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You're listening to the identity
of the center podcast, this is 

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the show that talks about 
identity and access management 

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and making sure you know who has
access to what let's get 

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started. 
Welcome to the identity of the 

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center podcast. 
I'm Jeff. 

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And that's Jim. 
Hey Jim. 

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Hey, Jeff, how are you? 
Oh, not so bad yourself. 

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Good, I see. 
You're recording from a hotel 

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room today. 
I am courtesy this this episode 

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not sponsored by any one 
particular, but I am in a 

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Marriott Courtyard right now. 
Well, we know what that that 

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experience is like, if your 
business traveler, I think 

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you've been to courtyards all 
over the United States or 

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essentially, all over the world.
Every one I've been to is pretty

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much the Same. 
I think if the consistency that 

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I appreciate the most about it, 
you book a Marriott Courtyard. 

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You know what? 
You're going to get. 

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That's right. 
Yeah. 

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And that there's something to be
said for that. 

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That's I think part of the 
reason, why McDonalds is so 

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popular, right? 
Is you had McDonald's everywhere

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and they're pretty close to the 
same experience. 

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But beyond that I've been, I had
a funny. 

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Thought we do. 
You remember Jack Handey on 

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worse? 
Yeah. 

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Jack Handey from My mother's 
alive, DDOS Deep Thoughts by 

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Jack Kennedy. 
So I was thinking about verified

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identities and so that the deep 
thought would go, not everybody 

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loves verified identities. 
For example, kids with fake IDs,

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do not want those identities 
verified It's pretty accurate. 

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I would say nerdy but accurate. 
Well that was yeah that was part

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of the Deep Thoughts by Jack 
Handey. 

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That was what it was all about. 
I can't imagine what he would 

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write at this point. 
I know I should probably say 

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what he would rather. 
I don't even know if he's still 

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alive or not but classic for the
90s I guess. 

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I just assumed that maybe he's 
moved on but I don't know for 

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sure. 
Now they're only we had a 

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researcher and you know and it 
like a producer that we could 

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yell into our ear to look that 
up. 

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What were the like an intern 
wherever you say? 

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When you go to look up her ass 
Jack Handey episodes on or skits

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and are they still alive? 
We need an intern Jeff. 

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We do it. 
Is it it pays - money. 

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You actually have to pay us and 
it's thankless work. 

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So if that's not an attractive 
job offer, I don't know what is.

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Yes. 
Exactly. 

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So hey, we've got a couple of 
things coming up. 

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Do you want to kind of run down 
the list or do you want me to 

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I'll kick us off? 
Because you did it last time. 

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We've got a few different things
going on. 

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So while you've got more going 
on than I do, at this point, 

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you've got what next week, 
actually this week by the time 

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people listen to this. 
So it'll be September 19th when 

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this episode goes live. 
But later on the week, there 

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will be a webinar that Jim is 
representing us on with one 

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Cosmos and that they tried to 
fix passwords. 

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But how do we fix MFA, you know,
super sexy title? 

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I'm sure be very interesting. 
So if you want to support the 

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show, go support Jim register 
for the webinar. 

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I'll have a link in our show 
notes. 

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People can check out, but yeah, 
looking forward to I'll be 

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catching that on the replay 
because I'll be on a flight back

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from Las Vegas. 
Theoretically, at that point. 

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We've also got the authentic 
eight 2022 conference coming up,

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put on by our friends, over at 
Fido. 

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That is October 17th to 19th. 
We're going to be out there, 

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both Jim and I, and looking to 
do some, some podcasting. 

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So, Jim has already started 
trying to fill up our schedule 

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with the chose to record. 
So, you know, we'll we'll be 

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looking to do some things. 
They're, we're also going to be 

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at Octane and November in San 
Francisco. 

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I think it's November 8th to the
10th. 

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It's kind of like a partner / 
customer conference. 

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But the idea there is again, 
we'll have hopefully 

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conversations with folks, in and
around sort of the 

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authentication space and Folks 
at Octane and so forth that I 

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want everything. 
I know, I think there's one 

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other one, so we don't know the 
date for it yet. 

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But friend of the show and 
friend of ours, Tom Lennon from 

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sale Point has Says to present 
to the Carolinas identity 

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Roundtable, so that's yet to be 
scheduled, but it should happen 

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here in, you know, 2022 and just
shout out to the Tom for giving 

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us the opportunity. 
I think it's going to be a fun 

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time. 
Yeah, that'll be cool. 

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I don't know what we're going to
talk about or how it's going to 

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work, but we're excited to 
figure it out and so maybe 

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something related to Identity 
and access management. 

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I'm guessing I hope so. 
That's the only thing. 

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Well, even that you could you 
could barely say we're qualified

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to speak about but we do it 
anyway but do it anyway. 

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You want to get to our topic for
today? 

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Sure. 
Yeah. 

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And so Jack Handy would be proud
of us. 

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We're going to talk about 
identity proofing, verified 

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identities and verifiable 
credentials. 

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And we had a good little 
conversation about making sure 

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we got that terminology right 
with us, we have Nishant kaushik

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CTO with eunuch in former 
colleague of ours. 

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Back in our adventure biddies. 
And I'd miss Sharpe was with us 

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last on episode number 73 which 
was December of twenty 20, 

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Rayven the the peak of the 
pandemic. 

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So I guess he was not out 
running around the world at that

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point. 
Like the rest of us we use. 

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He was at home and maybe we 
don't know. 

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Yeah, I guess, you know, we can,
we can introduce him and ask him

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what he's been up to since the 
last time he was on the show 

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hidden, Sean. 
Hey everyone. 

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Hi guys, I have definitely not 
been running around anywhere 

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even now like I think. 
Oh the only work-related or 

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identically trip. 
I took was when I went to 

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identify verse earlier this 
year, other than that, I've been

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pretty much homebound in terms 
of working from home and 

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focusing on the work we're doing
at Seneca. 

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Yeah. 
And what side is that conference

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wind up becoming like a super 
spreader. 

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I think a few people left the 
Conference and I wound up 

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catching covid shortly after but
I mean covid is pretty much 

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everywhere now. 
So I don't know if you can 

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necessarily pinpoint. 
The fact that you were at the 

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conference? 
Yeah. 

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No I think it definitely 
happened but it pretty much 

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happened at every conference 
that took place. 

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So you know it's just the nature
of going back to a world that 

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used to exist before but and 
we're trying to live that same 

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life but you know that world 
still hasn't come back yet. 

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So, yeah, our say was the same 
way earlier in the year. 

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Had I dodged it, but I know a 
lot of people got got sick and I

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think I heard to make the 
identifiers. 

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Jim. 
I could make a Denver's. 

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It was just terrible timing for,
for both of us, were for 

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different reasons. 
We were at Gartner a few weeks 

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ago, and knock on wood, so far, 
so good for me. 

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And I haven't heard of any sort 
of outbreaks, so maybe the same 

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people who were or maybe already
had the antibodies through the 

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roof or something. 
By the time they got the Gartner

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Earlier. 
So maybe that was strategy on 

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Gartner's part yet you let 
everyone else gets sick, build 

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up the immunity and then you 
know at their conference after 

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that Sonia Schott we're going to
talk about identity proofing 

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today and what we thought would 
be kind of a good way to start 

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would be to start with the 
basics of what is identity 

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proofing. 
And and one thing I wanted to 

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throw out there is like I had to
think of the process the way 

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used to be, which was You know, 
showing up in person with a 

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passport or and I, you know, 
like a driver's license or 

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walking license that we used to 
call him. 

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And I was kind of thinking of a 
client that I work with, you 

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know, probably eight years ago, 
that was the University, a large

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University, in order to get your
student ID ID to show up on 

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campus. 
Or if there was a remote campus 

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your or your full-time remote, 
you had to go to Some kind of 

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Licensing station to go and 
actually go through this 

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verification. 
That was you know in my mind 

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what identity proofing was, how 
do you define identity proofing?

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Well, conceptually it's pretty 
much what you laid out, right? 

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The idea there being that as a 
business as a service, you're 

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trying to verify the identity, 
the real world identity of a 

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person, whatever real world 
identity in that context means 

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because it's very 
context-sensitive 

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context-dependent. 
But the idea being that you just

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want to make sure that when 
somebody is coming in and 

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saying, hey, I'm Jen and I work 
at a worked at identity. 

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Actually, let me take a 
different example. 

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I'm Jim and I used to work at So
if I end, that's something that 

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you care about, well, how do I 
verify that as a business before

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I allow you to proceed? 
And how can I trust that? 

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So as you as you pointed out, 
you know, we're used to these 

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men. 
These processes proofing 

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processes being real world right
in terms of brick and mortar, as

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we call it in my world, where 
we're dealing very much with 

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this, in the consumer, a tiny 
space. 

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We dealing with it in the 
context of how do you know 

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People open bank accounts or 
people register for, you know, 

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retail accounts or and get 
access to, you know, Airline 

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accounts or health care, 
whatever. 

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Everybody cares about the 
identity of the person and on 

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the other side and that want to 
figure out today are required 

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level of assurance and that's 
the key part is this that real 

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person and you have to figure 
out how you're going to do that 

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and the old way of doing it, 
which was show up in person and 

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sure document to a human being 
doesn't work anymore. 

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That's what we're trying to get 
past. 

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And so in all the, in the 
identity proofing space that's 

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literally what's being focused 
on right now, is how do I 

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digitize the process such that I
can take the human being for the

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most part out of the equation 
and allow it to be fully self 

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service fully remote, you know? 
But with this the required level

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of assurance. 
Yeah. 

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So we talked about, I think we 
just laid out they're pretty 

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well was the verified identity. 
So in other words, you've gone 

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through the proofing process 
now, your identity has been 

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verified. 
We also hear about The right way

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to say it, I think is verifiable
credentials their wrong way, to 

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say, to her. 
What we commonly hear as 

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shorthand is verified 
credentials. 

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Yeah. 
Maybe do you run into do you 

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experience that as well? 
Hearing people say verified 

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credentials. 
Yes, because I think the area of

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verifiable credentials is still 
pretty new and unknown to folks,

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outside of the identity 
Community people who are dealing

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with this on day and that they 
are basis. 

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If you you know, it's really 
important for a lot of us who 

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work in identity to really, you 
know, make sure that we 

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acknowledge the bubble we live 
in. 

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You know, we think of these 
things and we know what they are

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and we have huge humongous 
debates about them when you go 

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out and talk. 
Do actual practitioners and 

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business people. 
They don't really know what it 

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is. 
They're thinking of their 

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problems that, right? 
So, you know, I like to, you 

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know, my Twitter by, I put them 
solver of problems, right? 

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So the point from my 
perspective, as always, been 

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what is the use case? 
What are you trying to solve? 

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And what businesses care about 
is, the verified identity part, 

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which is I need to know you are,
who you say, you are to the 

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level that I require to have 
trust in that and that changes 

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that's different for different 
organisms. 

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Ization. 
Because if I'm a, if I'm, you 

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know, shopping site a verified, 
any simply, yeah, you're 

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somebody who has an email 
address that, I was able to send

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a link to in verify that you had
possession of that email 

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address. 
And that's sufficient for me to 

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verify that. 
You are a somebody who wants to 

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be a customer with me. 
I don't care what whether you 

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use, Joe Schmo, as and as your 
name. 

227
00:12:17,500 --> 00:12:20,300
I don't matter later, when I get
it to payments, but for now if 

228
00:12:20,300 --> 00:12:22,500
you just, you know, doing stuff 
on site, I don't care. 

229
00:12:23,300 --> 00:12:25,800
But if you're a bank, then a 
verified at it. 

230
00:12:25,900 --> 00:12:28,100
I mean, something very, very 
different because you're looking

231
00:12:28,100 --> 00:12:32,600
at looking at the legal identity
and do I have enough information

232
00:12:32,600 --> 00:12:35,100
to know that this is a real 
person to have enough 

233
00:12:35,100 --> 00:12:38,800
information to satisfy the know,
your customer regulations that, 

234
00:12:38,900 --> 00:12:43,500
you know, have to dare to do. 
I have enough information to be 

235
00:12:43,500 --> 00:12:48,500
able to identify whether you try
to previously, open an account 

236
00:12:48,500 --> 00:12:51,300
with the different name. 
And, you know, you, you're 

237
00:12:51,300 --> 00:12:53,400
somehow trying to create 
duplicate account fraud and 

238
00:12:53,400 --> 00:12:57,700
things like that. 
So, So, verified identity from a

239
00:12:57,700 --> 00:13:01,100
business perspective, is trying 
to solve their problem with 

240
00:13:01,100 --> 00:13:03,500
their very specific point of 
view. 

241
00:13:03,500 --> 00:13:05,600
They're very specific lens that 
they looking at through. 

242
00:13:07,100 --> 00:13:09,300
Yeah. 
And the processes that we that 

243
00:13:09,300 --> 00:13:13,000
I've experienced in terms of 
going through a identity 

244
00:13:13,000 --> 00:13:17,500
proofing, process is very 
device-specific. 

245
00:13:17,500 --> 00:13:20,900
So, you know, I'm thinking of a 
specific example where I went 

246
00:13:20,900 --> 00:13:25,800
through a self-service process 
to verify my identity. 

247
00:13:26,300 --> 00:13:32,400
And use like a basically, a 
video selfie having me turn my 

248
00:13:32,400 --> 00:13:37,200
head and things like that and 
compared it to my driver's 

249
00:13:37,200 --> 00:13:41,300
license for sure provided copies
of in terms of picture. 

250
00:13:41,300 --> 00:13:44,300
So I'm wondering is that typical
workflow? 

251
00:13:44,300 --> 00:13:49,300
And you know what is and are 
different solutions, doing it 

252
00:13:49,300 --> 00:13:54,500
differently and how 
device-specific it is it because

253
00:13:55,100 --> 00:13:58,300
I tend to have You know, higher 
and devices than the average 

254
00:13:58,300 --> 00:14:00,700
person. 
So where does the average person

255
00:14:00,700 --> 00:14:02,300
fall? 
Yeah. 

256
00:14:02,300 --> 00:14:04,700
I mean it's a very very tricky 
topic, right? 

