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You're listening to the identity
of the center podcast, this is 

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the show that talks about 
identity and access management 

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and making sure you know who has
access to what let's get 

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started. 
Welcome to the identity of the 

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center podcast I'm Jeff. 
And that's Jim. 

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Hey Jim hey Jeff, how are you? 
Oh, not so bad yourself. 

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I'm doing great. 
We are broadcasting from the 

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podcast room or podcast Nook. 
Here at the authenticate, 2022 

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conference, gotta send a 
shout-out to and Russia are for 

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giving us this room and giving 
us the special attention. 

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I think we're the only podcast 
who are podcasting from the 

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conference and been a fantastic 
conference so far. 

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Yeah. 
Very much appreciated for sure. 

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I unfortunately, missed most of 
the first day dealing with 

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absolutely horrible allergies, 
but I am returned mostly been 

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ban back to the land of the 
living. 

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So but definitely appreciate 
Andrew and the team here. 

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Adrian for for hooking, us up, 
it's very cool. 

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You didn't realize how lucky you
were to live. 

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Was somewhere that had very few 
trees. 

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Now, you live somewhere that 
surrounded by trees and you went

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to visit somewhere we're just as
many trees. 

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So yeah. 
I think that's probably what's 

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what's causing you You problems 
and I'm sure like six or seven 

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errors and a high-pressure 
environment flying over the u.s.

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you know, from east coast to 
West Coast. 

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I'm sure that didn't, you know, 
heard it all for sure. 

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Yeah but this conference has 
been great sat through 

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basically. 
I think what was the business 

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track yesterday? 
Heard several stories from like 

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Salesforce USA, a city on them 
rolling out fine to 

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authentication to their customer
bases and just Kind of the 

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Lessons Learned super valuable 
feedback because hopefully the 

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folks who are practitioners here
at the conference can avoid some

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of those mistakes, right? 
But I think the takeaway that I 

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had was just the level at which 
Fido authentication is being 

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rolled out on the customer level
you know over the past year or 

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two like how many real 
implementations of taking place 

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and You know how many 
organizations are pushing for 

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like 100% adoption of Fido 
authentication, you know, 

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hundreds of thousands millions 
of users. 

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It's real. 
It's very frightening to think 

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that everyone's been talking 
about for like years it seems 

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like it's taken to get here is 
we're here now they're only 

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there isn't any excuses as to 
why people can't start to go 

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down this path of password lists
and things like web often, 

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obviously getting all the big 
vendors and like Google 

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Microsoft. 
Apple cetera, right? 

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All the browsers on board was a 
huge moment earlier this year. 

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And we talked with Andrew about 
that, I think, you know, several

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months back about it. 
But it's here. 

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Like there is literally no more 
excuses other than budget 

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funding, right? 
The will to do it like those 

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sorts of things. 
You know, one of the things that

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I also saw in the presentations 
yesterday was that there's kind 

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of like a vulnerability or at 
least a willingness to not try 

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to say, Like hey, we did 
everything in a went perfectly 

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and we didn't run into any 
issues. 

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It's kind of like here are the 
issues that we ran into and the 

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things that you should look to 
avoid. 

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And here's how we found to solve
those issues. 

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So it was like a lot of reality 
involved. 

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I mean, you know, even though 
the technology is fantastic, 

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that doesn't mean that, you 
know, the rollouts are going to 

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be without you. 
No bumps in the road. 

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Yeah, nothing's perfect. 
But I think if you're willing to

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get smarter and learn the 
lessons of Past. 

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That's why a conference like, 
this is so great, I think, 

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because we're hearing a lot of 
case studies, a lot of people in

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the real world doing this and 
getting it rolled out. 

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And I think that's where I think
a lot of values that is you're 

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not just, you know, talking to 
like a marketing person or 

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vendor. 
Here's how we do it. 

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You're hearing from except 
people in the real world 

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practitioners who are rolling 
the stuff out and they are been 

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they've been very cool about 
explaining how they did it. 

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What were some of the wrinkles 
that they faced, you know, how 

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they got past may be certain In 
issues, things like that. 

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So definitely kudos to sort of 
the content team putting this 

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together because it's been very 
valuable valuable. 

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So far, I'm really looking 
forward to is session. 

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That is going to take place 
tomorrow with our, Our Guest 

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right now from CVS l. 
So why don't you introduce them?

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Yeah, his name is John Porter, 
he's the lead director for CVS 

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Health. 
Welcome to the show. 

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Thanks Guy. 
Thanks for thanks very much for 

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having me. 
Yeah, thanks for taking the time

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and you're given a talk 
tomorrow. 

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We're going to talk about that 
in a But we have tradition, come

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on the show. 
First time is like to find out 

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more about the background, the 
identity origin story. 

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So to speak of the folks who 
join us. 

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I guess for folks who aren't 
familiar with John employer. 

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You know, how did you get into 
the identity space? 

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Is this something that you 
chose, or did it choose you? 

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I'm gonna have to say that 
identity absolutely chose me. 

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I was actually in the telephony 
space for a long time doing 

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voice recording and things like 
that on the in the contact 

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center. 
And at one point, Point RC so 

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came to the telephony 
organization looking for 

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somebody. 
I wound up being that person and

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and went over into the security 
side. 

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If you will bringing telephony 
knowledge into the security 

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Arena, that's pretty unique 
because you don't normally see, 

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I think at least that that 
telephony side of things, right?

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It's been there for so long. 
It's like, okay, well, how are 

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we going to leverage? 
You know, the skill sets and the

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knowledge we've gained through 
the telephony side into 

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information security, it seems 
like a natural fit about - I 

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don't see Happen as often these 
days, which is very cool. 

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So I guess what were some of the
original sort of issues that you

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were, you know, tackling from a,
from an info sector identity 

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standpoint. 
It's really all about this 

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conference, right? 
It's the identity and the 

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authentication piece. 
I think your guests last a 

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couple of podcasts ago. 
I was talking about is like, we 

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draw the line at authorization, 
right? 

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So we've always had that line 
that we're on the left side of 

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that line, we're going to do the
identity, and then we're going 

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to do the Authentication. 
And and then we throw it over to

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the app to do the authorization.
So that's where our teams at our

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Mantra is to kill the password. 
But Ironically in a call center 

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setting, you've never had a 
password on the phone and so 

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those are some of the challenges
that we look to to solve is the 

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you don't have the traditional 
identity Solutions. 

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When you're on a phone, there is
a talk that you're giving 

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tomorrow. 
I believe that Jim referenced 

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the forgotten, how we all 
started with the Are then forgot

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to secure it properly. 
I guess. 

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Can you give us a preview for 
the folks that are, you know, I 

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don't want you to, I don't want 
you to like, give it away now 

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because my plan is to get this 
edited and ready for tomorrow 

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morning. 
But you know, what is a preview 

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of that folks can expect on 
that? 

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Absolutely, one of the things is
the As we're at this conference,

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we're listening to all the 
different solutions that are out

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there and we're talking about 
web and mobile and in-person 

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interactions with your identity.
You don't, you don't have those 

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capabilities on the phone. 
So you have to come up with 

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different ways to identify 
somebody on the phone, you have 

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to actually come up with a 
different way to authenticate 

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them and and how do you do that 
in a secure method? 

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It's so here, I don't know that 
I'm teaching per se, but just 

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kind of enlightening and bring 
Something to the Forefront that 

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maybe people just fight 
all-conference, haven't thought 

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about where so ingrained and oh 
we're going to use our thumb 

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print. 
Okay, great what, but how do I 

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get a thumb print on a phone 
call? 

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That's it's not easy. 
And so we have to really think 

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about it and even, even some of 
the other Biometrics that we 

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would, I mean obviously voice 
would be something that you 

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would, you would go to, but 
that's not going to be 

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foolproof. 
And so it's funny to listen to 

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All of the conversations here, 
all of the solutions when 

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Everything goes awry is its 
they're going to wind up calling

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back into the contact center and
it's so we've forgotten the 

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contact center and it's not as 
secure as it should be. 

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Social engineering is it's 
everywhere and we really need to

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tighten up the contact center 
because as we tighten up, the 

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other areas contact centers were
the hackers and the social 

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Engineers are going to head to 
Jim. 

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I know you and I have a special 
place in our hearts and learn 

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our day jobs where this is an 
area that we see. 

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A lot of organizations struggle 
with is, how do you validate 

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people calling into context on 
our help desk, whatever that 

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that real human being is to 
validate their identity. 

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I know this is a challenge a 
little that a lot of 

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organizations that face, but 
what are your thoughts on it? 

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Yeah, I've got to think that 
just like on the web, there are 

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there's context to somebody 
calling in the calling in, from 

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a certain number. 
Maybe they're calling in at a, 

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at a time that, you know, is 
normal for when they were 

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calling or Not normal and then 
there's the voice unique 

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fingerprint. 
I think there's a couple things 

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that are right. 
One is you know, my 

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understanding of the voice 
fingerprint is, you know, it's 

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going to be a Big Blob of data. 
So you can't just generally say,

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hey, I'm going to search my 
database, based on your voice 

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and find you. 
You have to kind of like use the

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The Voice print almost like a 
password, but I wanted to kind 

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of Bounce some of that back to 
On to talk to us, a little bit 

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about how ivr might work as an 
authentication tool. 

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Alright? 
So in the cost center, right? 

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That's the first place that most
people get to talk to write 

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your, you get to get to the ivr 
and traditionally those 

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self-service options have been 
very limited because compliance 

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or maybe, security, or even 
legal won't let you do certain 

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things in the in the ivr. 
Because You haven't 

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authenticated that person or I 
would say the opposite as well. 

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Like they think they've done a 
great job authenticating just 

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because they've got three 
something you knows and if I 

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take the five something you know
is now I'm more secure because I

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know my mother's maiden name. 
I know the first car that I 

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drove and I know the color, you 
know, whatever, whatever those 

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things are you know, your your 
favorite food. 

