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You're listening to the identity
of the center podcast. 

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This is a show that talks about 
identity and access management 

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and making sure you know who has
access to what let's get 

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started. 
Welcome to the identity of the 

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sender podcast, I'm Jeff. 
And that's Jim. 

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Hey, Jim hey, Jeff, how are you?
Oh, not so bad yourself. 

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I'm good. 
I was wondering, who is it too? 

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Late to say, Happy New Year, you
know, I was like a call 

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yesterday and I feel like, you 
know, all last week it was happy

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New Year and this this was words
of Williams, I think it was 

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Brian. 
And I was talking to is like 

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well you know I kind of said 
happy New Years that way, are we

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still doing that in the second 
year of the of the new year? 

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He's like well last week was a 
short week because most people 

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had Monday off. 
So Going to wow it. 

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As far as Monday. 
Now, what I don't know is I'm 

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going to do it today Tuesday or 
if we were just kind of we've 

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moved on. 
Yes it's the new year. 

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Let's just keep it as it is. 
Yeah. 

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It's like about this, right? 
We're recording it advance. 

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So we say happy new year. 
Now it really is dated by the 

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time this goes live and then by 
the time somebody maybe listens 

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to it, it's like you know, could
be summer. 

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I mean that's that's how people 
listen, as I think this will go 

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out, probably like January 23rd 
episode 196. 

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Theoretically, unless something 
changes in scenes, but, yeah, 

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it's tough to be timely on some 
of the stuff. 

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So, we're getting close to 200, 
and I'm gonna do we ever have a 

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conversation about Christmas 
gifts? 

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I think we did. 
I think we touched on it, right?

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But one thing I didn't didn't 
mention this. 

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Yeah, that's right. 
Your Sweetwater talked about my 

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stickers, but I never talked 
about my chair and the reason I 

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thought of it about it this 
morning is that, you know, I've 

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been getting by for about a here
with a squeaky chair and I 

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bought a Herman Miller chair. 
And I talked about it on the 

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show before because most like, 
embarrassed, I spent 1600 

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dollars u.s. on the chair and 
this was before inflation. 

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So it is an expensive chair. 
So that's like 40 Grand chair 

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now. 
Yeah. 

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Right. 
Exactly, exactly. 

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I could treat it in for a BMW or
something, but you know, the 

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issue with the chairs, like it 
was squeaking and I tried to hit

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it. 
Yeah. 

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You know, I tried hitting it 
with the WD-40. 

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It didn't solve the problem and 
what happened was I contacted 

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Herman Miller was under 
warranty. 

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So get this, you know, rather 
than saying well what you need 

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to do is XYZ, they used FedEx to
send a box to my house, I put 

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the chair Inside. 
The Box FedEx, came picked up 

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the box with the chair in it. 
Brought it back to Herman 

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Miller, they replaced the part 
that was squeaking. 

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Another going to ship it back to
me. 

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Now, the good and bad. 
I mean, like, it's like wow. 

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Like they spared. 
No, expense to fix my darn chair

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but, you know, I'm also without 
a chair for like two weeks while

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this is all happening, and it 
just kind of seems like an odd 

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way to go about fixing the 
problem. 

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Yeah, I guess, I guess Advanced 
replacement, maybe that's 

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something that I've done to pass
for like laptops or stuff. 

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Like that would have kind of 
physical issues that can't be 

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solved for software, like yeah, 
okay, send the chair and then 

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take your chair and put it in 
the same box and then send that 

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back would seem to me to make 
the most sense laptops are kind 

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of small chairs for big. 
Yeah. 

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Oh yeah. 
I know, I I treated myself to a 

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chair as well. 
Yeah. 

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Yeah. 
So anyway, I'm excited about the

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new year kicking off. 
Really looking forward to the 

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conference's. 
I mean, we talk about this every

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week, but let me get the word 
out and get people thinking 

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about like setting their 
conference schedule or agenda 

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for the year. 
I think, you know anyone who 

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follows us on LinkedIn realizes 
by now you and I are are 

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co-hosting a session along with 
Henry K you know head Becky from

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Gartner that's Going to be 
during the Gartner conference 

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Gardner. 
I am Summit in Grapevine Texas 

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March 20th through 22nd. 
I'm not even sure exactly what 

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day our session is within that 
that range but certainly don't 

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happen within that range and we 
are super excited about that. 

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Yeah we'll have 30 minutes 
somewhere in there to bring the 

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identity of the sender show to 
the Gartner stage which is a 

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very cool. 
I think it's a point where I 

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start start to crowdsource some 
questions here from our audience

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and What we want to do about you
know, we're gonna have an 

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opportunity to really Grill 
Enrique and Becky so we can get 

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tough and we can have a good 
conversation about it and you 

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know maybe and the goal is to 
have really something different 

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than your normal sort of Gartner
presentation or session, 

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whatever may be especially if 
it's sort of like off to the 

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side and it's not really like a 
keynote. 

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So I'm hopeful that we'll have a
very good time and it'll be a 

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little bit different flavor and 
kind of be. 

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And if it's the right word, but 
like, the like the anti session,

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if that makes sense, a are the 
normal programming. 

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You may not learn anything, but 
I hope will be entertained like 

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the unconference. 
I was popular for a while or so 

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like you show up. 
You have no idea what you're 

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going to talk about. 
I don't think we'll do that 

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though. 
No I will have will have a good 

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time at this. 
We got Gartner coming up, we've 

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got the European identity 
conference. 

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We talked to Martin cougar, a 
couple weeks ago, we've got 

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identifiers coming up. 
So yeah, I think Now's the Time 

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to get those budget requests in,
try to point out that calendar 

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or, and you know, see what you 
can do to attend stuff like 

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that. 
So it seems like it's very 

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heavily. 
Front-loaded this year, for some

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reason, and our essays coming up
as well, in April, I think it 

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is, or maybe it's May. 
So I'm going to try and I think 

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is April actually, so I'm going 
to try and hit that as I kind of

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usually do. 
But yeah, put it, I put the bug 

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and I put a bug in Daniels here.
Daniel is our partner within our

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SM, who Jeff and I both report 
to and, you know, I take the 

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lead on, kind of like trying to 
help put together the strategy 

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for external marketing. 
So, That includes like 

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conferences so I'm like let's 
let's all good RSA obviously 

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it's not like an endless budget 
for going to conferences but 

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it's a fantastic opportunity to 
network and know what's going on

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within the industry. 
So I mean it's dollars well 

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invested but you know, gets 
expensive after a while 

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especially with all the the 
travel and entertainment that 

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goes along with it. 
Yeah. 

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So we don't do normally 
commercials for ourselves. 

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But yeah, if you need, identity 
Consulting, come talk to Jim and

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I That helps us get to 
conferences which means we can 

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bring the identity of Center 
podcast to those conferences, 

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typically, and do some sort of, 
you know, I'm on location 

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recording. 
So Shameless plug there. 

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Anything else coming up that we 
want to get to, or should we get

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to our guests? 
Why don't we get to our guest? 

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I don't want to like, you know, 
eat up all of our time with our 

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banter. 
Yeah are Mindless banter. 

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Let's talk with Mickey but I 
he's the CEO and co-founder of 

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transmit security. 
Welcome to the show Mickey. 

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Thank you, Jeff. 
Thank you, Jim. 

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It's great being here. 
Actually like listening to your 

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opening statement. 
So first of all, like I'm 

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sitting on probably the most 
uncomfortable chair that was 

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ever built, but it's part of the
office design and the designer 

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is my wife. 
So you know, I'm stuck with this

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chair but I kind of like learned
to to like it. 

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You know, the other thing that 
you've mentioned is Gardner 

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conference, which is obviously a
great conference. 

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And this is probably, you know, 
a good opportunity for us to 

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introduce David Maddie who was 
previously, Gartner identity and

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access management analyst, who 
is just joined transmitted and 

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he's starting in about a week. 
So I think by the time that this

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is going to air, it will be, you
know, part of our team. 

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And, lastly, you mentioned our 
say, which is very funny. 

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But like I I the first RSA I 
attended. 

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The first conference was in 
1993, I believe, which was 

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probably one of the first RSA 
conference has ever. 

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It was so tiny back then and you
know, I think the last one I 

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actually, you know, I attended 
was about like, you know, just 

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just before covid and it was so 
huge. 

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Like, you know, this one, and I 
keep kind of like looking at the

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RSA conference has I kind of 
like it's interesting to see how

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the entire industry of 
cybersecurity as evolved since 

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like you know the early 90s to, 
you know, these days, it's 

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pretty amazing. 
What keeps growing and growing. 

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You mentioned are saving so 
small and now it's a huge thing.

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I think it's something like 20 
or 30,000 people sort of all 

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descend into downtown San 
Francisco. 

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And yeah, I was there at the 
same one right before. 

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Sort of the pandemic sort of hit
it was like right at the very, 

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very beginning and I remember 
getting that notifications, 

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okay? 
Someone was at the conference 

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and there was, you know, an 
infection. 

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So that was sort of like, I 
think the, the closing 

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Ceremonies for the conference 
circuit and that kind of 

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reopened maybe, like, around 
this time. 

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Last year when I was at RSA, you
last year, as well. 

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And it felt like it was, there 
was excitement. 

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I think, I think people were 
kind of, like, okay, we've been 

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cooped up for a couple of years.
Now, let's kind of get out there

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and, you know, No. 
Yeah manually. 

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Yeah yeah it's pretty amazing. 
Like and everything's getting 

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back to normal like even China 
is getting back to normal you 

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know. 
Like that's that's a big event. 

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Yeah. 
So I want to touch on something.

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You mentioned, you mentioned 
about your uncomfortable chair 

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and that's sort of like the 
office design and I got to ask 

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questions. 
So if your wife design the 

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office and the chair is 
uncomfortable. 

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Is that so that it's like forces
you to like, stand up, move 

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around KT, KT office all day. 
No come home or was, is that 

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like a subtle nod? 
Like, hey, you can't work 24 

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hours a day. 
Let's do other things too. 

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Look, it's, it's probably the 
cheapest share that you could 

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imagine, but it goes well, with 
the decor of the office, like 

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the entire design. 
So it's all about how it looks 

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rather than, you know how it 
feels. 

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But yeah, you know, like, I'm 
mom mostly when I'm in the 

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office. 
So I'm you know, moving around 

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between meetings. 
So you know this is probably 

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going to be the longest that I 
I'm sitting on this chair today.

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So you know. 
Well let's keep on Pace here so 

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your back thinks this later or 
doesn't blame us later. 

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Anyway, this is the first time 
you've been on the show with us 

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and one things I like to do when
we talked with new guest is we 

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kind of find a little bit about 
their identity background and 

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how they got sort of into the 
infosec space and identity at 

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large. 
Can you take us through sort of 

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your journey from the beginning?
Did you get into identity? 

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And I don't think we need the 
whole Wikipedia entry, but maybe

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something that kind of explains,
you know, here's the context 

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that you're coming from. 
Because obviously, you've 

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started up a couple companies. 
Now this point and now you're a 

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transmit security. 
I'm just curious if if something

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is identity something that you 
chose or did it choose you? 

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All right so you know this story
goes back to when I was 18 years

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old. 
I'm 50 now so as you probably 

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00:11:29,300 --> 00:11:34,400
know in Israel we have like 
mandatory military service and 

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you started that when you're 18.
So I joined the military. 

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When I was 18 in this part of 
like the process, I was screened

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for its cyber security unit in 
the, in the military, I then 

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went to learn computer 
engineering and the first thing 

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00:11:53,500 --> 00:12:00,300
that I was assigned to when you 
know my first day in in the unit

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00:12:00,300 --> 00:12:05,200
was this like huge book and this
book was right. 

