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This is identity at the center. 
Welcome to the Identity of the 

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Center podcast. 
I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. 

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Hey, Jim. 
Hey, Jeff, how are you? 

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Oh, not so bad yourself. 
Doing great. 

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Well, mind if I start? 
To smile. 

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Something's up. 
Yeah, Go ahead. 

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Rant away, man. 
This is this is your time. 

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All right, my problem is with 
password less. 

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That truly isn't password less. 
There's damn password behind the

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scenes and it's actually this to
me, this is like exactly why 

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NIST said don't make people 
change passwords every three or 

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four months. 
Because when this stuff kind of 

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props up and you haven't been 
using your password, what are 

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you going to do? 
You're going to pick the 

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simplest password. 
You're going to write it down 

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and put it in like a notepad 
file somewhere so that on the 

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off chance once every three 
months where it says, hey, you 

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set up, I don't recognize this 
device. 

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You know, we're going to play a 
safe put in your password. 

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I don't remember my password. 
First off, it was like 852 

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characters long with all kinds 
of different special characters.

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I don't remember. 
And then you go through the 

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password reset and then every 
time you type in the password, 

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for some reason it doesn't match
the the policy. 

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Oh, sorry, that wasn't 862 
characters long. 

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Or maybe it looks like a word 
and our smart software picked 

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up. 
We're going to prove it. 

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Then after the three tries, I 
feel sorry. 

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You must be some kind of 
scammer. 

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Start over, call the help desk 
like it's actually, if you're 

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going to set up a process like 
that, it's worse than actually 

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having passwords. 
Yeah. 

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So Grant. 
So this rant brought to you by 

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Jim's new iPad, which we're 
recording slightly out of order.

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So I think it's like the next 
episode or maybe it's the 

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episode after that I remember 
where it's the one with Tobin S 

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that we're going to have come 
out where we talk about AI. 

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And Jim, you had started off 
that show saying you got the 

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iPad in the mail and it was in a
box. 

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You haven't like unboxed it at 
that point yet. 

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And so now we're a day later and
I'm guessing most of your 

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problems are because of trying 
to set up your iPad, am I right?

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Yeah, well, OK, make your props 
to Apple, because you set up the

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Apple and then it's like, OK, 
just hold your phone somewhere 

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close to this new device and 
we're going to bring over 

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everything you've ever had. 
My God, that's like such a 

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beautiful experience. 
Now don't forget if you ever 

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have to set up your Apple ID and
forget your password. 

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I haven't done that in a long 
time, but my goodness is that a 

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nightmare. 
It's passwords, Jeff. 

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Passwords are hell. 
They are. 

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I mean, nobody likes them. 
You, you know, this, this 

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example you just gave is a 
perfect example of the pain that

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people go through whenever they 
get a new device. 

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It's the same thing every time. 
You know, I, I have a bit Warden

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password wallet that has like 
1000 passwords in it. 

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I don't even remember them 
anymore. 

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I just automatically my, my, my 
workflow is just OK, create a 

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pass phrase, get it into bit 
Warden and then I'm never going 

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to remember it. 
And then just use that going for

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it. 
So I don't know any of my 

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passwords except for the 1 to 
get into bit warden. 

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That's it. 
Yeah, well, I mean I. 

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Definitely can't lose that way 
because I lose that I obscured. 

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Then you have access to nothing.
It's like you don't exist. 

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Death in the Digital Estate has 
just caught up with you. 

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You know, and that's probably 
something we should talk to that

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group about because, yeah, what 
happens if all your credentials 

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are stored in something like 
that? 

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Can you set up like a legacy 
contact somewhere? 

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It's like, I think like Facebook
does something like that where 

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if your your digital credentials
can pass on to your next of kin 

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or maybe just start putting that
into your into your will is, you

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know, I bequeath my bit warden 
wallet and all associated 

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information to my wife. 
Good luck. 

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Yeah, yeah, No, I also got AI 
got a thumb drive, you know, 

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basically a a password key. 
And I, you know, before I used 

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to think that was such a great 
idea, you attached it to your 

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keys. 
But the only thing I know that I

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have with me almost at all times
except when I'm sleeping is my 

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phone. 
I don't always have my keys on 

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me, I don't always have my 
leather wallet on me, but I 

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always have my phone. 
So I I continue to think that 

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the phone is the best form 
factor for me and probably for 

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most people. 
It's ubiquitous. 

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I think, you know, the phone is 
obviously there. 

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You've got watch, right? 
That could be another option, 

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still kind of pricey or a ring. 
There are a variety of things I 

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would love to see, you know, 
more of like a, I don't know if 

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it would be Apple, but a smart 
ring that actually has, you 

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know, some of those biometric 
authentication capabilities 

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rather than just measuring my 
heartbeat. 

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And you know, my terrible sleep 
was last night because I was so 

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excited to talk with our guest 
today about fraud. 

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Well, then we should get into 
that. 

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What do you think? 
Yeah, why don't we do it? 

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Because if you've read the title
of the show, which you probably 

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did, it's we're going to talk 
about fraud reduction and the 

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intelligence platforms going 
with it. 

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So I want to welcome back to the
show John Tolbert. 

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He's the director of 
cybersecurity research at 

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Cooper, your coal analyst. 
So welcome back to the show, 

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John. 
Thanks, nice to be back. 

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Good to talk to you guys again. 
So we were prepping the other 

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day and I was absolutely, and I 
don't use this word lightly, 

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flabbergasted that it's been 4 
years since we've had you on. 

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We actually had you back on 
almost back-to-back, which kind 

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of these days is kind of unheard
of. 

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It's November and December of 
2021. 

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We talked about customer or 
consumer identity and access 

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management. 
We talked about fraud reduction.

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And here we are 4 short years 
later talking to you again 

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around again, fraud reduction 
intelligence platforms. 

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We did see each other in Berlin 
earlier this year at the Coomer 

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Coal conference. 
That was kind of cool. 

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So maybe that's why it felt like
it was more recent. 

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But man, we can't, we can't have
another four years go by without

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a, without a dose of John 
Tolbert on this show. 

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I'm just going to say that right
now. 

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Sounds good to me, so why? 
Don't we catch up a little bit 

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here? 
It's been 4 years. 

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What's new? 
We already did your origin 

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story, so I'll encourage people 
to kind of go back, but maybe 

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you can kind of fill in this 
timeline gap in the Identity at 

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the Center cinematic universe of
2021 to now. 

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What have you been up to? 
Well. 

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As the life of the analyst 
dictates, we do a lot of 

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research, talk to a lot of 
customers, vendors and look at 

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what's new out there in the 
field, try to figure out what 

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trends are worth reporting on, 
and just to try to educate our 

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readers. 
So I've covered a number of 

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different subjects. 
Of course, I have been doing CIA

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for going on 10 years now, fraud
reduction for at least six or 

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seven I think. 
Then I also have covered XDRNDR,

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tax service management, a bunch 
of different cybersecurity 

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reports, as well as now we're 
keeping our eyes on things like 

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NHIS and agentic AI and topics 
that are emerging. 

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And, you know, everybody wants 
to know how can you secure these

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things? 
John, you just dropped alphabet 

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soup on us, OK. 
And by the way, that is OK 

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because that's the industry 
we're in is you got an acronym 

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for everything. 
But we do have some blisters who

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are newer to the space. 
So you mentioned CIAM, let's 

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start there. 
What is that and what makes that

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special? 
Well, you know, I had been for 

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the majority of the last 10 
years sort of calling it 

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customer slash consumer and also
it can encompass citizen 

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identity and access management. 
But you know I'm working on that

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report actually today the CIM 
report and I'm going to go back 

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and call this one consumer 
because I'm really going to 

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focus on B to C business to 
consumer interactions. 

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I'm doing a follow up report to 
that early next year around B to

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BCIM, which it's about business 
to business. 

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Because you know, I think over 
the last couple of years both 

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the requirements that we see 
businesses leveraging on vendors

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have changed and now the vendors
are trying to meet all those 

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requirements. 
And and I think that's good, but

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they're diverging quite a bit, 
as you can imagine, because the 

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use cases are different. 
Yeah, I'm glad you. 

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I'm really started there 
because, and I'm glad you 

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pointed out the citizen angle 
because I was going to say what 

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is CIA customer identity and 
access management, but that 

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citizen angle is interesting as 
well. 

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I, I think what's different is 
compare and contrast that to 

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kind of workforce identity and 
you know, fraud within the 

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workforce for sure. 
But when I think of like fraud 

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related to identity and access 
management, it's usually that 

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external use cases, folks who 
are, you know, outside of the 

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organization are trying to 
commit fraud through external 

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facing application, customer or 
citizen facing applications. 

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And there's this space now 
within my identity called fraud 

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reduction intelligence 
platforms. 

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And that's interesting because I
kind of feel like the the, the 

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only reason they put the word 
intelligence in there is because

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they needed a vowel. 
You correct me if I'm wrong, 

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right, but fraud reduction 
platform would have been good 

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enough, but that wouldn't have 
made a, you know, a word. 

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So correct me if I'm wrong, but 
just kind of walk us through 

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like, what is the space all 
about? 

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What? 
What is FRIPP? 

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So I usually define it as a set 
of capabilities. 

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There are six major kinds of 
capabilities that you need in a 

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fraud reduction Intel platform. 
First off would be identity 

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verification, which is something
that we all know and love. 

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Then device intelligence, you 
know, knowing about the device 

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that let's say a request or a 
login attempt is originating 

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from. 
And there's a ton of information

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that's available on devices that
usually gets pulled through 

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SDKS, software development kits 
or JavaScript. 

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And that can be everything from 
like the the device type. 

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Maybe it has a specific device 
fingerprint, you know, IP 

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address, location information, 
device posture check, you know, 

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can you tell whether or not it's
has, let's say an anti malware 

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program on it or is it 
exhibiting signs of a malware 

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infection? 
So all this intelligence can be 

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evaluated by a trip. 
Then we have compromise 

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credential intelligence. 
This is using information 

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sources from the dark and deep 
web about whether or not a 

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credential has been breached and
made available out there. 

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Or maybe if you're using shared 
signals, you might be aware of 

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an attempt to use a compromise 
credential, you know, in the 

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recent past and then maybe that 
presents on your website. 

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We'd like to raise the risk flag
on that. 

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Then we have user behavioral 
analysis and that can get, you 

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know, pretty in depth depending 
on the platform you're looking 

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at. 
You can look at transaction 

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amounts, transaction history, 
locations where transactions may

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have originated. 
Is this sort of in line with 

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other types of transactions a 
person who's made in the past? 

