1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:04,040 I created the Non human identity management group on LinkedIn 2 00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:08,760 back in May last year. I've been very surprised that 3 00:00:09,080 --> 00:00:14,040 we're now close to 2000 members. A lot of people in the industry, 4 00:00:14,040 --> 00:00:17,080 consultants, a lot of practitioners, pretty much the 5 00:00:17,080 --> 00:00:19,880 who's who's now in them in that group. 6 00:00:20,320 --> 00:00:23,760 And we've started to post a lot of content there. 7 00:00:24,160 --> 00:00:27,000 But then I realized that's not really going to work. 8 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:30,920 Whilst you'll be able to disseminate kind of news, what's 9 00:00:30,920 --> 00:00:33,040 going on in the industry, if someone wants to learn, they're 10 00:00:33,040 --> 00:00:36,600 not going to go through a feed of hundreds of NHI posts from me 11 00:00:36,600 --> 00:00:39,280 and others in the industry. And then I thought, look, let's 12 00:00:39,280 --> 00:00:43,800 create a portal. And that's when NHIM g.org was 13 00:00:43,800 --> 00:00:47,320 formed. And my mission was purely at the 14 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:50,880 time, all about education, evangelizing. 15 00:00:50,880 --> 00:00:54,160 I was in a job and this was kind of a side hobby, a bit like what 16 00:00:54,160 --> 00:00:58,440 you guys do at Idec. And it just sort of flourished 17 00:00:58,440 --> 00:01:00,560 from there. I wrote more white papers, more 18 00:01:00,560 --> 00:01:06,440 content, and there was a lot of good, you know, feedback. 19 00:01:06,880 --> 00:01:09,320 I started talking to sort of folks in the market to say, 20 00:01:09,320 --> 00:01:12,080 would you like to kind of share content as well? 21 00:01:12,480 --> 00:01:15,960 And then that's really what I've been doing for the last 12 22 00:01:15,960 --> 00:01:20,760 months and since January decided to go into this venture full 23 00:01:20,760 --> 00:01:23,120 time and the mission hasn't changed. 24 00:01:23,120 --> 00:01:26,560 It's to educate, evangelize. It's the kind of help the 25 00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:29,960 industry come together. And I guess along the way, 26 00:01:30,120 --> 00:01:33,880 someone, one of the vendors kind of just, and maybe a LinkedIn 27 00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:37,880 post was said to me kind of verbally, Mr. Nhi. 28 00:01:38,360 --> 00:01:43,960 And I started using the name and it's now now stuck with me 29 00:01:43,960 --> 00:01:46,440 unfortunately. But maybe it's a bit better than 30 00:01:46,440 --> 00:01:50,120 Mr. Sox. Yeah, Mr. Stocks kind of kind of 31 00:01:50,120 --> 00:01:52,960 sounds like a Quentin Tarantino character for Mike Reservoir 32 00:01:52,960 --> 00:01:56,640 Dogs or something like that. Or cat, a cat name. 33 00:01:57,080 --> 00:02:00,280 Yeah, that's true spoiler right. If you're watching a video, I've 34 00:02:00,280 --> 00:02:02,760 got a couple DJ cats in Amsterdam behind me. 35 00:02:02,760 --> 00:02:04,520 So if you're if you're not watching a video, you're missing 36 00:02:04,520 --> 00:02:14,000 out that that glorious scene. This is identity at the center 37 00:02:14,840 --> 00:02:17,840 if it has anything to do with IAM. 38 00:02:17,840 --> 00:02:24,400 This is the go to podcast now your hosts Jim McDonald and Jeff 39 00:02:24,400 --> 00:02:32,080 Steadman. Welcome to the Identity at the 40 00:02:32,080 --> 00:02:33,840 Center podcast. I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. 41 00:02:33,840 --> 00:02:36,080 Hey, Jim. Hey, Jeff, how are you? 42 00:02:36,600 --> 00:02:39,280 Oh, not so bad yourself. Doing great. 43 00:02:39,320 --> 00:02:43,280 I feel like we're living in this weird time work kind of thing. 44 00:02:43,520 --> 00:02:45,600 We're recording before Identverse. 45 00:02:45,600 --> 00:02:49,560 It's going to be dropped after Identverse, but I want to talk 46 00:02:49,560 --> 00:02:51,600 about Identverse. I mean, we're going to be doing 47 00:02:51,600 --> 00:02:54,040 the identity squabble game while we're there. 48 00:02:54,040 --> 00:02:57,880 I guess technically it's in the past, but hopefully we'll be 49 00:02:57,880 --> 00:03:01,280 able to drop it as an episode. It's going to happen in the NHI 50 00:03:01,480 --> 00:03:05,760 Pavilion at the Expo Hall. Really excited about what we're 51 00:03:05,760 --> 00:03:08,840 doing at Identverse. Yeah, it's a very cool thing. 52 00:03:08,840 --> 00:03:12,000 I I'll be honest, I'm a little bit nervous on how this will 53 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:14,240 come off. I dentist squabble as we're kind 54 00:03:14,240 --> 00:03:16,800 of calling it. It is an extension of the Fido 55 00:03:16,800 --> 00:03:19,600 feud that we did at the Authenticate conference last 56 00:03:19,600 --> 00:03:21,840 year. But we are doing it all on our 57 00:03:21,840 --> 00:03:24,240 own basically, right? No help. 58 00:03:24,240 --> 00:03:26,600 We don't have like an AV team. It's going to be me setting up a 59 00:03:26,600 --> 00:03:29,760 bunch of cameras and me figure out how to try to mic it up. 60 00:03:29,760 --> 00:03:33,720 So, you know, we are a couple days away from that and 61 00:03:33,720 --> 00:03:37,560 hopefully by the time people hear this, it turned out well. 62 00:03:37,560 --> 00:03:39,760 I hope people, you know, are entertained. 63 00:03:39,760 --> 00:03:42,080 You may not learn anything, but I hope they're entertained as we 64 00:03:42,080 --> 00:03:43,000 go through that. So. 65 00:03:43,520 --> 00:03:46,200 Yeah, I'm going to. I'm going to give my thank you 66 00:03:46,200 --> 00:03:50,360 in advance to the CRA for I mean, look, we're doing so much 67 00:03:50,360 --> 00:03:52,360 there. You and I are each hosting a 68 00:03:52,360 --> 00:03:58,280 panel and we're going to be recording a bunch of podcasts 69 00:03:58,280 --> 00:04:02,320 and have an opportunity in the actual hall to meet people, give 70 00:04:02,320 --> 00:04:04,960 out stickers. I'm excited for the whole thing. 71 00:04:05,600 --> 00:04:07,640 Yeah, definitely been a great experience. 72 00:04:07,640 --> 00:04:09,600 Shout out to Shirley for for helping us out with this. 73 00:04:09,600 --> 00:04:12,720 So if you see Shirley roaming the halls from CRA, give her an 74 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:14,600 identity at the center. Fist bump of gratitude. 75 00:04:14,600 --> 00:04:15,920 How about that and just a fist bump. 76 00:04:15,920 --> 00:04:20,800 Don't do anything else. Yeah, no, just fist, not fist to 77 00:04:20,800 --> 00:04:26,040 any other part of poor Shirley. I think the other thing that 78 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:29,040 would be great is like if people got to meet us, people got to 79 00:04:29,280 --> 00:04:34,240 and are listening to the show, go out, give us a a review on 80 00:04:34,360 --> 00:04:38,640 whatever podcast platform you listen or give us a thumbs up 81 00:04:38,640 --> 00:04:42,520 and subscribe on YouTube. It definitely helps get the word 82 00:04:42,520 --> 00:04:46,000 out because I mean, the podcast has grown significantly over the 83 00:04:46,000 --> 00:04:48,960 last six years and it's grown organically, right? 84 00:04:48,960 --> 00:04:52,240 We don't run any ads. It's people telling people about 85 00:04:52,240 --> 00:04:57,520 the podcast, people liking the podcast or giving us five star 86 00:04:57,520 --> 00:05:01,840 reviews and kind of like working it up in terms of the algorithm, 87 00:05:02,800 --> 00:05:04,520 yeah. No advertising. 88 00:05:04,520 --> 00:05:06,600 The only advertising is what I see behind you, all the 89 00:05:06,600 --> 00:05:09,600 different plaques that you've taken from, you know, the, the 90 00:05:09,600 --> 00:05:12,520 different cocks we've been at. But definitely very cool. 91 00:05:12,520 --> 00:05:15,080 And we are going to hit a couple milestones this year. 92 00:05:15,080 --> 00:05:17,720 We're going to be celebrating 6 years, I think pretty close by 93 00:05:17,720 --> 00:05:20,880 the time this one comes out. And you know, I'm going to 94 00:05:20,880 --> 00:05:23,560 preview we're, we're probably going to hit 1,000,000 downloads 95 00:05:23,840 --> 00:05:27,920 sometime later this year. So pretty pretty crazy. 96 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:30,840 Yeah, there's big, there's big numbers. 97 00:05:30,840 --> 00:05:33,720 They keep coming. They keep coming quicker than I 98 00:05:33,720 --> 00:05:37,200 expected them to come. So but that's, that's not a 99 00:05:37,200 --> 00:05:39,400 credit to me and you, Jeff. That's credit to all the people 100 00:05:39,400 --> 00:05:43,520 who listen. And I think the practitioners 101 00:05:43,520 --> 00:05:47,160 out there who you know, let us know all the time that you know 102 00:05:47,160 --> 00:05:52,080 how they feel about the content. 99% positive this. 103 00:05:52,120 --> 00:05:54,040 That's a shout out and a credit to them. 104 00:05:54,640 --> 00:05:57,520 Yeah, we like doing it and like the conversations we're able to 105 00:05:57,520 --> 00:05:59,120 have. And, you know, that's that 106 00:05:59,120 --> 00:06:01,360 what's that's what leads us to the conversation we're having 107 00:06:01,360 --> 00:06:03,880 today, you know, especially like around, you know, NHI, which is, 108 00:06:03,920 --> 00:06:06,160 you know, so hot right now if I want to steal something from 109 00:06:06,160 --> 00:06:08,680 Zoolander. But why don't we pivot into our 110 00:06:08,680 --> 00:06:12,560 conversation here with Mr. NHI himself, Lylett Choda. 