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This is identity at the center. 
If it has anything to do with I 

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am this is the go-to podcast. 
Now your host Jim McDonald and 

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Jeff Stedman Welcome to the 
identity of the sender podcast. 

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I'm Jeff. 
And that's Jim. 

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Hey, Jim. 
Hey, Jeff, how are you? 

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Oh, not too bad yourself. 
I'm doing fantastic man, and 

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I've survived last night 
tonight. 

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We've got karaoke, are you 
ready? 

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Well, i'mi'm? 
Ready? 

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Because I'm just gonna be 
sitting there watching. 

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Yeah, well, I have to make sure 
that I don't end up as horse at 

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the end of today, doing a lot of
recording you over here at 

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identify worse. 
And by the way, you know, we're 

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doing this Nostradamus week 
idea. 

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I think it's been going really 
well. 

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What do you think? 
Yeah, I've got some good. 

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Predictions. 
We've had some great guests. 

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We've got another one. 
Today we'll get to in a second. 

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It's interesting to see identify
worse this year, a ice there 

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decentralized identity. 
It seems like all the future 

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stuff is starting to become more
prevalent as topics within 

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things but there's a lot of new 
speakers to like that. 

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People just haven't seen before 
which has been pretty cool. 

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So I'm digging that. 
Yeah you know I think 

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everybody's like real open and 
networking here as well. 

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So all those new speakers there 
Like we're talking about before.

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Like you, you can learn so much 
from these individuals who are 

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out there in the real world. 
Just like our listeners 

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implementing identity and access
management Technologies, and 

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they just have so much knowledge
to share. 

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And I think what's great about 
our industry is that people are 

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so willing to share that that 
knowledge. 

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Yes definitely. 
That is like one of my 

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highlights for sure. 
I think I mentioned that in our 

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conversation, we talked about 
Andre Durand yesterday. 

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I think I came up during that 
So, yeah, yeah, it's good times.

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Yeah, and by the way, I didn't 
point this out, but he was one 

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of the few people who said, I 
chose identity. 

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Yeah, he absolutely did. 
It's a rare bird. 

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But yeah. 
Well it's just also to think 

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about like, you know, paying 
idea in the size of PID and he's

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like talking about like his 
first day was just him as in 

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boxes. 
Empty and he had no emails that 

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you know I just picture that my 
head. 

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I'm like that is absolutely 
insane. 

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It's funny. 
You know, everyone talks about 

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Inbox zero, and you're crazy 
inbox and stuff like that and 

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some people thrive on that and 
some people like, oh my gosh, I 

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have way too many emails when 
you're gonna get done. 

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It's interesting that see the 
dichotomy between the two. 

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It's like people who keep a 
clean inbox or have nothing 

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versus an inbox is just 
jam-packed with stuff. 

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Yeah, so I had a client, I won't
identify who it was, but he had 

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gotten so far behind on his 
email that he quote, unquote, 

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declared email bankruptcy. 
So that meant if you emailed me 

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and you're expecting your 
Response. 

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You will not be getting a 
response from that email. 

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So you need to email me again. 
It's like the big reset button. 

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It's a big reset. 
Yeah, kind of wish you could do 

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that for few different things. 
All right. 

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Why don't we get to our guest 
for today? 

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She's very, very gracious to 
gift us. 

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Some of her time. 
She is Gallaher Lansky. 

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She's the co-founder and chief 
product officer at plain' ID. 

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Welcome to the show. 
Go. 

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Thank you, thank you for having 
me here. 

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Yes, you're all the way coming 
from Tel Aviv Israel. 

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Yes, I were suffering. 
Various versions of jet. 

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Lag. 
Yours is probably little bit 

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worse than mine it at this 
point, but this is the first 

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time you've been on the show and
we like to learn more about 

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about identity origin stories. 
I actually met you several years

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ago, I think when playing Eddie 
was just kind of starting out 

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and it seems like you guys have 
grown quite a bit since then. 

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Yes, we have. 
So this is a conversation that's

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definitely worth worth having 
and has been probably long 

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overdue before we get to that, 
though. 

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How did you get into the 
identity and access management 

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space? 
Is it something that you You 

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chose or did it Choose You? 
Well I think it shows me 

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actually I you know, I started 
studying physics, not even 

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computer science. 
I did combine it a bit with 

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computer science but once I, you
know, in Israel does the 

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military service that we are 
doing right after that. 

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I started working for a company 
called mem Co not sure if are, 

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you know, when core but it was 
one of the first cyber security 

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companies in Well, and they 
invented single sign-on. 

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So maybe, you know, some of the 
other names of that product such

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as proxy, mices. 
So control is say, and so on. 

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So that's how I started my. 
I am Journey after that, I 

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joined cyber log, which you 
probably all know, right? 

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So again and identity company 
and form, they'll that was my 

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primary focus security, identity
and access management and now 

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plane Eid. 
So for those who aren't familiar

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with plain' ID, the 
authorization company I believe,

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tell us about it. 
Give us like what's the 32nd? 

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62nd hallway? 
Identifiers pitch if somebody's 

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like, oh, what have I done? 
You know, what is what is plain?

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I do put in a dee doo. 
Yeah. 

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So, plain idea is, there's 
always action company or thighs,

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ation is connecting identities 
to digital assets, right? 

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We enable organizations to 
manage to control Ortho ization 

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policies in a Assistant way a 
centralized way and enforce dose

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of the relation policies in the 
different Technologies which 

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organizations have today whether
those are applications apis, 

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Michael services, and data, so 
that the 30 seconds about of the

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relations, but we are going to 
talk more about that, right? 

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Yeah. 
We're going to get into P back a

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back, our back, all the backs, 
I'm sure authorizations are 

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really hard to do cross 
application cross. 

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Loud. 
I'd love to get a little more 

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about how you kind of approach 
that before we get to that. 

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We were kind of talking a little
bit before we hit record here 

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around introductions and say, 
okay, we've got gal, she's the, 

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You Know, Chief product officer,
but you're also do CTO work as 

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well. 
And you kind of had this 

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interesting spin, which I 
totally like get. 

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It makes, though it makes sense.
I was originally going to 

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introduce you as CT o /c p 0 
product officer, no privacy 

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C-3PO. 
Yes, a very, but she had this 

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interesting response. 
Why did you ask, why do we 

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settle on the introduction of 
Chief product officer and that 

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both? 
Yeah. 

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So I believe that Paul actually 
did technology and not the other

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way around. 
Eventually we are building 

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products for our customers. 
We are not throwing technology 

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on them that they can't really 
use. 

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And that's why. 
I believe product should be the 

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primary focus product should be 
using the technology options. 

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Which are available to the best 
way it is. 

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It is possible and not the other
way around. 

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You can just get in love with 
technology and then try to turn 

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it into a product. 
I think it should be the other 

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way around because sometimes you
need to choose other 

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technologies that can better 
fit. 

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What your customers are actually
asking, I love that connection 

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between customer requirements. 
Customer needs to the technology

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that can address them in the 
best way. 

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So, Give a standing ovation. 
I would because I love the idea 

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of identity as a product, even 
if even if you are a product 

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company even within an 
organization identity, is a 

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product that you're serving to 
your constituents employees 

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vendors, consumers, whatever it 
may be. 

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So yeah, I don't have my son 
works here but standing 

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Applause. 
I like that concept, Jeff. 

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I mean, you're putting together 
product and if nobody's buying 

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it, that ought to be an 
indication that it doesn't have 

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a lot of value or something's 
wrong, right? 

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They, it could be value. 
Could be awareness, maybe you've

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got Got wrong assumptions but 
yeah, nobody builds something 

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and hopes, it doesn't get used 
except maybe Disaster Recovery. 

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It's kind of a weird way but 
yeah. 

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Right. 
I get where you're going with 

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it. 
Yeah, so so gal, you're the 

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co-founder of plain' ID and you 
talked a lot about P back. 

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Can you give us an overview of 
what P back is? 

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Yes, I'm going to start with 
what provoked is not be work, is

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not marketing, just marketing. 
You know, some people might 

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argue but I do want to emphasize
It hasn't been development. 

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In that phase p Bach is a way to
manage authorization, policies. 

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That's pee bucket management 
method. 

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And if you look at how this 
space has evolved, it started 

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with ACLS. 
We all know ACLS, right? 

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Access Control list. 
That was the very first way. 

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We started managing Authority 
tations and then it evolved into

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a wall based Access Control to 
try and simplify how we manage 

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authorization that. 
Ended up in Roll Explosion. 

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We are also all familiar with 
that a buck attribute based 

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Access Control. 
Try to maybe. 

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So some of those challenges, a 
buckets, eventually the method 

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of leveraging attributes from 
the identity and the acetyl, the

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result identities, trying to 
access defining, the combining 

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relationship between them, and 
then making decisions based on 

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that. 
But it did also lacks some 

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stuff. 
It was very It wasn't it didn't 

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include all the posters which 
are required and then came 

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p'burg and feedback is not a 
replacement. 

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I mean, it's very important to 
understand P. 

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Work is a method of management. 
It includes yes. 

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A book policies is obviously 
travel injure attributes, but it

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also uses Roars Roars is just 
another attribute of the 

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identity. 
We can't throw away roles. 

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We can't do it because we don't 
know anything everything about 

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the idea. 
Entity. 

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So that's really P. 
Back one business policies life 

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cycle of how policy should be 
handled within the organization 

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and then enforcement different 
methods because so many 

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Technologies are out there. 
Can you give an example? 

