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This is identity at the center. 
Welcome to the Identity at the 

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Center podcast. 
I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. 

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Hey, Jim. 
Hey, Jeff, how are you? 

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Oh, not so bad yourself. 
Doing great, man. 

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I'm so excited for this episode.
There are a couple of hot trends

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in the identity space right now.
Continuous identity that we're 

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going to talk about today is one
that I really believe in. 

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I'm really excited to talk about
and I'm just excited to jump 

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into things. 
Yeah. 

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So today we've got a sponsor 
spotlight episode. 

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We do these from time to time. 
It's a fully sponsored episode. 

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So we get into the mindsets of 
our sponsors and sort of the big

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thinkers they've got on their 
side, get their perspectives on 

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I am market straight from the 
source, which is a little bit 

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different than our normal 
episodes where we are. 

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We try to be as vendor neutral 
as possible, right, not talk 

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product, but that is not one of 
these. 

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Today we're actually going to 
talk product and the product 

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today we're going to talk with 
is Signal. 

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And for those not familiar, you 
can find them on the web SGNL 

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dot AI slash IDAC. 
We'll take you to there. 

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I know it's like a lot of 
letters, but it's Signal. 

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And for that we've got Eric 
Gustafson. 

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He's the Co founder and CPO at 
Signal. 

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Welcome to Identity at the 
Center, Eric. 

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Hey, well, glad to be here. 
Yeah, thanks for taking the 

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time. 
So I, I, I, I kind of, I'm 

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joking a little bit because it's
like SGNL dot AI slash igac and 

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yet somehow people will know 
that that is signal and identity

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at the center, which is amazing.
Yeah, brains are amazing. 

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So this is your first time being
with us. 

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I always like to find out how 
people got into the identity 

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space. 
It's such a varied kind of skill

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set and background. 
So let's start there. 

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Eric, how did you get into the 
IM space? 

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Is it something that you chose 
or did it choose you? 

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You know, in some ways I'd say 
it was both back, what was it, 

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2011? 
My Co founder, my current Co 

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founder, Scott and I were 
working running identity and 

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product at a, of all things, a 
fantasy sports gaming company. 

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We built games for the NBA. 
We're B to B, so we built and 

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operated the games under 
somebody else's brand. 

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So we did things like NB as 
games, World Cup games, we did 

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NASCAR's game. 
We did some TV shows like The 

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Bachelorette. 
It was a lot of fun. 

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We were using all SAS products. 
Basically people weren't even 

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using that term at that point. 
You know, you had the sales 

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forces of the world, they 
existed. 

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And you know, at that point we 
were, we were just hired guns 

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there. 
We were employees and the 

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company is being sold off and we
were there to help transition it

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over. 
We got done with that and we're 

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looking around going, well, what
do you want to work on next? 

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Let's go, let's start a company.
But what's the problem we can 

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solve? 
And we kind of realized, hey, 

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everything we're using is cloud 
based. 

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We have this whole IT 
department, they use Active 

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Directory, we've got Exchange, 
it's all running on our own 

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hardware that's in some data 
center. 

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We're managing it all. 
And that group has no clue about

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any of the web things we're 
doing. 

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Like they don't know how people 
get access to them. 

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They don't have to remove 
people. 

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We were, you know, obviously 
transitioning the company to 

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someone else. 
You're removing access to 

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things. 
So you said how, how are people 

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going to solve this problem with
these web applications? 

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There's going to be a million of
them, which, yeah, at that point

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wasn't the most popular 
consensus. 

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I got laughed at a few times for
suggesting that. 

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It's like, Oh no, it's all going
to be just sales force. 

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They're going to own everything.
It's like there's no barrier to 

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entry to make a a web 
application. 

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And so we started looking around
and we ran across this start, 

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this little start up called 
Okta. 

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And we looked at Okta where 
we're like, huh, this is kind of

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what they do. 
But it seems really tied into 

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Active Directory. 
And I'm not sure about this. 

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Like we could do a better job. 
And so, you know, there were two

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years into it or so we, we said 
let's go raise some money and 

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start a company we called that 
that was called Bidium. 

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And we built an identity 
platform. 

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We didn't actually even know 
much about identity at that 

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time. 
We were mostly focused on, you 

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know, credential vaulting what 
we came that, but we built in 

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all the typical things, single 
sign on, SAML, open ID, connect,

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directory sync, provisioning, 
all that stuff. 

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And we did that for about 6 
years. 

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So we kind of stumbled into it, 
but I guess of our own volition 

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because we are going down this 
path of starting this company, 

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you know, sort of Fast forward, 
that brings us to 2017. 

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We were fully competing with 
Octa. 

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We were winning deals. 
I think we won like Bank of 

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America against them and Liberty
Mutual and they filed to go 

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public. 
Oh man, what's this going to 

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mean for us? 
Like what happens, you know, 

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we're, we're a lot smaller than 
they are now. 

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They're going to be a public 
company. 

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Like, are we going to be able to
compete? 

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And that actually catalyzed the 
entire industry to go, hey, this

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identity thing seems real is now
a public company that's, you 

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know, an identity provider. 
And every one of the partners we

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had. 
So we, we took, we took a very 

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cloud forward approach to 
things. 

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We weren't trying to tie back to
traditional LDAP systems. 

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We were looking at HR systems, 
we were looking at skim, we were

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looking at Google Cloud as 
identity sources to allow you to

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authenticate. 
And so these partners all 

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reached out to us and we 
actually ended up selling the 

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company to Google and that 
became part of Google Cloud 

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identity, which is their single 
sign on provisioning directory 

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sync product. 
And I, I ran a big chunk of the 

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single sign on portion directory
sync for about two years at 

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Google as Scott came along to 
and worked a bunch of 

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interesting things. 
So that's kind of how I got in 

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the identity space. 
I guess, you know, prior to that

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I was just doing software, 
various kind of enterprise 

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software and it just it, it made
sense to us and been on that 

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journey ever since. 
So as a recovering fantasy 

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football player, I don't know if
I should be shaking your hand or

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trying to tear it off because 
I've had good and bad seasons. 

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But I won't go over there with 
this one. 

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I introduced you as ACPO and 
that's a chief product officer. 

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Tell me about that role. 
What is what is ACPO? 

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And tell me a little bit like 
what is a normal day? 

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And maybe it's a normal week or 
average week, whatever you want 

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is portrayed as it's a so at 
signal. 

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What I do as a chief product 
officer is I oversee. 

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Both the engineering team and 
the product team. 

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So I have very solid product 
lead and engineering lead 

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underneath me and they take care
of their respective teams, make 

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sure things get built, make sure
our products released, talk to 

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customers, be happy. 
My job is really actually the 

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way I formulated is to talk to a
lot of customers. 

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I try to talk to as many 
customers during the week as 

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possible. 
I try to go along on sales 

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calls. 
I try to talk to customers that 

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have been deployed, what are 
their problems? 

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And I try to, I'm trying to kind
of see around the corner like 

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what's coming next? 
Like when someone says something

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interesting or customer A says, 
hey, I want this sort of, I'm 

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trying to solve these problems 
and customer B will probably 

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tell me they're trying to solve 
completely different problems. 

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But I realized there's some Venn
diagram overlap between those 

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things. 
I'm like, OK, my ears will perk 

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up and I'll bring that back to 
the team and we'll work on, OK, 

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how do we develop that? 
How do we turn that into product

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road map and product features? 
So I think my job is to listen 

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as much as possible to the 
market, reflect that back 

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internally and then take what 
the teams are coming up with too

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and bring it out and say, Hey, 
what do you think? 

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You know, customer X, what do 
you think of this sort of thing?

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We built something like this. 
Is this interesting? 

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And then for pre sales, the 
customers who have we're not 

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working with yet. 
So prospects, I guess see if it 

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fits them. 
Where are they on their journey 

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in the identity space? 
What we're building at signals 

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pretty new. 
And so there's a lot of 

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education in the market. 
It's it's there's definitely 

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people out there who are way 
more advanced than we are in 

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their thinking and they're like,
yes, this is what we've been 

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looking for, but there's also a 
lot there like what is signal to

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wait? 
Like, isn't that some messaging 

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app? 
Like what do you guys? 

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Do so I want to start up with 
how did you get the company name

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together there SGNL signal like 
how did you come up with that? 

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So Wes, we're thinking through 
this what we're now calling 

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continuous identity back in just
probably mid 2021, we were about

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to leave Google. 
We were Scott and I were sitting

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down. 
We're like, hey, what do you 

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want to call this company? 
And we start thinking about this

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is broadly in the authorization 
space where post login. 

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So we're not dealing with who 
the user is, not that part of 

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identity. 
We're the what can the user do 

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now once we know who they are 
that side of identity. 

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And a lot of what we thought 
about was this is a game of what

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signals can you get in from 
existing systems? 

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Can you get threat intelligence?
Can you get signals from 

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directories? 
Like thinking about as big way 

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of meshing the data together 
that's already living in the 

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enterprise and pulling it into a
sort of what we now call a 

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fabric. 
Like bringing all those 

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relationships together to be 
able to understand what are 

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people allowed to be doing at 
this moment in time. 

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And so we knew we only used the 
word signal somewhere in the 

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name. 
So I, we spent probably like 2 

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weeks just texting random names 
back and forth to each other. 

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Like what do you think of this? 
What do you think of that? 

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And we'd then go look to see if 
the domain name is available. 

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So eventually we came up with 
like, hey, if we take the word 

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signal, I think I, I came up 
with this and remove the vowels 

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from it. 
That's a short, that's a nice 

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short domain name. sgnl.com. 
Somebody's got that and 

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squatting on it. 
O dot AI. 

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Let's do that then. 
This was pre open AI, like there

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wasn't ChatGPT at this point and
coming from Google DNA or like, 

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OK, machine learning AI stuff, 
that's a thing. 

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And eventually, you know, we 
want to bring some of that into 

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this system. 
So yeah, let's go with SGNL dot 

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AI. 
Like that kind of encapsulates 

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it. 
Some point later, one of our 

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customers pointed out to me, 
like, do you realize that you 

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just took the vowels out of the 
word signal and moved them to 

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the dot after the dot? 
I'm like, yes, I'm really 

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brilliant. 
No, I did not realize that. 

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Yes, of course. 
Yes, we planned that all along. 

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It's an. 
It's an anagram. 

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Don't you get it? 
Yeah. 

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We should also say Head of 
marketing then. 

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I don't know. 
You know, you probably have one 

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of those and I don't. 
Want we do. 

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Steal from that person. 
So, you know, usually Eric, or I

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should say always when somebody 
has an idea for a company, a 

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solution, it's a solution to a 
problem. 

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So what is the? 
What is the problem that you 

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guys are solving? 
Yeah, absolutely. 

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So a lot of this has some roots 
inside when we were together at 

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Google. 
So Scott and I were both there. 

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You know, after we came in two 
years of stabilizing the 

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acquisition, Scott took a role 
inside Google to look at how do 

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you deal with authorization 
across the entire platform. 

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So this is everything from like 
Waymo to Google Maps to ads to 

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Nest, you know, every subsidiary
that Google owns. 

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How do you deal with policy 
across the board on that? 

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And I was spending a lot of time
with who's now our CTO, Otto, 

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And he was wanting to propose 
this thing that is now we call 

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00:11:07,920 --> 00:11:11,040
Cape Continuous Access 
Evaluation Profile. 

228
00:11:11,680 --> 00:11:13,680
And he wrote a blog on that. 
I actually was the guy who 

229
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approved the blog being 
published in 2019. 

230
00:11:15,800 --> 00:11:17,720
His manager came to me and said,
does this make sense? 

231
00:11:17,960 --> 00:11:19,600
I'm like, Yep, that is 
brilliant. 

232
00:11:19,600 --> 00:11:23,040
I want to talk to this Otto guy.
And so we were thinking about 

233
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these these problems, 
specifically what Scott, the 

234
00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:29,320
pain points Scott was being 
asked to solve is Google has, 

235
00:11:29,320 --> 00:11:31,400
you know, they've got a couple 
engineers they can they can do 

236
00:11:31,400 --> 00:11:34,440
some stuff over there. 
And they've built for themselves

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00:11:34,440 --> 00:11:37,200
pretty much every possible type 
of security and identity 

238
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technology and probably own 
licensing to have like all the 

239
00:11:40,760 --> 00:11:43,440
other ones anyway. 
But they ran into this issue 

240
00:11:43,440 --> 00:11:45,760
where, you know, for 
geopolitical reasons, they 

241
00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:49,480
wanted to lock down user access 
in Hong Kong. 