111 00:06:12,560 --> 00:06:16,800 He's the founder and CEO of the Non Human Identity Management 112 00:06:16,800 --> 00:06:18,480 Group. Welcome, Lylett. 113 00:06:19,120 --> 00:06:22,200 Thanks Jeff and Jim for inviting me to your identity of the 114 00:06:22,200 --> 00:06:25,320 Center podcast. Real pleasure to be here and 115 00:06:25,320 --> 00:06:29,400 talk all about NHIS non human identities or some will say 116 00:06:29,400 --> 00:06:32,760 machine or workload identities whichever camp you're in. 117 00:06:33,840 --> 00:06:35,680 Yeah, we're going to get totally into that. 118 00:06:35,680 --> 00:06:37,640 I want to start though, with your background, because this is 119 00:06:37,640 --> 00:06:40,920 tradition around here is the the identity origin stories for the 120 00:06:40,920 --> 00:06:43,240 people in the space. So tell us a little bit about 121 00:06:43,240 --> 00:06:45,600 your identity background. How did you get into this? 122 00:06:45,600 --> 00:06:48,760 Is it something that you chose or did identity choose you? 123 00:06:49,640 --> 00:06:54,120 It's probably the the latter. So I started my career 30 years 124 00:06:54,120 --> 00:06:59,080 ago in investment banking, came out of university straight into 125 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:01,600 Morgan Stanley, was there for 18 years. 126 00:07:02,360 --> 00:07:05,600 I moved into sort of the equities division running order 127 00:07:05,600 --> 00:07:08,680 management systems. And I guess that was my first 128 00:07:08,680 --> 00:07:14,440 exposure to sort of regulatory audit and sort of identity when 129 00:07:14,440 --> 00:07:20,000 the infamous Sarbanes-Oxley Sox Act came and we had to make sure 130 00:07:20,000 --> 00:07:22,960 our systems were Sox compliant, I was the only one in my 131 00:07:22,960 --> 00:07:26,840 equities division that really took the Sox control seriously. 132 00:07:27,360 --> 00:07:30,200 And ever since then, I was tagged in those days with a 133 00:07:30,200 --> 00:07:34,920 different nickname, Mr. Sox. And ever since then, sort of for 134 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:40,560 the last 25 years, anything that was his regulatory order, you 135 00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:45,200 know, compliance, operational risk, you know, I was involved 136 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:47,040 in. So I've run a number of large 137 00:07:47,680 --> 00:07:52,480 feds and other large regulatory programmes for, for, for various 138 00:07:52,480 --> 00:07:57,240 investment banks and then slowly went more and more into the 139 00:07:57,240 --> 00:08:02,640 identity space doing human regulatory programmes, Pam and 140 00:08:02,640 --> 00:08:07,040 I've done a number of NHI programmes along the way as 141 00:08:07,040 --> 00:08:09,600 well. And when I did SOCKS 25 years 142 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:12,840 ago, that was actually my first time I actually had to deal with 143 00:08:12,840 --> 00:08:16,800 Nhis or in those days we would call them technical accounts or 144 00:08:17,040 --> 00:08:19,800 service accounts. So it's a little bit of my 145 00:08:19,800 --> 00:08:24,560 background in terms of my identity journey until I became, 146 00:08:24,840 --> 00:08:28,320 I guess, Mr. NHI. So how did you, how were you 147 00:08:28,320 --> 00:08:31,840 awarded that title of Mr. NHI? Is this a, you know, something 148 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:34,000 that somebody gave you? You know, is it something that 149 00:08:34,000 --> 00:08:35,520 you've kind of adopted as a moniker? 150 00:08:35,520 --> 00:08:38,280 Tell me about that. Yeah. 151 00:08:38,280 --> 00:08:43,919 So about a just a year and a half ago I decided one weekend 152 00:08:43,919 --> 00:08:48,600 to write a white paper on how to manage non human identity risks. 153 00:08:48,600 --> 00:08:52,600 I was just running in the middle of a very large regulatory 154 00:08:52,600 --> 00:08:58,240 program at a large investment bank fixing the NHI issues. 155 00:08:58,760 --> 00:09:02,160 And I thought, look, it might be worth writing some insights on 156 00:09:02,160 --> 00:09:06,440 what we did, the challenges. And I probably said on LinkedIn, 157 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:10,800 I wasn't really a big LinkedIn follower or contributor. 158 00:09:11,560 --> 00:09:15,520 And what surprised me was within a few weeks, you know, I was 159 00:09:15,520 --> 00:09:19,800 getting pings from some pretty big industry heavyweights. 160 00:09:20,120 --> 00:09:26,000 I'll drop a name, for example, you know, head COVID said 161 00:09:26,000 --> 00:09:29,600 Silverthorpe pinged and said, love your white paper. 162 00:09:29,840 --> 00:09:33,400 Let's chat. And after writing that white 163 00:09:33,400 --> 00:09:36,320 paper, kind of a lot of doors started to open. 164 00:09:36,320 --> 00:09:39,600 I started to talk to a lot of folks in the industry and I 165 00:09:39,600 --> 00:09:43,280 realized what was going on. There'd been a huge growth in 166 00:09:43,800 --> 00:09:47,680 startups and a lot of discussion around the non human identity 167 00:09:47,680 --> 00:09:51,680 problem. And I then started to realise, 168 00:09:51,680 --> 00:09:56,200 well look, if you're a customer you want to learn about the 169 00:09:56,200 --> 00:10:00,760 problem, where do you go to understand about the risks, the 170 00:10:00,760 --> 00:10:03,040 challenges, where'd you get guidance and advice? 171 00:10:03,680 --> 00:10:08,240 And really there was nothing in the industry about just over a 172 00:10:08,240 --> 00:10:11,200 year ago. And again, just one weekend I 173 00:10:11,200 --> 00:10:15,920 thought, look, why don't I start and create like Anhi community. 174 00:10:15,920 --> 00:10:19,440 So I created the non human identity management group on 175 00:10:19,440 --> 00:10:24,720 LinkedIn back in May last year. And I've been very surprised 176 00:10:24,720 --> 00:10:28,000 that we're now close to 2000 members. 177 00:10:28,520 --> 00:10:31,320 A lot of people in the industry, consultants, a lot of 178 00:10:31,320 --> 00:10:35,480 practitioners, pretty much the who's who's now in them in that 179 00:10:35,480 --> 00:10:38,840 group. And we started to post a lot of 180 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:42,240 content there. But then I realized that's not 181 00:10:42,240 --> 00:10:44,400 really going to work. Whilst you'll be able to 182 00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:48,120 disseminate kind of news, what's going on in the industry, if 183 00:10:48,120 --> 00:10:50,200 someone wants to learn, they're not going to go through a feed 184 00:10:50,200 --> 00:10:54,360 of hundreds of NHI posts from me and others in the industry. 185 00:10:54,360 --> 00:10:56,440 And then I thought, look, let's create a portal. 186 00:10:56,840 --> 00:11:00,560 And that's where NHIM g.org was formed. 187 00:11:00,920 --> 00:11:05,520 And my mission was purely, at the time, all about education, 188 00:11:05,960 --> 00:11:08,920 evangelizing. I was in a job and this was kind 189 00:11:08,920 --> 00:11:11,920 of a side hobby, a bit like what you guys do at IDAC. 190 00:11:12,440 --> 00:11:14,960 And it just sort of flourished from there. 191 00:11:14,960 --> 00:11:20,120 I wrote more white papers, more content, and there was a lot of 192 00:11:20,120 --> 00:11:24,160 good, you know, feedback. I started talking to sort of 193 00:11:24,160 --> 00:11:26,720 folks in the market to say, would you like to kind of share 194 00:11:27,160 --> 00:11:30,160 content as well. And then that's really what I've 195 00:11:30,160 --> 00:11:34,960 been doing for the last 12 months and since January decided 196 00:11:34,960 --> 00:11:38,680 to go into this venture full time and the mission hasn't 197 00:11:38,680 --> 00:11:41,000 changed. It's to educate, evangelize. 198 00:11:41,360 --> 00:11:43,960 It's the kind of help the industry come together. 199 00:11:44,840 --> 00:11:48,120 And I guess along the way, someone in one of the vendors 200 00:11:48,120 --> 00:11:51,720 kind of just in maybe a LinkedIn post was said to me kind of 201 00:11:51,720 --> 00:11:58,240 verbally, Mr. Nhi, and I started using the name and it's now now 202 00:11:58,240 --> 00:12:02,480 stuck with me, unfortunately, But maybe it's a bit better than 203 00:12:02,480 --> 00:12:06,520 Mr. Sox. Yeah, Mr. Sox kind of sounds 204 00:12:06,520 --> 00:12:09,000 like a Quentin Tarantino character for Mike Reservoir 205 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:12,680 Dogs or something like that. Or cat, a cat name. 206 00:12:13,120 --> 00:12:16,320 Yeah, that's true spoiler right. If you're watching a video, I've 207 00:12:16,320 --> 00:12:18,800 got a couple DJ cats in Amsterdam behind me. 208 00:12:18,800 --> 00:12:20,560 So if you're if you're not watching a video, you're missing 209 00:12:20,560 --> 00:12:24,320 out that that glorious scene. But let me talk a little bit 210 00:12:24,320 --> 00:12:27,640 here with you about NHI, which is why we're here. 211 00:12:28,720 --> 00:12:31,240 I know we want to get probably a definition from you of what is 212 00:12:31,240 --> 00:12:32,880 NHI. But before I get to that, it 213 00:12:32,880 --> 00:12:36,920 seems like NHI is kind of having a moment right now, kind of like 214 00:12:36,920 --> 00:12:39,800 identity at large is having a moment as like, hey, there's a 215 00:12:39,800 --> 00:12:42,080 spotlight identity and people are trying to take notice of it 216 00:12:42,080 --> 00:12:43,320 even though we've been here for years. 