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Because I do think that, I don't
think people confuse P back with

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our backs so much. 
I think people have that concept

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down but P back in a back. 
And I think you pointed that out

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as people think it's the same 
thing. 

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Can you give an example of P 
back that will kind of highlight

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that difference. 
Yes. 

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So a book started as a velly 
technically notion. 

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Let's leverage attributes. 
To Define connections between 

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identities and assets. 
Right? 

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That's a box. 
That's very clear, but it 

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doesn't include the processes. 
Eventually we know authorities 

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ation. 
Should be governed. 

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Should be audited. 
Should be managed as a lifecycle

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to all of that. 
That and that is what P back 

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brings to the table. 
The policy is not just a 

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technical tool. 
It's also a business 

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representation of the decision, 
the organization wants to 

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implement within their systems, 
right? 

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So it needs to be expressed in 
that way. 

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It needs to go through a life 
cycle through the, through the 

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processes of the organization 
development staging staging 

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production. 
How that looks like, right? 

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It needs to have some Kind of 
review process simulation. 

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Maybe those are all elements of 
the policy system that the 

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organization I think. 
So, shout out to Paul volution 

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friend of the show, one of your 
employees. 

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They're playing an ID and he 
actually made the introduction 

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to get you here today. 
But he had given me a demo and 

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kind of one of my big takeaways 
was that you know the P back 

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system could Pull data 
attributes that were maybe 

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traditionally, identity data or 
they're not like in your ldap 

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right there. 
You can pull this data and start

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to build an Uber profile of a 
person. 

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Now, apply the policy to it and 
now you've got something that's,

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you know, a force multiplier if 
you will exactly it. 

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Sits on top of all those 
attributes that are being pulled

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about both the identity, by the 
way, and the acetate To 

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destroying to access. 
So leveraging, both sides in 

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order to make the decision. 
Yeah. 

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Where does p back fit from a 
strategy perspective? 

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Because I see a lot of 
organizations struggle with 

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rolls just in general, like, oh,
we want to be a man are back, 

231
00:12:37,700 --> 00:12:39,500
you know, shop, for lack of a 
better word. 

232
00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:44,200
And they get some percentage of 
the way down the journey. 

233
00:12:44,700 --> 00:12:49,200
And then they stopped making 
progress if I'm going into a 

234
00:12:49,200 --> 00:12:51,800
green field situation where We 
really haven't started anything 

235
00:12:51,800 --> 00:12:53,700
yet. 
I've always been more of a fan 

236
00:12:53,700 --> 00:12:57,000
of the attribute base side of 
things, because I feel like it's

237
00:12:57,000 --> 00:13:01,600
a little easier to start up 
setup because he was okay. 

238
00:13:01,600 --> 00:13:03,400
Well, what are some key 
attributes? 

239
00:13:03,400 --> 00:13:05,600
Are you an employee or you not 
an employee, okay? 

240
00:13:05,600 --> 00:13:08,000
Well, if you're an employee, you
get this. 

241
00:13:08,100 --> 00:13:10,800
And now, we've got some sort of 
Access Control like that and 

242
00:13:10,800 --> 00:13:13,200
maybe you start to combine a few
different attributes and for a 

243
00:13:13,208 --> 00:13:16,200
long time, I'm glad Jen, Jim 
asked the question because I 

244
00:13:16,200 --> 00:13:18,800
thought a back could be back 
where the same thing it was just

245
00:13:19,100 --> 00:13:21,900
pee back was the marketing term 
and Is I don't know a back 

246
00:13:21,900 --> 00:13:23,100
wasn't sexy enough, I don't 
know. 

247
00:13:24,100 --> 00:13:26,400
But as I've said, you know, 
learn more over the years. 

248
00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:30,900
It's like, okay I get it if I'm 
going into an organization and I

249
00:13:30,908 --> 00:13:34,800
have not yet taken the journey 
towards any sort of consistent 

250
00:13:34,800 --> 00:13:38,400
access control method. 
Any of the backs could I start 

251
00:13:38,400 --> 00:13:41,400
with policy based Access Control
P back or are there 

252
00:13:41,400 --> 00:13:45,300
prerequisites to be able to be 
successful for a policy 

253
00:13:45,300 --> 00:13:48,600
standpoint versus attribute or 
role-based perspective? 

254
00:13:49,000 --> 00:13:51,000
Yes. 
Oh, I think you should dealt 

255
00:13:51,000 --> 00:13:52,700
with policy based access 
control. 

256
00:13:52,700 --> 00:13:56,500
I think it is a core component 
of any modernized. 

257
00:13:56,500 --> 00:14:01,200
I am infrastructure but you 
know, you need to understand. 

258
00:14:01,200 --> 00:14:04,500
You can't do without holes and 
they'll explain. 

259
00:14:04,500 --> 00:14:06,200
Okay? 
You give an excuse, you gave an 

260
00:14:06,200 --> 00:14:12,600
example where you're leveraging 
HR data to make decisions, but 

261
00:14:12,600 --> 00:14:15,400
it's not enough, right? 
We can't make all the decisions 

262
00:14:15,400 --> 00:14:18,900
just to on what HR knows. 
And we all will also understand 

263
00:14:18,900 --> 00:14:22,700
that HR Doesn't get it. 
Always right. 

264
00:14:23,400 --> 00:14:27,300
No come on I don't hate has 
always pristine and never needs 

265
00:14:27,300 --> 00:14:28,700
to be cleaned. 
You know. 

266
00:14:28,700 --> 00:14:31,500
I was also thinking of a 
scenario like let's say you 

267
00:14:31,500 --> 00:14:35,400
wanted to have an authorization 
based on, you know, you can only

268
00:14:35,400 --> 00:14:39,100
access this if you have more 
than a hundred thousand dollars 

269
00:14:39,100 --> 00:14:41,300
of assets under management, 
right? 

270
00:14:41,300 --> 00:14:44,100
Well that's not data that you 
would want, you wouldn't want 

271
00:14:44,100 --> 00:14:47,500
the person's account balance, in
your, I am system, where you'd 

272
00:14:47,500 --> 00:14:51,100
want the ability to apply that 
rule, they get the Access 

273
00:14:51,100 --> 00:14:53,600
because yes or no. 
Hmm, right? 

274
00:14:53,900 --> 00:14:56,700
Yes, exactly, exactly. 
And that's, that's another key 

275
00:14:56,700 --> 00:14:59,900
component, which needs to be to 
be not. 

276
00:14:59,900 --> 00:15:03,600
Well, known, right? 
Pivec is not just about those 

277
00:15:03,600 --> 00:15:07,800
Dynamic, fine-grained decisions.
Eventually authorizations are 

278
00:15:07,800 --> 00:15:11,600
not implemented, just one way 
there. 

279
00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:15,500
So many ways of authorizations 
are implemented today and even 

280
00:15:15,500 --> 00:15:19,400
if we want for standard to be 
out there, it would take some 

281
00:15:19,400 --> 00:15:24,200
time if at all All we need to be
able to manage authorizations 

282
00:15:24,200 --> 00:15:28,300
for application Level security. 
We need to do the same for apis 

283
00:15:28,700 --> 00:15:35,000
for microservices for data and 
we can't say one fits, all 

284
00:15:35,000 --> 00:15:38,700
right, doesn't work that way. 
That's the advantage of P back. 

285
00:15:38,700 --> 00:15:43,700
They enable you to manage the 
decisions in a consistent way. 

286
00:15:43,700 --> 00:15:48,500
Regardless, if it is for data 
Access Control, API Access 

287
00:15:48,500 --> 00:15:50,600
Control, Michael service, Access
Control. 

288
00:15:50,700 --> 00:15:52,200
All. 
And that's important. 

289
00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:56,900
That is a key component P. 
Back does not enforce technology

290
00:15:57,400 --> 00:16:00,500
P. 
Back is a method of management 

291
00:16:00,500 --> 00:16:03,700
with many options of 
enforcement. 

292
00:16:04,100 --> 00:16:06,600
All right, I'm going to post a 
little bit into a rabbit hole 

293
00:16:06,600 --> 00:16:08,800
but all that on, I promise I'll 
stop. 

294
00:16:09,100 --> 00:16:12,500
But I would imagine a scenario 
where it let's take that 

295
00:16:12,500 --> 00:16:14,600
example. 
I had where, you know, people 

296
00:16:14,600 --> 00:16:18,800
can only access a certain portal
if they have a hundred thousand 

297
00:16:18,800 --> 00:16:22,800
dollars under management, So 
assumably that would be some 

298
00:16:22,800 --> 00:16:26,300
kind of like web service call to
some system that would say you 

299
00:16:26,300 --> 00:16:29,000
know Jim has the assets or he 
doesn't have the assets. 

300
00:16:29,000 --> 00:16:34,000
Ideally that's in real time but 
you can see the potential hang 

301
00:16:34,000 --> 00:16:39,100
up if that's in real time. 
So you have to probably stage 

302
00:16:39,100 --> 00:16:43,100
that data which is always like 
why virtual directories existed 

303
00:16:43,100 --> 00:16:45,600
in the first place, right? 
So I would imagine that's one of

304
00:16:45,600 --> 00:16:48,900
the real challenges when it 
comes to authorization is like 

305
00:16:48,900 --> 00:16:53,800
okay, how often do I have 
refresh this my data that I'm 

306
00:16:53,800 --> 00:16:56,000
going to base this policy 
decision on. 