242
00:11:49,680 --> 00:11:54,600
And they want to lock it down so
that only customer data for 

243
00:11:54,600 --> 00:11:57,360
customers that were located 
their headquarters are in Hong 

244
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Kong could be accessed by 
employees who are assigned to 

245
00:11:59,560 --> 00:12:02,160
work in their very big building 
in Hong Kong at the time and 

246
00:12:02,160 --> 00:12:05,320
probably still do. 
There are a lot of engineering 

247
00:12:05,320 --> 00:12:08,120
teams from different parts of 
the company working in that 

248
00:12:08,120 --> 00:12:12,200
building. 
And so how do you actually do 

249
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that? 
And it sounds like a simple 

250
00:12:14,000 --> 00:12:16,600
problem, but it actually gets 
complicated is like, how do you 

251
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know the customer's base there? 
How do you know it's the 

252
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headquarters? 
How do you know the users not 

253
00:12:19,880 --> 00:12:24,000
just like passing through 
temporarily and then office, 

254
00:12:24,000 --> 00:12:25,800
they don't actually work this. 
You have to pull all these data 

255
00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:27,880
feeds in to be able to solve 
those kinds of problems. 

256
00:12:28,280 --> 00:12:30,040
And it wasn't something that 
could be done quickly. 

257
00:12:30,200 --> 00:12:32,520
And obviously, you know, 
geopolitics doesn't move fast, 

258
00:12:32,520 --> 00:12:35,760
but it does move, you know, in 
weeks, not in years. 

259
00:12:36,200 --> 00:12:40,120
And so realize, hey, this is a 
probably a blind spot to our 

260
00:12:40,120 --> 00:12:42,360
systems that we can't do policy 
fast. 

261
00:12:43,120 --> 00:12:45,400
How do we solve that? 
Hey Scott, you seem like the 

262
00:12:45,400 --> 00:12:47,160
delusional entrepreneurial type 
of guy. 

263
00:12:47,640 --> 00:12:49,960
Can you solve this? 
And so he went off and, and they

264
00:12:49,960 --> 00:12:51,960
built this platform for like 2 
years or so. 

265
00:12:52,480 --> 00:12:54,920
And when he got done with it, I 
was comparing notes with him 

266
00:12:54,920 --> 00:12:57,720
because I had been always kind 
of interested in the post 

267
00:12:58,120 --> 00:12:59,920
authentication, the post login 
problem. 

268
00:12:59,920 --> 00:13:02,880
Like how do you know what people
are supposed to do right now? 

269
00:13:03,440 --> 00:13:06,240
Atul is obviously interested in 
this too with Cape being focused

270
00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:09,240
on session transitions. 
And so we were comparing notes 

271
00:13:09,240 --> 00:13:12,200
like that seems like a really 
good problem to solve. 

272
00:13:12,200 --> 00:13:14,200
It doesn't seem like there's, 
you know, but is this just a, 

273
00:13:14,640 --> 00:13:18,280
something that you have to be 
Google or you have to be Amazon 

274
00:13:18,280 --> 00:13:22,040
to have these, this is that big 
of a scale issue or do sort of 

275
00:13:22,040 --> 00:13:24,960
mere mortal enterprises actually
have this problem? 

276
00:13:24,960 --> 00:13:28,240
So we went out, we talked to 
some CSO's at large companies, 

277
00:13:28,240 --> 00:13:31,680
like, what are you all doing? 
And the answer we got back to 

278
00:13:31,680 --> 00:13:34,600
them was like, there's nothing 
good in the space that does this

279
00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:35,800
for us. 
We were probably going to 

280
00:13:35,920 --> 00:13:38,840
assemble a team of people 
together and do this ourselves. 

281
00:13:39,880 --> 00:13:41,720
That's enough. 
We were at the time where we had

282
00:13:41,720 --> 00:13:42,800
this sort of stick around at 
Google. 

283
00:13:42,800 --> 00:13:46,440
So like, hey, let's quit our 
jobs next week and let's go 

284
00:13:46,440 --> 00:13:49,400
found a company. 
You know, let's let's get the 

285
00:13:49,400 --> 00:13:51,360
band back together. 
So that's what we did. 

286
00:13:52,520 --> 00:13:55,520
So many questions based on what 
you said, and I'm going to stick

287
00:13:55,520 --> 00:13:59,760
with the one that we entered the
show with and talked about this 

288
00:13:59,760 --> 00:14:03,840
term, continuous identity. 
I mean, it has so much meaning 

289
00:14:03,840 --> 00:14:10,160
to me and it's something that 
has been, you know, needed for 

290
00:14:10,160 --> 00:14:12,960
such a long time. 
But I wanted you to get want to 

291
00:14:12,960 --> 00:14:16,440
give you an opportunity to put 
in your words what is meant by 

292
00:14:16,440 --> 00:14:20,160
continuous identity. 
What is the the dream behind 

293
00:14:20,160 --> 00:14:25,280
that? 
Yeah, it's a great question for 

294
00:14:25,280 --> 00:14:29,080
continuous identity and I'm 
really glad the market's 

295
00:14:29,080 --> 00:14:31,320
starting to, you know, customers
are starting to use this 

296
00:14:31,320 --> 00:14:33,840
terminology. 
I heard it a lot at Identiverse 

297
00:14:33,840 --> 00:14:36,080
this year. 
I've heard it come up in just 

298
00:14:36,080 --> 00:14:39,600
natural conversations now 
because it hasn't had a name. 

299
00:14:39,600 --> 00:14:43,160
In some ways I think of it if if
you think of the kind of 

300
00:14:43,160 --> 00:14:47,760
asynchronous, always on sharing 
first architecture that 

301
00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:51,000
something like Cape and the 
shared signals framework 

302
00:14:52,280 --> 00:14:56,080
envisions being there. 
Continuous identity is kind of 

303
00:14:56,080 --> 00:14:59,720
that solution. 
It is continuous identity is the

304
00:14:59,720 --> 00:15:03,880
idea that you should be always 
pulling in signals and 

305
00:15:03,880 --> 00:15:07,040
information from your systems 
and they should be evaluating 

306
00:15:07,040 --> 00:15:09,800
that in real time whenever a 
user's doing something. 

307
00:15:10,080 --> 00:15:12,520
And on top of that, you should 
be broadcasting it back out so 

308
00:15:12,520 --> 00:15:14,880
everybody knows about it, all 
the other systems know about it.

309
00:15:15,240 --> 00:15:21,040
So really simple example is, and
I guess I should add, time is 

310
00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:23,080
important to this, right, The 
time factor. 

311
00:15:23,080 --> 00:15:26,280
And we'd often think, don't 
think about time when we think 

312
00:15:26,280 --> 00:15:29,160
about identity policies. 
We should think in terms of more

313
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:31,680
what I call static access. 
Like I can do a thing. 

314
00:15:32,280 --> 00:15:35,240
But now really you want to ask 
like I can do a thing right now.

315
00:15:35,520 --> 00:15:41,040
So imagine your dev OPS and 
you're supposed to go out, You 

316
00:15:41,040 --> 00:15:43,120
know, today's the day I'm 
supposed to go to AWS and I'm 

317
00:15:43,120 --> 00:15:47,600
supposed to do ADNS update to 
deploy some new system into 

318
00:15:47,600 --> 00:15:49,600
production. 
Or maybe I'm supposed to do it 

319
00:15:49,600 --> 00:15:53,680
in staging it better. 
And I go there and I have 

320
00:15:53,680 --> 00:15:56,200
access. 
And now as soon as I get into 

321
00:15:56,200 --> 00:16:01,120
that environment, I realize 
like, hey, I have, I'm waiting 

322
00:16:01,120 --> 00:16:03,680
for something to happen. 
I click a link and I'm boom, 

323
00:16:03,680 --> 00:16:06,920
I've got malware on my device. 
I still have that session open. 

324
00:16:06,920 --> 00:16:09,240
That malware might be harvesting
those credentials, getting me in

325
00:16:09,240 --> 00:16:11,400
there. 
There's systems. 

326
00:16:11,400 --> 00:16:13,800
Crowdstrike does a great job of 
detecting those sorts of things.

327
00:16:13,800 --> 00:16:21,040
But how does Crowdstrike tell my
IDP to tell AWS that it should 

328
00:16:21,040 --> 00:16:24,560
cut me off? 
Or let's say I'm actually not 

329
00:16:24,560 --> 00:16:26,760
supposed to be in. 
I was supposed to be in staging 

330
00:16:27,040 --> 00:16:29,560
making this change, the prep for
next week's production release, 

331
00:16:29,880 --> 00:16:31,880
and I accidentally clicked on 
the tile for production. 

332
00:16:31,880 --> 00:16:34,280
And now because I am the guy 
that deploys the production and 

333
00:16:34,280 --> 00:16:36,800
I'm in production, I make this 
change too and I break things. 

334
00:16:37,320 --> 00:16:40,840
All these problems have to do 
with standing axis and a problem

335
00:16:40,840 --> 00:16:43,840
of not sharing information. 
So you think of continuous 

336
00:16:43,840 --> 00:16:47,560
identity as, hey, we pull the 
data in real time from systems, 

337
00:16:48,080 --> 00:16:54,200
we react to that changing state.
You were OK from a crowd strike 

338
00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:56,080
point of view. 
You're no longer OK now from a 

339
00:16:56,080 --> 00:16:58,480
crowd strike point of view or 
you're on call this week, you're

340
00:16:58,480 --> 00:17:00,880
not on call this week or you're 
supposed to be the tickets for 

341
00:17:00,880 --> 00:17:04,119
staging in service now, the 
tickets for production, 

342
00:17:04,119 --> 00:17:05,640
ServiceNow, these are all state 
changes. 

343
00:17:06,079 --> 00:17:11,640
And when that state or better, I
think for a, a less nerdy way of

344
00:17:11,640 --> 00:17:15,240
saying that is, you know, think 
about context, the context of me

345
00:17:15,240 --> 00:17:19,280
doing my job, that changes our 
identity system should react to 

346
00:17:19,280 --> 00:17:22,359
that. 
This is a really common concept 

347
00:17:22,359 --> 00:17:24,720
in the kind of cybersecurity 
land. 

348
00:17:24,960 --> 00:17:29,160
We have threat detection and 
automation and sores and Sims 

349
00:17:29,160 --> 00:17:31,880
and all these tools. 
How do you bring that into the 

350
00:17:31,880 --> 00:17:33,440
identity play? 
And then how do you have the 

351
00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:34,680
identity? 
And for the security side, 

352
00:17:34,680 --> 00:17:37,280
these, you know, we've been 
treating these two industries as

353
00:17:37,280 --> 00:17:39,680
separate for a really long time 
and I see them really kind of 

354
00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:45,600
converging. 
Yeah, I mean, the the podcast 

355
00:17:45,600 --> 00:17:48,600
name identity at the center has 
been all about the story that 

356
00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:51,120
you just relayed there. 
You know, I think a lot of 

357
00:17:51,120 --> 00:17:55,360
people think, OK, well, identity
is new perimeter identity center

358
00:17:55,360 --> 00:17:58,240
is kind of a play on that. 
But it's really that the 

359
00:17:58,240 --> 00:18:02,600
identity and what's happening in
all these systems kind of comes 

360
00:18:02,600 --> 00:18:04,400
back to the center and drives 
things. 

361
00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:08,040
Because you made a great point 
there about, OK, crowd strike 

362
00:18:08,040 --> 00:18:11,080
detects us. 
Does that information just kind 

363
00:18:11,080 --> 00:18:15,280
of die there or does that become
identity data that comes back to

364
00:18:15,280 --> 00:18:17,680
the center? 
And I think, I think where we're

365
00:18:17,680 --> 00:18:22,960
going with this is that then 
that data becomes usable for 

366
00:18:23,160 --> 00:18:27,800
making smart identity decisions.
And not only just making smart 

367
00:18:27,800 --> 00:18:31,600
decisions or throwing 
information on a dashboard, but 

368
00:18:31,600 --> 00:18:35,160
in real time saying this is a 
session that looks like it's 

369
00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:38,720
from an identity that's been 
compromised over here. 

370
00:18:39,120 --> 00:18:43,160
Let's do something about, let's 
temporarily shut off access, for

371
00:18:43,160 --> 00:18:45,200
example. 
Is that kind of what you're 

372
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:47,560
getting at exactly? 
Exactly. 

373
00:18:48,000 --> 00:18:51,320
It's that idea of like and I, I 
like to think about it as that 

374
00:18:51,320 --> 00:18:54,920
identity comes from the 
perimeters back to the center 

375
00:18:54,920 --> 00:18:58,320
and then is processed mixed with
other information from other, 

376
00:18:58,440 --> 00:19:00,840
other systems and then 
rebroadcast back out. 