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So there's a lot of information 
that potentially could be 

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evaluated by a fraud reduction 
Intel platform just on the user 

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behavioral analysis part. 
Then there's behavioral 

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biometrics, which is, you know, 
how you interact with your 

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devices could be typing cadence,
or how you use a mouse on a 

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desktop or laptop, and then how 
you hold and interact with your 

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phone, touch screen pressure, 
and then bot detection and bot 

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management. 
And behavioral biometrics 

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generally inform bot detection, 
but there are also other methods

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for trying to figure out whether
or not a session is being 

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initiated and controlled by bot.
You know, so I kind of feel like

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you talked about like the six 
different areas and they're all 

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kind of related, but all kind of
different. 

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And I kind of feel like 
sometimes we have to, the 

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analysts like yourself have to 
create a space and include all 

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these things because if you 
don't, you'd have too many 

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spaces. 
So you create 1 space and, but 

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00:13:08,080 --> 00:13:11,480
most vendors like, correct me if
I'm wrong here, they, they maybe

228
00:13:11,680 --> 00:13:15,400
tackle one or two of these 
things, but then they'll tackle 

229
00:13:15,680 --> 00:13:17,240
the whole space. 
Or am I wrong? 

230
00:13:17,520 --> 00:13:21,800
Well, there's kind of a a wide 
range of solutions here. 

231
00:13:22,080 --> 00:13:26,360
There are point solutions, let's
say behavioral biometrics is 

232
00:13:26,360 --> 00:13:29,320
good with there are several 
companies that specialize in 

233
00:13:29,320 --> 00:13:32,680
that and they do a really, 
really good job at that. 

234
00:13:33,920 --> 00:13:38,560
They may license their 
technology or OEM it into other 

235
00:13:38,560 --> 00:13:40,960
platforms. 
Then we see that can be pretty 

236
00:13:40,960 --> 00:13:43,880
common as well. 
But yeah, there are quite a 

237
00:13:43,880 --> 00:13:46,080
number of different solutions 
out there. 

238
00:13:46,080 --> 00:13:51,720
This time around, I think we had
close to 25 that do multiple of 

239
00:13:51,720 --> 00:13:56,480
these categories of intelligence
gathering and processing. 

240
00:13:57,520 --> 00:14:01,320
You mentioned the identity 
verification, which we all know 

241
00:14:01,320 --> 00:14:04,560
and love is what you said. 
And I kind of I smirked when you

242
00:14:04,560 --> 00:14:09,400
said that because actually I do 
feel like the space is getting 

243
00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:12,640
better. 
When I say the word better, I'm 

244
00:14:12,640 --> 00:14:14,880
thinking from a usability 
perspective. 

245
00:14:15,360 --> 00:14:19,320
I've had some instances in the 
past where I went to use that 

246
00:14:19,320 --> 00:14:22,000
any verification and couldn't be
verified. 

247
00:14:22,000 --> 00:14:24,800
And I'm like, what the heck, I'm
me. 

248
00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:29,400
Like I'm not committing a fraud.
Why is this saying you can't, 

249
00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:31,960
you can't Now I don't run into 
that as much. 

250
00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:34,960
And I don't know if the 
technology has improved or 

251
00:14:34,960 --> 00:14:40,960
they've, you know, widened the 
lane in terms of kind of letting

252
00:14:41,160 --> 00:14:45,840
more iffy connections go or what
it is. 

253
00:14:45,840 --> 00:14:47,640
What what's your perspective on 
that? 

254
00:14:47,640 --> 00:14:50,840
Is the space getting better? 
Is the tech getting better? 

255
00:14:52,200 --> 00:14:53,960
I think it is getting a lot 
better. 

256
00:14:53,960 --> 00:14:56,240
It's it's certainly more 
accepted. 

257
00:14:56,240 --> 00:15:00,480
I think we've seen it, you know,
it really started probably 

258
00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:05,240
mostly in like the government to
citizen interactions or in 

259
00:15:05,240 --> 00:15:09,400
finance, you know, because you 
want a strong or higher level of

260
00:15:09,400 --> 00:15:12,320
identity assurance. 
And then of course, the pandemic

261
00:15:12,320 --> 00:15:15,600
came along and made it hard for 
people to maybe go do some of 

262
00:15:15,600 --> 00:15:18,280
these things in person. 
So that's when we really started

263
00:15:18,280 --> 00:15:21,000
to see these remote onboarding 
apps proliferate. 

264
00:15:21,960 --> 00:15:26,600
And I, I do believe they've 
gotten quite a bit better. 

265
00:15:26,600 --> 00:15:29,720
I mean, many of them incorporate
liveness detection, passive 

266
00:15:29,720 --> 00:15:32,640
liveness detection. 
Sometimes you might be asked to,

267
00:15:33,080 --> 00:15:36,280
you know, look in a certain 
direction or blink your eyes or 

268
00:15:36,280 --> 00:15:40,640
something like that to, to prove
that you're a real person and 

269
00:15:40,640 --> 00:15:45,800
you're not holding up a photo. 
But I think overall usability 

270
00:15:45,800 --> 00:15:49,160
has gotten better, too, because 
they've probably applied better 

271
00:15:49,160 --> 00:15:53,280
usability engineering studies to
getting the flow just right. 

272
00:15:53,760 --> 00:15:55,600
Yeah, we all occasionally do 
these things. 

273
00:15:55,600 --> 00:15:59,040
I did one recently and kind of 
encountered a hiccup in the 

274
00:15:59,040 --> 00:16:03,320
process too, but fortunately it 
was able to be resolved pretty 

275
00:16:03,320 --> 00:16:07,280
quickly. 
So yeah, I do think usability 

276
00:16:07,280 --> 00:16:10,640
has improved, security has 
improved, but at the same time, 

277
00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:14,000
this has become a major attack 
vector too. 

278
00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:16,000
So this is another major source 
of fraud. 

279
00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:22,680
You use the term capabilities 
that OK Fripp is 6 capabilities.

280
00:16:23,080 --> 00:16:27,480
I'm wondering about how these 
capabilities get delivered. 

281
00:16:27,800 --> 00:16:34,080
So do they tend to be products 
or say like a software as a 

282
00:16:34,080 --> 00:16:38,920
service solution where you have 
to do the technical 

283
00:16:38,920 --> 00:16:42,920
implementation support or is it 
like a fully outsourced service?

284
00:16:42,920 --> 00:16:46,880
So I'm thinking like an ADP 
versus a work day. 

285
00:16:47,200 --> 00:16:50,320
I'd say by and large it's it's a
SAS. 

286
00:16:50,320 --> 00:16:54,960
It's API driven. 
So let's say I'm running a bank 

287
00:16:54,960 --> 00:16:59,160
and I want to contract with a 
Fripp service provider. 

288
00:16:59,960 --> 00:17:04,240
Mostly what I need to do is code
that into the their APIs. 

289
00:17:04,280 --> 00:17:06,960
You have to of course pass 
certain amount of requisite 

290
00:17:06,960 --> 00:17:11,079
information to them to get a 
judgement or a risk score back, 

291
00:17:11,079 --> 00:17:14,760
but it's generally API driven. 
So it's API driven. 

292
00:17:14,760 --> 00:17:19,119
So you know, the, the, the thing
I always think of from a fraud 

293
00:17:19,119 --> 00:17:23,640
perspective is that the old use 
case like, oh, somebody wants to

294
00:17:23,640 --> 00:17:28,359
transfer $50,000 and there's 
some kind of API on the back end

295
00:17:28,359 --> 00:17:33,360
that's saying, oh, that that 
trigger some kind of rule and 

296
00:17:33,360 --> 00:17:36,960
that rule now requires you to do
something more. 

297
00:17:36,960 --> 00:17:40,840
So I'm kind of thinking of like 
that RSA type of scenario. 

298
00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:43,640
And to me that's always kind of 
what fraud is. 

299
00:17:43,880 --> 00:17:46,080
But it sounds like we're talking
about the bigger picture of 

300
00:17:46,080 --> 00:17:50,920
fraud, which is preventing bots 
and things like that. 

301
00:17:50,920 --> 00:17:56,920
So I guess when you look at the 
space, what kinds of fraud are 

302
00:17:56,920 --> 00:18:00,280
we talking about preventing? 
And what is like outside of the 

303
00:18:00,280 --> 00:18:08,200
scope of what this FRIB solution
or solution set can provide a 

304
00:18:08,280 --> 00:18:11,520
defense against? 
What kind of fraud can I help 

305
00:18:11,520 --> 00:18:13,680
with and what kind of fraud 
can't it help with? 

306
00:18:14,160 --> 00:18:17,120
I think a lot of the solution 
providers in the space are 

307
00:18:17,120 --> 00:18:21,560
trying to address most every 
angle of it, you know, and from 

308
00:18:21,560 --> 00:18:25,000
the technological perspective, 
there can be many different 

309
00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:26,960
angles to come from. 
I mean, just thinking back to 

310
00:18:26,960 --> 00:18:31,080
identity verification, we see, 
you know, a huge increase in the

311
00:18:31,320 --> 00:18:36,680
numbers of things like face 
swapping attacks and use of like

312
00:18:36,680 --> 00:18:39,360
fake video, injecting video 
streams into video 

313
00:18:39,360 --> 00:18:42,960
identification processes. 
So I mean, that's like a whole 

314
00:18:42,960 --> 00:18:45,960
different kind of technology 
that you have to put into place 

315
00:18:46,280 --> 00:18:51,600
as opposed to if you're in the 
finance world and you need to do

316
00:18:51,760 --> 00:18:57,960
checking against sanctions lists
and you know, for anti money 

317
00:18:57,960 --> 00:19:01,800
laundering regulatory compliance
there. 

318
00:19:02,080 --> 00:19:05,680
There's just very disparate sets
of technology that go into this.

319
00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:09,920
But yes, there are several major
platforms that are trying to 

320
00:19:10,360 --> 00:19:14,760
address financial use cases, 
e-commerce use cases. 

321
00:19:14,760 --> 00:19:17,320
That's why I did two different 
reports on it, as I see that 

322
00:19:17,320 --> 00:19:21,480
they've kind of, you know, grown
apart in both the types of fraud

323
00:19:21,480 --> 00:19:25,040
that are being perpetrated 
against these different 

324
00:19:25,040 --> 00:19:29,360
organizations and the technical 
capabilities required to deter 

325
00:19:29,360 --> 00:19:31,160
it. 
So that is the distinction. 

326
00:19:31,160 --> 00:19:36,400
Then it's like the identity and 
access types of fraud, that's 

327
00:19:36,400 --> 00:19:39,520
what gets prevented. 
Whereas like some of those deep 

328
00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:44,840
finance use cases, those kind of
frauds need to be identified 

329
00:19:44,840 --> 00:19:48,040
within the applications. 
Is that right? 

330
00:19:49,960 --> 00:19:52,640
Well, I think there's several 
different layers for it too. 

