28:16,840
browser and scan your ID? 
Because then I will know it's 

505
00:28:16,840 --> 00:28:19,280
you and Wilkin and the people 
are freaking out. 

506
00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:22,080
The bank is calling them. 
Sounds really serious. 

507
00:28:22,400 --> 00:28:24,120
You don't even know you're being
puppeteered. 

508
00:28:24,760 --> 00:28:28,640
So what our tool does based on 
knowing how the bad guys operate

509
00:28:28,640 --> 00:28:32,080
is it takes a fingerprint every 
time the link is loaded. 

510
00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:36,160
And then you, even though you're
on mute because the person gave 

511
00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:39,440
you and you see on the map all 
these different houses, holds 

512
00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:42,880
and devices pop up. 
You say, OK, I know one thing 

513
00:28:42,880 --> 00:28:44,920
for sure. 
I'm not talking to Jim McDonald 

514
00:28:44,920 --> 00:28:47,760
on his own. 
There's he, he is not in five 

515
00:28:47,760 --> 00:28:50,320
different location. 
There is quantum stuff happening

516
00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:52,000
in entanglement, but this ain't 
it. 

517
00:28:54,280 --> 00:28:58,000
Not yet anyway. 
And and so this is the part that

518
00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:01,160
kind of really kind of sold it 
for me as I kind of looked at it

519
00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:05,320
was, OK, I'm looking and this is
not this is naughty, you know, 

520
00:29:05,320 --> 00:29:08,000
very hard thing to do for me as 
an admin. 

521
00:29:08,160 --> 00:29:10,960
I see it as very easy. 
It's showing me literally a map.

522
00:29:10,960 --> 00:29:14,040
And when we tested this out the 
other day, you know, we had your

523
00:29:14,040 --> 00:29:15,880
information and you were kind 
enough to kind of go through US 

524
00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:17,440
with us. 
And that's where that demo is, 

525
00:29:17,720 --> 00:29:21,080
is we see your information. 
And then we had OK, well, Jim, 

526
00:29:21,080 --> 00:29:22,920
go ahead and click, you know the
link again. 

527
00:29:22,920 --> 00:29:25,680
And all of a sudden across the 
world, right, the map zooms out 

528
00:29:25,680 --> 00:29:27,080
and says, OK, well, wait a 
second. 

529
00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:30,920
Why is why did we start in 
Arizona and then end up in South

530
00:29:30,920 --> 00:29:32,920
Dakota? 
Well, that's, that's a flag 

531
00:29:32,920 --> 00:29:34,640
right there. 
And so I think this kind of 

532
00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:36,480
brings home a little bit some of
that man in the middle because 

533
00:29:36,480 --> 00:29:39,080
we thought of ways. 
OK, well, and, and, or you were 

534
00:29:39,080 --> 00:29:40,440
very gracious, like try and 
break it. 

535
00:29:40,680 --> 00:29:42,440
Like, OK, well, let me think of 
ways to do it. 

536
00:29:42,440 --> 00:29:44,320
Now, I'm not a professional 
penetration tester. 

537
00:29:44,320 --> 00:29:46,840
So that's where we'll talk about
maybe later. 

538
00:29:46,840 --> 00:29:49,040
People can kind of, you know, 
help with that. 

539
00:29:49,040 --> 00:29:52,840
But the first thing I thought it
was, OK, well, what happens if I

540
00:29:52,840 --> 00:29:54,840
intercept the man in the middle 
type of thing, right? 

541
00:29:54,840 --> 00:29:58,280
E-mail, text, whatever may be 
another one was OK, well, the 

542
00:29:58,280 --> 00:30:01,000
whole liveness check, right? 
There's been, well, I can just 

543
00:30:01,000 --> 00:30:02,640
hold my picture to my camera, 
right? 

544
00:30:02,640 --> 00:30:05,480
And it will do that. 
Well, if you blink, that must be

545
00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:07,840
enough liveness. 
OK, well, that's not, you know, 

546
00:30:07,840 --> 00:30:09,600
good enough. 
And so now we're saying, OK, 

547
00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:12,600
you're scanning the document. 
You're saying, OK, you're 

548
00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:14,840
checking it against known 
sources of good information. 

549
00:30:14,840 --> 00:30:17,720
You're combining pieces of 
information from multiple 

550
00:30:17,720 --> 00:30:20,960
sources. 
So if I were to tamper with one,

551
00:30:21,440 --> 00:30:24,360
the odds of being able to do 
both become less and less. 

552
00:30:24,360 --> 00:30:28,320
Now they're never 0, right? 
And without being suspected as 

553
00:30:28,320 --> 00:30:32,800
SIM swapping, yes, let me 
reverse it and tell you, here's 

554
00:30:32,800 --> 00:30:35,040
how you can beat it. 
Like, let me give all the 

555
00:30:35,040 --> 00:30:38,000
listeners the recipe just so you
understand what your task is. 

556
00:30:38,360 --> 00:30:40,080
And then you'll see how 
monumental it is. 

557
00:30:41,280 --> 00:30:43,480
You'll hear at the end of this 
podcast that we're going to give

558
00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:48,320
you a challenge hack the box. 
And it's a very simple ask. 

559
00:30:48,440 --> 00:30:51,320
You need to log into our tool, 
play with it. 

560
00:30:52,080 --> 00:30:55,840
And if the tool will say that it
is me, meaning you can scan a 

561
00:30:55,840 --> 00:30:58,640
document that would pass all the
checks with the DMV to say, 

562
00:30:58,640 --> 00:31:02,760
yeah, yeah, this is Ori's real 
driver license and you will not 

563
00:31:02,760 --> 00:31:06,720
trip a we just SIM swapped his 
phone and my telephone company 

564
00:31:06,720 --> 00:31:10,400
will say that this if it all 
matches and there is no SIM swap

565
00:31:10,400 --> 00:31:12,920
and no man in the middle, you 
have beaten it. 