307
00:16:56,000 --> 00:16:59,600
Yeah, absolutely. 
And you know what, that's how we

308
00:16:59,600 --> 00:17:03,200
used to do authorizations. 
But now I believe you would find

309
00:17:03,200 --> 00:17:06,900
our more advanced ways. 
There are actually four patterns

310
00:17:06,900 --> 00:17:09,599
to authorities ations and and 
that's also, I don't know if 

311
00:17:09,599 --> 00:17:14,900
it's a well, known fact. 
But in the old standards, there 

312
00:17:14,900 --> 00:17:18,599
was just permit to deny. 
So you could ask that question. 

313
00:17:18,599 --> 00:17:22,700
Can I approve this transaction? 
Chen which is more or less than 

314
00:17:22,700 --> 00:17:24,700
1 million dollars and get a. 
Yes, no. 

315
00:17:25,000 --> 00:17:28,300
But that's really inefficient 
and you need to go leafless your

316
00:17:28,300 --> 00:17:31,200
data over and over again. 
Right today. 

317
00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:34,700
There are more patterns for, 
like, I mentioned patterns for 

318
00:17:34,700 --> 00:17:36,900
authorizations in addition to 
permitting. 

319
00:17:36,900 --> 00:17:41,200
I we also have entitlement 
resolution, which is an 

320
00:17:41,200 --> 00:17:44,500
open-ended question, right? 
What are the least of 

321
00:17:44,900 --> 00:17:47,700
capabilities? 
A user can do within this 

322
00:17:47,700 --> 00:17:50,300
session. 
People might even consider that 

323
00:17:50,300 --> 00:17:55,200
as Log in time or so ization, to
support a, the authorities, 

324
00:17:55,200 --> 00:17:59,500
ation spell, a login session. 
There's also a resource 

325
00:17:59,500 --> 00:18:02,500
resolution or asset resolution, 
which is the same way. 

326
00:18:02,500 --> 00:18:06,200
Same question, into the wealth 
Pearl, a specific asset. 

327
00:18:06,200 --> 00:18:10,100
What al-essawi idea user 
resolution is called what are 

328
00:18:10,100 --> 00:18:14,600
the list of users per asset 
under the most interesting one? 

329
00:18:14,600 --> 00:18:18,000
Which is, I think the answer to 
the example you gave it's called

330
00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:22,500
policy resolution and this is 
This decision is that handles 

331
00:18:22,500 --> 00:18:26,300
data because you do not have to 
ask a pill meeting I per 

332
00:18:26,300 --> 00:18:28,200
transaction, you don't need to 
do that. 

333
00:18:28,500 --> 00:18:32,300
You need to put your controls in
that case on the data 11 and 

334
00:18:32,300 --> 00:18:37,900
therefore the data which user 
can see is only the data, the 

335
00:18:37,900 --> 00:18:43,200
policy enables him to see not by
transaction by by filtering the 

336
00:18:43,200 --> 00:18:48,100
data, the user can actually 
access implementing those within

337
00:18:48,100 --> 00:18:52,000
your overall architecture 
provides It's you the best 

338
00:18:52,000 --> 00:18:55,000
authorization solution and 
obviously Security in place. 

339
00:18:55,500 --> 00:19:00,800
So that gives a good background.
I think of P back and what it is

340
00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:03,000
today, right? 
We talked about going to talk 

341
00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:06,000
about how things are going to be
in the future and one of the 

342
00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:11,100
things that I'd like to know 
would be, do you see p back over

343
00:19:11,100 --> 00:19:16,100
taking our back in the future 
and let me just before you start

344
00:19:16,100 --> 00:19:19,300
answering that? 
I feel like, I don't know if 

345
00:19:19,300 --> 00:19:23,300
Jeff really agrees with this 
because we kind of got into it 

346
00:19:23,300 --> 00:19:27,700
on, on this topic before, but I 
think that the popularity of our

347
00:19:27,700 --> 00:19:32,400
back is what it is, because 
people understand it. 

348
00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:38,200
I've got this role and I put 
people in the role and then they

349
00:19:38,200 --> 00:19:42,100
get this access. 
I get that or if it's a dynamic 

350
00:19:42,100 --> 00:19:44,900
role. 
It's, you know, I take the data 

351
00:19:44,900 --> 00:19:46,700
and my plug-in, I understand 
that. 

352
00:19:46,700 --> 00:19:50,300
All right. 
And it's audible a my orders, 

353
00:19:50,300 --> 00:19:53,400
like it. 
Now, I think Pete back 

354
00:19:53,400 --> 00:19:54,800
challenge. 
I think it's much stronger. 

355
00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:56,600
I think it has much more 
capabilities. 

356
00:19:57,300 --> 00:19:59,000
I don't think people understand,
right. 

357
00:19:59,000 --> 00:20:02,300
We're here on the identity, the 
center podcast, and I'm learning

358
00:20:02,300 --> 00:20:04,000
a lot. 
Just listening to you, I'm 

359
00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:06,700
learning a lot. 
So how's the data? 

360
00:20:06,800 --> 00:20:10,500
How does this information get 
out there and no bring it back 

361
00:20:10,500 --> 00:20:13,200
to the simple question? 
Do you see p back? 

362
00:20:13,200 --> 00:20:15,300
Overtaking are back in the 
future. 

363
00:20:16,200 --> 00:20:19,500
So no, I don't and also I want 
to emphasize. 

364
00:20:19,500 --> 00:20:23,500
This is not a wall between 5:00 
and a buckle Arabic. 

365
00:20:23,800 --> 00:20:28,100
They are all needed in order to 
support the advanced 

366
00:20:28,100 --> 00:20:30,700
authorization requirements 
organization have today. 

367
00:20:31,000 --> 00:20:33,800
Let's let me go back to the 
example you provided. 

368
00:20:33,900 --> 00:20:38,100
Yes, you are assigning a role to
a user and that simple to 

369
00:20:38,100 --> 00:20:41,200
understand. 
But now let's ask the question. 

370
00:20:41,700 --> 00:20:45,500
What does that wall entitle the 
user to do? 

371
00:20:46,200 --> 00:20:48,800
Who makes that decision. 
You are a doctor. 

372
00:20:48,800 --> 00:20:50,200
Okay. 
What can you do? 

373
00:20:50,800 --> 00:20:52,800
Can you see your patient 
records? 

374
00:20:53,100 --> 00:20:57,400
Can you approve of some kind of 
subscription that is 

375
00:20:57,400 --> 00:20:59,300
authorization? 
And that's the difference. 

376
00:20:59,300 --> 00:21:02,900
And that's what needs to be 
understood by the broader 

377
00:21:03,800 --> 00:21:06,000
audience. 
You still need words because you

378
00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:09,200
need to, you need to give some 
title or some. 

379
00:21:09,300 --> 00:21:14,900
I don't know information, which 
is personally personally 

380
00:21:14,900 --> 00:21:19,200
assigned to a user. 
But the decision, which is 

381
00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:22,700
attached to that or the logic, 
which is attached to that all 

382
00:21:23,100 --> 00:21:27,700
that is authorization. 
It takes the role and explains 

383
00:21:27,700 --> 00:21:30,800
the whole to the application 
resources to the data to 

384
00:21:30,800 --> 00:21:34,900
whatever. 
P back is still a concept of 

385
00:21:35,200 --> 00:21:38,500
like centralization that right. 
I mean it's not you're not 

386
00:21:38,500 --> 00:21:41,500
talking about at the app because
to me it's like if you have a 

387
00:21:41,500 --> 00:21:46,300
great orchestration of what you 
should have access to, In these 

388
00:21:46,300 --> 00:21:48,200
applications. 
But then when you get the 

389
00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:52,400
application, they have three 
rolls 33, you know, very simple 

390
00:21:52,400 --> 00:21:54,400
levels of what you can do within
the application. 

391
00:21:54,400 --> 00:21:57,800
Mom getting to at least 
privilege models pretty 

392
00:21:58,200 --> 00:21:59,800
difficult or impossible. 
Right? 

393
00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:04,200
Well, if you just rely on laws, 
then, yes, but let's talk about 

394
00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:06,300
least privilege. 
What is least privilege? 

395
00:22:06,800 --> 00:22:09,100
What what what is that? 
What does that mean? 

396
00:22:09,100 --> 00:22:15,300
It means that you can access 
whatever resources at a specific

397
00:22:15,300 --> 00:22:19,000
point of To begin with. 
You do not have access obviously

398
00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:23,500
but you'll get your gate egg 
getting access when you need it 

399
00:22:23,500 --> 00:22:29,700
to the specific function or 
resource whatever right now what

400
00:22:29,700 --> 00:22:32,700
is identity first what is 
identity? 

401
00:22:32,700 --> 00:22:36,700
Well what is zero trust and they
all saying basically the same 

402
00:22:36,700 --> 00:22:41,900
thing when access is made Let's 
understand who the user is. 

403
00:22:42,200 --> 00:22:45,700
Let's make the decision if this 
access can be granted. 

404
00:22:45,900 --> 00:22:51,100
David and to what level they are
all eventually talking about the

405
00:22:51,100 --> 00:22:56,100
same concept, the same Notions 
access should be much more 

406
00:22:56,100 --> 00:22:58,300
advanced. 
It should be dynamic. 

