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Do you know who has access to 
what this is? 

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The identity at the center 
podcast? 

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If you're looking for identity 
and access management talk 

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you've come to the right place 
and now on to the show, Welcome 

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to the identity at the center 
podcasts. 

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I'm Jeff and that's Jim here I 
am. 

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There you are, that's where you 
are. 

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You're there. 
Today was day, one of the 

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cooping, ercole consumer 
identity World Conference, 

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that's a mouthful. 
Yeah, good job pronounciations 

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whooping whooping, her coming 
up, injure, which I've said 

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before coming herself but yeah, 
whooping her as I learned today.

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So already a successful 
conference. 

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Yes, right, learn something. 
We can we can now correctly. 

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Say, the sponsors name. 
My attitude is generally, I want

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to learn something new every day
once I do, I shuffle. 

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Yeah, so we learn that pretty 
early. 

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So yeah, that makes a lot of 
sense. 

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Today was a day of workshops and
there was a few different things

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that were talked about. 
There was a presentation by ID 

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Pro around identity, access 
management or kind of like an 

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intro. 
I am but that's another good 

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topics in there. 
Yeah. 

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Yeah. 
You know, when I saw two topic 

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on the agenda, I thought okay 
I've been in the industry for 15

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years. 
Probably skip this one but it 

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was a single track day. 
So I sat in the session was 

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Sarah and Ian and they're both 
really brilliant people and I 

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got a lot out of it, you know. 
I think one of the things 

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sometimes, when you're so close 
to something is you don't see 

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with it. 
You'll see the first or the 

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trees. 
Are basically I think that's the

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right amount things that. 
But basically, what I mean by 

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that is, you know, they had a 
slide for example on IDP 

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Discovery or on Discovery. 
So it was, you know, somebody is

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doing a Federated login, how do 
you know what IEP to send them 

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to and they gave a good 
framework of a, the three 

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methods. 
And I think that is really 

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interesting. 
So I actually think what I'd 

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like to do Do is get their slide
deck and maybe even have one of 

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them. 
Come on the show some time and 

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really just go through what Ida 
Pro is all about me. 

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Pick some of those topics and 
and kind of dive into them. 

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Could be therapy and might be 
getting back from your 

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hesitation. 
Yeah. 

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And since we talked about in the
past, I think, as we've kind of 

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grown into this podcasts, right?
And kind of learned how it, how 

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it works that we can, you know, 
start to figure out how to, how 

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to get some some better guests 
and Were guests from other 

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things that our guests from the 
money. 

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Yeah. 
But I was wrong. 

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The were is wrong word but just,
you know, more guests different 

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guests from different areas and 
their cat top neurosurgeon but I

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do pro is a great word. 
It's only been around for, I 

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want to say this is the third 
year. 

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It started at the Ping Identity 
conference which became identify

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reverse severally identify think
it was 2016. 

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It was in Chicago and so I'm a 
founding member of the 

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organization just like, you 
know, a bunch of other people 

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and Ice also served last. 
Last year or this year I should 

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say on the board nomination 
committee. 

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So I do have some relationships 
there. 

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That maybe you might be helpful 
to kind of bring onto the show 

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and then talk group. 
Yeah, I think that would be is 

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it is a good, a good well-run 
well-managed and kind of 

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well-executed organization. 
It feels like they're trying to 

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make significant Change for the 
good in the industry. 

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So one of the things they were 
talking about is how the help 

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people get up speed quicker. 
And I think the way that it was 

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put was it takes people between 
five and ten years to really 

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know the industry and that was 
based on survey responses and 

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others people self grading. 
So, you know, I think you could 

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look as a out if you if you've 
been in the industry 15-20 years

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like you won't know it. 
As much as I know for so long. 

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But this is people greeting 
themselves and I think the 

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thought pattern well most of us 
who get into. 

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I am start with a single product
right before, we're not really 

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industry experts for, you know, 
during that period where we're 

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only working with one product 
because we get very product 

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focus and how that product 
solves a particular problem, 

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right? 
Yeah, I remember they went out 

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so everyone out. 
So it would definitely was a 

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poll of ID Chrome. 
Embers and kind of get that 

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sense of when to feel when do 
people feel proficient and it 

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was that 5 to 10-year Mark. 
But, you know, even people who 

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have been in the space for 
15-plus years like you and I I 

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still feel like, there's always 
something new to learn, right? 

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Technology is always changing. 
I think there's Core Concepts, 

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right? 
That maybe now we take for 

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granted right there. 
Are people who don't have that 

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experience, right? 
We have Morgan on a few weeks 

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ago, you know, she's relatively 
new to the I am space. 

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You know, it's people like that.
That, how do we groom the Next 

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Generation? 
I know that was a topic that 

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actually, you know, someone 
wrote in looking for us to talk 

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about, I think, in some point in
the future, once we get through 

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this, little travel still work 
on, it would be a good idea to 

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kind of, get those folks back 
into room and really kind of 

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talk about. 
How do we get, how do we get 

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the, you know, folks who don't 
have as much experience with? 

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I am. 
Snag them in college and see no 

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other areas, you know, younger 
folks are people who are just 

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looking to make a change. 
And And try to, you know, help 

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them along their path. 
Yeah. 

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Totally Ida pro has this 
project, they're working on 

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called the body of knowledge 
which is essentially the intent 

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is to be kind of a, you know, a 
training manual for I am. 

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Yeah. 
You know it was interesting. 

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Was it was meant to be kind of I
think the way Sarah was putting 

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it was. 
It's like so first off. 

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I'm PMP. 
So that's project management 

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professional. 
That's the group that PMI that 

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built the pain. 
My project management body of 

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knowledge. 
So I actually had to know it 

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like down to the job until at 
one point and what she was 

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saying was that they want to 
create a body of knowledge but 

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they don't want it to dictate 
best practices. 

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And my thought was, well, the 
pin bog definitely. 

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So this is the best practice. 
It is not a agnostic from that 

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sense, but I do think that And I
am it's a little dangerous to 

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you know try to say this is the 
best practice I think him. 

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Similarly different people have 
different perspectives on what 

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the best practices. 
Well they change. 

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So I mean they can change 
relatively quickly if you think 

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about it like what was that? 
Like two years ago SMS is fine. 

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Maybe three years ago but SMS is
fine for a one-time password. 

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Now it's not even recommended by
nist standards and no think 

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historically nist has moved as 
quickly maybe as you know the 

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industry but even nests you know
it is Saying, yeah, we're 

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deprecating that and it's no 
longer considered a secure form 

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for authentication, right? 
That being said, if you're only 

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using an ID and a password, and 
the only option you have 

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available is to use some sort of
SMS, you know, OTP, then it's 

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probably better that. 
It's nothing at all, rather than

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nothing, right? 
But yeah, things move so 

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quickly. 
That I don't know if you want to

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set a best practice today for 
without having to have several 

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pages of This is a point in 
time, you know exactly. 