331
00:19:52,640 --> 00:19:55,240
I mean, identity verification 
you can do as they come in 

332
00:19:55,240 --> 00:19:59,280
through the digital front door. 
But yeah, I think there are real

333
00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:02,440
time transaction level checks 
that need to go on in certain 

334
00:20:02,440 --> 00:20:05,840
circumstances. 
And you know, another, another 

335
00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:10,560
interesting thing is that this 
is kind of a union of just what 

336
00:20:10,560 --> 00:20:13,080
we think of pure identity and 
access management and 

337
00:20:13,080 --> 00:20:15,800
cybersecurity because you do 
have the bot angle too. 

338
00:20:15,800 --> 00:20:20,680
You know, bots are used. 
I I think you know slightly more

339
00:20:20,680 --> 00:20:24,560
than 50% of the traffic on the 
Internet is some kind of bot or 

340
00:20:24,560 --> 00:20:26,600
another. 
But you know, you can't just 

341
00:20:26,600 --> 00:20:30,120
say, OK, I don't want any bots 
to hit my site because a lot of 

342
00:20:30,120 --> 00:20:33,480
the legitimate business on the 
web is being handled by bots. 

343
00:20:33,480 --> 00:20:36,520
So you've got to be able to 
figure out are these good bots 

344
00:20:36,520 --> 00:20:39,080
or bad bots or somewhere in 
between? 

345
00:20:39,400 --> 00:20:40,720
And then what do you want to do 
with that? 

346
00:20:40,720 --> 00:20:43,800
Once you know that, how do you 
want to handle that? 

347
00:20:43,800 --> 00:20:48,040
Do you want to challenge them so
that we all see these captions 

348
00:20:48,040 --> 00:20:52,960
and get aggravated with those or
do you want to throttle them? 

349
00:20:53,560 --> 00:20:55,360
Do you want to redirect them or 
block them? 

350
00:20:55,400 --> 00:20:57,920
There's there's lots of 
different choices you can have 

351
00:20:58,200 --> 00:21:01,680
on how to handle bots want you 
to determine that's what it is. 

352
00:21:02,040 --> 00:21:05,360
But yeah, I mean, you can kind 
of see that there's this wide 

353
00:21:05,360 --> 00:21:09,160
variety of different kinds of 
techniques that span identity 

354
00:21:09,160 --> 00:21:12,480
and cybersecurity that are used 
by fraudsters. 

355
00:21:13,880 --> 00:21:16,000
And you, you kind of talked 
about there like the majority of

356
00:21:16,000 --> 00:21:19,360
traffic these days on the 
Internet is not human, right. 

357
00:21:19,360 --> 00:21:21,960
It's AP is and bots. 
And you know, I was going to say

358
00:21:21,960 --> 00:21:23,880
we've got a great system to 
catch bots, right? 

359
00:21:23,880 --> 00:21:27,240
Just pick all the pictures of a 
bus or a sidewalk and you know, 

360
00:21:27,240 --> 00:21:30,120
grainy little 9 box that it's 
like, I don't know, is that a 

361
00:21:30,120 --> 00:21:30,760
bot? 
I don't know. 

362
00:21:31,880 --> 00:21:35,680
Let's talk about the reports 
that you wrote back in July 

363
00:21:35,680 --> 00:21:37,640
here. 
So you had two, one was on 

364
00:21:37,640 --> 00:21:40,080
finance and one was on 
e-commerce. 

365
00:21:40,600 --> 00:21:42,080
Let's start with the finance 
one. 

366
00:21:42,560 --> 00:21:46,080
What are some of the trends or 
challenges that you saw that are

367
00:21:46,080 --> 00:21:49,600
sort of shaping the way that 
this RIP space is evolving and 

368
00:21:49,600 --> 00:21:51,040
maybe some of the way they're 
being used? 

369
00:21:51,200 --> 00:21:54,960
Well, you know, especially in 
the finance world, scams are are

370
00:21:55,520 --> 00:21:58,240
make the headlines and they're 
very problematic. 

371
00:21:58,320 --> 00:22:03,440
I mean, just talking with 
people, occasionally tell them 

372
00:22:03,440 --> 00:22:06,600
what it might be working on. 
Everybody's got a story about a 

373
00:22:06,600 --> 00:22:09,040
relative or a friend or somebody
that they know that's been 

374
00:22:09,040 --> 00:22:10,960
scammed out of a lot of money 
online. 

375
00:22:11,600 --> 00:22:15,200
So I think on the finance side 
now, depending on the 

376
00:22:15,200 --> 00:22:18,560
jurisdictions in which you live 
and operate, you know, some 

377
00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:22,920
areas are putting much more 
responsibility on financial 

378
00:22:22,920 --> 00:22:26,600
institutions for trying to help 
help their customers stop these 

379
00:22:26,600 --> 00:22:31,880
scams from happening. 
So that too is a takes some 

380
00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:35,720
pretty complex technology in 
order to be able to detect that 

381
00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:40,920
and then present options to the 
potential victim about whether 

382
00:22:40,920 --> 00:22:43,760
or not they want to actually 
authorize A transaction. 

383
00:22:44,360 --> 00:22:48,840
So scams, of course, are are big
news and a big problem. 

384
00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:55,440
But you still see lots of Ato 
account takeover attacks and you

385
00:22:55,440 --> 00:22:57,800
know, they're just trying to get
your account so they can get 

386
00:22:57,800 --> 00:23:03,800
money or something worth money. 
Now there's new account fraud, 

387
00:23:04,440 --> 00:23:09,000
various forms of new account 
fraud, where again, it could be 

388
00:23:09,000 --> 00:23:13,760
like a presentation time attack 
where you try to use, let's say 

389
00:23:13,760 --> 00:23:18,240
the fraudsters picture to get 
access to a legitimate bank 

390
00:23:18,240 --> 00:23:22,120
account or some other account. 
There's synthetic fraud where 

391
00:23:22,120 --> 00:23:26,440
you try to take realistic 
looking but not quite real 

392
00:23:26,440 --> 00:23:29,800
information and assemble an 
account so you can open an 

393
00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:33,480
account somewhere. 
So yeah, banks, financial 

394
00:23:33,480 --> 00:23:37,080
institutions are dealing with 
lots of different kinds of 

395
00:23:37,080 --> 00:23:41,760
fraud, all of which, you know, 
can result in big losses for not

396
00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:45,200
only the banks and FIS, but 
their customers as well. 

397
00:23:46,480 --> 00:23:49,880
Yeah, and it seems like at least
here in the USI think at this 

398
00:23:49,880 --> 00:23:52,920
point, everybody's Social 
Security number has been stolen 

399
00:23:52,920 --> 00:23:56,440
or burdened part of a breach. 
So, you know, that used to be 

400
00:23:56,440 --> 00:23:58,600
sort of like the unique 
identifier you could trust. 

401
00:23:58,600 --> 00:24:01,520
But you know, we're moving away 
from that thankfully. 

402
00:24:02,040 --> 00:24:03,680
But it's things like that, 
right? 

403
00:24:03,680 --> 00:24:08,480
It's hey, the data is out there.
So now it is incumbent on really

404
00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:10,680
everybody to be vigilant. 
But at least here in the US, it 

405
00:24:10,680 --> 00:24:13,520
seems like there are some 
stronger laws or maybe some 

406
00:24:13,520 --> 00:24:17,680
stronger in industry viewpoints 
or say, OK, we need to kind of 

407
00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:21,960
band together to fight this. 
Do you see at least in the 

408
00:24:21,960 --> 00:24:26,440
financial space, do you see like
a shared signals type approach 

409
00:24:26,440 --> 00:24:30,120
where it's like, hey, if one 
bank or financial institution 

410
00:24:30,120 --> 00:24:33,600
sort of detects an issue, are 
they sharing information or is 

411
00:24:33,600 --> 00:24:36,960
it because they're all using 
maybe a consolidated source that

412
00:24:36,960 --> 00:24:38,680
they're all kind of benefiting 
from that like it? 

413
00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:42,160
I guess my my short question is,
are these financial institutions

414
00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:45,520
working together to print fraud 
or are they going it alone? 

415
00:24:47,240 --> 00:24:49,320
Well, they're not really going 
alone. 

416
00:24:49,320 --> 00:24:54,240
I think ultimately this shared 
signal framework thing is a 

417
00:24:54,240 --> 00:24:57,480
great idea and it's going to get
more traction. 

418
00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:02,800
But one of the the features of 
some of the leading fraud 

419
00:25:02,800 --> 00:25:06,840
reduction Intel platform vendors
is that they aggregate 

420
00:25:07,840 --> 00:25:12,120
information amongst their 
customer base and then a share 

421
00:25:12,120 --> 00:25:14,960
that you know, to help prevent 
attacks throughout their 

422
00:25:14,960 --> 00:25:17,040
customer base. 
And yeah, there are quite a few 

423
00:25:17,040 --> 00:25:20,760
that are heavily invested in the
the financial industry. 

424
00:25:20,760 --> 00:25:25,640
So they are on a more limited 
scale sharing some of this 

425
00:25:25,640 --> 00:25:31,000
information about fraudsters 
amongst themselves through their

426
00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:35,000
Fripp service provider. 
But I think, yeah, eventually 

427
00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:38,600
where we need to get to is a 
more open framework where we can

428
00:25:38,600 --> 00:25:42,640
share signals. 
But I think we're we're not 

429
00:25:42,640 --> 00:25:45,000
there yet. 
Maybe I'm just thinking too much

430
00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:48,120
of like, you know, mob movies in
Vegas where, you know, the 

431
00:25:48,120 --> 00:25:50,680
person comes in to scan the 
casino and then all of a sudden 

432
00:25:50,840 --> 00:25:54,320
all the casinos are aware of, 
you know, Jim coming in counting

433
00:25:54,320 --> 00:25:55,480
cards. 
Sorry, Jim, pick on you. 

434
00:25:55,840 --> 00:25:58,280
But like, you know that that 
sort of like, hey, we've got a 

435
00:25:58,280 --> 00:26:00,800
known vector, right, a threat 
here. 

436
00:26:01,520 --> 00:26:04,200
Let's make sure that these 
institutions are all sort of on 

437
00:26:04,200 --> 00:26:06,000
the same page. 
Course, there are other 

438
00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:10,920
information sharing arrangements
out there and, and I think that 

439
00:26:10,920 --> 00:26:15,320
the they've probably been 
somewhat successful, but there's

440
00:26:15,320 --> 00:26:16,960
still always room for 
improvement. 