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Oh, by the way, the hint is it's
a triangle, it's all something 

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you know. 
So it's Not really satisfying, 

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all three pillars of 
authentication and and it's 

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funny that I know my team will 
laugh when they hear this. 

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But it's, it's my quote, it's 
something you have something, 

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you know, and something you are.
And you have to satisfy all 

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three of those to get an 
authentication complete, and the

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challenge in the phone spaces. 
Again, getting all three of 

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those. 
Yeah, I have experience of doing

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this. 
And the one that comes to my 

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mind is my Bank has completely 
switched over if you call their 

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call center. 
Now they sit they make you say, 

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my voice is my password and I 
guess kind of what I assume is 

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happening is that they already 
know that. 

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You know, this person is coming 
in and claiming to be Jim 

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McDonald. 
Now we're going to check you 

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know quote-unquote the secret 
which is does that voice for an 

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actually match Jim McDonald, 
right? 

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I mean they're not just 
generally saying you know My 

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voice is my password. 
Now let's search are 10 million 

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customers to see who this is, 
right? 

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So that's the first thing you do
on the way. 

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And the only thing you really 
have on the way into a phone 

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call is going to be your Annie 
your automatic number 

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identifies. 
Our AKA your caller ID so that 

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comes up and we're going to have
to do our best job of what we 

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00:12:04,608 --> 00:12:07,600
call a nanny look up. 
So I've got a customer database,

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I'm going to go through the 
customer database, take a look 

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and say, oh, you know, who? 
I think this might be, this 

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might be gem on us. 
Cell phone. 

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So we give that a test and if 
you are using the voice 

227
00:12:17,300 --> 00:12:18,800
biometric, you would take that 
utterance. 

228
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We got to get you to talk and 
most people's experience in the 

229
00:12:22,800 --> 00:12:25,800
ivr is representative 
representative. 

230
00:12:27,400 --> 00:12:30,200
The ironic part of that is 
they're talking, those are 

231
00:12:30,200 --> 00:12:32,900
utterances, I can absolutely 
take a nanny. 

232
00:12:32,900 --> 00:12:36,500
Look up, take that 
representative and and try to do

233
00:12:36,500 --> 00:12:38,100
a voice match. 
I might already have you 

234
00:12:38,100 --> 00:12:41,500
authenticated just because 
you're yelling at my ivr. 

235
00:12:43,100 --> 00:12:45,900
And we're going to go now, I'm 
going to open up all the 

236
00:12:45,900 --> 00:12:50,400
self-service options for you. 
Not just hey would you like us 

237
00:12:50,400 --> 00:12:53,700
to mail you an ID card? 
And you know, it's Karen calling

238
00:12:53,700 --> 00:12:56,800
us again, right? 
Yeah, exactly carry. 

239
00:12:56,800 --> 00:12:57,900
Yeah. 
And then she can be 

240
00:12:57,900 --> 00:13:00,100
authenticated as well. 
And that's, that's, that's the 

241
00:13:00,100 --> 00:13:01,400
cool thing about the boys 
princes. 

242
00:13:01,400 --> 00:13:04,300
They are unique, but they are a 
key value pair, like you said, 

243
00:13:04,300 --> 00:13:07,900
so you have to do that 
identification piece up front 

244
00:13:07,900 --> 00:13:11,000
before, you can actually go 
ahead and utilize any 

245
00:13:11,000 --> 00:13:14,100
identifier. 
Whether it be password, whether 

246
00:13:14,100 --> 00:13:18,100
it be your one-time passcode, 
your your favorite pizza, or 

247
00:13:18,100 --> 00:13:20,800
your voice biometric? 
I don't know if you know the 

248
00:13:20,800 --> 00:13:24,600
answer to this but what happens 
when somebody has a cold, right?

249
00:13:24,600 --> 00:13:27,600
And they just have that froggy 
voice and doesn't sound like 

250
00:13:27,600 --> 00:13:29,600
them. 
I mean you probably run into 

251
00:13:29,600 --> 00:13:33,200
scenarios like that, right? 
Does the ivr adjust for that or 

252
00:13:33,200 --> 00:13:36,200
do you have to have a plan B to 
authenticate the person? 

253
00:13:36,500 --> 00:13:41,400
Well, the the ivr is the device 
that is actually doing a lot of 

254
00:13:41,400 --> 00:13:43,200
the work. 
It's the technology behind I 

255
00:13:43,200 --> 00:13:46,100
know there's a few vendors out 
there that do a great job in 

256
00:13:46,100 --> 00:13:49,600
the, in the voice space. 
They'll tell you that they're 

257
00:13:49,600 --> 00:13:54,800
building the voiceprint based on
a number of attributes that are 

258
00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:00,200
basically not going to change 
like your the length of your 

259
00:14:00,500 --> 00:14:05,700
nasal passage the the size. 
How open you open your mouth? 

260
00:14:05,800 --> 00:14:07,500
I think they're going. 
Transient characteristics. 

261
00:14:07,500 --> 00:14:09,100
Renzi was right. 
There you go. 

262
00:14:09,300 --> 00:14:11,100
All those transient 
characteristics. 

263
00:14:11,100 --> 00:14:12,600
Are that make up your voice 
print. 

264
00:14:12,600 --> 00:14:15,300
So even If you do have a cold 
those aren't going to change and

265
00:14:15,300 --> 00:14:18,100
so the voiceprint stayed pretty 
consistent and we can 

266
00:14:18,100 --> 00:14:21,900
authenticate based on you know 
whether you have a cold or not 

267
00:14:21,900 --> 00:14:26,400
but your voice does age over 
time and there's a there's a 

268
00:14:26,408 --> 00:14:28,900
thought and we're not deep 
enough into this technology, but

269
00:14:28,900 --> 00:14:31,800
we think we have to enhance 
those voice prints as they age. 

270
00:14:32,100 --> 00:14:35,200
Moving on, this ring is almost 
like training your training a 

271
00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:37,000
voice model, basically, right, 
correct. 

272
00:14:37,000 --> 00:14:41,300
So to get to the step of you 
know authentication you have to 

273
00:14:41,300 --> 00:14:44,600
have gone through an enrollment 
That's right to get people to do

274
00:14:44,600 --> 00:14:46,800
that and it's funny. 
Jim you mentioned you don't you 

275
00:14:46,808 --> 00:14:50,000
know my voice is my password 
that must be like a stock thing 

276
00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:53,500
that like every voice 
recognition company uses because

277
00:14:53,500 --> 00:14:56,600
I'm ever doing this in the 
mid-2000s was rolling out an ivr

278
00:14:56,600 --> 00:14:59,400
for automated password resets 
and it was the same thing. 

279
00:14:59,600 --> 00:15:03,100
It was at someone. 
So my voice is my password and 

280
00:15:03,100 --> 00:15:06,100
that captured the you know, the 
voiceprint and it worked very 

281
00:15:06,100 --> 00:15:09,400
well and so forth, but the 
challenge was actually getting 

282
00:15:09,400 --> 00:15:12,000
people to enroll in this. 
I'm curious. 

283
00:15:12,000 --> 00:15:15,000
John if you've Tackled this, if 
you solve this somehow for 

284
00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:19,600
people, I will say that there's 
there's two two sides of the 

285
00:15:19,600 --> 00:15:23,900
street on that, right? 
So as far as the enrollment and 

286
00:15:23,900 --> 00:15:30,600
the consent, there's there's 
laws that the gramm-leach-bliley

287
00:15:30,600 --> 00:15:34,600
ACT actually allows you to, I 
don't want to use the word 

288
00:15:34,600 --> 00:15:39,000
ignore but the state laws are 
limiting to certain and 

289
00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:41,800
financial institutions are 
certainly one of those that are 

290
00:15:41,800 --> 00:15:46,400
protected by What we call gleba.
So you don't have to have the 

291
00:15:46,400 --> 00:15:49,900
consent but to have that consent
model to have that trust which I

292
00:15:49,908 --> 00:15:52,400
think is super important in a 
relationship with your 

293
00:15:52,400 --> 00:15:54,800
customers. 
You have that trust you, if you 

294
00:15:54,800 --> 00:15:57,700
establish that trust and you 
have a consent driven model 

295
00:15:58,100 --> 00:16:03,100
where they do actively enroll 
then then they know what they're

296
00:16:03,100 --> 00:16:05,000
doing. 
They're actively putting 

297
00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:07,700
themselves in a situation where 
we're trying to protect. 

298
00:16:07,700 --> 00:16:10,000
I mean that's the reason we have
passwords, that's the reason we 

299
00:16:10,000 --> 00:16:12,600
had we would go through all 
these steps the identity, the 

300
00:16:13,000 --> 00:16:15,800
Authentication is we want to 
protect which we're protecting 

301
00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:20,300
something whether it's legally 
that we have to through HIPAA or

302
00:16:20,300 --> 00:16:24,900
PCI compliance or whatever the 
legal reason is or just the the 

303
00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:29,600
social reason or the fact that 
you do want to protect your 

304
00:16:29,600 --> 00:16:33,400
customers information. 
So yeah we have discussed that 

305
00:16:33,600 --> 00:16:39,800
quite a bit and you can go 
either way on it right at the 

306
00:16:39,800 --> 00:16:42,100
end of the day, we're trying to 
do the right thing, protect the 

307
00:16:42,100 --> 00:16:46,000
customers and Nation and then 
you kind of up into it though, 

308
00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:47,900
right? 
I think there's always the path 

309
00:16:47,900 --> 00:16:50,100
where, you know, where do you 
want it? 

310
00:16:50,700 --> 00:16:53,900
What level of support are you 
willing to sacrifice some level 

311
00:16:53,900 --> 00:16:58,500
of privacy to obtain? 
So if you want to take advantage

312
00:16:58,500 --> 00:17:01,900
of the self-service on an ivr 
for example to be able to do 

313
00:17:01,900 --> 00:17:04,200
that, you need to provide your 
voice print. 