566
00:31:13,200 --> 00:31:15,000
OK. 
And we can talk about how to 

567
00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:19,600
claim your prize. 
What you can't do easily, Jeff 

568
00:31:19,600 --> 00:31:22,800
and Jim, is plant records in 
official databases. 

569
00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:26,400
You can clone my ID. 
You can do that if you know what

570
00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:28,800
to do because my record is 
there. 

571
00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:33,320
Who have to be able to do it in 
a way that is not caught. 

572
00:31:33,880 --> 00:31:37,200
This is really the hurdle. 
The next level is exactly what 

573
00:31:37,200 --> 00:31:39,840
you said is how do I do it 
without SIM swapping or man in 

574
00:31:39,840 --> 00:31:42,600
the middle, which really are 
trying to puppeteer somebody 

575
00:31:42,600 --> 00:31:44,480
with social engineering to do it
for me. 

576
00:31:45,120 --> 00:31:47,920
And the last leg of the stool is
this. 

577
00:31:48,520 --> 00:31:52,400
There is 5% of the listeners who
at this point are thinking a 

578
00:31:52,400 --> 00:31:54,200
thought. 
So let me just tell you what 

579
00:31:54,200 --> 00:31:55,680
they're thinking. 
Wait a second. 

580
00:31:55,880 --> 00:31:59,040
I know how to break this. 
Didn't you say that you need to 

581
00:31:59,040 --> 00:32:01,960
send the link and then I will 
see that multiple people. 

582
00:32:01,960 --> 00:32:03,840
Yeah, I'm. 
I'm revealing to you a method. 

583
00:32:04,320 --> 00:32:05,840
But here's what I'm not going to
reveal. 

584
00:32:05,840 --> 00:32:07,280
Just so you know, we thought 
about it. 

585
00:32:07,400 --> 00:32:09,800
And you will only learn about 
this if you're a customer in our

586
00:32:09,800 --> 00:32:11,920
training. 
What happens if the bad guy 

587
00:32:11,920 --> 00:32:15,160
doesn't click the link and only 
send it to you? 

588
00:32:15,520 --> 00:32:17,680
I just say the words. 
So you know, we thought about 

589
00:32:17,680 --> 00:32:19,960
it. 
Yo did you did not find the 

590
00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:21,400
gaping hole? 
Not yet. 

591
00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:24,920
But that we only train customers
because we do want to stay in 

592
00:32:24,920 --> 00:32:26,960
business. 
Or you can just tell Jeff and I 

593
00:32:26,960 --> 00:32:30,160
that way we can go ahead and 
steal your idea. 

594
00:32:30,520 --> 00:32:35,800
And I mean, I think this is a 
genius because I think the 

595
00:32:35,800 --> 00:32:41,040
industry's answer for identity 
verification is the document 

596
00:32:41,720 --> 00:32:44,440
verification, the liveness 
testing. 

597
00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:49,640
And I mean, that's built into 
your product, but it's more than

598
00:32:49,640 --> 00:32:52,480
that, right? 
Just stay in the geolocation 

599
00:32:52,560 --> 00:32:55,600
angle as well. 
So there's two forms of 

600
00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:59,120
assurance that go into kind of 
this risk modelling. 

601
00:32:59,760 --> 00:33:05,560
Yeah, we, we think about it as 5
disparate sets of signals. 

602
00:33:05,840 --> 00:33:08,560
Some of them come from the 
device itself, Jim. 

603
00:33:09,000 --> 00:33:11,840
So your browser can tell me what
language it's configured in. 

604
00:33:11,840 --> 00:33:14,720
And if it says Russian, you can 
tell me all day long that you 

605
00:33:14,720 --> 00:33:17,880
live not there, right? 
So that's one set of signals. 

606
00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:21,800
The second is, as you said, from
the scan of the document itself.

607
00:33:22,840 --> 00:33:24,960
The third is from the data 
verifiers. 

608
00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:28,960
So even if you fake the document
pretty good visually, the 

609
00:33:28,960 --> 00:33:32,040
verifier will say, well, I don't
have this document in my records

610
00:33:32,040 --> 00:33:33,680
because it's a synthetic 
identity. 

611
00:33:34,800 --> 00:33:37,800
The third will be all the man in
the middle detection to know, 

612
00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:42,040
did you forward something else? 
And the 5th, I know we didn't 

613
00:33:42,040 --> 00:33:44,360
talk about it much, but it's 
what we said before. 

614
00:33:44,360 --> 00:33:47,760
How would you know if somebody's
calling your employee and tell 

615
00:33:47,760 --> 00:33:50,320
them, hey, I'm calling you from 
ITI need you to do something. 

616
00:33:50,800 --> 00:33:55,920
So that is again another module 
in the Ato Protect suite that 

617
00:33:55,920 --> 00:33:59,440
companies can advertise either 
to their customers or to their 

618
00:33:59,440 --> 00:34:03,440
employees on an intranet and 
say, if ever you get a call from

619
00:34:03,440 --> 00:34:07,160
us, this is how you would know 
it's really coming from the 

620
00:34:07,160 --> 00:34:09,719
company as opposed to believing 
somebody who's done social 

621
00:34:09,719 --> 00:34:11,719
engineering. 
I'll talk us through that 

622
00:34:11,719 --> 00:34:14,480
because that's actually 
something that was on my mind. 

623
00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:18,639
I had my bank, I know we're 
talking about the workforce 

624
00:34:18,639 --> 00:34:21,719
example, but I had my bank call 
me the other day and they kind 

625
00:34:21,719 --> 00:34:24,880
of wanted to jump right into the
details of them. 

626
00:34:25,280 --> 00:34:27,600
I. 
I believe it was them because I 

627
00:34:27,880 --> 00:34:29,760
was just interacting with them, 
right? 