441
00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:21,320
I think kind of that scenario 
that you just talked about, you 

442
00:26:21,320 --> 00:26:25,960
know, especially if it's a 
smaller company, I don't imagine

443
00:26:25,960 --> 00:26:28,840
that they have that big of a 
picture of like what the 

444
00:26:28,840 --> 00:26:33,400
fraudulent accounts are. 
If they can get information from

445
00:26:33,400 --> 00:26:38,120
Google, Facebook, Microsoft, the
big identity providers in the 

446
00:26:38,120 --> 00:26:40,800
world, that would be a game 
changer. 

447
00:26:41,120 --> 00:26:45,280
And I would love to see the 
industry as a whole stop looking

448
00:26:45,280 --> 00:26:50,640
at security and fraud as a 
competitive advantage. 

449
00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:53,840
Like, oh, we're the biggest, we 
have the most logins, so we have

450
00:26:53,840 --> 00:26:57,480
the most visibility and start 
looking at it as like for a 

451
00:26:57,480 --> 00:27:03,080
common good being able to, you 
know, I, I see Jeff laughing 

452
00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:05,080
like, like for the good, like. 
Common. 

453
00:27:05,160 --> 00:27:06,640
Good. 
Like I'm speaking a different 

454
00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:09,400
language or something. 
I mean, you can't make money off

455
00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:12,480
that, so come on, like. 
I'm a capitalist by the way, so 

456
00:27:12,480 --> 00:27:17,040
I'm not trying to say that, but 
like, you know, we have 

457
00:27:17,040 --> 00:27:22,440
hospitals and we have. 
I mean, I mean, that's like a 

458
00:27:22,440 --> 00:27:25,960
real world example. 
But what I'm I'm saying is like 

459
00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:31,640
even people in the identity 
industry, like 2 identity 

460
00:27:31,640 --> 00:27:36,200
leaders from competitors, like 2
banks that compete with each 

461
00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:38,240
other. 
I've seen it in the real world 

462
00:27:38,240 --> 00:27:43,080
where they talk shop, they talk 
about what they're doing because

463
00:27:43,680 --> 00:27:48,040
you getting hacked doesn't like 
make my bank like more 

464
00:27:48,040 --> 00:27:51,000
attractive. 
It actually just makes the whole

465
00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:55,360
industry suffer. 
So I just kind of feel like 

466
00:27:56,880 --> 00:28:00,680
organizations should stop like 
taking this data and thinking 

467
00:28:00,680 --> 00:28:02,720
like, oh, we're going to use 
that for our competitive 

468
00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:05,160
advantage. 
I, I don't like that. 

469
00:28:06,360 --> 00:28:10,360
That's my, my two cents. 
That's my rant rant #2. 

470
00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:17,280
Well, you know, thinking about 
banks, I know a lot of people in

471
00:28:17,280 --> 00:28:23,480
the banking industry talk about 
the reliance on still mainframe 

472
00:28:23,480 --> 00:28:28,120
technology, COBOL written 
programs and trying to figure 

473
00:28:28,120 --> 00:28:31,760
out how to plug this kind of 
information in I think is 

474
00:28:31,880 --> 00:28:35,880
challenging because each company
is different how they built 

475
00:28:35,880 --> 00:28:38,960
their their systems. 
They may use home grown code, 

476
00:28:38,960 --> 00:28:42,400
they may use, you know, core 
banking applications made by 

477
00:28:42,840 --> 00:28:48,280
vendors from from years ago. 
So how do you integrate the 

478
00:28:48,280 --> 00:28:52,680
signals that you may be getting 
in an ideal world such that it 

479
00:28:52,680 --> 00:28:58,480
can be of use at runtime? 
Well, it becomes a major rewrite

480
00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:01,920
of the way that authentication 
or risk calculation works with 

481
00:29:01,920 --> 00:29:04,920
an organization, right? 
It's at that point you kind of 

482
00:29:04,920 --> 00:29:08,920
have to treat those as data 
sources, not as the system that 

483
00:29:08,920 --> 00:29:12,440
is performing the risk check. 
So you end up in this, you know,

484
00:29:12,440 --> 00:29:14,600
catch 22. 
It's like, OK, you know, do I, 

485
00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:17,840
you know, do I have this 
mainframe sitting in my basement

486
00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:20,920
and I, I don't have anyone who 
can maintain it or I'm going to 

487
00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:23,680
lose those people who can 
maintain it sooner, whether it's

488
00:29:23,680 --> 00:29:27,640
because they age out of the 
workforce, they die somewhere 

489
00:29:27,640 --> 00:29:29,640
else, right? 
There's a bunch of reasons like 

490
00:29:29,640 --> 00:29:32,000
they're going to, you have to 
start planning for that shift 

491
00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:34,040
over. 
And so it's like, OK, when do we

492
00:29:34,040 --> 00:29:37,680
bite the bullet and say, guess 
what, guys trying to modernize 

493
00:29:37,720 --> 00:29:40,920
the way that we approach 
authentication and as part of 

494
00:29:40,920 --> 00:29:43,320
the authentication, that means 
risk. 

495
00:29:43,440 --> 00:29:45,280
So how do we do things like 
identity verification? 

496
00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:48,600
How do we take all the different
signals within our own 

497
00:29:48,600 --> 00:29:51,920
environment and from our 
external signals coming in to 

498
00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:55,440
really modernize the way that, 
you know, we do this login so 

499
00:29:55,440 --> 00:29:58,080
that, you know, Jim doesn't have
to have a nightmare scenario 

500
00:29:58,080 --> 00:30:00,320
logging in right to his new 
device, right? 

501
00:30:00,560 --> 00:30:04,760
Or me if I forget my bit word 
and password and all of a sudden

502
00:30:04,760 --> 00:30:08,320
I'm and I'm another person going
through the unhappy path of I've

503
00:30:08,320 --> 00:30:11,720
got to call someone and then 
that's where attacks also go 

504
00:30:11,720 --> 00:30:13,720
after, right? 
Most attacks are you're getting 

505
00:30:13,720 --> 00:30:15,240
socially engineered, you're 
getting fished. 

506
00:30:15,520 --> 00:30:18,480
Your help desk would already be 
guess what they need risk 

507
00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:19,880
signals as well. 
So things like identity 

508
00:30:19,880 --> 00:30:23,480
verification to reduce fraud. 
So I, I don't want to lose the 

509
00:30:23,480 --> 00:30:27,560
lose sight of the fact here that
like this fraud reduction we 

510
00:30:27,560 --> 00:30:30,920
talked finance, but there's a 
lot of like entry points for 

511
00:30:30,920 --> 00:30:32,280
this, right? 
It's not just like a signal 

512
00:30:32,280 --> 00:30:34,400
behind the scenes. 
It's is this really John I'm 

513
00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:38,000
talking to or is this AI version
of John right that's trying to 

514
00:30:38,000 --> 00:30:40,000
scam me. 
That is also I think part of 

515
00:30:40,000 --> 00:30:41,560
this equation. 
And I don't know if that's 

516
00:30:41,560 --> 00:30:44,240
necessarily it definitely is 
finance, but maybe it's also 

517
00:30:44,240 --> 00:30:47,120
part of the e-commerce world 
where, you know, maybe it's more

518
00:30:47,120 --> 00:30:48,680
consumer focused. 
And I know there was a second 

519
00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:52,200
report that was written on that.
And so my very long winded 

520
00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:55,760
question is, OK, so we went from
one end on the finance and now 

521
00:30:55,760 --> 00:30:58,480
we're talking about sort of like
the end user experience of fraud

522
00:30:59,040 --> 00:31:01,960
and e-commerce companies or at 
least companies that have an 

523
00:31:01,960 --> 00:31:04,240
e-commerce component also need 
to address that. 

524
00:31:04,240 --> 00:31:08,000
So why write a second report? 
What's different about 

525
00:31:08,000 --> 00:31:10,840
e-commerce that's like, OK, we 
need to focus on specifically 

526
00:31:10,840 --> 00:31:15,040
this versus finance in general? 
Well, again, I think the use 

527
00:31:15,040 --> 00:31:18,440
cases are quite different. 
You know, where banks, financial

528
00:31:18,440 --> 00:31:21,720
institutions are really 
concerned about or or having to 

529
00:31:21,720 --> 00:31:25,880
do AML compliance, Know your 
customer, do that name watch 

530
00:31:25,880 --> 00:31:30,160
list screening and they 
generally have a higher levels 

531
00:31:30,160 --> 00:31:32,800
of requirements for identity 
assurance. 

532
00:31:34,400 --> 00:31:36,800
So there there's a lot of 
emphasis that gets put on that. 

533
00:31:36,800 --> 00:31:39,520
On the e-commerce side, you 
know, there's a whole different 

534
00:31:39,520 --> 00:31:43,640
set of attacks that they face 
and just think about how we 

535
00:31:43,640 --> 00:31:47,240
interact with online shopping 
services ourselves. 

536
00:31:48,160 --> 00:31:51,880
They can be concerned about 
many, many different kinds of 

537
00:31:51,880 --> 00:31:55,480
bot driven attacks. 
You know, think about ticket 

538
00:31:55,480 --> 00:32:00,400
scalping bots, bots that go out 
and you know, try to download 

539
00:32:00,400 --> 00:32:05,120
all the information that's 
available on a website there. 

540
00:32:05,120 --> 00:32:08,760
There can be other cases where 
you got bots that are out there 

541
00:32:08,760 --> 00:32:13,840
generating comments, generating 
fake reviews that might affect 

542
00:32:13,840 --> 00:32:18,560
the whole e-commerce experience.
And then they have policy abuse.

543
00:32:18,560 --> 00:32:21,520
They have to worry about two 
things like we probably all 

544
00:32:21,520 --> 00:32:23,960
encountered, you know, do you 
want to log in or do you want to

545
00:32:23,960 --> 00:32:28,160
check out as a guest? 
So guest check out policy abuse,

546
00:32:30,320 --> 00:32:34,560
returns, chargebacks, loyalty 
programs. 

547
00:32:34,960 --> 00:32:38,600
You know, frequent flyer miles 
is a good example because so 

548
00:32:38,600 --> 00:32:45,160
much money is sort of tied up in
loyalty programs of all sorts of

549
00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:49,520
different kinds. 
So, you know, trying to gain 

550
00:32:49,520 --> 00:32:52,760
access to somebody's account so 
you can drain those loyalty 

551
00:32:52,760 --> 00:32:56,560
points and use them elsewhere. 
These are things that are a 

552
00:32:56,560 --> 00:32:59,320
little bit different than what 
banks have to face. 

553
00:32:59,320 --> 00:33:04,000
So that's why I thought it would
be better to break this into two

554
00:33:04,840 --> 00:33:07,640
where I could in the first 
report put a little bit more 

555
00:33:07,640 --> 00:33:11,200
focus on the the name, watch 
those screening and identity 

556
00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:16,800
verification versus you know, 
looking for more thorough bot 

557
00:33:16,800 --> 00:33:21,200
detection and more granular bot 
management capabilities for the 

558
00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:26,080
e-commerce report. 
Yeah, I was, I I can't find any 

559
00:33:26,440 --> 00:33:30,920
holes in those in the argument. 
Like those seem to be the top 2 

560
00:33:31,280 --> 00:33:34,400
focuses for most fraud, but I 
can think of two others. 