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You're going to have to just I 
mean no matter what you do 

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you're going to have to update. 
That's the one thing about 

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identity management is pretty 
cool. 

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Since I first got into industry,
the first conference I went to 

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was called digital ID world, and
it was like, I think, you know, 

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was there because Rob he's been 
around for a long time but, you 

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know, it was like they talked 
about I am The standpoint of 

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like, what is the father, who 
what is the identity? 

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And it was really quite loved 
that about. 

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I was like, you know, I never 
really thought about what is an 

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identity mean to the 
philosophical discussion 

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philosophical discussion about 
it and, you know, there's so 

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many different Industries where 
they've kind of disappeared as 

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industry and they've just become
like could you imagine A CRM or 

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Erp industry event? 
I don't think those exist. 

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I think they're all focused on 
their one product and they're 

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all product Focus now. 
So it's a very, you know, 

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Salesforce or sap or, you know, 
one of those guys or maybe like 

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Microsoft or something, but, you
know, I didn't imagine still has

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vendor agnostic conferences. 
Yeah. 

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Which is that? 
Yes, I think it's great. 

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There's so many So many products
out there, you know, sometimes I

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fundamentally, I feel like 
fundamentally. 

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They do pretty much the same 
thing, they helped me understand

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who has access to what, and if 
that is appropriate at its basic

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level, that's pretty much all I 
am is right, that is different 

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things right there. 
Could be, you know around yes, 

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education site operation side, 
you know, wherever he may be. 

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But there's so many still good 
conferences. 

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Like you said that you can see 
the, you know, compare and 

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contrast the different solutions
because each one has an area 

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think that they're really good 
at we're other specialized maybe

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in, you know, another area of I 
am or even just down to, you 

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know, I'll call like simple 
things like IGA then he governs 

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Administration doing just the 
basics of Plumbing of 

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provisioning accounts be 
provisioning accounts. 

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Yeah, you know, certifications 
sale Point does it this way? 

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Saving? 
It does it this way, Oracle does

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it another way. 
They all have different 

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strengths that they liked him. 
Yeah, I asked the question and 

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it wasn't like in order to stump
these guys because I'm really 

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interested to see if they had an
answer. 

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But you know it's like we talked
about Samuel to and we talked 

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about oauth 2 and open ID 
connect and I asked question 

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what what's next and Puma was 
mentioned, that's definitely one

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that it has people's interests 
and their future. 

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Dietary things. 
But it's a little bit hard. 

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I think hard question to answer 
because I don't think there's 

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anything emergent that's like. 
Finally, the next you see, 

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here's the thing. 
I don't know what it is, but I 

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can tell you that 10 15 years 
down the road soon, be something

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else. 
That's kind of feel like about 

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actor-director right somewhere? 
Someone is out of replaced, 

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active directory, right? 
We just don't know it yet. 

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That's right. 
He's kind of same way that what 

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no vowel, you know, all of a 
sudden was gone and you're 

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really replaces Novella 
essentially, right? 

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Yeah. 
So something's out there and 

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replace it. 
I'm curious to see how the 

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blockchain plays into this. 
I think there's some sessions 

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and next couple days. 
Yeah, around that decentralized 

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identity. 
Sarah did have, you know, 

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interesting, use case around 
Puma, you may wear. 

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It was kind of like a 
point-to-point identification, 

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which I think is interesting 
because in the age of privacy, 

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you don't necessarily need need 
to know someone's birth date or 

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you just need to know you know 
are they old enough to do what 

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they're trying to do? 
Is it by a Beer by whatever 

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where they need to be 21 or 
maybe devote right? 

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You don't really need all that 
information. 

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Just Yes or no. 
Basically, it's a binary. 

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So then you start having the 
idea of like an identity 

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provider being government 
agency, and things like that. 

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Which, you know, that idea has 
been getting further else's 

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digital ID 1, I can see ya 
nationally and, you know, I 

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don't know, it's like as much as
it seems to make sense and never

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really, actually seems never 
happen. 

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I think part of it is, you know,
I'm not an anti-government 

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person. 
But, you know, I think the 

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government moves, Too slow to 
keep up with the pace of 

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technology for consumers. 
Yeah, isn't it? 

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I think it's Estonia. 
They've gone to an all-digital 

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identification. 
I don't know enough about speak 

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intelligently. 
So I'm going to stop right 

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there. 
All right, but I'm pretty sure 

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it's a Stony a little bit more, 
but, I'm pretty sure it's a 

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Stony of that has gone to like 
an all digital identity. 

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00:12:43,800 --> 00:12:48,300
Do all their voting online. 
I'm not sure how secure it is, 

227
00:12:48,300 --> 00:12:51,800
but you know that, Could be 
something that becomes a case. 

228
00:12:51,800 --> 00:12:55,100
Study of, here's what works and 
here's what doesn't work, 

229
00:12:55,100 --> 00:12:59,100
because like anything else, 
technology people processes Etc,

230
00:12:59,100 --> 00:13:03,800
will continue to evolve mature 
etcetera based on the needs of 

231
00:13:04,100 --> 00:13:06,500
humans. 
Yeah, until the robots take 

232
00:13:06,500 --> 00:13:08,800
over. 
So one last thing I want to do 

233
00:13:08,800 --> 00:13:12,000
is mention I was talking about 
that Discovery. 

234
00:13:12,300 --> 00:13:14,800
I went back and looked at the 
slide because it's a picture of 

235
00:13:14,800 --> 00:13:17,500
it. 
So the three forms were first 

236
00:13:17,500 --> 00:13:20,600
one they called NASCAR. 
I thought was a really cool 

237
00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:23,100
name. 
So the NASCAR was the login 

238
00:13:23,100 --> 00:13:26,500
screen with all the little 
witches or icons. 

239
00:13:26,700 --> 00:13:32,500
Also got they're like yeah 
sponsored by Google or Yahoo 

240
00:13:32,600 --> 00:13:36,100
Plankton laughing. 
Yeah. 

241
00:13:37,000 --> 00:13:38,200
So I thought that was pretty 
cool. 

242
00:13:38,200 --> 00:13:41,000
That was method. 
Number one is so this is IDP 

243
00:13:41,000 --> 00:13:45,200
Discovery, that's it. 
One must NASCAR method to was 

244
00:13:46,500 --> 00:13:51,100
what they call IDP discovery 
which was you Put in your domain

245
00:13:51,100 --> 00:13:55,300
or you hit a drop down, select 
your domain and then the third 

246
00:13:55,300 --> 00:13:58,400
was user base, which is where I 
say this is probably the most 

247
00:13:58,400 --> 00:14:03,000
common you type in an email 
address type style user name and

248
00:14:03,000 --> 00:14:06,300
it truncates off you know at 
yeah. 

