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You're listening to the identity
of the center podcast, this is 

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the show that talks about 
identity and access management 

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and making sure you know who has
access to what let's get 

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started. 
Welcome to the identity of the 

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sender podcast, I'm Jeff and 
that's Jim. 

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Hey Jim hey, Jeff, how are you 
and happy New Year? 

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Happy New Year. 
Welcome to 2022. 

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The first show of 2022. 
Yeah, the first call I had was 

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on Monday coming back from the 
long break and I felt like I 

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couldn't even concentrate, but 
I've been on the phone all day. 

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Now for you know the 
behind-the-scenes this Wednesday

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afternoon years and yeah sorry. 
Get back on track and my 

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favorite part is trying to 
remember what it is. 

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I do for a living and how to do 
all the different things that I 

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that I just don't do very often 
and have to start again, the new

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year. 
So it's always good times. 

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I'm sure other people are like 
that too. 

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Was always a big time for 
password resets coming home 

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security Hobson. 
No doubt no doubt in for what we

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do, you know I just was reminded
of one of the interesting 

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aspects today which is, you 
know, we hold workshops with our

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clients to help. 
Kind of develop their I am 

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strategy and we're meeting with 
people throughout the 

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organization. 
So we might be meeting with 

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somebody from the business 
continuity test Disaster, 

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Recovery side or logging, or you
name it, any other part of 

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eyeteeth. 
Pmo. 

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And if folks aren't prepared or 
understand why I am might have 

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something to do with their area 
or their area might have 

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something to do with, I am the 
last question. 

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It's like why are you asking 
these questions? 

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What we know, what is my what I 
do have to do with what you do? 

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And so I think that goes for a 
lot of parts of life, though, 

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right? 
I mean, you got to kind of set 

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the context. 
You got to kind of set the 

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Baseline and just, you know, I 
felt reminded of that today. 

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And that was, you know what I 
wanted to share? 

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Yeah, context is key in any in 
setting expectations for any 

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conversation you and I were part
of that same conversation and 

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Hopefully, I brought it back to 
try and rescue kind of where 

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things were going but you know, 
I think trick in full 

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transparency. 
It wasn't a great start but we 

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figured it out. 
Yeah, well, I mean, it's 

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something we've run into many 
times over many years or so it's

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something that, you know, I 
mean, it's it never goes away. 

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I used to call it, stump the 
chump because you get this, get 

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in a situation where, you know, 
you kind of feel like some of 

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those questions are Are you 
know, trying to get you rattled.

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It really kind of depends on 
the, you know, how aggressive 

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the the person gets in terms of 
white. 

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Why are you asking these 
questions? 

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But I think for the most part 
people are just trying to 

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understand like why do you need 
to know this information? 

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Because we're all kind of 
Guardians of the information 

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that were responsible for and 
you don't want to just give out 

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your give out that information 
willy-nilly we especially if 

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it's secret to that business. 
Yeah. 

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Plus I'll so people don't want 
to waste their time. 

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Right. 
Why am I here was you know, 

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what's the point of this? 
This could have been an email 

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instead of a meeting, right? 
All that all that stuff, too. 

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So it goes with it. 
We also started something new 

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over the break. 
You want to talk about that? 

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Yeah, so it's idac identity at 
the center or idac dot live. 

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It's a YouTube streaming. 
Page, if you will, we're going 

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on once a week and we're 
streaming video, we've always 

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been resistant to doing video 
with the podcast. 

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And when you see the podcasts 
are when you see the video, 

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you'll know why that's probably 
true. 

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But I think it's interesting 
because we do the podcast and 

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it's more formal more 
structured. 

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So he's guess where it's the 
streamers issue and I and it's a

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little less structured. 
We pick something like an 

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article, we read. 
Recently and just share our 

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thoughts and our experiences 
relative to that or whatever 

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comes to mind and I think people
will like it as I think, you 

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know, I I follow a few podcast 
myself and, you know, 

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definitely, you know, you start 
down your podcast route based on

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what your interest areas are and
you want to, you know, hear what

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these experts in whatever field 
it is talk. 

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But after a while, it's The 
personalities and the Side 

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Tracks that keep you interested 
in it and if you like this 

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personality should keep coming 
back for more and hopefully, you

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know, people like our 
personalities and come back for 

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more with the with the stream. 
Yeah, it's fun. 

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I like it, it's it's different. 
We're still kind of figuring 

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out, I think format and length, 
and time. 

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And when to do it and things 
like that, but I like that it 

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gives us the opportunity to be 
more current with things. 

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And also, if you're watching 
Seeing the stream or even after 

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the fact, right? 
You can always comment and we 

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can engage in a conversation 
kind of real-time and answer 

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questions and get you know what,
what people give our two cents 

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on what it was there thinking, 
you know, we've we've done it a 

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couple times here so it's cool. 
You know, the why, the wild 

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Madman ramblings of Jim and 
Geoff when it comes to I am and 

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whatever else strikes our fancy 
for that particular day. 

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Absolutely. 
Well let's pivot this to where 

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we want to take this 
conversation because Speaking of

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like Smooth Transitions and the 
wild ramblings. 

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I feel like zero trust has been 
one of those for the last couple

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of years. 
It has not stopped. 

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It is, you know, gained steam 
over the last, I'd say really 

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the last year is when I've seen 
kind of a lot of growth in the 

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area. 
And we're very fortunate that 

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for our first guest to 2022. 
We've got Dan Jones, he's the 

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chief security officer at Banyan
security and he's also an 

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Advisory Board member with the 
identity defined security 

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Alliance. 
Welcome to The show Den. 

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Hey guys! 
Thank you very much for having 

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me and happy New Year. 
Everyone, it's great to be here.

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Yeah, happy New Year and I 
should also, I'm going to T, 

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something. 
We're going to talk about later.

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Also known as Urban punks. 
So we're going to get into what 

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that means a little bit later 
because I'm totally fascinated 

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by this. 
But before we get there, let's 

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talk a little bit about identity
and this being the first time he

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on the show, we always like to 
kind of find out what the 

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identity origin story is for 
somebody, whether it's Identity 

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or info suck at Large. 
Is it something that you chose 

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or did it choose you? 
How did you get into the space? 

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Well, I tell you so I was a 
young kid at College back in 

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Scotland, in the mid 90s and, 
you know, back then it was 

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pretty hard to get a job out of 
college. 

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So I of their a class members. 
I was the one person to go to 

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job and the first sheet of 
leaving college. 

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And I just happened to join a 
factory working in a small, it 

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team and my first job. 
Was I was going to be in the 

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vale admin a network admin 
server admin and email admin all

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of all of the above you know 
like all these smaller it teams.

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So my first identity gig was 
really working with NDS Novella 

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version 3.0 11. 
I think it was back in those 

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days. 
And so I'd say in desperation, I

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got the first job that came 
along so I kind of You have 

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picked me. 
I think what I just wanted a 

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job. 
So, worked hard there and, you 

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know, to start to learn more 
things. 

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So then it was really a 
jack-of-all-trades. 

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So I know you kind of had like 
that, it background. 

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What is it? 
That I guess what was the pivot 

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from managing? 
Like an IT infrastructure? 

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We like yeah. 
Give me infosec like, that's 

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what I want. 
I'm crazy. 

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Yeah, it was really bizarre. 
So I left that company. 

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Sometime done some contract, 
work and landed in Adobe back in

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there and brofist, European it 
team. 

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And then in 2001, move to the 
US. 

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And if anyone follows the Adobe 
history, we certainly had our 

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challenges from a security 
perspective and it's some point 

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as part of a huge investment, 
Adobe were making to try and, 

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you know, get on top of all all 
of their challenges, they 

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created a central it security 
team and I was part of that and 

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what I It was all of the 
directory and authentication 

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stuff all the privilege stuff. 
So I really everything was all 

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centered around the directory 
type Services because that's 

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that's what I had been doing for
pretty much 20-odd years. 

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So I knew even within Adobe, I'd
been in Adobe that point for 

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over 15 years. 
So I knew where the skeletons 

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were because I knew about 
privileged because I knew about 

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About how the server team ran 
their stuff, so privileged 

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identities on servers. 
I knew how we done a Social 

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Media stuff. 
I knew about our Banking and 

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Financial systems because I had 
led Services, they care to 

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those. 
So when you think of identity 

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identity is not just the regular
personal logs in and checks 

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email, right, there's privileged
identity, especially is where 

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you get into. 
It's not just an API account. 

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It's not just an engineer, it's 
all of, it's all of the above 

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and more. 
So yeah. 

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So that was a fascinating change
and you're not the first person 

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from Adobe, we've had on the 
show we had Eric Anderson on a 

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few months back. 
Last year I guess technically at

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this point and it was a great 
conversations I think it was 

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episode 91 if I if I remember 
correctly so courage people to 

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go back and check that out and 
also shout out to Eric because I

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had forgotten how good the 
struts were and based on our 

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conversation on that one. 
They totally, they owned my 

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Spotify listening habits for 
2021. 

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So, But I digress. 
So at this point, then you're 

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with Danny and security. 
What is Banyan security do? 

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Because you know, for people who
aren't as familiar with the 

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organization, I guess, what are?
You know, some of the issues or 

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challenges that you guys look to
solve? 

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Yeah, well, well, the first 
thing to clear up is we're not 

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the Banyan veins team. 
If you know anyone who's been in

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the industry long enough, will 
know, there was this old company

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called Banyan Vines II, never 
use their technology so I don't 

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really know too. 
It's about them, but I can tell 

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you about us which is, were 
small start-up in the zero trust

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space and we will get back to 
what do we mean by zero? 

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Trust, I guess soon but in the 
zero trust space I was a 

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customer of Banyan when I was at
Adobe. 

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Eric and I and our team we 
adopted by a platform early on, 

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we were really excited about it 
years later because I'd left 

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Adobe a few years. 
Then I rejoined but I joined 

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Banyan with really some 
enthusiasm because their 

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proposition in this space I 
think is pretty unique their 

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ability to get up and running 
really fast is brilliant. 

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It's a really customer great 
user experience, you know, user 

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experience friendly platform and
then one of the other things is 

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VPN or not to VPN, they not only
help you recognize and solve 

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that. 
That question but they will show

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you and help you understand 
where you are in your journey of

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zero trust which is really 
unique. 

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There's there's not a lot of 
players in the market that do 

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that. 
So I knew the co-founders from 

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working with them before in 
Adobe and you know, they reached

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out they wanted to bring in some
people who'd had practitioner 

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experience. 
So me having led the team, Adobe

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to deploy, zero trust, then led 
the team at Cisco. 