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Kits. 
For those of you, no doubt, it's

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00:12:07,800 --> 00:12:11,500
like the axis control system for
mainframes. 

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So like, you know, for I 
remember that for a month, I was

224
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like, you know, reading the 
book, trying to figure out 

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what's going on there. 
So this is mostly identity 

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access management and then my 
first project in the military 

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was implementing Rock. 
If like kind of like Concepts on

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00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:37,400
Unix Systems. 
Right it was like you know 

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before Lee Newton was like Unix 
systems. 

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So since then I move between 
like different disciplines of 

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00:12:45,400 --> 00:12:50,500
cybersecurity in the military, 
firewalls intrusion detection, 

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systems data security and then 
write it that like the last two 

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00:12:55,500 --> 00:13:00,100
years was around application, 
security, web security. 

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00:13:01,000 --> 00:13:04,900
So when I got out of the 
military, the first thing I did 

235
00:13:04,900 --> 00:13:09,500
was Starting, you know, company 
around application security and 

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00:13:09,500 --> 00:13:15,600
it's kind of like started my low
whether intrapreneur but yes, 

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identity was the first thing I 
ever touched in my career and 

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it's a rough entrance rack f. 
I remember that back in the 

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00:13:25,500 --> 00:13:29,100
early 2000s, I guess would have 
been for me administrating rack 

240
00:13:29,100 --> 00:13:32,900
F access for for that. 
Not my most favorite thing to do

241
00:13:32,900 --> 00:13:35,100
in the world. 
Nah not at all. 

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00:13:35,300 --> 00:13:37,700
Like yeah. 
Took me a while to get back to 

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00:13:37,700 --> 00:13:38,900
Identity. 
Yeah. 

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00:13:40,600 --> 00:13:44,400
So those for those not familiar 
transmit security, I guess help 

245
00:13:45,100 --> 00:13:46,200
for the folks are listening out 
there. 

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00:13:46,300 --> 00:13:49,300
What's the 32nd or 60? 
Second elevator pitch for what 

247
00:13:49,300 --> 00:13:55,400
transmit security does, right? 
So Travis is security provides 

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00:13:55,400 --> 00:13:59,800
end-to-end customer identity 
Services, mainly for large 

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Enterprises, so our customers 
are alike, you know, City Bank 

250
00:14:03,800 --> 00:14:11,400
HSBC, JP Morgan Roger is a lot 
of these large down Giants and 

251
00:14:11,800 --> 00:14:15,300
the services include user 
management or ization advanced 

252
00:14:15,400 --> 00:14:19,000
advanced certification Reese 
trust and fraud identity 

253
00:14:19,000 --> 00:14:22,600
document verification identity 
orchestrations of pretty much. 

254
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Anything around customer 
identity and what's unique about

255
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us is that we're experts in 
cybersecurity. 

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00:14:31,900 --> 00:14:36,900
So our platform is built ground 
up for Enterprises want to keep 

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00:14:36,900 --> 00:14:41,200
secure yet, move very very fast 
in terms of their identity 

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00:14:41,200 --> 00:14:43,100
Journey. 
So we're going to get probably 

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00:14:43,100 --> 00:14:46,400
to talk a little bit more about 
the the see, I am aspect here, 

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00:14:46,400 --> 00:14:50,100
especially on the risk as read 
an article where you were 

261
00:14:50,100 --> 00:14:53,300
mentioned in it. 
And it mentioned I think there 

262
00:14:53,300 --> 00:14:55,400
was a quote and maybe can kind 
of help me understand the 

263
00:14:55,400 --> 00:14:57,900
context of this was you 
mentioned being kind of thought 

264
00:14:57,900 --> 00:15:01,600
of as they're at least the goal 
was to be the Google or meta of 

265
00:15:01,600 --> 00:15:04,800
personal security in the digital
world can you? 

266
00:15:05,300 --> 00:15:07,600
Me what you meant by that or 
maybe there was context that was

267
00:15:07,600 --> 00:15:10,900
missing from the conversation. 
Well yeah, thanks for for this 

268
00:15:10,900 --> 00:15:13,600
question, Jeff. 
It's it's a good opportunity to 

269
00:15:13,600 --> 00:15:18,900
clarify but up, I'm not 
comparing ourselves to Google or

270
00:15:18,900 --> 00:15:23,800
meta but what I'm like saying is
that I'm inspired by the way 

271
00:15:23,800 --> 00:15:27,600
they build their brand. 
So for example with Google, 

272
00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:32,300
right it's like googly is a term
rights like you know you're not 

273
00:15:32,300 --> 00:15:36,100
searching the web so So you know
the way. 

274
00:15:36,100 --> 00:15:39,800
Yeah, I do you think about being
Google is Google search and 

275
00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:43,600
search is Google. 
So for me to kind of like set 

276
00:15:43,600 --> 00:15:48,900
goals for transmit security 
around identity, what I really 

277
00:15:48,900 --> 00:15:53,500
want to happen eventually is 
that large Enterprises when they

278
00:15:53,500 --> 00:15:57,500
think about their customer 
identity, they think about 

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00:15:57,500 --> 00:16:01,400
transmit security. 
So that's kind of like the way I

280
00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:04,900
present it to, you know, 
everyone wants to listen to the 

281
00:16:04,900 --> 00:16:06,800
video. 
Well, you picked a good name and

282
00:16:06,800 --> 00:16:08,900
transmit because you think about
it was like, okay well we're 

283
00:16:09,100 --> 00:16:12,400
transmitting our identity where 
transmit security so I'm not 

284
00:16:12,400 --> 00:16:13,700
going to your marketing for you 
definitely. 

285
00:16:13,700 --> 00:16:19,400
Don't want that. 
But anyway you're based in 

286
00:16:19,400 --> 00:16:23,000
Israel and you know, been very 
gracious with your time with us 

287
00:16:23,000 --> 00:16:25,600
and I'm curious because we 
talked with a lot of folks in 

288
00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:29,900
the infosec space and it seems 
like Israel such a hotbed for 

289
00:16:29,900 --> 00:16:32,700
different cybersecurity startups
and things like that. 

290
00:16:33,100 --> 00:16:35,700
I guess why, is that what? 
You know, what is The the 

291
00:16:35,700 --> 00:16:40,300
culture there or whatever other 
you know, winds kind of that 

292
00:16:40,300 --> 00:16:46,200
help with that, right? 
So I think it's a combination of

293
00:16:46,200 --> 00:16:52,600
probably two main main things. 
The first one would be the, the 

294
00:16:52,600 --> 00:16:56,300
military, as I said, like no, we
have a mandatory military 

295
00:16:56,300 --> 00:16:59,700
service, which means that 
everyone at the age of 18 goes 

296
00:16:59,700 --> 00:17:03,800
to the military and then in the 
military, the different units 

297
00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:06,900
just decide. 
Where are you go? 

298
00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:12,800
So you know, some of them become
Pilots, you know, they they they

299
00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:17,000
want to but also the military 
needs to to decide that, you 

300
00:17:17,000 --> 00:17:20,599
know, this is, you know, a good 
seat for them. 

301
00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:24,700
But then like, you know, cyber 
security units within the 

302
00:17:24,700 --> 00:17:30,200
technical units are, you know, 
typically the most prestigious 

303
00:17:30,700 --> 00:17:35,500
units in the military and they 
get to pick their talent first 

304
00:17:36,100 --> 00:17:39,500
So if you think about it, the 
entire talent that we have in 

305
00:17:39,500 --> 00:17:46,300
Israel, the cybersecurity 
military, I get to choose the 

306
00:17:46,300 --> 00:17:50,500
ones that they want, so everyone
goes there like know, the best 

307
00:17:50,500 --> 00:17:55,600
talents and then in the military
you really get an opportunity to

308
00:17:55,600 --> 00:18:02,100
work on projects that you would 
never get a chance to work on in

309
00:18:02,100 --> 00:18:05,100
your civilian lives by the 
things that we do in the 

310
00:18:05,100 --> 00:18:07,300
military. 
We are liking almost on 

311
00:18:07,300 --> 00:18:11,200
comparable to, you know, what 
private companies are doing. 

312
00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:15,400
So, you get like a lot of 
experience very, very fast. 

313
00:18:15,600 --> 00:18:19,400
Definitely for someone who is a 
junior developer or Junior 

314
00:18:19,400 --> 00:18:24,300
researcher, they will never get 
the chance to do that in any 

315
00:18:24,800 --> 00:18:28,800
other part of the world. 
So you know military service 

316
00:18:28,800 --> 00:18:32,300
could be anywhere between like 
you know three years 26-year. 

317
00:18:32,300 --> 00:18:37,500
This is this is like where most 
people most Years and up. 

318
00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:41,600
So after like, you know, four 
five, six years in the military 

319
00:18:41,600 --> 00:18:46,600
with a lot of experience, you 
know, this guy's just go out and

320
00:18:46,600 --> 00:18:51,400
start their civilian career. 
And typically, what they want to

321
00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:55,700
do is to keep on doing the 
things that they're good at, 

322
00:18:55,700 --> 00:19:00,000
which is our security. 
So, you see a lot of 

323
00:19:00,000 --> 00:19:04,500
cybersecurity startups in 
Israel, you see a lot of big 

324
00:19:04,500 --> 00:19:08,400
companies that Out, you know are
in cybersecurity. 

325
00:19:08,700 --> 00:19:13,400
So you know I think it's kind of
like culture right now in Israel

326
00:19:13,600 --> 00:19:18,300
where you see most of the 
technical Talent going into 

327
00:19:18,300 --> 00:19:20,700
cyber. 
So Mickey we I mean, 

328
00:19:20,700 --> 00:19:23,200
transmitters been around for 
quite a while. 

329
00:19:23,400 --> 00:19:28,300
I mean, the buzz, I think lately
that I've heard is really, you 

330
00:19:28,308 --> 00:19:32,000
know, Pastor Liz for customer 
identity and access management 

331
00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:35,500
or we that's, you know, probably
if somebody asked me what 

332
00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,400
Schmidt does that's where my 
mind would go right away. 

333
00:19:38,600 --> 00:19:43,000
But early on, it was a focus on 
orchestration orchestration, can

334
00:19:43,000 --> 00:19:45,000
mean different things to 
different people. 

335
00:19:45,200 --> 00:19:49,400
They, for example, we had Jerry 
Gable and the show in November 

336
00:19:49,900 --> 00:19:53,000
talking about what they're doing
over shraddha and they're doing 

337
00:19:53,000 --> 00:19:55,200
orchestration. 
It's quite different. 

338
00:19:55,200 --> 00:19:58,500
I've encourage anybody who's 
listening who's interested to 

339
00:19:58,800 --> 00:20:01,900
understand the difference to go 
back and listen to that episode.

340
00:20:02,900 --> 00:20:06,200
But you know, I think the 
orchestration that transmitted 

341
00:20:06,200 --> 00:20:10,700
was focused on early on and 
probably, you know, still makes 

342
00:20:10,700 --> 00:20:14,800
up a big part of the stack is 
what we call security, 

343
00:20:14,800 --> 00:20:19,100
orchestration and automated 
response or soar, as kind of a 

344
00:20:19,108 --> 00:20:22,100
product area. 
Is that, what am I getting that 

345
00:20:22,100 --> 00:20:23,600
right? 
Or is it something else? 

346
00:20:24,700 --> 00:20:28,900
It's not exactly that about like
you not to really understand 

347
00:20:28,900 --> 00:20:34,600
what identity orchestration is. 
It's better to understand like, 

348
00:20:34,600 --> 00:20:37,100
you know, kind of like the 
history and where we come from. 