217 00:12:43,320 --> 00:12:45,280 And I would argue the same thing for NHI. 218 00:12:45,280 --> 00:12:49,480 But why do you think NHI is such a, a big deal right now? 219 00:12:49,480 --> 00:12:51,960 Because it seems like every conference that we've gone to 220 00:12:51,960 --> 00:12:55,360 over the last six months to 12 months has really started to put 221 00:12:55,360 --> 00:12:58,400 more focus on NHI. And I'm curious, you know, if 222 00:12:58,400 --> 00:13:01,320 you see the same thing and and if so, why do you think that is? 223 00:13:02,080 --> 00:13:05,040 Well, there's only one answer. It's because of me and our group 224 00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:07,720 and all the noise. No, that's not true. 225 00:13:09,680 --> 00:13:13,200 Look, I, I think, you know, I do get asked this question a lot 226 00:13:13,200 --> 00:13:17,320 about why now when you talked about identify earlier where our 227 00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:20,920 groups are actually going to be hosting a big NHL workshop next 228 00:13:20,920 --> 00:13:23,600 Tuesday and the pavilion you refer to we're hosting. 229 00:13:23,600 --> 00:13:25,040 So it's going to be great to have you there. 230 00:13:26,200 --> 00:13:31,080 Look, I think what's changed is the last four or five years 231 00:13:31,080 --> 00:13:33,840 where, you know, this was always a problem, right? 232 00:13:33,840 --> 00:13:36,920 As I said, I was dealing with this 25 years ago as part of Sox 233 00:13:36,920 --> 00:13:41,960 controls to cycle NHI passwords and in those days, but before it 234 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:44,920 was all about an internal issue, right? 235 00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:48,040 But with kind of the hyper fragmentation that we've now got 236 00:13:48,040 --> 00:13:52,240 in the environment with you know, the multi cloud kind of 237 00:13:52,240 --> 00:13:56,960 environment, SAS integrations, containerization, micro 238 00:13:56,960 --> 00:14:00,640 services, you know, API based interfaces. 239 00:14:01,000 --> 00:14:04,000 And I guess now, you know, more growth we're going to see with 240 00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:07,360 Gen. AII guess all these kind of non 241 00:14:07,360 --> 00:14:11,480 human identities, they're much more easy to compromise and 242 00:14:11,480 --> 00:14:14,520 discover. There's a great start by a 243 00:14:15,680 --> 00:14:20,440 company that produced a report in 24 saying that there were 244 00:14:20,440 --> 00:14:24,640 24,000,000 secrets found in public GitHub repos. 245 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:31,680 So look, people have not implemented good controls around 246 00:14:32,080 --> 00:14:36,920 managing NHIS or secrets. They're all over the place. 247 00:14:37,200 --> 00:14:39,320 You know, we've got generally very weak controls around 248 00:14:39,320 --> 00:14:43,720 managing the NHIS. So we're seeing, you know, a lot 249 00:14:43,720 --> 00:14:46,840 of issues, breaches that are occurring. 250 00:14:47,360 --> 00:14:52,240 That group recently published a 52 breach report to celebrate 251 00:14:52,240 --> 00:14:54,160 our 52 weeks since we were formed. 252 00:14:54,680 --> 00:14:58,080 And we're seeing breaches now occurring on a weekly basis 253 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:02,200 where threat actors are discovering these credentials in 254 00:15:02,760 --> 00:15:07,960 repos, API keys, tokens. And it's an easy way to get in, 255 00:15:07,960 --> 00:15:09,760 right? They don't longer need to, you 256 00:15:09,760 --> 00:15:12,240 know, kind of compromise a human's credentials. 257 00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:15,720 They just can get access to these NHI identities. 258 00:15:15,720 --> 00:15:18,640 And you're in, right? And given, you know, 259 00:15:18,720 --> 00:15:23,680 environments are so distributed with cloud and SAS, we're much 260 00:15:23,680 --> 00:15:26,760 more significantly exposed than we were, you know, many years 261 00:15:26,760 --> 00:15:29,200 ago. So I think just the explosion 262 00:15:29,200 --> 00:15:32,640 and you know, and the micro fragmentation that we've had in 263 00:15:32,640 --> 00:15:37,360 the environment has just now caused this this huge problem. 264 00:15:38,480 --> 00:15:44,160 Lalit, so feels like you come to this with from the practitioner 265 00:15:44,160 --> 00:15:47,600 perspective, and that's a big reason why Jeff and I wanted to 266 00:15:47,600 --> 00:15:52,040 have you on this podcast because we've got a lot of folks who 267 00:15:52,040 --> 00:15:54,280 come on with kind of the vendor perspective. 268 00:15:54,280 --> 00:15:59,800 And you know, this is, and no way to disparage what they do. 269 00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:01,920 They're out there building solutions, right? 270 00:16:02,240 --> 00:16:06,000 But overall we're I, we're hoping to get out of this 271 00:16:06,000 --> 00:16:10,080 conversation as kind of a framework for the practitioner 272 00:16:10,400 --> 00:16:15,720 to wrap their brain around this NHI problem and how they can 273 00:16:15,720 --> 00:16:18,600 solve it, right? Where do they use their existing 274 00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:24,000 tool sets like IGA privilege, access management, single sign 275 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:28,080 on? Where do they need new tooling 276 00:16:28,080 --> 00:16:32,720 or new approaches? And I'm going to start you with 277 00:16:32,720 --> 00:16:37,480 a really simple question because I, I kind of feel like we need 278 00:16:37,480 --> 00:16:41,160 to define NHI and you made a statement earlier. 279 00:16:41,160 --> 00:16:43,240 Some people might call it machine identities. 280 00:16:44,120 --> 00:16:49,480 Is that, is that what it is? Is NHI equal machine identity? 281 00:16:50,800 --> 00:16:54,520 Yeah, look, there is still a lot of debate in the industry around 282 00:16:54,560 --> 00:17:00,840 what's the the official term for this, this topic we're covering. 283 00:17:00,840 --> 00:17:04,640 Obviously you know, which camp I'm in, which is the non human 284 00:17:04,640 --> 00:17:06,680 identity camp. You know, I guess our friends 285 00:17:06,680 --> 00:17:10,560 are gonna, you know, talk about machine identity is kind of the 286 00:17:10,720 --> 00:17:14,119 descent of the universe. And then under there they talk 287 00:17:14,119 --> 00:17:18,400 about, you know, where workloads and devices, where we started 288 00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:22,480 non human and then talk about workloading devices under that. 289 00:17:23,480 --> 00:17:27,760 Look, I think it's going to take a while for things to settle on 290 00:17:27,760 --> 00:17:30,600 what you know will be the common term. 291 00:17:30,600 --> 00:17:33,680 I think hopefully what may happen is that these become 292 00:17:34,160 --> 00:17:38,080 interchangeable terms. You can to me non human machine 293 00:17:38,080 --> 00:17:41,160 workload, it's all really the same thing. 294 00:17:41,160 --> 00:17:44,880 And I think they can in some respects be used somewhat 295 00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:47,680 interchangeably. But I guess to your question, 296 00:17:47,680 --> 00:17:50,200 Jim, you know, what is a non human identity? 297 00:17:50,200 --> 00:17:54,120 Look, it's a digital identity or a credential that represents, 298 00:17:54,280 --> 00:17:57,240 you know, a machine, an application, some automated 299 00:17:57,240 --> 00:18:01,640 process or a service that's used within your IT infrastructure 300 00:18:01,640 --> 00:18:04,240 stack. And these non human identities 301 00:18:04,240 --> 00:18:08,280 allow those machines and software workloads to securely 302 00:18:08,280 --> 00:18:12,760 authenticate, you know, operate and perform tasks automatically, 303 00:18:12,760 --> 00:18:16,240 including kind of, you know, authenticating to other 304 00:18:16,240 --> 00:18:19,440 machines, processes and services without any kind of human 305 00:18:19,960 --> 00:18:21,720 interaction. So that these are the 306 00:18:22,120 --> 00:18:26,080 identities, the accounts they used to run all software, you 307 00:18:26,080 --> 00:18:29,720 know, all around the world, you know, including IoT devices and 308 00:18:30,320 --> 00:18:33,320 other devices, you know, in an automated way, right. 309 00:18:33,320 --> 00:18:35,240 So it's what runs everything we do. 310 00:18:36,360 --> 00:18:39,760 So they are pretty important from an identity standpoint. 311 00:18:40,720 --> 00:18:45,920 So if you were back at Morgan Stanley or your advice for a 312 00:18:45,920 --> 00:18:49,480 practitioner out there, right, they get stuck in a long 313 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:55,720 elevator ride with the CIO and he happened to hear about these 314 00:18:55,720 --> 00:18:59,640 non human identities and like, hey, I'm in the elevator with 315 00:18:59,640 --> 00:19:05,640 the identity guru. I'm going to ask Lala, what are 316 00:19:05,640 --> 00:19:07,600 we doing about non human identities? 317 00:19:07,760 --> 00:19:10,640 What's the right answer if you're a practitioner? 318 00:19:10,640 --> 00:19:12,840 Like, how do you even think about that question? 319 00:19:13,840 --> 00:19:16,640 Look, it's the we could talk for hours on this. 320 00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:21,160 Doing an elevator pitch on NHIS. It's quite challenging. 