257
00:14:04,700 --> 00:14:08,200
Because at the end of the day, 
what you're trying to do is 

258
00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:10,900
build an approximation for what 
for what that real-world 

259
00:14:10,900 --> 00:14:12,900
process, that brick-and-mortar 
process that we talked about 

260
00:14:12,900 --> 00:14:15,800
earlier, you're trying to build 
a digital equivalent for that 

261
00:14:15,800 --> 00:14:18,200
and that's because people are 
working from a frame of 

262
00:14:18,200 --> 00:14:21,100
reference and in many cases that
actually constrained by the fact

263
00:14:21,100 --> 00:14:24,700
that There are regulatory 
requirements that I were 

264
00:14:24,700 --> 00:14:28,600
designed for brick-and-mortar 
times that have not been updated

265
00:14:28,600 --> 00:14:31,100
for digital times. 
And there are no sometimes no 

266
00:14:31,100 --> 00:14:35,800
better solutions that you have 
available to the best proof of 

267
00:14:35,800 --> 00:14:39,500
who you are from a legal entity 
perspective is your physical 

268
00:14:39,500 --> 00:14:42,500
document, your driver's license,
your password, Etc. 

269
00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:46,300
And there are no widespread 
digital equivalents so people 

270
00:14:46,300 --> 00:14:49,200
are making do with what they 
have and that's forcing them 

271
00:14:49,200 --> 00:14:52,100
down a path where you said the 
process you described. 

272
00:14:52,400 --> 00:14:55,800
Which is yeah. 
Take take a selfie, you know, 

273
00:14:55,800 --> 00:14:59,300
take a, take a picture of your 
document and you know, oh wait, 

274
00:14:59,300 --> 00:15:02,500
if you have a passport that has 
a chip in it or we'll do that's 

275
00:15:02,500 --> 00:15:03,900
great. 
We'll do an NFC lead and we 

276
00:15:03,900 --> 00:15:06,000
trust that even more because now
there's some cryptographic 

277
00:15:06,000 --> 00:15:08,200
Assurance around it and stuff 
like that. 

278
00:15:08,200 --> 00:15:12,000
And that is very much 
state-of-the-art simply because 

279
00:15:12,000 --> 00:15:15,000
alternatives are still being 
developed and still fairly new 

280
00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:17,400
and they're not widespread 
enough, and they have enough 

281
00:15:17,600 --> 00:15:22,100
sort of friction in the process 
to have an adopter. 

282
00:15:22,200 --> 00:15:24,700
Problem right now, right? 
So it's changing, I think this 

283
00:15:24,700 --> 00:15:27,600
is a space that's very much 
changing their organizations 

284
00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:29,900
like better identity Coalition 
etcetera, that are working on 

285
00:15:29,900 --> 00:15:34,400
the regulatory side to try and 
introduce things that could make

286
00:15:34,400 --> 00:15:38,100
some of the stuff easier. 
But yeah, it's pretty still 

287
00:15:38,100 --> 00:15:41,000
pretty much. 
What do we have available to us?

288
00:15:41,000 --> 00:15:44,500
That we can make do with and 
what's pretty much ubiquitous 

289
00:15:44,500 --> 00:15:48,800
right now is essentially 
physical documents and digital 

290
00:15:48,800 --> 00:15:51,800
phones with cameras. 
That's basically the starting 

291
00:15:51,800 --> 00:15:52,700
set you up. 
With. 

292
00:15:53,600 --> 00:15:56,100
Yeah. 
And I think that part of what 

293
00:15:56,700 --> 00:16:01,000
I've heard referred to as 
liveness detection is part of 

294
00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:04,300
that process, right? 
We we want to make sure that 

295
00:16:04,300 --> 00:16:07,300
we're not just holding up a 
picture of ourselves to the 

296
00:16:07,300 --> 00:16:10,300
camera. 
And then I guess even there's 

297
00:16:10,300 --> 00:16:16,000
that next level of the call it 
like deep fakes where it's like 

298
00:16:16,000 --> 00:16:19,000
I can create a video that maybe 
does the things that you're 

299
00:16:19,000 --> 00:16:21,800
asking for. 
So I was trying to defeat that 

300
00:16:21,800 --> 00:16:22,700
ahead of time. 
Time. 

301
00:16:23,200 --> 00:16:27,600
We're certainly not the at the 
point of having droids or, you 

302
00:16:27,600 --> 00:16:32,600
know, I'll be watching this 
Captain Picard sequel to the 

303
00:16:32,600 --> 00:16:37,300
whole Star Trek, the Next 
Generation, and they call data 

304
00:16:37,300 --> 00:16:41,300
and the folks like date of the 
the Bots like data they call him

305
00:16:41,300 --> 00:16:44,100
since. 
So we're not at that point yet, 

306
00:16:44,200 --> 00:16:51,100
but yeah, they actually brought 
up something in that show that 

307
00:16:51,100 --> 00:16:55,500
got me thinking about the Wife 
nurse sharks which was that the 

308
00:16:55,500 --> 00:17:00,400
synths they could create 
absolute twins. 

309
00:17:00,700 --> 00:17:06,599
So there's no difference between
sin Theta and since B but that 

310
00:17:06,599 --> 00:17:09,900
twins human twins actually are 
different even if they're 

311
00:17:09,900 --> 00:17:13,500
identical twins and if you've 
known identical twins and you 

312
00:17:13,500 --> 00:17:16,300
really get to know them 
eventually they almost don't 

313
00:17:16,300 --> 00:17:18,300
even look the same to you 
anymore, right. 

314
00:17:18,300 --> 00:17:20,900
They look like two very 
different people of people 

315
00:17:20,900 --> 00:17:23,500
seeing them for the first time. 
I think, oh my gosh, you're 

316
00:17:23,500 --> 00:17:25,000
stupid. 
Will that look the same? 

317
00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:29,300
I'm wondering. 
Can liveness detection actually 

318
00:17:29,300 --> 00:17:31,400
detect the difference between 
Twins? 

319
00:17:33,300 --> 00:17:37,900
So it's important to understand 
the distinction between the 

320
00:17:38,800 --> 00:17:41,300
technical components in the 
process that we're discussing 

321
00:17:41,300 --> 00:17:43,000
here, right? 
So liveness detection enough 

322
00:17:43,000 --> 00:17:47,600
itself isn't quote, unquote and 
identity piece. 

323
00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:49,000
What it is. 
It's a security peace. 

324
00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:53,000
What lyman's detection is trying
to do, is ensure that the is 

325
00:17:53,100 --> 00:17:57,000
person who's presenting the 
document is the real person 

326
00:17:57,100 --> 00:17:59,800
associated with that document. 
So at the end of the day, when 

327
00:17:59,800 --> 00:18:02,800
you're doing an identity 
presentation, Of a proven 

328
00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:03,900
process. 
What you're doing is you're 

329
00:18:03,900 --> 00:18:06,900
providing a document and saying,
here's my document, that gives 

330
00:18:06,900 --> 00:18:10,400
you all the data that you can 
verify whatever process you have

331
00:18:10,400 --> 00:18:13,800
for verifying that. 
And in that document, there is a

332
00:18:13,800 --> 00:18:15,700
picture of me essentially, 
right? 

333
00:18:15,700 --> 00:18:19,300
Like and you don't want to say, 
and by the way, here's a selfie 

334
00:18:19,300 --> 00:18:22,100
of me and make sure that it's 
the two people because you want 

335
00:18:22,100 --> 00:18:23,300
a basic. 
What you're basically trying to 

336
00:18:23,300 --> 00:18:26,500
do that is is essentially 
validate that the person 

337
00:18:26,500 --> 00:18:29,700
presenting the document, is the 
person on the document, right? 

338
00:18:30,400 --> 00:18:31,700
So that's what you're trying to 
do. 

339
00:18:32,400 --> 00:18:35,800
But in order to ensure the 
Integrity of that, you have to 

340
00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:38,500
make sure the person who's 
taking the selfie is the real 

341
00:18:38,500 --> 00:18:41,200
person. 
And is not, as you said, a fake,

342
00:18:41,300 --> 00:18:43,100
a fake, because they picked up a
held up. 

343
00:18:43,108 --> 00:18:47,000
A photograph, to put on a mask, 
they played a video or something

344
00:18:47,000 --> 00:18:49,000
like that. 
So what liveness detection is 

345
00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:51,800
trying to do is trying to 
determine that this selfie that 

346
00:18:51,800 --> 00:18:56,200
was taken is taken off a real 
person, where any thing that 

347
00:18:56,200 --> 00:19:00,300
would be used to fake, that can 
be caught so it's a security 

348
00:19:00,300 --> 00:19:04,200
control around the ability. 
Selfie taking that you then 

349
00:19:04,200 --> 00:19:08,700
during the match on and that you
know, likeness detection is the 

350
00:19:08,700 --> 00:19:11,600
core. 
The I've said the server a bunch

351
00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:15,300
of times in various talks that 
given the because people talk 

352
00:19:15,300 --> 00:19:17,600
about, oh my biometric. 
If my Biometrics stolen is like 

353
00:19:17,600 --> 00:19:20,400
my foot password, got stolen and
things like that and it's not 

354
00:19:20,400 --> 00:19:22,700
right. 
The power of biometric is an 

355
00:19:22,700 --> 00:19:24,700
authentication Factor 
specifically. 

356
00:19:24,700 --> 00:19:27,600
But in all of these cases where 
we were to using it in this 

357
00:19:27,600 --> 00:19:30,900
context, in the proofing Factor 
doesn't like in its secrecy 

358
00:19:31,300 --> 00:19:34,500
because biometrics Or the most 
part are not secret the life. 

359
00:19:34,500 --> 00:19:38,700
The see the proof lies in 
actually the liveness detection 

360
00:19:38,700 --> 00:19:40,100
of it. 
That's the that's the real 

361
00:19:40,100 --> 00:19:42,100
thing. 
That makes sure that you have 

362
00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:45,100
Assurance around the Integrity 
of the process that you're 

363
00:19:45,100 --> 00:19:47,500
taking the user through. 
So that's why it's a really 

364
00:19:47,500 --> 00:19:50,100
critical component that you 
really need to pay attention to.

365
00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:55,400
So, the satellite just 
detection, that would tell you 

366
00:19:55,400 --> 00:19:57,400
the difference between identical
twins. 

367
00:19:57,400 --> 00:20:05,900
It's something else about that. 
King process is that an issue 

368
00:20:05,900 --> 00:20:10,500
within the industry that we're 
struggling with it with 

369
00:20:10,600 --> 00:20:14,500
identical twins. 
It doesn't come up a lot. 

370
00:20:14,500 --> 00:20:19,600
So I would say it's not really I
mean it's a nice interesting 

371
00:20:19,600 --> 00:20:21,500
example. 
That always gets used when 

372
00:20:21,500 --> 00:20:24,000
having a conversation about how 
good is this process. 

373
00:20:24,600 --> 00:20:28,900
But in reality, identical twins 
performing, fraud isn't really a

374
00:20:29,300 --> 00:20:32,000
isn't really an attack Vector 
that we any business is worried 

375
00:20:32,000 --> 00:20:34,100
about, right? 
It's not really high. 

376
00:20:35,700 --> 00:20:37,900
The few cases where it might be 
high. 

377
00:20:37,900 --> 00:20:40,300
Like, for example, if you're 
trying to commit some kind of, 

378
00:20:41,000 --> 00:20:44,800
you know, Account takeover 
fraud, in the context of, you 

379
00:20:44,808 --> 00:20:48,100
know, I want to take over your 
bank account and, you know, you 

380
00:20:48,100 --> 00:20:50,900
know, siblings are falling out 
when you have a high risk 

381
00:20:50,900 --> 00:20:53,600
transaction that like that, you 
don't rely on just that. 

382
00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:57,000
Then at that point you bring in 
additional things to validate 

383
00:20:57,000 --> 00:20:58,300
it, right? 
So you will do additional 

384
00:20:58,300 --> 00:21:00,400
checks. 
In addition to this you won't 

385
00:21:01,100 --> 00:21:02,900
you always risk adjust what 
you're doing. 

386
00:21:02,900 --> 00:21:06,600
So from that perspective, 
identical twins fraud or you 

387
00:21:06,600 --> 00:21:09,800
know, attack Vector is an 
interesting, you know, 

388
00:21:10,200 --> 00:21:12,700
theoretical concept, but in 
practicality nobody really ever.

389
00:21:12,900 --> 00:21:15,600
Has to deal with it. 
What are bigger issues and 

390
00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:20,100
bigger challenges right now that
we see across the board is 

391
00:21:21,400 --> 00:21:26,400
account takeover fraud, where, 
because you have identity 

392
00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:31,600
documents themselves that are 
easy to spoof and fake. 

393
00:21:32,200 --> 00:21:35,900
I can present myself as some as 
a fictitious person. 

394
00:21:35,900 --> 00:21:39,500
So it's more akin to the 
synthetic identity problem or me

395
00:21:39,500 --> 00:21:42,700
stealing somebody's a day. 
Not because I looked like them. 

396
00:21:43,300 --> 00:21:46,200
But because I took their 
document and put my likeness on 

397
00:21:46,200 --> 00:21:48,500
the document. 
So it's the, it's Jim's 

398
00:21:48,500 --> 00:21:50,800
document, but it's my picture on
it. 

399
00:21:50,800 --> 00:21:53,600
So how do you catch that? 
So verifying the document data, 

400
00:21:53,800 --> 00:21:56,200
but I find that I approve of the
identity that you're actually 

401
00:21:56,200 --> 00:21:58,300
using. 
That's really where the real 

402
00:21:58,300 --> 00:22:02,900
challenges are. 
Because quite frankly for an 

403
00:22:03,100 --> 00:22:06,500
industry, where we are, so 
obsessed and work on standards 

404
00:22:06,500 --> 00:22:09,900
and, you know, the xkcd article,
there's 14 standards and it's 

405
00:22:09,900 --> 00:22:11,500
not working. 
So that's figure out how to 

406
00:22:11,500 --> 00:22:14,200
combine it together. 
Now, we have 15 Right in 

407
00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:19,200
identity proofing and the 
document space is wide open. 

408
00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:23,100
Like there is no real cohesive 
standards so when you're trying 

409
00:22:23,100 --> 00:22:26,500
to do this you have to deal with
each Place. 