407
00:22:58,300 --> 00:23:01,000
It should be smart. 
However, marketing terms, you 

408
00:23:01,000 --> 00:23:06,500
have, you want to put on top of 
that, make the decision for user

409
00:23:06,900 --> 00:23:10,700
in the context of the access at 
the time of access. 

410
00:23:11,000 --> 00:23:14,500
Obviously, we'll possible or as 
close to access as possible. 

411
00:23:15,300 --> 00:23:17,600
Right? 
We make it sound so easy but 

412
00:23:17,600 --> 00:23:20,400
it's hard, right? 
I mean, if we think about it in 

413
00:23:20,408 --> 00:23:24,300
the real world of authorizations
are a mess for a lot of 

414
00:23:24,300 --> 00:23:25,500
companies. 
Yes, it is. 

415
00:23:25,500 --> 00:23:28,000
Even if you just look at active 
directory, naming conventions, 

416
00:23:28,000 --> 00:23:31,100
don't make any sense incomplete 
memberships are off. 

417
00:23:31,100 --> 00:23:34,100
You've got nested groups. 
Now you start taking that 

418
00:23:34,100 --> 00:23:38,200
problem and adding in every 
other application and trying to 

419
00:23:38,200 --> 00:23:40,800
come up with. 
Well, what is the policy for 

420
00:23:40,800 --> 00:23:47,700
someone across 20, 30, 40, 50 
different Maybe this the end 

421
00:23:47,700 --> 00:23:50,400
system doesn't support that 
granular. 

422
00:23:50,700 --> 00:23:52,800
Yeah I'm an authorization 
standpoint most probably 

423
00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:55,100
doesn't. 
You are absolutely right but you

424
00:23:55,100 --> 00:23:56,800
know what? 
That's the chicken and egg heel.

425
00:23:56,800 --> 00:23:58,300
Right. 
It's always like that with 

426
00:23:58,300 --> 00:24:01,500
technology. 
Think about s is so SS. 

427
00:24:01,500 --> 00:24:04,800
So today the authentication if 
you're saying authentication 

428
00:24:04,800 --> 00:24:08,800
today, everyone in the space 
would it automatically think 

429
00:24:08,800 --> 00:24:12,900
about IDP and open I did connect
or sam'l depending where you 

430
00:24:12,900 --> 00:24:15,200
are. 
That's given that even In a 

431
00:24:15,200 --> 00:24:20,300
commodity today, but going back 
10, 15 years, that was not the 

432
00:24:20,300 --> 00:24:23,400
case. 
I still remember, trying to 

433
00:24:23,400 --> 00:24:27,400
convince application owners 
where I where I walked to 

434
00:24:27,400 --> 00:24:31,800
connect to active directory or 
later on to connect to whatever 

435
00:24:31,800 --> 00:24:35,200
IDP I had in place, now, we 
don't want to speak with your 

436
00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:38,300
authentication system. 
We have built-in authentication 

437
00:24:38,300 --> 00:24:40,700
system. 
If your system goes down, my 

438
00:24:40,700 --> 00:24:43,100
application, not available. 
Exactly. 

439
00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:44,900
People get mad at me. 
They don't yell at you. 

440
00:24:45,100 --> 00:24:47,700
You, they yell at me and I can't
control the experience to the 

441
00:24:47,700 --> 00:24:49,000
level that they think that they 
want to. 

442
00:24:49,008 --> 00:24:53,300
That's where I mean, that's a 
common organizational struggle, 

443
00:24:53,300 --> 00:24:57,400
where to me it's like too much 
decision-making has been 

444
00:24:57,400 --> 00:25:01,900
delegated out to, you know, the 
business unit or the application

445
00:25:01,900 --> 00:25:05,600
teams where it's like, you're 
going to if you can't get by in 

446
00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:09,600
around a simple concept, like 
authentication than your current

447
00:25:09,600 --> 00:25:11,800
position where you can't really 
push anything. 

448
00:25:11,800 --> 00:25:15,400
Well, the cows point, though. 
Single sign-on was in the same 

449
00:25:15,400 --> 00:25:17,400
boat. 
Exactly 18, 20 years ago, and it

450
00:25:17,400 --> 00:25:19,400
took time as it always does, 
right? 

451
00:25:19,400 --> 00:25:23,400
We talk about cycles and yeah, 
some organizations are agile and

452
00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:26,800
can be and some, aren't it. 
Takes time to to build in that 

453
00:25:26,800 --> 00:25:31,300
functionality authorizations. 
I don't know if I've seen as 

454
00:25:31,300 --> 00:25:34,400
much of a shift towards. 
Yeah, we do need to build in 

455
00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:37,100
more granular permissions. 
Sometimes you see it. 

456
00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:40,100
Sometimes it's hidden behind 
extra licensing or subscription 

457
00:25:40,100 --> 00:25:44,800
costs that SAS products like to 
charge extra era for a team 

458
00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:46,800
license, right? 
Or something like that, versus 

459
00:25:46,800 --> 00:25:49,200
an individual seat or something 
like that. 

460
00:25:49,700 --> 00:25:54,100
How do we get applications to 
get on board with you know 

461
00:25:54,100 --> 00:25:56,500
having more flexibility from an 
authorization standpoint to be 

462
00:25:56,500 --> 00:25:58,100
able to enable stuff like this? 
Yeah. 

463
00:25:58,100 --> 00:26:01,400
So like I said, it's a chicken 
and egg you need to start 

464
00:26:01,400 --> 00:26:03,500
somewhere. 
Where would you start with the 

465
00:26:03,500 --> 00:26:06,700
newer Technologies with the new 
developments, right? 

466
00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:10,200
Be considered an organization 
which cut which currently takes 

467
00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:13,300
big monolithic applications and 
Converse. 

468
00:26:13,500 --> 00:26:16,400
Them to Michael Services, which 
is a common theme, right? 

469
00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:19,000
A lot of organizations are going
through that transition. 

470
00:26:19,200 --> 00:26:21,300
How do you provide 
authorizations for 

471
00:26:21,300 --> 00:26:24,000
microservices? 
Would you go develop that by the

472
00:26:24,100 --> 00:26:28,100
by yourself? 
If in the past developers they 

473
00:26:28,100 --> 00:26:32,900
said I want to own that code. 
I don't want you to tell me what

474
00:26:32,900 --> 00:26:35,400
to do. 
Once you move to my core 

475
00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:40,300
Services, that's not the case 
each micro service owner wants 

476
00:26:40,300 --> 00:26:44,400
to be responsible on the 
business logic of his His small 

477
00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:48,500
micro service authorization 
should be a service like 

478
00:26:48,500 --> 00:26:53,200
authentication provided to all 
those say microservices. 

479
00:26:53,200 --> 00:26:56,500
So this is like a very good 
opportunity to start thinking, 

480
00:26:56,800 --> 00:26:59,900
don't worry dowshen, don't try 
to take care of all your legacy 

481
00:26:59,900 --> 00:27:04,200
application that for sure would 
not walk, but look at new 

482
00:27:04,200 --> 00:27:07,200
development, new initiative, 
which you are onboarding. 

483
00:27:07,600 --> 00:27:13,300
So that would be one second. 
I see more vandals like cots. 

484
00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:17,000
SAS applications supporting 
built-in policies and that's 

485
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:19,000
another opportunity there, 
right? 

486
00:27:19,100 --> 00:27:23,400
So the market is evolving still 
slowly but it is evolving. 

487
00:27:23,600 --> 00:27:27,100
I think we are seeing a very 
similar path to what happened 

488
00:27:27,100 --> 00:27:32,200
with the SSO with you know 
single sign-on. 

489
00:27:33,300 --> 00:27:36,700
Yes it's more complex but also 
more interesting. 

490
00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:39,000
What's a fundamental shift in 
the way we do things? 

491
00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:41,200
Yeah. 
Just like MFA was as fundamental

492
00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:44,700
shift to Authentication. 
It's very difficult to change 

493
00:27:44,700 --> 00:27:47,600
How We Do authorizations in a 
short time period. 

494
00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:49,300
If you're building an 
application, your point. 

495
00:27:49,300 --> 00:27:52,300
Yes, you can do that. 
You know, if you're on a rack F 

496
00:27:52,300 --> 00:27:54,800
Mainframe which we've been 
saying, you know, is going to 

497
00:27:54,800 --> 00:27:58,500
die for, I don't know 30 years 
and now all of a sudden it's hot

498
00:27:58,500 --> 00:28:00,400
again, you can't find people who
know how to do it. 

499
00:28:01,200 --> 00:28:05,100
There's these great cycles and 
sometimes sometimes the answer 

500
00:28:05,100 --> 00:28:08,500
is no, we're just not going to 
do that because the cost is too 

501
00:28:08,500 --> 00:28:13,100
great to invest to re-architect 
an application when it is time 

502
00:28:13,100 --> 00:28:16,200
to replace the application. 
Let's take this as something 

503
00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:18,400
that we want to consider is part
of the, you know, the purchase 

504
00:28:18,400 --> 00:28:20,700
decision, which is why I love 
having identity. 

505
00:28:20,700 --> 00:28:24,300
Have a seat at the table for new
applications coming in having 

506
00:28:24,300 --> 00:28:26,800
some sort of Standards don't go 
buy a product that doesn't 

507
00:28:26,800 --> 00:28:29,000
integrate with Open Standards to
do. 