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I'm uniquely position to talk. 
About the scars and the war 

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wounds of actually delivering 
zero trust and how did you pull 

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that off? 
So it's an exciting thing. 

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The good thing is I'm not a big 
fan of salespeople, so I don't 

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mean to disparage on them but 
they're not. 

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My favorite type of people to 
engage with. 

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So one thing that we've got 
which is really cool, you don't 

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need to talk to her sales team, 
you can just go to Banyan 

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security dot IO and you can take
this test drive and for a small 

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team it's actually my teams 
Edition which is free and you 

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can get Running in 15 minutes so
you can you can get started and 

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it's pretty cool. 
So I don't want to do the sales 

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pitch. 
That's really not my job. 

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I don't want to be a sales guy 
so I'll let people go figure 

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00:13:07,600 --> 00:13:10,300
that out for themselves and you 
know they'll find out who call 

226
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the sales team if they want 
that. 

227
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Tim love, the origin story is 
kind of a blast from the past. 

228
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Think about the directory days 
because I think if you're 

229
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involved in, I am and account 
security, you know, 15, 20 years

230
00:13:26,100 --> 00:13:31,000
ago, it was all about ldap, it 
was all about Netscape directory

231
00:13:31,000 --> 00:13:35,400
or sun directory or even active 
directory, which was kind of 

232
00:13:35,400 --> 00:13:40,100
the, you know, it was frowned 
upon and in this establishment 

233
00:13:40,100 --> 00:13:43,100
in terms of being a true 
directory. 

234
00:13:43,400 --> 00:13:46,800
It's interesting. 
Today how much, how much more is

235
00:13:46,800 --> 00:13:50,700
looked at as the de facto 
directory standard or maybe not 

236
00:13:50,700 --> 00:13:55,700
the standard, but at least the 
standard-bearer it's, I am also 

237
00:13:55,700 --> 00:13:59,700
glad that you brought up the 
Banyan bind speech because I do 

238
00:13:59,700 --> 00:14:02,000
think I'm going to go on a limb 
here, Jeff. 

239
00:14:02,200 --> 00:14:06,600
And because we had one guess to 
part of their origin story, was 

240
00:14:06,800 --> 00:14:10,000
they were a banyan, binds 
administrator and I think it was

241
00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:15,100
Jackson Shaw episode 52. 
Back in July of 2020. 

242
00:14:15,900 --> 00:14:17,900
So I'm going to go back and 
listen to that. 

243
00:14:18,100 --> 00:14:21,500
I think it was him. 
If I got that wrong, it's my 

244
00:14:21,500 --> 00:14:25,300
bad. 
But yeah, you don't really run 

245
00:14:25,300 --> 00:14:29,100
into that many folks who are, 
you know, have banging binds in 

246
00:14:29,100 --> 00:14:32,300
their origin story. 
Yeah, I don't know for sure when

247
00:14:32,300 --> 00:14:35,600
it was, I'll be honest, but it's
old school. 

248
00:14:35,900 --> 00:14:39,900
I a, I think a banyan I think of
Steve Banyan from well, that's 

249
00:14:39,900 --> 00:14:40,500
different. 
Steve, Daniel. 

250
00:14:40,500 --> 00:14:43,200
But I think of Banyan from 
Seinfeld. 

251
00:14:43,700 --> 00:14:46,800
So that's just me. 
Yeah. 

252
00:14:46,900 --> 00:14:51,200
That's that's funny. 
So but so we're going to talk 

253
00:14:51,200 --> 00:14:54,600
today about zero trust and I'm 
not sure if you've heard of it, 

254
00:14:55,100 --> 00:15:01,500
but if you have you know, maybe 
you could give give us a. 

255
00:15:01,500 --> 00:15:03,900
What is your definition of zero 
trust. 

256
00:15:03,900 --> 00:15:07,200
What does it really mean to you?
Is it a product or is it 

257
00:15:08,400 --> 00:15:11,900
something something more? 
Yeah, that's it. 

258
00:15:12,300 --> 00:15:14,900
It's a great question. 
I always say people if you get 

259
00:15:15,100 --> 00:15:18,100
20 people in the room and you 
ask them what zero trust is, 

260
00:15:18,100 --> 00:15:22,600
you'll get 25 answers and I 
still think after all these 

261
00:15:22,600 --> 00:15:26,200
years you can go, you can go 
back to the junk in the rug 

262
00:15:26,200 --> 00:15:28,900
days, wherein photo store, you 
know, he's got the paper out and

263
00:15:28,900 --> 00:15:33,100
says what it is, you can go 
before that where you talk about

264
00:15:34,600 --> 00:15:37,900
the government US Government 
defense, where the they have 

265
00:15:37,900 --> 00:15:41,400
their views on that and then 
you've got Google's Beyond Corp,

266
00:15:41,700 --> 00:15:45,300
I kind of look at it. 
Like Is an architecture is a 

267
00:15:45,300 --> 00:15:49,000
principle. 
Is it, you know, an ideal 

268
00:15:49,000 --> 00:15:53,300
ideology. 
The reality for me is I sum this

269
00:15:53,300 --> 00:15:58,500
up really simply is I try and 
see it away from the terror now,

270
00:15:58,900 --> 00:16:01,100
because I really want to focus 
on the outcome. 

271
00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:04,100
I think so many people get 
wrapped up in what they mean by 

272
00:16:04,100 --> 00:16:08,100
zero trust that they forget what
actually here to run a business.

273
00:16:08,600 --> 00:16:12,000
And the biggest part of the 
outcome is the way the identity 

274
00:16:12,000 --> 00:16:15,600
industry is moved far. 
Or word years ago. 

275
00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:17,600
I needed to know. 
It was Dan, it was going to 

276
00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:20,100
access the app. 
So I put in a username and 

277
00:16:20,100 --> 00:16:24,400
password and there was no 
thought of trust, given to the 

278
00:16:24,400 --> 00:16:25,800
network. 
You are on. 

279
00:16:26,200 --> 00:16:30,200
So that whole idea of you've got
your firewall, and if you're 

280
00:16:30,200 --> 00:16:32,200
inside the corporate Network, 
you're good. 

281
00:16:32,500 --> 00:16:35,700
Well, that I think is obviously 
evolved over the years. 

282
00:16:35,700 --> 00:16:37,600
The way we're being attacked by 
bad, guys. 

283
00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:40,900
So, I just kind of look at this.
Like it's a bit of an 

284
00:16:40,900 --> 00:16:46,400
Eeveelution of how we access. 
And services taking into account

285
00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:49,400
that the networks and the 
environments were coming from, 

286
00:16:49,700 --> 00:16:51,800
have a totally different level 
of trust. 

287
00:16:52,100 --> 00:16:55,300
So what we're really trying to 
do now is establish a better 

288
00:16:55,300 --> 00:16:59,200
level of trust and in some cases
when you get more mature, you 

289
00:16:59,200 --> 00:17:03,100
might talk about that trust 
level might be more Dynamic, 

290
00:17:03,200 --> 00:17:04,200
right? 
I don't know. 

291
00:17:04,200 --> 00:17:08,500
The type of app I'm going to the
kind of role I have the kind of 

292
00:17:08,500 --> 00:17:11,000
device, I'm from the country, 
I'm from. 

293
00:17:11,300 --> 00:17:14,700
So when I think of this is no 
longer Simply am I in the 

294
00:17:14,700 --> 00:17:18,599
network on my corporate computer
where I just go straight to the 

295
00:17:18,599 --> 00:17:21,800
app internally? 
Well, we've evolved, we've got 

296
00:17:21,800 --> 00:17:25,099
so many more Cloud apps will get
so many traveling Workforce, 

297
00:17:25,400 --> 00:17:28,500
especially when the recent years
with all the work from home, 

298
00:17:28,800 --> 00:17:32,600
then that's totally changed our 
concept or our thinking on a 

299
00:17:32,600 --> 00:17:36,400
what this but how we're being 
attacked, you know, we're no 

300
00:17:36,400 --> 00:17:38,200
longer being Brute, Force 
attack. 

301
00:17:38,200 --> 00:17:40,000
Let me break your firewall and 
get in. 

302
00:17:40,300 --> 00:17:43,600
We're being here's an email. 
Just click this link and All of 

303
00:17:43,600 --> 00:17:47,400
a sudden the Bad actors on your 
device with your credentials. 

304
00:17:47,900 --> 00:17:51,800
So you know for me it's it's a 
different mindset. 

305
00:17:51,900 --> 00:17:55,400
I just see this though as an 
evolution of what we've really 

306
00:17:55,400 --> 00:17:58,400
been trying to do in the 
industry on guaranteeing that 

307
00:17:58,400 --> 00:18:01,700
it's you and that it's not a bad
guy pretending to be you. 

308
00:18:03,300 --> 00:18:06,800
Yeah, I kind of feel like if you
were to put together degree 

309
00:18:06,800 --> 00:18:11,900
program in identity and access 
management zero trust, would 

310
00:18:11,900 --> 00:18:16,400
have to, at least be one of the 
one of the courses and for me 

311
00:18:16,400 --> 00:18:22,400
required reading would be the 
newest paper. 800-218-4243 

312
00:18:23,900 --> 00:18:27,200
starco texture. 
It's it's heavy, right? 

313
00:18:27,200 --> 00:18:30,000
That's kind of putting it in 
that University context, a lot 

314
00:18:30,000 --> 00:18:33,000
of reading, but it's good 
reading, right? 

315
00:18:33,100 --> 00:18:37,000
I think if you really want to 
understand your trust and kind 

316
00:18:37,000 --> 00:18:40,100
of build a footing in it, it's a
good place to start. 

317
00:18:41,400 --> 00:18:45,000
I think the other thing is how 
to talk about zero trust because

318
00:18:45,000 --> 00:18:48,400
there's the selling process 
within the organization, right? 

319
00:18:50,500 --> 00:18:53,900
The first time I heard of zero 
trust you know, it did cross my 

320
00:18:53,900 --> 00:18:57,500
mind, what you don't trust me. 
And I kind of always feel like 

321
00:18:57,500 --> 00:19:02,000
when we talk about zero trust 
you, somebody who's not an I am 

322
00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:05,900
lifer or security lifer, that's 
probably the impression that 

323
00:19:05,900 --> 00:19:07,500
they get what you don't trust 
me. 

324
00:19:08,700 --> 00:19:11,700
What do you think of that? 
Kind of selling processor zero, 

325
00:19:11,700 --> 00:19:14,800
trust from C? 
So perspective, are you have to 

326
00:19:15,100 --> 00:19:20,100
talk to non non information 
security? 

327
00:19:20,300 --> 00:19:24,900
Nerds like us and make them 
understand what it is and why 

328
00:19:24,900 --> 00:19:27,400
it's important. 
And so how do you do, how do you

329
00:19:27,400 --> 00:19:31,100
do that and get past that those 
kind of hurdles? 