314
00:17:04,400 --> 00:17:07,400
If you want to log into your 
iPhone with just a fingerprint, 

315
00:17:07,599 --> 00:17:10,700
you are sacrificing your 
fingerprint in the name of 

316
00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:12,900
security and usability and 
Cetera, though. 

317
00:17:13,000 --> 00:17:15,400
Those sorts of things, I think 
that's probably where things 

318
00:17:15,400 --> 00:17:18,400
we're heading is. 
Okay, well, what is what level 

319
00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:21,800
of privacy or piece of data. 
Are you willing to maybe 

320
00:17:21,800 --> 00:17:25,900
sacrifices in the right word? 
But I'll allow another 

321
00:17:25,900 --> 00:17:28,500
organization. 
Whether it's your bank, or 

322
00:17:28,700 --> 00:17:31,900
health care, or college 
education, or even just your 

323
00:17:31,900 --> 00:17:36,000
employer to be able to leverage 
some of these other cat and Cat 

324
00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:37,000
buildings. 
That would imagine. 

325
00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:40,600
You have this ivr system in 
place, not everyone funnels 

326
00:17:40,600 --> 00:17:42,300
through that thing. 
There's always still some 

327
00:17:42,300 --> 00:17:44,900
percentage of the population. 
Elation that, for whatever 

328
00:17:44,900 --> 00:17:47,800
reason, doesn't go through that 
either it didn't work for them 

329
00:17:47,800 --> 00:17:51,800
or they refuse to sign up or 
they just don't trust it right 

330
00:17:51,800 --> 00:17:53,200
now. 
Whatever may be right and 

331
00:17:53,200 --> 00:17:55,100
they're like, you know, 
representative represent. 

332
00:17:55,100 --> 00:17:57,000
If they don't care, right? 
They just want to go right to a 

333
00:17:57,000 --> 00:18:00,400
human because they've had a poor
experience, maybe before. 

334
00:18:01,000 --> 00:18:05,100
And now you're you're fighting 
not only, you know, this, this 

335
00:18:05,100 --> 00:18:07,500
experience that person might 
have had in the past. 

336
00:18:07,500 --> 00:18:10,800
But also how do you get them to 
take advantage of the newer 

337
00:18:10,800 --> 00:18:12,900
technologies that better? 
Maybe it is a better experience.

338
00:18:13,000 --> 00:18:16,200
Since now compared to what they 
had before, you know, that could

339
00:18:16,200 --> 00:18:18,000
be something to think about. 
Yeah. 

340
00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:20,600
Absolutely. 
And those you know we've always 

341
00:18:20,600 --> 00:18:23,900
had that IV our message, right? 
That and it's evolved over the 

342
00:18:23,900 --> 00:18:26,800
years. 
It started off as your call, may

343
00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:31,100
be recorded for quality purposes
and then it evolved into your 

344
00:18:31,100 --> 00:18:35,400
call, may be monitored and 
recorded and then all of a 

345
00:18:35,400 --> 00:18:38,700
sudden your call will be 
monitored and recorded. 

346
00:18:38,700 --> 00:18:42,100
And so it's been an evolution. 
And we've taken the next step 

347
00:18:42,100 --> 00:18:46,200
that your All will be monitored 
and recorded for quality and 

348
00:18:46,200 --> 00:18:49,500
security purposes. 
So we're we're we're taking the 

349
00:18:49,500 --> 00:18:52,400
right steps as far as our 
consumers are concerned. 

350
00:18:52,700 --> 00:18:57,600
But I'm going to say that the 
consumers aren't always the most

351
00:18:58,100 --> 00:19:00,300
aware of what's going on in the 
industry. 

352
00:19:00,300 --> 00:19:04,800
And I think at this conference 
is an absolute eye-opening event

353
00:19:04,800 --> 00:19:08,100
for what's actually happening in
the, in the in the real world if

354
00:19:08,100 --> 00:19:11,500
you will the SMS that. 
I mean, it's a you can't even 

355
00:19:11,500 --> 00:19:14,700
use SMS anymore as a man. 
Multi-factor authentication. 

356
00:19:14,700 --> 00:19:17,500
The, the in-app experience. 
You can't trust the consumer 

357
00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:19,400
because they're just pushing. 
Yes, that was me. 

358
00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:22,600
Yes, yes, yes. 
Make this little box go away. 

359
00:19:22,600 --> 00:19:25,200
So, MFA fatigue, I think is what
you're talking about, if a 

360
00:19:25,200 --> 00:19:26,400
fatigue. 
Absolutely. 

361
00:19:26,400 --> 00:19:30,300
And that's been attributed to 
some of the the recent hacks 

362
00:19:30,300 --> 00:19:34,100
that some of the big ones that 
people are gaining access to 

363
00:19:34,100 --> 00:19:36,500
these systems because of MFA 
fatigue. 

364
00:19:36,600 --> 00:19:42,400
And the I'll just say that it's 
whether they're distracted or 

365
00:19:42,400 --> 00:19:43,200
whatever. 
The Whatever. 

366
00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:47,800
The reason of the excuses people
saying, yeah go ahead and then 

367
00:19:48,200 --> 00:19:52,900
you've seen credentials, get 
synchronized because you're in a

368
00:19:52,900 --> 00:19:56,000
certain browser and all of a 
sudden that synchronize you've 

369
00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:59,900
just given that person 
everything you need or you know 

370
00:19:59,900 --> 00:20:03,600
I'll throw a personal example 
and there just happened to me 

371
00:20:03,600 --> 00:20:08,000
last week and I have been a 
security professional out for a 

372
00:20:08,000 --> 00:20:09,500
while. 
I've been in the industry for 

373
00:20:10,000 --> 00:20:14,400
quite some time and and I've Got
my different passwords, right? 

374
00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:18,600
We've all started with passwords
like it was said that was 1961 

375
00:20:18,600 --> 00:20:22,400
passwords got invented so where 
I've grown up on passwords and I

376
00:20:22,408 --> 00:20:25,700
have my different levels My 
Level 0 password is super simple

377
00:20:25,700 --> 00:20:29,300
it's probably on. 
I've been have I been poned. 

378
00:20:29,300 --> 00:20:35,100
Yeah, it's absolutely up there. 
I've checked it but it's things 

379
00:20:35,100 --> 00:20:37,600
that I don't care about, it's 
those applications that I really

380
00:20:37,600 --> 00:20:41,400
don't care about. 
So I put that out there and I 

381
00:20:41,408 --> 00:20:45,700
didn't think I cared about Form,
but my Jersey Mike's account got

382
00:20:45,700 --> 00:20:48,700
hacked last week. 
No, and I yelled at, my boys are

383
00:20:48,700 --> 00:20:50,200
all, they're all home on the 
fall. 

384
00:20:50,200 --> 00:20:52,200
Break was just me. 
I was just making sure I got my 

385
00:20:52,200 --> 00:20:54,900
Philly cheesesteaks. 
So well, that the funny thing is

386
00:20:54,900 --> 00:20:58,100
I said, well, who ordered, uh, 
order to Jersey Mike's on my 

387
00:20:58,100 --> 00:20:59,400
account, though. 
It wasn't me, it wasn't me. 

388
00:20:59,408 --> 00:21:02,300
I'm like, wait a minute, that's 
in Jacksonville, Florida for a 

389
00:21:02,300 --> 00:21:06,100
415 pick up, it was for 14 
eastern time at the site called 

390
00:21:06,100 --> 00:21:09,000
the Jacksonville, Florida store.
Lady picked right up. 

391
00:21:09,100 --> 00:21:13,900
She said oh okay yeah yeah. 
When he I'm going to take this 

392
00:21:13,900 --> 00:21:16,600
off the shelf right now, when 
they come in I'll I'll ask him 

393
00:21:16,600 --> 00:21:17,900
and then, can you give me a call
back number? 

394
00:21:17,900 --> 00:21:21,700
So, I gave her my callback 
number and 15 minutes later, she

395
00:21:21,700 --> 00:21:25,000
calls me back and says, yep. 
He came in, and I said, Hey, 

396
00:21:25,000 --> 00:21:27,700
listen, the account owner 
actually called us and said that

397
00:21:27,700 --> 00:21:34,800
he didn't order this sandwich. 
And the guys, like it was for my

398
00:21:34,800 --> 00:21:36,700
cousin. 
Hold on, just a second. 

399
00:21:36,700 --> 00:21:39,200
He walked. 
And ran out the door and out the

400
00:21:39,200 --> 00:21:42,400
door and never came back. 
She said she goes, I'm 100% 

401
00:21:42,400 --> 00:21:44,500
certain that. 
Hacked your account used your 

402
00:21:44,500 --> 00:21:46,800
points and try to get that sub 
for free. 

403
00:21:47,100 --> 00:21:49,500
It's, you know, again, no, 
that's on me, that's on me with 

404
00:21:49,500 --> 00:21:53,000
my level 0 password, but then I 
turned it over to my team 

405
00:21:53,100 --> 00:21:57,900
internally, and within five 
minutes, my team had taken my 

406
00:21:57,900 --> 00:22:02,000
user name that I gave them and 
they had ran it through a few 

407
00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:04,100
tools, external, internal, 
whatever. 

408
00:22:04,100 --> 00:22:08,200
It might be. 
And I said, screen share with me

409
00:22:08,200 --> 00:22:09,900
when you're done. 
It was five minutes later. 

410
00:22:09,900 --> 00:22:12,000
One of my teammates came back 
and said you got a minute. 

411
00:22:12,000 --> 00:22:13,900
I said sure. 
Shared a screen. 

412
00:22:13,900 --> 00:22:15,200
He goes, can you confirm any of 
these? 

413
00:22:15,200 --> 00:22:19,300
I said, yeah, you've got my 
level one password, for sure. 

414
00:22:19,300 --> 00:22:22,200
You've got my root of My Level 3
password. 