249
00:14:06,300 --> 00:14:09,000
Whatever is the environment 
clean and then we'll send you 

250
00:14:09,000 --> 00:14:11,900
back to the room. 
That's interesting. 

251
00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:16,400
Yeah. 
So anyway, more to come on. 

252
00:14:16,400 --> 00:14:22,800
That probably the other part of 
the, the afternoon was focused 

253
00:14:22,800 --> 00:14:28,300
on a workshop around how to 
manage through a data breach and

254
00:14:28,300 --> 00:14:32,600
this was truly a workshop. 
So when I saw it on the agenda 

255
00:14:32,600 --> 00:14:36,300
didn't really distinguish, okay?
Workshop means there's going to 

256
00:14:36,300 --> 00:14:40,200
be a lot of participation by 
folks in the audience. 

257
00:14:40,200 --> 00:14:44,400
So it wasn't just watching a 
bunch of And some actually 

258
00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:47,500
thought that was good, really 
kept it from being too boring at

259
00:14:47,500 --> 00:14:51,700
least for me. 
But the case you guys were 

260
00:14:52,100 --> 00:14:55,700
Richard Hill and John Tolbert, I
thought it was a really good 

261
00:14:55,700 --> 00:15:01,300
session. 
I think that the big message was

262
00:15:01,400 --> 00:15:04,300
what was in session. 
So what was it about? 

263
00:15:04,300 --> 00:15:08,600
It was handling your identity 
breachers, a customer. 

264
00:15:13,700 --> 00:15:18,700
They went through the workshop 
was kind of, a lot of, here's 

265
00:15:18,700 --> 00:15:22,200
kind of the problem. 
One of the problems is, if you 

266
00:15:22,200 --> 00:15:26,400
look at handling your breach, 
there's how you can prevent it, 

267
00:15:26,700 --> 00:15:32,900
how you can detect it and how 
you can respond, most of the 

268
00:15:33,300 --> 00:15:37,000
investment that at least. 
So they did a survey of 

269
00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:41,300
companies in the UK and like 
ninety percent of those 

270
00:15:41,300 --> 00:15:48,300
companies have invested. 
And prevention 55% had done some

271
00:15:48,300 --> 00:15:50,300
level of investment in 
detection. 

272
00:15:50,600 --> 00:15:54,300
Only 13% invested in response. 
Yeah. 

273
00:15:54,300 --> 00:15:57,800
So in other words the planning 
for the response, the problem is

274
00:15:57,800 --> 00:16:03,100
like the Dave reaches I think 
occurred are currently 50 

275
00:16:03,100 --> 00:16:05,400
percent of companies or 
something like that. 

276
00:16:05,400 --> 00:16:07,400
I mean it's a really high 
percentage, I don't know who 

277
00:16:07,400 --> 00:16:10,900
said it, but if there's the old 
adage of either, you've been 

278
00:16:11,000 --> 00:16:14,400
either, you've been hacked. 
Or you don't know yet, right? 

279
00:16:14,400 --> 00:16:16,200
Exactly. 
And then what they're also 

280
00:16:16,200 --> 00:16:20,200
saying was like, you know, 
Common, there's coming patterns 

281
00:16:20,200 --> 00:16:24,500
that there that they found in 
their survey, there's a survey 

282
00:16:24,500 --> 00:16:28,600
by the Hanuman institute. 
There's one by IBM, and a lot of

283
00:16:28,608 --> 00:16:33,100
the numbers are the same and one
of the the shocking statistics 

284
00:16:33,100 --> 00:16:37,200
is it takes about a half a year 
on average to even detect that 

285
00:16:37,200 --> 00:16:39,400
you've been hacked. 
This is why I'm such a big fan 

286
00:16:39,400 --> 00:16:41,400
of things like machine learning 
and AI. 

287
00:16:41,600 --> 00:16:44,500
Yah is How You Gonna Catch? 
There's no way, you know, that 

288
00:16:44,500 --> 00:16:50,200
it makes sense to staff. 
Dozens hundreds of analysts just

289
00:16:50,200 --> 00:16:52,900
to try and pour over logs and 
you know whatever maybe he. 

290
00:16:52,900 --> 00:16:56,000
So I think that's I think that's
what you're seeing now is the 

291
00:16:56,000 --> 00:17:00,300
kind of the Leading Edge of. 
I am is a lot of this focus on 

292
00:17:00,300 --> 00:17:02,700
machine learning. 
Hey, I see a product like 

293
00:17:02,900 --> 00:17:05,300
exiting for example, right? 
We're doing that kind of looks 

294
00:17:05,300 --> 00:17:10,000
long and it was getting into it 
well especially when a lot of 

295
00:17:10,000 --> 00:17:14,300
these data breaches. 
Start with a phishing attack. 

296
00:17:14,500 --> 00:17:17,900
Other words, you're getting 
somebody credentials one way or 

297
00:17:17,900 --> 00:17:21,599
the other and then you start 
accident, if you're a hacker you

298
00:17:21,599 --> 00:17:25,800
start accessing the network in a
way that would be normal all the

299
00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:27,900
day I do. 
And in that case, whose you say,

300
00:17:27,900 --> 00:17:31,500
okay, while you're accessing the
network, in a way that's normal,

301
00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:33,900
we're accessing it from China, 
right? 

302
00:17:33,900 --> 00:17:38,000
Or you're accessing it from the 
VPN in your on the network at 

303
00:17:38,000 --> 00:17:40,100
the same time, right? 
Into different avoid that 

304
00:17:40,100 --> 00:17:42,500
doesn't make sense right? 
Or you're you know trying to 

305
00:17:42,700 --> 00:17:45,100
Access different things that you
normally don't try to access, 

306
00:17:45,200 --> 00:17:46,400
right? 
Right. 

307
00:17:46,400 --> 00:17:50,700
And then exactly so search 
kicking off a weird pattern and 

308
00:17:50,700 --> 00:17:53,000
it requires somebody to go look 
into it further. 

309
00:17:53,400 --> 00:17:59,700
But I think that was that's the 
thing is that so many of these 

310
00:17:59,700 --> 00:18:04,400
cases happen and then 
organizations don't have a plan 

311
00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:08,800
to deal with data breach and 
then one occurs and there. 

312
00:18:09,800 --> 00:18:13,500
They're trying to fight a battle
without a plan, right? 