321 00:19:22,520 --> 00:19:26,360 You know, when we started an NHI program at a more recent 322 00:19:26,360 --> 00:19:30,880 investment bank, my CSO said to me that why can't we fix this in 323 00:19:31,200 --> 00:19:34,800 a year? And we then had an incident that 324 00:19:34,800 --> 00:19:38,040 occurred a little bit later, which I can talk about if we've 325 00:19:38,040 --> 00:19:44,560 got time. But look, the real fundamental 326 00:19:44,640 --> 00:19:51,000 issues at the moment with NHIS is there's so many of them out 327 00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:54,600 there, right, that the stats that will quote NHIS are number 328 00:19:54,600 --> 00:20:00,720 human identities 25 to 50 X. Some will even quote 100X and 329 00:20:00,720 --> 00:20:03,280 these numbers will go up, you know, significantly more as 330 00:20:03,280 --> 00:20:07,680 we've got identic AI coming in. But generally non human 331 00:20:07,680 --> 00:20:11,960 identities are unmanaged, right? They have very weak controls. 332 00:20:12,400 --> 00:20:14,800 They're kind of the forgotten problem chart. 333 00:20:14,800 --> 00:20:18,360 You know everyone focused on human controls and Pam and 334 00:20:18,360 --> 00:20:23,320 protecting your barriers but managing non human identities 335 00:20:23,320 --> 00:20:25,080 and the secrets that are associated with them. 336 00:20:26,000 --> 00:20:29,440 Were typically not, you know, always an afterthought. 337 00:20:29,920 --> 00:20:33,600 You know, focus was on just delivering software as quickly 338 00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:36,800 as you can and security was an afterthought. 339 00:20:37,240 --> 00:20:39,040 So you have a lot of issues, right? 340 00:20:39,040 --> 00:20:42,880 With secret sprawl, you have a lot of weak control. 341 00:20:42,880 --> 00:20:46,360 So look, some of the issues you're going to get with NHIS, 342 00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:49,840 they're easy to discover. You'll find them hard coded in 343 00:20:49,840 --> 00:20:53,200 source code repositories, Confluence, SharePoint, Slack 344 00:20:53,200 --> 00:20:58,280 channels, you know, understanding how many you have, 345 00:20:58,920 --> 00:21:00,720 right. There have never really been any 346 00:21:00,880 --> 00:21:07,360 ways to kind of fully manage and inventory, you know, NHIS that's 347 00:21:07,360 --> 00:21:09,560 very hard to do. You know, a lot of these 348 00:21:09,560 --> 00:21:13,360 accounts are static in nature and that's kind of the core 349 00:21:13,440 --> 00:21:17,520 issue with kind of NHIS. Whilst we can talk about what we 350 00:21:17,520 --> 00:21:20,560 can do more strategically and zero trust maybe later in the 351 00:21:20,560 --> 00:21:24,960 discussion, the vast majority of NHI stays static, right? 352 00:21:24,960 --> 00:21:28,920 So they've been created, They have in most cases no ownership. 353 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:32,880 They may have been created 1020, thirty years ago. 354 00:21:32,880 --> 00:21:35,800 People don't know what they are. Are they still used? 355 00:21:36,160 --> 00:21:40,880 We've worked to organizations where 5060% of the accounts that 356 00:21:40,880 --> 00:21:43,240 we've uncovered have not been used. 357 00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:46,360 And clearly that increases the surface area of risk. 358 00:21:46,960 --> 00:21:49,880 You know, you have humans that are using these accounts and 359 00:21:49,880 --> 00:21:53,000 bypassing controls. We saw that when we turned on 360 00:21:53,000 --> 00:21:57,320 Pam controls at a, at a bank, they said, look, we don't like 361 00:21:57,320 --> 00:22:01,200 the Pam Corolla controls. So they started using NHIS as a 362 00:22:01,200 --> 00:22:04,160 way to bypass, you know, entry to, to production. 363 00:22:04,760 --> 00:22:07,120 You know, NHIS typically, right, because they're running your 364 00:22:07,120 --> 00:22:09,600 crown jewel apps, they're going to have high privileges. 365 00:22:09,960 --> 00:22:13,240 So again, these are targets for both internal and external 366 00:22:13,240 --> 00:22:16,040 threat actors. And there's many other issues 367 00:22:16,040 --> 00:22:18,360 that you have, you know, with with NHI. 368 00:22:18,360 --> 00:22:22,640 So unfortunately, you know, they've always had these issues. 369 00:22:22,640 --> 00:22:25,120 And now with all the hyper fragmentation that we've talked 370 00:22:25,120 --> 00:22:29,280 about, the problems just kind of exploded exponentially. 371 00:22:30,320 --> 00:22:32,640 So look, it's a huge elephant in the room. 372 00:22:32,840 --> 00:22:36,800 I would say it's probably one of the toughest challenges you'll 373 00:22:36,800 --> 00:22:40,960 face in your career in terms of solving much, much complex than 374 00:22:40,960 --> 00:22:44,480 solving kind of the human identity problem, which is much 375 00:22:44,480 --> 00:22:47,960 more mature. And a lot of the tool sets to a 376 00:22:47,960 --> 00:22:51,640 point you made earlier just aren't fit for purpose or at 377 00:22:51,640 --> 00:22:54,520 least the traditional tool sets. And we can talk about that if we 378 00:22:54,520 --> 00:22:58,400 want to dig deeper to to meet the requirements around sort of 379 00:22:58,400 --> 00:23:02,360 NHI life cycle processes. OK. 380 00:23:02,640 --> 00:23:04,080 I think we're on the 1st floor now. 381 00:23:04,080 --> 00:23:07,120 They've come all the way down on that elevator ride. 382 00:23:08,760 --> 00:23:14,280 I kind of feel like the original NHIS, at least that I dealt 383 00:23:14,280 --> 00:23:16,320 with, were service accounts, right? 384 00:23:16,320 --> 00:23:19,560 So you had these service accounts and I, I kind of feel 385 00:23:19,560 --> 00:23:26,800 like the life cycle is not probably managed all that well 386 00:23:27,160 --> 00:23:31,120 in a lot of organizations, But you know, privileged access 387 00:23:31,120 --> 00:23:36,160 management can do a good job of discovering and rotating 388 00:23:36,160 --> 00:23:39,920 passwords. It still doesn't have MFA, but 389 00:23:40,800 --> 00:23:43,200 you know, privileged access management probably knocks out 390 00:23:43,200 --> 00:23:44,480 some. We could probably use the 391 00:23:44,480 --> 00:23:48,960 governance processes in IGA to a certain extent. 392 00:23:48,960 --> 00:23:51,720 I know there are some tools out there, but service accounts 393 00:23:51,720 --> 00:23:53,560 isn't the whole ball game, right? 394 00:23:53,880 --> 00:23:58,160 And and what you pointed out with like GitHub repos, you 395 00:23:58,160 --> 00:24:02,200 could probably scan them and find these things like you could 396 00:24:02,200 --> 00:24:07,800 put controls around them with existing tools or maybe adding 397 00:24:07,800 --> 00:24:11,320 to your portfolio some. But I kind of feel like we're 398 00:24:11,400 --> 00:24:15,720 entering or we've entered this era now where there's this new 399 00:24:15,720 --> 00:24:23,560 crop of non human identities, whether they are device specific 400 00:24:23,880 --> 00:24:27,880 or they are more or less like these ephemeral identities that 401 00:24:27,880 --> 00:24:32,440 get created with like and infrastructure as a service type 402 00:24:32,440 --> 00:24:37,440 platform where it's not going to create the identities to roll 403 00:24:37,440 --> 00:24:41,080 out the cloud infrastructure that it needs and then 404 00:24:41,520 --> 00:24:43,720 potentially deactivate those identities. 405 00:24:43,720 --> 00:24:46,960 But you have to have your arms around it to some extent, right? 406 00:24:47,200 --> 00:24:49,320 And maybe it's not just those things. 407 00:24:49,360 --> 00:24:56,200 I mean, you just take in, take the whole cloud into scope and 408 00:24:56,480 --> 00:24:59,240 man, there's just tons of identities there. 409 00:24:59,240 --> 00:25:03,920 And I wouldn't think that the traditional privilege access 410 00:25:03,920 --> 00:25:08,200 management tooling is going to do a good job at that. 411 00:25:08,200 --> 00:25:15,680 So one thing, So OK, so that's one thing, which is that I think 412 00:25:15,680 --> 00:25:18,600 there's all these new types of identities. 413 00:25:19,440 --> 00:25:22,920 The other thing is, and this is what I've always kind of said, 414 00:25:22,920 --> 00:25:28,040 would it be nice if we manage non human identities the same 415 00:25:28,040 --> 00:25:32,040 way we manage humans, which is we have some source of record 416 00:25:32,040 --> 00:25:35,720 like an HR system or something. That's where you start by 417 00:25:35,720 --> 00:25:40,720 creating the identity there and then it gets provisioned, you 418 00:25:40,720 --> 00:25:44,000 know, through automation, ideally to the point where you 419 00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:46,200 wanted it. It can be checked on, the 420 00:25:46,200 --> 00:25:49,440 password could be rotated. You no longer need it. 421 00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:52,240 You're the source of record. Shut it off and it shuts it off 422 00:25:52,240 --> 00:25:55,480 anywhere that's being used. But it's not really like that, 423 00:25:55,480 --> 00:25:59,280 right? I mean, people spin up a server, 424 00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:04,600 they either manually or by automation create accounts to go 425 00:26:04,600 --> 00:26:08,600 and do those things, server or database or whatever they're 426 00:26:08,600 --> 00:26:12,920 spinning up. So the approach to managing 427 00:26:12,920 --> 00:26:18,640 these non human identities is not like linear where you start 428 00:26:18,640 --> 00:26:23,320 the process here point A and then the end of end of life is 429 00:26:23,640 --> 00:26:27,280 point Z. It's you're finding these things 430 00:26:27,520 --> 00:26:33,800 and then you have to wrap them up in layers of security 431 00:26:33,800 --> 00:26:37,480 management so that they are more secure. 