561
00:33:34,920 --> 00:33:41,560
So one is the other C for CIA 
and the Citizen, you know, 

562
00:33:41,560 --> 00:33:46,760
especially for state actors to 
go in and commit fraud, But I'm 

563
00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:48,880
sure there's other use cases as 
well. 

564
00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:52,240
And then the other one that I 
thought of, which I thought this

565
00:33:52,240 --> 00:33:56,520
is a growing one, is streaming 
services or any kind of 

566
00:33:56,520 --> 00:34:00,440
subscription services where 
people want to share their 

567
00:34:00,440 --> 00:34:04,800
account with other people. 
So I guess, you know, that's 

568
00:34:04,800 --> 00:34:06,560
just kind of like me thinking 
through it. 

569
00:34:07,280 --> 00:34:11,080
Have you given thought to 
additional reports to write, or 

570
00:34:11,080 --> 00:34:13,920
do you think there's just not 
enough meat on the bone? 

571
00:34:15,320 --> 00:34:17,400
I think those are two really 
good use cases. 

572
00:34:17,679 --> 00:34:20,760
Yeah, definitely two different 
areas of focus. 

573
00:34:21,639 --> 00:34:24,920
The citizen angle, yeah. 
I mean, harkening back to the 

574
00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:29,360
pandemic that that happened a 
lot, you know, when the Paycheck

575
00:34:29,360 --> 00:34:33,960
Protection Program was going on 
and a lot of state unemployment 

576
00:34:33,960 --> 00:34:38,239
agencies were hit. 
I'm sure if they'd had some 

577
00:34:38,239 --> 00:34:41,480
fraud reduction technology in 
place, it probably would have 

578
00:34:41,480 --> 00:34:49,760
saved taxpayers a lot of money. 
Many of these kinds of use cases

579
00:34:49,760 --> 00:34:54,960
can be addressed by well, in the
case of like unemployment 

580
00:34:54,960 --> 00:34:57,720
insurance, if you were using 
better identity verification. 

581
00:34:58,160 --> 00:35:01,240
So a lot of the same vendors 
that appear in both reports 

582
00:35:01,240 --> 00:35:07,000
probably would be able to help 
cases for like G to C government

583
00:35:07,000 --> 00:35:10,440
to citizen interaction and then 
the streaming services too. 

584
00:35:10,440 --> 00:35:14,400
That's I do try to address that 
a bit on the e-commerce side. 

585
00:35:14,800 --> 00:35:17,800
That's a a very good and 
interesting point you make there

586
00:35:17,800 --> 00:35:21,240
about people who do try to share
accounts and then the streaming 

587
00:35:21,240 --> 00:35:25,320
services who don't want you to 
do that with good reason. 

588
00:35:26,760 --> 00:35:28,880
Yeah. 
And and so I was, you know, 

589
00:35:29,320 --> 00:35:32,680
asking about, you know, whether 
or not it was worthy of a paper.

590
00:35:33,000 --> 00:35:37,480
But another angle is just kind 
of like, it seems to me like 

591
00:35:37,480 --> 00:35:41,640
these there's some form of those
six capabilities that almost 

592
00:35:41,640 --> 00:35:45,800
every industry that is on the 
Internet needs. 

593
00:35:46,360 --> 00:35:49,680
And I'm kind of wondering also, 
you know, when you're going 

594
00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:54,280
through this capabilities, just 
it seems to me there's like I'll

595
00:35:54,280 --> 00:35:59,600
use the term poor man's version 
of a lot of those built into ID 

596
00:35:59,600 --> 00:36:05,040
PS for example, or, you know, 
other Cam technologies where 

597
00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:08,240
it's like, you know, is that 
really the decision that 

598
00:36:08,240 --> 00:36:11,960
organizations need to make? 
Like, Oh yeah, I'm buying this 

599
00:36:11,960 --> 00:36:17,160
system to do my authentication. 
Is that good enough for am I 

600
00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:20,920
good enough just to use their 
layer of fraud protection? 

601
00:36:22,240 --> 00:36:24,400
Are you kind of looking at that 
when you're considering the 

602
00:36:24,400 --> 00:36:29,720
e-commerce or is it just looking
at, is it just looking at like 

603
00:36:29,720 --> 00:36:33,720
what are the add-ons that you 
can get on top of your IDP? 

604
00:36:34,160 --> 00:36:39,000
Mostly looking at what are the 
add-ons because yeah, let's say 

605
00:36:39,000 --> 00:36:41,920
you're an e-commerce vendor, 
you're going to be accepting 

606
00:36:42,680 --> 00:36:46,920
logins from lots of different ID
PS And it's not just the login 

607
00:36:46,920 --> 00:36:50,080
information or what the IDP 
knows about the person who 

608
00:36:50,080 --> 00:36:53,160
registered their account with 
that IDP maybe many years ago, 

609
00:36:53,160 --> 00:36:58,400
but what else do you know about 
that account right now? 

610
00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:02,160
You know, going back to the 
streaming thing there, that's 

611
00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:04,120
where device intelligence comes 
into play. 

612
00:37:04,120 --> 00:37:05,560
So what do you know about the 
device? 

613
00:37:05,560 --> 00:37:07,040
Are they watching on their 
phone? 

614
00:37:07,040 --> 00:37:10,760
Are they going to are watching 
on a smart TV or set-top box? 

615
00:37:11,080 --> 00:37:14,560
All those things have device IDs
and that can be part of the 

616
00:37:14,560 --> 00:37:18,800
overall risk equation. 
Same thing was about how you 

617
00:37:18,800 --> 00:37:24,160
present to AE commerce site. 
Sure, you might log in with your

618
00:37:24,160 --> 00:37:26,720
regular e-mail address. 
You've made an account there, 

619
00:37:27,600 --> 00:37:31,440
but are you authenticating that 
yourself, or are you relying on 

620
00:37:31,440 --> 00:37:34,320
the IDP to do the 
authentication? 

621
00:37:34,640 --> 00:37:38,160
And what other information do 
you want to collect about that 

622
00:37:38,160 --> 00:37:42,200
user at that particular 
transaction time that may not be

623
00:37:42,200 --> 00:37:44,360
available to the IDP? 
Yeah. 

624
00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:52,240
I'm kind of wondering also, you 
know, when it comes to these 

625
00:37:52,240 --> 00:37:55,960
kind of investments always, it 
always comes down to dollars and

626
00:37:55,960 --> 00:37:59,240
cents, right? 
And so maybe if you don't have 

627
00:37:59,240 --> 00:38:02,560
the money or you can't make the 
business justification, buying 

628
00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:06,480
an add on isn't something that 
you even consider. 

629
00:38:06,880 --> 00:38:13,080
But if you have enough money to 
add on, I think the answer I'm 

630
00:38:13,080 --> 00:38:18,080
going to get us, it depends. 
But John Tolbert, here's the the

631
00:38:18,080 --> 00:38:20,720
$1,000,000 question, like where 
do you put your money? 

632
00:38:20,800 --> 00:38:24,120
What's the order of importance? 
Where do you get the biggest 

633
00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:29,560
bang for your buck in terms of 
risk reduction and the different

634
00:38:29,560 --> 00:38:31,680
types of FRIPP? 
Capabilities. 

635
00:38:32,080 --> 00:38:36,960
Wow. 
I guess that's why you've got to

636
00:38:36,960 --> 00:38:39,440
know your own business. 
You know what? 

637
00:38:40,880 --> 00:38:45,440
Understanding the threats that 
you've already faced and, and 

638
00:38:45,440 --> 00:38:47,360
where you think they're going to
be coming from. 

639
00:38:47,360 --> 00:38:52,440
I think across both finance and 
e-commerce and, and any others, 

640
00:38:53,360 --> 00:38:56,720
four of the six are, are pretty 
commonplace and you're going to 

641
00:38:56,720 --> 00:39:01,240
need, you know, some combination
of those pretty much at all 

642
00:39:01,240 --> 00:39:03,480
times. 
And I guess I would say device 

643
00:39:03,480 --> 00:39:08,040
intelligence is really, really 
important user behavioral 

644
00:39:08,040 --> 00:39:10,880
analysis. 
I mean, because if you just do 1

645
00:39:10,880 --> 00:39:15,080
without the others, then you're 
still leaving an awful lot of 

646
00:39:15,080 --> 00:39:18,640
attack surface at that at that 
point. 

647
00:39:20,600 --> 00:39:26,120
So knowing about compromise 
credential usage, if somebody's 

648
00:39:26,120 --> 00:39:29,640
had their credentials leaked out
on the dark web, that's 

649
00:39:29,640 --> 00:39:32,040
certainly important. 
You'd, you'd certainly want to 

650
00:39:32,480 --> 00:39:34,840
increase your risk score because
of that. 

651
00:39:35,640 --> 00:39:40,280
If you're in a place where you 
really need higher assurance, 

652
00:39:40,320 --> 00:39:44,000
identity assurance levels, then 
identity verification is going 

653
00:39:44,000 --> 00:39:46,200
to be more important. 
So I don't think I could give 

654
00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:50,560
like A1 size fits all answer. 
It really depends on what 

655
00:39:50,560 --> 00:39:53,720
business you're in and 
understanding the threats that 

656
00:39:53,720 --> 00:39:57,000
you faced before and and how to 
most effectively reduce those. 

657
00:39:58,120 --> 00:40:00,080
I think that's a great answer, 
John, because Albert is going to

658
00:40:00,080 --> 00:40:03,480
say it depends. 
The consulting answer right it 

659
00:40:03,600 --> 00:40:05,040
where you know. 
Where are you? 

660
00:40:05,040 --> 00:40:06,240
Where? 
Do you need the most help? 

661
00:40:06,240 --> 00:40:08,320
Because not everybody is on a 
playing field where it's like 

662
00:40:08,520 --> 00:40:10,280
everybody's starting at 0. 
You might already have some 

663
00:40:10,280 --> 00:40:12,320
capabilities in place and you 
have to kind of start whatever. 

664
00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:15,600
That's no different whether 
we're talking fraud or we're 

665
00:40:15,600 --> 00:40:18,360
talking an IGA deployment or a 
privileged access deployment or 

666
00:40:18,400 --> 00:40:21,560
authentication just at large. 
So I'm curious that when we talk

667
00:40:21,560 --> 00:40:23,320
about these capabilities you 
talk about like identity 

668
00:40:23,320 --> 00:40:26,960
proofing and verification, 
credential intelligence, device 

669
00:40:26,960 --> 00:40:30,880
intelligence, behavior 
analytics, right, bot detection,

670
00:40:30,880 --> 00:40:32,400
right, kind of all these 
different things. 