410
00:22:26,500 --> 00:22:30,400
Each jurisdiction each 
geographic region, completely 

411
00:22:30,400 --> 00:22:33,800
different. 
So, when in our product where, 

412
00:22:33,800 --> 00:22:36,000
you know, rebuilt, we're 
building the site every platform

413
00:22:36,000 --> 00:22:39,800
which does the whole end-to-end 
security around the identity, 

414
00:22:39,800 --> 00:22:41,800
right? 
From proofing, onboarding, 

415
00:22:42,000 --> 00:22:44,700
authentications Strong 
authentication account recovery.

416
00:22:44,700 --> 00:22:46,400
All of that. 
We're trying to put it all 

417
00:22:46,400 --> 00:22:49,600
together into one cohesive 
seamless flow. 

418
00:22:49,600 --> 00:22:51,900
That's what our platform does. 
And then we dealing with 

419
00:22:51,900 --> 00:22:54,700
onboarding and, and this kind of
identity proofing, we're dealing

420
00:22:54,700 --> 00:22:59,400
with you've got countries where 
they have fully digitized 

421
00:23:00,000 --> 00:23:01,900
documents. 
Like, if you go to Singapore, 

422
00:23:01,900 --> 00:23:05,600
you have sing pass, you have, 
you know, identity wallets. 

423
00:23:05,600 --> 00:23:07,900
If you by the government, that 
can give you verifiable 

424
00:23:07,900 --> 00:23:10,500
credentials in some sense and so
on. 

425
00:23:11,200 --> 00:23:14,400
And you have the US where We 
have passports that have chips 

426
00:23:14,400 --> 00:23:17,600
in it, but we have, you know, 
state driver's licenses where 

427
00:23:17,600 --> 00:23:20,600
every state has a completely 
different format and structure. 

428
00:23:21,000 --> 00:23:24,000
And then you have, you know, we 
dealing a lot in areas like 

429
00:23:24,800 --> 00:23:28,100
Africa and South America, where 
you have the gamut. 

430
00:23:28,100 --> 00:23:31,200
You have really sophisticated 
chip-based and document but you 

431
00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:35,100
also have in the same area, same
jurisdiction, same population. 

432
00:23:35,400 --> 00:23:38,100
People whose only identification
is a piece of paper, like 

433
00:23:38,100 --> 00:23:41,100
literally a piece of A4 paper 
that has been folded up because 

434
00:23:41,100 --> 00:23:44,500
it's got stuff written on it. 
And and and Stuff and your as a 

435
00:23:44,508 --> 00:23:47,600
business trying to cover the 
entire population, which means 

436
00:23:47,600 --> 00:23:50,600
have to do with this in this 
vast range. 

437
00:23:50,700 --> 00:23:52,700
That's really the challenge. 
And I think that's where things 

438
00:23:52,700 --> 00:23:54,500
like verifiable credentials, 
Etc. 

439
00:23:55,400 --> 00:23:58,300
Really are the answers that 
people are looking for. 

440
00:23:58,900 --> 00:24:00,700
Whether we get, there is a whole
different issue. 

441
00:24:00,700 --> 00:24:03,300
Because there's, you know, like 
I said, other challenges the 

442
00:24:03,300 --> 00:24:06,100
place, but if you get to the 
point where you have that, that 

443
00:24:06,100 --> 00:24:07,800
can really solve a lot of these 
problems. 

444
00:24:07,800 --> 00:24:11,100
Because right now, people are 
dealing with just Goofy stuff. 

445
00:24:11,100 --> 00:24:12,400
Right? 
You know, this is not something 

446
00:24:12,400 --> 00:24:14,900
we should be dealing with but we
unfortunately have to deal with 

447
00:24:14,900 --> 00:24:17,200
because we living in the real 
world, right? 

448
00:24:17,300 --> 00:24:19,300
Yeah. 
I never really even thought of 

449
00:24:19,300 --> 00:24:22,900
that fraud use case where you 
just change the picture on the 

450
00:24:22,900 --> 00:24:25,600
driver's license and then take a
picture of that. 

451
00:24:25,600 --> 00:24:29,900
Now, I'm comparing my live self 
to a fake version of the 

452
00:24:29,900 --> 00:24:32,800
license. 
If you're able to take that 

453
00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:36,500
license and somehow verify that 
it hasn't been modified. 

454
00:24:37,500 --> 00:24:41,500
So, give me an example on the 
state Of all the 50 states that 

455
00:24:41,500 --> 00:24:45,700
they have some API that you go 
in here and you can download 

456
00:24:45,700 --> 00:24:49,600
something that is like a low-res
version of the license that you 

457
00:24:49,600 --> 00:24:54,300
can somehow do a comparison to 
make sure that it's the same 

458
00:24:54,300 --> 00:24:57,700
license. 
I mean how how do you make that 

459
00:24:57,700 --> 00:24:59,300
work with it? 
That it would be nice right? 

460
00:24:59,300 --> 00:25:05,600
But no and again it's not the 
challenge that we have is it 

461
00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:08,700
sounds like a nice idea to start
getting into the intricacies of 

462
00:25:09,400 --> 00:25:11,200
Just look at the way you 
described it. 

463
00:25:11,400 --> 00:25:15,400
Or is there an API can download?
You know, I can connect to that 

464
00:25:15,400 --> 00:25:18,200
APN and can download Jim's 
license and Jim's picture. 

465
00:25:18,300 --> 00:25:21,200
Wait, what about privacy? 
What about Jim's privacy, who 

466
00:25:21,200 --> 00:25:23,200
has access to that API? 
What are they doing with that 

467
00:25:23,200 --> 00:25:28,600
data? 
So there's all these concerns 

468
00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:31,400
and I want to say, answer your 
concerns but their envelope and 

469
00:25:31,400 --> 00:25:34,300
concerns that you have to 
account for in this kind of 

470
00:25:34,300 --> 00:25:37,300
thing where you have to worry 
about privacy after, right? 

471
00:25:37,300 --> 00:25:39,000
But who has access of data, what
are they using? 

472
00:25:39,300 --> 00:25:44,000
For who's authorized to use it, 
you know, should the bartender 

473
00:25:44,100 --> 00:25:47,800
have the ability to pick up a 
phone and look you up and get a 

474
00:25:47,800 --> 00:25:50,300
dress, just take a picture of 
you, take a selfie of you at the

475
00:25:50,300 --> 00:25:53,400
bar as your ordering the drink 
and get immediately a download 

476
00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:56,900
from the DMV saying, yeah, this 
is Jim and this is his date of 

477
00:25:56,900 --> 00:25:59,100
birth or whatever you don't want
that, right? 

478
00:25:59,100 --> 00:26:01,700
Because that that has huge 
potential ramifications. 

479
00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:06,300
But having those kind of 
identity Services is actually 

480
00:26:06,300 --> 00:26:08,900
pretty important when designed 
correctly and you do it 

481
00:26:08,900 --> 00:26:10,900
correctly. 
If we, because like I said, that

482
00:26:10,900 --> 00:26:14,200
is what will help us get past 
the current Log Jam, we find 

483
00:26:14,200 --> 00:26:19,000
ourself in where one of the 
challenges we, you often find 

484
00:26:19,000 --> 00:26:22,300
is, as it kind of what you 
bought pointed out, right? 

485
00:26:22,300 --> 00:26:24,000
What is the technology that is 
available? 

486
00:26:24,000 --> 00:26:27,700
But the technology default now 
has become smartphone based. 

487
00:26:28,000 --> 00:26:33,000
So what you're immediately 
excluding from that realm is 

488
00:26:33,000 --> 00:26:35,500
people who don't have access to 
smartphones, who are under the 

489
00:26:35,500 --> 00:26:39,000
tech poverty line, people who 
don't have, you know, valid, 

490
00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:42,000
Identity documents which is not 
as easy to have as you would 

491
00:26:42,000 --> 00:26:44,100
think like people lose. 
I Dare You documents all the 

492
00:26:44,100 --> 00:26:45,900
time. 
This is particularly problematic

493
00:26:45,900 --> 00:26:52,100
for folks who are, you know, 
displaced whether it's 

494
00:26:52,100 --> 00:26:55,400
immigrants or local people, who 
are displaced, who have lost 

495
00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:57,400
everything, and they don't have 
anything anymore. 

496
00:26:57,700 --> 00:27:00,800
But they need that identity. 
So they can their identity to 

497
00:27:00,900 --> 00:27:02,700
get the prove that I didn't. 
So they can go get welfare 

498
00:27:02,700 --> 00:27:04,300
benefits. 
How do you solve the problem? 

499
00:27:04,300 --> 00:27:07,100
These are really tricky. 
Really complicated challenges 

500
00:27:07,700 --> 00:27:09,900
trying to do all of that and 
talk about All of that we could 

501
00:27:09,900 --> 00:27:13,400
be talking for hours and not 
gonna get into that but you kind

502
00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:17,200
of get a sense of what the scope
and the, you know, scale of this

503
00:27:17,200 --> 00:27:21,100
challenge is as you go that way.
For example, one of the things 

504
00:27:21,100 --> 00:27:25,300
we're working with one of our 
partners, we dealing with a 

505
00:27:25,300 --> 00:27:28,000
banking product that is targeted
for financial inclusion. 

506
00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:31,000
So it's a it's a it's a banking 
platform that is used for 

507
00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:35,900
providing services to 
communities that are that have 

508
00:27:35,900 --> 00:27:39,800
traditionally been unbanked. 
And so they end up Having very 

509
00:27:39,800 --> 00:27:43,300
very unique challenges that we 
kind of have to figure out that 

510
00:27:43,300 --> 00:27:47,300
forced us to really rethink some
of the ways in which we do stuff

511
00:27:47,300 --> 00:27:49,600
from an identity perspective. 
Then improve enforcement. 

512
00:27:49,600 --> 00:27:54,800
I feel like everything you've 
been talking about is these are 

513
00:27:54,800 --> 00:27:57,300
hard problems to solve the we 
does the industry. 

514
00:27:57,300 --> 00:28:01,600
Draw a line at some point to say
here are the things that we can 

515
00:28:01,600 --> 00:28:05,000
solve and these are the 
variables that we can count on 

516
00:28:05,000 --> 00:28:09,300
versus trying to design a system
that works for literally Every 

517
00:28:09,300 --> 00:28:12,000
single person in every single 
country and every single region 

518
00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:13,900
by blah blah. 
Right, even planet right? 

519
00:28:14,200 --> 00:28:16,600
Ya know how does that work? 
Like is there a line that 

520
00:28:16,600 --> 00:28:20,500
basically says okay well you 
need to be, you know, this tall 

521
00:28:20,500 --> 00:28:22,800
to ride basically. 
Yeah. 

522
00:28:22,800 --> 00:28:25,200
For the identity space. 
Absolutely. 

523
00:28:25,200 --> 00:28:27,400
And I think people draw the line
all the time. 

524
00:28:27,400 --> 00:28:30,500
The challenge I think, right. 
Now we're facing in the industry

525
00:28:31,500 --> 00:28:37,300
which was a key part of the, the
keynote I gave it identifies is 

526
00:28:38,300 --> 00:28:43,100
We've all been drawing that 
line, kind of arbitrarily and 

527
00:28:43,100 --> 00:28:46,900
there are no guidelines. 
There is no, you know, 

528
00:28:47,100 --> 00:28:54,600
overarching ethical sort of body
or organization or anybody that 

529
00:28:54,600 --> 00:28:58,800
is saying well no wait that line
is drawn way too high or 

530
00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:02,400
technical side weight that drawn
and that line is Runway too low 

531
00:29:02,400 --> 00:29:04,200
and you just not just never 
going to get there. 

532
00:29:04,200 --> 00:29:07,200
So now you just spending a bunch
of money and time and effort 

533
00:29:07,200 --> 00:29:10,000
trying to build something That 
will never reach us objective 

534
00:29:10,000 --> 00:29:12,000
Go. 
I mean, you guys have been doing

535
00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:15,000
I am projects forever, right? 
You know what it's like right, 

536
00:29:15,200 --> 00:29:17,500
you define scope but you have to
figure out a way to make the 

537
00:29:17,508 --> 00:29:21,200
scope practical and actually 
deliverable because go scope 

538
00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:25,700
creep happens all the time. 
And the challenge with this is 

539
00:29:25,700 --> 00:29:29,200
that when you draw the line too 
high, then you have exclusion 

540
00:29:29,200 --> 00:29:31,000
problems. 
And that that's obviously not a 

541
00:29:31,008 --> 00:29:36,000
good thing especially with what 
we the role we play, right? 

542
00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:39,000
If you know, we don't we say 
Yeah, you're going to need, you 

543
00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:41,100
need the latest iPhone or the 
latest Android. 

544
00:29:41,100 --> 00:29:42,700
Great technically it works 
great. 

545
00:29:42,700 --> 00:29:45,100
But all of a sudden you now 
build something that up. 

546
00:29:45,100 --> 00:29:47,200
Huge SEC. 
Check the population. 

547
00:29:47,200 --> 00:29:48,400
You say yeah we don't care about
you. 

548
00:29:49,500 --> 00:29:52,400
Plus makes you wonder if we get 
down to a point where because of

549
00:29:52,400 --> 00:29:56,000
the the hardware assisted being 
fragmented amongst. 

550
00:29:56,000 --> 00:29:57,900
Let's call it let's call it 
three major players, right? 

551
00:29:57,900 --> 00:30:02,900
Microsoft Google and apple 
between Windows, the Apple 

552
00:30:02,900 --> 00:30:06,600
series of of os's and then 
you've got Android from Google 

553
00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:09,900
on the mobile device, side of 
things you know it's taken a 

554
00:30:09,900 --> 00:30:13,400
while even with the for those 
three heavyweights who are also 

555
00:30:13,500 --> 00:30:17,400
browser manufacturers to come to
agreement on even a standard 

556
00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:19,200
like web authentic and the 
fight. 

557
00:30:19,400 --> 00:30:21,900
Laughs, getting involved with 
that and really making progress,

558
00:30:22,100 --> 00:30:25,900
but that took time, I wonder if 
we get to the point where, you 

559
00:30:25,900 --> 00:30:29,500
know, it's it becomes, oh yeah, 
your can be verified, but it's 

560
00:30:29,500 --> 00:30:33,200
like, the blue chat, green chat,
where it only works on iPhone, 

561
00:30:33,200 --> 00:30:35,600
or it only works on Android or 
Windows. 

562
00:30:35,600 --> 00:30:37,500
Hello, only works on Windows 
right? 