628
00:34:30,120 --> 00:34:34,239
But the scenario was they called
me, so it could have been 

629
00:34:34,239 --> 00:34:38,600
anybody calling me. 
Imagine if someone calls you Ori

630
00:34:38,600 --> 00:34:41,679
and says, you know, I'm calling 
from the help desk and you're 

631
00:34:41,679 --> 00:34:44,960
like, OK, that that is my 
company's help desk now. 

632
00:34:45,520 --> 00:34:49,000
And they start asking you for 
information. 

633
00:34:49,639 --> 00:34:54,440
I mean, how can you how how as 
the person who received that 

634
00:34:54,440 --> 00:35:00,960
call use your product to verify 
that you know this legit? 

635
00:35:01,600 --> 00:35:03,840
Yep. 
I'll, I'll take a second to give

636
00:35:03,840 --> 00:35:07,480
some kudos to our we call them 
the ninjas at Trusonas. 

637
00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:10,480
Those are the engineers that sit
with me and the product 

638
00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:14,480
management team and say, listen,
the problem is thus how do you 

639
00:35:14,480 --> 00:35:16,280
solve it? 
I'll be honest with you. 

640
00:35:16,280 --> 00:35:18,320
I've been in this industry for 
24 years. 

641
00:35:19,040 --> 00:35:21,080
I did not think there's a 
solution to this. 

642
00:35:21,080 --> 00:35:23,040
I honestly did not. 
Actually, I didn't even spend 

643
00:35:23,040 --> 00:35:26,320
time figuring this out because 
it seems so well, how could you?

644
00:35:27,480 --> 00:35:29,480
Thank God we thought of 
something. 

645
00:35:29,480 --> 00:35:32,080
It's now patent pending, so I 
can talk about it freely. 

646
00:35:32,720 --> 00:35:35,760
If you'll have time to see the 
demo, we're demonstrating it 

647
00:35:35,760 --> 00:35:39,240
there. 
But it works like this, Jim, if 

648
00:35:39,240 --> 00:35:42,720
you went to the trusona.com 
website right now and scrolled 

649
00:35:42,720 --> 00:35:45,480
all the way to the bottom of it,
on the right hand side, there's 

650
00:35:45,480 --> 00:35:49,360
a link called Agent Verify. 
And we would recommend companies

651
00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:53,120
that have consumers and 
employees have a similar link on

652
00:35:53,120 --> 00:35:56,800
their homepage so everybody 
knows it's there, both the bad 

653
00:35:56,800 --> 00:36:00,760
guys and the good guys. 
And the law or the rule would be

654
00:36:00,760 --> 00:36:02,440
simple. 
If you get a phone call that 

655
00:36:02,440 --> 00:36:05,720
claims to be from the company, 
whether you're working here or 

656
00:36:05,720 --> 00:36:09,120
you're a customer, go there, 
click it and ask the person on 

657
00:36:09,120 --> 00:36:12,200
the phone for a simple thing. 
Give me your agent verify code. 

658
00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:16,320
If truly they are calling you 
from the company, our tool will 

659
00:36:16,320 --> 00:36:19,400
give him a six digit code that 
is a one time thing. 

660
00:36:19,400 --> 00:36:22,240
And then they can see I am 
talking to Jeff. 

661
00:36:23,160 --> 00:36:25,600
And after that this code will 
not work again. 

662
00:36:26,360 --> 00:36:30,280
And it's the first time that we 
can give a simple instruction 

663
00:36:30,880 --> 00:36:34,560
without any technical know how 
or buying something for the 

664
00:36:34,560 --> 00:36:37,720
consumer to do that. 
You have a tool to fight this. 

665
00:36:38,840 --> 00:36:40,800
And unfortunately this is the 
only thing we know of. 

666
00:36:40,800 --> 00:36:44,840
Everybody else who buys this and
understand how it works knows 

667
00:36:45,080 --> 00:36:46,880
that my employee can forget to 
do it. 

668
00:36:47,360 --> 00:36:51,120
I, I will tell you that as well.
My mom may not remember to go do

669
00:36:51,120 --> 00:36:52,200
it. 
I get that. 

670
00:36:52,720 --> 00:36:57,560
But at least now you have a way 
to prove to somebody that you're

671
00:36:57,560 --> 00:37:01,040
calling them, especially if you 
have a personal banker that 

672
00:37:01,040 --> 00:37:03,680
wants to help you with a wire 
and they are calling to help 

673
00:37:03,680 --> 00:37:06,800
you, but at the same time, they 
need to identify themselves. 

674
00:37:08,000 --> 00:37:12,000
If IT wants to call you and help
you while you're stuck, you want

675
00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:14,600
to get that help, but you also 
want to make sure that it is 

676
00:37:14,600 --> 00:37:18,640
really them calling you. 
So this will be the way to prove

677
00:37:18,640 --> 00:37:21,920
to both sides that you're 
talking to the right person with

678
00:37:21,920 --> 00:37:25,920
this feature that is included in
the umbrella of Ato Protect. 

679
00:37:26,200 --> 00:37:30,000
Oh, it's really great actually 
how to quit. 

680
00:37:30,000 --> 00:37:35,000
You brought up that topic and I 
did have a follow up there, but 

681
00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:39,720
you when you're talking earlier 
about the geolocation, I wanted 

682
00:37:39,720 --> 00:37:43,720
to get this question in. 
So if somebody is say the 

683
00:37:43,720 --> 00:37:48,880
hacker, the man in the middle is
using VPN software, do you 

684
00:37:48,880 --> 00:37:51,960
accommodate for that? 
Yeah, I, I mean, Ori, what I 

685
00:37:51,960 --> 00:37:57,160
think is cool was like coming 
into this session, you said 

686
00:37:58,640 --> 00:38:02,400
throw away the script, go ahead 
and like try to stump me. 