508
00:28:29,100 --> 00:28:32,600
Authentication, don't go buy a 
product that doesn't set us up 

509
00:28:32,600 --> 00:28:34,500
for future, success from an 
authorization standpoint. 

510
00:28:34,500 --> 00:28:37,300
Either maybe doesn't have as 
much cash. 

511
00:28:37,300 --> 00:28:40,000
A right now. 
From a, you know, a purchasing 

512
00:28:40,000 --> 00:28:42,900
decision standpoint, but it 
should be something that I A 

513
00:28:42,900 --> 00:28:46,400
teams out there who are 
listening and who have influence

514
00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:49,300
over steering committees or 
architecture review boards, or 

515
00:28:49,700 --> 00:28:52,500
whatever, you know, political 
thing exists, within an 

516
00:28:52,500 --> 00:28:54,800
organization to say yes we're 
going to get that app. 

517
00:28:55,000 --> 00:28:58,100
These are the things that they 
should be aware of when they're 

518
00:28:58,100 --> 00:29:01,000
making a decision. 
No one goes out and says I'm 

519
00:29:01,000 --> 00:29:03,900
going to buy this thing and I 
and I never will be able to 

520
00:29:03,900 --> 00:29:05,500
connect it to mind active 
directory. 

521
00:29:05,900 --> 00:29:08,700
Oh my gosh. 
Why not exactly. 

522
00:29:08,700 --> 00:29:10,400
And you know what? 
You touched, another very 

523
00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:12,700
important Point. 
Absolutely agree with you. 

524
00:29:12,800 --> 00:29:16,500
New identity, people, they need 
to be part of that discussion. 

525
00:29:16,600 --> 00:29:19,400
Today, there's a bit of 
Disconnect, right application 

526
00:29:19,400 --> 00:29:21,300
owners. 
They're doing what they want up.

527
00:29:21,300 --> 00:29:25,800
SEC data stack is not connected 
to the identity identity space. 

528
00:29:26,000 --> 00:29:29,500
And that leaves a very big gap 
there because also ization. 

529
00:29:29,500 --> 00:29:32,700
Eventually, if you think about 
that also has a Sheen takes all 

530
00:29:32,700 --> 00:29:36,400
the efforts, which organizations
have placed into identity and 

531
00:29:36,400 --> 00:29:39,900
access management well-defined 
identities, well-managed 

532
00:29:39,900 --> 00:29:42,600
identities. 
Well, authenticated identities. 

533
00:29:43,500 --> 00:29:48,400
And brings all that effort into 
the application, space into the 

534
00:29:48,400 --> 00:29:52,900
data space, but they need to 
stick together on the same Cable

535
00:29:52,900 --> 00:29:56,200
in order for that to happen. 
Can I ask a side question here? 

536
00:29:56,200 --> 00:29:58,800
Because it's it came up this 
morning as part of the opening, 

537
00:29:58,800 --> 00:30:03,000
Keener, the keynote for this for
this morning, about the role of 

538
00:30:03,000 --> 00:30:06,800
potentially having something, a 
chief identity officer, and 

539
00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:09,800
having a sea of the table at, 
you know, basically the c-suite.

540
00:30:09,900 --> 00:30:13,000
So right there with cpos and 
ctOS. 

541
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:17,000
And all the see people, where do
you stand on that? 

542
00:30:17,000 --> 00:30:18,600
Because I thought was 
interesting discussion this 

543
00:30:18,600 --> 00:30:21,100
morning. 
The panel with Andy, hindle and 

544
00:30:21,100 --> 00:30:26,300
Glaser and Claire something. 
I'm gonna personally know 

545
00:30:26,700 --> 00:30:28,400
someone else. 
There was a couple other folks I

546
00:30:28,400 --> 00:30:29,700
figured out names. 
I really apologize. 

547
00:30:29,700 --> 00:30:31,700
I should have been more prepared
to ask this question, but just 

548
00:30:31,700 --> 00:30:33,200
occurred to me as I'm thinking 
about it here. 

549
00:30:34,200 --> 00:30:41,000
Do you think now is a good time 
to have a chief identity officer

550
00:30:41,000 --> 00:30:43,800
sitting at the board level or 
reporting to a Like those other 

551
00:30:43,800 --> 00:30:47,600
roles might be, or do you have a
different perspective on it? 

552
00:30:48,600 --> 00:30:54,000
So, I haven't thought about that
too much, but I do believe it 

553
00:30:54,000 --> 00:30:58,300
should roll under security. 
Because why would you do that? 

554
00:30:58,300 --> 00:31:02,600
Why would you do authentication?
Why would you do authorization? 

555
00:31:03,300 --> 00:31:07,300
And the reason is Security in 
many cases. 

556
00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:12,600
And eventually, all of those 
Technologies are a means to an 

557
00:31:12,600 --> 00:31:14,800
end. 
And the end is the business 

558
00:31:14,800 --> 00:31:18,400
objective of the organization 
not having multi-factor 

559
00:31:18,400 --> 00:31:21,300
authentication or well-defined 
authorization that really 

560
00:31:21,300 --> 00:31:24,800
doesn't matter to anyone. 
They want, they their 

561
00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:28,000
organization to preform, 
according to its business 

562
00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:33,100
objective and to do that, they 
need support of security and I 

563
00:31:33,100 --> 00:31:37,600
am. 
So that's the way I can't lie, 

564
00:31:37,600 --> 00:31:41,700
see that but still new to the 
concept. 

565
00:31:42,400 --> 00:31:46,300
So I'm going to try Later. 
Turn this into a question, but 

566
00:31:46,600 --> 00:31:48,800
during Andres keynote, he talked
about. 

567
00:31:48,800 --> 00:31:51,500
Okay. 
Well, really where what's 

568
00:31:51,700 --> 00:31:55,700
important is like, I kind of 
feel like our industry has done 

569
00:31:55,700 --> 00:31:58,600
a pretty good job on the 
authentication side when you can

570
00:31:58,600 --> 00:32:01,200
see what's happening with it. 
It's like I was getting better 

571
00:32:01,200 --> 00:32:06,300
and better in terms of 
validating that the person or 

572
00:32:06,300 --> 00:32:10,900
potentially the non human being 
is who they say they are they 

573
00:32:10,900 --> 00:32:16,300
can authenticate the problem now
that we need To solve is on the 

574
00:32:16,300 --> 00:32:20,700
authorization side and I my mind
where I was going with this was 

575
00:32:20,700 --> 00:32:25,400
like the over-provisioned 
account problem, right? 

576
00:32:25,400 --> 00:32:28,900
Which kind of a pulling back to 
the statement. 

577
00:32:29,000 --> 00:32:32,900
It's not our back burst P back 
and I agree with that because I 

578
00:32:32,900 --> 00:32:39,200
feel like P back is In this 
context, kind of like the 

579
00:32:39,200 --> 00:32:41,900
scalpel. 
Where's our back is kind of like

580
00:32:41,900 --> 00:32:43,800
the sledgehammer or the axe, 
right? 

581
00:32:43,800 --> 00:32:47,400
It's like you have two hundred 
applications, you're probably 

582
00:32:47,400 --> 00:32:50,300
not going to do p back for all 
200 application but for your big

583
00:32:50,300 --> 00:32:53,300
ones it's like that's where we 
use the scalpel. 

584
00:32:53,300 --> 00:33:00,000
We got a really this is this my 
idea anyway, so I think that 

585
00:33:00,000 --> 00:33:03,000
over-provisioned account problem
because you have all these 

586
00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:08,000
accounts sitting dormant They've
got all this access if this 

587
00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:13,200
accounts get hijacked somehow. 
Now they've got tons of access 

588
00:33:13,200 --> 00:33:17,300
that they didn't really need to 
have in the first place and I 

589
00:33:17,300 --> 00:33:20,500
think our back puts you in 
position that that's what's 

590
00:33:20,500 --> 00:33:23,000
going to happen. 
I think P back is kind of like 

591
00:33:23,100 --> 00:33:26,400
on more like on-the-fly decision
so it's not like 

592
00:33:26,500 --> 00:33:29,300
over-provisioned account sitting
there with that access. 

593
00:33:29,600 --> 00:33:32,000
Do you see things that way? 
Is that is that the right way to

594
00:33:32,008 --> 00:33:34,800
think about it? 
Yeah, yeah and I think it's 

595
00:33:35,200 --> 00:33:38,200
Evolution not a revolution and 
that's it. 

596
00:33:38,500 --> 00:33:42,200
That's part of what. 
What you have mentioned. 

597
00:33:42,200 --> 00:33:46,900
P'burg does not replace any of 
the other stuff which is the lp 

598
00:33:46,900 --> 00:33:50,900
back makes them better. 
So yes, we have over-provisioned

599
00:33:50,900 --> 00:33:54,500
accounts, the reason being 
that's how application operate 

600
00:33:54,500 --> 00:33:59,100
today applications, the majority
of them, do not know how to 

601
00:33:59,100 --> 00:34:05,000
operate without that account. 
Being still, and we do see your 

602
00:34:05,000 --> 00:34:08,300
applications having that 
ability, which is great in my 

603
00:34:08,300 --> 00:34:10,600
opinion. 
But that's again an evolution, 

604
00:34:10,600 --> 00:34:15,400
which P book supports Arabic, 
cannot support that, pubic can 

605
00:34:15,400 --> 00:34:18,900
support that, but that's the 
combination of both that enables

606
00:34:19,199 --> 00:34:23,000
enable that to actually happen. 
I like to think of myself as 

607
00:34:23,100 --> 00:34:25,500
pragmatic, right? 
And this is where I think a back

608
00:34:25,500 --> 00:34:30,500
has a role because you may get 
into a situation where with your

609
00:34:30,500 --> 00:34:34,699
IDP you're integrating many 
applications since these are 

610
00:34:34,699 --> 00:34:37,500
just to pass them, the 
attributes that they want. 