377
00:19:01,160 --> 00:19:05,560
So not only are you getting all 
these superpowers of I can do 

378
00:19:05,560 --> 00:19:08,920
things in real time, I can take 
all this rich information that 

379
00:19:09,080 --> 00:19:12,440
we, hey, we already have inside 
the company and I can make 

380
00:19:12,440 --> 00:19:14,440
better use of it. 
But you actually make all your 

381
00:19:14,440 --> 00:19:17,520
other products better too. 
Because suddenly your, let's 

382
00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:21,000
call it your Okta instance or 
your Entre instance is suddenly 

383
00:19:21,560 --> 00:19:24,640
a lot smarter because now it's 
getting data feeds piped into it

384
00:19:24,640 --> 00:19:27,360
from your Crowdstrike solutions.
And Crowdstrike's smarter 

385
00:19:27,360 --> 00:19:32,320
because it sees somebody's 
probing at the at the IDP and it

386
00:19:32,320 --> 00:19:35,080
can bring that stuff back into 
Crowdstrike or bring it to a 

387
00:19:35,080 --> 00:19:37,600
sore. 
And you can run a playbook 

388
00:19:37,600 --> 00:19:40,280
against that saying, hey, well, 
if Jim's keeps hitting the thing

389
00:19:40,280 --> 00:19:45,160
that says deny, deny, deny 
repetitively, maybe that's not 

390
00:19:45,160 --> 00:19:47,400
Jim doing that. 
That's right. 

391
00:19:47,800 --> 00:19:49,560
Yeah. 
And by the way, so we you said 

392
00:19:49,560 --> 00:19:52,160
there with identity is at the 
perimeter comes back to the 

393
00:19:52,160 --> 00:19:53,880
center that goes back out to the
perimeter. 

394
00:19:54,160 --> 00:19:57,400
We thought of that as a podcast 
name, but we decided just to go 

395
00:19:57,400 --> 00:19:59,600
with Identity center. 
It's a little long. 

396
00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:01,280
Yeah. 
It's a little long. 

397
00:20:01,520 --> 00:20:07,360
It's hard to search for, but 
yeah, kind of what I wanted to 

398
00:20:07,360 --> 00:20:10,360
get at is something that I think
you're talking about. 

399
00:20:11,960 --> 00:20:16,240
And for me, this has been one of
my big questions about Signal is

400
00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:20,520
what are the systems that you 
want to collect this data from? 

401
00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:23,600
You met your crowd strike. 
Give us some more examples. 

402
00:20:23,880 --> 00:20:27,520
Yeah, absolutely. 
So there's probably 3 big 

403
00:20:27,520 --> 00:20:29,720
categories of data. 
I'd say there's traditional 

404
00:20:29,720 --> 00:20:32,160
identity data. 
So think your directories, your 

405
00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:38,120
HR systems, your groups policy 
information, that's all identity

406
00:20:38,120 --> 00:20:40,280
data. 
There's security data. 

407
00:20:40,280 --> 00:20:44,400
So your crowd strikes, I'd say 
your device compliance data, if 

408
00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:48,560
you have a device management 
platform, if you like a jam for 

409
00:20:48,560 --> 00:20:52,240
an Intune, it's that's the 
security feeds. 

410
00:20:52,560 --> 00:20:54,960
Maybe you've got other sources 
of data, other types of 

411
00:20:54,960 --> 00:20:56,960
telemetry that you've wired up 
in the enterprise. 

412
00:20:57,720 --> 00:21:00,920
Maybe you've got VPN logs or 
something if you're still using 

413
00:21:00,920 --> 00:21:03,440
that type of topology. 
And then you get your 

414
00:21:03,440 --> 00:21:05,840
operational data. 
This is your tickets, your 

415
00:21:05,840 --> 00:21:09,200
ServiceNow, your pager duty. 
Hey, I'm on call this week. 

416
00:21:09,200 --> 00:21:10,520
I'm the guy that's supposed to 
be going in there. 

417
00:21:11,360 --> 00:21:14,600
If I'm not on call, well, I 
shouldn't be able to get access 

418
00:21:14,600 --> 00:21:18,120
to things. 
Or if I'm on vacation, you know,

419
00:21:18,160 --> 00:21:20,200
unless I'm working for that kind
of company where I'm should be 

420
00:21:20,200 --> 00:21:24,440
dialing in from Hawaii to do my 
do my work mostly, I probably 

421
00:21:24,440 --> 00:21:27,520
shouldn't have access. 
Because if, if I'm coming in and

422
00:21:27,520 --> 00:21:31,640
work day says I'm actually out 
of office right now without any 

423
00:21:31,640 --> 00:21:33,720
other information, you should 
probably assume that I'm an 

424
00:21:33,720 --> 00:21:35,800
attacker. 
But I'm not actually me. 

425
00:21:36,040 --> 00:21:38,440
But somehow I've been 
compromised or from suddenly 

426
00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:40,880
coming from a strange IP address
I've never shown up before in a 

427
00:21:40,880 --> 00:21:45,120
browser you've never seen. 
So it's that type of business 

428
00:21:45,120 --> 00:21:48,520
telemetry and all these things 
exist in the enterprise. 

429
00:21:48,520 --> 00:21:52,000
We just stick them in silos and 
don't ever talk to them again. 

430
00:21:53,520 --> 00:21:58,000
So that concept of silos leads 
me to a very interesting 

431
00:21:58,000 --> 00:22:01,040
question. 
I think is the concept of data, 

432
00:22:01,840 --> 00:22:06,640
is stale better stale data 
better than no data or is no 

433
00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:09,000
data better than stale data 
data, I can't even say it 

434
00:22:09,000 --> 00:22:12,080
correctly, you know, but the 
better or stale data or no data,

435
00:22:12,080 --> 00:22:16,240
like what is what is the thought
process behind that I think? 

436
00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:19,360
I usually try to flip this 
around when when customers bring

437
00:22:19,360 --> 00:22:22,440
this up and I say, let's start 
with the policy instead. 

438
00:22:22,720 --> 00:22:25,280
What are you trying to 
accomplish and how if you had 

439
00:22:25,280 --> 00:22:27,560
like write that down, like 
literally write it down a piece 

440
00:22:27,560 --> 00:22:30,640
of paper. 
I only want on call engineers 

441
00:22:31,000 --> 00:22:33,240
who have a ticket assigned to 
them to go to a production 

442
00:22:33,240 --> 00:22:34,880
system. 
That's like the most basic 

443
00:22:34,880 --> 00:22:37,960
policy a company's going to have
that gets them in trouble. 

444
00:22:38,320 --> 00:22:40,640
I think no one thinks their 
cloud systems are the most 

445
00:22:40,640 --> 00:22:44,440
secure they could be in that 
scenario. 

446
00:22:44,440 --> 00:22:45,640
How would you go about proving 
that? 

447
00:22:45,920 --> 00:22:48,760
Forget real time. 
Forget non real time. 

448
00:22:48,760 --> 00:22:51,480
Like actually, literally like if
you had the if your job was to 

449
00:22:51,480 --> 00:22:54,960
go check out if Jeff's allowed 
to be in this system right now 

450
00:22:55,200 --> 00:22:58,160
by manually checking things, 
what systems would you go to? 

451
00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:00,720
OK, I need to know about 
tickets. 

452
00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:02,040
I I where would I go? 
Service. 

453
00:23:02,040 --> 00:23:04,840
Now I have some data there. 
Do I need all the data to be 

454
00:23:04,840 --> 00:23:08,880
perfect over in ServiceNow? 
No, I need some basic ticket 

455
00:23:08,880 --> 00:23:11,680
information available to me. 
Maybe I need a process that I 

456
00:23:11,680 --> 00:23:13,880
actually open tickets. 
But that's your policy. 

457
00:23:13,880 --> 00:23:16,000
I hope you're following your 
policy or else you've got 

458
00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:19,920
different problems. 
Do I need to go look at device 

459
00:23:19,920 --> 00:23:20,720
compliance? 
Yes. 

460
00:23:20,720 --> 00:23:22,320
OK. 
Like, should people be in the 

461
00:23:22,320 --> 00:23:27,680
production system if they're on 
their old unpatched Windows 2000

462
00:23:27,680 --> 00:23:29,560
laptop that's sitting in their 
garage? 

463
00:23:30,040 --> 00:23:32,440
No, I probably want them to be 
on a company managed defeat 

464
00:23:32,440 --> 00:23:35,400
machine if I'm letting them do 
really serious things. 

465
00:23:35,400 --> 00:23:40,120
So I'd say you need some data. 
You need to have a good handle 

466
00:23:40,120 --> 00:23:42,720
on your data, probably more than
you need to have good data. 

467
00:23:43,360 --> 00:23:45,640
Knowledge of data is probably 
the number one thing. 

468
00:23:45,720 --> 00:23:51,360
Just where are the systems? 
You can paper over quite a bit 

469
00:23:51,920 --> 00:23:55,920
by taking data from multiple 
systems and then organizing and 

470
00:23:55,920 --> 00:23:58,240
then signal helps you kind of 
stitch it all together. 

471
00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:00,000
And that creates a lot of power 
for you. 

472
00:24:00,200 --> 00:24:02,760
It doesn't need to be perfect. 
It doesn't all need to be 

473
00:24:02,760 --> 00:24:05,680
pristine. 
But if you know the different 

474
00:24:05,680 --> 00:24:08,480
systems that you you'd use to 
force your policy, like if you 

475
00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:12,480
can put your hands on that 
manually, then you can start. 

476
00:24:12,480 --> 00:24:14,920
And I think that's a better 
position than just saying, oh, 

477
00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:17,520
it's all in these silos. 
And I just not like, I, I don't 

478
00:24:17,520 --> 00:24:18,760
know, I'm not even going to go 
after it. 

479
00:24:18,760 --> 00:24:23,000
I'm not even going to try. 
So Eric, it seems to me what 

480
00:24:23,480 --> 00:24:26,960
you're talking about here is 
that most of the signal data 

481
00:24:26,960 --> 00:24:31,640
that you get the most value from
is from your own IT systems, 

482
00:24:31,640 --> 00:24:37,800
whether they're stash systems. 
So what about getting data from 

483
00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:43,120
like big ID PS, like a Facebook 
or something like that? 

484
00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:46,280
Does that make any sense? 
Does it, do you ever see a 

485
00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:49,760
future where it's like, you 
know, you're you're getting this

486
00:24:49,760 --> 00:24:52,360
from a broker, in other words, 
you're plugging into some kind 

487
00:24:52,360 --> 00:24:57,440
of central broker data hub, or 
does that just go against what 

488
00:24:57,440 --> 00:25:01,560
you're trying to achieve? 
I, I, I like to be more agnostic

489
00:25:01,560 --> 00:25:03,000
about where the data might come 
from. 

490
00:25:03,000 --> 00:25:05,640
I think the easy, the low 
hanging fruit is your internal 

491
00:25:05,640 --> 00:25:13,320
systems, but you know, it's a 
sibling standard to Cape is 

492
00:25:13,320 --> 00:25:16,520
Risk, which is for account 
takeover feeds and Google 

493
00:25:16,520 --> 00:25:19,600
publishes one and the US 
government publishes one for 

494
00:25:19,760 --> 00:25:21,720
account takeovers. 
That's reasonable. 

495
00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:25,040
If you're dealing with consumer 
identities, that might be handy 

496
00:25:25,040 --> 00:25:28,160
to, to grab that data feed and 
use that in your policies. 

497
00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:33,120
There's lots of sources of IP 
reputation, data, threat 

498
00:25:33,120 --> 00:25:36,000
signatures, there's lots of 
vendors of that information. 

499
00:25:36,360 --> 00:25:39,960
And so I think for the the 
enterprise use case or the 

500
00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:43,000
second party like the 
contractors, vendors, use cases,

501
00:25:43,400 --> 00:25:44,880
your internal systems are great 
for that. 

502
00:25:45,360 --> 00:25:48,840
For consumer use cases, which 
we're starting to see some more 

503
00:25:48,840 --> 00:25:51,360
customers tiptoe towards 
building those sorts of things, 

504
00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:54,800
Yeah, they might be good public 
sets mixing it all together. 

505
00:25:54,800 --> 00:25:58,640
Those the real, the real power 
comes from, because the more you

506
00:25:58,640 --> 00:26:01,760
layer into the system, the more 
you map out the connectivity, 

507
00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:04,720
just this gets exponentially 
more powerful for you. 

508
00:26:05,560 --> 00:26:08,960
You have a lot more capabilities
as you start to expand the 

509
00:26:08,960 --> 00:26:11,040
network of data that's coming 
into this. 