671
00:40:32,880 --> 00:40:36,720
Where does where do those 
capabilities tend to fit? 

672
00:40:36,800 --> 00:40:40,520
Jimmy, you kind of alluded to 
the authentication platform of 

673
00:40:40,520 --> 00:40:44,200
the IDP, but talk to me a little
bit about like where do you see 

674
00:40:44,200 --> 00:40:45,720
these coming in? 
Because I don't think it's just 

675
00:40:45,720 --> 00:40:48,240
one product that does all this, 
right. 

676
00:40:48,240 --> 00:40:51,480
It's a mesh of things that need 
to kind of provide the full 

677
00:40:51,480 --> 00:40:55,440
solution set to have an 
effective fraud reduction into 

678
00:40:55,520 --> 00:40:59,600
intelligence platform. 
Again, I think it, it, it sort 

679
00:40:59,600 --> 00:41:01,160
of depends on what you've 
already got. 

680
00:41:01,160 --> 00:41:04,960
I mean, if we go back to the 
bank situation, a lot of banks 

681
00:41:04,960 --> 00:41:10,400
have already written their own 
fraud detection routines and 

682
00:41:10,400 --> 00:41:13,600
they're, they're running that 
alongside their other banking 

683
00:41:13,600 --> 00:41:16,720
application. 
So maybe they just want to get 

684
00:41:17,360 --> 00:41:21,200
better identity verification. 
In that case, you might just 

685
00:41:21,200 --> 00:41:26,560
look for discrete identity 
verification services or if 

686
00:41:26,560 --> 00:41:30,280
you're looking to sort of 
totally upgrade all of your 

687
00:41:30,280 --> 00:41:32,760
fraud prevention capabilities, 
then yeah, you might want to 

688
00:41:32,760 --> 00:41:36,560
look for a platform that has 
some of all of it. 

689
00:41:36,560 --> 00:41:40,400
And then many of these can be 
augmented. 

690
00:41:40,440 --> 00:41:43,560
You know, this is, it's more of 
an ecosystem kind of things. 

691
00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:48,280
So you will find that even in 
this Fripp space, there are 

692
00:41:48,640 --> 00:41:52,400
partnering arrangements amongst 
the vendors in some cases like I

693
00:41:52,400 --> 00:41:55,160
was talking about with 
behavioral biometrics, some of 

694
00:41:55,160 --> 00:42:00,520
the other platforms will OEM in 
the behavioral biometrics piece 

695
00:42:00,520 --> 00:42:04,880
and and use that or they may 
automatically or have you know, 

696
00:42:04,880 --> 00:42:07,360
contracts with other service 
providers so that they're 

697
00:42:07,720 --> 00:42:11,320
bringing in say device 
intelligence feeds or IP 

698
00:42:11,320 --> 00:42:14,360
reputation information from 
third party sources. 

699
00:42:14,360 --> 00:42:20,760
So it really is an ecosystem and
you can which one do you want to

700
00:42:20,760 --> 00:42:26,360
be your front end if you're 
trying to augment your own fraud

701
00:42:26,360 --> 00:42:32,200
detection capabilities? 
It's it's again very specific to

702
00:42:32,520 --> 00:42:34,440
the organization that that needs
it. 

703
00:42:35,960 --> 00:42:38,400
So for this to work effectively,
there's got to be some sort of 

704
00:42:38,400 --> 00:42:42,480
like automation or integration 
and I'm taking off, you know, 

705
00:42:43,040 --> 00:42:46,600
larger platforms that tend to be
within, you know, a large 

706
00:42:46,600 --> 00:42:49,960
organization that might need 
this type of solution, something

707
00:42:49,960 --> 00:42:51,800
like an identity governance 
solution. 

708
00:42:51,800 --> 00:42:54,600
So I'm thinking of like a sale 
point or a savior or maybe a 

709
00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:57,000
privileged access management 
solution like a cyber Ark or 

710
00:42:57,000 --> 00:42:59,480
Delinea or Beyond Trust, right? 
Those are just kind of leaders 

711
00:42:59,480 --> 00:43:03,960
sort of in those spaces. 
Is that where, you know, the 

712
00:43:03,960 --> 00:43:07,280
information sharing between your
fraud platform is saying, hey, 

713
00:43:07,640 --> 00:43:11,080
not only don't authenticate, but
kick over this thing into your 

714
00:43:11,080 --> 00:43:14,040
IGA platform or your Pam 
platform to do some sort of 

715
00:43:14,040 --> 00:43:15,160
thing? 
Like there's got to be 

716
00:43:15,160 --> 00:43:17,520
orchestration that takes place 
behind the scenes, right? 

717
00:43:17,560 --> 00:43:20,320
Like what does that 
orchestration layer look like 

718
00:43:20,320 --> 00:43:22,960
and where does it come in? 
Like what is the driver for 

719
00:43:22,960 --> 00:43:24,960
that? 
Is it the risk platform or is it

720
00:43:24,960 --> 00:43:28,040
just a signal and somebody has 
to do something about that 

721
00:43:28,040 --> 00:43:30,240
signal? 
I'm glad you use the O word. 

722
00:43:31,400 --> 00:43:34,360
It's it's a very hot topic 
everywhere in identity 

723
00:43:34,360 --> 00:43:39,200
orchestration. 
It's many of the platforms that 

724
00:43:39,200 --> 00:43:42,600
I looked at do have really good 
orchestration capabilities and I

725
00:43:42,600 --> 00:43:48,880
think that's key to making it 
adaptable to what, you know, 

726
00:43:48,880 --> 00:43:52,400
many organizations already have.
So you probably already are 

727
00:43:52,400 --> 00:43:55,480
using let's say for example an 
IP reputation or a device 

728
00:43:55,480 --> 00:43:59,080
reputation service and you just 
want to sort of Plumb that into 

729
00:43:59,080 --> 00:44:01,680
your flow. 
We do need a good orchestration 

730
00:44:01,680 --> 00:44:05,520
engine and a good, you know, 
graphical workflow designer 

731
00:44:05,520 --> 00:44:08,680
ideally to help you figure out 
how to do that just right. 

732
00:44:09,760 --> 00:44:13,200
That is something that I think 
is pretty much absolutely 

733
00:44:13,200 --> 00:44:17,240
required, the ability to 
orchestrate amongst existing 

734
00:44:17,240 --> 00:44:20,920
services that you might use. 
And then also, you know, a year 

735
00:44:20,920 --> 00:44:22,720
from now, two years from now, 
after you do this 

736
00:44:22,720 --> 00:44:26,240
implementation, you might find 
you want to swap out and use a 

737
00:44:26,240 --> 00:44:31,440
different point solution for an 
intelligence source than to. 

738
00:44:31,760 --> 00:44:34,680
John, it wouldn't be an episode 
of Identity at the Center if we 

739
00:44:34,680 --> 00:44:39,080
didn't bring up AI. 
So I mean, obviously AI is 

740
00:44:39,080 --> 00:44:43,200
touching everything and it's 
touching it so fast and it's 

741
00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:47,120
changing the game where, you 
know, new vendors spin up 

742
00:44:47,120 --> 00:44:53,480
solutions and they can do things
that the the vendors that kind 

743
00:44:53,480 --> 00:44:56,440
of are the incumbents and have 
been doing this for a dozen 

744
00:44:56,440 --> 00:45:01,480
years can't do. 
Where do you see the impact when

745
00:45:01,480 --> 00:45:03,680
it comes to FRIB? 
I mean, are you seeing it 

746
00:45:03,680 --> 00:45:08,960
already with like vendors 
starting to use AI to multiply 

747
00:45:08,960 --> 00:45:12,720
what they can do? 
Yes, I mean, I guess it depends 

748
00:45:12,720 --> 00:45:15,840
on what we mean by AI. 
I mean, ML has been around for a

749
00:45:15,840 --> 00:45:18,120
long time. 
It's sort of the silent hero in 

750
00:45:18,120 --> 00:45:21,800
the background that's been 
helping us in multiple areas of 

751
00:45:21,800 --> 00:45:24,640
cybersecurity for, you know, 
more than a decade. 

752
00:45:25,280 --> 00:45:28,120
And that's very true in in the 
fraud reduction space. 

753
00:45:28,120 --> 00:45:31,200
Do you think about the numbers 
of transactions that are going 

754
00:45:31,200 --> 00:45:35,840
through, you know, any, any 
customer facing organization and

755
00:45:35,840 --> 00:45:38,120
then all the different data 
points that they have to analyze

756
00:45:38,120 --> 00:45:43,320
around like identity analytics? 
ML is a big help right there. 

757
00:45:43,320 --> 00:45:46,040
Just because there's such a 
large volume of data. 

758
00:45:46,040 --> 00:45:49,280
You need something to be able to
look for anomalies, look for 

759
00:45:49,280 --> 00:45:53,880
normal traffic, classify it and 
then, you know, alert the human 

760
00:45:53,880 --> 00:45:55,920
fraud analysts to go take a look
at it. 

761
00:45:56,520 --> 00:45:59,760
So M LS been around for a while 
and it's it's it's doing a great

762
00:45:59,760 --> 00:46:02,920
job. 
I think when it comes to Gen. 

763
00:46:02,920 --> 00:46:07,840
AIII see some implementation of 
Gen. 

764
00:46:07,840 --> 00:46:10,280
AI like in the fraud analysts 
interfaces. 

765
00:46:10,720 --> 00:46:12,080
I think that can be very 
helpful. 

766
00:46:12,560 --> 00:46:17,120
But I'll say the same thing 
about that as I did for, you 

767
00:46:17,120 --> 00:46:20,840
know, cybersecurity solutions 
that are starting to embed Gen. 

768
00:46:20,840 --> 00:46:23,040
AI. 
And that's I'm curious about 

769
00:46:23,040 --> 00:46:27,880
who's doing the, the quality 
assurance on on the output 

770
00:46:27,880 --> 00:46:32,080
there. 
Because yes, you can take in a 

771
00:46:32,080 --> 00:46:35,120
big amount of data. 
You can have it create a 

772
00:46:35,120 --> 00:46:39,760
narrative to feed to a junior 
analyst that get them to be able

773
00:46:39,760 --> 00:46:44,120
to take a, you know, a 
particular action that I think 

774
00:46:45,240 --> 00:46:48,680
it would be nice to understand 
what the the level of quality is

775
00:46:48,680 --> 00:46:53,560
on the output of that. 
Some are also working toward 

776
00:46:54,800 --> 00:47:00,240
allowing business people to 
write policies in, you know, 

777
00:47:00,400 --> 00:47:02,880
what we would call natural 
language and then then turn that

778
00:47:02,880 --> 00:47:05,400
into a machine executable 
language. 