563
00:30:37,500 --> 00:30:42,400
Those sorts of things. 
If we are, we are we destined to

564
00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:46,100
basically repeat you know, 
history and have this 

565
00:30:46,100 --> 00:30:49,100
fragmentation or do you think 
that there's hope that we can 

566
00:30:49,100 --> 00:30:50,600
make? 
Maybe solve for this ahead of 

567
00:30:50,600 --> 00:30:54,800
time through more neutral bodies
or through third parties that 

568
00:30:54,800 --> 00:31:00,900
are sort of acting as the bridge
across devices. yeah, so I think

569
00:31:03,700 --> 00:31:07,800
I would love to say that this is
a linear progression towards an 

570
00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:12,100
objective and goal, right? 
Yeah, we see the advances, we 

571
00:31:12,100 --> 00:31:14,700
see the advances with the mobile
plant manufactures, with see how

572
00:31:14,700 --> 00:31:17,500
the cooperating, and things like
that, and we're working towards 

573
00:31:17,500 --> 00:31:18,500
something, and we're going to 
get there. 

574
00:31:18,500 --> 00:31:21,800
If you keep going down this 
path, I don't have any faith 

575
00:31:21,800 --> 00:31:24,100
that that will actually happen. 
What I do think is actually 

576
00:31:24,100 --> 00:31:28,400
going to happen, is there's 50 
different types of ways. 

577
00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:30,900
People are trying to solve this 
and they're all, you know, 

578
00:31:32,700 --> 00:31:36,400
trying to solve Sort of in a 
Jason sees, but with some unique

579
00:31:36,400 --> 00:31:40,300
differences, or whatever. 
But at the end of the day, there

580
00:31:40,300 --> 00:31:42,900
are doing this to one thing that
has to happen. 

581
00:31:42,900 --> 00:31:45,100
And one thing that I think will 
happen, one thing that has to 

582
00:31:45,100 --> 00:31:50,300
happen is this will require 
investment from actors that are 

583
00:31:50,300 --> 00:31:54,000
not incentivized by profit and 
not incentivized by business is 

584
00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:56,300
that exercise. 
It was so. 

585
00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:58,800
So we've seen. 
So if you think about it from 

586
00:31:58,800 --> 00:32:00,800
that perspective, right? 
There's a reason why what 

587
00:32:00,800 --> 00:32:04,300
Singapore did has worked really 
well because I looked at it and 

588
00:32:04,300 --> 00:32:07,600
said, we are not. 
We're looking at it as something

589
00:32:07,600 --> 00:32:10,200
that gives benefit to Citizens, 
right? 

590
00:32:10,300 --> 00:32:13,900
And so there's a regular, 
there's a government requirement

591
00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:17,600
or government mandate that came 
in saying, this is helpful, this

592
00:32:17,600 --> 00:32:19,200
will unlock a bunch of other 
things. 

593
00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:21,700
So it's worth for us to make the
investment. 

594
00:32:21,700 --> 00:32:23,300
We've seen this happen in 
Canada. 

595
00:32:25,200 --> 00:32:28,600
If you've talked to Joey 
Brennan, who heads diac, she can

596
00:32:29,000 --> 00:32:31,600
she's much better than me at 
explaining this and how she's 

597
00:32:31,600 --> 00:32:34,700
been able to Wrangle the cats 
and get things working. 

598
00:32:35,600 --> 00:32:39,400
To a public-private partnership 
and getting people on board on 

599
00:32:39,400 --> 00:32:41,800
board with the idea, but it 
takes to your point. 

600
00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:45,600
It takes a lot of time, but 
without that, kind of driver, 

601
00:32:45,600 --> 00:32:48,700
it's not going to happen. 
So, that's the key key piece, 

602
00:32:48,700 --> 00:32:49,900
right? 
So, we see in the US, for 

603
00:32:49,900 --> 00:32:53,600
example, better idea. 
Coalition is trying to push for 

604
00:32:53,600 --> 00:32:55,600
digital identity. 
Bills is trying to push for 

605
00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:59,800
government to become an 
attribute provider and issuer of

606
00:32:59,800 --> 00:33:02,000
a silo credentials and things 
like that. 

607
00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:04,300
That will that will have 
Downstream benefits. 

608
00:33:06,100 --> 00:33:09,700
In our organization, we see in 
Africa, for example, a bunch of 

609
00:33:09,700 --> 00:33:12,100
governments are heavily 
investing in digital identity 

610
00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:16,700
initiatives because they see 
that this is a way of really 

611
00:33:16,700 --> 00:33:20,500
unlocking the potential of their
citizenship Citroen citizenry. 

612
00:33:21,100 --> 00:33:24,500
So that's the thing that has to 
happen for us to any in any way 

613
00:33:24,500 --> 00:33:27,300
shape form, get somewhere. 
The flip side of that is the 

614
00:33:27,300 --> 00:33:29,500
thing that makes it will likely 
happen. 

615
00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:32,500
Is this going to be something 
that comes out of nowhere? 

616
00:33:32,800 --> 00:33:36,300
That we don't predict that the 
comment down would Killer app or

617
00:33:36,300 --> 00:33:38,600
something like that. 
Something will happen that we 

618
00:33:38,600 --> 00:33:43,900
can't really see but that will 
unlock it sort of a methodology 

619
00:33:43,900 --> 00:33:47,300
or a modality or something. 
We're always gonna be like, hey,

620
00:33:47,300 --> 00:33:50,300
let's jump on that. 
And that's that will that will 

621
00:33:50,300 --> 00:33:54,400
be the thing that unlocks 
everybody else's ability to say,

622
00:33:54,700 --> 00:33:57,200
oh, I can use that, I can use 
that, I can use that, and that's

623
00:33:57,200 --> 00:33:59,300
going to happen. 
I be seeing that with to a 

624
00:33:59,300 --> 00:34:03,000
certain extent with how, when 
Apple and Android start working 

625
00:34:03,000 --> 00:34:05,300
with with the secure enclave and
Paris. 

626
00:34:05,500 --> 00:34:08,100
Metrics on the device and how 
all of a sudden that has 

627
00:34:08,100 --> 00:34:11,699
unlocked a lot of potential 
around, how authentication is 

628
00:34:11,800 --> 00:34:13,600
MFA happens and things like 
that. 

629
00:34:13,800 --> 00:34:17,600
Those things will, I think show 
up and create they will be 

630
00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:20,500
unexpected sources of 
advancement, but that when they 

631
00:34:20,500 --> 00:34:22,400
show up will be like, well, that
was totally logical. 

632
00:34:22,800 --> 00:34:25,100
But we can't see it right now. 
I'm sure something like that 

633
00:34:25,100 --> 00:34:27,300
will happen. 
Yeah, makes me wonder what that 

634
00:34:27,300 --> 00:34:30,300
killer app will be because I 
feel like this is not a 

635
00:34:30,300 --> 00:34:34,400
technology problem per se. 
It is a mindset problem because 

636
00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:37,900
I think of anything that The 
pandemic has taught us is half 

637
00:34:37,900 --> 00:34:41,800
the population. 
Will, you know, do do will make 

638
00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:45,400
the societal choice and others 
may not for various reasons, 

639
00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:49,400
whatever it may be right. 
What is the killer app that 

640
00:34:49,400 --> 00:34:52,800
brings everybody to the table. 
I just, you know, I just moved 

641
00:34:52,800 --> 00:34:55,699
and had to go in. 
I spent the day getting driver's

642
00:34:55,699 --> 00:34:59,900
license and license plates and 
things like that, and that was a

643
00:34:59,900 --> 00:35:01,700
pain in the butt. 
Like, this is all stuff. 

644
00:35:01,700 --> 00:35:05,400
I should be able to do online. 
You don't make it easy. 

645
00:35:05,700 --> 00:35:07,700
Things like that and maybe 
that's it. 

646
00:35:07,700 --> 00:35:12,000
Maybe it's, you know, easy 
access to government services to

647
00:35:12,300 --> 00:35:16,700
pay your taxes. 
Get your IDs change your names, 

648
00:35:16,700 --> 00:35:18,700
right? 
All the things that you kind of 

649
00:35:18,700 --> 00:35:20,200
take for granted. 
They're like what do you mean 

650
00:35:20,200 --> 00:35:21,900
this is, this is your 2022. 
What do you mean? 

651
00:35:21,900 --> 00:35:23,500
I can't do it online. 
What do you mean? 

652
00:35:23,500 --> 00:35:26,300
I have to make an appointment 
for 3 months out. 

653
00:35:26,300 --> 00:35:29,700
Not saying that this didn't 
happen to me then show up and 

654
00:35:29,700 --> 00:35:33,900
then wait another two hours 
after my appointment to actually

655
00:35:33,900 --> 00:35:38,300
get in for my scheduled. 
Like this is it seems, you know,

656
00:35:38,600 --> 00:35:41,800
weird to me that we still 
haven't sort of solve this 

657
00:35:41,800 --> 00:35:46,100
identity at a macro level of 
making it easier for the 

658
00:35:46,100 --> 00:35:49,600
population and it feel like it's
not necessarily a technology 

659
00:35:49,600 --> 00:35:51,400
thing. 
At this point, we have the tools

660
00:35:52,300 --> 00:35:55,100
I'm wondering what is that? 
Killer app that will pull 

661
00:35:55,100 --> 00:35:59,300
everyone to the table and say, 
oh yes, we are willing to either

662
00:35:59,300 --> 00:36:01,800
invest in this, in some way, 
whether it's investment 

663
00:36:01,800 --> 00:36:06,900
financially or investment in, 
you know, the The Privacy 

664
00:36:07,400 --> 00:36:10,300
components, that might go into 
either managing that or giving 

665
00:36:10,300 --> 00:36:13,400
up some level of privacy to be 
able to take advantage of things

666
00:36:13,400 --> 00:36:16,400
like that. 
It makes me wonder you know when

667
00:36:16,400 --> 00:36:18,400
will that happen? 
I don't know if we have an 

668
00:36:18,400 --> 00:36:22,100
answer but it gives no thinking.
I most definitely do not have an

669
00:36:22,100 --> 00:36:26,000
answer because honestly it is 
one of those things where you 

670
00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:28,800
catch me on the wrong day and 
I'll be like, listen, I've been 

671
00:36:28,800 --> 00:36:30,000
dealing with this for the last 
three months. 

672
00:36:30,000 --> 00:36:32,800
I know exactly what's going on. 
This is never going to happen. 

673
00:36:32,800 --> 00:36:34,700
I know the people involved, this
is never going to happen. 

674
00:36:34,700 --> 00:36:36,900
They will kill this. 
But then there's other days 

675
00:36:36,900 --> 00:36:40,800
where I'm like, oh I see people 
who want to and they're willing 

676
00:36:40,800 --> 00:36:43,100
to make the investment and 
you're right, it's not a 

677
00:36:43,100 --> 00:36:46,100
technology problem. 
Honestly, you know, and we 

678
00:36:46,100 --> 00:36:47,700
talked about this in, I am all 
the time. 

679
00:36:47,700 --> 00:36:50,300
I'd like, it's not about 
technology is about process and 

680
00:36:50,300 --> 00:36:52,300
it's about people. 
It's actually more than that, 

681
00:36:52,300 --> 00:36:53,900
right? 
This is, this is not just about 

682
00:36:54,000 --> 00:36:57,600
not even just about process. 
And people it's about Legacy 

683
00:36:58,100 --> 00:37:01,900
that or detect that and the fact
that yeah, we have the 

684
00:37:01,900 --> 00:37:04,000
technology but shifting what you
have today to the new 

685
00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:05,500
technologies, just way too 
complicated. 

686
00:37:05,700 --> 00:37:08,400
Because nobody figures out how 
to do a migration correctly. 

687
00:37:08,600 --> 00:37:12,100
That's not something people 
invested, its political, it's 

688
00:37:12,100 --> 00:37:15,600
highly sensitive and personal 
like that's one of the things 

689
00:37:15,700 --> 00:37:21,300
that, you know, both frustrates 
but also attracts me to this 

690
00:37:21,500 --> 00:37:25,800
identity thing that we work in 
which is it's not a pure Tech 

691
00:37:25,800 --> 00:37:28,000
problem, right? 
It's not just throw a bunch of 

692
00:37:28,000 --> 00:37:31,400
cryptography that or, you know, 
just build build a service and 

693
00:37:31,400 --> 00:37:32,800
it's fine. 
I can just, I just need to 

694
00:37:32,808 --> 00:37:35,200
figure out how to do high 
availability or something like 

695
00:37:35,200 --> 00:37:37,100
that. 
And configure my network nodes, 

696
00:37:37,600 --> 00:37:42,200
this is about people and people 
by definition become nebulous 

697
00:37:42,200 --> 00:37:44,900
and problematic to figure out 
because you can't do it one way 

698
00:37:44,900 --> 00:37:47,100
for across everybody. 
We were is unique and so you end

699
00:37:47,100 --> 00:37:50,700
up with this really challenging 
in many times philosophical 

700
00:37:50,700 --> 00:37:52,500
issue. 
But usually like I said, it's 

701
00:37:52,500 --> 00:37:57,500
political its Financial, you 
know, it's just problematic that

702
00:37:57,500 --> 00:38:00,500
way. 
Yeah, the experience that I went

703
00:38:00,500 --> 00:38:05,500
through recently was I was going
for a mortgage and had to go and

704
00:38:05,500 --> 00:38:08,900
It's some transcripts from the 
IRS, so it's forced to go 

705
00:38:08,900 --> 00:38:13,200
through the ID dot me process. 
It seemed like the ultimate 

706
00:38:13,200 --> 00:38:16,700
example of a friction user 
experience, right? 

707
00:38:17,100 --> 00:38:19,700
We're all shooting for this 
frictionless user experience. 

708
00:38:19,700 --> 00:38:24,600
There's a ton of friction to get
that verified identity now 

709
00:38:24,600 --> 00:38:27,100
effort. 
And if it wasn't that I needed 

710
00:38:27,100 --> 00:38:30,200
those transcripts so badly, I 
would have abandoned the 

711
00:38:30,200 --> 00:38:32,600
process, right. 
But there's enough value there 

712
00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:35,700
that as willing to go through, 
so to kind of go back to the the

713
00:38:35,700 --> 00:38:39,400
killer app to me, what I was 
thinking was now that I've gone 

714
00:38:39,400 --> 00:38:44,300
through this now the IRS has my 
identity verified boy. 