687
00:38:02,760 --> 00:38:09,440
This is my attempt, you know now
like I I'm not based on my I 

688
00:38:09,440 --> 00:38:14,680
could be calling you from Russia
using AVPN voice over IP. 

689
00:38:15,440 --> 00:38:17,560
How did your software stop that?
Great. 

690
00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:24,000
So you can't stop somebody from 
using AVPN, but we do help you 

691
00:38:24,000 --> 00:38:25,960
uncover it and solve it two 
ways. 

692
00:38:25,960 --> 00:38:29,400
One of them, we have a list of 
VPNs, either they're, they're 

693
00:38:29,400 --> 00:38:32,760
beautiful ones from Apple. 
There's AIP range that you can 

694
00:38:32,760 --> 00:38:36,200
say, OK, you're using iCloud 
relay and that's just a toggle. 

695
00:38:36,760 --> 00:38:39,080
If it's one of your employees 
and you really wanted to know 

696
00:38:39,080 --> 00:38:40,760
where they are, you just tell 
them, hey, can I give you 

697
00:38:40,760 --> 00:38:43,800
instructions of how to turn it 
off momentarily because I want 

698
00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:47,080
to make and no employee should 
argue about that because they 

699
00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:48,920
really want to make sure the 
company's safe. 

700
00:38:49,760 --> 00:38:52,960
The other one is AVPN, like a 
Nord VPN that you can come from 

701
00:38:52,960 --> 00:38:56,640
any country in the world. 
But hear me out, Jim, if you 

702
00:38:56,640 --> 00:39:00,920
wanted to get privileged access 
and you called in and says, hey,

703
00:39:00,920 --> 00:39:06,000
I'm working from our whatever 
office or from my home, once you

704
00:39:06,000 --> 00:39:08,760
scan your driver license, it has
your home address. 

705
00:39:09,360 --> 00:39:12,760
So if I now ask you to click on 
a reveal your GPS location and 

706
00:39:12,760 --> 00:39:15,880
that is like 20 miles from that 
address, there's a problem. 

707
00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:20,880
Our tool can show you those, the
driver license address and the 

708
00:39:20,880 --> 00:39:23,160
GPS within 100 feet of each 
other. 

709
00:39:23,640 --> 00:39:26,440
And you have every reason to 
think that the person is there. 

710
00:39:27,480 --> 00:39:29,360
I'll give you one more thing 
that we do. 

711
00:39:29,480 --> 00:39:32,320
And again, not revealing any 
methods that will help the bad 

712
00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:35,360
guys. 
Some companies are so large that

713
00:39:35,360 --> 00:39:38,960
they have 5 different IT help 
desks in different countries. 

714
00:39:39,320 --> 00:39:44,240
So what do you do then? 
We allow them to associate the C

715
00:39:44,240 --> 00:39:48,680
blocks of those different areas 
so that you can tell, hey, this 

716
00:39:48,680 --> 00:39:51,840
person was asking for help is 
coming from an internal IP 

717
00:39:51,840 --> 00:39:55,320
address of the company, which 
again, would lower the guard, 

718
00:39:55,320 --> 00:39:58,160
not completely, but give you 
reason to think that you're not 

719
00:39:58,160 --> 00:40:00,720
talking to somebody who's just 
talking to you out of the blue. 

720
00:40:01,720 --> 00:40:05,200
And lastly, if somebody at the 
company does use VPN because 

721
00:40:05,200 --> 00:40:07,960
they want to stream some stuff, 
hey, we all do it, it's fine. 

722
00:40:08,640 --> 00:40:11,320
You can simply tell them for 
this call, I'm asking to turn it

723
00:40:11,320 --> 00:40:13,080
off. 
And if they give you any 

724
00:40:13,080 --> 00:40:16,840
resistance, that is immediate 
reason for you to pause and say,

725
00:40:16,840 --> 00:40:21,280
OK, I need to use more security 
on this call versus less. 

726
00:40:21,440 --> 00:40:24,160
Because if somebody really works
here and they don't want to 

727
00:40:24,320 --> 00:40:27,520
masquerade at somebody else, 
there's no reason for them to 

728
00:40:27,520 --> 00:40:30,640
not listen to your asks so that 
you can give them service. 

729
00:40:32,880 --> 00:40:36,040
I think it's such a fascinating 
approach to this is you're 

730
00:40:36,040 --> 00:40:37,960
collecting all these signals, 
you know, from all these 

731
00:40:37,960 --> 00:40:40,040
different areas and kind of 
combining to it. 

732
00:40:40,040 --> 00:40:42,800
You know, Jim and I have been 
consulting now together for 10 

733
00:40:42,800 --> 00:40:45,080
years, him him much longer in 
his advanced age. 

734
00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:48,920
But this is a question that, you
know, has constantly come up is 

735
00:40:48,920 --> 00:40:51,240
how do you validate people 
calling the help desk? 

736
00:40:51,240 --> 00:40:55,680
And, you know, for the last 
eight years or so, there hasn't 

737
00:40:55,680 --> 00:40:57,400
been really the last 10 years, 
there hasn't really been an 

738
00:40:57,400 --> 00:40:58,880
answer. 
I remember being on these calls 

739
00:40:58,880 --> 00:41:03,200
before as a help desk agent 
doing password resets and this 

740
00:41:03,200 --> 00:41:05,240
is a very interesting solution. 
So I would definitely encourage 

741
00:41:05,240 --> 00:41:08,720
people go check it out. 
trusoda.com/IDAC. 

742
00:41:08,720 --> 00:41:11,360
There's a whole demo there. 
And you know, we're, we're, most

743
00:41:11,360 --> 00:41:12,800
of our listeners are listeners, 
right? 