349
00:20:37,800 --> 00:20:43,000
So it's around 2007, my 
co-founder Rakesh in Ankara 

350
00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:45,600
myself. 
We, we started a company called 

351
00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:50,300
trusteer now, trusteer was 
eventually got acquired by IBM 

352
00:20:50,300 --> 00:20:53,700
and it's not part of IBM 
security, but what we did there,

353
00:20:53,900 --> 00:20:57,900
There is like we identified very
early on that on the next big 

354
00:20:57,900 --> 00:21:02,600
thing in terms of attacks 
against organizations and 

355
00:21:02,600 --> 00:21:06,100
specifically financial 
institutions is going to be 

356
00:21:06,500 --> 00:21:10,500
malware and financial malware. 
Now, this was even before 

357
00:21:10,500 --> 00:21:15,300
sentential malware was even 
invented and that was probably a

358
00:21:15,308 --> 00:21:18,200
year here and asking for the 
first one like Zeus was 

359
00:21:18,200 --> 00:21:21,100
invented. 
So we started a company, we 

360
00:21:21,100 --> 00:21:23,700
started building like, you know,
the defense's around it. 

361
00:21:24,500 --> 00:21:31,400
And you know, then when the 
axle, you know, let's say the 

362
00:21:34,000 --> 00:21:39,500
the actual attacks against Banks
started to happen, you know, 

363
00:21:39,500 --> 00:21:43,400
like organizations were looking 
for Solutions. 

364
00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:47,000
And this is where we basically 
came in with the ability to 

365
00:21:47,000 --> 00:21:54,800
identify fraudsters and, you 
know that that are Leveraging 

366
00:21:55,600 --> 00:22:03,000
malware against Banks consumers 
and be able to alert to the 

367
00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:05,700
bank. 
That for example, a certain 

368
00:22:06,700 --> 00:22:13,000
consumer who is now trying to 
Bank online is infected with a 

369
00:22:13,000 --> 00:22:18,000
financial malware that could 
eventually still credentials or,

370
00:22:18,000 --> 00:22:20,800
you know, make transactions and 
things like that. 

371
00:22:21,100 --> 00:22:25,500
So the signal was very strong 
and You know, was we were very 

372
00:22:25,500 --> 00:22:29,000
successful with that but as we 
kind of like wanted to build 

373
00:22:29,000 --> 00:22:32,600
that into mitigation controls, 
okay? 

374
00:22:32,600 --> 00:22:35,300
Like you know, you get a signal,
you understand that there is 

375
00:22:35,300 --> 00:22:39,300
something bad happening how do 
you stop it right? 

376
00:22:39,300 --> 00:22:43,500
The way to stop it is true, 
perhaps stronger authentication 

377
00:22:43,700 --> 00:22:47,600
or restricted access. 
So these are kind of like you 

378
00:22:47,600 --> 00:22:53,600
know, what you want to to do as 
actions because when you look at

379
00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:57,700
Consumer identity, right? 
It's different than Workforce 

380
00:22:57,700 --> 00:23:02,200
identity because you still need 
to like allow your consumers to 

381
00:23:02,400 --> 00:23:06,000
to log in and do stuff so you 
can just keep blocking People 

382
00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:08,500
based on, you know, all these 
signals. 

383
00:23:08,500 --> 00:23:12,200
And we're talking about Millions
sometimes of tens of millions of

384
00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:15,800
users per organization or per 
application. 

385
00:23:16,200 --> 00:23:21,200
So to automate all that we had 
to kind of like blend our 

386
00:23:21,200 --> 00:23:26,700
signals with Authentication. 
Shen's and authorization actions

387
00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:32,000
and we wanted to to do that. 
But you know based on the 

388
00:23:32,000 --> 00:23:37,600
architectures that our customers
add back then it was really 

389
00:23:37,600 --> 00:23:40,600
really hard to do. 
Like how do you blend their? 

390
00:23:40,600 --> 00:23:45,800
I am stack into the signals that
we're giving them and change the

391
00:23:45,800 --> 00:23:50,600
authentication on the Fly based 
on these signals. 

392
00:23:50,700 --> 00:23:53,700
So it could be like, okay, when 
the user comes to trans day, 

393
00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:57,000
Doctor do something during the 
session. 

394
00:23:57,200 --> 00:24:01,500
You need to challenge them just 
because your seat you're picking

395
00:24:01,500 --> 00:24:05,400
up different signals or when the
user is opening an account. 

396
00:24:05,400 --> 00:24:10,000
During the process, you want to 
change the experience and 

397
00:24:10,000 --> 00:24:14,200
introduce more friction because 
you're picking up these signals 

398
00:24:14,500 --> 00:24:19,300
and it was impossible to do. 
So it was like, okay, we need to

399
00:24:19,300 --> 00:24:22,800
do a lot of coding in the 
application and deserve very 

400
00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:25,500
difficult. 
Nations to touch. 

401
00:24:25,600 --> 00:24:29,000
And these are very sensitive 
places to touch and like you 

402
00:24:29,000 --> 00:24:31,900
know you need to buy cast the 
entire. 

403
00:24:32,300 --> 00:24:37,600
I am architecture to do that. 
So you know, for years I think 

404
00:24:37,600 --> 00:24:41,300
like three or four years that we
we actually try to implement 

405
00:24:41,300 --> 00:24:44,900
this concept. 
It was impossible for us to do 

406
00:24:44,900 --> 00:24:47,600
it. 
So eventually, what we decided 

407
00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:51,000
to do is we want to start a new 
company. 

408
00:24:51,900 --> 00:24:58,700
Where we can glue together, all 
sorts of signals about risk with

409
00:24:58,700 --> 00:25:03,400
authentication with 
authorization in a very easy way

410
00:25:03,400 --> 00:25:06,400
for the application. 
So think about it is kind of 

411
00:25:06,400 --> 00:25:11,900
like an abstraction layer that 
sits between the application and

412
00:25:11,900 --> 00:25:15,500
the iin stack, and most 
organizations that have a lot of

413
00:25:15,500 --> 00:25:21,600
Solutions in our I am. 
So we sit in between and we Can 

414
00:25:21,600 --> 00:25:27,500
take the signals and then 
operate the different actions 

415
00:25:27,500 --> 00:25:30,800
like, okay, you need to do this 
type of authentication or we 

416
00:25:30,800 --> 00:25:35,800
need to restrict your access to 
specific parts of the of the 

417
00:25:35,800 --> 00:25:38,900
application. 
So this is our, the concept was 

418
00:25:38,900 --> 00:25:43,600
born and when we started to 
present the concept to customers

419
00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:49,500
and to to analysts, you know, I 
think David was like, you know, 

420
00:25:49,500 --> 00:25:54,700
the gal that I mentioned. 
Earlier they came up with the 

421
00:25:54,800 --> 00:25:58,700
kind of like, the category of 
identity orchestration, okay. 

422
00:25:58,700 --> 00:26:02,700
So this is like, you know, 
you're orchestrating the entire 

423
00:26:02,700 --> 00:26:06,500
I am stack and this is how it 
all started. 

424
00:26:07,200 --> 00:26:09,900
Yeah, that's really interesting.
You mentioned a couple key 

425
00:26:09,900 --> 00:26:13,600
terms, I want to pick on but 
overall the impression that I'm 

426
00:26:13,600 --> 00:26:17,900
getting is really, you know, 
this is all comes back to risk 

427
00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:21,300
and gauging the risk of the 
Authentication. 

428
00:26:21,400 --> 00:26:25,700
Fashion Event and let's be 
frank, different organizations, 

429
00:26:25,700 --> 00:26:29,400
different Industries, have a 
different tolerance for risk. 

430
00:26:29,400 --> 00:26:32,800
You mentioned, you know, if 
you're in the customer identity,

431
00:26:32,900 --> 00:26:37,300
you don't want to just keep 
sending people away because they

432
00:26:37,500 --> 00:26:41,500
represent some level of risk. 
You know, as a Workforce people 

433
00:26:41,500 --> 00:26:44,400
are going to keep trying until 
they get in, right for whatever 

434
00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:47,600
reason, will call the help desk 
but if it's somebody wants to 

435
00:26:47,608 --> 00:26:53,300
buy a sweater or sign up for a 
cell phone service, Or transact 

436
00:26:53,300 --> 00:26:55,300
with their Bank. 
Those are three different levels

437
00:26:55,300 --> 00:26:58,700
of risk and they probably want 
to turn people away based on 

438
00:26:58,700 --> 00:27:02,400
different levels or make sure 
I'm getting that right? 

439
00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:06,200
And then talk to me a little bit
about how these signals that you

440
00:27:06,200 --> 00:27:09,400
talk about, what are some of the
examples of signals and how does

441
00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:12,900
that play into determining that 
risk? 

442
00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:16,200
Yeah. 
So first of all you're, you 

443
00:27:16,200 --> 00:27:21,300
know, absolutely right that 
different verticals have 

444
00:27:21,300 --> 00:27:25,800
different tolerance to to risk 
and you know, account Takeover 

445
00:27:25,800 --> 00:27:30,700
in general. 
So traditionally the financial 

446
00:27:30,700 --> 00:27:35,400
sector was much more sensitive 
or is much more sensitive to 

447
00:27:35,700 --> 00:27:40,000
Therese and this is why you see 
like all the controls and much 

448
00:27:40,000 --> 00:27:42,900
better or stronger 
authentication process. 

449
00:27:43,000 --> 00:27:46,400
As with financial institutions, 
then you see, for example, with 

450
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:50,100
retail. 
But even, you know, we three 

451
00:27:50,100 --> 00:27:53,900
till what we're seeing recently 
is that there are two main 

452
00:27:53,900 --> 00:27:58,500
reasons why in there trying to 
look at that more seriously. 

453
00:27:58,500 --> 00:28:03,800
The first one is customer 
experience so think about like 

454
00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:09,500
you know, your account, you 
know, getting and or you know, 

455
00:28:09,500 --> 00:28:14,300
your credentials are stolen, 
someone gets in Your account 

456
00:28:14,300 --> 00:28:17,700
with a certain retailer, you 
start getting like, you know, 

457
00:28:17,700 --> 00:28:20,500
these emails about like is EQ, 
is it? 

458
00:28:20,500 --> 00:28:22,700
Not you? 
Do you want to stop it? 

459
00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:26,600
We had a breach, we had 
something so it's like it. 

460
00:28:27,300 --> 00:28:31,700
There is damage to the brand and
this is something that they want

461
00:28:31,700 --> 00:28:38,500
to to avoid and the frequency 
and the kind of like, you know, 

462
00:28:38,500 --> 00:28:42,300
the amount of attacks that 
they're seeing today in retail 

463
00:28:42,700 --> 00:28:47,600
is Not comparable to what they 
used to see, probably five, six,

464
00:28:47,600 --> 00:28:51,700
seven years ago. 
So as this increases their 

465
00:28:51,700 --> 00:28:55,600
starting to look at this more 
seriously to, you know, improve 

466
00:28:55,600 --> 00:28:59,200
their other brand and like, you 
know, their entire operational, 

467
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:05,100
you know, cost. 
But you know, in terms of the 

468
00:29:05,100 --> 00:29:10,200
attacks themselves, it's a lot 
about, you know, account 

469
00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:15,700
takeover so account. 
Typically you would see, you 

470
00:29:15,700 --> 00:29:20,400
know, someone like they're kind 
of like typical ways of doing 

471
00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:23,800
account takeover. 
So we're reading a lot of bad 

472
00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:26,700
data breaches, right? 
It's like almost on a daily 

473
00:29:26,700 --> 00:29:30,400
basis that were saying even the,
you know, the biggest brands 

474
00:29:31,000 --> 00:29:36,600
being rich and like, you know, 
customer data is going out and, 

475
00:29:36,700 --> 00:29:42,400
you know, is probably available 
in the dark web and what current

476
00:29:42,400 --> 00:29:45,600
cyber those are doing is just 
like, you know, downloading this

477
00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:50,200
data and, you know, starting to 
do things like credential 

478
00:29:50,200 --> 00:29:53,300
stuffing, which is for those of 
you don't know. 