715
00:38:44,300 --> 00:38:48,700
It would be great if I could use
that verified identity Elsewhere

716
00:38:48,700 --> 00:38:53,100
for other government services 
or, you know, be even better if 

717
00:38:53,100 --> 00:38:58,500
I could somehow stick it in a 
wallet on my phone and use it to

718
00:38:58,500 --> 00:39:04,200
authenticate for high, you know 
high risk transactions and never

719
00:39:04,200 --> 00:39:06,800
have to go through this. 
Again, or not have to go through

720
00:39:06,800 --> 00:39:10,800
this again for a long time. 
So to me, it was killer app 

721
00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:13,200
being that. 
I go through it one time because

722
00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:16,700
I have to but then I get to 
leverage it for much more. 

723
00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:22,500
What are your thoughts on that? 
So, it is precisely, what a 

724
00:39:22,500 --> 00:39:25,800
bunch of organizations taught 
would happen, right? 

725
00:39:25,800 --> 00:39:32,800
Which is, we just need that one 
place where there is enough Of 

726
00:39:32,800 --> 00:39:36,500
an incentive for people to go 
through a very heavy friction 

727
00:39:36,500 --> 00:39:41,600
process to bootstrap, they're 
sort of verified identity system

728
00:39:41,900 --> 00:39:44,700
and now you can take that 
verified identity and use it 

729
00:39:44,700 --> 00:39:48,200
everywhere else, right? 
That's the Nirvana. 

730
00:39:48,200 --> 00:39:51,500
Right? 
If you will and then that falls,

731
00:39:51,500 --> 00:39:53,300
that doesn't fall apart on 
technical reason. 

732
00:39:53,300 --> 00:39:55,900
It falls apart. 
Found like I said, Let It Go 

733
00:39:56,400 --> 00:40:00,000
policy controls. 
Like who else has access to it 

734
00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:02,700
wherever I'm using it somewhere 
else, with why using Somewhere 

735
00:40:02,700 --> 00:40:04,600
else. 
What if I don't want those, I 

736
00:40:04,600 --> 00:40:09,400
don't like we saw with the 
backlash that happened to I eat 

737
00:40:09,400 --> 00:40:12,500
at me of a huge part of it 
because this is a private 

738
00:40:12,500 --> 00:40:14,300
entity. 
Yes, it's for IRS but it's a 

739
00:40:14,300 --> 00:40:17,600
private entity. 
They now have a huge 

740
00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:21,200
Stranglehold on something that's
very valuable and they can do 

741
00:40:21,200 --> 00:40:24,000
things like I can look across 
Services, I can see what all 

742
00:40:24,000 --> 00:40:26,500
you're doing. 
There's these are political 

743
00:40:26,500 --> 00:40:28,600
issues that prevent stuff like 
this and that's the reason why 

744
00:40:28,600 --> 00:40:31,800
we folks have been trying to do 
verify the credentials and do 

745
00:40:31,800 --> 00:40:33,400
something. 
Where it sort of dissing 

746
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:36,600
disambiguates or this 
intermediates the whole process.

747
00:40:37,000 --> 00:40:39,900
So you can set up a service 
where you build it, they will 

748
00:40:39,900 --> 00:40:43,200
verify your identity but then 
they can issue your credentials.

749
00:40:43,200 --> 00:40:45,400
And then you can take those 
credentials with you and use 

750
00:40:45,400 --> 00:40:49,200
them without having the 
authority knowing that you're 

751
00:40:49,200 --> 00:40:51,900
using it. 
And the service provider has a 

752
00:40:51,908 --> 00:40:55,700
way of using your verifiable 
credential to it's verifiable 

753
00:40:56,000 --> 00:40:57,100
because they're getting the 
credential. 

754
00:40:57,100 --> 00:41:00,400
They getting the other stations 
that are in that credential and 

755
00:41:00,400 --> 00:41:03,300
saying, well, I can verify this.
But I don't have to actually go 

756
00:41:03,300 --> 00:41:06,800
back to somebody or I have a way
of doing it without requiring, 

757
00:41:06,800 --> 00:41:10,400
the dots, getting connected, the
dots getting connected piece is 

758
00:41:10,400 --> 00:41:14,200
a huge block of in a whole bunch
of energy initiatives that show 

759
00:41:14,200 --> 00:41:17,500
up and that's the flip side of 
it right there. 

760
00:41:17,500 --> 00:41:20,600
I use the Singapore example for 
a couple of times. 

761
00:41:21,100 --> 00:41:24,200
The flip side of the sink of 
example is also an example of 

762
00:41:24,200 --> 00:41:26,100
the kind of idea that would 
never work here because it is 

763
00:41:26,100 --> 00:41:29,400
highly centralized and it is all
the dots are connected and 

764
00:41:29,400 --> 00:41:31,800
somebody has complete visibility
on your whole life. 

765
00:41:31,800 --> 00:41:34,200
And You know, you know, that 
would never work here. 

766
00:41:34,200 --> 00:41:37,700
That's the reason why we don't 
have a single federal identity 

767
00:41:37,700 --> 00:41:40,700
Federal national ID and all that
sort of stuff. 

768
00:41:41,000 --> 00:41:43,300
So, like I said, it's not that 
the picture. 

769
00:41:43,400 --> 00:41:45,500
It's like you said, Jeff I? 
This is not that, it's a 

770
00:41:45,500 --> 00:41:48,200
technology issue. 
The technology to do many 

771
00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:51,400
different things exist. 
It's about, can you do it in a 

772
00:41:51,400 --> 00:41:55,900
way that satisfies the needs of 
the various constituents, 

773
00:41:55,900 --> 00:41:58,300
including the citizen, including
the human being? 

774
00:41:58,300 --> 00:42:01,600
That is part of this process. 
It sounds to me, like what 

775
00:42:01,600 --> 00:42:06,400
you're proposing is sort of like
this this set of different 

776
00:42:06,400 --> 00:42:08,700
attributes and their kind of 
chain together. 

777
00:42:09,100 --> 00:42:11,500
And then, you know, maybe 
they're like different shapes, 

778
00:42:11,500 --> 00:42:14,000
may be just like blocks or 
something like that. 

779
00:42:14,300 --> 00:42:16,700
And then, you know, you somehow 
leverage. 

780
00:42:16,900 --> 00:42:19,100
This thing I do, I'll call it 
Block Chain. 

781
00:42:19,600 --> 00:42:23,900
Now, that'll be better term. 
Okay, I got to drop off that. 

782
00:42:23,900 --> 00:42:27,400
I got to be part of this great 
job. 

783
00:42:29,000 --> 00:42:32,400
Let's shift gears a little bit. 
How to make sure we respect the 

784
00:42:32,400 --> 00:42:35,300
Sean's time. 
A few weeks ago, actually 

785
00:42:35,300 --> 00:42:39,400
probably a couple months ago at 
this point we asked a bunch of 

786
00:42:39,400 --> 00:42:43,100
identity folks out there what 
the difference was between 

787
00:42:43,100 --> 00:42:46,100
digital identity and identity 
and access management. 

788
00:42:46,200 --> 00:42:51,200
And we had us a show and I think
we played like five or six 

789
00:42:51,500 --> 00:42:54,100
different responses that we got 
everyone answered it 

790
00:42:54,100 --> 00:42:58,200
differently. 
And what I want to do now is I'm

791
00:42:58,200 --> 00:43:00,800
going to ask you the shot the 
same question here. 

792
00:43:00,900 --> 00:43:04,600
But before I want to get that 
our friend Alec fry fry identity

793
00:43:04,600 --> 00:43:08,900
for those who are in the know, 
also responded to it a little 

794
00:43:08,900 --> 00:43:10,800
bit late, but I promised we 
would get it in. 

795
00:43:11,100 --> 00:43:12,500
So I'm going to play it now. 
It's about three or four 

796
00:43:12,500 --> 00:43:15,700
minutes, sort of his explanation
of what he thinks the difference

797
00:43:15,700 --> 00:43:18,100
is between digital identity, and
he has some good analogies in 

798
00:43:18,107 --> 00:43:20,900
there and then what we'll do is 
we'll just kind of talk about it

799
00:43:20,900 --> 00:43:24,300
real quick. 
So let me play that now, good 

800
00:43:24,300 --> 00:43:27,400
day, gents for identity here. 
I'm so excited to say that I 

801
00:43:27,408 --> 00:43:29,900
have the, the answer, I have the
solution to the major. 

802
00:43:30,200 --> 00:43:34,000
You know, of I am versus digital
identity at first, when I 

803
00:43:34,000 --> 00:43:37,600
recorded something it was a lot 
like what you guys said late in 

804
00:43:37,600 --> 00:43:42,400
the conversation in session. 
151, where if you ask what your 

805
00:43:42,400 --> 00:43:44,800
practice does earlier used to 
say that you do? 

806
00:43:44,800 --> 00:43:47,500
I am and recently you would say 
you do digital identity. 

807
00:43:48,300 --> 00:43:52,300
And the reason why I think that 
during the responses from 

808
00:43:52,300 --> 00:43:56,100
different people where digital 
identity fits kept flipping from

809
00:43:56,100 --> 00:44:00,900
being the umbrella layer above I
am and then later Terron being 

810
00:44:00,900 --> 00:44:04,200
the lower component underneath. 
I am, I think the major reason 

811
00:44:04,200 --> 00:44:08,800
for that is because if I ask 
you, what does the word football

812
00:44:08,800 --> 00:44:10,300
mean? 
You might tell me. 

813
00:44:10,300 --> 00:44:12,800
It means a sport. 
If two teams are people running 

814
00:44:12,800 --> 00:44:15,700
around on a field trying to 
score goals against each other 

815
00:44:16,000 --> 00:44:19,600
or you might tell me it's a 
little leather ball that's used 

816
00:44:19,900 --> 00:44:23,400
in that sport on the field and I
think digital identity is 

817
00:44:23,400 --> 00:44:26,700
exactly that. 
So, earlier on identity and 

818
00:44:26,700 --> 00:44:30,000
access management in the early 
days meant as someone pointed, 

819
00:44:30,200 --> 00:44:33,700
At user account management. 
So it means giving users access 

820
00:44:33,700 --> 00:44:37,100
to systems basically getting 
their identity validating it 

821
00:44:37,100 --> 00:44:41,500
with a password or now with MFA 
or password list, even and and 

822
00:44:41,500 --> 00:44:43,500
then allowing them access to 
certain systems. 

823
00:44:43,900 --> 00:44:47,600
I am kind of became the umbrella
term for things that also 

824
00:44:47,600 --> 00:44:51,500
included IGA. 
So technically I am is the 

825
00:44:51,500 --> 00:44:55,200
access and the authentication 
and IGA is governance of the 

826
00:44:55,200 --> 00:44:57,900
user the user profiles and 
everything else. 

827
00:44:57,900 --> 00:45:01,900
But arguably, I am was kind of 
you As an umbrella term above 

828
00:45:01,900 --> 00:45:04,800
that anyway. 
So the interesting thing is as 

829
00:45:04,800 --> 00:45:09,200
you said as well that with Siam 
now I am is sometimes got an 

830
00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:11,500
invisible W-4 Workforce in front
of it. 

831
00:45:11,500 --> 00:45:16,400
So again there's not really a 
new umbrella term to sit over 

832
00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:21,500
Workforce, I am and Siam then, 
as we said there's also IGA and 

833
00:45:21,500 --> 00:45:24,900
other areas. 
And then as pointed out by Sarah

834
00:45:24,900 --> 00:45:30,000
as well, ID proofing, so whole 
verification of physical. 

835
00:45:30,300 --> 00:45:33,400
To a user's online digital 
representation. 

836
00:45:34,100 --> 00:45:39,300
Now interestingly, as well, as I
think Jim said that when you log

837
00:45:39,300 --> 00:45:42,800
into a certain environment, 
whether it's apple or an online 

838
00:45:42,800 --> 00:45:46,800
store that you deal with, they 
have a digital identity 

839
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:49,700
representation of you. 
Similarly, as you said, in the 

840
00:45:49,700 --> 00:45:53,900
Internet of Things devices, each
have its own digital identity. 

841
00:45:54,300 --> 00:45:59,000
So I think the challenge here 
getting the terminology sort of 

842
00:45:59,000 --> 00:46:01,500
sort it out. 
Out or agreed upon. 

843
00:46:01,600 --> 00:46:05,000
I think, as you said, the real 
challenge is the context in 

844
00:46:05,000 --> 00:46:08,900
which the person you're talking 
to is referring to this whole 

845
00:46:08,900 --> 00:46:12,100
Space, where the umbrella which 
arguably. 

846
00:46:12,100 --> 00:46:15,600
For now, let's say doesn't have 
a proper title includes. 

847
00:46:15,600 --> 00:46:24,300
I am and Siam and Workforce. 
I am and IGA, and authentication

848
00:46:24,300 --> 00:46:27,800
of, you know, identity proofing 
and assurance and all those 

849
00:46:27,800 --> 00:46:31,700
other factors including things 
like The sea and other areas 

850
00:46:31,700 --> 00:46:34,900
that fit in that space as well. 
And even risk and fraud 

851
00:46:34,900 --> 00:46:40,300
detection, everything that fits 
in what's needed to manage user 

852
00:46:40,300 --> 00:46:42,100
access. 
And, you know, identifying the 

853
00:46:42,100 --> 00:46:44,900
correct person making sure the 
right access to the right 

854
00:46:44,900 --> 00:46:47,500
systems at the right, time in 
the right context and everything

855
00:46:47,800 --> 00:46:50,600
that we've sort of come to 
phrase a lot around this whole 

856
00:46:50,600 --> 00:46:52,200
space. 
But I think the biggest 

857
00:46:52,200 --> 00:46:55,800
challenge is that in the last, 
however, many years now that 

858
00:46:55,800 --> 00:46:59,900
we're looking at that record 
that is stored in systems. 

859
00:47:00,100 --> 00:47:03,100
Of a user and their habits, and 
their system access. 

860
00:47:03,300 --> 00:47:07,100
That's a digital identity and 
for lack of a better umbrella 

861
00:47:07,100 --> 00:47:10,200
term, I think I am and sort of 
more recently. 