415
00:22:22,500 --> 00:22:26,700
Wow, that was quick. 
I'll bet all based off my email 

416
00:22:27,000 --> 00:22:30,100
and and know we're battling 
those things and so he could run

417
00:22:30,100 --> 00:22:32,300
that through a tool. 
And he could see where that that

418
00:22:32,300 --> 00:22:36,500
level 0 password was used all 
over the place. 

419
00:22:36,700 --> 00:22:39,400
I believe it was and that's 
ultimately the use case. 

420
00:22:39,400 --> 00:22:45,000
That that Fido is all about is 
Even somebody who has, you know,

421
00:22:45,000 --> 00:22:49,500
experience and decent pastured, 
hygiene still, super 

422
00:22:49,500 --> 00:22:52,700
susceptible. 
Absolutely, you know, I think 

423
00:22:52,700 --> 00:22:54,700
one of the other themes that 
have come through in the 

424
00:22:54,700 --> 00:22:59,600
sessions, I sat there yesterday.
Is that look, nobody comes to 

425
00:22:59,900 --> 00:23:03,500
your company for your whiz-bang 
authentication experience, 

426
00:23:03,500 --> 00:23:06,000
right? 
They come through for the 

427
00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:09,800
content to get something done. 
You want to manage your account,

428
00:23:09,800 --> 00:23:12,700
or they want to do whatever you 
do. 

429
00:23:12,900 --> 00:23:16,100
And I talked about something 
else is like, so imagine you're 

430
00:23:16,100 --> 00:23:20,200
now calling into CVS to do 
something. 

431
00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:24,000
You get authenticated, you do it
and now they want you to do a 

432
00:23:24,000 --> 00:23:26,900
survey, right? 
You're right. 

433
00:23:26,900 --> 00:23:30,000
And most people just hang up at 
that point, but you've been able

434
00:23:30,000 --> 00:23:36,000
to do something that you're 
pretty proud of to increase the 

435
00:23:36,000 --> 00:23:38,300
survey rate. 
So you just tell us about that. 

436
00:23:38,300 --> 00:23:41,100
Share that little tidbit 
somebody out there might benefit

437
00:23:41,100 --> 00:23:42,700
from it. 
Yeah, absolutely things. 

438
00:23:42,900 --> 00:23:45,100
And it's wreck when I started 
before. 

439
00:23:45,100 --> 00:23:47,900
I was in security. 
Actually, it was a solution that

440
00:23:47,900 --> 00:23:51,400
we were. 
It's changing the mindset of the

441
00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:53,600
the contact center 
representative, right? 

442
00:23:54,100 --> 00:23:56,800
You have all these rules that 
we've put in place to keep the 

443
00:23:56,800 --> 00:23:59,300
context under secure and keep it
csat. 

444
00:23:59,300 --> 00:24:02,900
Score really nice and high. 
And we do all these things that 

445
00:24:02,900 --> 00:24:05,900
we think are the right thing. 
And I've seen, many, of example,

446
00:24:05,900 --> 00:24:09,400
is sales where you have to go 
through your actual, you have 

447
00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:11,400
to, you have to use all these 
words or you're going to get in 

448
00:24:11,408 --> 00:24:14,100
trouble, you know, right? 
So one of the things in the 

449
00:24:14,108 --> 00:24:17,800
context Center was that the 
representative never hung up on 

450
00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:20,900
the consumer. 
So the person calling in had to 

451
00:24:20,900 --> 00:24:26,700
disconnect first or you got in 
trouble and When we 

452
00:24:26,700 --> 00:24:30,900
revolutionize that we said no, 
that's wrong, what we should be 

453
00:24:30,900 --> 00:24:36,100
doing is using return 
destination and it telephony 

454
00:24:36,100 --> 00:24:39,700
routing, right? 
And so when our agent hangs up, 

455
00:24:39,900 --> 00:24:43,300
we introduced, we ask them to 
introduce the the survey I 

456
00:24:43,308 --> 00:24:45,500
didn't need to ask you to 
beginning whether or not you 

457
00:24:45,508 --> 00:24:49,600
want to take a survey that made 
no sense whatsoever to us, you 

458
00:24:49,600 --> 00:24:51,700
don't know yet, you haven't had 
that experience. 

459
00:24:51,700 --> 00:24:54,000
I would, why would you, why 
would you render an opinion 

460
00:24:54,000 --> 00:24:56,400
before the experience, even And 
so, let me interject for a 

461
00:24:56,400 --> 00:24:58,400
second because I always, I've 
always been curious about this. 

462
00:24:59,400 --> 00:25:01,100
I've been through that 
experience, where it's like, 

463
00:25:01,100 --> 00:25:03,000
hey, would you be willing to 
take a survey after your 

464
00:25:03,000 --> 00:25:05,100
experience, right? 
And I was thinking I was like, 

465
00:25:05,100 --> 00:25:08,200
okay, well, if I say yes, does 
like the person know, and I'm 

466
00:25:08,200 --> 00:25:11,800
going to get better customer 
service because of that, I'm 

467
00:25:11,800 --> 00:25:15,000
going to say no to that have at 
least at least in the solutions 

468
00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:16,400
that I've implemented over the 
years. 

469
00:25:16,800 --> 00:25:18,900
No. 
But you know, it makes as much 

470
00:25:18,900 --> 00:25:21,300
sense to me is putting the the 
fork and the knife. 

471
00:25:21,300 --> 00:25:23,800
At the beginning of the buffet 
line, why do you want to carry 

472
00:25:23,800 --> 00:25:25,000
your fork and knife all the way 
through? 

473
00:25:25,100 --> 00:25:28,200
Buffett, you're not going to use
it in the buffet line, right? 

474
00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:31,200
So you don't want to ask that 
question up front. 

475
00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:34,200
You want to ask it at the end 
but you don't even need to ask 

476
00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:35,100
it. 
You just present it. 

477
00:25:35,100 --> 00:25:37,100
So what we've done is we ask the
agents. 

478
00:25:37,100 --> 00:25:40,800
Hey, introduced to serve a. 
Hey listen, thank you for your 

479
00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:43,300
call today. 
I'm going to I'm going to 

480
00:25:43,300 --> 00:25:46,100
disconnect and you're going to 
be sent on to a survey, feel 

481
00:25:46,100 --> 00:25:48,600
free to take the survey or not 
take that, you know, whatever, 

482
00:25:48,600 --> 00:25:51,300
whatever that introduction, 
winds up being but you'd be 

483
00:25:51,300 --> 00:25:53,700
absolutely surprised at the 
number of people that do take 

484
00:25:53,700 --> 00:25:56,900
the survey because they were 
Almost you're not surprising 

485
00:25:56,900 --> 00:25:59,100
them with it but you're 
presenting them with an 

486
00:25:59,100 --> 00:26:03,100
opportunity and it was, it was, 
it was, it is it far as I'm 

487
00:26:03,100 --> 00:26:06,700
concerned, change the game and 
we got a lot of surveys and we 

488
00:26:06,700 --> 00:26:09,900
got a lot of feedback as well. 
We allowed people to talk for 90

489
00:26:09,900 --> 00:26:15,000
seconds after the survey was 
complete, and it was amazing to 

490
00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:17,700
us how, how much feedback we 
got. 

491
00:26:17,700 --> 00:26:20,700
And so we turned those speech to
text and turn it into a word 

492
00:26:20,700 --> 00:26:22,300
cloud. 
And we can see these words pop 

493
00:26:22,300 --> 00:26:25,500
up and very, very, very, very 
Insightful. 

494
00:26:25,500 --> 00:26:28,300
And that you'd think that the 
people that do stay on the line 

495
00:26:28,300 --> 00:26:30,800
to give you the survey, we're 
going to adjust reme you and 

496
00:26:30,800 --> 00:26:34,900
give you negative feedback. 
It was overwhelmingly positive 

497
00:26:35,000 --> 00:26:37,500
and it was a it was very 
insightful, it's good. 

498
00:26:37,500 --> 00:26:39,800
Maybe it makes me not feel weird
though. 

499
00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:42,100
When I always give the positive 
stuff at the end, like I had a 

500
00:26:42,100 --> 00:26:43,700
great experience yesterday with 
apple. 

501
00:26:44,900 --> 00:26:47,200
In order that I had placed, and 
I'm like, where's my thing? 

502
00:26:47,200 --> 00:26:50,100
And given the order numbers 
like, okay, great got it taken 

503
00:26:50,100 --> 00:26:52,900
care of and it was a great 
experience for a couple things. 

504
00:26:52,900 --> 00:26:56,900
One, they authenticated me 
through An MFA Channel. 

505
00:26:57,000 --> 00:26:59,500
We're all I had to do, was put 
Camille press confirm on my 

506
00:26:59,500 --> 00:27:02,700
iPhone and they knew immediately
that was me which I thought. 

507
00:27:02,700 --> 00:27:04,800
Okay, that's really cool. 
Like I'm used to like okay, I 

508
00:27:04,808 --> 00:27:07,700
have to give you a code or 
answer a question, right? 

509
00:27:07,700 --> 00:27:09,200
Or some like that is like 
literally it was like I'm going 

510
00:27:09,200 --> 00:27:11,300
to send you a prompt. 
Just want to confirm that this 

511
00:27:11,300 --> 00:27:13,900
is, you know, Jeff pops up on my
iPhone. 

512
00:27:13,900 --> 00:27:15,600
I hit confirm right. 
Great. 

513
00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:17,700
Thanks with move on and kind of 
thing and it was like, all 

514
00:27:17,700 --> 00:27:19,600
right. 
Well that's you know, here I am 

515
00:27:19,600 --> 00:27:23,000
at an authenticated kind of 
authentication conference and 

516
00:27:23,000 --> 00:27:27,800
that was like the best Remote 
Call Center contact center 

517
00:27:27,800 --> 00:27:31,300
authentication experience that I
had experienced so far and it 

518
00:27:31,300 --> 00:27:34,200
was seamless. 
It just worked and I was happy 

519
00:27:34,300 --> 00:27:36,900
to provide the feedback 
afterwards, the hey, you know, 

520
00:27:36,900 --> 00:27:40,400
this couldn't have gone any 
better for me as I someone I 

521
00:27:40,400 --> 00:27:41,700
did. 
I already don't want to talk to 

522
00:27:41,700 --> 00:27:45,200
you but here we are and now the 
police are coming to make sure 

523
00:27:45,200 --> 00:27:48,800
that I didn't speak ill of 
apples or yet, you should be 

524
00:27:48,800 --> 00:27:51,900
good. 
John look to kind of shift, the 

525
00:27:51,908 --> 00:27:55,000
conversation to be kind of 
future facing. 