744
00:41:12,800 --> 00:41:14,920
They're, they're not seeing 
things happening and stuff like 

745
00:41:14,920 --> 00:41:16,680
that. 
So we're trying to describe it 

746
00:41:16,680 --> 00:41:20,120
as we go along, but it, it is a 
very, very cool solution. 

747
00:41:20,480 --> 00:41:23,040
I want to kind of take us into 
the future here a little bit 

748
00:41:23,040 --> 00:41:24,560
with a little bit of time that 
you've got left. 

749
00:41:24,840 --> 00:41:28,240
What do you think is the next 
battleground when it comes to 

750
00:41:29,080 --> 00:41:30,360
this type of thing? 
Right? 

751
00:41:30,360 --> 00:41:32,840
Is it's it's really identity 
verification. 

752
00:41:32,840 --> 00:41:36,640
It's how do I make sure this is 
really Ori and not, you know, 

753
00:41:36,640 --> 00:41:40,360
the the Google VO2 or the meta. 
What do they call it? 

754
00:41:40,360 --> 00:41:44,240
Emu model, right? 
Whatever AVAI thing that I can 

755
00:41:44,240 --> 00:41:48,000
create that would say Oh yeah, 
that sure looks and sounds like 

756
00:41:48,000 --> 00:41:49,840
Ori. 
Let me go ahead and do it for 

757
00:41:49,840 --> 00:41:52,520
him and take care of his his 
account for him. 

758
00:41:52,760 --> 00:41:53,920
What like what do you see as 
next? 

759
00:41:53,920 --> 00:41:56,640
So. 
Jeff and Jim, I, I told you that

760
00:41:56,640 --> 00:42:00,040
I brought my special effects 
here just in case the 

761
00:42:00,040 --> 00:42:02,960
opportunity will arise. 
So it is you just ask the 

762
00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:05,640
question that merits this. 
So I'm going to have a 

763
00:42:05,640 --> 00:42:08,680
contrarian view. 
It's, it's not fun news, but I 

764
00:42:08,680 --> 00:42:11,080
will share it with your audience
of what I think comes next. 

765
00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:13,480
So unfortunately, it will begin 
with this sound. 

766
00:42:17,760 --> 00:42:20,320
I'm happy that I'm at the end of
my security career. 

767
00:42:20,320 --> 00:42:21,800
That's the beginning of the 
answer. 

768
00:42:23,640 --> 00:42:27,640
I have a son who's 22 years old,
just finished computer science 

769
00:42:27,640 --> 00:42:29,680
and forensic accounting. 
He's just getting into this 

770
00:42:29,680 --> 00:42:34,800
world and I tell him I don't 
know how your generation will 

771
00:42:34,800 --> 00:42:37,600
handle what comes next. 
And next is not 20 years. 

772
00:42:37,960 --> 00:42:43,200
Next is 2 years, five years. 
Here's what I think would happen

773
00:42:43,200 --> 00:42:48,960
next. 
Video Gen. 

774
00:42:48,960 --> 00:42:54,840
AI will become so good that for 
most people it will be 

775
00:42:54,840 --> 00:42:57,080
indistinguishable from live 
video. 

776
00:42:58,880 --> 00:43:02,520
That includes sound, which is 
very important for this topic 

777
00:43:02,520 --> 00:43:05,920
today. 
Without mentioning company 

778
00:43:05,920 --> 00:43:09,440
names, I can tell you I've 
listened to recordings of CEOs 

779
00:43:09,440 --> 00:43:13,320
of company because they were 
interviewed on the TV being 

780
00:43:13,320 --> 00:43:16,040
voice modulated. 
And now you can have this voice 

781
00:43:16,040 --> 00:43:20,120
say anything you want, berating 
the IT help desk to reset the 

782
00:43:20,120 --> 00:43:23,960
password. 
That will only get better with 

783
00:43:23,960 --> 00:43:27,560
time, not worse. 
So you won't be able to trust 

784
00:43:27,560 --> 00:43:29,800
your ears. 
You won't be able to trust your 

785
00:43:29,800 --> 00:43:35,720
eyes, you won't be able to trust
images that I show you because 

786
00:43:36,160 --> 00:43:40,920
who knows? 
So it will again rob us as an 

787
00:43:40,920 --> 00:43:44,600
industry from all those senses, 
if you want to think about it, 

788
00:43:44,600 --> 00:43:51,120
that we had for so, so long. 
And the next thing again that 

789
00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:54,760
that could come, I hope it won't
is any breach of the 

790
00:43:54,760 --> 00:43:57,640
authoritative data sources. 
So if you told me today, all the

791
00:43:57,920 --> 00:44:02,320
DM VS data has been spilled out.
We are now going to be in a 

792
00:44:02,720 --> 00:44:06,240
period of time of just not 
knowing blind, leave it leading 

793
00:44:06,240 --> 00:44:09,960
the blind until it would be so 
bad that governments will say, 

794
00:44:09,960 --> 00:44:13,120
OK, now we need the self 
sovereign identity and all the 

795
00:44:13,120 --> 00:44:16,840
things that we're talking about 
in futuristic world. 

796
00:44:17,680 --> 00:44:19,560
I believe we're not there for a 
simple reason. 

797
00:44:19,560 --> 00:44:23,080
We did not experience enough 
pain as a society to say enough 

798
00:44:23,080 --> 00:44:26,760
with this, we're doing it. 
Heck, 50 states in the United 

799
00:44:26,760 --> 00:44:29,760
States cannot agree on what's 
secure between them. 

800
00:44:29,760 --> 00:44:31,320
So what? 
What do you want the world to 

801
00:44:31,320 --> 00:44:31,760
do? 
Right? 