862
00:47:10,200 --> 00:47:14,100
Digital identity is being used 
as the umbrella term as well 

863
00:47:14,300 --> 00:47:16,600
because we don't have a great 
umbrella term for it. 

864
00:47:17,000 --> 00:47:19,000
So, there you go. 
I think, at the end of the day 

865
00:47:19,200 --> 00:47:22,200
football is the whole answer to 
the question of? 

866
00:47:22,200 --> 00:47:25,000
What's the difference between I 
am and digital identity. 

867
00:47:25,400 --> 00:47:27,100
Hope that was helpful. 
Thanks bye. 

868
00:47:27,900 --> 00:47:29,500
Alright, so that was from Alec 
Friday. 

869
00:47:29,500 --> 00:47:30,900
I think you here. 
Brings up a few different 

870
00:47:30,900 --> 00:47:33,000
points. 
For what I'm hearing is, he 

871
00:47:33,000 --> 00:47:34,700
agrees with sort of my 
assessment? 

872
00:47:34,700 --> 00:47:38,300
Is that context matters who 
you're talking to, how you're 

873
00:47:38,300 --> 00:47:42,900
using it, the words, I guess and
that it can kind of morph around

874
00:47:43,300 --> 00:47:46,700
anything in there. 
Kind of jog, may be a difference

875
00:47:46,700 --> 00:47:49,700
of opinion or maybe you want to 
add on to that in a second. 

876
00:47:50,100 --> 00:47:56,200
So I hate this question, just 
because it's what's good, where 

877
00:47:56,200 --> 00:47:58,700
you will never have a good, you 
will never get a good answer 

878
00:47:58,700 --> 00:48:02,100
because everybody comes That it 
slightly differently and I'm 

879
00:48:02,107 --> 00:48:04,800
sure you've seen that with all 
the responses you got from 

880
00:48:04,800 --> 00:48:09,500
everybody else. 
But and I can just hear Steve 

881
00:48:09,500 --> 00:48:12,700
Wilson yelling at me. 
No, the we should just ban the 

882
00:48:12,700 --> 00:48:14,400
word identity, identity doesn't 
exist. 

883
00:48:14,400 --> 00:48:16,900
Everything is about data. 
Everything is about, you know, 

884
00:48:17,400 --> 00:48:19,000
got it. 
What it is, that's rather than 

885
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:21,200
some trying to figure out 
something, but at the end of the

886
00:48:21,200 --> 00:48:27,800
day, I think, So I understand 
all of these perspectives 

887
00:48:27,800 --> 00:48:30,000
because at the end of the day 
there is no right answer. 

888
00:48:30,000 --> 00:48:33,200
It's more about what is it that 
we're trying to solve? 

889
00:48:33,200 --> 00:48:35,300
Like I can't like I said, I come
at everything from a use case 

890
00:48:35,300 --> 00:48:38,100
problem and and also an 
architecture background. 

891
00:48:38,100 --> 00:48:40,100
So I think about about 
everything like architect and 

892
00:48:40,100 --> 00:48:44,500
architect. 
And the me I am is simple in 

893
00:48:44,500 --> 00:48:46,800
terms of a definition and can 
get very complicated very 

894
00:48:46,800 --> 00:48:49,400
quickly but it's simple, it's 
about the tools. 

895
00:48:49,400 --> 00:48:52,300
The technology is the 
methodology is the processes 

896
00:48:53,000 --> 00:48:55,300
around. 
Managing identities. 

897
00:48:55,300 --> 00:48:56,900
The word management is right in 
there, right? 

898
00:48:56,900 --> 00:49:00,300
It's about managing identities. 
What is an identity? 

899
00:49:00,300 --> 00:49:02,500
That's what digital the word, 
digital item in somebody's as 

900
00:49:02,500 --> 00:49:06,200
well as a digital identity. 
Well, you're managing the 

901
00:49:06,200 --> 00:49:09,300
digital identity, but what is 
the digital identity is so 

902
00:49:10,100 --> 00:49:14,100
nebulous and so directly tied 
to, who's using it? 

903
00:49:14,200 --> 00:49:18,600
Not who has, it is not about the
individual, but who's using it 

904
00:49:19,200 --> 00:49:24,200
and what that sort of consuming 
entity the business, the 

905
00:49:24,200 --> 00:49:26,900
service, whatever it needs. 
It defines what? 

906
00:49:26,900 --> 00:49:29,900
It considers an identity and 
when it defines what? 

907
00:49:29,900 --> 00:49:33,900
It considers an identity you 
then pick what are the I am. 

908
00:49:34,500 --> 00:49:38,700
Components tools, technology Etc
that you need in order to 

909
00:49:38,700 --> 00:49:43,100
satisfy that requirement. 
So for example, you know, it's 

910
00:49:43,100 --> 00:49:47,300
interesting because obviously I 
come from an identity management

911
00:49:47,300 --> 00:49:50,000
background where I was doing 
what is called Enterprise 

912
00:49:50,000 --> 00:49:52,500
identity, which is Workforce 
identity, etc, etc. 

913
00:49:52,900 --> 00:49:58,200
But I do not consider, I am to 
be the silent W, right? 

914
00:49:58,200 --> 00:50:01,700
For me, I am is encompassing 
because I very much deal with. 

915
00:50:01,700 --> 00:50:06,100
I am even in the consumer space 
because Consumer space requires,

916
00:50:06,100 --> 00:50:09,800
I am methodologies, whether it's
onboarding proofing which is 

917
00:50:09,800 --> 00:50:11,800
essentially what in the 
Enterprise and anywhere we would

918
00:50:11,800 --> 00:50:13,400
have called account 
registration. 

919
00:50:13,400 --> 00:50:15,900
User registration is the 
equivalent thing but they're 

920
00:50:15,900 --> 00:50:17,900
doing it from a different place.
Different requirements, 

921
00:50:17,900 --> 00:50:22,300
different needs. 
Do you need IGA in consumer 

922
00:50:22,300 --> 00:50:25,700
identity, not necessarily, but 
you do need proofing. 

923
00:50:25,700 --> 00:50:28,400
You do need you. 
A lot of nice people don't think

924
00:50:28,400 --> 00:50:31,100
about authorization the vast 
majority of consumer. 

925
00:50:32,100 --> 00:50:34,400
I am deployments. 
Don't care about authorization. 

926
00:50:34,600 --> 00:50:37,500
Because every user is a customer
and they're all kind of the same

927
00:50:37,500 --> 00:50:39,000
but then you go to another 
scenarios. 

928
00:50:40,100 --> 00:50:44,400
Oh well they end user logged in 
and I want them to have certain 

929
00:50:44,400 --> 00:50:46,300
oauth Scopes based on who they 
are. 

930
00:50:46,300 --> 00:50:49,400
Certain rules that allow them to
do what they can do. 

931
00:50:49,400 --> 00:50:53,000
Allow them to access certain 
features that I pray for them. 

932
00:50:53,000 --> 00:50:56,300
So now you've got authorization 
in the space so digital 

933
00:50:56,300 --> 00:50:58,700
identity. 
So digital identity itself is 

934
00:50:58,700 --> 00:51:02,600
nebulous and very much defined 
by who's using it and because it

935
00:51:02,600 --> 00:51:05,600
is defined by who's using it. 
That dictates what that 

936
00:51:06,700 --> 00:51:09,900
consuming entity service 
etcetera will call I am. 

937
00:51:10,100 --> 00:51:15,300
But at the end of the day, I am 
just on the ID Pro body of 

938
00:51:15,300 --> 00:51:17,500
knowledge. 
There are lots of definitions 

939
00:51:17,500 --> 00:51:19,100
there. 
I don't necessarily agree with 

940
00:51:19,100 --> 00:51:21,900
all of them, but at least with 
stuff like I am Etc. 

941
00:51:22,300 --> 00:51:25,200
It tries to get to that point 
which is I am is a much much 

942
00:51:25,200 --> 00:51:28,200
simpler definition because it's 
mostly focusing on the tools and

943
00:51:28,200 --> 00:51:31,800
Technologies and processes and 
digital identity is in the eye 

944
00:51:31,800 --> 00:51:33,800
of the beholder. 
So that's nebulous and that and 

945
00:51:33,800 --> 00:51:35,400
they're connected. 
There are talking about the 

946
00:51:35,400 --> 00:51:38,900
connected so you can't in you 
can't separate the two. 

947
00:51:38,900 --> 00:51:40,600
So it's not about umbrella or 
anything. 

948
00:51:41,200 --> 00:51:43,500
I've introduced a new dimension 
right, there are talking to each

949
00:51:43,500 --> 00:51:47,500
other and related, right? 
Well you bring up, you know, the

950
00:51:47,500 --> 00:51:51,100
different definitions even like 
within ID Pro right, which is 

951
00:51:51,600 --> 00:51:53,400
made up of a whole bunch of 
identity people. 

952
00:51:53,400 --> 00:51:56,600
And I think there's value in 
that because it's offering 

953
00:51:56,600 --> 00:52:00,300
different perspectives. 
And yeah, I don't think will 

954
00:52:00,300 --> 00:52:01,900
ever come. 
I don't know if we'll come to an

955
00:52:01,900 --> 00:52:05,100
agreement on the definition 
itself, but I I think at least 

956
00:52:05,100 --> 00:52:09,000
understanding the different 
viewpoints and the context that 

957
00:52:09,000 --> 00:52:12,700
people might be approaching it 
from is helpful in the design, 

958
00:52:13,000 --> 00:52:16,000
the thinking, you know, of both 
the architecture business 

959
00:52:16,000 --> 00:52:17,800
processes, cetera things like 
that. 

960
00:52:18,100 --> 00:52:19,800
That was I think one of the 
things I took away at our 

961
00:52:19,800 --> 00:52:22,600
original episode, we did on this
was a damn Michael. 

962
00:52:23,100 --> 00:52:26,400
He was the only one of the folks
that we had kind of played. 

963
00:52:26,500 --> 00:52:29,000
He's from Texas A&M and he's in 
the business. 

964
00:52:29,000 --> 00:52:32,200
Meaning he's not a identity 
vendor, he's not an identity 

965
00:52:32,200 --> 00:52:35,600
consultant, he's running 
identity, For a very large 

966
00:52:35,600 --> 00:52:39,000
organization. 
So his viewpoint on what is 

967
00:52:39,000 --> 00:52:41,000
difference in the two was 
completely different than 

968
00:52:41,000 --> 00:52:45,200
everyone else, not that it 
wasn't more or less valid. 

969
00:52:45,300 --> 00:52:47,700
It was just a different 
Viewpoint and you're basically 

970
00:52:47,700 --> 00:52:51,700
looking at the problem and 
looking at the space and all the

971
00:52:51,700 --> 00:52:55,200
answers are probably right to 
some degree based on the context

972
00:52:55,200 --> 00:52:57,000
of looking at it. 
Yeah, and I'm sure you've 

973
00:52:57,000 --> 00:52:59,500
encountered this like there's a 
bunch of stuff that we do and 

974
00:52:59,500 --> 00:53:01,200
identity that we get pulled 
into. 

975
00:53:02,200 --> 00:53:05,200
That from a business, the 
business doesn't even consider 

976
00:53:05,200 --> 00:53:06,700
it or think about it as 
identity. 

977
00:53:06,700 --> 00:53:08,000
They're like, why are you guys 
here? 

978
00:53:08,100 --> 00:53:11,200
Like this is not anything that 
you think this is my, you know, 

979
00:53:11,700 --> 00:53:14,600
kyc project is my fraud. 
This is a fraud system. 

980
00:53:14,800 --> 00:53:16,300
Why is the identity folks are 
like? 

981
00:53:16,300 --> 00:53:20,300
Well, because we're feeding you 
the data, that is helping you 

982
00:53:20,300 --> 00:53:21,800
drive, your fraud and risk 
decisions. 

983
00:53:21,800 --> 00:53:23,400
And so you need to tell us what 
you care about. 

984
00:53:23,400 --> 00:53:25,200
And so that we can build that 
into the identity system. 

985
00:53:25,200 --> 00:53:25,800
Etc. 
Etc. 

986
00:53:25,800 --> 00:53:28,100
So, most of the time, the 
businesses don't even think of 

987
00:53:28,100 --> 00:53:30,700
this as identity for them is 
their Core Business. 

988
00:53:31,400 --> 00:53:34,800
Well, identities, at the center.
Jill, what do you do? 

989
00:53:34,800 --> 00:53:36,200
What do you think about what 
Alex said? 

990
00:53:36,700 --> 00:53:39,100
That's it. 
I think this is his definition 

991
00:53:39,100 --> 00:53:43,900
is as good as any that I've 
heard because I think it's it's 

992
00:53:43,900 --> 00:53:46,900
kind of a nebulous answer. 
But here's here's what I'm going

993
00:53:46,900 --> 00:53:48,500
to bring new to the 
conversation. 

994
00:53:48,500 --> 00:53:53,100
So I had this thought. 
Recently, which is that? 

995
00:53:53,500 --> 00:53:56,500
You know, when we went from 
calling it, I am to some people 

996
00:53:56,500 --> 00:53:58,100
are now calling you digital 
identity. 

997
00:53:58,100 --> 00:54:00,800
We don't know if that's going to
catch on, and everybody's just 

998
00:54:00,800 --> 00:54:04,900
going to call this space digital
identity, and not identity and 

999
00:54:04,900 --> 00:54:09,100
access management and a year. 
But or in five years or or any 

1000
00:54:09,100 --> 00:54:13,900
time down the road but it 
brought me back to the term, IGA

1001
00:54:14,400 --> 00:54:16,700
the term IGA didn't exist, 
whatever. 

1002
00:54:16,700 --> 00:54:20,100
It was 10 15 years ago, it was 
called identity management, 

1003
00:54:20,300 --> 00:54:23,100
right? 
Then something happened to those

1004
00:54:23,100 --> 00:54:25,700
platforms. 
That someone said these are not 

1005
00:54:25,700 --> 00:54:28,200
like the old identity management
platforms out there doing 

1006
00:54:28,200 --> 00:54:33,400
governance right there, a full 
circle picture of the identity 

1007
00:54:33,400 --> 00:54:35,900
lifecycle. 
And now we're going to call it 

1008
00:54:36,000 --> 00:54:37,800
identity governance and 
administration. 