313
00:18:13,500 --> 00:18:17,400
So things start moving very 
quickly on you when I thought 

314
00:18:17,400 --> 00:18:21,100
was interesting about that part 
where the vast majority of the 

315
00:18:21,100 --> 00:18:26,100
spend was on the prevention side
and very minimal spend on 

316
00:18:26,300 --> 00:18:29,200
response. 
I think you see that today in 

317
00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:32,000
some of the responses, you see, 
if the companies where frankly, 

318
00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:34,500
their trash responses, they're 
not good, right? 

319
00:18:34,500 --> 00:18:38,300
They just do a terrible job and 
every once in a while, I'll see 

320
00:18:38,300 --> 00:18:40,500
a company, I'm trying things. 
Off the top of my head I can 

321
00:18:40,500 --> 00:18:43,200
think of was like okay they 
actually I think they did a good

322
00:18:43,200 --> 00:18:45,200
job. 
Yes they got hacked that's bad. 

323
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:47,400
But at least they're responsible
bit better. 

324
00:18:47,800 --> 00:18:49,400
And if there was some 
interesting conversation to room

325
00:18:49,400 --> 00:18:54,200
around, why do we think the 
response spend is so small? 

326
00:18:54,200 --> 00:18:58,400
In comparison to prevention 
detection mitigation, those 

327
00:18:58,400 --> 00:19:01,900
sorts of things and I don't 
member who said in the room, but

328
00:19:01,900 --> 00:19:03,000
I was kind of thinking see 
anything. 

329
00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:06,500
It's if you're spending, but 
this is just a perception thing,

330
00:19:06,500 --> 00:19:08,700
right? 
If you're spending a lot of 

331
00:19:08,700 --> 00:19:12,100
money. 
On recovery or response. 

332
00:19:13,100 --> 00:19:15,600
Isn't that self-defeating 
because the whole point of you 

333
00:19:15,600 --> 00:19:19,400
spending money on prevention and
detection, all those sort of 

334
00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:21,300
things is that you don't get to 
the response. 

335
00:19:22,200 --> 00:19:25,800
So what are you saying to your 
CEO and say, hey I need, you 

336
00:19:25,800 --> 00:19:30,300
know, a million dollars for 
prevention and detection and 

337
00:19:30,300 --> 00:19:32,700
another million dollars for 
response. 

338
00:19:32,900 --> 00:19:34,900
Or what do you mean, why am I 
spending million dollars on 

339
00:19:34,900 --> 00:19:37,100
prevention if you're telling me 
that's already going to fail? 

340
00:19:37,100 --> 00:19:40,100
So I think it's an issue given 
the dynamic that, you know, 

341
00:19:40,100 --> 00:19:44,300
cisos and cios other folks. 
He's likable have to balance 

342
00:19:44,300 --> 00:19:47,700
that, you know that. 
Yes, we're going to do 

343
00:19:47,708 --> 00:19:50,100
everything we can to stop the 
breach, but we know that 

344
00:19:50,100 --> 00:19:53,900
inevitably something could 
happen and we need to prepare 

345
00:19:53,900 --> 00:19:56,100
for it as well. 
Yeah, the Challenger would have 

346
00:19:56,100 --> 00:20:00,400
on that would be, it should not 
cost you a million dollars. 

347
00:20:00,400 --> 00:20:02,800
So, I was responsible, I was 
using easy numbers for my 

348
00:20:02,800 --> 00:20:08,100
citizenship in some companies. 
Maybe it would, because I think 

349
00:20:08,100 --> 00:20:12,300
that parallel, and it is like a 
disaster. 

350
00:20:12,400 --> 00:20:16,300
Every plan, you know, yes, you 
go into your Datacenter gu built

351
00:20:16,300 --> 00:20:20,800
on a redundancy and Geographic 
redundancy and things like that.

352
00:20:20,900 --> 00:20:25,700
That doesn't mean you couldn't 
fall prey to a disaster, right? 

353
00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:30,100
And every companies deserve for 
her, reflect it and the disaster

354
00:20:30,100 --> 00:20:33,900
recovery. 
Plan could say, well, you know, 

355
00:20:33,900 --> 00:20:36,800
we have a hot side over here. 
So we should never be down. 

356
00:20:37,000 --> 00:20:41,200
And the response plan like this 
for a data breach probably 

357
00:20:41,700 --> 00:20:44,300
probably know. 
Oh like you know no matter what 

358
00:20:44,300 --> 00:20:47,900
we're covered, right? 
But at least give a plan to say 

359
00:20:48,700 --> 00:20:50,700
when we find out Something's 
Happened. 

360
00:20:51,200 --> 00:20:55,400
This is the team that's going to
run with it and those folks are 

361
00:20:55,400 --> 00:20:58,400
prepared know their role. 
Yeah, I think that was, I think 

362
00:20:58,400 --> 00:21:02,400
one of these you spoke about was
ownership, very who owns this. 

363
00:21:02,400 --> 00:21:05,000
And I think people kind of 
thinking around the room because

364
00:21:05,000 --> 00:21:07,500
it can't see, faces was kind of 
like, uh, that's a good 

365
00:21:07,500 --> 00:21:08,500
question. 
Who owns this? 

366
00:21:10,500 --> 00:21:15,400
Yeah, so so the way they 
approach the workshop the KCI is

367
00:21:15,400 --> 00:21:21,000
was they set up a fictitious 
example I guess they said it was

368
00:21:21,000 --> 00:21:24,800
based on something that really 
happened but regardless you can 

369
00:21:24,800 --> 00:21:28,200
see how this could really happen
and they dribbled a little bit 

370
00:21:28,200 --> 00:21:31,200
of information as the hack was 
playing out. 

371
00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:35,800
So you were in the shoes of a 
new security analysts have been 

372
00:21:35,800 --> 00:21:39,700
with the company for a week and,
you know, so slide one was like 

373
00:21:39,800 --> 00:21:44,800
Like you start hearing about 
some issues where the helped us 

374
00:21:44,800 --> 00:21:48,300
who's getting slammed with all 
these questions about their 

375
00:21:48,300 --> 00:21:53,000
accounts and then you saw a 
social media post that some 

376
00:21:53,000 --> 00:21:56,000
accounts have been posted to the
dark web, you're starting to 

377
00:21:56,000 --> 00:21:59,400
become aware of it and that's 
one where the reporter. 

378
00:21:59,800 --> 00:22:03,400
Then the final step to the 
reporter calls you I reporter 

379
00:22:03,400 --> 00:22:08,300
calls you from some online media
site. 

380
00:22:08,300 --> 00:22:13,000
And as you You know about this 
episode. 

381
00:22:13,000 --> 00:22:14,600
I think that's where things got 
really interesting. 

382
00:22:14,600 --> 00:22:16,100
Their room, great. 
Yeah. 

383
00:22:17,300 --> 00:22:22,200
My perspective was, you know, 
phones Curiosity Company. 