330
00:19:31,700 --> 00:19:37,100
Yeah and there's three main 
audience is, you know, so I was 

331
00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:41,400
in Adobe it was a uniquely 
different experience because the

332
00:19:41,400 --> 00:19:44,800
term zero trust wasn't as 
mainstream as it is now. 

333
00:19:45,200 --> 00:19:48,100
So we're going back to late 
2017. 

334
00:19:50,200 --> 00:19:55,300
And the, the way I phrased this 
and I was blessed either. 

335
00:19:55,300 --> 00:20:00,100
Good, architect was in our team 
that really was hit my head off 

336
00:20:00,100 --> 00:20:02,000
a wall. 
Saying, hey, we should look at 

337
00:20:02,000 --> 00:20:03,000
this. 
We should do this. 

338
00:20:03,000 --> 00:20:06,200
It wasn't my brainchild and 
Adobe to start the program off. 

339
00:20:07,100 --> 00:20:11,200
I think re-architect Benzie 
John, he was hit my head off a 

340
00:20:11,200 --> 00:20:13,500
wall thing, but but look think 
of this thing. 

341
00:20:13,700 --> 00:20:17,500
So it started with him selling 
it to me and he was selling it 

342
00:20:17,500 --> 00:20:22,400
to me, really a technical level 
But then an emotional level and 

343
00:20:22,400 --> 00:20:25,800
the first thing I thought of is 
okay, this thing actually would 

344
00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:29,500
be brilliant, totally, they 
don't know, I'm sold in the 

345
00:20:29,500 --> 00:20:31,800
principles of the easiest sales 
technique. 

346
00:20:31,800 --> 00:20:35,000
There's three audiences. 
There is the person that runs 

347
00:20:35,400 --> 00:20:38,100
it. 
There's a person I run security 

348
00:20:38,300 --> 00:20:42,100
and then there's your user base.
And if you start with your user 

349
00:20:42,100 --> 00:20:45,700
base and you turn around and 
say, would you like to never 

350
00:20:45,700 --> 00:20:48,200
have to enter your username and 
password again? 

351
00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:52,000
Right, I'd sounds like an easy 
question. 

352
00:20:52,300 --> 00:20:55,600
So, would you like to never have
to login via VPN again? 

353
00:20:56,300 --> 00:20:58,300
Okay, sounds like an easy 
question. 

354
00:20:58,700 --> 00:21:01,100
How about you never want to 
change your password every 90 

355
00:21:01,100 --> 00:21:04,500
days again? 
And that sounds like an easy 

356
00:21:04,500 --> 00:21:05,800
question. 
So if you got your user 

357
00:21:05,800 --> 00:21:07,900
community and you say, hey, do 
you want some of that? 

358
00:21:08,600 --> 00:21:13,700
That's easy. 
If you go to your CIO and their 

359
00:21:13,700 --> 00:21:18,100
leadership team, they are all 
about user experience in the 

360
00:21:18,100 --> 00:21:21,600
organization and that all about 
saving money, right? 

361
00:21:21,600 --> 00:21:25,900
Cios are under extreme pressure.
To reduce the operational cost. 

362
00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:29,300
So if you turn right into them 
and you would say, how would you

363
00:21:29,300 --> 00:21:32,200
like to reduce the service desk 
ticket? 

364
00:21:32,400 --> 00:21:35,600
Related to password change by 60
to 80%. 

365
00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:40,100
They're all over that if you 
would like to say to them or and

366
00:21:40,100 --> 00:21:43,000
how would you like to not have 
to have users change passwords 

367
00:21:43,300 --> 00:21:46,000
and user passwords? 
And, and when you tell them the 

368
00:21:46,000 --> 00:21:50,200
same thing, their eyes light up 
because they get it, and they 

369
00:21:50,200 --> 00:21:54,700
can translate that to soft 
dollar value that they can take 

370
00:21:54,700 --> 00:21:58,600
back to their leadership. 
Now, if you go to the, the 

371
00:21:58,600 --> 00:22:02,700
security leader, now, in those 
days, in Adobe, I was the Right 

372
00:22:02,700 --> 00:22:06,900
to reporting to their CSO. 
When I go to our CSO, an adult. 

373
00:22:06,900 --> 00:22:10,000
We I was like, hey, how would 
you like to improve security? 

374
00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:13,200
And these ways? 
Oh, and by the way, your peer, 

375
00:22:13,200 --> 00:22:17,600
the CIO, she'll reduce our cost 
by X y&z here. 

376
00:22:17,600 --> 00:22:23,700
Here and here, At that point, 
the security conversation is 

377
00:22:23,700 --> 00:22:26,200
really good. 
Would you like to improve 

378
00:22:26,200 --> 00:22:28,200
security? 
So, the bad guy is kind of 

379
00:22:28,200 --> 00:22:31,800
scraped passwords and we're 
doing more more male factor or 

380
00:22:31,800 --> 00:22:35,500
more Dynamic than to keishon. 
Would you like to remove the 

381
00:22:35,500 --> 00:22:39,000
ability for lateral movement? 
Would you like it so that when 

382
00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:43,800
you VPN the employee, who vpns 
and doesn't have full access to 

383
00:22:43,800 --> 00:22:46,700
the corporate Network? 
Because most companies when they

384
00:22:46,700 --> 00:22:52,300
build VPN Solutions They lock it
down for all these groups, but 

385
00:22:52,300 --> 00:22:55,200
generally, the full time 
employee Group, which is your 

386
00:22:55,200 --> 00:22:57,700
biggest group. 
They're not locked down. 

387
00:22:57,900 --> 00:23:02,000
They usually get full access 
because locking it down was very

388
00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:06,800
expensive, and very complicated 
and usually flawed anyway. 

389
00:23:07,300 --> 00:23:12,200
So when you tell these people, 
that all of a sudden these three

390
00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:16,500
audiences, they love with the 
here and you're not mentioning 

391
00:23:16,500 --> 00:23:19,900
zero trust because you don't 
have to say, Would you like some

392
00:23:19,900 --> 00:23:22,200
zero trust, especially nobody 
really agrees? 

393
00:23:22,200 --> 00:23:25,500
What zero trust us? 
Yeah, it's not like there's like

394
00:23:25,800 --> 00:23:28,900
an easy button right for it. 
So, so Dan, you sold me. 

395
00:23:28,900 --> 00:23:30,900
I don't want to change my 
password anymore. 

396
00:23:30,900 --> 00:23:32,400
I don't want to have to enter 
the one. 

397
00:23:32,400 --> 00:23:37,100
I do have as often now comes the
hard part, I think in a lot of 

398
00:23:37,100 --> 00:23:40,400
people's minds and that is where
do I even start? 

399
00:23:40,700 --> 00:23:44,100
I guess my question to you would
be how do I get started with 

400
00:23:44,100 --> 00:23:47,200
zero trust? 
And if you can kind of help me 

401
00:23:47,500 --> 00:23:49,100
understand that I think that 
would help a lot. 

402
00:23:49,300 --> 00:23:50,500
People out there. 
Yeah. 

403
00:23:50,500 --> 00:23:54,800
So there's there's people 
process technology but just from

404
00:23:54,800 --> 00:23:58,700
a you know, most of us are in 
the listeners are technologists,

405
00:23:58,700 --> 00:24:00,800
right? 
So let's talk about technology. 

406
00:24:01,400 --> 00:24:05,800
So I was in charge of the 
identity management of both 

407
00:24:05,800 --> 00:24:11,600
companies Adobe in Cisco, and 
you don't need to ask permission

408
00:24:12,400 --> 00:24:15,800
to improve the experience of the
authentication workflow. 

409
00:24:16,500 --> 00:24:19,800
So I started there, I said, 
well, wait a minute, I'll 

410
00:24:19,800 --> 00:24:25,900
improve the experience. 
We connected our alte platform 

411
00:24:25,900 --> 00:24:30,500
in Adobe to r0. 
Trust platform for posture 

412
00:24:30,500 --> 00:24:32,500
check. 
So, the very first thing we done

413
00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:36,300
with we do not really small 
pilot where we built these 

414
00:24:36,300 --> 00:24:39,700
little environment. 
You know, the pilot environment 

415
00:24:39,900 --> 00:24:43,700
and we took OCTA. 
And in those days, it was a 

416
00:24:43,700 --> 00:24:49,300
VMware, the IDM and Five, apm's 
for the reverse proxy and we 

417
00:24:49,300 --> 00:24:54,000
built these things together in a
small pilot to prove that we 

418
00:24:54,000 --> 00:24:59,400
could use a certificate instead 
of the password that we could do

419
00:24:59,400 --> 00:25:03,600
a posture check on the device 
and then we could seamlessly let

420
00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:08,200
you into our applications on the
network but only to the specific

421
00:25:08,200 --> 00:25:12,100
selected applications. 
So basically we were internet 

422
00:25:12,100 --> 00:25:14,900
enabling those apps. 
That was the kind of feel in 

423
00:25:14,900 --> 00:25:17,900
your giving. 
For someone who's on the device 

424
00:25:17,900 --> 00:25:21,900
which has the zero trust stuff. 
So in our case is zero trust off

425
00:25:21,900 --> 00:25:27,500
was, was it managed did have our
endpoint protection on it or we 

426
00:25:27,500 --> 00:25:30,800
look at the iOS version. 
Do you look at the patch version

427
00:25:31,300 --> 00:25:35,700
and your journey of zero trust? 
You know that that posture check

428
00:25:36,100 --> 00:25:38,900
can improve? 
We didn't start to off 

429
00:25:39,300 --> 00:25:43,400
complicated at all. 
It was latest OS and was it 

430
00:25:43,400 --> 00:25:46,900
managed and then with the 
endpoint protection, And our 

431
00:25:46,900 --> 00:25:50,800
certificate have our certificate
existed that was, you know, a 

432
00:25:50,800 --> 00:25:53,900
big thing because we use that to
hide the username and password. 

433
00:25:54,300 --> 00:25:58,600
So if you can inject into the 
authentication flow and then do 

434
00:25:58,600 --> 00:26:01,700
the posture check and then 
divert traffic. 

435
00:26:01,700 --> 00:26:04,900
If it's an internal app via your
proxy. 

436
00:26:05,300 --> 00:26:08,600
That's not a complicated 
architecture to build out. 

437
00:26:08,900 --> 00:26:13,000
We built our pilot environment 
in a couple of months and then 

438
00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:16,000
actually to expand that to a 
production friends. 