479
00:29:53,600 --> 00:29:57,500
It's like, you know, you're 
taking a database of usernames 

480
00:29:57,500 --> 00:30:02,400
like typically email addresses 
and their passwords from a 

481
00:30:02,408 --> 00:30:07,800
specific website and then you go
and try the same credentials 

482
00:30:07,800 --> 00:30:11,400
with other websites. 
And the assumption is that 

483
00:30:11,800 --> 00:30:15,700
customers are Using their 
credentials across multiple 

484
00:30:15,700 --> 00:30:18,600
websites, which is typically 
correct assumption. 

485
00:30:19,100 --> 00:30:23,100
And so they go and just try 
these across multiple 

486
00:30:23,900 --> 00:30:29,600
applications with huge databases
of customers and they're able 

487
00:30:29,600 --> 00:30:35,000
to, you know, get into your into
your account even though you did

488
00:30:35,000 --> 00:30:37,600
nothing wrong. 
Other than using the same 

489
00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:40,700
password across multiple 
applications. 

490
00:30:40,900 --> 00:30:45,700
So this is one attack Vector for
Example, the other would be 

491
00:30:46,200 --> 00:30:49,300
another one which is very 
interesting would be social 

492
00:30:49,300 --> 00:30:52,500
engineering and this is 
something that we're seeing more

493
00:30:52,500 --> 00:30:56,900
and more which is like, you 
know, someone colds you 

494
00:30:57,100 --> 00:31:01,700
pretending to be your, you know,
someone from the bank or someone

495
00:31:01,700 --> 00:31:06,900
from law enforcement agencies or
you know, even your Telco 

496
00:31:06,900 --> 00:31:10,700
provider and they tell you a 
story that you believe 

497
00:31:10,700 --> 00:31:16,100
eventually that you need to do. 
And this something could be, you

498
00:31:16,100 --> 00:31:20,500
know, as bad as like you need to
move money from your account to 

499
00:31:20,500 --> 00:31:26,900
this account because, you know, 
this is a backup account and 

500
00:31:26,900 --> 00:31:29,800
something happened and for 
security reason you need to do 

501
00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:34,700
that, it really, it really 
depends on the creativity of 

502
00:31:34,700 --> 00:31:38,600
the, you know, if the attacker 
of cyber criminals and there are

503
00:31:38,600 --> 00:31:41,600
quite successful in that. 
So, obviously the more practice 

504
00:31:41,600 --> 00:31:44,900
they get the better, They become
in telling these stories and 

505
00:31:44,900 --> 00:31:47,100
finding the right victims for 
it. 

506
00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:50,800
So this would be like, you know,
a couple of the attacks that 

507
00:31:50,800 --> 00:31:54,600
we're seeing today. 
Also you know, you're seeing 

508
00:31:54,600 --> 00:32:00,300
things that are more geared 
toward bypassing two-factor 

509
00:32:00,300 --> 00:32:03,900
authentication. 
So it you know this is funny 

510
00:32:03,900 --> 00:32:08,000
like you know, when two Factor 
authentication is kind of like 

511
00:32:08,000 --> 00:32:12,600
you know, recent in terms of the
adoption rate of two Factor 

512
00:32:12,600 --> 00:32:14,600
Authentication Station. 
Even though it's been with us 

513
00:32:14,600 --> 00:32:19,400
for many many years only, you 
know, probably in the last five 

514
00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:21,800
years or so. 
We're starting to see 

515
00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:26,900
organizations really adapting 
two-factor authentication and 

516
00:32:26,900 --> 00:32:33,500
typically with an OTP typically 
over you know SMS or email or 

517
00:32:33,500 --> 00:32:36,200
not specific application to do 
that. 

518
00:32:36,800 --> 00:32:42,000
And you know as soon as you know
fraudsters realized that you 

519
00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:45,000
know, this is this This is what 
organizations are doing. 

520
00:32:45,500 --> 00:32:49,400
They immediately came up with 
men in the middle attacks like, 

521
00:32:49,400 --> 00:32:51,800
you know, stuff like they 
invented it, right? 

522
00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:54,700
Like this attack vectors. 
I can tell you that, you know, 

523
00:32:54,700 --> 00:32:57,900
we've been experimenting with 
them like 20 years ago. 

524
00:32:58,600 --> 00:33:02,500
So, everything was known but 
like, you know, sometimes like 

525
00:33:02,500 --> 00:33:06,100
the motion is, it's like, always
like, you know, for me, it's 

526
00:33:06,100 --> 00:33:09,900
like you're watching something 
in slow motion, right? 

527
00:33:09,900 --> 00:33:12,300
It's like when you're watching 
something in slow motion, you 

528
00:33:12,300 --> 00:33:15,900
know what's To come next because
you get like a lot of time to 

529
00:33:15,900 --> 00:33:18,900
think. 
So with, you know, for example, 

530
00:33:18,900 --> 00:33:22,800
with two-factor authentication 
was pretty obvious that as soon 

531
00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:26,400
as everyone is, you know, starts
to adopt it, you know, 

532
00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:29,600
fraudsters will be able to 
bypass it very easily. 

533
00:33:29,700 --> 00:33:32,800
So we're seeing a lot kind of 
like men in the middle phishing 

534
00:33:32,800 --> 00:33:37,600
websites where like you know the
phishing website asks you for 

535
00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:41,500
the the OTP code and then the 
fraudster goes and completes 

536
00:33:41,500 --> 00:33:45,300
that and let slightly more. 
Advanced attack would be a seem 

537
00:33:45,300 --> 00:33:51,000
swap which is becoming easier to
do now, with a seam and the fact

538
00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:55,000
that you don't need like a 
physical seem to, to pretend to 

539
00:33:55,000 --> 00:33:59,300
be, you know, to take over a 
different phone number. 

540
00:33:59,900 --> 00:34:04,600
So the the actual mobile 
operators are being a part or 

541
00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:08,900
being you know a step in the 
attack itself. 

542
00:34:09,400 --> 00:34:12,699
So we're seeing a lot of that 
typically yeah you hear a lot 

543
00:34:12,699 --> 00:34:17,199
about Out the evolving threat 
landscape and I think evolving 

544
00:34:17,400 --> 00:34:20,600
may or may not be the right 
word, but evolving to me is like

545
00:34:20,600 --> 00:34:25,699
it's not Revolution, right? 
There's not a whole different 

546
00:34:25,699 --> 00:34:29,800
set of you know, from year to 
year how these threats are 

547
00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:34,000
Manifesting, it's interesting. 
Every time you look at one of 

548
00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:37,100
these reports of, hey, let's 
recap the year. 

549
00:34:37,300 --> 00:34:39,100
The data breaches that have 
occurred. 

550
00:34:39,199 --> 00:34:41,699
It's fishing as social 
engineering. 

551
00:34:41,699 --> 00:34:47,000
It's like the most common 
denominator, and it's kind of 

552
00:34:47,000 --> 00:34:50,900
sad that it always kind of seems
to boil back to those those 

553
00:34:50,900 --> 00:34:53,699
Basics. 
But it's interesting because I 

554
00:34:53,707 --> 00:34:56,800
was thinking as you're talking, 
there's, you know, if we just 

555
00:34:56,800 --> 00:35:00,600
want to Super simplify it, 
there's really kind of two. 

556
00:35:00,700 --> 00:35:05,100
Types of actors. 
There's the single actor that 

557
00:35:05,100 --> 00:35:07,600
you talked about. 
That's how to be the harder one 

558
00:35:07,600 --> 00:35:10,400
to stop, right? 
Because now neither, they're 

559
00:35:10,400 --> 00:35:13,100
hitting it from a normal 
browser. 

560
00:35:13,300 --> 00:35:16,300
They've got a regular IP address
might be out, you know, that 

561
00:35:16,500 --> 00:35:22,800
they probably have some Shadow 
of Doubt behind them but they're

562
00:35:22,800 --> 00:35:25,900
probably harder to detect. 
The other type. 

563
00:35:25,900 --> 00:35:28,600
The other bucket is the 
campaign. 

564
00:35:29,100 --> 00:35:35,400
It's we just Downloaded 50,000 
accounts from the dark web and 

565
00:35:35,400 --> 00:35:40,600
now we're going to try to hammer
every website and you can do. 

566
00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:43,500
So they've really have a shadow 
behind them, right? 

567
00:35:43,600 --> 00:35:48,100
Maybe it's the same IP address, 
maybe it's a thousand login 

568
00:35:48,200 --> 00:35:52,900
attempts per minute. 
Talk to me a little bit about 

569
00:35:53,400 --> 00:35:56,400
those kind of scenarios because 
I think that that's what the 

570
00:35:56,400 --> 00:36:00,200
signaling is all about, right? 
It's identifying or detecting. 

571
00:36:00,200 --> 00:36:05,100
That That hey, this is a 
malicious actor or you know, a 

572
00:36:05,100 --> 00:36:10,900
campaign that's going on, right?
So you know it with campaigns. 

573
00:36:10,900 --> 00:36:16,300
If it all comes to automation, 
when you want to do something 

574
00:36:16,300 --> 00:36:18,800
like a thousand times ten 
thousand times sometimes 

575
00:36:18,800 --> 00:36:22,400
millions of times against a 
specific application or across 

576
00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:28,000
applications websites you need 
good Automation and you know the

577
00:36:28,000 --> 00:36:33,300
signals that you want to pee 
During the, you know, the 

578
00:36:33,300 --> 00:36:37,000
detection phase are all around 
automation. 

579
00:36:37,300 --> 00:36:42,500
So you mentioned, you know, 
frequency you mentioned, you 

580
00:36:42,500 --> 00:36:45,700
know, the ability to understand 
that, you know, perhaps they're 

581
00:36:45,700 --> 00:36:49,800
coming from the same IP address.
I would say that like, you know,

582
00:36:49,800 --> 00:36:53,900
they're much smarter today then,
you know, then then just at. 

583
00:36:53,900 --> 00:36:58,500
So like you know, these kind of 
like basic signals or not enough

584
00:36:58,500 --> 00:37:02,200
to take these campaigns. 
What you actually need to 

585
00:37:02,200 --> 00:37:06,800
understand is how automation 
tools work. 

586
00:37:07,600 --> 00:37:11,600
So you need to like, you know, 
map, the different automation 

587
00:37:11,600 --> 00:37:14,800
tools that are available to 
cybercriminals. 

588
00:37:15,300 --> 00:37:19,600
You need to research them, you 
need to figure out. 

589
00:37:20,000 --> 00:37:24,000
How do you identify the specific
behavior of each? 

590
00:37:24,000 --> 00:37:29,500
One of these tools and build 
kind of like, not the right, you

591
00:37:29,500 --> 00:37:33,800
know, the right, Detection 
capabilities for these. 