510
00:26:11,040 --> 00:26:12,760
What you know, we think of it, 
we call it the identity data 

511
00:26:12,760 --> 00:26:14,040
fabric. 
It's stitching. 

512
00:26:14,040 --> 00:26:16,160
You've got to weave all those 
threads in together. 

513
00:26:16,360 --> 00:26:19,280
So I'd say, yeah, I can see a 
world where there's going to be 

514
00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:21,120
public feeds. 
I don't necessarily think I'd 

515
00:26:21,120 --> 00:26:23,200
see a world where that's the 
only source of feeds. 

516
00:26:23,600 --> 00:26:25,640
Companies are always going to 
have their internal systems. 

517
00:26:25,640 --> 00:26:27,680
They're going to have their home
grown things and they're going 

518
00:26:27,680 --> 00:26:30,000
to want to use those for their 
own business reasons. 

519
00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:35,960
I'd love that. 
Answer So one more, which is, 

520
00:26:36,080 --> 00:26:40,440
you know, around kind of whose 
signals built for, is it built 

521
00:26:40,440 --> 00:26:43,080
for? 
You know, who's going to use it?

522
00:26:43,360 --> 00:26:48,080
I, I, I'd love the answer if it 
would be IAM practitioner. 

523
00:26:48,360 --> 00:26:52,840
I also think the role of the IAM
practitioner is expanding, but 

524
00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:57,920
where in the organization do you
see folks getting excited about 

525
00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:02,520
this and kind of reaching out to
you and you know, being 

526
00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:05,240
interested in the product and 
potentially buying on? 

527
00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:08,760
I'll, I'll make your day at the 
identity partitioners. 

528
00:27:08,800 --> 00:27:11,120
It's really the IAM architects 
that we see. 

529
00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:16,640
We, we deliberately designed 
signal though to handle two 

530
00:27:16,640 --> 00:27:18,360
different personas in the 
organization. 

531
00:27:18,840 --> 00:27:21,800
So the identity partitioner is 
the main operator. 

532
00:27:21,800 --> 00:27:27,000
They, the architect, they manage
the system, they define, we call

533
00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:29,560
them policy snippets inside the 
system. 

534
00:27:29,840 --> 00:27:31,160
Think of them as like they're 
the nouns. 

535
00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:34,080
So they've built the Lego 
building blocks that we use to 

536
00:27:34,080 --> 00:27:38,200
assemble how signal operates 
inside your company, because we 

537
00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:40,800
want to do that because they 
understand the identity 

538
00:27:40,800 --> 00:27:43,320
principles that the enterprise 
wants to put in place. 

539
00:27:43,880 --> 00:27:46,960
But then we give an interface 
where a business analyst or 

540
00:27:46,960 --> 00:27:49,400
someone who's closer to the 
application we're trying to 

541
00:27:49,400 --> 00:27:54,520
protect, we refer to that as a 
protected system, that persona, 

542
00:27:55,280 --> 00:27:59,240
they should get a very 
simplified, not simplistic, but 

543
00:27:59,520 --> 00:28:04,400
easy to use way to say, here's 
what I want to do and do that by

544
00:28:04,400 --> 00:28:07,120
taking those Lego blocks and 
then snapping them together. 

545
00:28:07,120 --> 00:28:09,880
I, if you're familiar with Mad 
Libs, it's kind of like Mad 

546
00:28:09,880 --> 00:28:11,600
Libs, like there's just the 
policy. 

547
00:28:11,600 --> 00:28:14,480
And let me throw in who's the 
principal? 

548
00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:17,840
What are the actions, what are 
the assets they're trying to 

549
00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:19,360
protect here and what are some 
conditions? 

550
00:28:19,480 --> 00:28:23,640
Those are all pre canned. 
My local identity architect has 

551
00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:26,320
already come up with those based
on the data sets we've pulled in

552
00:28:26,320 --> 00:28:28,520
the signal and I just seem to 
put them together and layer 

553
00:28:28,520 --> 00:28:31,400
that, hey, now I have a policy 
and let me go stack up a couple 

554
00:28:31,400 --> 00:28:33,920
policies. 
We really want to think about 

555
00:28:33,920 --> 00:28:37,440
reuse. 
So I want that policy like I can

556
00:28:37,440 --> 00:28:41,600
go to the cloud if I have a 
ticket and my device and I'm not

557
00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:46,000
a compromised device that should
apply if I'm multi cloud. 

558
00:28:46,120 --> 00:28:48,800
That's literally the same policy
we shouldn't care about. 

559
00:28:49,200 --> 00:28:53,280
Yeah, GCP uses a different 
identifier from Azure uses a 

560
00:28:53,280 --> 00:28:56,760
different identifier from AWS. 
Or even if I've got a couple 

561
00:28:56,760 --> 00:29:00,520
different ID PS in the mix, 
which is really common, the 

562
00:29:01,080 --> 00:29:05,560
person who's trying to put that 
policy in place shouldn't have 

563
00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:09,280
to worry about those details. 
Let this graph, let this fabric 

564
00:29:09,280 --> 00:29:12,360
handle that, let it do the on 
the on the fly translation. 

565
00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:17,960
And that's so the architect role
defines the terms of use in a 

566
00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:20,520
way. 
And the business analyst or the 

567
00:29:20,560 --> 00:29:25,080
end person who's after maintain 
their job is to maintain a 

568
00:29:25,080 --> 00:29:28,080
system. 
That person is also a persona 

569
00:29:28,080 --> 00:29:30,240
and signal. 
So we usually come in and talk 

570
00:29:30,240 --> 00:29:33,560
to the architects first. 
They're kind of like the hero of

571
00:29:33,560 --> 00:29:37,240
the journey, and then they bring
it to their internal teams who 

572
00:29:37,240 --> 00:29:40,800
rely on them to get things done.
You're pushing all my buttons. 

573
00:29:40,800 --> 00:29:43,160
In the right way, when you start
mentioning things like Lego and 

574
00:29:43,160 --> 00:29:47,800
Mad Libs and things like that, 
I, you know, I think right or 

575
00:29:47,800 --> 00:29:51,000
wrong, the industry likes to put
things into a box. 

576
00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:56,720
And so we already have boxes 
like IGA, Pam, Kim, and a whole 

577
00:29:56,720 --> 00:29:58,720
bunch of other ones that, you 
know, would take forever to kind

578
00:29:58,720 --> 00:30:01,280
of list off. 
Where does Signal fit into that 

579
00:30:01,320 --> 00:30:04,120
ecosystem? 
Is this a new category or is 

580
00:30:04,120 --> 00:30:07,240
this creating something new? 
Does it complement things that 

581
00:30:07,240 --> 00:30:09,120
already exists? 
Tell me a little bit about like 

582
00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:11,920
where you see Signal fitting 
into the ecosystem. 

583
00:30:12,280 --> 00:30:14,200
Sure. 
In some ways it's a bit of all 

584
00:30:14,200 --> 00:30:18,400
the above. 
We do complement, so we go into 

585
00:30:18,520 --> 00:30:20,800
companies. 
They already own everything. 

586
00:30:20,840 --> 00:30:23,800
They probably already own 3 or 4
versions of everything. 

587
00:30:23,840 --> 00:30:27,520
Like I've got octoping onto 
running around, I've got 

588
00:30:27,520 --> 00:30:33,160
division over here that uses 
Curity, I've got sale point from

589
00:30:33,160 --> 00:30:35,440
this thing and oh, this 
acquisition we made there on 

590
00:30:35,440 --> 00:30:40,440
Savvy and I've got Cyber Ark. 
So we work with all those 

591
00:30:40,440 --> 00:30:42,840
systems, we stitch them together
and we make them all better. 

592
00:30:43,400 --> 00:30:49,720
I'd say the way I really think 
about it, it is a new way of 

593
00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:55,360
looking at the identity stack. 
And so there's some parts of IGA

594
00:30:55,360 --> 00:30:59,760
in here in terms of the ability 
to deal with users and groups. 

595
00:30:59,760 --> 00:31:02,640
Like a lot of times in I when 
you're trying to solve this with

596
00:31:02,640 --> 00:31:07,360
an IGA hat on, you go make more 
roles, you make more groups, but

597
00:31:07,360 --> 00:31:10,600
really you're trying to emulate 
policies rather, but you're 

598
00:31:10,600 --> 00:31:13,000
doing it statically. 
And that eventually gets this 

599
00:31:13,000 --> 00:31:16,560
problem where you have like 3.3 
groups per every user or 

600
00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:21,920
employee of your company and 
your, you know, Sarbanes-Oxley 

601
00:31:21,920 --> 00:31:25,040
quarterly access reviews start 
exploding because you just have 

602
00:31:25,040 --> 00:31:27,400
way too many things for all your
managers to review. 

603
00:31:28,240 --> 00:31:30,920
Or you might approach it with a 
privileged access management 

604
00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:34,800
lens and go, all right, well, 
yeah, this is early. 

605
00:31:34,800 --> 00:31:37,440
I need to step up. 
I need a special token to go and

606
00:31:37,440 --> 00:31:41,640
do something that that 
technology is very based on 

607
00:31:42,080 --> 00:31:44,120
credentials. 
It's passwords you're checking 

608
00:31:44,120 --> 00:31:46,400
in and out. 
Yeah, they might be piped 

609
00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:49,480
through something, but it's it's
inherently different from the 

610
00:31:49,480 --> 00:31:52,480
single sign on workforce 
identity world that we live in 

611
00:31:52,480 --> 00:31:56,200
in 2025. 
So we pull some aspects of Pam, 

612
00:31:56,320 --> 00:31:58,280
we pull some aspects of IGA 
together. 

613
00:31:58,840 --> 00:32:02,000
But I really argue like we 
wouldn't build identity 

614
00:32:02,000 --> 00:32:04,600
solutions the way they're built 
right now. 

615
00:32:04,600 --> 00:32:06,320
Like these things came up over 
time. 

616
00:32:07,040 --> 00:32:10,480
Pam arose from pre cloud. 
This is like, how do I deal with

617
00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:14,520
my Cisco routers and root 
passwords on Linux boxes, not 

618
00:32:14,520 --> 00:32:16,400
even thinking about single sign 
on at that point. 

619
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:19,600
IGA that came out of 
Sarbanes-Oxley. 

620
00:32:19,600 --> 00:32:21,640
Like we're in this sort of 
generational change. 

621
00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:25,200
Like these technologies and 
techniques had been around like 

622
00:32:25,200 --> 00:32:29,240
25 plus years. 
It's kind of time to rethink how

623
00:32:29,240 --> 00:32:32,880
we're doing stuff because we 
build this massive identity 

624
00:32:32,880 --> 00:32:35,160
edifice and yet we still have 
problems. 

625
00:32:35,160 --> 00:32:36,680
We still get hacked, we still 
get breached. 

626
00:32:37,160 --> 00:32:40,360
Like we're clearly we're not 
doing like everything's 100%, 

627
00:32:40,360 --> 00:32:43,240
there's never going to be 100%, 
but we're clearly not doing 

628
00:32:43,240 --> 00:32:45,600
something right in the identity 
space that we can't even keep 

629
00:32:45,680 --> 00:32:48,680
basic use it as a basic security
tool for us. 

630
00:32:48,680 --> 00:32:51,560
So I do think this is a new way 
of looking at the problem. 

631
00:32:52,400 --> 00:32:56,080
I don't, I don't want to have 
the hubris that a startup can 

632
00:32:56,080 --> 00:32:58,920
define a brand new category and 
be like, tada, here's the silver

633
00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:02,080
bullet magic beans. 
But I do see we're reflecting 

634
00:33:02,080 --> 00:33:04,120
the trend of where the industry 
is starting to go in terms of 

635
00:33:04,120 --> 00:33:06,440
thinking about these problems. 
And we want to help with that. 

636
00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:09,120
But we also, we will play nice 
with the existing stack. 

637
00:33:09,120 --> 00:33:12,800
We don't come in and say, hey, 
yeah, like we don't coexist with

638
00:33:12,800 --> 00:33:14,360
these things. 
No, we coexist with everything. 

639
00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:15,560
Like, that's actually part of 
the. 