611
00:34:37,500 --> 00:34:40,600
It's not so Security numbers is 
not Bank. 

612
00:34:40,699 --> 00:34:45,400
Count balances and find you guys
want to take the attributes and 

613
00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:47,500
determine what parts of your 
application. 

614
00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:51,199
Pragmatically speaking, I'm just
going to pass a so to me that's 

615
00:34:51,699 --> 00:34:57,100
where a back or if you don't 
have a pee back tool that might 

616
00:34:57,100 --> 00:35:00,300
end up being your answer. 
I feel like if you're going to 

617
00:35:00,300 --> 00:35:04,000
go down the P background as more
of you know as somebody 

618
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:07,400
delivering this authorization 
service to the organization you 

619
00:35:07,400 --> 00:35:11,400
have to have more of a 
partnership with the Application

620
00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:15,400
teams to make sure that you're 
applying these policies 

621
00:35:15,400 --> 00:35:18,100
correctly, putting people into 
the right roles. 

622
00:35:18,100 --> 00:35:19,500
Correct. 
I mean, of course, you have to 

623
00:35:19,508 --> 00:35:23,500
put them in the right roles, but
it made me think of where we 

624
00:35:23,500 --> 00:35:26,900
were with the authorization, 
maybe a decade ago, which was 

625
00:35:26,900 --> 00:35:29,800
exact mole, right? 
The exact Mo standard and I 

626
00:35:29,800 --> 00:35:34,400
always felt like the exact the 
most standard was, I didn't see 

627
00:35:34,400 --> 00:35:38,000
very many organizations 
implementing it because back to 

628
00:35:38,000 --> 00:35:40,600
your original point, it was hard
enough to get. 

629
00:35:40,700 --> 00:35:44,100
In teams many times to give up 
authorization, right? 

630
00:35:44,100 --> 00:35:47,300
And maybe I'm just thinking a 
point in time where I had to 

631
00:35:47,308 --> 00:35:51,300
physically deal with trying to 
get a bunch of applications with

632
00:35:51,300 --> 00:35:54,800
different application owners and
their own agendas to get onto a 

633
00:35:54,808 --> 00:35:59,700
common authentication platform, 
that was really hard, but then 

634
00:35:59,700 --> 00:36:03,300
to get them to give up 
authorization where you're 

635
00:36:03,300 --> 00:36:06,600
making the decision whether or 
not the end user can see a 

636
00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:10,600
screen within their application.
It's like, no way not happening.

637
00:36:10,700 --> 00:36:13,300
You're not qualified to make 
that decision. 

638
00:36:13,400 --> 00:36:17,400
And to me, that's where exact 
mode put you now to me, there 

639
00:36:17,400 --> 00:36:21,700
was a, I use case for that. 
If you had a situation where, 

640
00:36:22,200 --> 00:36:26,000
you know, you are a Security 
First organization, and you 

641
00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:29,800
absolutely had to have a paper 
trail in Central location of 

642
00:36:29,800 --> 00:36:34,200
what people could access, and 
did access that put you in a 

643
00:36:34,207 --> 00:36:37,800
good position to do that. 
But it feels like nobody talks 

644
00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:40,800
about exactly anymore which is a
good thing. 

645
00:36:42,100 --> 00:36:47,300
No I'm just okay so I think 
Sakamoto meant well and it's a 

646
00:36:47,300 --> 00:36:51,900
good deal it was a good 
involvement of the market to 

647
00:36:51,900 --> 00:36:55,000
start speaking about 
authorizations. 

648
00:36:55,000 --> 00:36:59,400
I also believe that is part of 
the reason, people are afraid 

649
00:36:59,700 --> 00:37:03,400
for my salvation, just because 
of that Camille and the 

650
00:37:03,400 --> 00:37:07,700
complexity it brought in In but 
Zach. 

651
00:37:07,700 --> 00:37:13,200
Amell is not the only method for
authorization management. 

652
00:37:13,200 --> 00:37:16,100
Certainly not for authorization 
enforcement. 

653
00:37:16,100 --> 00:37:19,700
There are many new developments 
today and we can see them all 

654
00:37:19,700 --> 00:37:27,800
over the place like, Opa, which 
is an open standard Amazon Sada.

655
00:37:27,800 --> 00:37:33,600
We have, we have other 
development as well there. 

656
00:37:33,600 --> 00:37:35,700
And I think that those are all 
good. 

657
00:37:35,900 --> 00:37:39,900
Indications because it means 
there is the need what we 

658
00:37:39,900 --> 00:37:42,500
started with maybe Zachary was 
not good. 

659
00:37:42,500 --> 00:37:48,100
Enough was too complex for us 
and looking for news new options

660
00:37:48,300 --> 00:37:50,600
and and that's good. 
That's the evolution. 

661
00:37:50,600 --> 00:37:52,200
The market is currently going 
through. 

662
00:37:52,200 --> 00:38:01,500
We need to I would say shake out
that is a Camille bad notion. 

663
00:38:01,500 --> 00:38:03,700
May be sent to some areas are 
currently still. 

664
00:38:03,700 --> 00:38:08,200
Okay to still good. 
I I formed my personal 

665
00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:12,000
perspective, do not see 
organizations now. 

666
00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:16,000
Adopting zakah meal for four. 
New implementations, doesn't 

667
00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:21,800
seem like a lot of the concepts 
from exact mole still exist. 

668
00:38:21,800 --> 00:38:26,300
Like policy decision Point 
policy enforcement Point policy 

669
00:38:26,300 --> 00:38:28,400
Administration Point. 
Like to me those were like oh 

670
00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:32,400
yeah that helped me understand 
authorization. 

671
00:38:32,700 --> 00:38:37,000
Yes, I think those concepts are 
still They still apply it right?

672
00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:41,900
Yes is absolutely and that that 
is certainly a very important 

673
00:38:41,900 --> 00:38:46,900
contributor physical standard to
put in place those main elements

674
00:38:46,900 --> 00:38:51,100
of an authorization solution but
let's not get too much in love 

675
00:38:51,100 --> 00:38:55,200
with that because we are seeing 
that the solution eventually can

676
00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:58,900
be more distributed. 
For example, we cannot force all

677
00:38:58,900 --> 00:39:03,700
Technologies to outreach to the 
PDP the policy decision Point. 

678
00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:06,000
That's not how it works today. 
Day. 

679
00:39:06,100 --> 00:39:11,700
So we need to kind of understand
those all separate components 

680
00:39:11,800 --> 00:39:15,400
that can reside in the 
technology itself, not just in 

681
00:39:15,400 --> 00:39:18,600
the authorization solution and 
that's how we need to think 

682
00:39:18,600 --> 00:39:20,800
about it. 
Maybe I got the Nuance that 

683
00:39:20,800 --> 00:39:24,400
you're talking about their the 
distribution which I think is 

684
00:39:24,400 --> 00:39:31,000
kind of like okay if you're 
talking about a pea back system,

685
00:39:31,200 --> 00:39:36,600
you have the IDP that somewhere 
in the chain of Person to the 

686
00:39:36,600 --> 00:39:40,600
applications and authenticated 
User, it's doing some call to 

687
00:39:40,900 --> 00:39:43,700
that P. 
Back system to get, give me the 

688
00:39:43,700 --> 00:39:47,800
authorizations. 
I'm going to stick these in the 

689
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:49,800
information I'm sending to the 
application. 

690
00:39:50,100 --> 00:39:53,400
Yes, for example. 
Yeah, that would be one one 

691
00:39:53,400 --> 00:39:55,500
example, and it's a good 
example. 

692
00:39:55,500 --> 00:39:59,400
It's not against how 
authorization should be treated 

693
00:39:59,500 --> 00:40:03,800
because again, the, he's a 
technology that needs to consume

694
00:40:03,800 --> 00:40:07,200
the authorizations. 
We can't Force the technology. 

695
00:40:07,200 --> 00:40:09,400
How to walk? 
We can't force the application 

696
00:40:09,600 --> 00:40:12,100
to call out each. 
And every time it needs a 

697
00:40:12,107 --> 00:40:16,200
decision that failed. 
It didn't prove itself. 

698
00:40:16,200 --> 00:40:19,100
So we need to be more flexible. 
We buy, we, I'm saying the 

699
00:40:19,100 --> 00:40:21,800
authorization solution. 
There's always action, solution 

700
00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:25,700
should be flexible to 
accommodate the different 

701
00:40:25,700 --> 00:40:28,300
technology requirements 
application. 

702
00:40:29,600 --> 00:40:32,300
That needs everything in 
advanced and application that 

703
00:40:32,300 --> 00:40:35,400
needs more elaborated. 
Decision, that is fine. 

704
00:40:35,400 --> 00:40:40,300
A And surely the objective is to
be able to see the decisions to 

705
00:40:40,300 --> 00:40:42,900
manage them. 
In a centralized way to be able 

706
00:40:42,900 --> 00:40:47,000
to govern an audit, all those 
authorization policies, that's 

707
00:40:47,000 --> 00:40:50,500
what we want to achieve. 
Not at the underlying 

708
00:40:50,500 --> 00:40:52,900
technology, which controls 
enforcement. 