432 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:41,760 And I don't think it goes from like not secure at all to 100% 433 00:26:41,760 --> 00:26:45,120 secure. But to me, that's the the big 434 00:26:45,120 --> 00:26:48,280 thing is that, hey, there's these new identities and they 435 00:26:48,280 --> 00:26:53,800 are not easily managed and the tools you have today don't do a 436 00:26:53,800 --> 00:26:57,000 good job of managing them. And that to me, that's like why 437 00:26:57,000 --> 00:27:00,640 it's hot. It's like all of a sudden we're 438 00:27:00,640 --> 00:27:04,880 inundated with all these places that are now creating identities 439 00:27:04,880 --> 00:27:09,960 and none of the tools that we have traditionally do a great 440 00:27:09,960 --> 00:27:12,240 job at managing them. Did I get that right? 441 00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:15,200 Yeah. Look, I think you've summarized 442 00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:18,160 that very, very well. Look, even if you look at the 443 00:27:18,160 --> 00:27:22,000 human space where you've got all the cloud tools that are out 444 00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:25,560 there, right, that have come along because sort of, you know, 445 00:27:26,120 --> 00:27:29,600 move beyond sort of the traditional IGA and Pam even for 446 00:27:29,600 --> 00:27:34,120 just kind of the human use case, but with kind of non human 447 00:27:34,120 --> 00:27:36,560 identities. You know, there isn't a single 448 00:27:36,560 --> 00:27:39,720 source of truth like you might have with human identities. 449 00:27:40,160 --> 00:27:42,280 You know, there's going to be many places where they get 450 00:27:42,400 --> 00:27:46,440 provisioned, you know, in the cloud on your, you know, on Prem 451 00:27:46,440 --> 00:27:49,520 environment, you can have a lot of local accounts, maybe on 452 00:27:49,520 --> 00:27:53,080 legacy databases, Active Directory, you're going to have 453 00:27:53,080 --> 00:27:57,000 many, you know, ID PS Right. So there's going to be like, you 454 00:27:57,000 --> 00:27:59,920 know, 10s of places where a typical organization is going to 455 00:27:59,920 --> 00:28:03,200 have these NHIS kind of provisioned. 456 00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:05,880 But generally they get provisioned. 457 00:28:05,960 --> 00:28:10,240 You know, they typically come if they're static with some keys 458 00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:13,240 and passwords. They get shared around, you 459 00:28:13,240 --> 00:28:16,040 know, maybe in an e-mail or in some other communication 460 00:28:16,440 --> 00:28:18,800 channel, in a ticket to the requester. 461 00:28:19,880 --> 00:28:22,320 So there you go. You know, problem one already, 462 00:28:22,320 --> 00:28:24,360 right? The credentials are known by 463 00:28:24,360 --> 00:28:27,120 humans. And then they'll, you know, 464 00:28:27,120 --> 00:28:29,680 they'll take the easy route. They'll just put them into 465 00:28:30,080 --> 00:28:32,560 source code, hard code, the credentials. 466 00:28:32,880 --> 00:28:35,800 So you've got all the challenges around, you know, vaulting, 467 00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:40,320 removing hard coded credentials. Look, so yes, a Pam solution can 468 00:28:40,320 --> 00:28:43,920 help with some of that, but a Pam solution isn't really going 469 00:28:43,920 --> 00:28:46,280 to solve your whole inventory problem. 470 00:28:46,280 --> 00:28:50,840 And discovering all these identities that are out there, 471 00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:54,960 you know, once you've discovered them, you need to understand 472 00:28:54,960 --> 00:28:58,960 who's the owner, what's the level of permissions, how broad 473 00:28:58,960 --> 00:29:02,560 is the access right? And classify them, you know, and 474 00:29:02,560 --> 00:29:05,680 then you can start doing things like posture management, you 475 00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:09,120 know, have they got excessive permissions, misconfigurations, 476 00:29:09,560 --> 00:29:11,960 what's inactive, you know, what's shared. 477 00:29:12,440 --> 00:29:16,640 And clearly, you know, with, you know, the growth in cloud, the 478 00:29:16,640 --> 00:29:20,520 number of privileges that you can get in the cloud, just kind 479 00:29:20,520 --> 00:29:23,600 of a crazy rather 10s of thousands of difference of 480 00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:26,920 combinations. So people take the easy path out 481 00:29:26,920 --> 00:29:28,920 and say, look, rather than following least privileged 482 00:29:28,920 --> 00:29:32,200 principles, let's just go with, you know, an Uber kind of 483 00:29:32,200 --> 00:29:34,640 privilege. So you see a lot of, I think the 484 00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:38,400 clouds kind of encouraged kind of more excessive privileges to, 485 00:29:38,400 --> 00:29:41,520 to these identities. So you've got, you know, them 486 00:29:41,520 --> 00:29:43,000 all out there. And you, you talked about 487 00:29:43,000 --> 00:29:45,120 scanning. You know, that's another area 488 00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:48,120 that traditional tools would not have done right is to scan and 489 00:29:48,120 --> 00:29:52,440 look for these credentials in source code, in repos and other 490 00:29:52,480 --> 00:29:55,920 places. And then, you know, the big task 491 00:29:55,920 --> 00:29:58,160 is once you've found all the things, yes, you can do some 492 00:29:58,160 --> 00:30:01,920 hygiene, some clean up, but you're then going to secure the, 493 00:30:01,920 --> 00:30:04,800 the, the secrets if they're hard coded. 494 00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:09,480 You know, had a previous org that I wrapped up last year, you 495 00:30:09,480 --> 00:30:13,960 know, we had to secure over 100,000 NHIS that we were 496 00:30:15,160 --> 00:30:18,440 uncovered in source code. And our initial scan that we did 497 00:30:18,440 --> 00:30:23,520 found over a million potential hard coded secrets passwords. 498 00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:27,160 So you can see the size of the problem and then to make those 499 00:30:27,160 --> 00:30:31,240 changes, move those credentials into a vault, you know, the 500 00:30:31,240 --> 00:30:34,400 amount of changes you need to make to your code to remove 501 00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:37,000 those credentials, the operational risk. 502 00:30:37,480 --> 00:30:41,160 And then you talk to him about cycling right and rotating these 503 00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:45,760 credentials 1 is securing them. But reality is people still know 504 00:30:45,760 --> 00:30:49,040 the, the, the, the passwords, the secrets. 505 00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:53,000 And as people leave, you know, and then with Cloud API keys, 506 00:30:53,560 --> 00:30:56,280 you know, you can take that information with you, right, to 507 00:30:56,280 --> 00:31:00,000 another organization or compromise those accounts, you 508 00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:02,080 know, even if you've left an organization. 509 00:31:02,400 --> 00:31:05,080 So rotation becomes something that you need to do. 510 00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:07,880 And whenever there's a breach, right, the first thing is rotate 511 00:31:07,880 --> 00:31:11,640 your keys. But again, you know how those 512 00:31:11,640 --> 00:31:15,240 credentials used in many places in your code, How do you know 513 00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:18,680 when you rotate? You know that all the code, you 514 00:31:18,680 --> 00:31:23,440 know, is using the same, you know, vault solution to source 515 00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:24,960 their password. If you miss one of those 516 00:31:24,960 --> 00:31:29,040 dependencies out, you could end up causing operational impact. 517 00:31:29,040 --> 00:31:32,240 And we've seen that so much have many orbs where you didn't 518 00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:35,680 realize a credential was, you know, used. 519 00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:39,520 You missed a piece of code or you found, oh, some other app 520 00:31:39,720 --> 00:31:42,600 you've given the credential to, you know, like to another team 521 00:31:42,920 --> 00:31:44,440 that needed to connect to your database. 522 00:31:44,440 --> 00:31:47,560 You give them the password and they're using it as well. 523 00:31:48,000 --> 00:31:51,520 So there's a lot of legacy that's been created and that's 524 00:31:51,520 --> 00:31:55,960 why a traditional IGA or a Pam tool is not going to solve these 525 00:31:55,960 --> 00:31:58,000 problems. That's why you've got a new crop 526 00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:02,560 of pure NHI products that have come into the market. 527 00:32:03,040 --> 00:32:05,840 And then also now we're seeing a lot of movement with the 528 00:32:05,840 --> 00:32:09,720 traditional IGA and Pam players that are now investing 529 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:14,080 significant sums to build, you know, NHI capabilities. 