526
00:27:55,400 --> 00:27:58,800
And when we talked last time you
made a statement, which I 

527
00:27:58,808 --> 00:28:02,500
thought was pretty interesting 
and you said voice is the way of

528
00:28:02,500 --> 00:28:05,200
the future. 
I don't know if you remember 

529
00:28:05,200 --> 00:28:07,200
saying that but of you what were
you thinking? 

530
00:28:07,200 --> 00:28:12,000
When you said that so we've done
a great job on securing the 

531
00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:13,700
mobile in the web environment. 
Right. 

532
00:28:13,800 --> 00:28:18,800
And the more you secure that the
harder it is to get through and 

533
00:28:18,800 --> 00:28:20,800
social engineering get get to 
that data. 

534
00:28:20,800 --> 00:28:24,200
Whatever that data winds up 
being the the pot of gold at the

535
00:28:24,208 --> 00:28:27,600
end of the rainbow, right? 
The or using your face print 

536
00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:31,100
were using your your 
fingerprint, but your other bio 

537
00:28:31,100 --> 00:28:34,600
much as a few other Biometrics. 
But the next one I think is Line

538
00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:37,000
to be very successful is your 
voice print. 

539
00:28:37,100 --> 00:28:40,700
If it can be implemented 
properly and in like we talked 

540
00:28:40,700 --> 00:28:42,400
earlier, you have to have that 
key value pair. 

541
00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:48,100
I have to know who you are, so 
that I can verify that voice and

542
00:28:48,800 --> 00:28:51,300
we don't get the device 
information in a, in a 

543
00:28:51,308 --> 00:28:53,500
particular phone call, right? 
So when you call in, on your 

544
00:28:53,500 --> 00:28:55,700
phone, all I'm getting is your 
auntie, I don't get any of your 

545
00:28:55,700 --> 00:28:58,000
device characteristics, I don't 
know, really any, your could be 

546
00:28:58,008 --> 00:28:59,800
on a payphone. 
You could be in a work phone, 

547
00:29:00,500 --> 00:29:02,700
whatever. 
Most people are calling it on 

548
00:29:02,700 --> 00:29:06,500
their cell phones today. 
So, we have that. 

549
00:29:08,000 --> 00:29:12,400
The Voice pieces is the is the 
next thing that's going to be in

550
00:29:12,400 --> 00:29:18,400
line for that authentication. 
So again away from face print 

551
00:29:18,400 --> 00:29:21,600
fingerprint and now I'm in a 
voice Channel. 

552
00:29:21,600 --> 00:29:23,800
These smart speakers that are 
coming on board today. 

553
00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:27,100
The iot, there's going to be, 
you have to do something. 

554
00:29:27,100 --> 00:29:30,700
If it's not a physical device 
that you can touch voice is 

555
00:29:30,700 --> 00:29:32,300
going to be the way you transmit
that. 

556
00:29:32,300 --> 00:29:34,800
So you have to, again, we have 
to go back to that identity. 

557
00:29:34,800 --> 00:29:38,500
We have to be able to identify 
the person but then, I think you

558
00:29:38,500 --> 00:29:42,000
said it best earlier, it's 
almost like your password, your 

559
00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:45,200
voice is your password and that 
you don't necessarily have to 

560
00:29:45,200 --> 00:29:48,300
say those words anymore. 
We it's almost a free open 

561
00:29:48,300 --> 00:29:51,800
speech that you just we analyze 
your voice would continually 

562
00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:54,100
analyze your voice to create 
that voice print. 

563
00:29:54,100 --> 00:29:56,700
And it's Unique. 
And and I think that's what 

564
00:29:56,700 --> 00:29:58,500
we're a thing that's really cool
about that. 

565
00:29:58,500 --> 00:30:02,600
Just think about like, 
Fingerprints and face prints. 

566
00:30:02,900 --> 00:30:06,100
Usually, it's all kind of device
Centric. 

567
00:30:06,100 --> 00:30:08,300
So you capture all that on your 
device? 

568
00:30:08,500 --> 00:30:11,200
Where's your voice is going back
to some Central server. 

569
00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:14,800
So completely device agnostic, 
whether you're calling from a 

570
00:30:14,808 --> 00:30:18,900
pay phone, cell phone Hotel, 
phone, whatever. 

571
00:30:19,400 --> 00:30:24,200
That verification is happening 
independent of that device. 

572
00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:29,700
So it's definitely a different 
different, you know, Channel 

573
00:30:29,700 --> 00:30:31,900
over which Goes. 
And there was a great 

574
00:30:31,900 --> 00:30:34,400
conversation yesterday about web
3.0. 

575
00:30:34,700 --> 00:30:38,000
You know, a lot of people that 
know we were on web 3.0 yet, you

576
00:30:38,000 --> 00:30:42,500
know, we've been through Web Web
2.0, which here's a website, 

577
00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:44,600
check it out. 
Oh, great, I can read anything. 

578
00:30:44,600 --> 00:30:47,400
I want on what, you know, check 
out my MySpace account, check 

579
00:30:47,400 --> 00:30:50,700
out whatever, right. 
And then we moved into the Web 

580
00:30:50,700 --> 00:30:54,200
2.0 with the social apps and the
ability to interact. 

581
00:30:54,200 --> 00:30:57,100
And really that's when the data 
collection really started 

582
00:30:57,100 --> 00:30:59,400
happening, but we lost track of 
our identity. 

583
00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:03,300
We don't Own our identity, 
Facebook owns, my identity. 

584
00:31:03,700 --> 00:31:08,400
Google owns my identity, they 
own my identity and its really 

585
00:31:08,400 --> 00:31:12,000
taken out of my hands now and 
and they manage my identity. 

586
00:31:12,000 --> 00:31:14,400
Then they get breached in my 
identities out there. 

587
00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:16,500
That wasn't me, I didn't do 
that. 

588
00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:19,700
I didn't put my level zero 
password out there on purpose 

589
00:31:19,700 --> 00:31:22,300
that was in a data breach 
somewhere that somebody then 

590
00:31:22,300 --> 00:31:25,400
used some tools to start 
leveraging these data breaches 

591
00:31:25,900 --> 00:31:29,800
and she appoint web 3.0. 
I feel like voice is going to be

592
00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:33,800
part of the 3.0 experience where
we're going to come back, we're 

593
00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:36,200
going to own our identity. 
We're going to own that we're 

594
00:31:36,200 --> 00:31:37,400
going to have that digital 
wallet. 

595
00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:39,500
We're going to have that 
blockchain experience. 

596
00:31:39,500 --> 00:31:43,500
We're going to have the ability 
to really put the identity at 

597
00:31:43,500 --> 00:31:47,500
the Forefront and then put voice
behind it to your point. 

598
00:31:47,500 --> 00:31:49,500
Does it have to be on a specific
phone? 

599
00:31:49,500 --> 00:31:54,300
I can use my friend's phone now 
and and put in my Identity or 

600
00:31:54,300 --> 00:31:56,400
whatever. 
That identity piece becomes, the

601
00:31:56,408 --> 00:31:59,000
voice becomes that password 
behind the scenes and I think 

602
00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:01,800
it's going to be powerful. 
Especially in the smart speaker 

603
00:32:01,800 --> 00:32:06,600
Arena and the, in the iot, my 
wife, and I take heavy advantage

604
00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:08,800
of Google smart speakers around 
the house. 

605
00:32:08,800 --> 00:32:11,800
And it's amazing how, you know, 
accurate is and picking out 

606
00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:15,300
who's telling it to do what, and
when it knows the difference 

607
00:32:15,300 --> 00:32:19,000
between Jeff, asking the turn 
the lights on in the office or, 

608
00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:21,900
you know, my wife saying, you 
know, set a timer for something 

609
00:32:21,900 --> 00:32:22,700
right. 
Whatever it might be. 

610
00:32:22,700 --> 00:32:26,700
I think it's interesting that 
they've been able to advance the

611
00:32:26,700 --> 00:32:32,500
the Fidelity of being able to To
make that determination on just 

612
00:32:32,500 --> 00:32:35,200
this cheap little device that 
just sits in the corner of the 

613
00:32:35,200 --> 00:32:37,500
room. 
It's always listening, which is 

614
00:32:37,500 --> 00:32:40,000
always a concern. 
But it's doing a good job. 

615
00:32:40,000 --> 00:32:42,000
And I think that goes back to 
what my previous statement 

616
00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:44,400
because you know, you're always 
sacrificing something in the 

617
00:32:44,408 --> 00:32:47,900
name of convenience or usability
or whatever. 

618
00:32:47,900 --> 00:32:51,100
Maybe that's a choice that you 
know my wife and I have made 

619
00:32:51,100 --> 00:32:54,700
mostly for my wife to be honest 
and say, hey this is how we turn

620
00:32:54,700 --> 00:32:56,600
on the lights right in this 
area, right? 

621
00:32:56,600 --> 00:32:59,400
Or, you know, I can walk into my
office and morning and say, hey 

622
00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:02,300
so and so I won't I'll trigger 
it here but you know, turn on 

623
00:33:02,300 --> 00:33:04,800
the office and I have Smart 
lights to turn on. 

624
00:33:04,800 --> 00:33:07,300
I have a TV that turns on a 
monitor behind me and, you know,

625
00:33:07,300 --> 00:33:09,300
stuff like that and it's, it's 
cool. 