592
00:37:33,800 --> 00:37:37,900
So it involves, you know, if you
think about it, it involves two 

593
00:37:37,900 --> 00:37:40,200
parts. 
The first part is more around 

594
00:37:40,200 --> 00:37:43,600
threat intelligence. 
How do you keep up with the 

595
00:37:43,600 --> 00:37:48,400
sybers criminal community and 
everything they do because 

596
00:37:48,500 --> 00:37:52,500
almost none of them is lacking 
on making their own tools or 

597
00:37:52,500 --> 00:37:56,300
building their own optic 
Technologies, the whole reused 

598
00:37:56,300 --> 00:38:00,200
by from each other, and use kind
of like, you know, the same 

599
00:38:02,100 --> 00:38:05,500
Tools and, you know, so this 
would be the first. 

600
00:38:05,500 --> 00:38:10,000
The second is like, okay, we 
need to analyze all that and 

601
00:38:10,200 --> 00:38:15,500
build the right ability to build
the ability to detect these 

602
00:38:15,500 --> 00:38:19,800
signals as the tools are being 
used against, you know, a 

603
00:38:19,800 --> 00:38:22,900
specific application, specific 
website. 

604
00:38:23,100 --> 00:38:25,500
So, these are kind of like 
another two parts there. 

605
00:38:25,500 --> 00:38:31,900
So this is around, automation 
when goes to single, Attackers 

606
00:38:32,700 --> 00:38:38,100
it is much harder to do than 
just detecting automation but 

607
00:38:38,500 --> 00:38:44,500
again it involves a lot of 
understanding of how these cyber

608
00:38:44,500 --> 00:38:47,500
criminals out is fraudsters 
operate. 

609
00:38:47,500 --> 00:38:50,700
How they think? 
What are they going to look for?

610
00:38:50,700 --> 00:38:55,800
And which tools are going to use
and eventually the tactics that 

611
00:38:55,800 --> 00:38:58,200
they're using are very similar 
across. 

612
00:38:58,200 --> 00:39:00,500
Cyber criminals and Crosse, 
Regional. 

613
00:39:00,600 --> 00:39:04,000
Ins around the world. 
So you know once you once you 

614
00:39:04,008 --> 00:39:08,700
understand that and you know how
to build the kind of like the 

615
00:39:08,700 --> 00:39:12,300
ride detection mechanisms around
it what what are the things that

616
00:39:12,300 --> 00:39:15,600
you need to profile water than 
the things that would trigger an

617
00:39:15,600 --> 00:39:18,100
anomaly? 
How do you connect different 

618
00:39:18,100 --> 00:39:21,800
anomalies together and 
understand that there are part 

619
00:39:21,800 --> 00:39:26,900
of an actual attack as opposed 
to just you know, false false 

620
00:39:26,900 --> 00:39:32,100
positives then then you get a 
chance to You know, detect and 

621
00:39:32,100 --> 00:39:37,300
stop the the real attacks. 
Yeah, just observation that this

622
00:39:37,300 --> 00:39:39,100
is everything you just 
mentioned. 

623
00:39:40,900 --> 00:39:43,800
I'm sure all of our lists are 
thinking the same thing, which 

624
00:39:43,800 --> 00:39:48,100
is that, you know, this would 
for an individual company to 

625
00:39:48,100 --> 00:39:50,700
kind of build these capabilities
is threat intelligence. 

626
00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:56,600
It's just something that doesn't
make sense to try to build your 

627
00:39:56,600 --> 00:40:00,300
own, I think, you know, my early
days of it, that was the 

628
00:40:00,300 --> 00:40:02,300
question. 
Question like build versus by 

629
00:40:02,500 --> 00:40:04,900
today. 
It seems like you can bypass 

630
00:40:04,900 --> 00:40:07,400
that and go right to which one 
do we buy? 

631
00:40:07,700 --> 00:40:10,400
Because everything, you just 
laid out unless you are not even

632
00:40:10,400 --> 00:40:13,600
a tech company, to me. 
If you're a tech company, you 

633
00:40:13,600 --> 00:40:16,400
still need to buy, unless you 
want to become an authentication

634
00:40:16,400 --> 00:40:18,100
company. 
If you're an authentication 

635
00:40:18,100 --> 00:40:19,900
company, that made me spill 
versus by. 

636
00:40:19,900 --> 00:40:25,900
But, you know, to me this model 
of relying on, especially when 

637
00:40:25,900 --> 00:40:29,600
you're talking about the threat 
intelligence, the intelligence 

638
00:40:29,600 --> 00:40:33,600
is built. 
Across hundreds, or thousands of

639
00:40:33,600 --> 00:40:37,800
customers into, and seeing these
signals repeat themselves, and 

640
00:40:37,800 --> 00:40:42,200
building into the, you know, the
Borg of understanding of what a 

641
00:40:42,200 --> 00:40:45,000
what an attack looks like. 
Because it's like you said, it's

642
00:40:45,000 --> 00:40:46,800
not the basics. 
It's not. 

643
00:40:46,800 --> 00:40:50,400
Oh, you're just, you know, we're
getting 1,000 hits from one IP 

644
00:40:50,400 --> 00:40:54,600
address, obviously, that's how I
simplified it but it's that the 

645
00:40:54,600 --> 00:40:57,200
attackers already know that 
that's getting us knocked out. 

646
00:40:57,200 --> 00:41:00,500
So how do we get around that? 
You know, they're they're trying

647
00:41:00,500 --> 00:41:06,000
to To stay one step ahead, the 
authentication companies like 

648
00:41:06,000 --> 00:41:07,900
transmit. 
Try to stay one step ahead. 

649
00:41:07,900 --> 00:41:12,300
So it's a constant battle if 
you're not in that business. 

650
00:41:12,300 --> 00:41:14,300
Why would you want to be in that
business? 

651
00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:18,000
Yeah, exactly. 
And up look, it's a very big 

652
00:41:18,000 --> 00:41:20,100
operation like an offer 
transmit. 

653
00:41:20,100 --> 00:41:26,700
We have around 200 to close to 
250 people, you know, talents 

654
00:41:27,000 --> 00:41:30,600
that specialize in, you know, 
this type of attack. 

655
00:41:30,800 --> 00:41:33,400
Actors. 
And this is what they do all day

656
00:41:33,400 --> 00:41:35,800
long. 
So you look at a typical 

657
00:41:35,800 --> 00:41:38,400
organization, even a very large 
organization. 

658
00:41:38,400 --> 00:41:41,700
They, you know, they may have 
people who know how to do some 

659
00:41:41,700 --> 00:41:45,900
of this stuff, but you know, it 
doesn't scale to like, you know,

660
00:41:45,900 --> 00:41:48,600
hundreds of people, which is 
what they actually need to 

661
00:41:48,600 --> 00:41:50,900
provide in a very good 
protection. 

662
00:41:50,900 --> 00:41:55,200
So eventually you would see, 
even, you know, even even 

663
00:41:55,700 --> 00:42:01,000
Enterprises with a very good 
talent, they would go and you 

664
00:42:01,008 --> 00:42:06,000
know, by Technologies from 
companies like transmit that 

665
00:42:06,000 --> 00:42:11,800
specializing in fraud identity 
because this is something that 

666
00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:14,300
is very hard to to build 
yourself. 

667
00:42:14,500 --> 00:42:19,200
I like for example, other parts 
of, you know, identity such as 

668
00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:22,100
like know building a user store,
you know, you can build your 

669
00:42:22,100 --> 00:42:25,200
users or yourself or you can, 
you know, you can buy it. 

670
00:42:25,200 --> 00:42:28,000
It's really a question of 
what's, what is easier for you? 

671
00:42:28,000 --> 00:42:29,900
What is cheaper? 
What is faster? 

672
00:42:30,700 --> 00:42:35,900
In each one of the each customer
has their own kind of like 

673
00:42:36,100 --> 00:42:39,800
priorities around it. 
But when it comes to risk fraud,

674
00:42:39,800 --> 00:42:43,900
actual security Technologies, 
you know, it's very, very hard 

675
00:42:43,900 --> 00:42:47,700
to build it yourself and the 
other part that we're seeing 

676
00:42:47,700 --> 00:42:51,600
that is also kind of like 
similar to it is when it comes 

677
00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:59,500
to account opening in highly 
regulated markets such as the 

678
00:42:59,500 --> 00:43:02,500
financial Market, It. 
So you get a lot of light, you 

679
00:43:02,500 --> 00:43:06,600
know, document scanning and 
things like that, which are 

680
00:43:06,600 --> 00:43:10,700
really, you know, to prevent 
fraud account opening fraud 

681
00:43:10,900 --> 00:43:14,600
where someone is pretending to 
be like, you know, Jim were Jeff

682
00:43:14,600 --> 00:43:17,100
and trying to open an account on
your behalf. 

683
00:43:17,100 --> 00:43:18,800
Like this is a typical attack, 
right? 

684
00:43:18,800 --> 00:43:23,200
Like, Eye-Fi convince the bank 
that, you know, I'm Jim. 

685
00:43:23,700 --> 00:43:28,700
And they open an account for Jim
and then like, you know, I do 

686
00:43:28,700 --> 00:43:32,600
some basic stuff in the account 
and then, Take like a 60k loan 

687
00:43:33,000 --> 00:43:36,100
and I disappear. 
The bank is going to go after 

688
00:43:36,100 --> 00:43:40,100
Jim is not going to go out after
after me, right? 

689
00:43:40,100 --> 00:43:42,800
It's like so I'll even yeah it 
is. 

690
00:43:42,800 --> 00:43:46,000
So in the u.s. we, you know, the
big regulation is anti-money 

691
00:43:46,000 --> 00:43:48,700
laundering am L. 
The idea is like, okay, I'm 

692
00:43:48,700 --> 00:43:53,000
making cash through some illegal
business, and I'm laundering it 

693
00:43:53,000 --> 00:43:56,600
by trying to make it legal 
dollars at this point and put it

694
00:43:56,600 --> 00:43:59,800
into a bank account. 
So, you know, obviously, if you 

695
00:43:59,800 --> 00:44:02,800
take Dollars and run away. 
You make fifty thousand dollars.

696
00:44:02,800 --> 00:44:05,800
But if you're taking millions of
dollars of cash from no legal 

697
00:44:05,800 --> 00:44:10,200
operation and, you know, now 
making it legal by putting it, 

698
00:44:10,200 --> 00:44:12,900
into the system, paying taxes on
it, things like that. 

699
00:44:14,200 --> 00:44:18,100
Yeah, so definitely account 
opening is a major attack. 

700
00:44:18,900 --> 00:44:22,100
Yeah. 
And as a major attack like, you 

701
00:44:22,100 --> 00:44:26,200
know, that Victory, you need to 
like nav, very, very good skills

702
00:44:27,000 --> 00:44:30,500
in like your ability to actually
detect. 

703
00:44:30,700 --> 00:44:33,700
And, you know, detecting these 
attacks, involve a lot of 

704
00:44:33,700 --> 00:44:37,200
understanding or not. 
These fraudsters operate, how 

705
00:44:37,200 --> 00:44:41,300
they try to bypass the different
controls that the bank's put in 

706
00:44:41,300 --> 00:44:43,800
place? 
So, you know, this level of 

707
00:44:43,800 --> 00:44:47,600
expertise is is very, very hard 
to obtain. 

708
00:44:48,200 --> 00:44:51,100
When we talk about build versus 
by always go back to, you know, 

709
00:44:51,100 --> 00:44:52,700
a company. 
Like let's just pick something, 

710
00:44:52,700 --> 00:44:55,700
fictional hopefully Larry's Tire
Shop, Right? 

711
00:44:55,700 --> 00:45:00,300
Do you want to be in the 
business of creating risk fraud?