530 00:32:14,080 --> 00:32:20,360 So it's definitely the existing tool sets just could not support 531 00:32:20,360 --> 00:32:23,040 these use cases. It's much, much more complex 532 00:32:23,600 --> 00:32:27,320 then what we talk about for humans, you know, and then 533 00:32:27,320 --> 00:32:30,400 you've got to think about monitoring, you know, if someone 534 00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:36,080 inappropriately using your, your NHIS coming from some unknown IP 535 00:32:36,080 --> 00:32:37,920 addresses that are human using them. 536 00:32:38,640 --> 00:32:40,720 And then they are already being compromised. 537 00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:44,160 And then you get into the, you know, what's the target state, 538 00:32:44,160 --> 00:32:47,800 right, which is kind of ephemeral just in time zero 539 00:32:47,800 --> 00:32:50,800 trust. You know, our previous org, we 540 00:32:50,800 --> 00:32:52,760 also implemented prevent controls. 541 00:32:52,760 --> 00:32:55,880 When you check in your code, we're actually looking runtime 542 00:32:55,880 --> 00:33:00,040 to see, have you checked in an API key or a password to an NHI 543 00:33:00,040 --> 00:33:02,720 credential? And we actually block the check 544 00:33:02,720 --> 00:33:04,800 it. So if you look at the overall 545 00:33:04,800 --> 00:33:07,920 life cycle, we've published one of these on our portal. 546 00:33:08,560 --> 00:33:13,040 It's a huge, huge problem to solve if you want to try and 547 00:33:13,040 --> 00:33:16,040 tackle the whole thing holistically from a life cycle 548 00:33:16,040 --> 00:33:18,280 standpoint. So from an organizational 549 00:33:18,280 --> 00:33:22,560 standpoint, I think you're going to take a balance, which is try 550 00:33:22,560 --> 00:33:24,480 and do some things more strategically. 551 00:33:24,720 --> 00:33:29,560 You know, do kind of dynamic ephemeral secrets with your 552 00:33:29,560 --> 00:33:31,880 workloads. You know, more of a zero trust 553 00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:35,680 model, maybe with your Genentech staff or your grand duels as you 554 00:33:35,680 --> 00:33:38,320 re engineer. But you've also got to deal with 555 00:33:38,320 --> 00:33:41,920 your existing kind of state that's out there, which is 556 00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:44,880 static in nature, and you've got to get that under control. 557 00:33:44,880 --> 00:33:47,240 So you're going to have to always think of a hybrid 558 00:33:47,240 --> 00:33:50,720 approach to dealing with the NHI problem, you know, a lot of 559 00:33:50,720 --> 00:33:55,200 legacy and figure out how you kind of strategically kind of 560 00:33:55,200 --> 00:33:57,240 stop the bleeding, you know, over time as well. 561 00:33:58,360 --> 00:34:00,640 So listening to a couple of points. 562 00:34:01,680 --> 00:34:03,880 It certainly did, but it opens up some questions for me because 563 00:34:03,880 --> 00:34:06,440 I'm listening to the two of you talk here and now I'm wondering, 564 00:34:07,360 --> 00:34:11,280 you know, whose fault is this? Where does the blame lie? 565 00:34:11,280 --> 00:34:14,639 Because I feel like this is where privileged access 566 00:34:14,639 --> 00:34:18,000 management was supposed to have been the solution for this. 567 00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:20,920 We've been sold this bill of goods by Pam vendors for decades 568 00:34:20,920 --> 00:34:24,440 that hey, this is where you go to manage your non human 569 00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:25,719 identities. We didn't call it that. 570 00:34:25,719 --> 00:34:28,159 We called IT service accounts. We called it keys, right, All 571 00:34:28,159 --> 00:34:31,840 that kind of stuff. But listening to the two of you 572 00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:35,159 makes me feel like, OK, well, OK, what do you mean? 573 00:34:35,159 --> 00:34:37,440 I thought Pam was supposed to do that and it's not doing it. 574 00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:40,040 And that has opened up the door for these new vendors to come in 575 00:34:40,040 --> 00:34:45,239 and specialize in this version of Pam 2 point O or three-point 576 00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:46,360 O or whatever you want to call it. 577 00:34:46,360 --> 00:34:50,280 But I almost have a feeling of a little bit of remorse here. 578 00:34:50,280 --> 00:34:53,040 It's like, all right, well, Pam was supposed to do this. 579 00:34:53,199 --> 00:34:55,560 Why isn't it doing it? And I don't know if that's a 580 00:34:55,560 --> 00:34:58,720 fair assessment based on the conversation so far or just kind 581 00:34:58,720 --> 00:35:01,080 of my my experience with Pam solutions, but I'm curious. 582 00:35:01,080 --> 00:35:03,840 I'll like to see. Look, I think it's different. 583 00:35:04,880 --> 00:35:07,000 Sorry to interrupt. No, please go ahead. 584 00:35:07,360 --> 00:35:14,200 Look, I think, well, if I if you asked me did was Pam designed to 585 00:35:14,200 --> 00:35:20,040 solve NHI, I would say partly. Like my background in dealing 586 00:35:20,040 --> 00:35:24,240 with Pam was really driven from kind of a human standpoint where 587 00:35:24,240 --> 00:35:28,240 you had like core admin accounts, ROU accounts, service 588 00:35:28,240 --> 00:35:32,240 accounts, right, that I needed to operate, you know, your your 589 00:35:32,240 --> 00:35:36,200 infrastructure, your software, you know, So the definition we 590 00:35:36,640 --> 00:35:43,720 gave on NHIS, but usually the Pam element there was around 591 00:35:43,720 --> 00:35:47,480 humans and controlling people that needed to elevate their 592 00:35:47,480 --> 00:35:52,440 privileges, right to impersonate pseudo become that account, you 593 00:35:52,440 --> 00:35:55,800 know, to maybe deploy the software or maybe when there's a 594 00:35:55,800 --> 00:35:59,600 support issue, go in and, you know, become that account so 595 00:35:59,600 --> 00:36:01,640 they could then deal with support issues. 596 00:36:02,720 --> 00:36:06,880 So yes, it was there to protect kind of your keys to your 597 00:36:06,880 --> 00:36:09,800 Kingdom, like your most privileged accounts. 598 00:36:10,160 --> 00:36:13,560 But I think non human identities are much, much poorer than just 599 00:36:13,760 --> 00:36:16,280 Pam, right. I think you know, like, you 600 00:36:16,280 --> 00:36:18,920 know, if an application's got an account that it uses to connect 601 00:36:18,920 --> 00:36:22,400 to a database, is that a privileged account that's really 602 00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:26,800 just an account that that process needs to operate and 603 00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:32,000 communicate with other services. Yes, it has privileges, but is 604 00:36:32,000 --> 00:36:35,440 it a privileged account like in the traditional Pam sense? 605 00:36:35,440 --> 00:36:39,560 I'm not sure it is. But yes, the the the the idea of 606 00:36:39,560 --> 00:36:44,600 what Pam tools did, you could argue could cater for some of 607 00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:46,720 the life cycle processes for an NHI. 608 00:36:47,160 --> 00:36:51,520 But you know, again, like take a vote like Hashi, all they do is 609 00:36:52,040 --> 00:36:54,320 capture the secrets, right? They don't deal with the life 610 00:36:54,320 --> 00:36:57,040 cycle processes. They don't natively deal with 611 00:36:57,040 --> 00:37:01,240 cycling or scanning or inventory or ownership. 612 00:37:02,280 --> 00:37:06,000 So many of these existing tool sets only deal with a really 613 00:37:06,000 --> 00:37:10,280 small part of the overall life cycle of Nhis. 614 00:37:11,680 --> 00:37:14,400 Yeah. And I think that's go ahead, 615 00:37:14,400 --> 00:37:15,400 Jeff. I say. 616 00:37:15,400 --> 00:37:19,920 So I think the the important distinction here then is the 617 00:37:19,920 --> 00:37:24,040 first word of Pam privileged, Does privilege connotate non 618 00:37:24,040 --> 00:37:26,440 human identity? And then does non human identity 619 00:37:27,000 --> 00:37:28,880 equate to privileged? Right. 620 00:37:28,880 --> 00:37:31,120 I think that's kind of what I got from your answer was not 621 00:37:31,120 --> 00:37:35,960 every, not everything is equal. You can have a non privileged 622 00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:39,840 non human identity. I'm kind of thinking about what 623 00:37:39,840 --> 00:37:41,840 maybe you can give me an example of what that might look like. 624 00:37:41,840 --> 00:37:44,440 Because if I think of non human identity, I'm thinking of 625 00:37:45,040 --> 00:37:46,680 something that's sitting behind the scenes. 626 00:37:46,680 --> 00:37:49,360 It's a service account, it's a script, it's an API. 627 00:37:49,360 --> 00:37:53,160 It's, you know, some sort of thing that is accessing a data 628 00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:56,320 or a resource. And you know, I guess maybe it's 629 00:37:56,320 --> 00:37:59,440 like what the cafeteria menu or or something like that. 630 00:37:59,440 --> 00:38:03,240 I don't know what would be an example of a non human identity 631 00:38:03,240 --> 00:38:08,160 that is not privileged. Well, I think every non human 632 00:38:08,160 --> 00:38:12,800 identity will have privileges, you know, permissions, you know, 633 00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:16,440 to whatever identity it needs to operate. 634 00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:21,040 But I guess the privilege when I when I think of the Pam, it's 635 00:38:21,040 --> 00:38:24,200 really, you know, where you're trying to elevate and you know, 636 00:38:24,400 --> 00:38:28,440 get sort of higher privileges and what you had today as a 637 00:38:28,440 --> 00:38:33,320 human right to perform some elevated role from your basic 638 00:38:33,320 --> 00:38:35,560 credentials as you know, a human identity. 