626
00:33:09,300 --> 00:33:12,000
It feels a little bit like Star 
Trek or something, some degree, 

627
00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:16,100
but I think that's, that's where
I totally believe in the power 

628
00:33:16,100 --> 00:33:18,100
of the voice. 
The one thing I don't want to 

629
00:33:18,100 --> 00:33:20,700
lose sight of the oars, for the 
people who can't take advantage 

630
00:33:20,700 --> 00:33:24,400
of that technology. 
There needs to be a alternative 

631
00:33:24,400 --> 00:33:27,600
that is, you know, just as good.
So if you, for whatever reason, 

632
00:33:27,600 --> 00:33:29,600
can't speak, whatever it might 
be, you know, whatever the 

633
00:33:29,600 --> 00:33:32,700
situation might be. 
That there still needs to be a 

634
00:33:32,708 --> 00:33:34,900
path that we're not leaving 
people behind on that too. 

635
00:33:35,300 --> 00:33:38,200
Absolutely. 
And you make a great point that 

636
00:33:38,200 --> 00:33:41,500
trust, you've put your trust 
into sounds like Google. 

637
00:33:41,700 --> 00:33:44,100
And so you allowed those Google 
smart speakers to come in. 

638
00:33:44,100 --> 00:33:49,300
And now you're trusting them and
it's it's difficult for us in a 

639
00:33:49,300 --> 00:33:53,000
in a heavily regulated 
environment. 

640
00:33:53,000 --> 00:33:55,600
We right hip. 
You've got PCI, you've got a lot

641
00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:57,000
of different laws and 
regulations. 

642
00:33:58,300 --> 00:34:02,400
I don't know that we can 
necessarily Trust to that level 

643
00:34:02,400 --> 00:34:05,000
yet. 
We have to get there and there 

644
00:34:05,000 --> 00:34:08,000
has to be some efforts really 
from a lot of different 

645
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:12,000
organizations and Leadership 
that allow us to use that 

646
00:34:12,000 --> 00:34:15,699
person's voice because I can't 
give you PCI Data. 

647
00:34:15,900 --> 00:34:18,500
Based on just the fact that it's
your voice, I really have to 

648
00:34:18,500 --> 00:34:22,500
authenticate you and understand 
that it is you so that and you 

649
00:34:22,500 --> 00:34:24,100
are authorized at that point, 
right? 

650
00:34:24,100 --> 00:34:27,800
So again, identity 
authentication, and then 

651
00:34:27,800 --> 00:34:30,199
authorization, just because it's
your wife on this. 

652
00:34:30,400 --> 00:34:34,900
Speaker, does she is she allowed
to know a certain piece of 

653
00:34:34,900 --> 00:34:37,900
information, right? 
And we have a lot of that in the

654
00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:42,199
health care Arena, where once a 
child turns 18, you know, you 

655
00:34:42,199 --> 00:34:44,600
were able to talk about them 
last week and this week. 

656
00:34:45,100 --> 00:34:48,100
So a lot of regulations that 
really drive. 

657
00:34:48,300 --> 00:34:50,900
A lot of these solutions that we
have just had to be very careful

658
00:34:50,900 --> 00:34:54,699
but they have that trust is I 
think trust is the key and and 

659
00:34:54,699 --> 00:34:57,400
voice is going to unlock a lot 
of that for us in the future. 

660
00:34:57,500 --> 00:35:00,200
I'm pretty sure we could pick 
John's brain for the next hour. 

661
00:35:00,300 --> 00:35:03,100
Or two. 
But at some point, we've got to 

662
00:35:03,100 --> 00:35:05,200
kind of shift into the. 
He probably wants to actually go

663
00:35:05,200 --> 00:35:07,200
to the conference and actually, 
like, listen to the smart people

664
00:35:07,200 --> 00:35:08,500
talk, so we should find let him 
go. 

665
00:35:08,600 --> 00:35:12,200
I don't know, I don't know. 
We're kind of fun, right, fun? 

666
00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:15,300
Yes, intelligent is totally 
separate discussion. 

667
00:35:16,100 --> 00:35:18,600
Let's talk a, let's start to 
wrap things up here though, but 

668
00:35:18,600 --> 00:35:22,000
we were talking before we hit 
the record button and you were 

669
00:35:22,000 --> 00:35:26,600
sharing some pictures of 
Robotics things that that you do

670
00:35:26,600 --> 00:35:29,900
on the side, right? 
Can you tell us about sort of 

671
00:35:29,900 --> 00:35:33,000
this very A cool robot thing 
that you do. 

672
00:35:33,700 --> 00:35:34,900
I want to like, steal your 
thunder. 

673
00:35:34,900 --> 00:35:36,800
So that's like a no worries. 
I appreciate that. 

674
00:35:36,800 --> 00:35:41,900
So, but no one about six years 
now, it's a a, i coach at the 

675
00:35:41,908 --> 00:35:47,000
junior, high level Vex robotics.
So, Vex is a worldwide program, 

676
00:35:47,000 --> 00:35:50,600
they change the game every year,
and this year's games called 

677
00:35:50,600 --> 00:35:54,800
spin up. 
It's basically frisbee golf and 

678
00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:57,800
I go in on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays to the junior high 

679
00:35:58,400 --> 00:36:03,000
right by my house. 
And I, Teach kids the ways of 

680
00:36:03,000 --> 00:36:05,500
the engineer, if you will. 
So we've got an engineering 

681
00:36:05,500 --> 00:36:08,800
notebook that they're supposed 
to be documenting. 

682
00:36:09,500 --> 00:36:13,100
They build the robot, they 
program, the robot and robotc, 

683
00:36:13,700 --> 00:36:17,600
and then they also program the 
controller. 

684
00:36:17,700 --> 00:36:21,300
I mean, it's a Xbox controller, 
but it's it might as well be a 

685
00:36:21,300 --> 00:36:23,500
brick until you start program 
again. 

686
00:36:23,500 --> 00:36:26,000
So they get, they get to robots 
to do amazing things. 

687
00:36:26,400 --> 00:36:29,600
And it's just unbelievable to 
me, the seventh and eighth 

688
00:36:29,600 --> 00:36:32,500
graders. 
Once I get the parents out of 

689
00:36:32,500 --> 00:36:37,800
the way to allow the kids to 
just be themselves and that, 

690
00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:41,400
that I feel like, I'm just like,
a, an old friend for them. 

691
00:36:41,600 --> 00:36:44,500
I go into that room and let them
do their thing. 

692
00:36:44,700 --> 00:36:49,100
And it's amazing to me what 
these kids can do the parents, 

693
00:36:49,100 --> 00:36:51,500
every year, every year, the end 
of the year. 

694
00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:54,100
Wow, I didn't know they can do 
that. 

695
00:36:54,100 --> 00:36:57,900
And if you let the kids do what 
they just naturally do, it's 

696
00:36:57,900 --> 00:37:00,600
absolutely amazing. 
And I've got a very A very 

697
00:37:00,600 --> 00:37:04,300
successful program very proud of
obviously and we've got a lot of

698
00:37:04,300 --> 00:37:08,300
really good. 
Great kids in the area and went 

699
00:37:08,300 --> 00:37:11,200
to the I took three out of four 
of the teams in my program to 

700
00:37:11,207 --> 00:37:12,800
the World Championships last 
year. 

701
00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:14,500
And I know we're headed back 
there. 

702
00:37:14,500 --> 00:37:16,600
I tell them every year, I said 
we're going back to the World 

703
00:37:16,600 --> 00:37:18,600
Championships who's going with 
me. 

704
00:37:18,800 --> 00:37:22,400
So that's pretty cool. 
I hate is this I've always been 

705
00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:24,700
like a Lego person at heart and 
I feel like this is like the 

706
00:37:24,700 --> 00:37:27,800
next stage of that. 
How does how does someone get 

707
00:37:27,800 --> 00:37:31,700
involved without have a child? 
It sounds It might be expensive.

708
00:37:31,700 --> 00:37:33,300
Do I get where do I get the 
parts? 

709
00:37:33,300 --> 00:37:37,300
Like what is the barrier for to 
get more people involved with 

710
00:37:37,300 --> 00:37:39,800
us? 
That's really insightful. 

711
00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:43,900
And it is expensive sport. 
It's actually recognized in the 

712
00:37:43,900 --> 00:37:46,800
state of Arizona. 
Now as a sport you can letter 

713
00:37:46,800 --> 00:37:52,100
and Robotics now but it is 
expensive and we the school 

714
00:37:52,100 --> 00:37:56,400
district has been very very 
helpful and really good at 

715
00:37:56,400 --> 00:37:58,600
finding us. 
They bought the robotics kits. 

716
00:37:58,600 --> 00:38:01,700
A few years ago we just enhance 
the Every year of X is a pretty 

717
00:38:01,700 --> 00:38:05,500
standardized program where the 
parts are the same every year. 

718
00:38:05,500 --> 00:38:08,400
So you have access to parts. 
And there's a lot Tronics that, 

719
00:38:08,400 --> 00:38:10,600
sometimes I'll change the 
electron, you might get a bumper

720
00:38:10,600 --> 00:38:13,100
switch, or a limit switch or 
different things. 

721
00:38:13,500 --> 00:38:17,000
But we buy these, we buy these 
parts and year to year, they're 

722
00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:19,200
good. 
It's been pretty consistent with

723
00:38:19,200 --> 00:38:20,600
that. 
Would take all the V5 over the 

724
00:38:20,600 --> 00:38:25,100
last few years, and we just 
enhance that every year, but we 

725
00:38:25,100 --> 00:38:27,300
charge just like you would a 
sport. 

726
00:38:27,300 --> 00:38:28,900
If you're going to go play 
football, you going to probably 

727
00:38:28,900 --> 00:38:32,800
pay 75 bucks. 80 bucks. 100 
bucks to play football and 

728
00:38:32,800 --> 00:38:35,000
Eagles. 
Pay for baseball in the spring. 