712
00:45:00,600 --> 00:45:04,400
Technologies, or do you want to 
focus on selling or, you know, 

713
00:45:04,700 --> 00:45:06,800
installing tires, right? 
Think that's, that's the 

714
00:45:06,800 --> 00:45:09,400
question. 
Take a lot of organizations they

715
00:45:09,400 --> 00:45:11,700
end up struggling with sometimes
is like, okay, well, they 

716
00:45:11,700 --> 00:45:13,800
started down this slippery slope
of identity because you're 

717
00:45:13,800 --> 00:45:15,400
totally right. 
You stolen my thunder was 

718
00:45:15,400 --> 00:45:16,300
thinking. 
Okay. 

719
00:45:16,300 --> 00:45:19,000
Well there are probably certain 
components of identity that are 

720
00:45:19,400 --> 00:45:22,200
I won't say easy. 
But relatively easy to do on 

721
00:45:22,200 --> 00:45:24,900
your own, you can stand up your 
own open ldap and create an 

722
00:45:24,900 --> 00:45:27,000
identity store. 
Maybe we could do some light 

723
00:45:27,000 --> 00:45:29,800
provisioning through Powershell 
and things like that, if you're,

724
00:45:29,800 --> 00:45:31,700
you know, an active directory. 
You're a sure, something like 

725
00:45:31,700 --> 00:45:33,800
that. 
But I think the further you go 

726
00:45:33,800 --> 00:45:37,600
to the right when it comes to 
maturity, things like, 

727
00:45:37,600 --> 00:45:43,600
intelligence risk, fraud signals
there is no way that you would 

728
00:45:43,600 --> 00:45:47,600
ever be able to compete against 
someone who does this day in day

729
00:45:47,600 --> 00:45:48,900
out. 
If you try to do it yourself, 

730
00:45:48,900 --> 00:45:51,000
even the largest companies in 
the world would struggle with 

731
00:45:51,000 --> 00:45:52,600
us. 
Imagine, I mean you're you're 

732
00:45:52,600 --> 00:45:54,600
you know, transmits working with
a bunch of Banks. 

733
00:45:55,000 --> 00:45:58,900
Banks typically have a lot of 
cyber security budget and 

734
00:45:58,900 --> 00:46:02,900
resources because you know, they
need to keep money secure and 

735
00:46:02,900 --> 00:46:05,300
safe and do the anti-money 
laundering. 

736
00:46:05,300 --> 00:46:07,000
Do the know your customer, 
right? 

737
00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:09,600
All that stuff to make sure that
things have the appropriate risk

738
00:46:09,600 --> 00:46:13,600
and protections around them. 
So, you know, I think about this

739
00:46:13,600 --> 00:46:15,300
from like, okay, well we're 
going to go off and do it. 

740
00:46:15,300 --> 00:46:19,000
Ourselves really is that really 
the business you want to be in 

741
00:46:19,000 --> 00:46:21,400
because I think you're being a 
little bit more. 

742
00:46:21,400 --> 00:46:23,800
You can chew. 
Nah, definitely something. 

743
00:46:23,800 --> 00:46:27,600
Not something that, you know, a 
lot of these, a lot of, you 

744
00:46:27,600 --> 00:46:30,900
know, the the organizations that
we're seeing at least or Trying 

745
00:46:30,900 --> 00:46:33,600
to do themselves. 
You know, some of them are not 

746
00:46:33,600 --> 00:46:36,200
trying to do this at all which 
is, which is okay. 

747
00:46:36,200 --> 00:46:40,700
It depends really on the level 
of risk and the attacks that 

748
00:46:40,700 --> 00:46:45,500
you're actually seeing, you 
know, from my 30-something years

749
00:46:45,500 --> 00:46:49,500
in in in the space. 
I know that which is really 

750
00:46:49,500 --> 00:46:53,000
funny like, you know, you know, 
that these attacks are going to 

751
00:46:53,000 --> 00:47:00,600
come but then like, you know, 
organizations really prefer to I

752
00:47:00,607 --> 00:47:06,900
first see the loss for CDI. 
You know, the problem first see 

753
00:47:06,900 --> 00:47:11,800
themselves bleeding before they 
actually, you know, by solution 

754
00:47:12,000 --> 00:47:14,600
and I remember and this goes 
back like, you know, 

755
00:47:14,600 --> 00:47:18,700
20-something years ago when I 
was the co-founder of a global 

756
00:47:18,700 --> 00:47:21,300
web application security 
company. 

757
00:47:21,900 --> 00:47:26,000
And, you know, we kind of like, 
you know, where the first to 

758
00:47:26,000 --> 00:47:29,100
introduce the web application 
firewall concept. 

759
00:47:29,300 --> 00:47:34,500
And one of the The first 
prospects we add was a bank and,

760
00:47:34,700 --> 00:47:37,500
you know, they knew like, you 
know, most of our customers back

761
00:47:37,500 --> 00:47:41,100
then knew nothing about, you 
know, application security web 

762
00:47:41,100 --> 00:47:46,100
application security. 
And what we did back then is to 

763
00:47:46,100 --> 00:47:49,600
do like penetration testing, 
application, Level penetration 

764
00:47:49,600 --> 00:47:52,500
testing to show them that a 
problem exists. 

765
00:47:52,500 --> 00:47:55,200
So they would buy, you know, our
solution. 

766
00:47:55,600 --> 00:47:59,100
So I remember this like, you 
know, One Bank in the US, you 

767
00:47:59,100 --> 00:48:04,400
know, it's it wasn't a all Bank 
was pretty like no big bang and 

768
00:48:04,400 --> 00:48:08,200
we went there and we'd like a 
penetration testing against the 

769
00:48:08,200 --> 00:48:11,800
online banking application and I
think it was like within like 

770
00:48:11,800 --> 00:48:15,200
one hour we're able to get to 
the entire database. 

771
00:48:15,200 --> 00:48:19,200
Love their customers and like, 
you know, do transactions on 

772
00:48:19,200 --> 00:48:25,300
behalf of customers and they're 
kind of like conclusion was. 

773
00:48:25,600 --> 00:48:28,400
Okay. 
So we got like a couple of bucks

774
00:48:28,400 --> 00:48:30,400
in the application will fix 
that. 

775
00:48:30,600 --> 00:48:33,300
Thank you. 
We don't need any other control.

776
00:48:34,400 --> 00:48:38,600
So you know, eventually 
obviously all the bank's today 

777
00:48:38,600 --> 00:48:42,000
have a web application firewall.
And this is kind of like you 

778
00:48:42,000 --> 00:48:46,700
know, part of the standard but 
just demonstrate that until they

779
00:48:46,700 --> 00:48:50,900
actually start bleeding and 
that's true for you know I guess

780
00:48:50,900 --> 00:48:54,400
everyone you don't go and just 
buy Solutions. 

781
00:48:55,200 --> 00:48:56,600
I think there's two types of 
people in the world. 

782
00:48:56,600 --> 00:48:59,700
There's the ones that they get a
cut and they go by a by a 

783
00:48:59,707 --> 00:49:02,100
bandage and then There's others 
who have just, you know a couple

784
00:49:02,100 --> 00:49:04,700
bandages laying around the house
in case they get cut. 

785
00:49:05,400 --> 00:49:09,200
All right I know we've been 
really pretty generous with your

786
00:49:09,200 --> 00:49:10,400
time. 
I want to ask a question about 

787
00:49:10,400 --> 00:49:13,100
password list because I feel 
like this is a question that 

788
00:49:13,100 --> 00:49:15,700
comes up every year. 
You know, is this the year that 

789
00:49:15,700 --> 00:49:18,500
the password eyes that's been I 
think something has been 

790
00:49:18,500 --> 00:49:20,300
happening for the last 10 years 
now. 

791
00:49:20,700 --> 00:49:22,800
And, you know, Jim you I think 
you kind of coin is one of our 

792
00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:25,300
previous episode this year is 
like, is this the decade that 

793
00:49:25,300 --> 00:49:29,700
passwords died because I feel 
like there is you know it's a 

794
00:49:29,700 --> 00:49:31,600
freight train. 
We're talking about really 

795
00:49:31,600 --> 00:49:36,300
changing the direction of one of
the core principles, or one of 

796
00:49:36,300 --> 00:49:38,500
the core things that drives sort
of security. 

797
00:49:38,500 --> 00:49:43,100
It's the password is this, is 
this the year password eyes? 

798
00:49:43,100 --> 00:49:46,100
Is this the decorated? 
Password dies is the century. 

799
00:49:46,100 --> 00:49:48,200
That's weird. 
Eyes, I guess, where do you feel

800
00:49:48,200 --> 00:49:53,600
like we are in that journey to 
eventually at some point get rid

801
00:49:53,600 --> 00:49:56,100
of the password. 
So I think, you know, we need 

802
00:49:56,100 --> 00:50:00,400
to, you know, split the question
into two different. 

803
00:50:00,500 --> 00:50:03,700
Current domains. 
The first one is Workforce and a

804
00:50:03,707 --> 00:50:07,500
second one is consumers. 
When it comes to Workforce. 

805
00:50:07,600 --> 00:50:12,300
I think like, you know, even 
though many of the projects that

806
00:50:12,300 --> 00:50:16,700
we've seen last year for 
password less were in Workforce 

807
00:50:17,600 --> 00:50:22,000
or for the workforce, I think 
that it's going to take a while 

808
00:50:22,100 --> 00:50:27,600
until we see the password die, 
you know, in these environments 

809
00:50:27,600 --> 00:50:30,100
and the reason is Legacy 
systems. 

810
00:50:30,600 --> 00:50:33,600
Well, we got a lot of Legacy 
systems in these environments 

811
00:50:33,600 --> 00:50:36,300
that should do when it comes to 
large Enterprises. 

812
00:50:36,800 --> 00:50:41,400
And you know, you go to large 
Enterprise, and, and amount of 

813
00:50:41,600 --> 00:50:48,800
systems they have that are like,
no, probably 15, 20 years old, 

814
00:50:49,400 --> 00:50:53,300
you know, it's like, you know, 
it's huge huge and you know, 

815
00:50:53,300 --> 00:50:58,500
these systems do not support any
password less capabilities and 

816
00:50:58,500 --> 00:51:00,200
they will not support any 
Casper. 

817
00:51:00,200 --> 00:51:02,800
Let's Capabilities, like I still
have like, you know, 

818
00:51:03,000 --> 00:51:07,300
organizations with as400 and 
obviously main friends. 

819
00:51:07,300 --> 00:51:10,200
And so it's going to take a 
while. 

820
00:51:10,200 --> 00:51:14,500
You'll see, you'll see a mix of 
systems where you can go, you 

821
00:51:14,500 --> 00:51:17,500
know, passing that's definitely 
all these SAS applications. 

822
00:51:17,500 --> 00:51:21,200
Everything that is in the cloud 
relatively easy to go password 

823
00:51:21,200 --> 00:51:23,000
this. 
But, you know, a lot of the on 

824
00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:26,200
Prime stuff. 
Just, you know, it's not going 

825
00:51:26,200 --> 00:51:34,000
to go away that that fast on the
Consumer side actually on Mom, 

826
00:51:34,100 --> 00:51:39,800
you know, much more positive 
that we can get rid of passwords

827
00:51:39,800 --> 00:51:44,200
relatively faster. 
And the reason is the, you know,

828
00:51:44,200 --> 00:51:49,700
first the Readiness of the the 
protocols the support that we're

829
00:51:49,700 --> 00:51:53,100
getting as an industry from 
Apple. 