639 00:38:36,040 --> 00:38:40,600 So I, my always view of Pam was around how you elevated, you 640 00:38:40,600 --> 00:38:45,000 know, the human use case to, to, to, to get access to those non 641 00:38:45,000 --> 00:38:50,200 human identities versus Pam being the, the, the thing that 642 00:38:50,320 --> 00:38:53,240 managed everything, every NHI that's out there. 643 00:38:53,600 --> 00:38:56,840 I'm not sure I've quite answered your question. 644 00:38:57,440 --> 00:39:00,560 Well, I like how this I like how this conversation is going, 645 00:39:00,560 --> 00:39:06,360 because I think we've as least privileged people as identity 646 00:39:06,360 --> 00:39:11,520 people, lifers, if you will, we want everything to be done 647 00:39:11,560 --> 00:39:17,040 great, But we know that the reality is that we have to take 648 00:39:17,040 --> 00:39:18,920 some kind of a risk based approach. 649 00:39:19,320 --> 00:39:21,680 And so it's all about setting priorities. 650 00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:25,400 I was going to ask the question a more, you know, from the 651 00:39:25,400 --> 00:39:29,760 beginning, like a huge elephant. I mean, when you talk about non 652 00:39:29,760 --> 00:39:34,320 human identities and you talk about the the pure scale, even 653 00:39:34,320 --> 00:39:37,920 in like a small to mid sized organization, we talk about a 654 00:39:37,920 --> 00:39:40,520 large enterprise. You could be talking about 655 00:39:40,520 --> 00:39:43,880 literally millions of identities. 656 00:39:45,200 --> 00:39:47,000 How do you wrap your arms around that? 657 00:39:47,000 --> 00:39:50,760 Where do you start? And I think it's got to be based 658 00:39:50,760 --> 00:39:54,640 on risk you got to look for. And so when we talk about 659 00:39:54,640 --> 00:39:57,720 privilege, I mean, of course, like every account has some 660 00:39:57,720 --> 00:40:02,040 privileges, but we've got to go for those ones where it's like, 661 00:40:02,120 --> 00:40:05,560 oh, that's. That's one or maybe it's the 662 00:40:05,560 --> 00:40:09,760 type of an account where like, hey, if these got compromised in 663 00:40:10,600 --> 00:40:15,160 our Active Directory, what? And like, I'm sure there's some 664 00:40:15,160 --> 00:40:18,720 people out there scoffing at the Active Directory, but normally 665 00:40:18,720 --> 00:40:22,480 when companies get completely ransomware and completely shut 666 00:40:22,480 --> 00:40:26,840 down, it's because the hackers got the Active Directory. 667 00:40:27,040 --> 00:40:30,360 They have control of the Active Directory and they can basically 668 00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:33,800 turn off your business and make it so you, you know, your e-mail 669 00:40:33,800 --> 00:40:37,880 doesn't work, People can't log into their laptops, can't get to 670 00:40:37,880 --> 00:40:40,200 their files. I'm sorry, that's lights out. 671 00:40:40,560 --> 00:40:45,040 And so whether or not you like Active Directory, hear me out. 672 00:40:46,440 --> 00:40:50,600 Those kind of accounts have got to be like at the, the top of 673 00:40:50,600 --> 00:40:53,080 your pecking order. And then I think it would be 674 00:40:53,600 --> 00:40:57,920 applications that are, you know, the quarter of your business. 675 00:40:58,360 --> 00:41:03,040 So do you agree that like that's how you go about prioritizing? 676 00:41:03,240 --> 00:41:09,800 And I'm, I'm assume whether you agree or disagree, how do you 677 00:41:09,800 --> 00:41:15,160 then choose your technology stack to solve that? 678 00:41:15,160 --> 00:41:21,120 Because to your point earlier about Hashi, great, great vault 679 00:41:21,240 --> 00:41:25,640 technology and maybe that, you know, you say I'm going to take 680 00:41:25,640 --> 00:41:28,760 on risk #1 and that's what I need. 681 00:41:29,400 --> 00:41:33,120 But then you can't be doing that evaluation each time you go. 682 00:41:33,120 --> 00:41:38,760 Like what is your technology approach to make sure that you 683 00:41:38,760 --> 00:41:43,080 have the right number and the right strategic alignment of 684 00:41:43,080 --> 00:41:48,120 technologies in your portfolio so that you can manage your NHI 685 00:41:48,280 --> 00:41:50,440 problem? Hey, look, it's a great 686 00:41:50,440 --> 00:41:52,720 question. I get to ask this a lot and I 687 00:41:52,720 --> 00:41:57,240 recently talked about this at AIC and next week I'll be doing 688 00:41:57,240 --> 00:42:01,560 a seminar talk at Identiverse, A practitioner's guide to NHIS. 689 00:42:02,120 --> 00:42:07,480 So look, when I ran my last NHI programme at a large investment 690 00:42:07,480 --> 00:42:11,520 bank, you know, we took took step back first and took a 691 00:42:11,520 --> 00:42:15,160 holistic approach and clearly our mantra was you're going to 692 00:42:15,160 --> 00:42:17,880 take your risk based approach. You can't tackle the elephant in 693 00:42:17,880 --> 00:42:20,520 the room. So some of the things Jim you've 694 00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:23,640 talked about you have to look at where are your clearly your 695 00:42:23,640 --> 00:42:26,280 highest risks. So you have to go after your 696 00:42:26,280 --> 00:42:28,800 most privileged, you know, accounts like your admin 697 00:42:28,800 --> 00:42:32,840 accounts, your domain controllers, you know, etcetera, 698 00:42:33,200 --> 00:42:36,800 your root accounts on servers, databases. 699 00:42:38,080 --> 00:42:40,080 And you know, the other thing you're going to need to do is 700 00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:44,360 look at what controls you have around those accounts per 701 00:42:44,360 --> 00:42:47,800 platform. Now, you may have interactive 702 00:42:47,800 --> 00:42:51,400 logins enabled on your Windows service accounts, which we all 703 00:42:51,400 --> 00:42:53,560 know is really, really bad, right? 704 00:42:54,000 --> 00:42:58,360 So you can then interactively get in and start to become that 705 00:42:58,360 --> 00:42:59,800 account, sort of. There's lots. 706 00:42:59,800 --> 00:43:03,640 You do first need to understand what your control maturity looks 707 00:43:03,640 --> 00:43:04,920 like. You know, where do you have 708 00:43:04,920 --> 00:43:09,480 strong controls or processes? And maybe you know, your Linux 709 00:43:09,480 --> 00:43:12,240 state might be very well secure because you don't have 710 00:43:12,240 --> 00:43:15,160 interactive logins. No one knows the password for 711 00:43:15,160 --> 00:43:18,040 any of the counts, but your Windows ADS, right, where 712 00:43:18,040 --> 00:43:20,840 everybody knows the passwords and never cycled and they're 713 00:43:20,840 --> 00:43:23,080 interactive, right? So you know, you need to 714 00:43:23,080 --> 00:43:27,240 understand kind of your control levels across your tech stack. 715 00:43:27,640 --> 00:43:31,080 You clearly need to go for your highest risk accounts, right? 716 00:43:31,360 --> 00:43:34,280 You need to look at things like lateral movement, right? 717 00:43:34,280 --> 00:43:37,040 Because typically folks will first find some non prod 718 00:43:37,040 --> 00:43:39,320 environment and then laterally move. 719 00:43:39,680 --> 00:43:42,120 You know, we see a lot of service accounts that don't have 720 00:43:42,120 --> 00:43:46,480 environment segregation and that applies to any NHIS where the 721 00:43:46,480 --> 00:43:49,800 same account has access to prod and non prod. 722 00:43:50,600 --> 00:43:52,880 So once you're in, you can laterally move. 723 00:43:53,760 --> 00:43:57,720 So you really need to understand all your controls and then come 724 00:43:57,720 --> 00:44:00,680 up with more of a holistic approach of how you're going to, 725 00:44:01,160 --> 00:44:04,160 you know, go for, you know, the areas that have got the biggest 726 00:44:04,160 --> 00:44:07,520 risk exposures. Like at a previous org, we felt 727 00:44:07,520 --> 00:44:10,840 the database estate was our biggest risk, right? 728 00:44:10,840 --> 00:44:13,760 Because you can't turn off interactive logins there. 729 00:44:14,120 --> 00:44:16,440 As long as you know the credential, the password, you 730 00:44:16,440 --> 00:44:20,280 can log in and you know, you know, you can do anything once 731 00:44:20,280 --> 00:44:22,520 you're once you're in. And then there's a lack of 732 00:44:22,680 --> 00:44:26,760 monitoring of what you're doing. The other thing I think is 733 00:44:26,760 --> 00:44:30,080 really important that people forget is you've got to really 734 00:44:30,240 --> 00:44:32,960 look at this top town from a management standpoint. 735 00:44:33,360 --> 00:44:37,760 Look at kind of your policies, your standards, your controls, 736 00:44:38,200 --> 00:44:41,720 and make sure you educate folks. And look, you may not have all 737 00:44:41,720 --> 00:44:44,960 the best tech stack out there. You may not even have a vault, 738 00:44:44,960 --> 00:44:47,600 you may not have scanning in place, but you need to let 739 00:44:47,600 --> 00:44:51,200 people know. Look, security first development 740 00:44:51,200 --> 00:44:53,320 is the way to go, right? They have SEC OPS. 741 00:44:53,720 --> 00:44:57,560 And while some of the automation through your CICD pipelines and 742 00:44:57,560 --> 00:45:01,040 integration to your vaults and other controls may come over 743 00:45:01,040 --> 00:45:04,040 time, they need to know that this stuff is unacceptable, 744 00:45:04,040 --> 00:45:06,240 right? So we're checking in hard coded 745 00:45:06,240 --> 00:45:10,200 credentials into source code. And you know, they need to 746 00:45:10,200 --> 00:45:13,040 realise that our previous org, you know, we basically said to 747 00:45:13,040 --> 00:45:17,360 folks, if you continue to repeat the mistakes of the past, you 748 00:45:17,360 --> 00:45:20,640 know, you will be disciplined and even, you know, lose your 749 00:45:20,640 --> 00:45:23,840 job. So we had those things top down. 750 00:45:23,840 --> 00:45:27,080 Education training is really, really important. 