729
00:38:35,000 --> 00:38:38,000
So same thing where we run it. 
Like a sport. 

730
00:38:38,200 --> 00:38:41,900
It's a club and then I work for 
sponsorship. 

731
00:38:41,900 --> 00:38:45,400
So we actually have sponsors at 
the school district level that 

732
00:38:45,400 --> 00:38:47,700
will contribute money and 
they'll help us from that 

733
00:38:47,700 --> 00:38:50,000
perspective. 
But to get involved, it's just a

734
00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:54,000
club and it's word of mouth and 
it's actually, I called a geek 

735
00:38:54,000 --> 00:38:57,600
tryouts. 
The first time, I'd 47 kids, try

736
00:38:57,600 --> 00:39:00,100
out and I had to actually pair 
it down. 

737
00:39:00,200 --> 00:39:02,600
And I didn't know what the 
perfect team size was when I got

738
00:39:02,600 --> 00:39:05,000
started, but for seemed to be a 
real good team. 

739
00:39:05,000 --> 00:39:07,700
So we have about 16 kids, it's 
competitive. 

740
00:39:07,800 --> 00:39:11,400
You try to get into the club and
so now I think we've generated 

741
00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:13,600
enough buzz and we've been to 
the World Championships. 

742
00:39:13,600 --> 00:39:16,500
Now, the last well, we've been 
eligible for the world champion.

743
00:39:16,500 --> 00:39:17,900
Nobody got to go anywhere in 
2020. 

744
00:39:19,400 --> 00:39:22,600
It was virtual in 2021. 
So this year was the first year 

745
00:39:22,600 --> 00:39:25,500
we've actually been able to 
physically, go to Dallas. 

746
00:39:25,500 --> 00:39:28,400
And yeah, we've got enough Buzz.
Now that the kids are really 

747
00:39:28,400 --> 00:39:32,300
interested in it and Just it's a
program that they want to be 

748
00:39:32,300 --> 00:39:34,200
part of. 
Wow, that's pretty cool. 

749
00:39:35,100 --> 00:39:37,200
So I don't want to like take up 
too much more time. 

750
00:39:37,200 --> 00:39:40,600
We got one more question about 
this is so you mentioned sort of

751
00:39:40,600 --> 00:39:44,500
like the kits and this year I 
think you said the theme was 

752
00:39:44,500 --> 00:39:48,400
spin up is the idea that you've 
bet you have these kits and 

753
00:39:48,400 --> 00:39:51,200
every year there's different 
theme but it's for the most part

754
00:39:51,200 --> 00:39:53,300
sort of taking what you've 
already got, maybe with a couple

755
00:39:53,300 --> 00:39:56,900
of random new bits, you know, I 
keep going back to the Lego, 

756
00:39:56,900 --> 00:39:57,700
right? 
But I have like this. 

757
00:39:57,800 --> 00:39:59,800
I think of the my child. 
I have like this. 

758
00:40:00,400 --> 00:40:04,000
Giant gray like toolbox. 
Phil just a whole bunch of Lego 

759
00:40:04,200 --> 00:40:07,300
pieces in it and, you know, we 
would just come up with weird 

760
00:40:07,300 --> 00:40:11,500
random stuff off of that is this
is the concept the same almost 

761
00:40:11,500 --> 00:40:14,100
exactly. 
With the exception of I don't 

762
00:40:14,100 --> 00:40:15,500
think you've probably ever cut a
leg. 

763
00:40:15,500 --> 00:40:20,500
Oh no I got so we have a there's
metal, there's aluminum, see 

764
00:40:20,500 --> 00:40:23,800
channels or different, different
size pieces and and sometimes 

765
00:40:23,800 --> 00:40:28,300
they'll come in standard 
lengths, like a 15 or a 25 or 35

766
00:40:28,300 --> 00:40:31,800
and 35 dots. 
All it is is 17 and a half 

767
00:40:31,800 --> 00:40:35,800
inches and your robot can only 
be 18 by 18, typically and can 

768
00:40:35,800 --> 00:40:38,300
expand some years there let you 
expand past that. 

769
00:40:38,300 --> 00:40:41,800
But no, you, you might need a 4,
right? 

770
00:40:41,800 --> 00:40:44,100
And so you cut that. 
So that said by about the only 

771
00:40:44,100 --> 00:40:48,500
difference really is that it is 
a standard box of stuff and we 

772
00:40:48,500 --> 00:40:51,000
start from scratch. 
Every year, you put wheels and 

773
00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:53,900
you make a chassis and you build
whatever that game is and this 

774
00:40:53,900 --> 00:40:56,800
year, we pick up discs and we 
throw them like a frisbee. 

775
00:40:57,600 --> 00:40:59,100
Interesting. 
And when it does, I wonder if 

776
00:40:59,100 --> 00:41:03,000
this feeds back into like some 
master, robot databases, if I 

777
00:41:03,008 --> 00:41:05,500
got we've tackled picking up 
this, what's next? 

778
00:41:05,500 --> 00:41:07,600
What's next? 
Right, we need to, I don't know,

779
00:41:07,600 --> 00:41:10,000
let's figure something else out 
and that's one outsourced, 

780
00:41:10,100 --> 00:41:12,100
that's one of our most 
anticipated events of the year. 

781
00:41:12,100 --> 00:41:14,100
It happens at the World 
Championships every year on 

782
00:41:14,100 --> 00:41:17,100
Thursday night, they announced 
next year's game and you want to

783
00:41:17,100 --> 00:41:20,000
talk about. 
There's people all over the 

784
00:41:20,000 --> 00:41:23,600
world just tuned into that live 
broadcast. 

785
00:41:23,600 --> 00:41:27,100
I had for, I one team that 
didn't go this last year for the

786
00:41:27,100 --> 00:41:29,700
five. 
Kids texted me on Friday said, 

787
00:41:29,800 --> 00:41:32,200
will you be in the, in the 
classroom on Tuesday? 

788
00:41:32,200 --> 00:41:34,500
I said, yes, I will. 
Can we come in? 

789
00:41:34,500 --> 00:41:38,400
I said, no, three out of four of
them showed up anyways, because 

790
00:41:38,500 --> 00:41:41,100
because it just know me that I 
think I'm gonna let him in. 

791
00:41:42,300 --> 00:41:45,500
That's really cool. 
It reminds me of BattleBots. 

792
00:41:45,900 --> 00:41:48,200
Oh, yeah, no legs. 
You seen that show. 

793
00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:52,100
But I think what's really great 
about a John. 

794
00:41:52,100 --> 00:41:55,200
I just want to recognize this is
like you're donating so much of 

795
00:41:55,200 --> 00:41:58,600
your time, two kids. 
That aren't even your own kids, 

796
00:41:58,600 --> 00:41:59,500
right? 
Right. 

797
00:41:59,500 --> 00:42:01,200
Just and I think that's really 
cool. 

798
00:42:01,200 --> 00:42:04,900
I mean, that's it, you know, 
hats off to you. 

799
00:42:05,100 --> 00:42:08,100
And it also gave me the idea 
that I've got a son, who's a 

800
00:42:08,107 --> 00:42:10,800
freshman in high school, I'm 
gonna have them, you know, 

801
00:42:10,800 --> 00:42:14,100
investigate whether or not 
that's available in his school. 

802
00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:16,800
I bet you. 
There's a good chance it is. 

803
00:42:18,900 --> 00:42:20,700
Yes. 
And for anybody out there, who's

804
00:42:20,700 --> 00:42:24,500
a parent who has kid, that's 
that age, or coming up to that 

805
00:42:24,500 --> 00:42:27,200
age, you know, be something they
could look into. 

806
00:42:29,100 --> 00:42:32,200
Anyway, as we're talking about 
this, this whole robot thing. 

807
00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:35,500
So here's our lighter note, 
like, we love to end on a 

808
00:42:35,500 --> 00:42:40,800
lighter note and it kind of got 
me thinking about robots that 

809
00:42:40,800 --> 00:42:45,100
are being built commercially. 
Like, you know, Elon musk's had 

810
00:42:45,100 --> 00:42:49,300
a unveiling of a robot that I 
think Tesla is building or one 

811
00:42:49,300 --> 00:42:52,500
of his companies building. 
And it also got me thinking 

812
00:42:52,500 --> 00:42:56,500
about Star Wars and Star Trek, 
and you would ask me if I was 

813
00:42:56,500 --> 00:42:59,100
Star Wars start. 
I said, I'm more on the Star 

814
00:42:59,100 --> 00:43:03,400
Trek Star Trek side, Jeff is 
probably more on the Star Wars 

815
00:43:03,400 --> 00:43:07,700
Side based on conversations 
we've had, but I think they both

816
00:43:07,700 --> 00:43:12,600
had a different direction for 
would robots, would be in the 

817
00:43:12,800 --> 00:43:16,000
far distant future. 
So in the Star Wars side, I 

818
00:43:16,000 --> 00:43:20,000
think R2D2 and C3PO. 
In other words, you know, there 

819
00:43:20,000 --> 00:43:23,500
were about, you look at them, 
they're robots, the Star Trek 

820
00:43:23,500 --> 00:43:26,900
side had data. 
So it was more like the 

821
00:43:26,900 --> 00:43:30,500
humanoid, I'd meant to be that 
you couldn't tell the difference

822
00:43:30,500 --> 00:43:34,400
between a synthetic life form 
and a human life form. 

823
00:43:34,400 --> 00:43:37,600
And really the goal was to try 
to get to the point where you 

824
00:43:37,600 --> 00:43:41,900
couldn't tell the difference. 
And so that the letter, no 

825
00:43:41,900 --> 00:43:46,200
question for all three of us 
will be, which way do you see 

826
00:43:47,000 --> 00:43:49,600
actual human Direction going in 
the far distant? 

827
00:43:49,600 --> 00:43:54,700
Future, is it to build robots to
be indistinguishable from 

828
00:43:54,700 --> 00:43:57,800
humans? 
Or is it to make them very Both 

829
00:43:57,800 --> 00:44:00,300
from humans. 
That's a great question. 