640
00:33:16,680 --> 00:33:20,560
It's a nice aspect of the way 
the system works, and the way it

641
00:33:20,560 --> 00:33:23,720
works best is when it integrates
everything together that has a 

642
00:33:23,720 --> 00:33:25,560
nice property of. 
Will work with what you have 

643
00:33:25,560 --> 00:33:28,560
too, so there has. 
The reason I bring this up is 

644
00:33:28,560 --> 00:33:30,840
because I know we have all these
different acronyms and one of 

645
00:33:30,840 --> 00:33:33,920
the ones that's kind of newer, 
at least to me is this idea of 

646
00:33:33,920 --> 00:33:37,280
authorization and Gartner has a 
term for authorization 

647
00:33:37,280 --> 00:33:41,000
management platform or AMP. 
At the same time, we're seeing 

648
00:33:41,000 --> 00:33:44,960
things like P back policy based 
access controls kind of rearing 

649
00:33:44,960 --> 00:33:48,320
its head up again as people try 
to solve for, you know, well, 

650
00:33:48,320 --> 00:33:50,800
RBAC just stinks. 
It just takes forever to get it 

651
00:33:50,800 --> 00:33:52,560
right. 
And it's, it's outdated as soon 

652
00:33:52,560 --> 00:33:56,440
as you press, you know, submit. 
So where do you see, you know, 

653
00:33:56,680 --> 00:33:58,920
the, the industry going? 
But also how does signal like 

654
00:33:58,920 --> 00:34:04,080
aligned with things like AMP or 
PBAC or you know STAR dot back, 

655
00:34:04,080 --> 00:34:06,960
you know, whatever acronym you 
want to put in front of the the 

656
00:34:06,960 --> 00:34:11,840
access control? 
So I say we're pretty aligned 

657
00:34:11,840 --> 00:34:14,280
with this idea of amp. 
Like I really like when I was 

658
00:34:14,280 --> 00:34:16,920
Paul Mozzaro, who wrote that. 
If you have a Gartner 

659
00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:18,880
subscription, I highly recommend
giving it a read. 

660
00:34:18,880 --> 00:34:20,679
It's it's, it's going in the 
right direction. 

661
00:34:20,679 --> 00:34:23,679
You know, if you talk to Paul 
himself, he'll, you know, it's, 

662
00:34:23,679 --> 00:34:26,040
this is evolving still. 
This is the first foray into 

663
00:34:26,040 --> 00:34:30,080
trying to find this movement 
that's happening in the identity

664
00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:32,840
space. 
It hits on a lot of things that 

665
00:34:32,840 --> 00:34:35,199
really resonate with me and with
signal. 

666
00:34:35,440 --> 00:34:38,199
So it it asked like Paul, like, 
hey, what's the what? 

667
00:34:38,199 --> 00:34:40,280
How do you differentiate this 
from what's come before? 

668
00:34:40,639 --> 00:34:41,920
And it's this orchestration 
layer. 

669
00:34:42,800 --> 00:34:44,600
And that's where the Cape side 
of things, that's where the 

670
00:34:44,600 --> 00:34:48,000
signals, the emitting of 
signals, that's the we send 

671
00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:50,520
information from the edge to the
center and send it back. 

672
00:34:50,520 --> 00:34:52,840
That's the orchestration portion
of this. 

673
00:34:53,560 --> 00:34:56,120
You need policy on top of that 
because you need that. 

674
00:34:56,120 --> 00:35:01,080
You need the rules of the road. 
How am I steering my car or, you

675
00:35:01,080 --> 00:35:02,800
know, on my steering my ship? 
Pick your analogy. 

676
00:35:03,600 --> 00:35:05,560
That has to be part of it. 
And then you need the data 

677
00:35:05,560 --> 00:35:07,600
fabric underneath it. 
And those are the three main 

678
00:35:07,600 --> 00:35:12,560
legs of the signal stool policy 
engine orchestration layer, 

679
00:35:12,840 --> 00:35:15,840
which looks a lot like policy, 
but you, you think a little bit 

680
00:35:15,840 --> 00:35:18,880
more asynchronously with the 
orchestration and then the 

681
00:35:18,880 --> 00:35:22,320
fabric that powers both of them,
which is the aggregation of the 

682
00:35:22,320 --> 00:35:24,600
data. 
You want to back up all your 

683
00:35:24,600 --> 00:35:26,600
policies. 
And you know, we call them 

684
00:35:26,600 --> 00:35:29,240
triggers in the in the 
orchestration tool. 

685
00:35:30,240 --> 00:35:32,320
All those things kind of come 
into play here for us. 

686
00:35:32,840 --> 00:35:35,640
And so, you know, P backs an 
interesting term. 

687
00:35:35,640 --> 00:35:39,160
I think there's lots of really 
solid P back tools out there. 

688
00:35:39,680 --> 00:35:43,200
But historically, like if you 
think back to like as ACMOL 

689
00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:46,840
days, like 25 something years 
ago, if you can remember that 

690
00:35:46,840 --> 00:35:50,320
long ago, those are kind of 
meant to be more developer 

691
00:35:50,320 --> 00:35:52,520
tools. 
Like I just want to build a 

692
00:35:52,520 --> 00:35:56,960
better framework within my 
application for dealing with 

693
00:35:57,360 --> 00:35:59,720
these problems. 
And what we've seen is a lot of 

694
00:35:59,720 --> 00:36:03,040
customers who are not successful
trying to apply those concepts 

695
00:36:03,360 --> 00:36:05,720
horizontally inside their 
enterprise. 

696
00:36:05,720 --> 00:36:09,840
If you try to take a a classic, 
you know, Zac Amol tool, or if 

697
00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:12,240
you get to like alpha and stop 
having to deal with XML and you 

698
00:36:12,240 --> 00:36:18,080
can use Jason, it is, you know, 
2025 now, it's still difficult 

699
00:36:18,080 --> 00:36:21,720
because they're not they weren't
designed to think about the 

700
00:36:21,720 --> 00:36:24,520
enterprise state. 
You need to have these things 

701
00:36:24,520 --> 00:36:26,840
all work in concert, but you 
need that backbone saying like 

702
00:36:26,840 --> 00:36:29,600
this is what I'm trying to apply
across horizontally, across the 

703
00:36:29,600 --> 00:36:31,680
board, not down into the 
application. 

704
00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:35,080
So you know, when, when you're 
all were asking about personas, 

705
00:36:35,080 --> 00:36:38,240
like I did not talk about 
developers, like we're not a 

706
00:36:38,240 --> 00:36:40,480
developer focused tool. 
I think they're great P back 

707
00:36:40,480 --> 00:36:43,520
tools out there like OPA that 
are good for a developer wanting

708
00:36:43,520 --> 00:36:47,320
to do something better than hard
coding authorization logic into 

709
00:36:47,320 --> 00:36:50,240
the system. 
But as soon as you need data 

710
00:36:50,560 --> 00:36:54,400
that's not resident to that 
application, who's on vacation? 

711
00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:55,960
Unless you're building an 
application that manages the 

712
00:36:55,960 --> 00:36:59,240
vacation schedule, you want to 
get that from somewhere else and

713
00:36:59,240 --> 00:37:02,160
you don't want to deal with the 
stale data problem of that. 

714
00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:04,040
And how do I synchronize that 
information and maybe some of 

715
00:37:04,040 --> 00:37:06,760
that sensitive like, you know, 
obviously vacations might not be

716
00:37:06,760 --> 00:37:10,120
that sensitive, but think of 
something like it's a legitimate

717
00:37:10,120 --> 00:37:13,000
policy. 
Citizenship might come into 

718
00:37:13,000 --> 00:37:15,600
play. 
Maybe I have to be a certain 

719
00:37:15,640 --> 00:37:18,200
citizenship to see some piece of
government data. 

720
00:37:18,520 --> 00:37:22,360
That's a very common regulatory 
policy, difficult to enforce. 

721
00:37:22,360 --> 00:37:26,360
And I don't think we wanna be 
pushing what citizenship my 

722
00:37:26,360 --> 00:37:29,320
employees are to every single 
one of the applications in the 

723
00:37:29,320 --> 00:37:30,840
enterprise. 
I'm sure that'll get you in 

724
00:37:30,840 --> 00:37:35,920
trouble in Europe, if if not in 
the US to do those sorts of 

725
00:37:35,920 --> 00:37:37,800
things. 
So feedback tools are 

726
00:37:37,800 --> 00:37:40,200
interesting and they're, I think
they're a useful part of the 

727
00:37:40,200 --> 00:37:44,880
system, but it doesn't solve 
this problem. 

728
00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:48,480
And I think amps on the right 
direction as we start seeing the

729
00:37:48,480 --> 00:37:51,280
space emerge and these 
architectures get real mileage 

730
00:37:52,040 --> 00:37:55,600
in the space and more adoption, 
I think that will also evolve a 

731
00:37:55,600 --> 00:37:57,320
little bit too. 
But it's, it's promising. 

732
00:37:58,200 --> 00:38:00,040
So Eric, I want. 
To go back to what you're 

733
00:38:00,040 --> 00:38:03,880
talking about with the agenda 
architects. 

734
00:38:03,880 --> 00:38:08,560
So the one that once that pull 
you in, they went under and I, I

735
00:38:08,560 --> 00:38:13,320
realized like making the case to
those folks is no easy task 

736
00:38:13,320 --> 00:38:16,440
because they need to really 
understand this. 

737
00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:21,520
So at that, at that point that 
you achieve like, OK, they get 

738
00:38:21,520 --> 00:38:23,360
it, they buy. 
And I'm thinking of like some 

739
00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:26,560
really smart people who could 
probably do both sides of this 

740
00:38:26,560 --> 00:38:29,040
equation. 
So you know, I'm thinking of 

741
00:38:29,040 --> 00:38:31,080
Shawn Odell, thinking of Andrew 
Cameron. 

742
00:38:31,320 --> 00:38:36,080
They first you have to sell them
on the tech right after that. 

743
00:38:36,200 --> 00:38:41,920
These are guys who can speak the
the language of business to make

744
00:38:41,920 --> 00:38:45,080
the case. 
I'm wondering, you know what, 

745
00:38:45,080 --> 00:38:48,280
what does that sound like? 
Help us out for the people who 

746
00:38:48,280 --> 00:38:51,200
are listening who are like 
excited about this and maybe 

747
00:38:51,200 --> 00:38:54,040
when we dig into the tech, 
that's great. 

748
00:38:54,080 --> 00:38:55,880
Eventually you get them sold on 
that. 

749
00:38:56,120 --> 00:38:59,320
Now you have to explain it to 
somebody who's used nothing 

750
00:38:59,320 --> 00:39:02,560
about the tech and probably 
doesn't care and you have to put

751
00:39:02,560 --> 00:39:06,880
it in the language of business. 
So how do they do that? 

752
00:39:06,880 --> 00:39:09,840
How are they successful? 
Yeah, absolutely. 

753
00:39:10,320 --> 00:39:13,200
I think, you know, it's kind of 
like what does it look like to 

754
00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:15,680
win in a company when we go into
it? 

755
00:39:15,800 --> 00:39:18,680
And this is where I, I usually 
start with something. 

756
00:39:18,680 --> 00:39:23,640
I think Ian Glaser put this on a
on a blog of his called, you 

757
00:39:23,640 --> 00:39:26,760
know, we endearingly inside a 
signal called the pyramid of 

758
00:39:26,760 --> 00:39:30,000
pain, which is if you think of 
all the applications in your 

759
00:39:30,000 --> 00:39:34,640
company that you're using, which
ones are you the most worried 

760
00:39:34,640 --> 00:39:36,480
about? 
Like where is the biggest 

761
00:39:36,480 --> 00:39:39,160
problem gonna be start there. 
That's the top of the pyramid. 

762
00:39:39,160 --> 00:39:41,400
That's the most painful thing. 
And those are usually 

763
00:39:41,400 --> 00:39:44,280
applications that you're you're 
not in it every minute of the 

764
00:39:44,280 --> 00:39:46,360
day. 
It's not, it's not slack or 

765
00:39:46,360 --> 00:39:48,960
e-mail or your calendar. 
It's your production 

766
00:39:48,960 --> 00:39:51,560
environments, your your 
production systems, maybe your 

767
00:39:51,560 --> 00:39:55,680
financial systems, maybe it's 
your CICD pipeline. 

768
00:39:55,680 --> 00:39:59,160
So things that are like someone 
got in and just went haywire in 

769
00:39:59,160 --> 00:40:01,920
there. 
That's potentially a company 

770
00:40:01,920 --> 00:40:04,440
ending moment, if not at least a
career ending moment for 

771
00:40:04,440 --> 00:40:08,200
someone. 
Those are the most difficult. 

772
00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:12,120
They require the most context. 
They require the the biggest 

773
00:40:12,120 --> 00:40:15,560
need to reduce access to them so
that you're not always able to, 

774
00:40:15,560 --> 00:40:17,160
you know, it reduces the attack 
surface. 

775
00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:19,760
That's where we try to frame 
people to start there. 

776
00:40:19,960 --> 00:40:23,640
And then we look at, OK, can you
reduce the number of roles and 

777
00:40:23,640 --> 00:40:25,960
groups in the system? 
Can you reduce the amount of 

778
00:40:25,960 --> 00:40:28,760
standing access? 
Can you be more responsive? 