709
00:40:53,100 --> 00:40:56,900
There's so much to unpack here. 
Well, we can do some more vodka.

710
00:40:56,900 --> 00:40:59,500
Yeah, each and every suffix, 
your death is going to come 

711
00:40:59,500 --> 00:41:02,200
back, but I know we've got 
different engagements that we 

712
00:41:02,200 --> 00:41:04,000
all need to get to probably 
Colonel but so will probably 

713
00:41:04,000 --> 00:41:05,900
rise. 
Start to wrap things up but To 

714
00:41:05,900 --> 00:41:09,200
close us out with a lightning 
round something where I'm going 

715
00:41:09,200 --> 00:41:14,200
to say something and you give me
your gut reaction or prediction 

716
00:41:14,300 --> 00:41:16,400
or whatever you'd like to go off
of it. 

717
00:41:16,400 --> 00:41:18,000
So it's kind of a dealer's 
Choice. 

718
00:41:18,000 --> 00:41:22,000
That's we're in Vegas, are back 
and P back, what comes to mind 

719
00:41:22,800 --> 00:41:27,000
also, we sections, that was kind
of a softball just to get things

720
00:41:27,000 --> 00:41:32,100
warmed up. 
Zero trust wide concept need to 

721
00:41:32,100 --> 00:41:34,700
be better understood in the 
market. 

722
00:41:35,700 --> 00:41:38,000
Artificial intelligence. 
Oh cool. 

723
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:42,500
Interesting future and one I'm 
just got throw in blockchain. 

724
00:41:44,100 --> 00:41:47,900
Yeah, absolutely. 
I absolutely believe a big 

725
00:41:47,900 --> 00:41:49,200
believer. 
Yes, I am. 

726
00:41:49,500 --> 00:41:51,600
What do you think? 
Is the killer app? 

727
00:41:51,700 --> 00:41:54,200
The killer use case for 
blockchain other than 

728
00:41:54,200 --> 00:41:57,500
cryptocurrency. 
Okay, so not allowed to talk 

729
00:41:57,500 --> 00:42:01,600
about crypto and this to the 
can, if you want but just just 

730
00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:04,400
well, they'll many there are 
many and they think 

731
00:42:04,400 --> 00:42:09,700
decentralized identity comes 
into mind because that's the 

732
00:42:09,700 --> 00:42:12,000
space. 
I mean, I think it would be very

733
00:42:12,000 --> 00:42:16,300
interesting to see how that 
would evolve having each person 

734
00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:21,600
own its own identity and the 
data, which is associated with 

735
00:42:21,600 --> 00:42:26,200
his identity and having the 
ability to share that, not as 

736
00:42:26,500 --> 00:42:31,200
you know, just one package but 
in a more smart way and 

737
00:42:31,900 --> 00:42:35,100
certainly I want to go back to 
artificial intelligence for a 

738
00:42:35,107 --> 00:42:39,200
minute because relative to 
authorization, I think is a big 

739
00:42:39,200 --> 00:42:44,100
opportunity for AI, which is 
again, with these Provisioned 

740
00:42:44,100 --> 00:42:49,600
accounts to be able to Crunch 
the data of you have this 

741
00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:52,000
access, but you're using this 
access. 

742
00:42:52,000 --> 00:42:55,700
So therefore, all this other 
access, you don't really need, 

743
00:42:56,000 --> 00:42:59,400
we could take it away. 
One of the things have been kind

744
00:42:59,400 --> 00:43:03,900
of turning on is, well, if you 
don't write those rules very 

745
00:43:03,900 --> 00:43:06,800
carefully. 
So let's say you use this access

746
00:43:06,800 --> 00:43:08,300
in six months, you don't need 
it. 

747
00:43:08,500 --> 00:43:11,500
Well what about like route 
annual review? 

748
00:43:11,500 --> 00:43:13,400
Just like you, do the annual 
reviews of people? 

749
00:43:13,400 --> 00:43:18,200
People annually. 
What if that got taken away in 

750
00:43:18,200 --> 00:43:21,700
August because you hadn't used 
it in a year, man on a good 

751
00:43:21,700 --> 00:43:23,700
thing, right? 
It happens all the time, you 

752
00:43:23,700 --> 00:43:26,300
your aunt's cycles and it's 
true. 

753
00:43:26,900 --> 00:43:28,400
It happens. 
Anyway, right, how do we get 

754
00:43:28,400 --> 00:43:31,800
smarter about that maybe more? 
Maybe there's a way to say, hey 

755
00:43:31,800 --> 00:43:35,600
we're you know, because of the 
time of year and attribute or 

756
00:43:35,600 --> 00:43:39,600
policy comes up and says, for 
people who don't normally carry 

757
00:43:39,600 --> 00:43:41,500
this access throughout the year,
but we know it's a busy time 

758
00:43:41,500 --> 00:43:43,300
this season. 
Maybe you were ramping up 

759
00:43:43,500 --> 00:43:46,100
Password reset support because 
we still are killing the 

760
00:43:46,100 --> 00:43:48,900
password. 20 years later, you 
know things like that where you 

761
00:43:48,908 --> 00:43:53,600
have more of a dynamic or a 
femoral access policy where it 

762
00:43:53,600 --> 00:43:57,000
only exists when you need it. 
And because you have the data to

763
00:43:57,000 --> 00:44:00,800
be able to determine 
predetermine when you're going 

764
00:44:00,800 --> 00:44:04,500
to need it, we know there was 
going to be a spike in something

765
00:44:04,600 --> 00:44:07,200
or we know that we're going to 
kick off a certification. 

766
00:44:07,900 --> 00:44:10,800
All the people who don't care 
the access kick, you kick it on 

767
00:44:10,800 --> 00:44:13,100
for the pilot for the axis 
owners or whatever it may be. 

768
00:44:13,500 --> 00:44:15,600
I think there's I think there's 
ways to go with that nose. 

769
00:44:15,700 --> 00:44:17,000
Let's see. 
Now we're getting into AI at the

770
00:44:17,000 --> 00:44:20,000
center again. 
Yeah, we've been told our 

771
00:44:20,000 --> 00:44:22,100
podcast is becoming a at the 
center. 

772
00:44:22,100 --> 00:44:26,500
It's that could be a compliment.
I mean, it's we can't ignore it.

773
00:44:26,700 --> 00:44:29,700
I mean, it's you, it's 
everywhere here at identity 

774
00:44:29,700 --> 00:44:32,300
versus people are not well. 
We've gotta figure out how to 

775
00:44:32,300 --> 00:44:34,400
how we're going to work with. 
It's not going to go away. 

776
00:44:34,900 --> 00:44:39,400
I think we at some point in the 
last two years, the name 

777
00:44:39,400 --> 00:44:42,400
identity at the center, kind of 
finally hit like, oh my gosh, 

778
00:44:42,400 --> 00:44:44,900
genius. 
Like you guys saw this coming? 

779
00:44:44,900 --> 00:44:47,800
Yes. 
Well, here's why I say, we just 

780
00:44:47,800 --> 00:44:50,600
call it identity. 
The center people say, identity 

781
00:44:50,600 --> 00:44:54,200
is the new perimeter and then 
we're at the identity as 

782
00:44:54,500 --> 00:44:59,400
everywhere conference. 
So it's just identity, identity 

783
00:44:59,400 --> 00:45:01,700
identity. 
All right, let's end on a 

784
00:45:01,707 --> 00:45:04,500
lighter note. 
What's been your favorite 

785
00:45:04,500 --> 00:45:07,100
identify verse experience so far
this week? 

786
00:45:08,500 --> 00:45:14,200
Okay. 
So the many, the many Event 

787
00:45:14,200 --> 00:45:18,300
Zealand and, you know, 
discussion panels and so on. 

788
00:45:18,500 --> 00:45:22,000
I was primarily in meeting. 
So I'm just being locked in a 

789
00:45:22,008 --> 00:45:23,800
meeting room to speak with 
customers. 

790
00:45:23,800 --> 00:45:26,900
That's what they do. 
So I would say my favorite 

791
00:45:26,900 --> 00:45:30,000
experience was the pizza place. 
I really like pizza. 

792
00:45:30,000 --> 00:45:32,200
Okay. 
Which pizza place one here. 

793
00:45:32,700 --> 00:45:34,800
That's where I saw you. 
Yo, yes, exactly. 

794
00:45:34,800 --> 00:45:36,700
That's what we met on that first
day. 

795
00:45:36,700 --> 00:45:38,400
Yeah. 
What did you what did you end up

796
00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:41,200
ordering to eat? 
Well, what's on your pizza 

797
00:45:42,400 --> 00:45:45,600
basic? 
You know, Oh the napoletana. 

798
00:45:45,600 --> 00:45:48,400
Like they call Italy love 
something like that. 

799
00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:52,700
Just plain tradition of picture.
I like the margarita. 

800
00:45:52,800 --> 00:45:55,500
Yeah, my beliefs and yeah, yeah,
exactly. 

801
00:45:55,500 --> 00:45:58,400
I actually went to this place to
get pizza and I wound up getting

802
00:45:58,400 --> 00:46:01,300
chicken parm and I don't regret 
that decision. 

803
00:46:01,300 --> 00:46:05,800
One bit, it was fantastic. 
I had Margarita Pizza on Monday 

804
00:46:05,800 --> 00:46:07,800
when I fill in, so hey, of 
course, we're good. 