779
00:47:05,400 --> 00:47:08,720
I think that's ongoing in some 
areas too. 

780
00:47:09,320 --> 00:47:14,000
But I think the biggest area of 
course, where AI has had an 

781
00:47:14,000 --> 00:47:18,080
impact on fraud is helping the 
fraudsters themselves, 

782
00:47:18,240 --> 00:47:21,960
unfortunately. 
Yeah, that that is the 

783
00:47:21,960 --> 00:47:25,200
unfortunate punchline to every 
one of these discussions. 

784
00:47:26,880 --> 00:47:30,680
You know, I always want to make 
sure that we're coming away with

785
00:47:30,680 --> 00:47:34,880
actionable tips for the identity
practitioner. 

786
00:47:35,000 --> 00:47:38,560
So in this case, I'm thinking 
the identity practitioner that 

787
00:47:38,920 --> 00:47:42,520
is evaluating some of these trip
platforms. 

788
00:47:42,520 --> 00:47:48,280
And I think with as much whiz 
bang stuff there is as there is 

789
00:47:48,280 --> 00:47:52,840
here, it's easy to kind of like,
get lost in some of the glitz 

790
00:47:52,840 --> 00:47:58,000
and glam. 
But what I'd want you to help 

791
00:47:58,000 --> 00:48:01,880
with would be like, what are 
some things that people need to 

792
00:48:02,200 --> 00:48:05,200
make sure they're asking when 
they get a demo of a solution? 

793
00:48:05,560 --> 00:48:09,080
How do they ask smart questions 
that are going to get to, yeah, 

794
00:48:09,080 --> 00:48:13,120
these guys can really, you know,
mail my use case or not? 

795
00:48:13,480 --> 00:48:15,280
That's a good question. 
I can just think of the 

796
00:48:15,280 --> 00:48:19,560
questions that I'd like to ask 
the vendors themselves and I 

797
00:48:19,560 --> 00:48:23,600
really want to understand what 
part of the solution are they 

798
00:48:23,600 --> 00:48:27,600
contributing themselves and 
where are you depending on 

799
00:48:27,600 --> 00:48:32,840
others you know, And this is 
bigger than let's say a use of 

800
00:48:32,840 --> 00:48:34,560
open source code kind of 
question. 

801
00:48:34,560 --> 00:48:38,360
But if your solution is 
depending on, let's say a third 

802
00:48:38,360 --> 00:48:43,000
party for behavioral biometrics 
or some third party service that

803
00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:47,160
collates dark web intelligence, 
then I think having that 

804
00:48:47,160 --> 00:48:51,400
information transparently 
presented is is very useful for 

805
00:48:51,400 --> 00:48:55,520
somebody that's looking to buy a
platform, buy access to a 

806
00:48:55,520 --> 00:49:00,000
platform. 
How how do they do they have 

807
00:49:00,000 --> 00:49:05,920
SDKS is another one. 
You know, many organizations are

808
00:49:06,000 --> 00:49:10,280
trending toward, you know, going
completely API driven, but there

809
00:49:10,280 --> 00:49:12,280
are lots of different SDK 
environments. 

810
00:49:12,280 --> 00:49:15,120
And maybe if you're in an 
organization that's already 

811
00:49:15,120 --> 00:49:19,320
built, let's say a big, you 
know, web presence and you've 

812
00:49:19,320 --> 00:49:23,920
got mobile apps that you're 
really proud of and you're happy

813
00:49:23,920 --> 00:49:26,800
with the SDK environments. 
Make sure that whatever you're 

814
00:49:26,800 --> 00:49:29,200
looking for supports all of 
that. 

815
00:49:32,080 --> 00:49:35,040
And then trying to get 
information about false 

816
00:49:35,040 --> 00:49:40,760
positives is always very useful.
Trying to get objective 

817
00:49:40,760 --> 00:49:44,160
information about false positive
rates and what techniques do 

818
00:49:44,160 --> 00:49:49,360
they use to help mitigate that. 
And in a few very rare cases, 

819
00:49:49,360 --> 00:49:52,360
there are a couple of these 
vendors out there in the fraud 

820
00:49:52,360 --> 00:49:55,800
reduction space that offer 
things like warranties or 

821
00:49:55,800 --> 00:49:59,160
chargeback guarantees. 
So if that's important to your 

822
00:49:59,160 --> 00:50:03,320
organization, I'd say ask about 
that because it can save you 

823
00:50:03,320 --> 00:50:06,880
money in the long run. 
I, I don't want to get into the 

824
00:50:06,880 --> 00:50:09,960
financial implications of a 
chargeback, but you know, 

825
00:50:09,960 --> 00:50:12,200
hopefully it's not something 
where it's like, OK, it's a 

826
00:50:12,200 --> 00:50:15,400
nickel per check, we will refund
you that nickel that said that 

827
00:50:15,400 --> 00:50:19,560
this transaction of $5,000,000 
was, you know, was, you know, a,

828
00:50:19,800 --> 00:50:21,440
a flow enough risk that you 
could ignore it. 

829
00:50:21,440 --> 00:50:24,160
I'm going to assume that there 
is some better contract 

830
00:50:24,160 --> 00:50:27,000
structure around that. 
Most likely, yeah. 

831
00:50:28,480 --> 00:50:30,880
Well, John, it's been a great 
conversation. 

832
00:50:30,880 --> 00:50:34,880
I want to wrap things up with a 
little bit of music talk here. 

833
00:50:35,480 --> 00:50:38,760
So we were talking yesterday as 
we were kind of getting prepped 

834
00:50:38,760 --> 00:50:40,920
up for this and you mentioned 
you've been to a couple concerts

835
00:50:40,920 --> 00:50:43,320
recently. 
And one of the things that I 

836
00:50:43,320 --> 00:50:47,840
want to find out from each of 
you is what is a musical act, 

837
00:50:48,120 --> 00:50:51,560
band, you know, performance 
artist, whatever you want to 

838
00:50:51,560 --> 00:50:54,880
call it, right? 
That you have not seen yet in 

839
00:50:54,880 --> 00:50:58,160
person, but you would 
absolutely, you know, go out of 

840
00:50:58,160 --> 00:51:01,640
your way like it's your Mount 
Rushmore of this is the person 

841
00:51:01,640 --> 00:51:03,320
that I want to see or band or 
group or whatever. 

842
00:51:03,400 --> 00:51:05,200
Like what do you? 
What do you most want to see? 

843
00:51:05,360 --> 00:51:09,640
Well, what I would have liked to
have seen would be Pink Floyd. 

844
00:51:09,840 --> 00:51:13,520
I've seen Brit Floyd a number of
times and Aussie Floyd a number 

845
00:51:13,520 --> 00:51:16,720
of times and they, they, they do
a great job. 

846
00:51:17,400 --> 00:51:22,200
But I think it would have been 
nice to to see the real Pink 

847
00:51:22,200 --> 00:51:26,080
Floyd at least once. 
So why Pink Floyd? 

848
00:51:26,080 --> 00:51:29,360
Is it the dark side of the moon?
Or is it you just celebrate 

849
00:51:29,360 --> 00:51:31,640
their entire catalog and you 
just want to be part of it? 

850
00:51:32,200 --> 00:51:36,560
Oh, I think I like it all. 
Yeah, I like it all from the 

851
00:51:36,560 --> 00:51:40,200
early days through the the 
Gilmore only era. 

852
00:51:40,200 --> 00:51:45,440
You know, in general, I'm a fan 
of progressive rock and 

853
00:51:45,440 --> 00:51:49,520
everything that came afterwards,
so I've gotten to see most of 

854
00:51:49,520 --> 00:51:52,880
the progressive rock bands that 
I like, but not the real Pink 

855
00:51:52,880 --> 00:51:56,120
Floyd. 
But not a grunge fan, as I 

856
00:51:56,120 --> 00:51:58,200
established yesterday and being 
from Seattle. 

857
00:51:59,000 --> 00:52:02,160
Yeah, not so much. 
So I'm a big like Alice In 

858
00:52:02,160 --> 00:52:05,160
Chains fan and you know, 
Nirvana, Pearl Jam, like that 

859
00:52:05,160 --> 00:52:07,960
kind of stuff. 
But I got there's so many 

860
00:52:07,960 --> 00:52:09,120
different things that go with 
this one. 

861
00:52:09,120 --> 00:52:10,960
Let me think about this for a 
second, Jim, what about you? 

862
00:52:10,960 --> 00:52:14,440
Like who is the band or artist 
or whoever that you would love 

863
00:52:14,440 --> 00:52:17,080
to see in person? 
They have not yet. 

864
00:52:17,800 --> 00:52:21,000
Well, I feel like I have to 
comment on Pink Floyd because 

865
00:52:21,360 --> 00:52:25,680
Pink Floyd, like Dark Side of 
the Moon is such an epic album 

866
00:52:25,680 --> 00:52:27,120
and I listened to it the other 
day. 

867
00:52:27,120 --> 00:52:31,280
It's like if you get into a long
drive in your car, just tell 

868
00:52:31,280 --> 00:52:33,680
Siri, play Dark Side of the Moon
album. 

869
00:52:34,000 --> 00:52:39,520
And it is just like 45 minutes 
of insanity. 

870
00:52:40,640 --> 00:52:46,080
And I didn't have a chance to go
see them in probably the early 

871
00:52:46,080 --> 00:52:51,280
90 or early 90s or late 80s. 
But at that time, it was like 

872
00:52:51,280 --> 00:52:56,720
$300 a ticket. 
And it was already like, insane.

873
00:52:57,880 --> 00:53:01,400
And, you know, they were known 
for putting on a huge show with 

874
00:53:01,400 --> 00:53:03,920
like, laser lights and 
everything, all the stuff they 

875
00:53:03,920 --> 00:53:06,760
used to do at concerts that was 
like, so cool. 

876
00:53:06,760 --> 00:53:10,640
And you look back at it now or 
So what they have at concerts 

877
00:53:10,640 --> 00:53:15,520
today and it's like a joke. 
It looks like you're watching 

878
00:53:15,520 --> 00:53:17,320
your grandparents TV or 
something. 

879
00:53:17,680 --> 00:53:20,280
So OK, so Part 2 of what I 
wanted to say. 

880
00:53:20,280 --> 00:53:24,240
So there were two bands that I 
really wanted to see I'll never 

881
00:53:24,240 --> 00:53:27,120
hit to see now. 
And I should have just pulled 

882
00:53:27,120 --> 00:53:28,880
the trigger when I had the 
opportunity. 