779
00:40:28,760 --> 00:40:33,640
Like the problem of if your 
Crowdstrike or your other 

780
00:40:33,640 --> 00:40:37,400
security systems detect a 
problem with this user, can you 

781
00:40:37,400 --> 00:40:38,880
react to that? 
And can you pull them out of an 

782
00:40:38,880 --> 00:40:42,480
environment If the user's been 
no longer an employee, like they

783
00:40:42,480 --> 00:40:45,640
were terminated in the morning 
or they resigned in the morning,

784
00:40:46,280 --> 00:40:48,160
but they had an open session 
from the night before, or are 

785
00:40:48,160 --> 00:40:50,480
they still I'll get access to 
things like, can you shut people

786
00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:54,640
off quickly in response to some 
type of HR event that goes on? 

787
00:40:55,360 --> 00:40:57,880
So then those become wins for 
the business because the 

788
00:40:57,880 --> 00:41:00,120
business recognizes this is a 
lot of risk. 

789
00:41:00,440 --> 00:41:04,240
Or if I've got a lot of groups, 
I've got to do access reviews in

790
00:41:04,240 --> 00:41:07,120
those groups. 
And after I've got 100,000 

791
00:41:07,120 --> 00:41:10,680
groups for 10,000 employees, 
that's a lot of work for people 

792
00:41:10,680 --> 00:41:12,680
that's not really helping the 
business move forward. 

793
00:41:13,000 --> 00:41:14,440
And so we can start to show 
value. 

794
00:41:14,560 --> 00:41:16,760
It somewhat depends on who we're
talking to. 

795
00:41:16,760 --> 00:41:20,360
So if I'm talking to application
owners, we might talk in terms 

796
00:41:20,360 --> 00:41:24,360
of I give you dynamic access to 
things rather than, you know, I 

797
00:41:24,360 --> 00:41:26,720
talked to identity person. 
I talk about 0 standing access. 

798
00:41:26,720 --> 00:41:29,160
Like people don't have access 
when they're not supposed to, 

799
00:41:29,600 --> 00:41:32,040
but magically the access is 
there when they need to use it. 

800
00:41:32,280 --> 00:41:33,840
The business likes to hear it 
the other way around. 

801
00:41:33,840 --> 00:41:36,920
Like it'll be there when I want 
it and it's not there when I'm 

802
00:41:36,920 --> 00:41:39,440
not looking. 
That's the right stance to be 

803
00:41:39,440 --> 00:41:41,600
in. 
And that ultimately drives a 

804
00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:44,840
better security posture. 
I'm talking to kind of the CISO 

805
00:41:44,840 --> 00:41:47,400
persona. 
They tend to be the ones they 

806
00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:49,960
start thinking about. 
What are my risk signals in the 

807
00:41:49,960 --> 00:41:52,720
organization? 
How do I lower overall risk the 

808
00:41:52,720 --> 00:41:55,560
things and icing on the cake, 
can I make my business 

809
00:41:55,560 --> 00:41:57,240
operational processes simpler 
too? 

810
00:41:57,240 --> 00:42:01,320
Can I reduce access reviews? 
Can I reduce toil inside the 

811
00:42:01,320 --> 00:42:02,800
company? 
Those are all wins for us. 

812
00:42:03,400 --> 00:42:05,440
Yeah, that I. 
Mean that's a great business 

813
00:42:05,440 --> 00:42:09,480
story about reducing risk, 
reducing that kind of overhead 

814
00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:14,000
of things that help reduce the 
risk so that it makes it more 

815
00:42:14,000 --> 00:42:16,480
effective. 
You actually start to steal from

816
00:42:16,480 --> 00:42:19,720
my next question, which was 
around what are the use cases, 

817
00:42:19,720 --> 00:42:20,840
right? 
Because you think of a good 

818
00:42:20,840 --> 00:42:25,040
picture there especially, and 
tied back to the continuous 

819
00:42:25,040 --> 00:42:29,800
identity because you talked 
about, you know, someone has 

820
00:42:29,800 --> 00:42:33,680
been terminated from the system,
but maybe they have a a session 

821
00:42:33,680 --> 00:42:36,480
open. 
I mean, literally, I've run into

822
00:42:36,480 --> 00:42:40,080
that before where it's like, 
well, yeah, we shut off their 

823
00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:43,720
access, but if they still have 
their laptop and they're already

824
00:42:43,720 --> 00:42:46,800
logged in, you know, and we 
wouldn't know it. 

825
00:42:46,800 --> 00:42:49,600
And I'm like, that's terrible. 
That is absolutely terrible. 

826
00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:53,120
So this whole idea of, you know,
being able to go in and like 

827
00:42:53,720 --> 00:42:58,360
surgically kill sessions. 
The one thing that you'd 

828
00:42:58,360 --> 00:43:01,120
mentioned earlier is I asked a 
question about what are the 

829
00:43:01,120 --> 00:43:05,840
sources of these signals and 
then, you know, obviously you 

830
00:43:05,840 --> 00:43:08,040
link that to them, we can take 
action. 

831
00:43:08,240 --> 00:43:10,600
And the example used was the 
IDP. 

832
00:43:10,760 --> 00:43:14,400
I'm wondering if you have any 
other examples, like is are 

833
00:43:14,400 --> 00:43:17,960
there examples about going into 
IGA systems or privileged access

834
00:43:17,960 --> 00:43:21,800
management or anything else 
that, you know, maybe I didn't 

835
00:43:21,800 --> 00:43:25,000
mention that. 
Just seems like, you know, when 

836
00:43:25,000 --> 00:43:27,480
you want to brag about a little 
bit, yeah. 

837
00:43:27,480 --> 00:43:30,240
Absolutely. 
You know, the the IDP to to 

838
00:43:30,640 --> 00:43:33,760
cloud provider is probably our 
most popular use case. 

839
00:43:34,480 --> 00:43:37,880
Closely related though, CICD 
pipelines, I've got my GitHub. 

840
00:43:37,880 --> 00:43:41,040
If I can push code, I might as 
well have console access to the 

841
00:43:41,040 --> 00:43:44,360
cloud. 
So predicting that I can't push 

842
00:43:44,360 --> 00:43:46,200
unless I need policies. 
I have to be the release 

843
00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:47,840
manager. 
Right now I'm assigned to do 

844
00:43:47,840 --> 00:43:51,720
that and I'm on my a pash device
and it's doesn't have malware. 

845
00:43:52,080 --> 00:43:53,600
All those things are important 
to me. 

846
00:43:54,720 --> 00:44:00,360
That's another popular use case.
I'd say the other ones, API 

847
00:44:00,360 --> 00:44:04,520
gateways is a big one for us. 
So I'm making API calls. 

848
00:44:04,520 --> 00:44:07,000
This really comes into play. 
And I know we haven't used the 

849
00:44:07,080 --> 00:44:11,200
AI Buds word yet, but you know, 
MCP or model context protocol 

850
00:44:11,800 --> 00:44:15,440
that's just an API Gateway 
pattern protecting that we're 

851
00:44:15,440 --> 00:44:17,840
getting a lot of interest in. 
How do you put policy in place 

852
00:44:17,840 --> 00:44:21,200
for that, especially because 
it's really easy to vibe code 

853
00:44:21,200 --> 00:44:24,040
out one of these things without 
thinking about any kind of 

854
00:44:24,040 --> 00:44:26,120
identity security practices. 
Roll it out. 

855
00:44:26,120 --> 00:44:29,240
And now I've done all kinds of 
egregious things like embedding 

856
00:44:29,240 --> 00:44:32,280
tokens and not thinking about 
access control and not thinking 

857
00:44:32,280 --> 00:44:34,720
about deployment and no one 
knows about it. 

858
00:44:34,720 --> 00:44:37,880
So this is just a, a sort of 
accident waiting to happen here.

859
00:44:37,880 --> 00:44:40,480
We got, you know, pits with 
spikes at the bottom of them in 

860
00:44:40,480 --> 00:44:45,000
this area. 
Working with IGA and Pam, those 

861
00:44:45,000 --> 00:44:48,280
are good ones too. 
So we've got some nice use cases

862
00:44:48,280 --> 00:44:51,880
with say, sale point where maybe
we want to do some of these 

863
00:44:51,880 --> 00:44:55,680
checks against security systems.
When someone comes into Cell 

864
00:44:55,680 --> 00:44:58,400
Point and requests access to 
something, Cell Point could call

865
00:44:58,400 --> 00:45:02,400
it a signal, look for a policy. 
The signal says, yeah, the 

866
00:45:02,400 --> 00:45:04,040
person, you know, Jeff looks 
good. 

867
00:45:04,400 --> 00:45:06,560
He's, you know, his everything's
fine with him. 

868
00:45:06,560 --> 00:45:08,880
He's allowed to do this. 
Beyond this, the normal rules. 

869
00:45:08,880 --> 00:45:12,840
And then or flip that around, 
something changes in a system 

870
00:45:12,840 --> 00:45:16,920
and we could go say, hey, deeper
vision Jim, like go take him out

871
00:45:16,920 --> 00:45:19,600
of this Active Directory group 
because you've got that all 

872
00:45:19,600 --> 00:45:24,400
wired up anyway as part of your 
join remover lever settings in 

873
00:45:24,400 --> 00:45:26,400
Cell Point. 
Let's just trigger that. 

874
00:45:26,400 --> 00:45:29,160
We see something anomalous that 
comes in from the SoC. 

875
00:45:29,760 --> 00:45:32,000
We can go tell cell Point to do 
that. 

876
00:45:32,160 --> 00:45:33,960
And that can speed things up 
too. 

877
00:45:33,960 --> 00:45:36,560
That can make you more reactive 
and make your existing 

878
00:45:36,560 --> 00:45:40,040
investments better. 
Do something similar with Pam, 

879
00:45:40,240 --> 00:45:42,040
like, hey, we know it's 
someone's compromised. 

880
00:45:42,040 --> 00:45:44,120
We could tell it to rotate a 
credential or we can we could 

881
00:45:44,120 --> 00:45:47,720
even potentially block access to
the Pam system itself for that 

882
00:45:47,720 --> 00:45:51,680
user so that they, if they they 
can't just go start doing X fill

883
00:45:51,680 --> 00:45:53,680
against all the passwords that 
are in the vault. 

884
00:45:54,160 --> 00:45:57,680
So there's a lot that we can do 
in conjunction with those other 

885
00:45:57,680 --> 00:45:59,880
systems. 
And these are all we tend to see

886
00:45:59,880 --> 00:46:03,640
people solve the and we 
encourage folks solve the easy 

887
00:46:04,000 --> 00:46:08,640
problems first, like solve those
and then expand because the way 

888
00:46:08,640 --> 00:46:12,160
the platform's built, it's meant
to keep going to more use cases.

889
00:46:12,160 --> 00:46:13,920
And we just see customers follow
that pattern. 

890
00:46:14,080 --> 00:46:18,240
They start with one use case or 
two, we nail them, we roll it 

891
00:46:18,240 --> 00:46:20,240
out, everyone's happy. 
We're all, you know, popping 

892
00:46:20,240 --> 00:46:22,680
champagne, celebrating. 
And then, hey, the next use 

893
00:46:22,680 --> 00:46:26,440
case, the next use case, the 
next use case and so forth, we 

894
00:46:26,440 --> 00:46:27,800
can pop some. 
Champagne in a little bit. 

895
00:46:27,800 --> 00:46:29,320
I got a couple more questions 
for you. 

896
00:46:30,640 --> 00:46:33,600
What is it that makes signal 
different from, you know, your 

897
00:46:33,600 --> 00:46:36,400
contemporaries in this space? 
Tell me what sets you apart 

898
00:46:36,400 --> 00:46:39,240
because this is my jaded CSO 
time where I say OK I already 

899
00:46:39,240 --> 00:46:42,640
got a bunch of tools, why do I 
need signal and why is it signal

900
00:46:42,640 --> 00:46:46,280
over something else? 
I'd say there's really not much 

901
00:46:46,280 --> 00:46:48,520
out there that does this in the 
way we approach it. 

902
00:46:48,520 --> 00:46:51,680
So there are other tools out 
there that understand Cape 

903
00:46:51,680 --> 00:46:54,160
signals and protocols. 
There's other tools that'll pull

904
00:46:54,160 --> 00:46:57,560
data in, like you could use Octa
and they have a directory system

905
00:46:57,560 --> 00:47:01,240
that they use provisioning. 
But these weren't men and they 

906
00:47:01,240 --> 00:47:03,800
weren't designed to think about 
it from an enterprise wide 

907
00:47:03,800 --> 00:47:05,320
scale. 
They have kind of their corner 

908
00:47:05,320 --> 00:47:07,680
and their main objective and 
they tiptoe into these other 

909
00:47:07,680 --> 00:47:11,280
areas. 
So all the IGA tools have some 

910
00:47:11,280 --> 00:47:13,360
kind of Pam module that can do 
some privilege stuff. 