802
00:44:33,200 --> 00:44:37,360
I think we still have more time.
We can still do some work, but 

803
00:44:37,520 --> 00:44:43,840
AI will be the breaking weapon 
of the bad guys if they use it 

804
00:44:44,080 --> 00:44:48,760
well, including writing emails 
and persuading people with, you 

805
00:44:48,760 --> 00:44:52,360
know, agents that know how to do
that, man, they will have the 

806
00:44:52,360 --> 00:44:54,240
upper hand. 
It's just nature of the beast. 

807
00:44:54,240 --> 00:44:56,920
I don't like saying it. 
I know people don't like hearing

808
00:44:56,920 --> 00:44:59,080
it. 
But as a defender, as a 

809
00:44:59,080 --> 00:45:02,680
practitioner, I'm happy that I'm
towards the end of my career 

810
00:45:02,680 --> 00:45:05,680
because I I have no idea what 
comes next and how we will solve

811
00:45:05,680 --> 00:45:08,080
it. 
Because things that we held near

812
00:45:08,080 --> 00:45:12,760
and dear as sacred will not be 
with us as the gold standard 

813
00:45:12,760 --> 00:45:14,880
anymore. 
Well, that's a very positive way

814
00:45:14,880 --> 00:45:17,800
to to end the conversation. 
But I think this is the 

815
00:45:17,800 --> 00:45:22,040
realistic way, right Is this is 
has always been a cat and mouse 

816
00:45:22,360 --> 00:45:25,800
game with attacker versus 
defender and trying to figure 

817
00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:28,320
out how can we stop one or the 
other. 

818
00:45:28,360 --> 00:45:31,480
And it happens on both sides. 
So it's as hard as we are trying

819
00:45:31,480 --> 00:45:36,280
to defend the other side, just 
as much is trying to poke holes 

820
00:45:36,280 --> 00:45:39,080
into that. 
And there will be new creative 

821
00:45:39,080 --> 00:45:41,240
ways to do it. 
AI is just the latest version of

822
00:45:41,240 --> 00:45:43,000
it. 
I mean, we did an entire episode

823
00:45:43,000 --> 00:45:45,960
that was all AI like for us on 
April 1st. 

824
00:45:46,360 --> 00:45:50,680
And, you know, it was fine. 
It sounded OK. 

825
00:45:50,680 --> 00:45:53,480
And that's me as an amateur 
spending a little bit of time, 

826
00:45:53,520 --> 00:45:56,440
you know, training models on my 
voice and Jim's voice and, and 

827
00:45:56,440 --> 00:45:59,400
me telling Jim, no, you got to 
do it more demonstrably, right? 

828
00:45:59,960 --> 00:46:03,640
If I have motivation, the tools 
are absolutely there. 

829
00:46:03,680 --> 00:46:06,320
The accessibility to be able to 
do Gen. 

830
00:46:06,360 --> 00:46:12,080
AI to create video, audio images
is, is so good right now. 

831
00:46:12,080 --> 00:46:15,000
And it's absolutely scary 
because what does this lead back

832
00:46:15,000 --> 00:46:17,240
to? 
It's social engineering again. 

833
00:46:17,760 --> 00:46:20,840
The unhappy path, as we've 
called it for a long time, is 

834
00:46:21,120 --> 00:46:22,680
that's what people are going to 
take advantage of. 

835
00:46:22,680 --> 00:46:26,480
It's usually the way that people
get breached or popped or 

836
00:46:26,480 --> 00:46:28,760
whatever word you want to use to
say that bad things have 

837
00:46:28,760 --> 00:46:30,920
happened. 
And these are just tools that 

838
00:46:30,920 --> 00:46:31,920
people are going to use to do 
that. 

839
00:46:31,960 --> 00:46:35,240
And so another arrow in that 
quiver might be something like 

840
00:46:35,240 --> 00:46:38,320
this is how do you stop account 
takeovers as well? 

841
00:46:38,320 --> 00:46:40,240
Take a look at something like 
Trisona's ATL protect. 

842
00:46:40,240 --> 00:46:43,520
So I'm a big fan of it. 
I remember when you, when you 

843
00:46:43,520 --> 00:46:45,680
called me or I think you shot me
a LinkedIn message like a year 

844
00:46:45,680 --> 00:46:47,000
and a half ago, it was like, oh,
this is kind of cool. 

845
00:46:47,000 --> 00:46:50,080
Like what is this thing? 
And to see it evolve over the 

846
00:46:50,080 --> 00:46:53,560
last, like I said, year and a 
half and see the value of it has

847
00:46:53,560 --> 00:46:56,160
been really interesting. 
So like typical cap to you, Sir.

848
00:46:57,320 --> 00:46:58,720
Thank you. 
I appreciate it. 

849
00:46:58,720 --> 00:47:02,480
But as I asked you and Jim, I 
want today to be all about 

850
00:47:03,480 --> 00:47:06,920
trying to break this because I 
feel for everybody who listens 

851
00:47:06,920 --> 00:47:09,600
to this podcast on the defender 
side. 

852
00:47:09,600 --> 00:47:13,120
I would not want to be doing 
this job today because it's we 

853
00:47:13,120 --> 00:47:14,840
don't get paid enough for doing 
it. 

854
00:47:15,360 --> 00:47:18,560
But I do have a positive endnote
if you don't mind, and I'll use 

855
00:47:18,560 --> 00:47:22,120
my slide whistle in the in the 
fun way just to say this. 

856
00:47:25,480 --> 00:47:29,400
I believe that some of us will 
try to fight AI with AII, 

857
00:47:29,400 --> 00:47:31,280
already see startups trying to 
do that. 

858
00:47:31,960 --> 00:47:34,600
I personally don't believe that 
that will be the solution 

859
00:47:34,600 --> 00:47:38,160
because of the cat and mouse 
issue. 25 years ago when you 

860
00:47:38,160 --> 00:47:41,400
bought Norton Virus, you were 
defended from what he knew 

861
00:47:41,400 --> 00:47:43,120
about, but not from the next 
thing, right? 