439
00:26:16,000 --> 00:26:19,600
And Family launch get some 
feedback that that for us in 

440
00:26:19,600 --> 00:26:25,500
Adobe was a seven-month project 
to go from concept to actual 

441
00:26:25,500 --> 00:26:30,000
fill go live with 40,000 users 
and along that Journey. 

442
00:26:30,500 --> 00:26:34,600
We were just testing out with 
larger groups but the 

443
00:26:34,600 --> 00:26:36,700
architecture wasn't very 
complicated. 

444
00:26:37,000 --> 00:26:39,800
So I think people that think how
do I get started? 

445
00:26:39,900 --> 00:26:41,600
I've heard all sorts of 
nonsense. 

446
00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:45,400
I've heard someone say asset 
management and it's like, what 

447
00:26:45,400 --> 00:26:46,900
do you mean asset? 
Judgment. 

448
00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:50,600
I don't think in 20 years I've 
ever heard of the cmdb ever been

449
00:26:50,600 --> 00:26:53,000
right? 
And asset management ever been 

450
00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:56,700
great, you know? 
So for me one thing I could do 

451
00:26:56,700 --> 00:27:01,400
though as I could say using our 
zero trust platform, we could 

452
00:27:01,400 --> 00:27:05,200
scrape the data of the, your 
device, and the fact you logged 

453
00:27:05,200 --> 00:27:07,700
in. 
And we can fair that we see you 

454
00:27:07,700 --> 00:27:11,100
every day on this laptop week, 
them fair that, that laptop is 

455
00:27:11,100 --> 00:27:15,300
there for yours or were tagging 
it to you and then then we'll 

456
00:27:15,300 --> 00:27:19,100
drop that in this. 
Cmdb and then and you would have

457
00:27:19,100 --> 00:27:23,400
heard Eric talked about this on 
your show how we gamified and we

458
00:27:23,400 --> 00:27:26,600
showed that devices. 
So if you logged into an 

459
00:27:26,600 --> 00:27:31,400
application from a device that 
had nothing like didn't have any

460
00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:33,300
of our zero trust. 
No end point. 

461
00:27:33,400 --> 00:27:37,200
We would throw it under your 
name on that portal and give you

462
00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:40,900
a flat zero. 
You've got really low score so 

463
00:27:40,900 --> 00:27:44,300
if I wanted my organization of a
good score then hey guys, I 

464
00:27:44,308 --> 00:27:47,700
better get to a position where 
that device Is managed because 

465
00:27:47,700 --> 00:27:51,600
any unmanaged device is a log in
to any of our apps from. 

466
00:27:52,000 --> 00:27:55,200
I'm going to get a bad score so 
you can scrape that information 

467
00:27:55,600 --> 00:27:57,600
and stuff. 
Like that was really cool. 

468
00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:00,500
Well I think of zero trust for 
me zero. 

469
00:28:00,500 --> 00:28:03,100
Trust says, I don't trust a 
device that doesn't have at 

470
00:28:03,100 --> 00:28:06,700
least three things that we 
wanted to have and we would 

471
00:28:06,700 --> 00:28:09,300
which grape that. 
And then you get to the position

472
00:28:09,300 --> 00:28:10,800
as well. 
We're within that. 

473
00:28:10,800 --> 00:28:15,300
Same thing that you built out, 
you could deny access to the 

474
00:28:15,300 --> 00:28:18,400
application. 
Even if you were zero trust 

475
00:28:18,400 --> 00:28:22,500
enabled meet in our minimum 
posture and that's the really 

476
00:28:22,500 --> 00:28:26,700
powerful piece. 
So I have a quick comment around

477
00:28:26,700 --> 00:28:32,500
gamification and I just this is 
my brilliant identity software. 

478
00:28:32,500 --> 00:28:36,700
Feature enhancement idea for 
2022 that I'd love to see 

479
00:28:36,700 --> 00:28:42,100
someone build and that is take 
the idea of Spotify unwrapped 

480
00:28:42,100 --> 00:28:44,900
right where it listens to your 
music history and kind of comes 

481
00:28:44,900 --> 00:28:47,100
in with, here's your things. 
Do the same thing for 

482
00:28:47,100 --> 00:28:51,200
authentication except gamify in 
a way was like, oh, you typed 

483
00:28:51,200 --> 00:28:54,300
your password in X number of 
times this year, or you took 

484
00:28:54,300 --> 00:28:57,000
advantage of x y z, you know, 
methods whatever. 

485
00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:59,100
Maybe that's how big of an 
identity nerd. 

486
00:28:59,100 --> 00:29:01,300
I am. 
And I'm sure that somewhere out 

487
00:29:01,300 --> 00:29:02,600
there. 
Someone wants to build something

488
00:29:02,600 --> 00:29:04,100
like that. 
Well, we were doing. 

489
00:29:04,600 --> 00:29:09,700
Yeah, in the Adobe team. 
So in 2001, we build a portal 

490
00:29:10,500 --> 00:29:14,500
myself and this one lowest notes
developer. 

491
00:29:14,500 --> 00:29:17,400
Believe It or Not, Eric. 
Talked about this poor old where

492
00:29:17,400 --> 00:29:20,100
we used to allow self-service 
for groups, right? 

493
00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:23,700
We done groups and password that
lipstick on the pig in front of 

494
00:29:23,700 --> 00:29:25,700
all these platforms that we had 
an adobe. 

495
00:29:26,100 --> 00:29:30,200
Well, myself, in this guy, 
venkatesh, we built this and 

496
00:29:30,200 --> 00:29:33,200
then the original version of it.
He built a Lotus Notes, front 

497
00:29:33,200 --> 00:29:37,700
end, and I had batch files at 
the back end, all going to 

498
00:29:37,700 --> 00:29:40,500
active directory and there's 
like net group, blah, blah, 

499
00:29:40,500 --> 00:29:42,300
blah. 
And so, we were, adding removing

500
00:29:42,300 --> 00:29:45,100
users from groups way back in 
2001. 

501
00:29:46,600 --> 00:29:50,600
And in, for me, I wanted to 
evolve that thing to where we 

502
00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:53,500
were going to be like, like a 
dynamic playlist. 

503
00:29:53,900 --> 00:29:57,600
So I remember Tallman your show,
talking about role-based access 

504
00:29:57,600 --> 00:30:00,700
control. 
And for me, I was never a fan of

505
00:30:00,700 --> 00:30:04,000
it because it never really, it 
was always expensive, right? 

506
00:30:04,100 --> 00:30:07,200
So I was like, well, why don't 
we create it that you as a user 

507
00:30:07,200 --> 00:30:10,500
could go in there and you could 
create rules, but you can create

508
00:30:10,500 --> 00:30:12,700
roles in the form of a dynamic 
playlist. 

509
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:16,000
Hey, if you didn't this org, 
you've got this title. 

510
00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:19,600
You get in this country, I want 
you to be in this group and this

511
00:30:19,600 --> 00:30:23,600
group has access to these things
and then all of a sudden we just

512
00:30:23,600 --> 00:30:28,200
do the look up every night and 
we'd start to see that and then 

513
00:30:28,200 --> 00:30:32,700
all you know you can't have no 
gamify it but you you make it 

514
00:30:32,700 --> 00:30:36,700
all self-service, my whole thing
in my career was I don't want to

515
00:30:36,700 --> 00:30:40,000
have to work really hard. 
I want to build things that 

516
00:30:40,000 --> 00:30:44,100
enable things to happen without 
being intrusive to our users, 

517
00:30:44,800 --> 00:30:47,300
and and sense. 
That makes me don't work so 

518
00:30:47,300 --> 00:30:50,300
hard. 
So Dan, one of the things that 

519
00:30:50,300 --> 00:30:52,300
crossed my mind? 
Well, first, I have to kind of 

520
00:30:52,300 --> 00:30:55,500
go back to the cmdb point 
because I just thought this is 

521
00:30:55,500 --> 00:30:58,700
funny Jeff. 
And I, we were during our stream

522
00:30:58,700 --> 00:31:03,900
this morning, you know, both in 
lockstep need to cmdb need, a 

523
00:31:03,900 --> 00:31:08,800
good asset inventory, right? 
I mean, but I think the point 

524
00:31:08,800 --> 00:31:11,700
that you're making, right, is 
you never seem to seem DP this 

525
00:31:11,700 --> 00:31:14,000
perfect. 
But have you ever seen a 

526
00:31:14,000 --> 00:31:18,800
non-existent cmdb or One that is
like such garbage that you can't

527
00:31:18,800 --> 00:31:22,000
even use as a starting point. 
That's the problem that I run 

528
00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:24,700
into a lot. 
And it's like you at least need 

529
00:31:24,700 --> 00:31:27,400
to know the basics of your 
environment. 

530
00:31:27,400 --> 00:31:31,800
Because how are you going to get
control of access to your 

531
00:31:31,800 --> 00:31:33,100
environment? 
If you don't know what your 

532
00:31:33,100 --> 00:31:35,300
environment is? 
Yeah. 

533
00:31:35,300 --> 00:31:36,000
Yeah, absolutely. 
No. 

534
00:31:36,008 --> 00:31:39,600
I've never seen one that's been 
so garbage that you've wanted to

535
00:31:39,600 --> 00:31:41,700
just throw it out and start all 
over again. 

536
00:31:42,600 --> 00:31:44,600
I've seen some fancy Excel 
sheets. 

537
00:31:46,300 --> 00:31:51,200
I remember really in the early 
days in Adobe we had before this

538
00:31:51,200 --> 00:31:54,700
is all automated. 
A lot of our networks were all 

539
00:31:54,700 --> 00:31:57,200
Excel sheets. 
I mean it was all, you know, 

540
00:31:57,200 --> 00:31:59,600
this huge big tables and tables 
and tables. 

541
00:32:00,700 --> 00:32:06,800
And in the end we we deployed 
you know, bmc's platform. 

542
00:32:06,800 --> 00:32:09,800
But we also deployed in four 
blocks his platform, we 

543
00:32:09,800 --> 00:32:12,700
integrated them. 
And then we go bmc's Network 

544
00:32:12,700 --> 00:32:16,000
automation technology. 
So that it was always bring that

545
00:32:16,100 --> 00:32:21,100
In and I think the principle is 
a good cmdb is something which 

546
00:32:21,100 --> 00:32:24,800
is derived via, you know, 
Discovery and automated means. 