911
00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:16,600
All the Pam tools out there have
now acquired some IGA vendor and

912
00:47:16,600 --> 00:47:18,200
they can do some simple IGA 
things. 

913
00:47:18,880 --> 00:47:21,480
Sokta just announced, I think, 
you know, the other day that 

914
00:47:21,480 --> 00:47:24,600
they've got, you know, they made
an acquisition in the space and 

915
00:47:24,600 --> 00:47:25,920
they've got some IGA and Pam 
things. 

916
00:47:25,920 --> 00:47:28,720
So everyone's kind of tiptoeing 
around this, like refactoring of

917
00:47:28,720 --> 00:47:31,960
the identity stack right now. 
We built this from day one to 

918
00:47:32,200 --> 00:47:35,760
solve this type of problem. 
How do I stitch my entire stack 

919
00:47:35,760 --> 00:47:39,440
together, not just of identity 
data, operational data and 

920
00:47:39,440 --> 00:47:42,680
security data, bring this all in
one place and give you the 

921
00:47:42,680 --> 00:47:47,000
ability to have this continuous 
identity architecture within the

922
00:47:47,000 --> 00:47:49,320
organization. 
That's what sets us apart is we 

923
00:47:49,320 --> 00:47:51,600
were purpose built for this 
problem. 

924
00:47:51,600 --> 00:47:55,320
We're not trying to retrofit 
this into an existing system. 

925
00:47:55,680 --> 00:47:57,720
In some ways it's kind of like 
the innovator's dilemma issue, 

926
00:47:58,120 --> 00:48:01,760
like you have to reinvent your 
IJ stacked work in real time or 

927
00:48:01,760 --> 00:48:05,040
you'd have to reinvent your Pam 
system to understand workforce 

928
00:48:05,040 --> 00:48:07,480
and single sign on none of these
systems. 

929
00:48:08,360 --> 00:48:10,720
They all kind of want to play in
their own sandboxes if no one 

930
00:48:10,720 --> 00:48:13,080
else exists. 
And I said, hey, this is 1 big 

931
00:48:13,080 --> 00:48:14,480
sandbox, we all have to work in 
it. 

932
00:48:14,480 --> 00:48:17,560
And maybe we should look, talk 
to the guys next door about the 

933
00:48:17,560 --> 00:48:20,080
security stuff because that 
seems kind of important to us. 

934
00:48:21,320 --> 00:48:23,160
Yeah, I can see. 
Definitely a lot of linkage with

935
00:48:23,160 --> 00:48:25,800
things like, you know, security 
operations center and some of 

936
00:48:25,800 --> 00:48:28,280
the tools they have, right? 
It's, it's all data you're 

937
00:48:28,280 --> 00:48:30,120
trying to pull in. 
The more data that you've got, 

938
00:48:30,120 --> 00:48:33,520
the more interesting and 
educated decisions you can make 

939
00:48:33,920 --> 00:48:35,600
on how you want to leverage it, 
right? 

940
00:48:35,600 --> 00:48:37,880
Exactly. 
So let's take a look. 

941
00:48:37,880 --> 00:48:41,280
At the broader range, industry 
at large here from an identity 

942
00:48:41,280 --> 00:48:44,680
perspective, and I'm hoping I 
won't hear AI is the answer, 

943
00:48:44,680 --> 00:48:47,240
although it probably is. 
What are some of the big trends 

944
00:48:47,240 --> 00:48:50,640
that you see coming along that 
people should be keeping it out 

945
00:48:50,640 --> 00:48:52,440
for? 
So I kind of call this of like 

946
00:48:52,560 --> 00:48:55,520
skating to where the puck is 
going to be from an ice hockey 

947
00:48:55,520 --> 00:48:58,280
analogy. 
What's coming up that you know 

948
00:48:58,280 --> 00:49:00,880
that that is really kind of 
piquing your interest or is it 

949
00:49:00,880 --> 00:49:03,680
just, hey man, AI is here and 
we've really got to got to get 

950
00:49:03,680 --> 00:49:06,960
that figured out? 
I mean, definitely I'll, I'll 

951
00:49:07,200 --> 00:49:09,280
we'll put the AI one out of the 
way like AI is here. 

952
00:49:09,280 --> 00:49:12,440
We got to figure that out. 
I'm not smart enough to know all

953
00:49:12,440 --> 00:49:14,400
the impact it's going to have in
the identity space. 

954
00:49:14,400 --> 00:49:17,240
It's definitely having an impact
and we'll continue to have one. 

955
00:49:17,840 --> 00:49:20,640
I probably the only thing I 
won't be surprised by is that 

956
00:49:20,640 --> 00:49:24,160
I'm going to be surprised about 
where we are in a 12 months in 

957
00:49:24,160 --> 00:49:26,640
the AI world. 
So putting that one to the side 

958
00:49:26,640 --> 00:49:30,240
for the moment, the two big 
trends that I see here right 

959
00:49:30,240 --> 00:49:33,440
now, one, we've been kind of 
dancing around a little bit 

960
00:49:33,440 --> 00:49:36,520
here, the convergence of 
identity and security together. 

961
00:49:36,880 --> 00:49:39,600
And I actually think some 
drivers of this are it's 

962
00:49:39,600 --> 00:49:43,520
becoming pretty common for your 
CSO to start taking over your 

963
00:49:43,520 --> 00:49:47,520
traditional CIO roles or your 
CIO taking over CSO. 

964
00:49:47,520 --> 00:49:51,240
This, those two leaders are 
morphing into one leader. 

965
00:49:51,760 --> 00:49:55,120
A lot of things that the CIO 
looked after before probably 

966
00:49:55,120 --> 00:49:59,600
live under like a COO, like what
productivity suite we're going 

967
00:49:59,600 --> 00:50:01,600
to use? 
Are we going to be on Slack or 

968
00:50:01,640 --> 00:50:04,800
you know, teams? 
Are we going to be on Zoom or 

969
00:50:04,800 --> 00:50:10,800
Google meet or you know teams? 
Those decisions aren't don't 

970
00:50:10,800 --> 00:50:13,120
require a specialist as much as 
they require someone to 

971
00:50:13,120 --> 00:50:17,160
negotiate price points on a per 
user per month pricing concept. 

972
00:50:18,040 --> 00:50:20,680
So where's that leave the 
identity team? 

973
00:50:20,840 --> 00:50:23,760
Because if you're thinking about
identity systems and 

974
00:50:23,760 --> 00:50:26,880
traditionally, you know, you 
guys know this probably better 

975
00:50:26,880 --> 00:50:31,720
than I do, your IGA tools, your 
IDP tools kind of live in the IT

976
00:50:31,720 --> 00:50:34,600
world and kind of we're more 
like productivity things. 

977
00:50:35,080 --> 00:50:38,840
And your Pam tools, if they 
weren't in identity land, they 

978
00:50:38,840 --> 00:50:42,160
were more in the security land. 
And as those worlds come 

979
00:50:42,160 --> 00:50:46,280
together, it stops being about 
just productivity. 

980
00:50:46,480 --> 00:50:50,640
It starts being more about, OK, 
yes, single sign on gives me 

981
00:50:50,640 --> 00:50:53,440
productivity and reduces 
passwords and I get MFA and all 

982
00:50:53,440 --> 00:50:56,400
this goodness out of that. 
But I also started wanting to 

983
00:50:56,400 --> 00:50:59,360
use this as security controls, 
which has historically been the 

984
00:50:59,360 --> 00:51:01,560
sea sales world. 
So I think that's a massive 

985
00:51:01,560 --> 00:51:04,720
trend right now. 
It's just the convergence and 

986
00:51:05,120 --> 00:51:10,520
mind meld of those two sort of 
organizations together into one.

987
00:51:11,080 --> 00:51:14,720
And I'd say it's probably not a 
surprise that of our customers 

988
00:51:14,720 --> 00:51:17,480
who are moving the fastest, who 
are the furthest ahead here and 

989
00:51:17,480 --> 00:51:20,840
of the industry voices you hear 
they probably work in an 

990
00:51:20,840 --> 00:51:25,600
identity security team. 
And obviously like you see, you 

991
00:51:25,600 --> 00:51:28,960
know, Palo Alto's acquisition of
Cyber Ark, you know, that 

992
00:51:28,960 --> 00:51:32,360
happened a couple weeks back. 
They're talking about that as 

993
00:51:32,360 --> 00:51:35,320
identity security. 
So this is in the air. 

994
00:51:36,160 --> 00:51:39,160
The other big trend I see is 
this generational change. 

995
00:51:40,160 --> 00:51:44,440
It's been 25 years since we kind
of came up with the IGA and Pam 

996
00:51:44,440 --> 00:51:46,960
things. 
It is that is a long time. 

997
00:51:46,960 --> 00:51:51,960
Like there's whole generations 
of humans who grew up after 

998
00:51:51,960 --> 00:51:56,080
those events, right after, you 
know, the Enron events of the 

999
00:51:56,080 --> 00:52:00,840
world that drove Sarbanes-Oxley.
It's time to rethink how we do 

1000
00:52:00,840 --> 00:52:02,360
things. 
And so that's the other big 

1001
00:52:02,360 --> 00:52:06,880
trend to see is we are coming up
on massive replacement cycles of

1002
00:52:06,880 --> 00:52:11,520
two entire sets of sort of the 
core identity stack. 

1003
00:52:11,520 --> 00:52:14,960
I'd say ID, PS and pass through 
lists are probably the latest 

1004
00:52:14,960 --> 00:52:17,440
generation and even those are 
like those are 15 year old 

1005
00:52:17,440 --> 00:52:21,880
things. 
So it's it's natural that we're 

1006
00:52:21,880 --> 00:52:24,960
coming up on rethinking this. 
Yeah, some of these. 

1007
00:52:25,040 --> 00:52:26,640
Solutions are not old enough to 
vote. 

1008
00:52:27,080 --> 00:52:30,120
Maybe you can drink exactly. 
They're old enough to rent a 

1009
00:52:30,120 --> 00:52:32,400
car. 
You. 

1010
00:52:32,560 --> 00:52:32,840
You. 
You've. 

1011
00:52:33,040 --> 00:52:35,320
Been so gracious with your time.
I want to kind of pivot here to 

1012
00:52:35,320 --> 00:52:37,520
a little bit of a lighter note 
and kind of wrap the show up 

1013
00:52:37,520 --> 00:52:40,040
here. 
We were talking before we hit 

1014
00:52:40,040 --> 00:52:43,720
record and you mentioned that 
you are into cooking and I am 

1015
00:52:43,720 --> 00:52:45,720
into eating. 
So I think this is going to be a

1016
00:52:45,720 --> 00:52:48,800
great conversation. 
So I would like to pose a 

1017
00:52:48,800 --> 00:52:52,200
hypothetical to you. 
So let's say you've got to 

1018
00:52:52,200 --> 00:52:55,880
create the perfect meal, and I'm
going to put you on the spot 

1019
00:52:55,880 --> 00:52:57,480
here. 
Not only create the perfect 

1020
00:52:57,480 --> 00:53:01,240
meal, you have to create the 
perfect meal for me, OK. 

1021
00:53:01,600 --> 00:53:04,520
What are you going to make? 
Why are you and why, you know, 

1022
00:53:04,520 --> 00:53:06,800
why are you making decisions, 
decisions, you know, for what 

1023
00:53:06,800 --> 00:53:08,680
you're going to make? 
And you can feel free to ask me 

1024
00:53:08,680 --> 00:53:09,960
questions if that helps you in 
any way. 

1025
00:53:09,960 --> 00:53:12,720
Yeah, yeah. 
Let me ask if you like, you 

1026
00:53:12,720 --> 00:53:15,600
know, First off, like anything 
you don't like eating, like 

1027
00:53:15,600 --> 00:53:18,040
what's you know, any, any areas 
to avoid? 

1028
00:53:18,040 --> 00:53:23,160
Hey, I really hate, you know, 
spicy food or I don't eat fish, 

1029
00:53:23,640 --> 00:53:25,240
you know, anything like that to 
be aware of. 

1030
00:53:25,240 --> 00:53:27,920
Well, you hit two right there. 
So I'm not a fish person. 