862
00:47:43,120 --> 00:47:48,080
So unfortunately, it is a way to
give you some cover from what's 

863
00:47:48,080 --> 00:47:50,080
known. 
But in this world of AI 

864
00:47:50,080 --> 00:47:52,000
deepfakes, you just don't know 
what's coming tomorrow. 

865
00:47:52,000 --> 00:47:54,760
So I just don't know that 
overall that's the strategy. 

866
00:47:56,000 --> 00:48:00,120
A way to finish this episode is 
to think about what we described

867
00:48:00,120 --> 00:48:03,560
today and what this tool does as
a sort of a Turing test. 

868
00:48:05,440 --> 00:48:08,760
Hear me out. 
If we try to fight AI with AI, 

869
00:48:09,000 --> 00:48:12,560
we're now just fighting CPU with
CPU and capacity with capacity. 

870
00:48:12,560 --> 00:48:15,240
And unfortunately, the bad guys 
have more money than most 

871
00:48:15,240 --> 00:48:18,080
companies to do this. 
What we're trying to do with 

872
00:48:18,080 --> 00:48:21,800
this tool is to take you out of 
your comfort zone, Mr. AI, and 

873
00:48:21,800 --> 00:48:24,720
have you hold the phone in the 
air and scan something. 

874
00:48:24,720 --> 00:48:27,440
In real life, no AI model can do
that. 

875
00:48:28,120 --> 00:48:31,120
No AI model can generate the 
record for me in the phone 

876
00:48:31,120 --> 00:48:33,680
company. 
No AI model can do a lot of 

877
00:48:33,680 --> 00:48:37,080
things that we're testing for 
because it simply doesn't know. 

878
00:48:37,120 --> 00:48:40,440
It knows how to do a lot of 
things, but we're forcing it to 

879
00:48:40,440 --> 00:48:42,360
do things that human can do 
easily. 

880
00:48:42,360 --> 00:48:47,640
So here's the positive sound. 
But AI will fail miserably. 

881
00:48:48,440 --> 00:48:51,320
So I don't want people listening
to this thinking, Oh my God, 

882
00:48:51,320 --> 00:48:53,520
we're doomed. 
AI will take over the world. 

883
00:48:53,520 --> 00:48:56,720
That is not what I'm saying. 
I'm saying if you put in front 

884
00:48:56,720 --> 00:48:59,400
of AI the things that it knows 
how to defend from, just with 

885
00:48:59,400 --> 00:49:02,200
more training, that is not a 
great strategy. 

886
00:49:02,760 --> 00:49:06,800
Force it to do the thing it 
cannot and now you have a leg to

887
00:49:06,800 --> 00:49:09,720
stand on. 
OK, well you've been teasing us 

888
00:49:09,720 --> 00:49:13,280
the whole conversation and so 
let's talk about how do we break

889
00:49:13,280 --> 00:49:15,240
this? 
And so you've you're issuing a 

890
00:49:15,240 --> 00:49:17,040
challenge to whoever is 
listening. 

891
00:49:17,760 --> 00:49:19,320
Tell us more about this hack the
box. 

892
00:49:19,560 --> 00:49:21,680
What is it? 
How is it going to work? 

893
00:49:21,720 --> 00:49:23,960
And I guess just give the 
details on it. 

894
00:49:24,640 --> 00:49:30,640
So we will go to the website of 
Trusona forward slash idac at 

895
00:49:30,640 --> 00:49:34,720
empty at the center. 
There you will read a little bit

896
00:49:34,720 --> 00:49:37,160
about this demo. 
You can see a video of it. 

897
00:49:37,160 --> 00:49:41,160
If you don't want to go do it 
yourself to hack the box, I'm 

898
00:49:41,160 --> 00:49:45,000
offering the following thing. 
Go to our demo and send us a 

899
00:49:45,000 --> 00:49:48,360
screenshot of the entire screen 
that it would also have a GUID 

900
00:49:48,360 --> 00:49:50,600
of the transaction you're on 
because we need to find it in 

901
00:49:50,600 --> 00:49:53,560
our systems to see that you did 
not manufacture one. 

902
00:49:54,600 --> 00:49:58,200
How's that for thinking like a 
hacker where the DMV and the 

903
00:49:58,200 --> 00:50:01,080
phone company and all those 
things do not suspect that it's 

904
00:50:01,080 --> 00:50:03,760
not my document. 
And again, I have one. 

905
00:50:04,720 --> 00:50:07,240
I'm not going to hold it too 
close to the camera. 

906
00:50:07,240 --> 00:50:09,040
I'm not going to do that, but I 
have one. 

907
00:50:09,760 --> 00:50:13,320
I've done this demo as you'll 
see there, but the net net of it

908
00:50:13,320 --> 00:50:17,720
is if you can generate a 
screenshot from our tool that we

909
00:50:17,720 --> 00:50:20,720
can verify was a real 
transaction on our end and it 

910
00:50:20,720 --> 00:50:23,720
will say, yeah, this is Ori 
Eisen, it was not me. 

911
00:50:24,280 --> 00:50:27,720
You get the prize now, Jeff, 
Jeff and Jim, you can help me 

912
00:50:27,720 --> 00:50:30,680
pick what the prize will be. 
I don't want it to be like a 

913
00:50:30,800 --> 00:50:33,160
gift card or something. 
Should be something cool. 

914
00:50:33,440 --> 00:50:36,440
So we will by the time this 
episode will pause post, we'll 

915
00:50:36,440 --> 00:50:40,080
decide what the prizes. 
I think it's such a cool thing 

916
00:50:40,120 --> 00:50:43,080
and, you know, being able and 
open to be able to say, hey, 

917
00:50:43,400 --> 00:50:45,840
let's figure out better ways to 
poke a hole in this is great. 