547
00:32:25,100 --> 00:32:29,800
So if you're if you've got a 
nice, you know, is our Cloud 

548
00:32:29,800 --> 00:32:33,400
platform where you're building 
compute, you do have a choice to

549
00:32:33,400 --> 00:32:35,900
say, if I'm going to build a 
computer where it's only going 

550
00:32:35,900 --> 00:32:39,400
to last 15 minutes. 
However, going to record that 

551
00:32:39,400 --> 00:32:43,500
thing existed for 15 minutes and
then was pulled down like these 

552
00:32:43,500 --> 00:32:45,900
kind of decisions. 
I think where you get into the 

553
00:32:45,900 --> 00:32:52,200
net Nitty-gritty of it. 
But ultimately, I can look at 

554
00:32:52,200 --> 00:32:56,900
this, like, we have enough logs.
We've enough automated processes

555
00:32:57,300 --> 00:33:00,000
where it's not hard to put it 
together. 

556
00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:04,200
It's just about dedicating 
resources and time to kind of 

557
00:33:04,200 --> 00:33:07,400
make that effort. 
And, and, you know, a lot of 

558
00:33:07,408 --> 00:33:12,000
cios, they all talk about cmdb 
has been brilliant, but at the 

559
00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:14,100
end of it when they're really 
pressured about, where do they 

560
00:33:14,100 --> 00:33:16,000
put their money, they put their 
money on. 

561
00:33:16,100 --> 00:33:20,500
Things are very visible to the 
business and sometimes the cmdb 

562
00:33:20,600 --> 00:33:23,300
and he's back end Services. 
They're just not so visible. 

563
00:33:23,600 --> 00:33:26,700
So they don't really enjoy the 
same level of funding attention 

564
00:33:26,700 --> 00:33:31,100
and love that you really need to
have, you know, but that's life 

565
00:33:31,300 --> 00:33:32,900
Point. 
I've definitely seen that. 

566
00:33:34,100 --> 00:33:37,900
One other thing I wanted to 
mention about the selling 

567
00:33:37,900 --> 00:33:42,100
process of zero trust as I think
even people might start with the

568
00:33:42,108 --> 00:33:45,000
question, like well why do I 
need to see row trust that? 

569
00:33:45,000 --> 00:33:49,300
All right, what is Protecting me
from like, what is the benefit I

570
00:33:49,300 --> 00:33:53,200
get. 
And I think if you kind of 

571
00:33:53,900 --> 00:33:58,100
dissect a data breach or 
ransomware attack and you kind 

572
00:33:58,100 --> 00:34:01,900
of go through the parts and 
pieces of how somebody gets in 

573
00:34:01,900 --> 00:34:05,400
and then what they do from 
there, so you talked a lot about

574
00:34:05,400 --> 00:34:08,199
authentication, right? 
Which is the, how do they get in

575
00:34:08,500 --> 00:34:11,400
or, you know, but there's other 
ways that you can have a 

576
00:34:11,400 --> 00:34:14,699
ransomware attack which is 
somebody's machine, could be 

577
00:34:14,699 --> 00:34:17,800
compromised at a Starbucks. 
Buck's location or they're 

578
00:34:17,800 --> 00:34:23,400
working from home and click 
officially part of the, the 

579
00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:26,800
smart thing about ransomware 
containment is containment 

580
00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:30,400
right, making sure that that can
spread laterally. 

581
00:34:30,400 --> 00:34:33,699
And when we talked the other 
day, you brought up an idea, 

582
00:34:33,699 --> 00:34:36,600
which I hadn't thought of 
before, which was brilliant 

583
00:34:36,699 --> 00:34:39,300
around. 
You know, when you, you join the

584
00:34:39,300 --> 00:34:42,000
corporate, when you come on the 
corporate Network, right? 

585
00:34:42,000 --> 00:34:46,500
You're in your own little cell 
kind of like when you Go to a 

586
00:34:46,500 --> 00:34:51,800
Starbucks or something, you join
a public public Wi-Fi, right? 

587
00:34:51,800 --> 00:34:53,400
You're not. 
You shouldn't see the clients 

588
00:34:53,400 --> 00:34:57,300
who are our next to you also on 
that Wi-Fi, maybe you can, but 

589
00:34:57,300 --> 00:34:59,500
that would be a security flaw. 
All right. 

590
00:35:00,700 --> 00:35:04,700
It reminded me of, you know, 15,
20 years ago when you would go 

591
00:35:04,700 --> 00:35:09,100
on to corporate network with 
your Windows machine and you go 

592
00:35:09,100 --> 00:35:12,000
into Network Explorer and you 
see all these computers and all 

593
00:35:12,000 --> 00:35:14,600
these printers and you could 
just go and see what are they 

594
00:35:14,600 --> 00:35:18,500
sharing in a people? 
For oversharing potentially 

595
00:35:18,500 --> 00:35:22,400
could get into their file shares
and and do things, right? 

596
00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:24,500
I was kind of like a network 
guy. 

597
00:35:24,500 --> 00:35:29,300
So I was always goofing around 
like looking around and people 

598
00:35:29,400 --> 00:35:33,100
over share all the time and you 
know, I mean who could who could

599
00:35:33,100 --> 00:35:36,200
be completely aware of all the 
settings and what they're 

600
00:35:36,200 --> 00:35:39,200
sharing on their computer. 
But sorry, I wanted to turn it 

601
00:35:39,200 --> 00:35:42,300
over to you to kind of explain 
what your idea was around that 

602
00:35:42,300 --> 00:35:44,100
because I thought that was 
really interesting. 

603
00:35:44,500 --> 00:35:48,700
Yeah, this is so, One of the 
earliest things that I shared 

604
00:35:48,700 --> 00:35:52,000
with our CSO was, you know, what
do you wanna do, you want to? 

605
00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:55,700
And I put the word almost 
eliminate lateral movement 

606
00:35:56,100 --> 00:36:00,800
because in every big attack. 
The bad actor comes in, they get

607
00:36:00,800 --> 00:36:03,200
a machine. 
And from the machine, they start

608
00:36:03,200 --> 00:36:05,600
spreading out and they can 
spread out in seconds right 

609
00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:07,200
there. 
No, this isn't over months. 

610
00:36:07,200 --> 00:36:10,600
It's this, this they can be 
hiding for months, but they can 

611
00:36:10,600 --> 00:36:14,100
spread out over s. 
So, one of the things in that 

612
00:36:14,100 --> 00:36:18,700
concept was If you just look at 
Network segmentation and the 

613
00:36:18,707 --> 00:36:20,400
industry. 
So, first of all, a lot of 

614
00:36:20,400 --> 00:36:24,300
security people, a lot of their 
Origins are networks, so they 

615
00:36:24,300 --> 00:36:28,100
think of it like Network 
segmentation and firewalls solve

616
00:36:28,100 --> 00:36:31,700
all problems, right? 
Or most of our problems, I'd 

617
00:36:31,700 --> 00:36:34,900
like to expand on that little 
bit farther and say don't don't 

618
00:36:34,900 --> 00:36:37,600
necessarily disagree that they 
solve lots of problems. 

619
00:36:38,100 --> 00:36:41,800
But, if you take a network, you 
say, look, I've got a data 

620
00:36:41,800 --> 00:36:44,600
center. 
I've got a lab Network and I've 

621
00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:48,300
got an office Network. so just 
those three kind of based 

622
00:36:48,300 --> 00:36:53,400
Networks, To get from the office
Network to the data center. 

623
00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:56,900
Normally every good company with
a Bastion host and they should 

624
00:36:56,900 --> 00:36:58,900
require multi-factor 
authentication. 

625
00:36:59,100 --> 00:37:03,800
So there's some level of gate to
get in there and and lab 

626
00:37:03,800 --> 00:37:05,600
networks. 
You know, maybe they're a bit 

627
00:37:05,600 --> 00:37:08,700
twice eaten unique so they may 
have that they may not they 

628
00:37:08,700 --> 00:37:12,100
might be wide open to get to. 
But if they were then why would 

629
00:37:12,100 --> 00:37:14,200
you segment them off to begin 
with, right? 

630
00:37:14,500 --> 00:37:18,400
So the office Network, that's 
the one where the Massey's are 

631
00:37:18,900 --> 00:37:20,800
if you think of your privilege. 
Users. 

632
00:37:21,100 --> 00:37:24,900
They're usually always in the 
office Network before the get 

633
00:37:24,900 --> 00:37:28,300
privileged and go into, you 
know, their computer horse 

634
00:37:28,300 --> 00:37:31,900
bastions or whatever. 
But if you took that office 

635
00:37:31,900 --> 00:37:36,400
Network and you turn that into a
guest network and on all guests 

636
00:37:36,400 --> 00:37:40,000
networks Starbucks, for example,
is like a guest Network, all 

637
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:42,400
guest Network. 
So you've got the principle of 

638
00:37:42,500 --> 00:37:44,500
all I can do is get to the 
internet. 

639
00:37:45,000 --> 00:37:47,300
I can't see those arriving to 
me, right? 

640
00:37:47,600 --> 00:37:53,100
So if you do that, That to your 
office Network and your 

641
00:37:53,100 --> 00:37:56,900
applications and services at all
behind your zero trust platform.

642
00:37:57,100 --> 00:38:00,200
Then you're not VPN again to get
any white access. 

643
00:38:00,500 --> 00:38:03,600
The only thing you can do is 
connect to your zero, trust 

644
00:38:04,000 --> 00:38:08,000
available applications and you 
get to the app and nothing else 

645
00:38:08,100 --> 00:38:12,600
via that port and protocol and 
it guarantees, and ensures your 

646
00:38:12,600 --> 00:38:15,000
device meets a minimum security 
posture. 

647
00:38:15,500 --> 00:38:18,300
So, the problem with things like
ransomware and all this other 

648
00:38:18,300 --> 00:38:21,900
stuff, is it cancer? 
Right really quickly to things 

649
00:38:21,900 --> 00:38:25,400
you don't want and and it gets 
in really quickly because 

650
00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:30,700
usually the point of entry, is 
someone clicked a link and their

651
00:38:30,700 --> 00:38:33,300
endpoint security software, 
didn't catch it. 

652
00:38:33,900 --> 00:38:37,000
So do you have good endpoint? 
I don't know, like which one's 

653
00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:38,700
the best. 
I don't want to debate that but 

654
00:38:38,700 --> 00:38:42,900
the reality is is give yourself 
a Fighting Chance as an 

655
00:38:42,900 --> 00:38:47,400
organization by saying I will 
require that device have a good 

656
00:38:47,400 --> 00:38:52,700
awareness, be patched have good.
A software, good logging and 

657
00:38:52,700 --> 00:38:55,900
require multi-factor. 
You know at least a basic 

658
00:38:55,900 --> 00:38:57,700
hygiene that we know is all 
goodness. 