384
00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:27,700
My role is not to talk to Media 
right now agreed that otherwise 

385
00:22:27,700 --> 00:22:29,400
would have media training 
employee. 

386
00:22:29,500 --> 00:22:32,100
Yeah, exactly. 
But, you know, and the point I 

387
00:22:32,108 --> 00:22:35,900
was making was, you know, 
answering that question, even 

388
00:22:35,900 --> 00:22:39,200
just say, like, no, I don't know
that I'll have somebody get back

389
00:22:39,200 --> 00:22:41,400
to you. 
That could be a headline, like 

390
00:22:41,400 --> 00:22:43,500
security analyst, doesn't your 
this company. 

391
00:22:43,500 --> 00:22:46,200
As even know that they stay 
number of ways. 

392
00:22:46,200 --> 00:22:48,000
I think he has fun A number of 
ways. 

393
00:22:48,000 --> 00:22:52,800
I'm just looking for a headline.
I think I'll take away on that 

394
00:22:52,800 --> 00:22:56,100
part though. 
Was that from a training 

395
00:22:56,100 --> 00:23:01,300
perspective, making sure the 
organization knows who to send 

396
00:23:01,300 --> 00:23:03,700
media inquiries to one of the 
companies I work for. 

397
00:23:03,700 --> 00:23:07,100
That was part of our training 
was if you receive requests from

398
00:23:07,100 --> 00:23:11,500
the media for, you know, send 
them to this person or this 

399
00:23:11,500 --> 00:23:13,000
department, or phone number, 
whatever it was. 

400
00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:15,500
And we had to actually do that 
every year rice, you know, it 

401
00:23:15,500 --> 00:23:16,900
was because it, you know, people
change it. 

402
00:23:17,000 --> 00:23:19,100
And procedures, whatever. 
But it was something that was 

403
00:23:19,100 --> 00:23:23,100
actually accounted for from a 
organizational level, somebody 

404
00:23:23,100 --> 00:23:26,800
made that statement. 
I think because, you know, from 

405
00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:29,900
that perspective, the data 
breaches not much different than

406
00:23:30,400 --> 00:23:32,500
any other type of accident that 
could tap. 

407
00:23:32,500 --> 00:23:37,000
So if your you had a factory and
the factory caught fire and they

408
00:23:37,500 --> 00:23:40,200
somebody found your number or 
they were just kind of word 

409
00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:46,300
island of corporate phone 
number, you know, block they got

410
00:23:46,300 --> 00:23:48,800
you. 
I want to know about the fire, 

411
00:23:49,300 --> 00:23:52,400
you know, you'd have to know, 
don't say anything is not your 

412
00:23:52,400 --> 00:23:55,200
job, right? 
Send them to that corporate 

413
00:23:55,200 --> 00:24:03,200
phone number. 
So, even if you had a plan, if 

414
00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:06,000
you had a plan around how to do 
a data breaches, it should 

415
00:24:06,600 --> 00:24:09,400
include having them call that 
number because I think they 

416
00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:14,200
would know how to say no comment
you know, I'll return your call 

417
00:24:14,200 --> 00:24:17,300
later or something like that. 
They would know how to Surely 

418
00:24:17,300 --> 00:24:19,400
get all kinds of offbeat calls 
all the time. 

419
00:24:19,600 --> 00:24:20,700
Yeah. 
That's when you see her it, when

420
00:24:20,700 --> 00:24:23,400
you read like a news article you
know reached out to so-and-so 

421
00:24:24,000 --> 00:24:27,500
have not heard back or you know 
did not provide a comment, 

422
00:24:27,600 --> 00:24:29,800
right, right? 
Which is probably okay at that 

423
00:24:29,800 --> 00:24:32,000
early stage, right? 
You're probably still 

424
00:24:32,000 --> 00:24:34,100
fact-finding and trying to 
figure out what the heck is 

425
00:24:34,100 --> 00:24:35,900
going on. 
You know. 

426
00:24:36,600 --> 00:24:39,100
You would hope that the 
organization would be aware of 

427
00:24:39,100 --> 00:24:40,400
things before it gets the 
outside. 

428
00:24:40,400 --> 00:24:43,400
But this is the real world and 
it doesn't always happen, right?

429
00:24:43,500 --> 00:24:46,500
So I can't. 
So at that point, we're kind of 

430
00:24:46,500 --> 00:24:48,700
at the point. 
Or with so you're starting to 

431
00:24:48,700 --> 00:24:51,100
become aware. 
You were starting to think, okay

432
00:24:51,100 --> 00:24:54,900
there's something I need to look
into but before you re believe 

433
00:24:55,100 --> 00:25:00,700
even the look into it, you get 
this media call then advances 

434
00:25:00,700 --> 00:25:03,900
into you start having more 
information come your way. 

435
00:25:04,100 --> 00:25:07,500
I think the real key is if you 
have a plan you know who to get 

436
00:25:07,500 --> 00:25:13,200
involved and you start things 
going, it's kind of fast forward

437
00:25:13,300 --> 00:25:15,100
because I even though it was a 
great session. 

438
00:25:15,300 --> 00:25:19,800
What I wanted to talk about was 
There were two example videos 

439
00:25:19,800 --> 00:25:23,400
that we watched her kind of News
interviews. 

440
00:25:23,600 --> 00:25:27,500
The first one was with the 
British Airways when they got 

441
00:25:27,800 --> 00:25:32,600
breached and it was two weeks 
after they hadn't come out and 

442
00:25:32,600 --> 00:25:34,200
made a public statement that 
point. 

443
00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:37,800
So they had this guy home kind 
of a talking head because that's

444
00:25:38,600 --> 00:25:40,800
the other. 
So many Talking Heads on news 

445
00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:43,300
channels and sports channels 
these days. 

446
00:25:43,700 --> 00:25:48,700
And he's just saying, you know, 
Thing after another and it was, 

447
00:25:48,800 --> 00:25:50,600
they lost control of the 
situation. 

448
00:25:50,600 --> 00:25:53,500
They didn't get out and 
proactively communicate. 

449
00:25:53,500 --> 00:25:56,200
About British Airways. 
Yeah, pretty sure ways. 

450
00:25:56,300 --> 00:25:59,000
And, you know, and they lost the
opportunity to kind of 

451
00:25:59,000 --> 00:26:03,200
formulate, the message and let 
customers know that they'll be 

452
00:26:03,200 --> 00:26:05,900
made whole and they'll be taken 
care of in that. 

453
00:26:06,200 --> 00:26:08,800
Not only that, that their planes
are safe, right? 