1009
00:54:37,800 --> 00:54:39,800
I think it was identity 
Administration and governance 

1010
00:54:39,800 --> 00:54:43,400
and first, but that kind of the 
same thing, right? 

1011
00:54:43,900 --> 00:54:48,700
So actually something change to 
go from one, you know, identity 

1012
00:54:48,700 --> 00:54:52,200
management, which was, you know,
Oracle. 

1013
00:54:52,200 --> 00:54:58,600
See a son and then sell point 
and of exit came out and like 

1014
00:54:58,800 --> 00:55:01,900
created this new space and all 
those other tools that went on 

1015
00:55:01,900 --> 00:55:05,300
to acquire Government Solutions,
bolted them onto their 

1016
00:55:05,500 --> 00:55:09,000
traditional identity management 
system and said you know hey 

1017
00:55:09,000 --> 00:55:12,700
we've got iga2 and everything 
kind of fell into the bucket but

1018
00:55:12,700 --> 00:55:17,100
the ones that were truly IJ 
systems, are the ones that 

1019
00:55:17,100 --> 00:55:21,900
survived in and kind of made it,
our hooks that hook So much I 

1020
00:55:21,900 --> 00:55:26,700
know because I was there you 
wrote Thor but you know then it 

1021
00:55:26,700 --> 00:55:29,100
got bought by what Oracle, 
right? 

1022
00:55:29,100 --> 00:55:30,800
Yeah. 
And then but that's the thing, 

1023
00:55:30,800 --> 00:55:33,900
right? 
It's like we had a identity 

1024
00:55:33,900 --> 00:55:37,100
management platform which was 
focused on provisioning and to 

1025
00:55:37,100 --> 00:55:40,300
meet the business requirements. 
We built-in capabilities for 

1026
00:55:40,300 --> 00:55:43,200
Access certification, a 
recertification, right? 

1027
00:55:43,500 --> 00:55:45,800
And it was just part of our 
identity management solution, 

1028
00:55:46,100 --> 00:55:48,500
right? 
And we had it, and then we've 

1029
00:55:48,500 --> 00:55:51,700
said, had it and then we all got
four in And so son, had it, and 

1030
00:55:51,700 --> 00:55:56,700
then Oracle had it. 
And then you had the nerve to 

1031
00:55:56,700 --> 00:56:00,200
newer folks short of show up 
saying, well, we're going to 

1032
00:56:00,207 --> 00:56:04,900
focus on that one feature but 
saying, you can't raise money 

1033
00:56:05,200 --> 00:56:08,100
and you can sell a product 
saying, what you're selling is a

1034
00:56:08,100 --> 00:56:11,500
feature, so they built it 
better. 

1035
00:56:12,000 --> 00:56:16,000
But was essentially a super if 
you think about it, is 

1036
00:56:16,000 --> 00:56:18,400
supercharged version of what, 
all of these products had where 

1037
00:56:18,400 --> 00:56:20,600
we were sending it. 
As a feature, they cameras are 

1038
00:56:21,000 --> 00:56:25,000
It's it's own thing and the term
identity governance was born out

1039
00:56:25,000 --> 00:56:27,700
of Marketing. 
Is my cynical take. 

1040
00:56:27,800 --> 00:56:29,000
That's exactly what I was going 
to say. 

1041
00:56:29,000 --> 00:56:31,600
It was a masterful marketing. 
It look it was a masterful 

1042
00:56:31,600 --> 00:56:35,100
marketing move. 
I wish I had thought of it. 

1043
00:56:35,100 --> 00:56:40,700
But you know at the end of the 
day why did that happen besides 

1044
00:56:40,700 --> 00:56:43,100
the money part of it? 
Is because of the fact going 

1045
00:56:43,100 --> 00:56:47,000
back to this definitions are 
nebulous and we all keep not 

1046
00:56:47,000 --> 00:56:49,400
working, we don't work of a 
single lexicon. 

1047
00:56:49,700 --> 00:56:52,400
We don't have a single unified 
terminology that we all agreed 

1048
00:56:52,400 --> 00:56:54,400
on. 
So it gives you the opportunity 

1049
00:56:54,400 --> 00:56:56,200
to come in and say I'm going to 
create a new thing. 

1050
00:56:56,500 --> 00:56:59,100
So yeah, we're talking about 
verifying identities and 

1051
00:56:59,100 --> 00:57:02,100
somebody else will come in and 
say well yeah, that thing is 

1052
00:57:02,100 --> 00:57:04,400
verified that it is his this new
thing and it's going to be 

1053
00:57:04,400 --> 00:57:07,400
called something else and people
will be like, oh that's its own 

1054
00:57:07,400 --> 00:57:09,700
thing. 
When it's not, it may just be 

1055
00:57:10,300 --> 00:57:14,500
the same thing in different 
color clothing, but, you know, 

1056
00:57:14,600 --> 00:57:17,600
you you get enough mindshare and
all of a sudden, it becomes a 

1057
00:57:17,600 --> 00:57:20,300
self-fulfilling prophecy seeing 
this. 

1058
00:57:20,900 --> 00:57:24,500
And again, I'm not in any way 
shape, or form trying to 

1059
00:57:24,500 --> 00:57:26,600
denigrate that, it's just the 
reality of the space. 

1060
00:57:26,600 --> 00:57:30,200
We live in, which is as things 
evolve people look for ways to 

1061
00:57:30,200 --> 00:57:32,800
stand out and differentiate. 
It's just the nature of being in

1062
00:57:32,800 --> 00:57:36,100
product, and business and 
analysts. 

1063
00:57:36,100 --> 00:57:39,000
Worlds, right? 
Analyst Juan To also come up 

1064
00:57:39,000 --> 00:57:41,900
with new say that we look we 
understood and this is a new 

1065
00:57:41,900 --> 00:57:43,700
thing that is emerging because 
you need that you need to pay 

1066
00:57:43,700 --> 00:57:47,000
attention to. 
So there's these there's forces 

1067
00:57:47,000 --> 00:57:52,400
at work that happen in this 
context that aren't really 

1068
00:57:52,400 --> 00:57:55,700
driven by again. 
Like I said not, everything is 

1069
00:57:55,700 --> 00:58:00,300
linear things just happen. 
Sometimes you can only get these

1070
00:58:00,300 --> 00:58:03,500
hot takes on the identity at the
center podcast. 

1071
00:58:05,000 --> 00:58:07,700
Exactly, it's all marketing for 
sure. 

1072
00:58:08,100 --> 00:58:11,200
That, you know, someone there 
are taste makers that are in the

1073
00:58:11,207 --> 00:58:13,800
space, right? 
The big analyst firms and they 

1074
00:58:13,800 --> 00:58:17,700
come up with these things to 
call similar products and it's 

1075
00:58:17,700 --> 00:58:23,000
whether it's IGA or privileged 
access management or identity 

1076
00:58:23,000 --> 00:58:27,900
threat detection and response or
zero, trust the concepts that 

1077
00:58:27,900 --> 00:58:29,500
make those things up are not 
new. 

1078
00:58:30,000 --> 00:58:34,300
It's just a repackaged, maybe 
it's better refined message, 

1079
00:58:34,300 --> 00:58:37,900
maybe it is a collection of 
additional tools. 

1080
00:58:38,000 --> 00:58:41,400
That maybe weren't quite a long 
as they were maybe two or three 

1081
00:58:41,400 --> 00:58:44,200
years ago but a lot of stuff 
does I feel like it does come 

1082
00:58:44,200 --> 00:58:47,900
down to marketing and yeah, it's
you know it's how do you get 

1083
00:58:47,900 --> 00:58:49,500
that in front of the potential 
buyer? 

1084
00:58:49,500 --> 00:58:50,800
Well you got to have something 
that snazzy new. 

1085
00:58:50,800 --> 00:58:53,600
You can't go off and to your 
point in a shot say well, we 

1086
00:58:53,600 --> 00:58:55,000
have a whole bunch of features, 
right? 

1087
00:58:55,000 --> 00:58:59,700
I think that's, I think that's 
sort of Windows thinking and the

1088
00:58:59,700 --> 00:59:04,100
early 90s versus apple and 
telling a message and telling a 

1089
00:59:04,107 --> 00:59:09,000
story you wanted an iPhone. 
You didn't Eat an iPhone and I 

1090
00:59:09,000 --> 00:59:10,900
think that was part of the 
message and I think that's where

1091
00:59:10,900 --> 00:59:13,100
we saw some of those 
up-and-comers. 

1092
00:59:13,200 --> 00:59:15,400
Kind of hit at the right time 
and say okay well we've got this

1093
00:59:15,400 --> 00:59:18,300
kind of legacy to. 
He myth this web thing seems 

1094
00:59:18,300 --> 00:59:20,100
interesting. 
Maybe there's something there. 

1095
00:59:20,100 --> 00:59:24,100
I don't know right. 
And you know they rode that wave

1096
00:59:24,100 --> 00:59:27,000
and you know they've been very 
successful with it and there 

1097
00:59:27,000 --> 00:59:29,700
will be another thing that comes
along that maybe is another 

1098
00:59:29,700 --> 00:59:32,800
killer app and identities based 
kind of circle back for four. 

1099
00:59:32,800 --> 00:59:36,700
But I think that's, you know, 
it's like it's almost like a you

1100
00:59:36,707 --> 00:59:39,800
know, web authentic No one's 
going to really know what web 

1101
00:59:39,800 --> 00:59:42,600
often is what they're going to 
know is, oh, pass keys. 

1102
00:59:42,700 --> 00:59:47,700
I heard that from Apple Windows 
Google and sort of having this 

1103
00:59:47,800 --> 00:59:52,100
marketing term associated with a
very technical term that the 

1104
00:59:52,107 --> 00:59:54,700
fight Alliance came up with to 
kind of call it. 

1105
00:59:54,700 --> 00:59:57,400
This multi thing which makes a 
lot of sense to Identity nerds 

1106
00:59:57,400 --> 00:59:59,100
like us. 
You know. 

1107
00:59:59,300 --> 01:00:00,600
No one else is going to know 
what though, they're gonna know 

1108
01:00:00,600 --> 01:00:04,200
what has passed keys and that's 
and I think that's good to some 

1109
01:00:04,200 --> 01:00:07,300
degree. 
But when we have this nebulous 

1110
01:00:07,300 --> 01:00:11,400
language, We have, you know, 
loose interpretations of what, 

1111
01:00:11,400 --> 01:00:13,100
some of these things mean, 
that's where we get into 

1112
01:00:13,100 --> 01:00:14,900
trouble. 
And that's, that's generally, 

1113
01:00:14,900 --> 01:00:17,900
writing could get concerned, I 
see things, you know, everything

1114
01:00:17,900 --> 01:00:19,800
is zero trust. 
Now, you know, there's a zero 

1115
01:00:19,800 --> 01:00:23,700
trust IGA, what does that even 
mean, right? 

1116
01:00:23,700 --> 01:00:26,200
Like, it's just your writing 
marketing at that point because 

1117
01:00:26,200 --> 01:00:28,200
you're hoping for, I don't know.
SEO. 

1118
01:00:28,300 --> 01:00:30,300
Search engine optimization more 
hits in your website. 

1119
01:00:30,300 --> 01:00:33,700
I don't know what it is, but 
it's a component of it, but to 

1120
01:00:33,700 --> 01:00:35,700
say that you are the zero trust 
solution. 

1121
01:00:35,700 --> 01:00:37,600
Doesn't make any sense in that 
context. 

1122
01:00:38,300 --> 01:00:40,800
Listen, there's a lot of money 
that gets raised as a lot of 

1123
01:00:40,808 --> 01:00:44,200
sales that get me. 
She made, there's a lot of, you 

1124
01:00:44,200 --> 01:00:47,900
know, sales that get could get 
closer doors that get open, when

1125
01:00:47,900 --> 01:00:50,000
you have the right Buzz words, 
it's just the reality of the 

1126
01:00:50,000 --> 01:00:51,300
world. 
I'm not going to get better 

1127
01:00:51,300 --> 01:00:52,600
about that. 
It's true. 

1128
01:00:52,600 --> 01:00:55,100
Like like we do with perception.
We deal with. 

1129
01:00:55,400 --> 01:00:58,400
We're dealing with humanity and 
people, as you said they want 

1130
01:00:58,400 --> 01:01:02,000
stories and thus, it sounds a 
lot better to spend money on 

1131
01:01:02,000 --> 01:01:03,400
something. 
When somebody's telling you, 

1132
01:01:03,400 --> 01:01:06,800
it's a product not a feature and
then you're willing to spend 

1133
01:01:06,800 --> 01:01:09,600
that kind of money on it. 
He's already a real things and, 

1134
01:01:09,600 --> 01:01:11,300
you know, it unlocks things as 
well, right? 

1135
01:01:11,300 --> 01:01:13,000
I thought, I think there's a lot
of things that would never have 

1136
01:01:13,000 --> 01:01:15,400
advanced. 
If they had stayed in the 

1137
01:01:15,400 --> 01:01:18,500
feature space, they needed to 
come out of that, right? 

1138
01:01:18,500 --> 01:01:22,100
So we can agree to disagree on 
specific examples. 

1139
01:01:22,100 --> 01:01:26,200
But in general, I try not to be 
a stickler for terminology or 

1140
01:01:26,200 --> 01:01:28,500
things like that, except when it
causes breakdown in 

1141
01:01:28,508 --> 01:01:31,200
communication, which happens 
fairly often in our space as 

1142
01:01:31,200 --> 01:01:33,100
well. 
But I tried not to be a stickler

1143
01:01:33,100 --> 01:01:35,300
for communication for 
terminology because I try to 

1144
01:01:35,300 --> 01:01:37,200
say, okay, what is it? 
You really want. 

1145
01:01:37,200 --> 01:01:38,900
Tell me exactly. 
See what you're looking for. 

1146
01:01:39,200 --> 01:01:41,000
Tell me your use case, explain 
to me what you're trying to 

1147
01:01:41,500 --> 01:01:43,900
figure out, and let's figure out
what you need for that. 

1148
01:01:44,800 --> 01:01:47,100
Yeah, I need help with, I am. 
Okay, what? 

1149
01:01:47,100 --> 01:01:50,300
Part of my act? 
All right, let's say we've gone 

1150
01:01:50,300 --> 01:01:53,200
a little bit long, but I want to
end with something on a lighter 

1151
01:01:53,200 --> 01:01:54,900
note. 
Something stupid, your Ledger 

1152
01:01:54,900 --> 01:01:57,300
than that better than that, for 
sure. 