659
00:38:58,200 --> 00:39:03,000
So the problem is is 
traditionally before zero trust 

660
00:39:03,000 --> 00:39:06,200
before what we were building, it
was just username and password 

661
00:39:06,200 --> 00:39:09,600
regardless of the device posture
and it was on a network that was

662
00:39:09,600 --> 00:39:13,000
wide open. 
So if I can see for a thousand 

663
00:39:13,000 --> 00:39:17,400
devices inside a corporate 
Network like Adobe or Cisco or 

664
00:39:17,800 --> 00:39:21,500
whatever, right then that means 
A doctor, once they're in they 

665
00:39:21,500 --> 00:39:27,300
can spread that far that far 
that fast usually in those 

666
00:39:27,300 --> 00:39:32,300
Networks you're going to find 
devices evading stay of quality 

667
00:39:32,600 --> 00:39:36,000
of security posture. 
So me you're gonna have a, 

668
00:39:36,700 --> 00:39:39,400
you're going to come in on the 
one machine, you're going to 

669
00:39:39,400 --> 00:39:45,200
scan, whatever you can scan, you
know, in the lateral way. 

670
00:39:45,500 --> 00:39:50,900
And then if you can find another
device and in fact it Take over 

671
00:39:50,900 --> 00:39:55,000
that device, use whatever 
authentic, whatever accounts 

672
00:39:55,000 --> 00:39:59,000
have been, authenticator hashes 
exist on that computer and then 

673
00:39:59,300 --> 00:40:02,100
we play that until you get to 
the point where eventually, you 

674
00:40:02,100 --> 00:40:05,600
can own the active directory and
then it's game over, right? 

675
00:40:05,600 --> 00:40:08,000
That's when you pay the big 
Ransom, whatever. 

676
00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:10,900
It's going to take because your 
company's been brought to its 

677
00:40:10,900 --> 00:40:14,000
knees. 
But interesting, one thing I 

678
00:40:14,008 --> 00:40:16,200
wanted to key off of the you 
talk about their, she talked 

679
00:40:16,200 --> 00:40:19,100
about corporate networks, I 
haven't been on a corporate 

680
00:40:19,100 --> 00:40:22,400
Network and Two years, right? 
I haven't gone into an office in

681
00:40:22,400 --> 00:40:27,900
two years, but I VPN in and I'm 
wondering, you know, I learned a

682
00:40:27,900 --> 00:40:34,900
lot about ztn a over the past 
two years, you know, especially 

683
00:40:34,900 --> 00:40:38,000
over this past year and I'm 
wondering, is that the Next 

684
00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:41,600
Generation for VPN is VPN going 
to the go the way of the 

685
00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:46,300
dinosaur? 
Is that the TLs instead of HTTP?

686
00:40:48,900 --> 00:40:50,000
If you're following what I'm 
here? 

687
00:40:50,300 --> 00:40:55,000
Yeah, so it's great. 
Great quite so I great question 

688
00:40:55,700 --> 00:41:00,400
when I've done a lot of 
presentations. 2018 onwards on 

689
00:41:00,400 --> 00:41:04,500
on our zero, trust efforts over 
the years, both the Adobe stuff 

690
00:41:04,500 --> 00:41:08,000
on The Cisco stuff. 
And most of the questions that 

691
00:41:08,000 --> 00:41:13,900
people gave me were, is this a 
VPN replacement project? 

692
00:41:13,900 --> 00:41:16,800
Or did you justify the funding 
for your zero? 

693
00:41:16,800 --> 00:41:20,600
Trust by using funding from VPN 
in an Cases. 

694
00:41:20,600 --> 00:41:29,100
I said no there's there's a 
place for VPN and I never used 

695
00:41:29,100 --> 00:41:32,400
the funding for it. 
Why did use though was the 

696
00:41:32,400 --> 00:41:35,200
luxury of saying? 
Hey we're going to deploy this 

697
00:41:35,200 --> 00:41:38,100
zero trust thing and if ever 
this thing doesn't work you can 

698
00:41:38,100 --> 00:41:40,800
still use a VPN stuff. 
We're not taking that away just 

699
00:41:40,800 --> 00:41:46,200
now and then over the course of 
the maturity of your efforts you

700
00:41:46,200 --> 00:41:48,100
get to decide. 
Are you going to reduce the 

701
00:41:48,100 --> 00:41:54,700
investment and VPN One of one of
the things that people really 

702
00:41:54,700 --> 00:41:58,200
struggle with on any zero trust 
initiative, where they're trying

703
00:41:58,200 --> 00:42:04,100
to reduce the VPN usage is 
understanding the VPN stuff and 

704
00:42:04,100 --> 00:42:06,500
you know what activities 
happening over there VPN 

705
00:42:06,500 --> 00:42:08,800
network. 
I would always just say to 

706
00:42:08,800 --> 00:42:12,300
people. 
There's a lot of players in the 

707
00:42:12,308 --> 00:42:14,500
market. 
One thing I love about what 

708
00:42:14,500 --> 00:42:17,100
we're doing is we enable that 
visibility. 

709
00:42:17,400 --> 00:42:20,000
We actually do have a VPN 
solution as well. 

710
00:42:20,200 --> 00:42:24,000
So we do, we do acknowledge that
you might not be comfortable 

711
00:42:24,000 --> 00:42:29,400
taking VPN away, there may be 
usages for that but we use that 

712
00:42:29,400 --> 00:42:33,100
to our advantage as part of your
journey, I look at it. 

713
00:42:33,100 --> 00:42:39,200
Like there's vpns are usually 
wide open to your network with 

714
00:42:39,200 --> 00:42:43,400
any port and protocol. 
Well our proposition is with 

715
00:42:43,400 --> 00:42:47,900
zero, trust deployments is to 
say, it's only that application 

716
00:42:47,900 --> 00:42:50,000
and only that Port protocol that
you need. 

717
00:42:50,100 --> 00:42:53,800
Need to get to the application 
and you don't get to the rest of

718
00:42:53,800 --> 00:42:56,500
the stuff inside. 
Get ecosystem, which from a 

719
00:42:56,508 --> 00:43:00,400
security perspective is huge. 
And from a user experience 

720
00:43:00,400 --> 00:43:04,800
perspective is huge because you 
don't know where the app is. 

721
00:43:04,800 --> 00:43:07,800
You don't need to know where the
app is and you're not VPN again.

722
00:43:08,800 --> 00:43:14,400
I think the first scenario is 
less administrative effort. 

723
00:43:14,800 --> 00:43:17,600
You can just have access to 
everything, the others more 

724
00:43:17,600 --> 00:43:23,000
administrative effort by much. 
Secure you know, the last 

725
00:43:23,100 --> 00:43:26,800
question I went to kind of hit 
on relative to zero. 

726
00:43:26,800 --> 00:43:30,000
Trust was you were talking about
how much money you can see for 

727
00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:33,400
passwords and sticky from the 
CEO, I'm thinking to myself, I 

728
00:43:33,408 --> 00:43:35,300
don't want to spend anything on 
passwords. 

729
00:43:35,300 --> 00:43:39,100
It's like you came to my house 
and said you know, I could put 

730
00:43:39,100 --> 00:43:42,300
it in a new well and it's like 
already have a well I don't want

731
00:43:42,300 --> 00:43:47,000
to spend money on that but just 
thinking of. 

732
00:43:47,300 --> 00:43:49,800
So another words where I was 
going with that is like I'd 

733
00:43:49,800 --> 00:43:52,100
rather. 
Ergo password less, you know, 

734
00:43:52,107 --> 00:43:55,800
you talked about, you know, the 
days of people trying to Brute 

735
00:43:55,800 --> 00:43:58,800
Force passwords is over, but 
people are still trying to use 

736
00:43:58,800 --> 00:44:03,800
the password as a way, as 
probably the most common way to 

737
00:44:03,800 --> 00:44:07,800
start a ransomware attack or at 
least a data breach or any way 

738
00:44:07,800 --> 00:44:11,500
to infiltrate a network or an 
application is through a stolen 

739
00:44:11,500 --> 00:44:15,400
password or you know, commonly 
use password things like that, 

740
00:44:15,800 --> 00:44:20,000
go to possession based 
authentication to me seems like 

741
00:44:20,200 --> 00:44:23,800
It's a critical component of 
zero trial straight. 

742
00:44:23,800 --> 00:44:27,200
It's a it's your level of 
assurance that the person is who

743
00:44:27,200 --> 00:44:31,900
they say they are of course much
more by going past from this, 

744
00:44:32,100 --> 00:44:33,300
would you? 
Yeah. 

745
00:44:33,500 --> 00:44:34,600
Yeah. 
Absolutely. 

746
00:44:34,700 --> 00:44:38,700
Now I'd love to come by to one 
point, you mentioned on the VPN 

747
00:44:38,700 --> 00:44:42,300
and the cost of administration. 
One thing to think of in the ztn

748
00:44:42,300 --> 00:44:45,800
platform zero trust. 
Environment is you're not 

749
00:44:45,800 --> 00:44:49,600
worried about the network 
articles and all that business. 

750
00:44:49,600 --> 00:44:52,500
So there's Nothing of that. 
It's a few two members of the 

751
00:44:52,500 --> 00:44:54,600
group that has access to the 
application. 

752
00:44:54,900 --> 00:44:58,500
So it's really just by nature of
you being in the directory 

753
00:44:58,500 --> 00:45:00,900
group, you get access to the 
app. 

754
00:45:00,900 --> 00:45:04,600
So there's absolutely zero 
Administration from a VPN 

755
00:45:04,600 --> 00:45:08,800
equivalent, which is a great 
cost saver from an operational 

756
00:45:08,800 --> 00:45:13,200
perspective from a password list
perspective, I've been trying to

757
00:45:13,207 --> 00:45:18,200
go password list since about 
2011. 

758
00:45:18,200 --> 00:45:23,500
I think I wrote a way, Paper 
internally to do, be working 

759
00:45:23,500 --> 00:45:28,800
with PWC, just own identity 
strategies and in this idea of 

760
00:45:28,808 --> 00:45:31,800
being able to go password list 
was just, you know, always 

761
00:45:31,800 --> 00:45:37,500
intriguing to me because, yeah, 
look, we always just write the 

762
00:45:37,500 --> 00:45:40,200
same crap down on a Post-It 
note, you know, back then. 

763
00:45:40,200 --> 00:45:42,300
And you'd be like, password, and
then it's like, okay. 

764
00:45:42,300 --> 00:45:45,500
But you got to change your 
password 10 times, you know, or 

765
00:45:45,500 --> 00:45:48,800
like every so often. 
But you can't reuse the last 10.