454
00:26:08,800 --> 00:26:13,100
This had nothing to do with the 
operation of their planes 

455
00:26:13,100 --> 00:26:16,100
because I think with an airline 
okay, even if you got my credit 

456
00:26:16,100 --> 00:26:18,500
card number five, Fine. 
I don't want to be on a plane 

457
00:26:18,500 --> 00:26:20,300
that crashed. 
Well, it's interesting because 

458
00:26:20,300 --> 00:26:23,000
look at what happened recently, 
the 737 Max, right? 

459
00:26:23,100 --> 00:26:25,400
A grounder that worldwide 
because of the software issue, 

460
00:26:25,600 --> 00:26:27,900
software issue young. 
So now we're starting to let me 

461
00:26:27,900 --> 00:26:30,200
on board. 
The lines between it's not just 

462
00:26:30,300 --> 00:26:33,700
payment and billing software 
issues can happen anywhere from 

463
00:26:33,700 --> 00:26:35,000
playing. 
You certainly don't want to 

464
00:26:35,008 --> 00:26:39,000
happen in the air for sure. 
So you have to be able to steer 

465
00:26:39,000 --> 00:26:41,500
the message where you need to 
go, obviously they want to 

466
00:26:41,500 --> 00:26:46,300
mislead people, right? 
But controlling the narrative, 

467
00:26:46,300 --> 00:26:48,300
which You know, is all over the 
place. 

468
00:26:48,300 --> 00:26:51,800
Politics, Etc Sports, whatever 
it may be is a key part of 

469
00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:53,700
making sure that it goes 
stories. 

470
00:26:53,700 --> 00:26:55,300
Go the direction, you're looking
some gum. 

471
00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:59,000
Yeah, exactly. 
The other video we watched was 

472
00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:03,600
the CEO of talk talk. 
And this interesting, the room, 

473
00:27:03,600 --> 00:27:07,600
a lot of people had an opinion 
on whether or not the CEO did a 

474
00:27:07,600 --> 00:27:09,600
good job. 
No, I watched the video. 

475
00:27:09,600 --> 00:27:12,300
I thought the CEO did a good job
in that. 

476
00:27:12,500 --> 00:27:14,200
I felt like she was being 
honest. 

477
00:27:14,200 --> 00:27:16,800
Yeah, she was not trying to 
cover anything. 

478
00:27:16,900 --> 00:27:21,800
Yup, there was an attack 
journalism from style, but I 

479
00:27:21,800 --> 00:27:24,900
also could see the point, some 
of the other people were making,

480
00:27:24,900 --> 00:27:29,400
which was she look like, she had
slept in 48 hours, probably 

481
00:27:29,400 --> 00:27:33,600
hadn't Hughes hanging your head.
Her body language was pretty 

482
00:27:33,600 --> 00:27:36,800
weak and then there's attack 
journalist, just like peppering 

483
00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:40,300
her with questions and rather 
than Prosecuting instead of 

484
00:27:40,300 --> 00:27:42,900
interview Prosecuting, right? 
She wasn't letting your finisher

485
00:27:42,900 --> 00:27:45,200
answers, the answers for never 
good enough. 

486
00:27:45,600 --> 00:27:48,800
And it's like, you, The people 
who handle that the best 

487
00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:52,300
basically put the reporter in 
their place and say, one 

488
00:27:52,300 --> 00:27:55,400
question at a time, you know, 
let me finish answering. 

489
00:27:57,000 --> 00:28:02,500
So, Anyway, we should try to 
find those videos and app to the

490
00:28:02,500 --> 00:28:04,900
show notes. 
I think that, you know, I know 

491
00:28:04,900 --> 00:28:07,100
we're kind of jumping all over 
because we don't want the show 

492
00:28:07,100 --> 00:28:13,100
to go on for ever, in the day. 
But one of the other interesting

493
00:28:13,100 --> 00:28:16,900
conversations was around when to
get law enforcement involved, I 

494
00:28:16,900 --> 00:28:19,000
am. 
And there was a FBI special 

495
00:28:19,000 --> 00:28:21,700
agent in the room as well. 
There was an FBI special agent 

496
00:28:21,700 --> 00:28:24,900
or no, and I've had we found 
him. 

497
00:28:25,100 --> 00:28:28,100
Yes, I thought that was pretty 
cool. 

498
00:28:29,700 --> 00:28:35,600
You know, depending on the 
industry or in depending on what

499
00:28:35,600 --> 00:28:41,100
the potential risks of the, of 
the reach, our main we were 

500
00:28:41,100 --> 00:28:46,300
looking at a I think we're led 
to believe that this particular 

501
00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:51,700
company wasn't in the in the 
business doing anything that 

502
00:28:52,200 --> 00:28:56,000
would threaten the lives and 
safety of people therapies, like

503
00:28:56,000 --> 00:28:58,300
an e-commerce type scenario. 
I think really right. 

504
00:28:58,700 --> 00:29:01,800
It's an e-commerce area but it 
didn't seem like as e-commerce 

505
00:29:01,800 --> 00:29:04,800
like Gun Company, right? 
They weren't selling guns, 

506
00:29:04,800 --> 00:29:08,500
firing line or anything but, you
know, imagine a scenario where 

507
00:29:08,600 --> 00:29:14,100
your client is selling guns or 
public safety's involved in some

508
00:29:14,100 --> 00:29:16,100
way. 
I think you need to be much 

509
00:29:16,100 --> 00:29:19,500
quicker in terms of contacting 
law enforcement before you even 

510
00:29:19,500 --> 00:29:22,500
had the full picture. 
Yeah, if your something where 

511
00:29:22,600 --> 00:29:27,500
lies aren't threatened, maybe 
take your time to try to, you 

512
00:29:27,500 --> 00:29:31,000
know, you don't want to Um, did 
love law, enforcement 

513
00:29:31,000 --> 00:29:34,100
involvement, find out that 
actually learnt for each and 

514
00:29:34,300 --> 00:29:36,200
this is all a big mistake, 
right? 

515
00:29:36,600 --> 00:29:41,100
I think the FBI is going to have
a presentation on Friday in a 

516
00:29:41,100 --> 00:29:43,800
couple days. 
So we'll see if it's worth if 

517
00:29:43,800 --> 00:29:47,500
it's worth talking about that 
point but he certainly didn't 

518
00:29:47,500 --> 00:29:51,900
want to spoil or, you know, 
steal his own Thunder ahead of 

519
00:29:51,900 --> 00:29:55,300
that. 
What did you think of the show? 

520
00:29:55,700 --> 00:29:58,200
The show the, the conference 
overall, because I have 

521
00:29:58,200 --> 00:29:58,900
opinions. 
Ins? 

522
00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:05,400
I'll let you go first. 
Well, is very small, I like the 

523
00:30:05,400 --> 00:30:09,600
style of today and I don't think
the style of today is going to 

524
00:30:09,600 --> 00:30:13,400
carry forward the way the 
conference Hall is that I 

525
00:30:13,400 --> 00:30:14,700
shouldn't even call a conference
Hall. 