1031
00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:30,560
I'm generally not a seafood 
person with the exception of 

1032
00:53:30,560 --> 00:53:32,440
shrimp. 
As long as the heads are cut 

1033
00:53:32,440 --> 00:53:34,360
off. 
I don't, I don't dig on, you 

1034
00:53:34,360 --> 00:53:35,920
know, the shrimp showing up with
their heads on. 

1035
00:53:36,000 --> 00:53:38,360
No, give it to me after the 
sushi. 

1036
00:53:38,360 --> 00:53:40,840
I thought you liked sushi. 
Sushi is the one. 

1037
00:53:40,840 --> 00:53:44,160
Exception, I will do something 
like tuna, maybe like a lighter 

1038
00:53:44,160 --> 00:53:48,480
fish, but it has to be with like
something else like in a roll or

1039
00:53:48,480 --> 00:53:52,160
something like that. 
Not spicy, although I can 

1040
00:53:52,160 --> 00:53:55,600
tolerate a little bit of pain. 
And then mushrooms are just not 

1041
00:53:55,600 --> 00:53:58,720
my jam at all. 
So other than that, I feel like 

1042
00:53:58,720 --> 00:54:02,120
I've got a pretty open palette 
now that I've, you know, cut off

1043
00:54:02,120 --> 00:54:05,000
like a third of the of the menu.
No, no, no. 

1044
00:54:05,000 --> 00:54:07,120
So, yeah, So my thoughts are way
out the window now. 

1045
00:54:07,840 --> 00:54:12,120
No, I'm just kidding. 
I'd say let me think through 

1046
00:54:12,120 --> 00:54:16,200
this. 
If tuna's on the menu, I'd say a

1047
00:54:16,560 --> 00:54:21,440
really nice piece of like ahi 
tuna that's just really well 

1048
00:54:21,440 --> 00:54:24,440
seared, a little seasoning, a 
little salt, pepper, you know, 

1049
00:54:24,440 --> 00:54:26,600
let the fish speak for itself. 
It'll probably be sort of I'd 

1050
00:54:26,720 --> 00:54:29,560
anchor that around the main. 
Maybe a really good I I'm 

1051
00:54:29,560 --> 00:54:32,720
thinking Japanese would be a a 
good venue to go down. 

1052
00:54:33,560 --> 00:54:39,440
Go with a nice tuna over some 
nice rice, just like sliced up 

1053
00:54:39,440 --> 00:54:41,440
for you. 
Like nice presentation. 

1054
00:54:41,880 --> 00:54:43,840
Maybe a little seaweed salad on 
the side. 

1055
00:54:44,040 --> 00:54:45,920
I'd probably think about a 
couple courses. 

1056
00:54:46,640 --> 00:54:49,400
Make it really good miso soup to
start with. 

1057
00:54:50,720 --> 00:54:53,120
I like roasting vegetables a 
lot, so I'd probably roast up 

1058
00:54:53,120 --> 00:54:55,200
some carrots. 
Look for some, you know, go see 

1059
00:54:55,200 --> 00:54:57,560
what's fresh, what's 
interesting, what's going to be 

1060
00:54:57,560 --> 00:54:59,400
colorful. 
Think about putting that 

1061
00:54:59,400 --> 00:55:01,880
together and then maybe serving 
it out. 

1062
00:55:02,240 --> 00:55:06,080
I like to do more family style, 
like put things out on plates, 

1063
00:55:06,080 --> 00:55:08,640
share it around. 
I think that just makes for a 

1064
00:55:08,640 --> 00:55:12,160
better conversation and it comes
out nice because it uses a big 

1065
00:55:12,160 --> 00:55:14,200
plate with lots of stuff on it 
looks always looks great. 

1066
00:55:14,200 --> 00:55:16,560
So that's probably the direction
I would take it in. 

1067
00:55:17,360 --> 00:55:18,280
OK. 
So, Eric? 

1068
00:55:18,360 --> 00:55:22,600
What time do I show up for this?
Because you absolutely nailed 

1069
00:55:22,600 --> 00:55:24,840
that. 
Like, that is totally my jam. 

1070
00:55:24,880 --> 00:55:28,120
I am totally on top of that. 
So I'm going to invite myself 

1071
00:55:28,120 --> 00:55:29,920
over for dinner at some point. 
Or maybe we'll just go out and 

1072
00:55:29,920 --> 00:55:31,160
get a nice sushi dinner 
somewhere. 

1073
00:55:31,640 --> 00:55:33,680
Yeah, no, whenever. 
Whenever you want, happy to 

1074
00:55:33,680 --> 00:55:34,760
happy to cook for the both of 
you. 

1075
00:55:35,280 --> 00:55:37,440
Next time you're up in the Bay 
Area, we'll, we'll make it a 

1076
00:55:37,440 --> 00:55:39,320
date. 
Jim, how about? 

1077
00:55:39,400 --> 00:55:43,080
Yourself like how does that 
strike you of like a dinner like

1078
00:55:43,200 --> 00:55:46,920
the AHI tuning as possible. 
Yeah, I'm pretty open minded. 

1079
00:55:46,920 --> 00:55:51,480
The only thing I don't like is 
really strong cheese, like blue 

1080
00:55:51,480 --> 00:55:53,000
cheese. 
I don't like feta. 

1081
00:55:53,440 --> 00:55:56,600
It's just the smell turns me off
and I've always been that way. 

1082
00:55:57,240 --> 00:56:00,240
But other than that, I mean I'm 
pretty open. 

1083
00:56:00,240 --> 00:56:04,120
I mean, I'll even eat like 
really strong meats, like organ 

1084
00:56:04,120 --> 00:56:06,760
meat, like liver and stuff like 
that. 

1085
00:56:07,920 --> 00:56:11,800
So yeah. 
And wild game, like, I know a 

1086
00:56:11,800 --> 00:56:15,320
lot of people don't like that. 
I think it's interesting. 

1087
00:56:15,560 --> 00:56:18,080
So yeah, I'm pretty much up for 
anything. 

1088
00:56:18,320 --> 00:56:21,840
But if you put blue cheese on 
it, I might just leave. 

1089
00:56:22,760 --> 00:56:25,040
Yeah, I'll leave the blue cheese
off the nice piece of ahi. 

1090
00:56:25,200 --> 00:56:28,200
So there you go that. 
Sounds good, I totally. 

1091
00:56:28,200 --> 00:56:30,000
Appreciate that because blue 
cheese is one of the things I 

1092
00:56:30,000 --> 00:56:34,040
absolutely detest because I 
spent the better part of 

1093
00:56:34,040 --> 00:56:36,840
probably 7 or 8 years bartending
and one of the things that we 

1094
00:56:36,840 --> 00:56:39,680
had to do was stuffed blue 
cheese olives for our martinis. 

1095
00:56:39,680 --> 00:56:42,640
And so if I never see blue 
cheese again, I will be totally 

1096
00:56:42,640 --> 00:56:45,960
fine with that. 
I'll, I'll be the contrary and 

1097
00:56:45,960 --> 00:56:48,920
say I I like blue cheese. 
I love a good piece of feta, but

1098
00:56:48,920 --> 00:56:51,680
I, I will probably eat most 
anything. 

1099
00:56:52,520 --> 00:56:56,400
I early in my career, I spent a 
year in Hong Kong working on a 

1100
00:56:56,400 --> 00:56:58,400
project. 
And yeah, before that I was a 

1101
00:56:58,400 --> 00:56:59,880
little, I didn't eat as much 
seafood. 

1102
00:56:59,880 --> 00:57:03,520
I didn't like eggs too much and 
I just went in with the mentai. 

1103
00:57:03,520 --> 00:57:05,240
Like this is a totally new 
cuisine. 

1104
00:57:05,240 --> 00:57:07,520
There's influences from all over
Asia here. 

1105
00:57:07,920 --> 00:57:09,840
I'm just going to eat whatever. 
So if it didn't crawl off my 

1106
00:57:09,840 --> 00:57:13,160
plate, I'd eat it. 
And so now I'm a much, you know,

1107
00:57:13,160 --> 00:57:15,560
this has been a while now. 
It's been 20 plus years since I 

1108
00:57:15,560 --> 00:57:21,560
was there, but it's definitely 
opened my palate quite a bit. 

1109
00:57:22,480 --> 00:57:24,120
I was not always. 
An adventurous eater. 

1110
00:57:24,120 --> 00:57:26,680
I would stay I'm, you know, 
starting to put my toe in the 

1111
00:57:26,680 --> 00:57:28,760
water. 
I was very much like a grilled 

1112
00:57:28,760 --> 00:57:31,240
cheese and, you know, chicken 
Nuggets growing up. 

1113
00:57:31,680 --> 00:57:34,600
But as I found as I've gotten 
older, that I have been more 

1114
00:57:34,600 --> 00:57:37,800
willing to try things. 
So I will try just about 

1115
00:57:37,800 --> 00:57:40,800
anything once, just now. 
I know that like Daniel. 

1116
00:57:41,160 --> 00:57:45,800
I mean you you either get 
experimental or you don't eat. 

1117
00:57:47,320 --> 00:57:49,520
I will give a lot of. 
Credit to Daniel, so you know 

1118
00:57:49,560 --> 00:57:53,320
our our boss here at RSM, but he
has definitely taken me on some 

1119
00:57:53,320 --> 00:57:55,560
excursions and I'm very grateful
for that because I have tried 

1120
00:57:55,560 --> 00:57:58,560
things that I would normally not
have eaten and I've enjoyed some

1121
00:57:58,560 --> 00:57:59,600
of it. 
I won't say all of it. 

1122
00:57:59,600 --> 00:58:02,800
I have enjoyed some of it I. 
Like, hey, I liked a lot of 

1123
00:58:02,800 --> 00:58:06,640
things. 
I wasn't big on bone marrow, but

1124
00:58:06,640 --> 00:58:09,240
I mean, at the same time I could
eat it again. 

1125
00:58:09,520 --> 00:58:13,440
Just wasn't my favorite. 
Yeah, I hear you. 

1126
00:58:14,320 --> 00:58:15,720
Yep. 
I think it's important to try it

1127
00:58:15,720 --> 00:58:17,280
once, see if you like it. 
You never know. 

1128
00:58:17,280 --> 00:58:19,320
You'd be surprised. 
Yeah, that's how you. 

1129
00:58:19,320 --> 00:58:21,680
Discover, you know, Hey, new 
things, you know, it's kind of 

1130
00:58:21,680 --> 00:58:24,120
like music, right? 
You just like, oh, I didn't 

1131
00:58:24,120 --> 00:58:26,360
discover The Beatles until I was
30, or I didn't discover 

1132
00:58:26,360 --> 00:58:29,160
Metallica until I was, well, I 
discovered them, really, but you

1133
00:58:29,160 --> 00:58:30,920
get my drift. 
Exactly. 

1134
00:58:30,960 --> 00:58:33,120
Exactly. 
Well, Eric, you've. 

1135
00:58:33,120 --> 00:58:35,840
Been great and really appreciate
you taking some time with us. 

1136
00:58:35,840 --> 00:58:37,880
Thank you again for sponsoring 
an episode here with us. 

1137
00:58:37,880 --> 00:58:40,560
I'm going to have links in our 
show notes here for people to 

1138
00:58:40,560 --> 00:58:44,000
reach out to you on LinkedIn. 
Maybe, you know, share recipes 

1139
00:58:44,000 --> 00:58:46,800
or other things, whether it's 
recipes for, you know, identity 

1140
00:58:46,880 --> 00:58:50,160
data or other food items. 
Let's see what else. 

1141
00:58:50,680 --> 00:58:54,360
Visit the website SGNL dot AI 
slash IDAC. 

1142
00:58:55,280 --> 00:58:57,040
There'll be some information 
there that people can kind of 

1143
00:58:57,040 --> 00:58:59,280
check out and that also show 
support for the show that hey, 

1144
00:58:59,280 --> 00:59:01,000
you heard it here on on identity
at the center. 

1145
00:59:01,000 --> 00:59:03,480
So with that, we're going to go 
ahead and leave it for this 

1146
00:59:03,480 --> 00:59:06,120
week. 
Thanks everyone for watching and

1147
00:59:06,120 --> 00:59:08,560
or listening and we'll talk with
you all in the next one. 

1148
00:59:11,080 --> 00:59:13,520
You've been. 
Listening to Identity at the 

1149
00:59:13,520 --> 00:59:16,160
Center? 
We hope you've enjoyed the show.

1150
00:59:16,360 --> 00:59:20,480
Make sure to like, rate and 
review, and we'll be back soon. 

1151
00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:23,000
But in the meantime, hit the 
website at 

1152
00:59:23,000 --> 00:59:29,360
identity@thecenter.com. 
See you next time on Identity at

1153
00:59:29,360 --> 00:59:30,280
the Center.