883
00:53:29,200 --> 00:53:33,320
Grateful Dead with Jerry Garcia.
So I wanted you to see them 

884
00:53:33,320 --> 00:53:36,280
actually the summer that he 
passed away. 

885
00:53:36,600 --> 00:53:41,680
And I didn't like have tickets 
or anything, but it's like 94 

886
00:53:41,680 --> 00:53:45,680
ish 95. 
And then Nirvana, right before 

887
00:53:45,680 --> 00:53:50,840
Kurt Cobain passed away, he 
actually did Lollapalooza #1. 

888
00:53:51,160 --> 00:53:53,720
I went to Lollapalooza #2 or 
not? 

889
00:53:53,720 --> 00:53:55,880
What's the Lollapalooza? 
I think so, yeah. 

890
00:53:56,280 --> 00:53:58,960
Lollapalooza. 
Anyway, I didn't get to see 

891
00:53:59,200 --> 00:54:04,480
Nirvana or I've gone to a lot of
concerts, a lot of concerts, 

892
00:54:04,480 --> 00:54:09,640
hundreds of concerts. 
So I've got 2 that now. 

893
00:54:09,640 --> 00:54:11,800
This is Part 3. 
This is the direct answer to 

894
00:54:11,800 --> 00:54:15,080
your question. 
So one that will probably 

895
00:54:15,640 --> 00:54:18,600
everybody can understand would 
be Metallica. 

896
00:54:18,880 --> 00:54:23,560
I miss like going to a real deal
Metallica concert, but I would 

897
00:54:23,560 --> 00:54:27,880
still go to see them. 
I still pay the 300 bucks to go 

898
00:54:27,880 --> 00:54:32,000
see them live even though I know
it wouldn't be prime Metallica. 

899
00:54:32,520 --> 00:54:37,920
And then a current act, which I 
very well could easily get to is

900
00:54:37,920 --> 00:54:40,520
Post Malone. 
But it's like one of those 

901
00:54:40,520 --> 00:54:43,200
things like that's why I didn't 
go to see Nerf Honda was like, 

902
00:54:43,200 --> 00:54:45,920
I'll definitely get to see them.
I'll just wait till next summer.

903
00:54:46,760 --> 00:54:50,440
Next summer might never come so.
Just watch on YouTube. 

904
00:54:51,600 --> 00:54:53,360
Well, that's I've got that for 
life, man. 

905
00:54:53,360 --> 00:54:56,200
I can see Jerry Garcia on the 
YouTube all the time, all day 

906
00:54:56,200 --> 00:54:58,680
long. 
So this was a chance to make 

907
00:54:58,680 --> 00:55:03,280
John jealous because you saw 
Pink Floyd live. 

908
00:55:03,640 --> 00:55:06,520
I've seen Metallica twice, at 
least twice live. 

909
00:55:06,880 --> 00:55:09,680
So now I can make you jealous. 
And they put on a great show. 

910
00:55:09,680 --> 00:55:13,880
I saw them in early 2000s, late 
late 90s. 

911
00:55:13,880 --> 00:55:18,600
I think it was the Load Reload 
album tour that they were on. 

912
00:55:18,600 --> 00:55:20,960
So it was great. 
Saw them at the Rosemont Horizon

913
00:55:20,960 --> 00:55:22,800
in Chicago. 
Now it's called like Allstate 

914
00:55:22,800 --> 00:55:25,600
Arena or something like that. 
And I saw them at Lollapalooza 

915
00:55:25,600 --> 00:55:27,760
when they did that, I think it 
was like 97. 

916
00:55:28,400 --> 00:55:33,480
So I've seen them live a couple 
times, a band that I have not 

917
00:55:33,480 --> 00:55:37,480
seen that I would love to see, 
but it's probably too late. 

918
00:55:37,520 --> 00:55:40,280
And I would like to see the 
maybe a decade ago is Megadeth. 

919
00:55:41,320 --> 00:55:44,400
I'm a huge Dave Mustaine fan and
I think the guys just a 

920
00:55:44,400 --> 00:55:49,160
brilliant guitarist and I would 
love to see prime Dave Mustaine 

921
00:55:49,240 --> 00:55:51,880
out there. 
Just whaling baby. 

922
00:55:53,400 --> 00:55:55,360
That's that's what I want to see
in here. 

923
00:55:55,480 --> 00:55:58,120
And now I'm going to listen to 
Megadeth after I'm done while I 

924
00:55:58,360 --> 00:56:00,040
you don't work on editing this 
the show. 

925
00:56:00,840 --> 00:56:03,120
That was, you know, another one 
that I could have gone to see in

926
00:56:03,120 --> 00:56:07,640
the 80s was Rolling Stones like 
way already way past their 

927
00:56:07,640 --> 00:56:09,680
prime. 
The funny thing was, I mean, 

928
00:56:09,680 --> 00:56:13,200
they were touring as of like 
within the past decade. 

929
00:56:13,200 --> 00:56:15,720
I think it's like. 
Just a few years. 

930
00:56:17,000 --> 00:56:23,440
Definitely you missed. 
You can, you can watch the AI 

931
00:56:23,440 --> 00:56:26,480
version of it. 
You know, there's the holograms 

932
00:56:26,480 --> 00:56:28,560
that people are doing now for 
some of these shows. 

933
00:56:28,560 --> 00:56:31,600
Like, you know, it's, it's an 
interesting world we're living 

934
00:56:31,600 --> 00:56:34,520
in now from a technology 
standpoint where we have 

935
00:56:34,520 --> 00:56:38,000
recordings, right, audio now, we
got beta recordings. 

936
00:56:38,000 --> 00:56:41,120
And now we're serving this next 
generation of like, yeah, what's

937
00:56:41,120 --> 00:56:44,680
stopping somebody from making a 
virtual version of any of these 

938
00:56:44,680 --> 00:56:47,480
acts and doing something brand 
new with it? 

939
00:56:47,480 --> 00:56:49,520
I think that's part of the, you 
know, the part of the battle, 

940
00:56:49,520 --> 00:56:51,840
right, that a lot of like 
artists are having right now is 

941
00:56:51,840 --> 00:56:56,800
how is their name, likeness and 
content going to be used in the 

942
00:56:56,800 --> 00:56:58,520
future after, you know, they've 
moved on. 

943
00:56:59,000 --> 00:57:01,160
Have we ever asked? 
And maybe we'll just do it real 

944
00:57:01,160 --> 00:57:03,240
quick. 
What's the first concert you 

945
00:57:03,240 --> 00:57:06,000
went to? 
First concert for me was 

946
00:57:06,400 --> 00:57:12,240
Offspring 1994, the smash album 
at the Aragon Brawl Room, 

947
00:57:12,240 --> 00:57:14,680
downtown Chicago. 
What about you, Jim? 

948
00:57:15,960 --> 00:57:18,800
Harry Chapin, My parents took me
when I was a little kid. 

949
00:57:20,200 --> 00:57:21,560
OK, well, that explains a lot, 
yeah. 

950
00:57:22,480 --> 00:57:25,080
What do you think, John? 
What's your your first concert? 

951
00:57:25,960 --> 00:57:29,880
First concert was Yes and I went
up to see them about 30 times 

952
00:57:29,880 --> 00:57:33,760
all together over the SO. 
Definitely a yes, man, yeah. 

953
00:57:33,760 --> 00:57:36,600
Definitely. 
Yeah, I'll never forget that 

954
00:57:36,600 --> 00:57:39,080
first concert. 
It's such a great, I don't know,

955
00:57:39,360 --> 00:57:41,520
memory, I think for everybody, 
right, No matter who you go to, 

956
00:57:41,520 --> 00:57:43,080
kind of go and see. 
Maybe I don't know, Jim, I don't

957
00:57:43,080 --> 00:57:43,840
know about you. 
Maybe. 

958
00:57:43,840 --> 00:57:47,120
I don't know if you're a fan. 
It was a great, great experience

959
00:57:47,120 --> 00:57:53,200
and I'm like, what's that smell?
Never mind, Jim, never mind. 

960
00:57:54,280 --> 00:57:55,920
Don't worry about that, little 
Jimmy. 

961
00:57:58,360 --> 00:58:00,440
All right, let's go ahead and 
wrap it up for this week. 

962
00:58:00,680 --> 00:58:02,560
John, thank you so much for 
coming back. 

963
00:58:02,920 --> 00:58:06,520
Looking forward to see you in 
Berlin in 2026, hopefully at the

964
00:58:06,520 --> 00:58:08,840
European Identity and Cloud 
Conference. 

965
00:58:09,120 --> 00:58:10,600
Right now, Jim and I are 
planning to be there. 

966
00:58:11,280 --> 00:58:13,480
Hopefully you'll come back 
sooner than in four years. 

967
00:58:13,720 --> 00:58:15,720
Maybe as you put out some new 
research and things like that, 

968
00:58:15,720 --> 00:58:18,080
you'll come back and kind of 
update us so we can, you know, 

969
00:58:18,080 --> 00:58:20,160
tease people to go out and get 
the report and kind of, you 

970
00:58:20,160 --> 00:58:22,520
know, see what what's in that 
big brain of yours that you're 

971
00:58:22,520 --> 00:58:24,800
willing to share with with the 
Internet at large. 

972
00:58:26,360 --> 00:58:30,040
I'll have I'll have Lincoln or 
show notes for people to connect

973
00:58:30,040 --> 00:58:32,520
with you on LinkedIn. 
I'll have links to both reports,

974
00:58:32,520 --> 00:58:35,840
the e-commerce and the finance 
version of the Fraud Reduction 

975
00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:38,200
Intelligence platform report 
from Cooper Cole. 

976
00:58:39,160 --> 00:58:42,520
And then for Jim and I connect 
with us on LinkedIn, like and 

977
00:58:42,520 --> 00:58:45,240
subscribe to all that stuff. 
For us that helps us outgrow the

978
00:58:45,240 --> 00:58:47,920
channel, get great guests like 
John and others to to join us 

979
00:58:47,920 --> 00:58:51,280
and spread the gospel of I am 
and identity at the center. 

980
00:58:51,280 --> 00:58:54,000
So with that, we'll go ahead and
leave it for this week. 

981
00:58:54,360 --> 00:58:57,560
Thanks everyone for watching and
or listening and we'll talk with

982
00:58:57,560 --> 00:59:02,320
y'all in the next one. 
You've been listening to 

983
00:59:02,360 --> 00:59:06,280
Identity at the Center. 
We hope you've enjoyed the show.

984
00:59:06,480 --> 00:59:10,600
Make sure to like, rate and 
review, and we'll be back soon. 

985
00:59:10,840 --> 00:59:13,120
But in the meantime, hit the 
website at 

986
00:59:13,120 --> 00:59:19,480
identity@thecenter.com. 
See you next time on Identity at

987
00:59:19,480 --> 00:59:20,360
the Center.