830
00:51:53,100 --> 00:51:56,800
Google and Microsoft with task 
keys and you know the 

831
00:51:56,800 --> 00:52:00,000
technologies that they're 
building into the operating 

832
00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:05,600
system Eames and the browsers 
and the fact that most of the 

833
00:52:05,600 --> 00:52:10,400
endpoint devices, whether these 
are mobile devices that desktops

834
00:52:10,400 --> 00:52:16,100
are now coming with support for 
device Biometrics, whether its 

835
00:52:16,100 --> 00:52:20,100
face recognition fingerprint 
scanning like this support, all 

836
00:52:20,100 --> 00:52:23,500
that. 
So you know, and they support 

837
00:52:23,500 --> 00:52:28,800
all that for the past few years.
So I'm you know, I'm much more 

838
00:52:28,800 --> 00:52:31,800
bullish about that. 
I I think that organizations 

839
00:52:31,800 --> 00:52:41,200
that want to go password Less on
now to do this in 2023 and we'll

840
00:52:41,200 --> 00:52:44,000
start seeing like, you know 
what, eventually it will be 

841
00:52:44,000 --> 00:52:48,400
like, you know, you don't want 
to stay behind, right? 

842
00:52:48,400 --> 00:52:51,200
It's like you don't want your 
customers to stand with 

843
00:52:51,200 --> 00:52:54,900
passwords when all the other 
organizations are offering 

844
00:52:54,900 --> 00:52:58,800
Castle these Technologies. 
So for example like you know, 

845
00:52:58,800 --> 00:53:04,000
City Bank, which is A customer 
of ours or not in a very big 

846
00:53:04,000 --> 00:53:10,700
project to deploy password list 
technology to like, you know, 

847
00:53:10,700 --> 00:53:15,600
200 and users across the across 
the globe and we're seeing quite

848
00:53:15,600 --> 00:53:19,800
a few large institutions, doing 
odds doing the same. 

849
00:53:19,800 --> 00:53:24,400
So I think that Mike, you know, 
second half of the year, we'll 

850
00:53:24,400 --> 00:53:26,800
see many more projects around 
Castle. 

851
00:53:26,800 --> 00:53:31,400
Des, I think that a lot of the 
organization's It to plan for 

852
00:53:31,400 --> 00:53:34,300
Paso. 
Robles last year continued to 

853
00:53:34,300 --> 00:53:37,600
plan for password less this 
year, second half of the Year. 

854
00:53:37,600 --> 00:53:42,100
Beginning of next year are going
to be will see a very big move 

855
00:53:42,100 --> 00:53:44,300
toward Castle desk on the 
consumer side. 

856
00:53:45,000 --> 00:53:47,800
Okay, so you heard it here 
first, the password eyes, / 

857
00:53:47,800 --> 00:53:51,500
Mickey would I let no later than
2020 for. 

858
00:53:51,500 --> 00:53:52,600
So we're going to hold you to 
that. 

859
00:53:55,000 --> 00:53:57,900
I can tell that we're getting 
short on time because your 

860
00:53:57,900 --> 00:54:00,900
background is getting slowly and
slowly darker as the sun, Sets 

861
00:54:01,600 --> 00:54:04,100
over Israel Sky there, which is 
very cool. 

862
00:54:04,700 --> 00:54:08,300
I want to end on a lighter note,
we were kind of talking before 

863
00:54:08,300 --> 00:54:12,200
we hit record about. 
I think our love of travel and 

864
00:54:12,200 --> 00:54:15,000
restaurants and food sort of 
around the world and things like

865
00:54:15,000 --> 00:54:16,800
that is. 
It's one of the things I think 

866
00:54:16,800 --> 00:54:19,600
all three of us look forward to 
after a long day especially 

867
00:54:19,600 --> 00:54:25,900
after travel and I want to ask 
each of you give me us like a 

868
00:54:25,900 --> 00:54:30,300
small town restaurant or meal or
some other. 

869
00:54:30,500 --> 00:54:35,200
Sort of, you know, similar sort 
of activity like that, that you 

870
00:54:35,200 --> 00:54:38,300
just really enjoyed or 
conversely. 

871
00:54:38,300 --> 00:54:41,100
If you have a really memorable, 
one that you just did not enjoy,

872
00:54:41,400 --> 00:54:43,800
because I think that's one of 
the things that really 

873
00:54:43,800 --> 00:54:46,400
fascinates me specifically about
travel is being able to visit 

874
00:54:46,400 --> 00:54:49,200
all these different places. 
And, you know, I remember my 

875
00:54:49,200 --> 00:54:52,500
first trip to New York City and 
it was like, you mean, there's 

876
00:54:52,500 --> 00:54:55,000
like this Deli, like every other
block and there's like this 

877
00:54:55,000 --> 00:54:57,800
amazing food in there and it was
like nothing high-end but which 

878
00:54:57,800 --> 00:55:01,800
is good stuff. 
That's not my example, but I'll 

879
00:55:01,800 --> 00:55:03,600
start with you Mickey. 
Like, do you have an example 

880
00:55:03,600 --> 00:55:05,800
like a surreal? 
Get small town restaurant, 

881
00:55:05,800 --> 00:55:07,400
something, maybe something local
to you or something. 

882
00:55:07,400 --> 00:55:08,800
You've encountered in your 
travels. 

883
00:55:09,300 --> 00:55:12,300
Wow, you mentioned travel. 
And, you know, I've been 

884
00:55:12,300 --> 00:55:15,100
traveling a lot for the past 
like, and I don't know, like, 

885
00:55:15,100 --> 00:55:20,700
20, something years and you 
know, many of my troops were to,

886
00:55:21,500 --> 00:55:24,800
to do not Estates. 
And it's pretty, it's pretty 

887
00:55:24,800 --> 00:55:28,400
long flight from Tel Aviv to 
sell these to New York is about,

888
00:55:28,400 --> 00:55:30,300
you know, between 10 and 12 
hours. 

889
00:55:31,600 --> 00:55:36,400
So typically you get, you know, 
you get or either late at night 

890
00:55:36,400 --> 00:55:41,800
or very early in the morning and
I remember liking a couple of 

891
00:55:41,800 --> 00:55:43,600
times. 
So first of all like you know 

892
00:55:43,600 --> 00:55:49,300
for for perhaps a day kid every 
time I got into the state's, I 

893
00:55:49,300 --> 00:55:52,400
was like you know the first 
thing I was doing I did was to 

894
00:55:52,400 --> 00:55:56,800
go and get a burger because like
you know, back then the burgers 

895
00:55:56,800 --> 00:56:01,500
were so much better than the one
that we had in the Israel, you 

896
00:56:01,500 --> 00:56:04,900
know, now we're alike. 
I think like, you know, we're 

897
00:56:04,900 --> 00:56:08,400
very good at it as well. 
But, you know, I remember this 

898
00:56:08,400 --> 00:56:16,200
like, you know, one time that I 
landed in Newark and I stayed at

899
00:56:16,200 --> 00:56:21,800
your hotel at one of the hotels 
in the in the airport it was 

900
00:56:21,800 --> 00:56:23,600
like a pretty shitty hotel 
rights. 

901
00:56:23,600 --> 00:56:28,400
Like you know, something that 
you know I would not do right 

902
00:56:28,400 --> 00:56:33,900
now but back then You know, I 
was on a very tight budget and I

903
00:56:33,900 --> 00:56:38,800
said, that'll tell and I went to
like the until bar and I ordered

904
00:56:38,800 --> 00:56:44,200
a burger and it was I don't know
why it was the best burger I had

905
00:56:44,200 --> 00:56:46,700
in my entire life. 
Really. 

906
00:56:46,700 --> 00:56:50,700
And then I am still a story 
that, you know, this one is from

907
00:56:50,700 --> 00:56:55,400
the Bay Area and you know, very 
similar like shitty hotel. 

908
00:56:56,200 --> 00:56:58,800
And I remember like, you know 
being like you know it was you 

909
00:56:58,800 --> 00:57:03,300
just tell that probably You 
know, probably like a got a room

910
00:57:03,300 --> 00:57:05,800
there for. 
I don't know like, 60 bucks and 

911
00:57:05,808 --> 00:57:10,700
night and, you know, went to, 
you know, went to the bar in the

912
00:57:10,700 --> 00:57:16,400
evening and I ordered soup. 
And this was like, you know, the

913
00:57:16,400 --> 00:57:21,300
best soup, add my entire life. 
And I don't know why. 

914
00:57:21,300 --> 00:57:25,500
But, you know, these are two 
things that I remember for like,

915
00:57:25,500 --> 00:57:28,100
in a war than 20 years now. 
Jim, hi yourself. 

916
00:57:28,100 --> 00:57:30,500
We got some memorable meals. 
Yeah, I mean it. 

917
00:57:30,600 --> 00:57:33,500
It's it's along the same lines 
as Mickey, right? 

918
00:57:33,500 --> 00:57:38,500
Like When you start are still 
talking about a meal that you 

919
00:57:38,500 --> 00:57:45,200
had years ago or Mickey's case 
decades ago, it deserves 

920
00:57:45,200 --> 00:57:47,800
mention. 
So there's a restaurant in the 

921
00:57:47,800 --> 00:57:51,300
Caesars like this is not like 
hey, this is a quarter place and

922
00:57:51,600 --> 00:57:55,700
you can spend 20 bucks and get a
good meal know, this is hundred 

923
00:57:55,700 --> 00:57:59,700
dollar plus steaks, but the 
stakes are so good. 

924
00:57:59,700 --> 00:58:02,100
So Old Homestead in Caesars 
Palace. 

925
00:58:02,100 --> 00:58:04,600
So if you're going to Will 
Gardner you, so always Hold 

926
00:58:04,600 --> 00:58:07,300
their conferences there. 
So I've been to Caesars a bunch 

927
00:58:07,300 --> 00:58:09,800
of times. 
Anyway, this you were there with

928
00:58:09,800 --> 00:58:11,700
me Jeff. 
I sure wise in that, yeah, that 

929
00:58:11,700 --> 00:58:15,800
Wagyu steak was just ma perfect.
Yeah. 

930
00:58:15,800 --> 00:58:19,900
And like it's like 120 bucks for
a steak and they come out and 

931
00:58:19,900 --> 00:58:22,200
it's a plate with a piece of 
meat on it. 

932
00:58:22,300 --> 00:58:24,700
Nothing else, right? 
It's taking up late at stake in 

933
00:58:24,700 --> 00:58:27,900
a plate and but boy was it worth
every penny? 

934
00:58:28,800 --> 00:58:30,100
Yeah. 
That was that was a darn good 

935
00:58:30,100 --> 00:58:33,200
meal and I think it was. 
Yeah I think it's it's not just 

936
00:58:33,200 --> 00:58:35,100
the food. 
It's usually the Ambiance is 

937
00:58:35,100 --> 00:58:36,400
everything kind of goes around 
it. 

938
00:58:36,400 --> 00:58:39,700
That sort of forms, that memory.
And I've got a few. 

939
00:58:39,900 --> 00:58:42,000
I'm thinking of another meal. 
It seems like there's a theme 

940
00:58:42,000 --> 00:58:43,800
like Jim and I had that great 
steak. 

941
00:58:44,300 --> 00:58:47,300
We went to a restaurant called, 
fang in San Francisco. 

942
00:58:47,300 --> 00:58:50,800
It's a Chinese place next to 
Moscow. 

943
00:58:50,800 --> 00:58:53,600
Nice enter. 
And I don't know what it was, 

944
00:58:53,600 --> 00:58:56,600
but that was just a darn good 
food, man. 

945
00:58:56,700 --> 00:58:58,000
I mean, they come out with the 
fried rice. 