1153
01:01:58,100 --> 01:02:01,100
All right, here's what I've come
up with for this week and 

1154
01:02:01,100 --> 01:02:04,800
Nishant, I'll start with you and
they'll go to gym Nashawn. 

1155
01:02:04,800 --> 01:02:08,900
If you could replace all the 
grass in the With something 

1156
01:02:08,900 --> 01:02:11,400
else. 
What would you replace it with? 

1157
01:02:12,800 --> 01:02:15,000
No more grass. 
You can replace it with any 

1158
01:02:15,000 --> 01:02:18,400
other type of surface that you 
would like hypoallergenic grass.

1159
01:02:18,400 --> 01:02:23,200
That doesn't require water tank.
So I want like AstroTurf 

1160
01:02:23,200 --> 01:02:26,800
basically something like no but 
it should ask Jeff is not grass 

1161
01:02:26,800 --> 01:02:31,000
that come on but you know if you
don't have hypoallergenic dogs, 

1162
01:02:31,000 --> 01:02:33,200
right? 
So it's like why can't you bring

1163
01:02:33,200 --> 01:02:35,400
create a great grass? 
That's hypoallergenic. 

1164
01:02:35,400 --> 01:02:36,700
I don't know. 
It feels like it's something 

1165
01:02:36,700 --> 01:02:39,100
that should be able to be done 
and never has any hot. 

1166
01:02:39,100 --> 01:02:42,100
Never gets weeds. 
Just all looking. 

1167
01:02:42,100 --> 01:02:43,400
Now, you're making it a 
certified. 

1168
01:02:43,400 --> 01:02:46,800
Oh no, no, it needs. 
It should, it should grow. 

1169
01:02:46,800 --> 01:02:49,600
It should be allowed to go wild,
you know. 

1170
01:02:49,900 --> 01:02:52,600
So it's funny, right? 
Astroturfing you don't we talk 

1171
01:02:52,600 --> 01:02:55,900
about because some talked about 
football and I keep thinking 

1172
01:02:55,900 --> 01:03:01,100
about this like natural is good 
because I don't want to lose the

1173
01:03:01,100 --> 01:03:03,400
natural. 
I don't, you know, this is a 

1174
01:03:03,500 --> 01:03:06,200
describe your topic for a whole 
other discussion about metaverse

1175
01:03:06,200 --> 01:03:08,800
and stuff like that. 
But I don't want to lose the 

1176
01:03:08,800 --> 01:03:11,800
connection and with reality and 
the real world and Right. 

1177
01:03:11,800 --> 01:03:19,900
So you know it's it's I hate I 
don't I don't like when grass 

1178
01:03:19,900 --> 01:03:23,400
causes me to, you know, have 
allergy reactions to it and 

1179
01:03:23,400 --> 01:03:26,000
everything but I'd like the fact
that there is natural grass all 

1180
01:03:26,000 --> 01:03:28,800
over the place. 
That is something that has 

1181
01:03:28,800 --> 01:03:33,500
existed for a long time. 
It was probably a better Jim. 

1182
01:03:33,500 --> 01:03:35,000
What would you replace grass 
with? 

1183
01:03:35,600 --> 01:03:40,600
So have you ever heard of kudzu?
It sounds familiar. 

1184
01:03:40,600 --> 01:03:43,300
Refresh my memory. 
So you're in North Carolina now 

1185
01:03:43,300 --> 01:03:48,000
so the idea with Kudzu was that 
it was this plant that could be 

1186
01:03:48,000 --> 01:03:52,200
grown and takes very little 
resources and it just goes crazy

1187
01:03:52,600 --> 01:03:57,200
and it could be harvested and 
turned into fuel. 

1188
01:03:57,900 --> 01:04:01,800
So anyway the problem was it 
became an invasive species and 

1189
01:04:01,800 --> 01:04:05,300
went absolutely Bonkers and like
it's not a good idea. 

1190
01:04:05,300 --> 01:04:09,700
So, I think that the whole 
question You know, we could come

1191
01:04:09,700 --> 01:04:13,500
up with an answer and say, you 
know, I'd rather have this plan 

1192
01:04:13,700 --> 01:04:16,400
that might cause other 
Downstream problems. 

1193
01:04:16,700 --> 01:04:18,300
So, I'm just putting that out 
there. 

1194
01:04:18,900 --> 01:04:22,300
I definitely wouldn't use Kudzu 
as a replacement for grass. 

1195
01:04:23,000 --> 01:04:28,800
What I was going to say is 
candy, you know, this is, this 

1196
01:04:28,800 --> 01:04:33,200
is like we, we really can't do. 
This isn't like a question based

1197
01:04:33,200 --> 01:04:35,700
in reality. 
Why should my answer be based in

1198
01:04:35,700 --> 01:04:37,900
reality? 
God, I took like so, what candy 

1199
01:04:40,200 --> 01:04:44,100
You know, I meant like the mood 
for something like very sugary 

1200
01:04:44,100 --> 01:04:47,600
and so I'm thinking smart, he's 
just like Laura Smarties, that 

1201
01:04:47,600 --> 01:04:50,000
would grow and you can just pick
them off and eat them whenever 

1202
01:04:50,000 --> 01:04:52,100
you want. 
Okay? 

1203
01:04:52,100 --> 01:04:55,500
So that's so then, at some point
in Jim's World, someone will 

1204
01:04:55,500 --> 01:04:57,200
have to go out and buy. 
I got to go get some nor 

1205
01:04:57,200 --> 01:05:00,500
Smarties boots, it's very deep 
with smart, he's outside. 

1206
01:05:00,500 --> 01:05:04,400
Gotta get the smarties shovel 
right, stuff like that. 

1207
01:05:04,600 --> 01:05:06,800
It's just like you. 
Fling on somebody, they open 

1208
01:05:06,800 --> 01:05:08,600
their mouth and just try and 
catch. 

1209
01:05:08,700 --> 01:05:10,800
Catch them in their mouth. 
Yeah, exactly. 

1210
01:05:11,500 --> 01:05:14,100
Why not a side of insulin for 
everybody as well? 

1211
01:05:14,100 --> 01:05:16,800
The go on with that. 
Yeah, we're live again. 

1212
01:05:16,900 --> 01:05:20,100
In this in this fantasy world 
where we're basically. 

1213
01:05:20,100 --> 01:05:24,900
It's Candy Land living in Candy 
Land and no one needs known as 

1214
01:05:24,900 --> 01:05:28,800
diabetic and Kendall and I like 
it, that sounds like, that 

1215
01:05:28,808 --> 01:05:33,100
sounds like a very happy world. 
I'm going to go high fantasy and

1216
01:05:33,100 --> 01:05:37,200
just not even thinking of very, 
very I didn't think a very very 

1217
01:05:37,200 --> 01:05:41,500
through, or thoroughly Solar 
panels being able to capture 

1218
01:05:41,600 --> 01:05:45,100
that much energy and have it be 
able to turn back into something

1219
01:05:45,100 --> 01:05:47,800
back into the grid. 
I think would be super cool, I 

1220
01:05:47,800 --> 01:05:51,300
think would be very hot, a lot 
of services, and we would be 

1221
01:05:51,300 --> 01:05:56,500
walking on glass quite a bit or 
maybe, you know, thin layers of 

1222
01:05:56,500 --> 01:05:59,400
plastic or whatever. 
Maybe but yeah. 

1223
01:05:59,400 --> 01:06:01,800
And and my world, we don't pay 
for energy. 

1224
01:06:01,800 --> 01:06:06,500
It just it just happens. 
Yeah, you know in like it in 

1225
01:06:06,500 --> 01:06:09,800
colleges, usually they have 
signs like Stay off the grass, 

1226
01:06:09,800 --> 01:06:12,700
right? 
Like, stay on the sidewalk. 

1227
01:06:12,900 --> 01:06:15,400
If you put solar panels there, 
you wouldn't have to put the 

1228
01:06:15,400 --> 01:06:19,100
signs up anymore. 
You save so much money in signs.

1229
01:06:19,500 --> 01:06:22,000
Well, they'd be blocking, uh, 
you know, the energy production 

1230
01:06:22,000 --> 01:06:23,300
be like, stay off the solar 
panel. 

1231
01:06:24,100 --> 01:06:27,100
Yeah. 
Well, in my college dorm we had 

1232
01:06:27,100 --> 01:06:30,800
a sign that said, keep off the 
grass because we thought it was 

1233
01:06:30,800 --> 01:06:36,200
funny that, you know, grass is 
also like the 70s era term for 

1234
01:06:36,500 --> 01:06:40,900
something else. 
Yeah, I yes, we know what you're

1235
01:06:40,900 --> 01:06:43,200
referring to. 
We'll call him. 

1236
01:06:43,200 --> 01:06:45,600
Jim, get off my lawn McDonald. 
At this point. 

1237
01:06:45,600 --> 01:06:48,500
There you go. 
All right, let's go ahead. 

1238
01:06:48,500 --> 01:06:52,600
We've successfully gotten super,
super dumb with it here in the 

1239
01:06:52,600 --> 01:06:56,100
last couple minutes, but this 
shot really appreciate your time

1240
01:06:56,100 --> 01:06:58,200
and joining us for this week so 
far. 

1241
01:06:58,200 --> 01:07:02,200
It seems like the Courtyard 
Marriott Wi-Fi gods have held 

1242
01:07:02,200 --> 01:07:03,500
with us. 
So hopefully this turns out to 

1243
01:07:03,500 --> 01:07:05,400
be a good recording. 
I'm sure it was conversation was

1244
01:07:05,400 --> 01:07:06,900
excellent. 
Anything. 

1245
01:07:06,900 --> 01:07:09,200
You want to wrap up with 
Michelle before we Let you go. 

1246
01:07:09,800 --> 01:07:14,700
And no, I think it was an 
interesting conversation, that 

1247
01:07:14,700 --> 01:07:18,700
kind of reflects the vastness 
broadness and nebulous nests of 

1248
01:07:18,700 --> 01:07:22,600
what we do. 
So I think I will sort of end 

1249
01:07:22,600 --> 01:07:25,300
with saying hey everybody go 
sign up for Ida Pro. 

1250
01:07:26,400 --> 01:07:28,600
Good one, I like that one. 
But come on, I deep remember, 

1251
01:07:29,200 --> 01:07:31,300
bring these conversations into 
the slack Channel. 

1252
01:07:31,300 --> 01:07:33,800
We need more of these. 
The slack channel was definitely

1253
01:07:33,800 --> 01:07:35,500
worth the money. 
All three of us are ID Pro 

1254
01:07:35,500 --> 01:07:38,600
members, the slack Channel, I 
am, I'm more of a worker there. 

1255
01:07:39,400 --> 01:07:42,000
But I can go there and post 
something with a couple times I 

1256
01:07:42,008 --> 01:07:43,500
have. 
And I get like an answer back in

1257
01:07:43,500 --> 01:07:45,200
like, 30 minutes. 
It's crazy. 

1258
01:07:45,300 --> 01:07:46,800
So totally worth it just for 
that. 

1259
01:07:47,000 --> 01:07:48,600
Yeah, Jim. 
How about yourself final 

1260
01:07:48,600 --> 01:07:51,300
thoughts for this week? 
I can't top with new Chandra 

1261
01:07:51,300 --> 01:07:56,100
said, but you know, definitely 
open to networking. 

1262
01:07:56,600 --> 01:08:00,200
Please connect with me on 
LinkedIn connect to all of us on

1263
01:08:00,200 --> 01:08:05,000
LinkedIn. 
And yeah, I hope to have a 

1264
01:08:05,000 --> 01:08:08,400
chance to, you know, connect 
with so many people as possible.

1265
01:08:08,700 --> 01:08:12,400
It really helped when we were at
the Gartner conference because 

1266
01:08:12,400 --> 01:08:16,700
with the show and kind of all 
the new connections that we've 

1267
01:08:16,700 --> 01:08:19,600
made. 
I got to kind of meet so many 

1268
01:08:19,600 --> 01:08:22,000
folks in person, it was really 
great. 

1269
01:08:22,000 --> 01:08:24,399
I really feel like we're kind of
building Community with the 

1270
01:08:24,399 --> 01:08:28,300
podcast. 
Yeah, it is very cool, very 

1271
01:08:28,300 --> 01:08:31,500
happy with being able to even do
like that show that we did with,

1272
01:08:32,300 --> 01:08:35,100
you know, listeners that we 
hadn't met before. 

1273
01:08:35,100 --> 01:08:37,100
I was like, hey, let's you know,
let's sit down and just talk 

1274
01:08:37,100 --> 01:08:40,399
identity and we turn it into I 
think I can our episode and we 

1275
01:08:40,399 --> 01:08:43,000
had a good old time doing it. 
So yeah that's that's the kind 

1276
01:08:43,000 --> 01:08:45,500
of stuff that we're into and 
definitely will have links to 

1277
01:08:45,500 --> 01:08:49,399
all of our linkedin's the shots,
Jim's myself and show notes have

1278
01:08:49,399 --> 01:08:51,800
a link to Yuna Kim's. 
You can check out what in shots 

1279
01:08:51,800 --> 01:08:55,500
been working on as well as don't
forget to support gym with his 

1280
01:08:55,600 --> 01:08:59,500
webinar later this week and 
hopefully we'll see people that 

1281
01:08:59,500 --> 01:09:03,200
sonicate maybe at Octane and 
we're on the web. 

1282
01:09:03,200 --> 01:09:07,800
Idac podcast.com we're at 
Twitter idac podcast and we're 

1283
01:09:07,800 --> 01:09:09,200
enough with all that. 
That promotion. 

1284
01:09:09,200 --> 01:09:12,100
Will it ever let everyone go and
call it for this week? 

1285
01:09:12,200 --> 01:09:14,000
Thanks everyone for listening 
and we'll talk with you all in 

1286
01:09:14,008 --> 01:09:18,800
the next one. 
Thanks for listening to the 

1287
01:09:18,800 --> 01:09:21,600
identity at the center podcast. 
If you like what you heard, 

1288
01:09:21,600 --> 01:09:24,899
don't forget to subscribe and 
visit us on the web and identity

1289
01:09:24,899 --> 01:09:25,800
at the center.com.