830
00:44:01,100 --> 00:44:04,700
And, you know, as far as I'm 
concerned, I have no idea where 

831
00:44:04,700 --> 00:44:06,800
we're headed, but I would think,
would lean towards more of those

832
00:44:06,800 --> 00:44:09,600
Star Trek side where they're 
going to look more like humans. 

833
00:44:10,500 --> 00:44:12,600
Maybe not identical. 
You should be able to tell the 

834
00:44:12,600 --> 00:44:16,000
difference, you know, in real 
life even like was a Boston 

835
00:44:16,000 --> 00:44:18,800
Dynamics and they have that dog 
that walked, you know, the 

836
00:44:18,800 --> 00:44:22,200
trying to make that walk like a 
dog and act like a dog. 

837
00:44:22,200 --> 00:44:23,600
And I think that's where we're 
headed. 

838
00:44:23,600 --> 00:44:27,400
I think that the will be more 
human-like in. 

839
00:44:27,600 --> 00:44:30,800
Maybe probably have a servant in
our home and go back to George 

840
00:44:30,800 --> 00:44:33,400
Jetson. 
Those days won't mind Rosie 

841
00:44:33,400 --> 00:44:36,200
Rosie. 
Yeah, something like that. 

842
00:44:36,200 --> 00:44:41,500
But looking more like Star Trek 
and more human-like. 

843
00:44:41,500 --> 00:44:43,400
More humanoid. 
What do you think? 

844
00:44:43,400 --> 00:44:46,800
Jeff, you know, I thought the 
answer is going to be easy for 

845
00:44:46,800 --> 00:44:50,100
me and I'm going to cheat and 
say both because I'm going to 

846
00:44:50,100 --> 00:44:54,800
take the risk based cost based 
version of this. 

847
00:44:55,100 --> 00:44:57,300
I think we're going to have at 
the highwomen. 

848
00:44:57,600 --> 00:45:01,800
And robots that are virtually 
indistinguishable from a human 

849
00:45:02,100 --> 00:45:06,600
basically data from Star Trek 
and you're going to have purpose

850
00:45:06,600 --> 00:45:10,100
built robots that nobody cares 
what it looks like. 

851
00:45:10,600 --> 00:45:13,200
It's, you know, it's in 
warehouses today. 

852
00:45:13,200 --> 00:45:16,400
They move boxes back and forth 
on these little loader 

853
00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:18,600
platforms, right? 
It doesn't look like a robot. 

854
00:45:18,600 --> 00:45:21,400
It is a robot but doesn't look 
like, you know, it doesn't have 

855
00:45:21,400 --> 00:45:24,500
arms and legs and head right 
MBA. 

856
00:45:24,600 --> 00:45:25,800
Yeah, Rumba. 
Yeah, exactly. 

857
00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:27,400
Like it's, you know, it's a 
purpose-built. 

858
00:45:27,500 --> 00:45:30,300
Nothing. 
And so I think it's I think that

859
00:45:30,300 --> 00:45:31,800
would just be this trend, it 
will be. 

860
00:45:31,800 --> 00:45:34,100
If if you don't care what it 
looks like, it'll look like a 

861
00:45:34,300 --> 00:45:37,200
thing that does a thing Rumba if
you do care. 

862
00:45:37,200 --> 00:45:40,700
And if you're not trying to 
replicate a human experience 

863
00:45:41,000 --> 00:45:46,200
caregiving, you know, medical 
education, maybe or even just 

864
00:45:46,200 --> 00:45:47,600
companionship, those types of 
things. 

865
00:45:47,900 --> 00:45:51,600
Then the interface and the 
visual appeal of the robot 

866
00:45:51,600 --> 00:45:55,000
itself, takes a much higher 
precedence over the 

867
00:45:55,000 --> 00:45:56,700
functionality. 
It's a great Point. 

868
00:45:56,700 --> 00:45:59,000
Yeah, I like that answer. 
Are you know what? 

869
00:45:59,000 --> 00:46:02,800
I was kind of thinking is that 
one branch for robotics is going

870
00:46:02,800 --> 00:46:09,000
to Branch into the medical side.
So someone loses a hand, how can

871
00:46:09,000 --> 00:46:13,000
we replace the hand with a 
robotic hand and of course, 

872
00:46:13,000 --> 00:46:15,600
you're going to want that to 
look as much like a human as 

873
00:46:15,600 --> 00:46:17,500
possible. 
I don't know, man, we're gonna 

874
00:46:17,500 --> 00:46:21,300
take like a nice giant claw, 
like a USB port. 

875
00:46:21,300 --> 00:46:23,600
Something I can plug my phone 
into keep it charged. 

876
00:46:25,600 --> 00:46:28,100
Yeah. 
So maybe you Would but I think 

877
00:46:28,100 --> 00:46:30,700
that most people would like like
those like an actual. 

878
00:46:30,700 --> 00:46:35,000
And anyway, I think there's also
something that'll happen which 

879
00:46:35,000 --> 00:46:45,900
is the the the use of organic 
cells as the understanding of 

880
00:46:46,000 --> 00:46:50,200
organic cells in the ability to 
send chemical signals to them. 

881
00:46:50,600 --> 00:46:55,500
We'll cross a point of knowledge
that you can actually build 

882
00:46:55,500 --> 00:47:01,100
something organically. 
A robot because I think to get 

883
00:47:01,100 --> 00:47:07,400
to kind of the data 2.0 which if
you seen Star Trek the card, 

884
00:47:07,500 --> 00:47:11,400
it's like the next generation of
synthetics and they are 

885
00:47:11,400 --> 00:47:14,900
indistinguishable from humans. 
I feel like the only way you can

886
00:47:14,900 --> 00:47:17,500
get there. 
As if like you have real skin 

887
00:47:17,500 --> 00:47:22,700
real blood, real hair and so she
could get there. 

888
00:47:22,900 --> 00:47:24,500
That should be deep. 
Yeah. 

889
00:47:24,500 --> 00:47:26,300
Yeah. 
I guess I'm like kind of deep 

890
00:47:26,400 --> 00:47:29,300
but so high. 
I kind of think that that would 

891
00:47:29,300 --> 00:47:32,600
be the direction because even 
though I do agree with you if 

892
00:47:32,600 --> 00:47:38,400
like you're going to have 
robotic devices for doing tasks.

893
00:47:38,700 --> 00:47:43,000
But I think when you start 
talking about like, AI robots, 

894
00:47:43,400 --> 00:47:46,700
you know, it's going to go down 
the medical route and then 

895
00:47:46,700 --> 00:47:50,600
eventually be indistinguishable 
from humans because I think 

896
00:47:50,600 --> 00:47:54,300
people are essentially wants to 
live forever. 

897
00:47:55,000 --> 00:47:58,400
Just like that, I'll take care 
of and I don't think people want

898
00:47:58,400 --> 00:48:02,100
to reach their demise because 
they have some disease or 

899
00:48:02,100 --> 00:48:05,500
something like that. 
They'd want to have it repaired.

900
00:48:05,900 --> 00:48:09,700
See now we're getting into like 
the ship of, was it ship of 

901
00:48:09,700 --> 00:48:12,000
Theseus? 
Like with you start removing all

902
00:48:12,000 --> 00:48:15,700
the parts from something and you
reassemble it is it still the 

903
00:48:15,700 --> 00:48:19,000
same ship. 
Well way to end on a lighter 

904
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:21,600
note. 
Yeah, in that show the card to 

905
00:48:21,600 --> 00:48:24,700
mean. 
Jean-Luc Picard has like some 

906
00:48:24,700 --> 00:48:28,900
kind of Of brain disease and 
then in the end, they replace 

907
00:48:28,900 --> 00:48:31,400
his brain with a synthetic 
brain. 

908
00:48:32,200 --> 00:48:36,000
But rewired all the chemicals 
that essentially just didn't 

909
00:48:36,000 --> 00:48:39,400
even realize that he had a new 
synthetic brain. 

910
00:48:40,100 --> 00:48:43,000
Is that possible on a remote? 
But I mean Star Trek it is. 

911
00:48:44,700 --> 00:48:46,600
Everything is possible. 
The TV show, right? 

912
00:48:48,900 --> 00:48:50,500
All right. 
Well with that, I don't know 

913
00:48:50,508 --> 00:48:53,400
where to go with that gym but 
thank you for that uplifting 

914
00:48:54,200 --> 00:48:55,900
view on. 
Unity in the future. 

915
00:48:56,300 --> 00:48:58,400
We'll go and wrap it up for this
episode. 

916
00:48:58,700 --> 00:49:00,300
John, thank you so much for 
joining us. 

917
00:49:00,600 --> 00:49:02,000
Thanks for having me. 
I'm looking forward to the 

918
00:49:02,000 --> 00:49:04,600
conversation. 
Can continually to move forward 

919
00:49:04,600 --> 00:49:06,700
here. 
Hopefully enjoy the conference 

920
00:49:06,700 --> 00:49:08,700
again. 
Shout out to Andrew and Adrienne

921
00:49:08,700 --> 00:49:11,200
and all the folks here at Fido 
who are hosting us. 

922
00:49:11,700 --> 00:49:13,200
We'll go ahead and leave it here
for this week. 

923
00:49:13,300 --> 00:49:15,900
You can check us out on the web 
identity of the center.com. 

924
00:49:15,900 --> 00:49:18,100
We're on Twitter and IDC 
podcast. 

925
00:49:18,500 --> 00:49:20,600
And with that, thanks everyone 
for listening and we'll talk 

926
00:49:20,600 --> 00:49:26,500
with everyone in the next one. 
Thanks for listening to the 

927
00:49:26,500 --> 00:49:29,300
identity at the center podcast. 
If you like what you heard, 

928
00:49:29,300 --> 00:49:32,600
don't forget to subscribe and 
visit us on the web and identity

929
00:49:32,600 --> 00:49:33,500
at the center.com.