946
00:58:58,000 --> 00:59:01,600
They do the whole like swirling 
scrambled egg, right there at 

947
00:59:01,600 --> 00:59:03,900
the, at the table. 
I mean, the whole place. 

948
00:59:04,400 --> 00:59:07,100
Stunk. 
Oh yeah, it was like, oh, we 

949
00:59:07,100 --> 00:59:09,800
couldn't like see or breathe but
the food was really, really 

950
00:59:09,800 --> 00:59:13,100
good. 
Yeah, that what it was was that 

951
00:59:13,100 --> 00:59:16,500
scrambled egg mixture that they 
put down has some kind of pepper

952
00:59:16,500 --> 00:59:20,600
sauce in it and when it heats 
up, it's like tear gas. 

953
00:59:20,800 --> 00:59:22,000
Yep. 
I've used to better link to 

954
00:59:22,000 --> 00:59:25,200
holds the whole restaurant 
starts coughing, anytime someone

955
00:59:25,200 --> 00:59:28,600
rotors fried rice because it's 
like tear gas throughout the 

956
00:59:28,600 --> 00:59:31,300
place. 
So yeah, really strange, but 

957
00:59:31,300 --> 00:59:32,800
excellent food. 
Yeah. 

958
00:59:32,900 --> 00:59:34,100
And everybody orders it because 
it's okay. 

959
00:59:34,300 --> 00:59:38,100
One of the one of the I guess 
the other Specialties, you know,

960
00:59:38,100 --> 00:59:40,500
the other one I was thinking 
about was this is not I my I 

961
00:59:40,500 --> 00:59:43,400
guess this is travel but not 
like exotic. 

962
00:59:43,600 --> 00:59:46,100
I actually had to go into 
Charlotte North Carolina and not

963
00:59:46,100 --> 00:59:51,200
too long ago, to work on some 
stuff and I found this tiny 

964
00:59:51,200 --> 00:59:53,900
little barbecue place and like 
this strip mall, it's called The

965
00:59:53,900 --> 00:59:56,800
Q Shack. 
It's like on the Southeast side,

966
00:59:56,800 --> 00:59:59,300
kind of like past Matthews area 
for people who are familiar with

967
00:59:59,300 --> 01:00:02,000
it, and this is just the place 
that just doesn't look anything 

968
01:00:02,000 --> 01:00:04,200
like special, but I tell you, it
might be. 

969
01:00:04,400 --> 01:00:10,000
The best barbecue I've ever had.
I mean it was fantastic and I'm 

970
01:00:10,000 --> 01:00:13,400
planning on going in there. 
Thursday, have to go back to 

971
01:00:13,400 --> 01:00:16,400
Charlotte this week so it's just
one of those little things that 

972
01:00:16,400 --> 01:00:18,200
kind of popped up and I was 
like, oh yeah, we'll just try 

973
01:00:18,200 --> 01:00:21,200
it, you know, kind of there with
my wife and we walked out like 

974
01:00:21,200 --> 01:00:24,500
super impressed and it was just,
you know, it just a regular day 

975
01:00:24,500 --> 01:00:27,800
is like, okay, that was really 
good stuff. 

976
01:00:27,800 --> 01:00:31,000
So did you put her did you put a
review on Yelp or anything? 

977
01:00:31,300 --> 01:00:35,100
I did, you know, five stars and 
so, Is like, this is this is 

978
01:00:35,100 --> 01:00:38,400
darn good stuff, man. 
I've another story which is kind

979
01:00:38,400 --> 01:00:42,000
of like another the opposite, 
which I think was like, also, 

980
01:00:42,000 --> 01:00:46,900
like, not probably 15 years ago 
Scottsdale Arizona, I was during

981
01:00:46,900 --> 01:00:52,800
a conference and then like no 
one of my cells guys told me 

982
01:00:52,800 --> 01:00:55,700
like live, there is, you know, 
really, really good. 

983
01:00:56,300 --> 01:01:00,000
Mexican restaurant. 
It's just like an old 30 minutes

984
01:01:00,000 --> 01:01:03,700
drive for me or let's go. 
You have to go and we went to 

985
01:01:03,700 --> 01:01:06,200
this place. 
Lace and this was like, you 

986
01:01:06,200 --> 01:01:10,600
know, hardcore Mexican 
restaurant like you know only 

987
01:01:10,600 --> 01:01:15,300
Mexicans there and you know, 
they're like okay we can serve 

988
01:01:15,300 --> 01:01:19,900
you these poor very, very hot. 
What do you prefer? 

989
01:01:19,900 --> 01:01:24,400
I was like you know, The least 
hot that you can make that's 

990
01:01:24,400 --> 01:01:28,600
good for me and I couldn't take 
more than two steps, right? 

991
01:01:28,600 --> 01:01:34,100
It's like it was, it was so hot.
Like, you know, I was starting 

992
01:01:34,100 --> 01:01:38,900
to sweat from places that I 
didn't even exist and, you know,

993
01:01:38,900 --> 01:01:43,400
people were looking at me and I 
was like, okay, what do I do 

994
01:01:43,400 --> 01:01:47,400
now? 
You know, I can still imagine 

995
01:01:47,400 --> 01:01:51,800
that like even 15 years later, 
it's like was Horrible. 

996
01:01:52,300 --> 01:01:53,200
Yeah. 
You know if here it's hot 

997
01:01:53,200 --> 01:01:54,600
interior seats. 
Wet. 

998
01:01:56,500 --> 01:01:57,400
I Rise. 
We are. 

999
01:01:57,400 --> 01:01:59,600
I mean II could go out a couple 
different things but I had a 

1000
01:01:59,607 --> 01:02:01,500
chicken sandwich. 
We went out for burgers in 

1001
01:02:01,500 --> 01:02:05,300
Chennai about 10 years ago with 
a team as working with out there

1002
01:02:05,700 --> 01:02:10,300
and you know, I wasn't thinking 
at the time and their burger 

1003
01:02:10,300 --> 01:02:12,900
means chicken sandwich is like, 
okay, that's fine, right? 

1004
01:02:13,000 --> 01:02:13,500
No. 
Big deal. 

1005
01:02:13,800 --> 01:02:17,900
And this might be, it might have
been liquid lava, that was I 

1006
01:02:17,900 --> 01:02:20,400
took like one bite and I was 
trying to be respectful and 

1007
01:02:20,400 --> 01:02:23,400
polite so way that Mike I'm 
really sorry, but if I eat this,

1008
01:02:23,400 --> 01:02:27,800
I will die. 
Well, the funny thing is we were

1009
01:02:27,800 --> 01:02:32,000
in Nashville recently, and now 
everything is like, Nashville 

1010
01:02:32,000 --> 01:02:34,200
chicken. 
And you get National chicken 

1011
01:02:34,200 --> 01:02:35,800
anywhere in the United States. 
Yeah. 

1012
01:02:35,800 --> 01:02:38,900
The higher the day I was in the 
freezer section at the grocery 

1013
01:02:38,900 --> 01:02:41,400
store and it was Nashville style
shrimp. 

1014
01:02:41,400 --> 01:02:44,600
I was like I think you made that
up anyway. 

1015
01:02:44,900 --> 01:02:49,100
You love Hattie B's which is 
like the national chicken spot. 

1016
01:02:49,200 --> 01:02:50,300
I like it. 
Yeah, it's good. 

1017
01:02:50,300 --> 01:02:52,800
Yeah. 
But you You get you don't get 

1018
01:02:52,800 --> 01:02:57,000
him National. 
Yeah you know chickens good. 

1019
01:02:57,100 --> 01:03:00,300
I don't like super spicy. 
There's a difference between 

1020
01:03:00,300 --> 01:03:04,100
spicy good and spicy just for 
the experience like I want 

1021
01:03:04,100 --> 01:03:08,800
flavor it's is almost like that 
show that hot ones on YouTube 

1022
01:03:08,800 --> 01:03:11,700
which has gotten over you know 
famous over the last several 

1023
01:03:11,700 --> 01:03:14,200
years like there is a difference
between yeah that's a little bit

1024
01:03:14,200 --> 01:03:16,200
of spice. 
It amplifies and helps the 

1025
01:03:16,200 --> 01:03:20,500
flavor versus this is a trial 
that I must pass to become a 

1026
01:03:20,500 --> 01:03:23,500
warrior. 
Of spice or whatever it may be, 

1027
01:03:23,500 --> 01:03:25,100
right? 
Like, I'm not a fan. 

1028
01:03:25,300 --> 01:03:27,100
Like, I'm not interested 
becoming a warrior spice. 

1029
01:03:27,100 --> 01:03:30,900
I want delicious flavorful food 
and I feel like there's a lot of

1030
01:03:30,908 --> 01:03:33,000
places when they do the hot 
chicken is they just throw spice

1031
01:03:33,000 --> 01:03:35,100
at it just to make it hot and 
there's no flavor to it. 

1032
01:03:35,100 --> 01:03:38,400
It's just hot for hot sake 
rather than trying to actually 

1033
01:03:38,400 --> 01:03:41,900
have a flavor, which bugs me. 
Yeah. 

1034
01:03:42,200 --> 01:03:44,000
That's myself box. 
I'm going to see you. 

1035
01:03:45,200 --> 01:03:47,700
All right. 
It is now dark outside of 

1036
01:03:47,700 --> 01:03:50,600
Mickey's window so we're going 
to let him go make it really 

1037
01:03:50,600 --> 01:03:52,600
appreciate the time that you 
spent with us here. 

1038
01:03:52,600 --> 01:03:54,900
Today we're going to have a 
whole bunch of links in the show

1039
01:03:54,900 --> 01:03:57,200
notes, you know, to connect with
Mickey on LinkedIn. 

1040
01:03:57,200 --> 01:03:59,100
If you've got questions 
concerns, or if you want to, 

1041
01:03:59,100 --> 01:04:03,600
maybe share a good or bad meal 
that you've had, we'll have a 

1042
01:04:03,607 --> 01:04:05,500
link to transmit security as 
well. 

1043
01:04:06,800 --> 01:04:08,500
We'll go ahead and wrap things 
up for this week. 

1044
01:04:08,500 --> 01:04:11,500
You find us on the web idac. 
Test.com. 

1045
01:04:11,500 --> 01:04:14,100
We're on Twitter at idea. 
See podcasts. 

1046
01:04:14,300 --> 01:04:18,500
We're on Mastodon at. 
Idac podcast at infosec that 

1047
01:04:18,500 --> 01:04:22,800
exchange mastodons. 
Got to get way easier to take 

1048
01:04:22,800 --> 01:04:26,800
off Jim and I are on LinkedIn 
and don't forget to subscribe 

1049
01:04:26,800 --> 01:04:29,600
and and you know like the 
episodes and stuff like that 

1050
01:04:29,600 --> 01:04:31,200
that way, you know, when new 
ones are coming out. 

1051
01:04:31,200 --> 01:04:34,500
So Mickey, thank you so much for
your time and we'll talk with 

1052
01:04:34,500 --> 01:04:36,800
you all in the next one. 
Thank you. 

1053
01:04:36,800 --> 01:04:40,300
Just thank you, Jim. 
I'm going to get some dinner 

1054
01:04:40,300 --> 01:04:44,500
right now. 
So I got really angry right on. 

1055
01:04:44,500 --> 01:04:50,200
Take care of. 
Thanks for listening to the 

1056
01:04:50,200 --> 01:04:53,000
identity at the center podcast. 
If you like what you heard, 

1057
01:04:53,000 --> 01:04:56,300
don't forget to subscribe and 
visit us on the web and identity

1058
01:04:56,300 --> 01:04:57,200
at the center.com.