526
00:30:14,900 --> 00:30:19,300
It's a floor on a hotel, but 
there's another conference going

527
00:30:19,300 --> 00:30:24,200
on in the room next to ours. 
So tomorrow it will be split 

528
00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:27,700
across those two rooms. 
There may be more people so I 

529
00:30:27,700 --> 00:30:32,700
think too Kind of make my call 
now would be premature, right? 

530
00:30:32,700 --> 00:30:37,300
It's definitely a hot, take a 
hot date, but I'm having fun 

531
00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:42,900
and, you know, I met a guy named
Dirk wolf healed from cognitum 

532
00:30:42,900 --> 00:30:46,400
software. 
He's a GDP, our expert. 

533
00:30:46,700 --> 00:30:50,400
And one thing I didn't realize 
is that there are companies 

534
00:30:50,400 --> 00:30:55,600
already paying fines gdpr. 
British Airways was one right. 

535
00:30:55,600 --> 00:30:57,500
There's a and it's not an 
insignificant amount. 

536
00:30:57,500 --> 00:31:00,200
It's based on a bleeder Gross 
profit or something like that. 

537
00:31:00,200 --> 00:31:03,700
Exactly. 
Year, 25 percent of your gross 

538
00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:07,200
revenue deficit Olivia. 
Yes, if you're 100 billion 

539
00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:09,800
dollar company, could be five 
billion dollars. 

540
00:31:09,800 --> 00:31:12,800
Yeah, that's nothing to sneeze 
that. 

541
00:31:12,800 --> 00:31:16,600
So, yeah. 
So anyway, he was showing me 

542
00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:21,000
some data that's publicly 
available and, you know, there 

543
00:31:21,000 --> 00:31:24,800
are some large US companies 
being fined for their 

544
00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:28,700
activities, in countries, in 
Europe. 

545
00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:33,100
And I know Google was just a 
news recently because they won a

546
00:31:33,100 --> 00:31:36,400
lawsuit against gdpr. 
Okay? 

547
00:31:37,300 --> 00:31:39,600
The it's around the right to be 
forgotten. 

548
00:31:40,000 --> 00:31:44,800
Part of GDP are. 
And what gdpr was arguing, was 

549
00:31:44,800 --> 00:31:50,600
that if someone makes a request 
to be forgotten, Google or the 

550
00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:53,000
search engine would have to 
remove it from all of their 

551
00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:55,900
product, from all of their 
search engines, meaning even 

552
00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:59,500
searches, and search engines in 
different regions, not Located 

553
00:31:59,500 --> 00:32:03,500
in European country and Google 
one. 

554
00:32:03,700 --> 00:32:04,900
I'm sure he'll get a peel 
Google. 

555
00:32:04,900 --> 00:32:08,800
One by saying, are they won? 
The ruling from the judge. 

556
00:32:08,800 --> 00:32:10,300
Was that? 
No, that's not correct. 

557
00:32:10,300 --> 00:32:15,700
They only have to remove it from
the, you know, the member areas 

558
00:32:15,700 --> 00:32:17,700
of the EU that are falling under
gdpr. 

559
00:32:17,700 --> 00:32:21,000
So America is not covered under 
that you know, other other 

560
00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:22,400
areas. 
So I think that was a real 

561
00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:26,600
interesting ruling how that's 
going to kind of move things 

562
00:32:26,600 --> 00:32:29,900
forward because theoretically, 
Lee, you know, if you're in, 

563
00:32:29,900 --> 00:32:32,800
let's say France, all you have 
to do is just change it to the 

564
00:32:32,800 --> 00:32:35,200
US version and you be able to 
still find whatever it is, 

565
00:32:35,200 --> 00:32:37,900
you're looking for versus. 
If you're in France version of 

566
00:32:37,900 --> 00:32:40,600
Google, for example, the results
weren't show up. 

567
00:32:41,400 --> 00:32:46,300
I want to give Dirk Werner on 
our podcast because we get asked

568
00:32:46,300 --> 00:32:49,100
by customers all the time about,
Judy PR. 

569
00:32:49,500 --> 00:32:56,700
And now companies are receiving,
real finds remain real money and

570
00:32:56,900 --> 00:33:00,700
this guy knows a lot about. 
So I'd like Get him on and share

571
00:33:00,700 --> 00:33:02,500
some of this information with 
Arliss. 

572
00:33:04,200 --> 00:33:07,300
So I'm going to agree and say I 
thought was it's a very small 

573
00:33:07,300 --> 00:33:10,800
conference. 
The format of the conference is 

574
00:33:10,800 --> 00:33:12,900
three days. 
Today was really kind of 

575
00:33:12,900 --> 00:33:16,100
Workshop, so it's even though 
it's day one of the concrete, 

576
00:33:16,100 --> 00:33:17,300
that's really more, like Day 
Zero. 

577
00:33:18,100 --> 00:33:22,300
So I'm curious to see how things
ramp up the next two days 

578
00:33:22,300 --> 00:33:25,400
because then becomes more of a 
conference type thing where 

579
00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:27,200
those different sessions. 
But it's still relatively small.

580
00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:30,500
I think from my account today, 
there were less than 30 people 

581
00:33:30,600 --> 00:33:34,100
there today, which is a very 
small number, you know, for a 

582
00:33:34,100 --> 00:33:36,100
concern, you know, and identity 
world. 

583
00:33:37,100 --> 00:33:38,600
Now I believe this is a new 
conference. 

584
00:33:38,800 --> 00:33:40,300
It's the u.s. 
I think it's only been around 

585
00:33:40,300 --> 00:33:44,500
for here that could be wrong on 
that and I felt like today was 

586
00:33:44,500 --> 00:33:47,700
really good. 
It could have been a webinar for

587
00:33:47,700 --> 00:33:51,300
sure but by being in the room 
and being able to have 

588
00:33:51,300 --> 00:33:53,500
interactions with all the other 
attendees and there was a pretty

589
00:33:53,500 --> 00:33:57,100
good mix from different people 
of, you know, other Consultants.

590
00:33:57,100 --> 00:34:00,100
But you know companies and you 
know some fairly big companies 

591
00:34:00,100 --> 00:34:04,000
as well that we're having the 
conversation of the room it was 

592
00:34:04,200 --> 00:34:06,100
I think that's the part that 
Rose like okay. 

593
00:34:06,900 --> 00:34:09,100
This was a good thing to be here
for. 

594
00:34:09,600 --> 00:34:12,100
I just hope that the next couple
days, get a little bit bigger, 

595
00:34:13,600 --> 00:34:17,699
but I think the content itself 
is hopefully going to live up to

596
00:34:17,900 --> 00:34:20,699
Billy's my expectations because 
I think that there's a there's 

597
00:34:20,699 --> 00:34:23,400
something here and it kind of 
strikes me as you know. 