918
00:50:45,840 --> 00:50:49,880
And I guess be prepared because 
I think, you know, hopefully 

919
00:50:49,880 --> 00:50:52,560
people will check this out and 
really want to try to figure out

920
00:50:52,560 --> 00:50:55,160
how it gets. 
I will let me say it again. 

921
00:50:55,160 --> 00:50:57,480
I'm not afraid. 
Most vendors are afraid to be. 

922
00:50:58,000 --> 00:51:02,040
It's OK if you ever listen to 
Karen and Lazari's Ted talk that

923
00:51:02,040 --> 00:51:04,160
hackers are the immune system of
the Internet. 

924
00:51:04,160 --> 00:51:06,920
I believe in that. 
So if you're listening to this 

925
00:51:06,920 --> 00:51:10,480
podcast, I'm not afraid. 
I want you to show me where the 

926
00:51:10,480 --> 00:51:14,080
holes are because I'd rather fix
them if there are and protect 

927
00:51:14,080 --> 00:51:16,880
the world then not allowing you 
to test it. 

928
00:51:16,880 --> 00:51:19,120
I mean, that is not security. 
There's no security and 

929
00:51:19,120 --> 00:51:20,160
obscurity. 
Sorry. 

930
00:51:20,640 --> 00:51:24,520
I'm asking you help us see how 
it can be broken. 

931
00:51:24,520 --> 00:51:26,960
And if you can't break it, at 
least be like Jeff and Jim, they

932
00:51:26,960 --> 00:51:29,920
were very honorable and say, 
hey, we couldn't break it 

933
00:51:29,920 --> 00:51:31,560
easily. 
Let us at least share it with 

934
00:51:31,560 --> 00:51:34,960
more people because if this can 
help the companies to not be 

935
00:51:34,960 --> 00:51:38,200
broken into, so be it. 
I think the other cool thing is,

936
00:51:38,520 --> 00:51:42,560
well, first of all, famous last 
words, I'm not afraid so I'm not

937
00:51:42,560 --> 00:51:45,160
that. 
I'm not that courageous, so I 

938
00:51:45,160 --> 00:51:47,560
will not say that myself. 
But the other thing I think 

939
00:51:47,560 --> 00:51:50,160
people should know is if they go
to trusoda.com and they click on

940
00:51:50,160 --> 00:51:52,200
the try now you actually get 
what, six of these? 

941
00:51:52,200 --> 00:51:54,120
I think 3 per month. 
Per month? 

942
00:51:54,240 --> 00:51:56,200
Yep. 
And so people can actually try 

943
00:51:56,200 --> 00:51:58,400
this, try that in an 
environment, see how it. 

944
00:51:58,400 --> 00:52:00,520
Works on their own ideas. 
You can just see what it would 

945
00:52:00,520 --> 00:52:03,280
do for you. 
Literally it's like a Gray box 

946
00:52:03,280 --> 00:52:05,920
as opposed to a black box. 
You can see what would happen, 

947
00:52:06,400 --> 00:52:11,080
but to break it, you need to be 
me with a real transaction. 

948
00:52:11,400 --> 00:52:14,200
Then we can chat about the prize
so far. 

949
00:52:14,200 --> 00:52:16,440
Just so you know, no one has 
been successful trying to do 

950
00:52:16,440 --> 00:52:18,720
this. 
OK, the challenge has been 

951
00:52:18,720 --> 00:52:21,440
tossed out there. 
The gulp has been tossed down. 

952
00:52:21,440 --> 00:52:25,280
Whatever analogy you want to 
use, Ori, I'm I'm a big fan of 

953
00:52:25,280 --> 00:52:27,880
what you've built here. 
Very impressed to see how it 

954
00:52:27,880 --> 00:52:30,120
goes out there. 
Definitely encourage people 

955
00:52:30,200 --> 00:52:34,040
visit trisona.com/idac and we'll
have links in our show notes for

956
00:52:34,040 --> 00:52:38,320
people to find that easily, as 
well as a LinkedIn link for you 

957
00:52:38,320 --> 00:52:41,440
as well or for people to reach 
out and maybe send those 

958
00:52:41,440 --> 00:52:43,960
screenshots or whatever it may 
be to say, hey, I got you. 

959
00:52:44,520 --> 00:52:47,120
But hopefully not. 
So with that, we'll go ahead and

960
00:52:47,120 --> 00:52:49,240
leave it for this week. 
Ori, thank you so much for your 

961
00:52:49,240 --> 00:52:50,760
time. 
Really appreciate you being a 

962
00:52:50,760 --> 00:52:53,800
supporter of the podcast and 
encourage people to visit the 

963
00:52:53,800 --> 00:52:57,120
website, visit us on the web, 
idscpodcast.com, do all those 

964
00:52:57,120 --> 00:52:58,960
fun, cool things like and 
subscribe, share those with 

965
00:52:58,960 --> 00:53:01,280
people. 
And yeah, we appreciate it. 

966
00:53:01,280 --> 00:53:03,400
So we'll go ahead and leave it 
there for this week. 

967
00:53:03,640 --> 00:53:06,440
Thanks everyone for watching and
or listening and we'll talk with

968
00:53:06,440 --> 00:53:10,880
you all in the next one. 
You've been listening to 

969
00:53:10,880 --> 00:53:14,800
Identity at the Center. 
We hope you've enjoyed the show.

970
00:53:15,000 --> 00:53:19,080
Make sure to like, rate and 
review, and we'll be back soon. 

971
00:53:19,360 --> 00:53:21,640
But in the meantime, hit the 
website at 

972
00:53:21,640 --> 00:53:28,000
identity@thecenter.com. 
See you next time on Identity at

973
00:53:28,000 --> 00:53:28,920
the Center.