805
00:46:07,800 --> 00:46:10,200
Yeah, Jim. 
What's been your favorite 

806
00:46:10,200 --> 00:46:13,300
experience? 
So last night we went out of on 

807
00:46:13,400 --> 00:46:16,900
on this party bus with my 
friends from accents, thank you 

808
00:46:16,900 --> 00:46:20,300
to them. 
They had that Jason, Statham 

809
00:46:20,300 --> 00:46:24,100
impersonator his, by the way. 
His real first name is Jason, 

810
00:46:24,100 --> 00:46:27,500
Jason Stanley's is real name. 
Very cool guy. 

811
00:46:27,800 --> 00:46:31,600
And what I realized was when you
get a bunch of it, people 

812
00:46:31,600 --> 00:46:34,800
together, right? 
We're kind of like a tame crowd.

813
00:46:35,000 --> 00:46:39,200
So having somebody like him kind
of like get everybody dancing 

814
00:46:39,200 --> 00:46:41,700
and doing their thing was really
cool. 

815
00:46:41,900 --> 00:46:45,400
So party bus kind Sounds a 
little intimidating, which is, I

816
00:46:45,400 --> 00:46:48,600
think why I probably didn't have
a bigger crowd than they had, 

817
00:46:49,400 --> 00:46:52,600
but I mean, we basically took a 
bus and they had some like, an 

818
00:46:52,600 --> 00:46:57,700
open bar on the bus. 
We took this bus to that, 

819
00:46:57,800 --> 00:47:01,900
welcome to Las Vegas sign, which
is a very everybody knows it. 

820
00:47:02,100 --> 00:47:05,600
And then we went to the Fremont 
Street Experience, they had an 

821
00:47:05,600 --> 00:47:08,600
outdoor concert. 
I mean, so if you need a 

822
00:47:08,600 --> 00:47:12,800
recommendation, it take. 
Next time I come to Las Vegas is

823
00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:15,000
either. 
Spend some extra non-business 

824
00:47:15,000 --> 00:47:18,700
time or come here on vacation 
Fremont Street. 

825
00:47:18,700 --> 00:47:23,000
Looks like that's my speed man. 
Like you know they've got the 

826
00:47:23,000 --> 00:47:29,500
1199 steak and lobster dinner. 
They've got open concerts and 

827
00:47:29,500 --> 00:47:34,900
its technical Wizardry. 
Like you think Times Square or 

828
00:47:35,800 --> 00:47:38,800
the strip here is like neon. 
Go there. 

829
00:47:39,200 --> 00:47:42,700
You feel like it's full day time
because they have an overhead 

830
00:47:42,900 --> 00:47:45,000
TV. 
Just bigger than one I've ever 

831
00:47:45,000 --> 00:47:49,700
seen before and just like, 
great, fantastic experience. 

832
00:47:49,700 --> 00:47:55,400
So, yeah, last night sounds like
about you, Jeff, you know, it's 

833
00:47:55,400 --> 00:47:58,600
a lot of little little moments 
walking through the hall seeing 

834
00:47:58,600 --> 00:48:01,900
people that I haven't seen 
before being able to thank guess

835
00:48:01,900 --> 00:48:03,800
that we've had on the show that 
we haven't been able to meet in 

836
00:48:03,800 --> 00:48:07,600
person over the years. 
I'm not, I don't know what it 

837
00:48:07,600 --> 00:48:09,400
is, but I guess I'm not as 
approachable as you because I 

838
00:48:09,408 --> 00:48:11,500
know you have always had people 
coming up saying, Hey, listen to

839
00:48:11,508 --> 00:48:13,200
the show and for that, which is 
very cool. 

840
00:48:13,300 --> 00:48:16,200
We always appreciate all our 
listeners, I had one last night,

841
00:48:16,200 --> 00:48:18,200
which was great. 
I was walking back to my hotel 

842
00:48:18,200 --> 00:48:21,800
room and I think his name was 
John John. 

843
00:48:22,300 --> 00:48:25,100
Hopefully, with John, from 
transmits times like, hey, Jeff,

844
00:48:25,100 --> 00:48:26,800
I listen to podcasts like, oh, 
very cool. 

845
00:48:26,800 --> 00:48:29,100
Thank you very much. 
So you're definitely the more 

846
00:48:29,100 --> 00:48:31,300
social butterfly but little 
interactions like that. 

847
00:48:31,300 --> 00:48:34,400
I think are very cool and being 
able to kind of talk with looks 

848
00:48:34,400 --> 00:48:35,500
like that. 
Yeah, yeah. 

849
00:48:35,500 --> 00:48:41,000
Like well half of it is like me 
grabbing people that I've known 

850
00:48:41,000 --> 00:48:45,900
over the years I saw Ryan Rossi 
in the vendor Hall. 

851
00:48:45,900 --> 00:48:50,000
And, you know, we go back a long
time and back from his board 

852
00:48:50,000 --> 00:48:53,200
Rock days and he left word Rock 
and now he's back and forward 

853
00:48:53,200 --> 00:48:55,700
Rock. 
So yeah, it's great seeing him 

854
00:48:55,700 --> 00:48:58,000
and he's supposed to come out 
and do karaoke tonight. 

855
00:48:58,000 --> 00:48:59,700
So we'll see. 
We'll see what you're supposed 

856
00:48:59,700 --> 00:49:01,800
to sing something tonight. 
You still haven't told me what 

857
00:49:01,800 --> 00:49:04,400
your songs going to be Jesus. 
And told me what 

858
00:49:04,400 --> 00:49:06,800
misunderstanding. 
Okay, well I won't be singing. 

859
00:49:06,800 --> 00:49:09,300
So hopefully people come out and
join me on the bench watching. 

860
00:49:09,300 --> 00:49:11,900
There you go. 
Hey I think you guys will have 

861
00:49:11,900 --> 00:49:14,000
just as much money on if not. 
More definitely. 

862
00:49:14,900 --> 00:49:16,800
All right, let's go ahead and 
wrap it up for this one. 

863
00:49:16,800 --> 00:49:19,700
Gal thank you so much for being 
part of this conversation for 

864
00:49:19,700 --> 00:49:22,300
folks who are interested will 
have links in the show notes. 

865
00:49:22,300 --> 00:49:27,000
But you can check out plain' 
ID.com to learn more about what 

866
00:49:27,000 --> 00:49:28,700
you guys are doing a speech was 
very cool. 

867
00:49:29,000 --> 00:49:31,800
We'll also have a link to gals 
profile on LinkedIn, so you can 

868
00:49:31,800 --> 00:49:35,000
connect with her and tell her 
why she's right or wrong when it

869
00:49:35,000 --> 00:49:38,400
comes to, I guess anything. 
But probably something identity.

870
00:49:38,400 --> 00:49:40,500
Right? 
Is what I'm guessing we're on 

871
00:49:41,000 --> 00:49:42,300
the web. 
Idac. 

872
00:49:42,300 --> 00:49:47,800
Podcast.com On Twitter at idac 
podcast, Mastodon at I still 

873
00:49:47,800 --> 00:49:50,900
have mastered. 
So I still post we have one or 

874
00:49:50,900 --> 00:49:54,000
two people who sort of engage on
that side and like a post, we 

875
00:49:54,000 --> 00:49:57,900
definitely help appreciate that.
Our friend, Chris is one of 

876
00:49:57,900 --> 00:50:00,400
those. 
So I basically do it for Chris, 

877
00:50:00,500 --> 00:50:04,000
do it, because it's hard. 
Yeah, Chris Powers but yeah, 

878
00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:07,400
we're on Macon. 
At idac podcasts at infosec got 

879
00:50:07,400 --> 00:50:08,800
exchanged. 
Obviously, you can always 

880
00:50:08,800 --> 00:50:11,600
connect with Jim and I we got a 
lot of interesting things coming

881
00:50:11,600 --> 00:50:12,900
up. 
I think I want to get into a 

882
00:50:12,900 --> 00:50:14,500
little more. 
I run this Chief identity 

883
00:50:14,500 --> 00:50:18,000
officer role and Jim and I are 
going to kind of fall some ideas

884
00:50:18,000 --> 00:50:21,100
and take it back again. 
We've got Ian Ian's coming up 

885
00:50:21,100 --> 00:50:24,000
next here, except so yeah, so 
that would be a good one to 

886
00:50:24,000 --> 00:50:26,400
springboard off of maybe. 
Yeah. 

887
00:50:26,400 --> 00:50:29,600
And that's pretty much it. 
So subscribe like all the cool 

888
00:50:29,600 --> 00:50:32,200
fun things that you know people 
like you to do when you listen 

889
00:50:32,200 --> 00:50:35,800
to podcasts and we'll talk with 
everyone in the next one. 

890
00:50:36,000 --> 00:50:39,100
Thank you. 
You've been listening to 

891
00:50:39,100 --> 00:50:43,100
Identity at the center. 
We hope you've enjoyed the show.

892
00:50:43,300 --> 00:50:47,600
Make sure to like rate and 
review and we'll be back soon, 

893
00:50:47,600 --> 00:50:51,100
but in the meantime, hit the 
website at identity at the 

894
00:50:51,100 --> 00:50:57,100
center.com and find us on 
Twitter at ivac podcast. 

895
00:50:57,500 --> 00:51:01,600
See you next time on identity at
the center,