598
00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:25,699
It's a relatively new seems like
they'll regret. 

599
00:34:25,699 --> 00:34:29,500
So relatively new show. 
It's for my European based 

600
00:34:29,500 --> 00:34:32,199
company think it's Cooper. 
Miracle is in Germany. 

601
00:34:32,300 --> 00:34:34,100
I think is really really Munich 
Germany, right? 

602
00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:37,800
Where they're based out of. 
So They're much bigger. 

603
00:34:37,800 --> 00:34:42,300
I think I'm you know the across 
the Atlantic I think we need to 

604
00:34:42,300 --> 00:34:45,900
go and that fighting Weenie 
Roast acts that evaluation. 

605
00:34:47,199 --> 00:34:52,199
Now my favorite thing of the 
conference today was what the 

606
00:34:52,199 --> 00:34:57,400
food food was really good but 
specifically one item of food. 

607
00:34:59,600 --> 00:35:03,200
I guess the brownies brownies 
brownies were actually really 

608
00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:05,000
good but and I'm a chocolate 
guy. 

609
00:35:05,000 --> 00:35:07,200
So I definitely would have 
gotten that but no, it was 

610
00:35:07,200 --> 00:35:10,000
potato chips. 
Oh yeah, they were. 

611
00:35:11,100 --> 00:35:14,200
Unexpectedly good, you were 
Dynamite. 

612
00:35:14,300 --> 00:35:19,300
Yeah, I'm gonna consider the day
one a success just based on 

613
00:35:19,500 --> 00:35:23,000
learning how to pronounce 
whooping your coal and the 

614
00:35:23,000 --> 00:35:28,000
quality of the potato chips. 
Yeah, here's my problem is that 

615
00:35:28,300 --> 00:35:32,300
I eat like 6,000 calories a day 
when I go to conferences, like 

616
00:35:32,300 --> 00:35:35,400
this food is too good. 
That's not something that 

617
00:35:35,400 --> 00:35:38,200
normally happens, though. 
Usually we're eating better 

618
00:35:38,200 --> 00:35:39,600
outside of the conference, 
right? 

619
00:35:39,800 --> 00:35:42,200
But yeah. 
In Previous podcasts to talked 

620
00:35:42,200 --> 00:35:45,200
about Oracle World. 
They remember their lunch was 

621
00:35:45,300 --> 00:35:49,000
gotten a long line behind a 
couple hundred people and picked

622
00:35:49,000 --> 00:35:52,800
up a bag lunch. 
And then you went and tried to 

623
00:35:52,808 --> 00:35:56,800
find somewhere to sit and eat it
Force networking with other 

624
00:35:56,800 --> 00:36:00,100
people or several. 
Yeah, I know Gartner does that 

625
00:36:00,100 --> 00:36:01,900
not to pick up Carter but like 
the other tables. 

626
00:36:01,900 --> 00:36:02,700
Right. 
Right. 

627
00:36:02,700 --> 00:36:04,800
Birds of a feather, I think is 
what they call it. 

628
00:36:04,800 --> 00:36:07,900
And, you know, it's kind of cool
people to see right in your own 

629
00:36:07,900 --> 00:36:11,200
like, you know, sometimes 
awkward small talk for people 

630
00:36:11,200 --> 00:36:14,300
who don't really want because 
social part of another's that do

631
00:36:14,300 --> 00:36:17,400
and you see faces that, you 
know, so it's good and bad. 

632
00:36:17,400 --> 00:36:21,300
But yeah, it definitely wasn't 
your typical comprises of hers 

633
00:36:21,300 --> 00:36:24,900
to people like the quiet people.
One of the like exam like yeah, 

634
00:36:24,900 --> 00:36:26,300
these are good. 
Potato chips. 

635
00:36:26,300 --> 00:36:32,700
Aren't they? 
You should try ones, but I think

636
00:36:32,700 --> 00:36:35,200
I think as far as day one goes 
into the first successful, I'm 

637
00:36:35,200 --> 00:36:36,800
curious to see what happens next
couple days. 

638
00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:39,200
So I think our plan is to 
record. 

639
00:36:39,400 --> 00:36:42,500
Another one or two more of 
these, just to kind of cover it 

640
00:36:42,500 --> 00:36:45,700
up. 
But yeah, I'm I am cautiously 

641
00:36:45,700 --> 00:36:48,200
optimistic. 
We'll see where it goes from 

642
00:36:48,200 --> 00:36:49,300
here. 
Yeah. 

643
00:36:49,300 --> 00:36:52,000
I mean, depending on how it 
goes, we might just want to do 

644
00:36:52,300 --> 00:36:55,700
daily updates and then tag him 
to the end of this podcast. 

645
00:36:55,700 --> 00:36:59,200
You can kind of see like either 
the evolution of opinion. 

646
00:36:59,200 --> 00:37:00,300
Right. 
Maybe it's a go. 

647
00:37:00,300 --> 00:37:06,500
Yeah it's a is you know it's 
going to be like for like three 

648
00:37:06,500 --> 00:37:11,300
months. 
Yeah. 

649
00:37:11,900 --> 00:37:14,200
Who knows maybe the potato chips
tomorrow and I'll be good and 

650
00:37:14,200 --> 00:37:15,800
you know I'm going to give him a
sailing reading. 

651
00:37:17,900 --> 00:37:21,200
All right. 
Well, I think that's probably it

652
00:37:21,200 --> 00:37:25,300
for today. 
Yeah, man, and we'll wrap it 

653
00:37:25,300 --> 00:37:28,400
there. 
You've got questions, comments 

654
00:37:28,900 --> 00:37:36,700
concerns accolades, send them 
over to if you're also suffering

655
00:37:36,700 --> 00:37:40,600
from Seattle allergies, Seattle 
allergies and It's like full 

656
00:37:40,600 --> 00:37:45,000
here and fall everywhere. 
Not about who you are not Lana, 

657
00:37:45,100 --> 00:37:48,600
it's not it's set in Chicago, 
for is still in the 90s every 

658
00:37:48,600 --> 00:37:53,400
day, I like that. 
Yeah, so if you've got 

659
00:37:53,400 --> 00:37:57,100
questions, comments concerns, 
send them to questions at 

660
00:37:57,100 --> 00:38:01,500
identity at the center.com and 
we'll be talking to you in the 

661
00:38:01,508 --> 00:38:07,700
next one. 
You've been listening to the 

662
00:38:07,700 --> 00:38:11,800
identity at the center podcast 
Taxes all episodes visit 

663
00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:11,800
identity at the center.com. 
Taxes all episodes visit 

664
00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:13,500
identity at the center.com.