766
00:45:49,100 --> 00:45:53,500
So you're paying the The 1 or a 
2 and a 3 and you said it's 

767
00:45:53,500 --> 00:45:56,500
always the same format, we're 
human, we're not, we're not that

768
00:45:56,500 --> 00:45:59,400
creative. 
If we use a password manager, 

769
00:45:59,400 --> 00:46:03,700
now that's brilliant. 
But from a corporate perspective

770
00:46:03,700 --> 00:46:07,800
and this was great in Adobe, we 
used to give password managers 

771
00:46:07,800 --> 00:46:11,400
out as part of, you know, just 
being an employee. 

772
00:46:12,400 --> 00:46:14,400
But at some point we ended up 
saying, look, we're not going to

773
00:46:14,400 --> 00:46:17,600
pay for this anymore. 
We'll arrange a discount and 

774
00:46:17,600 --> 00:46:23,400
here's a discount code because 
Corporate ways we had over 2,000

775
00:46:23,400 --> 00:46:29,100
applications tighter opta 
platform all requiring MFA so 

776
00:46:29,100 --> 00:46:32,900
when we use certificates as part
of that first factor or not 

777
00:46:32,900 --> 00:46:36,100
password we're like what's that 
password manager doing within 

778
00:46:36,100 --> 00:46:40,000
our corporate really not much in
your home like you may still 

779
00:46:40,000 --> 00:46:42,500
have hundreds of things because 
they're not easily tied like 

780
00:46:42,500 --> 00:46:46,000
that. 
But the desire to go password 

781
00:46:46,000 --> 00:46:48,900
list is if I'm not entering a 
password. 

782
00:46:48,900 --> 00:46:52,600
I've nothing for a bad day. 
Actor to scrape and that's a big

783
00:46:52,600 --> 00:46:54,500
thing, right? 
So for us, it's like, it's 

784
00:46:54,500 --> 00:46:58,800
changing the security posture at
the same time as it's changing 

785
00:46:58,800 --> 00:47:02,100
that user experience. 
I think that's the key part of 

786
00:47:02,100 --> 00:47:04,700
password list, right? 
Is removing that, that hash that

787
00:47:04,700 --> 00:47:07,700
can't be compromised. 
Yeah, we've covered a lot of 

788
00:47:07,700 --> 00:47:11,900
ground on the Zero trusting and 
it's, you can see why people are

789
00:47:11,900 --> 00:47:15,200
confused over it, just on this 
conversation alone, sometimes 

790
00:47:15,200 --> 00:47:19,300
where it's sprawl. 
So much of the infrastructure 

791
00:47:19,700 --> 00:47:23,100
and The network and the internet
and all the different things 

792
00:47:23,100 --> 00:47:27,100
that are out there which leads 
me to my last question for you 

793
00:47:27,100 --> 00:47:29,700
done. 
And that is what is good enough?

794
00:47:29,700 --> 00:47:33,800
Look like 40 trust in the year 
2022 because I feel like 

795
00:47:33,800 --> 00:47:36,600
sometimes we get lost and say, 
oh, you need to have the latest 

796
00:47:36,600 --> 00:47:39,500
and greatest all the bells and 
whistles and you're never truly 

797
00:47:39,500 --> 00:47:41,300
done. 
But I think about this from a 

798
00:47:41,308 --> 00:47:44,400
more pragmatic perspective is, 
okay, how do I get to good 

799
00:47:44,400 --> 00:47:45,700
enough? 
Because this is not the only 

800
00:47:45,700 --> 00:47:47,800
fire as a sea so that I need to 
fight. 

801
00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:49,900
Yeah, I know that's a brilliant 
question, Jeff. 

802
00:47:50,000 --> 00:47:53,600
And it's funny, right? 
So, my both of my team is but my

803
00:47:53,600 --> 00:47:56,300
Adobe leadership team that I 
worked with for years. 

804
00:47:56,300 --> 00:48:00,100
Great, great, great team. 
But they would give me so much 

805
00:48:00,100 --> 00:48:03,400
grief because I'd use a term 
good enough all the time and 

806
00:48:03,400 --> 00:48:06,900
they're like, if I told the 
organization had good enough, 

807
00:48:06,900 --> 00:48:10,700
they're thinking that I'm 
loading my standards and it's 

808
00:48:10,700 --> 00:48:13,300
like no I don't want to lower 
the standards, I want to 

809
00:48:13,300 --> 00:48:16,000
recognize that we have other 
things, I don't think are good 

810
00:48:16,000 --> 00:48:18,400
enough. 
So let's get this to good enough

811
00:48:18,400 --> 00:48:21,600
and then decide how far You want
to take it, right? 

812
00:48:21,700 --> 00:48:27,000
So, good enough, if you haven't 
taken any steps and zero trust, 

813
00:48:27,000 --> 00:48:30,800
I want to say look, it's easy. 
You're not having to bring in a 

814
00:48:30,808 --> 00:48:34,200
million players. 
I need one person to my staff 

815
00:48:34,200 --> 00:48:38,400
and Adobe we use the existing 
team that does the existing 

816
00:48:38,400 --> 00:48:41,700
endpoint, the existing Network 
that exists, all the existing 

817
00:48:41,700 --> 00:48:45,300
people, you know, they're just 
working together and the good 

818
00:48:45,300 --> 00:48:49,900
enough for me was get them 
working together, get a small. 

819
00:48:50,000 --> 00:48:53,200
Pilot going and then expand the 
pilot into production. 

820
00:48:53,200 --> 00:48:56,900
And the first thing you want to 
really do, say, can we do a 

821
00:48:56,900 --> 00:49:00,900
posture check as part of the 
authentication from? 

822
00:49:00,900 --> 00:49:05,400
If can we get to the internal 
applications via a reverse proxy

823
00:49:05,400 --> 00:49:09,900
or some other capability? 
And if you can, if you can get 

824
00:49:09,900 --> 00:49:14,100
to a position where you can see,
let's let's do those things. 

825
00:49:14,100 --> 00:49:17,800
Then for me, that that be a 
great accomplishment, as you go 

826
00:49:17,800 --> 00:49:22,800
through your year, you get to 
Further, you know, the network 

827
00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:26,100
concept of turning your network 
and two guest Network or if 

828
00:49:26,100 --> 00:49:30,000
you're doing an m&a try not 
connecting their Network to 

829
00:49:30,000 --> 00:49:32,700
yours and have the things that 
that company needs. 

830
00:49:32,700 --> 00:49:35,600
Those people needs available via
zero trust zero. 

831
00:49:35,600 --> 00:49:38,800
Trust enabled their devices we 
done that in Adobe a couple of 

832
00:49:38,800 --> 00:49:45,100
times and it worked a charm. 
I would just say you know take 

833
00:49:45,100 --> 00:49:49,000
one step forward every day that 
gets you in a position where you

834
00:49:49,008 --> 00:49:50,800
would a little bit better. 
Better off than you were 

835
00:49:50,800 --> 00:49:53,100
yesterday. 
One of the big things that 

836
00:49:53,100 --> 00:49:56,200
people get hung up on and they 
don't take a step forward is 

837
00:49:56,200 --> 00:49:59,100
because it's not perfect. 
So, good enough for me, is a 

838
00:49:59,100 --> 00:50:02,600
brilliant term because it simply
means I want to be better today 

839
00:50:02,600 --> 00:50:05,800
than I was yesterday. 
And I want to recognize that 

840
00:50:05,800 --> 00:50:08,400
this week, I might Focus here. 
And next week, you might focus 

841
00:50:08,400 --> 00:50:11,300
on security intelligence or 
something else. 

842
00:50:12,500 --> 00:50:16,900
It's okay to get smarter, right?
What is he doing? 

843
00:50:17,700 --> 00:50:19,700
Sorry, good sorry. 
I was just going to say look we 

844
00:50:19,700 --> 00:50:24,200
don't have enough money and 
resources as Enterprises to do 

845
00:50:24,200 --> 00:50:27,700
all the things you want to do. 
So you have to be really smart 

846
00:50:27,700 --> 00:50:31,500
and pick your battles wisely and
just know, you know, not try and

847
00:50:31,500 --> 00:50:33,400
boil the ocean on Everything You
Touch. 

848
00:50:34,400 --> 00:50:37,000
So I know that we normally would
do like predictions at the end 

849
00:50:37,000 --> 00:50:38,700
of the year, so it, but we're 
weird. 

850
00:50:38,700 --> 00:50:40,700
And we're going to start with, 
or at the beginning of the year 

851
00:50:41,400 --> 00:50:43,600
real quickly, because I know 
we're running short on time. 

852
00:50:43,700 --> 00:50:47,900
Is what is zero trust? 
Good enough look like next year 

853
00:50:48,100 --> 00:50:51,900
in 2023 of table Stakes right 
now, in your mind is being able 

854
00:50:51,900 --> 00:50:56,000
to do that posture check, what 
should I be planning for as 

855
00:50:56,000 --> 00:50:59,700
table Stakes for next year? 
I would say, you know, 

856
00:50:59,700 --> 00:51:03,500
especially as people will return
to the office figuring out how 

857
00:51:03,500 --> 00:51:06,200
to start. 
Learning office networks and two

858
00:51:06,200 --> 00:51:10,700
guest networks and, you know, 
allow listing core services that

859
00:51:10,700 --> 00:51:14,800
you just couldn't zero trust and
able and and for everything else

860
00:51:14,800 --> 00:51:19,500
have users, just go to the 
internet to get any internal 

861
00:51:19,500 --> 00:51:22,900
Services acknowledging that you 
have a blend of internal and 

862
00:51:22,900 --> 00:51:24,700
very likely, a lot of cloud 
services. 

863
00:51:25,100 --> 00:51:27,800
You can do that. 
That would be that because 

864
00:51:27,800 --> 00:51:29,800
ransomware is not slowing down, 
right? 

865
00:51:30,200 --> 00:51:34,100
And that's something that can 
really help save and reduce the 

866
00:51:34,100 --> 00:51:36,500
Impact of any, you know, 
ransomware attack. 

867
00:51:37,500 --> 00:51:40,500
That makes sense. 
So let's it's--this at the 

868
00:51:40,500 --> 00:51:43,800
beginning of the of the show. 
When I mention Urban punks. 

869
00:51:44,300 --> 00:51:49,100
So who / what is urban Punk's 
dead? 

870
00:51:51,100 --> 00:51:51,900
Yeah. 
It's brilliant. 

871
00:51:51,900 --> 00:51:54,900
You don't link link to the I 
guess I left sitting in there 

872
00:51:54,900 --> 00:51:57,200
that, you know, co-founder of 
our Urban Punk's. 

873
00:51:57,200 --> 00:52:03,000
Not for we originally, Urban 
punks was my idea where I've got

874
00:52:03,000 --> 00:52:07,200
a big musical background and I 
just had the idea. 

875
00:52:07,300 --> 00:52:11,400
I wanted to get a collective of 
producers together and we would 

876
00:52:11,900 --> 00:52:17,000
collaborate on every song that 
we released, but I got really 

877
00:52:17,000 --> 00:52:20,900
busy in this work business so I 
never got to get the other 

878
00:52:20,900 --> 00:52:23,300
people together. 
So Arbonne Punk's is just one. 

879
00:52:23,300 --> 00:52:28,600
Punk is to still just me where I
over the years, I've released 

880
00:52:28,600 --> 00:52:32,000
music under many names are Ben 
Punk's was the the most recent 

881
00:52:32,000 --> 00:52:35,300
one that I've used. 
I'd been releasing music since 

882
00:52:35,300 --> 00:52:40,000
94 released my first First 
single on vinyl hoping everyone 

883
00:52:40,000 --> 00:52:43,400
remembers what vinyl is because 
it's making a huge comeback. 

884
00:52:43,400 --> 00:52:45,600
I say it, it's the new rage 
right now again like yeah it's 

885
00:52:45,600 --> 00:52:48,800
right up there, a bell bottoms. 
Yeah, yeah, is right. 

886
00:52:48,800 --> 00:52:53,400
So I was fortunate enough to get
a record deal in my early 20s 

887
00:52:54,100 --> 00:52:59,000
played gigs release Records Was 
a ghost ghost writer for other 

888
00:52:59,000 --> 00:53:03,600
bands and DJs so, you know, I 
done I don't know a lot of that 

889
00:53:03,600 --> 00:53:07,200
stuff in my mid-20s and then 
when I moved to the u.s. in, 

890
00:53:07,300 --> 00:53:11,600
One, I continue to do it, but 
just know as not know, I 

891
00:53:11,600 --> 00:53:15,300
successfully or not as busy I 
guess, because I was focused on 

892
00:53:15,300 --> 00:53:19,600
this, it career. 
So the type of music, you know, 

893
00:53:19,600 --> 00:53:22,400
you were kind enough to share 
kind of the SoundCloud with it 

894
00:53:22,400 --> 00:53:27,300
and is I guess electronic dance 
music but I don't want to over 

895
00:53:27,300 --> 00:53:29,300
generalize it. 
How would you describe your 

896
00:53:29,300 --> 00:53:31,700
music to someone's like, okay, 
what the heck? 

897
00:53:31,700 --> 00:53:35,800
What the heck am I listening to?
Yeah, I mean it's it's 

898
00:53:35,800 --> 00:53:41,400
electronic. 
It's based on sense and that 

899
00:53:41,400 --> 00:53:46,200
style of gear, you'll not find 
much in the way of a guitar and 

900
00:53:46,200 --> 00:53:48,900
a saxophone in my music. 
But sometimes I've been known to

901
00:53:48,908 --> 00:53:53,900
drop them in there and, and, you
know, I try to think that it was

902
00:53:53,900 --> 00:53:58,900
house techno trance, but I never
seem to think I faii easily in 

903
00:53:58,900 --> 00:54:02,900
any of those genres. 
So, I try not to label it. 

904
00:54:02,900 --> 00:54:06,400
It's a hobby, it's fun. 
You know, and I'm trying to not 

905
00:54:06,400 --> 00:54:12,100
like, Pressure on myself to try 
and like get the next top 40 hit

906
00:54:12,100 --> 00:54:14,400
I guess although that would be 
nice. 

907
00:54:16,000 --> 00:54:20,200
So I guess you've been kind of, 
we're actually going to play one

908
00:54:20,200 --> 00:54:23,000
of your songs. 
I'm going to append it to the 

909
00:54:23,000 --> 00:54:25,000
end of the show here, so people 
will check it out. 

910
00:54:25,100 --> 00:54:28,400
It's a track called gee, I 
guess, tell me what the 

911
00:54:28,400 --> 00:54:33,500
inspiration for that is, well, 
it's funny because all the names

912
00:54:33,500 --> 00:54:36,700
of the songs is kind of like, 
going back to the days where I 

913
00:54:36,700 --> 00:54:39,100
was sharing earlier, you know, 
naming servers, when I was 

914
00:54:39,100 --> 00:54:41,900
building servers. 
I could never think of a name. 

915
00:54:41,900 --> 00:54:44,100
I could build this error quicker
than I could think of the name 

916
00:54:44,100 --> 00:54:50,000
for this Arbor So usually I'm 
pulling names from famous 

917
00:54:50,200 --> 00:54:55,200
actresses, actors TV, movie 
characters and things like that.

918
00:54:55,200 --> 00:54:58,400
So randomly these names just pop
up. 

919
00:54:58,700 --> 00:55:00,800
I guess, I don't really know 
where they come from. 

920
00:55:01,300 --> 00:55:05,200
Usually with enough of the 
right, the right liquid 

921
00:55:05,200 --> 00:55:07,600
refreshment. 
Then you can come up with some 

922
00:55:07,600 --> 00:55:12,300
creative names that is known to 
been to be truth, the world 

923
00:55:12,300 --> 00:55:13,800
over. 
All right, well, I think that's 

924
00:55:13,800 --> 00:55:18,400
a pretty good spot to leave it. 
It for this week real quickly. 

925
00:55:18,400 --> 00:55:22,900
Any final thoughts Den on the 
topic of zero trust or or 

926
00:55:22,900 --> 00:55:24,400
anything. 
That's kind of spark at your 

927
00:55:24,400 --> 00:55:27,500
brain right now that people 
should be taking away from this 

928
00:55:27,500 --> 00:55:30,600
specific conversation. 
I mean I yeah I mean I think 

929
00:55:31,500 --> 00:55:35,400
well first of all zero trust is 
going to continue to be a huge 

930
00:55:35,400 --> 00:55:39,600
Buzz board and probably become 
mind-numbingly boring as a term,

931
00:55:40,200 --> 00:55:43,000
I really just say focus on the 
outcomes. 

932
00:55:43,500 --> 00:55:46,500
Don't focus on the term, focus 
on the Outcomes and focus on 

933
00:55:46,500 --> 00:55:51,100
that business value and find a 
way to connect with the 

934
00:55:51,100 --> 00:55:54,300
leadership above you and the the
customers around you. 

935
00:55:54,300 --> 00:55:57,000
Because if you can get connected
there without emotional level, 

936
00:55:57,500 --> 00:55:59,500
then you'll find that they want 
those outcomes. 

937
00:56:00,900 --> 00:56:01,900
Jim. 
How about yourself? 

938
00:56:04,200 --> 00:56:09,100
Well, something that I think Dan
just kind of touched on very 

939
00:56:09,100 --> 00:56:14,400
briefly, which is around, you 
know, the idea that we want to 

940
00:56:14,400 --> 00:56:19,400
invest in something that's 
something that can be seen or 

941
00:56:19,400 --> 00:56:24,100
felt or, you know, I think in it
a lot, it's the user experience,

942
00:56:24,300 --> 00:56:26,000
right? 
It's improvements to the user 

943
00:56:26,000 --> 00:56:29,700
experience, so even if that's 
most of the money is going in 

944
00:56:29,700 --> 00:56:33,300
behind the scenes, if you can, 
you know, remove somebody's 

945
00:56:33,300 --> 00:56:36,700
ability. 
Or requirement to put in a 

946
00:56:36,700 --> 00:56:39,300
password, you can improve 
security, but also improve the 

947
00:56:39,300 --> 00:56:42,500
user experience. 
So I know that in our past 

948
00:56:42,500 --> 00:56:44,900
conversation, when you hit on it
too much on the call today, but 

949
00:56:44,900 --> 00:56:48,400
in our conversation previously, 
with then we talked quite a bit 

950
00:56:48,400 --> 00:56:52,500
of a lot about that. 
And I think that ought to be 

951
00:56:52,500 --> 00:56:57,300
kind of a minor take away that 
people tie that user experiences

952
00:56:57,300 --> 00:57:01,900
way to sell something like zero 
trust, or the parts and 

953
00:57:01,900 --> 00:57:04,600
components of a zero. 
Trust are Architecture. 

954
00:57:05,900 --> 00:57:08,500
I don't care how good your 
product is, if it sucks to use, 

955
00:57:08,500 --> 00:57:12,100
no one wants it. 
So and very I was going to say 

956
00:57:12,100 --> 00:57:15,100
Jeff from very rarely in your 
career do you get a chance to 

957
00:57:15,100 --> 00:57:18,200
improve the user experience and 
improve security. 

958
00:57:18,900 --> 00:57:22,200
This is one of those rare things
where you get to do both. 

959
00:57:22,600 --> 00:57:24,200
Yep. 
This is why I like the, I am 

960
00:57:24,200 --> 00:57:27,000
space. 
It's the opportunity to fix 

961
00:57:27,600 --> 00:57:31,900
process through the proper 
application of people, process 

962
00:57:31,900 --> 00:57:34,400
and technology. 
So, how's that for a nerd speak?

963
00:57:35,000 --> 00:57:37,800
All right, so I think we'll go 
ahead and leave it for this 

964
00:57:37,800 --> 00:57:39,600
week. 
You could learn more about 

965
00:57:39,600 --> 00:57:43,200
Banyan security at Banyan 
security dot IO. 

966
00:57:43,200 --> 00:57:47,700
It's be a ñ, ÿ åý, ñ security. 
.I o if you want to learn more 

967
00:57:47,700 --> 00:57:51,400
about us and the show we're at 
idac podcast.com and you can 

968
00:57:51,400 --> 00:57:56,400
follow us on Twitter at idac 
podcast and come on, check out 

969
00:57:56,400 --> 00:57:59,000
our YouTube show that we're 
doing weekly. 

970
00:57:59,100 --> 00:58:02,400
It's idea CDOT live, that'll 
take you right to our YouTube 

971
00:58:02,400 --> 00:58:05,600
channel. 
Again, kind of a A work in 

972
00:58:05,600 --> 00:58:08,000
progress as we work through it. 
But hope to see more and more 

973
00:58:08,000 --> 00:58:11,200
people kind of attending live 
and continue the conversation 

974
00:58:11,500 --> 00:58:14,100
with that. 
So, rather than our normal 

975
00:58:14,100 --> 00:58:17,600
clothes out, I'm going to 
through the power of audio 

976
00:58:17,600 --> 00:58:22,300
editing, insert Urban punks and 
a track called Gia. 

977
00:58:22,300 --> 00:58:24,700
So thank you all for listening 
and here's that, 

978
01:03:45,100 --> 01:03:48,000
Thanks for listening to the 
identity at the center podcast. 

979
01:03:48,100 --> 01:03:50,400
If you like what you heard, 
don't forget to subscribe and 

980
01:03:50,400 --> 01:03:53,500
visit us on the web and identity
at the center.com.