751 00:45:27,080 --> 00:45:29,720 And then it's about defining controls. 752 00:45:29,720 --> 00:45:32,080 Like what is the bar that people need to adhere to? 753 00:45:32,840 --> 00:45:36,640 You know, it was shocking. At a previous org, there was no 754 00:45:36,640 --> 00:45:39,080 requirement to cycle passwords for NHIS. 755 00:45:39,080 --> 00:45:42,440 As long as the password was 15 characters in length and 756 00:45:42,440 --> 00:45:45,440 complex, that was it. No requirement to cycle. 757 00:45:45,960 --> 00:45:48,680 And a regulator comes in and says, do you cycle passwords? 758 00:45:48,680 --> 00:45:53,000 No bang, huge regulatory point. So you have to start with the 759 00:45:53,000 --> 00:45:56,000 basics and to a point, Jim, you made earlier, a lot of the 760 00:45:56,000 --> 00:46:01,880 controls are very similar from a human standpoint as well around, 761 00:46:02,120 --> 00:46:04,680 you know, the life cycle processes, what is the way you 762 00:46:04,680 --> 00:46:06,760 provision? How do you deal with the 763 00:46:06,800 --> 00:46:10,800 provisioning? So always focus on the basics. 764 00:46:10,800 --> 00:46:14,720 Make sure you've got the basic control processes in place and 765 00:46:14,720 --> 00:46:19,200 then people process technology. Continue to mature out your 766 00:46:19,200 --> 00:46:22,800 processes and then continue to mature out your tech stack. 767 00:46:22,800 --> 00:46:25,280 And it may mean then you buy a solution and it may mean you 768 00:46:25,280 --> 00:46:30,000 supplement your existing IGA products and Pam products or do 769 00:46:30,000 --> 00:46:32,960 something in the middle, right? It really depends where you are 770 00:46:32,960 --> 00:46:36,680 in your organization and the complexity of your environment. 771 00:46:38,280 --> 00:46:40,680 So, you know, I think with anything, it's just start with 772 00:46:40,680 --> 00:46:43,120 the basics first, right? The fundamentals. 773 00:46:44,240 --> 00:46:46,680 I love the idea of the basics because it gets overlooked so 774 00:46:46,680 --> 00:46:48,560 often. And it's, you know, the 775 00:46:48,560 --> 00:46:51,120 fundamentals need to be there. You want to build on a solid 776 00:46:51,120 --> 00:46:53,920 foundation. And if you skip that step, 777 00:46:53,920 --> 00:46:56,200 you're probably going to have a bad time down the road. 778 00:46:56,560 --> 00:46:58,640 And you can't just buy a product and say, well, this is going to 779 00:46:58,640 --> 00:47:01,280 solve my problems. You know, there's a lot of, you 780 00:47:01,280 --> 00:47:03,920 know, governance and the people in the process that go along 781 00:47:03,920 --> 00:47:06,280 with that to actually address the issue. 782 00:47:07,200 --> 00:47:08,440 I mean, I'll give you a great example. 783 00:47:08,440 --> 00:47:10,120 Hashi, right? We used some of the previous 784 00:47:10,120 --> 00:47:13,520 organization. Yes, you can put passwords into 785 00:47:13,520 --> 00:47:17,320 a vault for service account and any other kind of NHIS, right? 786 00:47:17,320 --> 00:47:20,200 But if you don't think about when you onboard that to the 787 00:47:20,200 --> 00:47:23,440 vault, if you don't set up the right metadata, what is the 788 00:47:23,440 --> 00:47:25,920 account name? Where is it used? 789 00:47:25,920 --> 00:47:29,360 What database or server is it used on? 790 00:47:29,720 --> 00:47:31,920 If you don't provide that metadata, I mean just Chuck in 791 00:47:31,920 --> 00:47:36,760 the password and give it A tag like password 1, password 2 when 792 00:47:36,760 --> 00:47:38,240 you don't need to move on to cycling. 793 00:47:38,240 --> 00:47:41,720 Oh, I've got something in a vault, you know, I know the 794 00:47:41,720 --> 00:47:44,760 password, but I've got no idea what it is that it's actually a 795 00:47:44,760 --> 00:47:47,760 database account on server XYZ, right? 796 00:47:47,760 --> 00:47:50,920 So again, you've really got to plan this stuff end to end. 797 00:47:50,920 --> 00:47:53,560 And maybe some of this stuff is basic. 798 00:47:53,560 --> 00:47:56,680 You think you would do that, but you won't believe the number of 799 00:47:56,760 --> 00:48:00,000 groups that have just chucked stuff into a vault without 800 00:48:00,160 --> 00:48:02,840 having proper metadata when it's really burnt them, you know, 801 00:48:03,000 --> 00:48:05,640 later on. So you really need to think 802 00:48:05,640 --> 00:48:08,840 about this from a strategy and architecture standpoint and 803 00:48:08,840 --> 00:48:13,680 design your whole solution around NHIS end to end is is 804 00:48:13,680 --> 00:48:17,080 what we would recommend. So why don't I ask you a little 805 00:48:17,080 --> 00:48:20,280 bit of a deep question and then we'll end on a lighter note to 806 00:48:20,280 --> 00:48:21,720 kind of get us out of the deep water. 807 00:48:22,280 --> 00:48:26,080 And here's my deep question. Is there anything that scares 808 00:48:26,080 --> 00:48:29,840 you about NHI? Look everything excuse me about 809 00:48:29,840 --> 00:48:31,640 NHI. That's why anything that doesn't 810 00:48:31,640 --> 00:48:32,040 I'm. Doing. 811 00:48:32,040 --> 00:48:33,240 How about that? Maybe that's a better way to do 812 00:48:33,240 --> 00:48:39,200 it. Look, but the problem that 813 00:48:39,200 --> 00:48:42,840 scares me is, you know, the fact that this problem has been there 814 00:48:42,840 --> 00:48:46,880 for 2530 years, ever since computers existed. 815 00:48:46,880 --> 00:48:50,040 And we haven't really moved the needle that much, right? 816 00:48:50,280 --> 00:48:54,000 And it's only really been in the last few years where some of the 817 00:48:54,000 --> 00:48:58,040 vendors and the focus from everyone has been in the space. 818 00:48:58,600 --> 00:49:02,200 And yes, there's vendors that deal with governance and posture 819 00:49:02,200 --> 00:49:05,120 management. How do we deal with kind of zero 820 00:49:05,120 --> 00:49:09,520 trust based architectures? You know, there's a lot of good 821 00:49:09,520 --> 00:49:15,080 standards, spy, spy whimsy that are coming, right, that are 822 00:49:15,080 --> 00:49:19,000 helping define how you can build kind of scalable workload 823 00:49:19,000 --> 00:49:22,560 dynamic based kind of architectures for managing your 824 00:49:22,560 --> 00:49:26,120 workloads and follow zero trust principles. 825 00:49:26,120 --> 00:49:28,400 But all that stuff is still not baked. 826 00:49:29,320 --> 00:49:32,000 But I think the one thing that's really scary, right, is kind of 827 00:49:32,880 --> 00:49:35,040 obviously you're probably going to guess what I'm going to say 828 00:49:35,040 --> 00:49:40,160 like a gentic AI and, and the ramifications for NHIS, given 829 00:49:40,160 --> 00:49:43,320 that they're so weakly managed already, right? 830 00:49:43,320 --> 00:49:46,880 So if you continue to use the same processes for your gentic 831 00:49:46,880 --> 00:49:49,520 AI, they're probably going to be even more privileged, right, 832 00:49:49,520 --> 00:49:53,840 than regular Nhis that are used. And as they become 833 00:49:53,840 --> 00:49:58,480 interconnected and can elevate their privileges dynamically, if 834 00:49:58,480 --> 00:50:02,080 you don't apply, you know, sort of strong zero trust privileges 835 00:50:02,080 --> 00:50:06,280 around that, it's scary what could happen, right, with people 836 00:50:06,280 --> 00:50:09,680 compromising AI agents, which obviously under the covers using 837 00:50:09,680 --> 00:50:12,000 NHIS. So I think we've got a long way 838 00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:15,920 to go that the agentic AI stuff is just moving so fast. 839 00:50:16,360 --> 00:50:19,040 But I just don't think at the moment we've got the right 840 00:50:19,040 --> 00:50:23,800 controls and solutions to solve NHIS fundamentally anywhere at 841 00:50:23,800 --> 00:50:27,800 the moment, let alone, you know, the fast moving pace of agentic 842 00:50:27,800 --> 00:50:30,120 AI. So that probably the thing that 843 00:50:30,160 --> 00:50:33,600 worries me the most and probably is the most hotly discussed 844 00:50:33,600 --> 00:50:37,400 topic at the moment in the kind of agentic AI and NHI space. 845 00:50:38,200 --> 00:50:40,480 I mean, I can see a, a, you know, a scenario say, well, we 846 00:50:40,480 --> 00:50:44,280 just built an agentic AI product to solve our agentic AI product. 847 00:50:44,480 --> 00:50:48,080 OK, so you know, we're in this, you know, dog chasing its tail 848 00:50:48,080 --> 00:50:49,080 type of scenario. I don't know. 849 00:50:49,080 --> 00:50:52,720 All right, let's shift to a little bit wider note because I 850 00:50:52,720 --> 00:50:56,320 know that's if for people who aren't watching this on YouTube, 851 00:50:56,600 --> 00:51:01,120 you have a very impressive vinyl collection behind you of I don't 852 00:51:01,120 --> 00:51:03,760 know how many thousands of records you might have. 853 00:51:03,760 --> 00:51:06,840 First of all, let's talk there. How many, how much do you have 854 00:51:06,840 --> 00:51:08,000 behind you? Let's start there. 855 00:51:09,440 --> 00:51:12,200 I guess I've been collecting vinyls since I was a student at 856 00:51:12,200 --> 00:51:14,320 university, so that's over 30 years. 857 00:51:14,320 --> 00:51:15,760 So you can probably guess my age now. 858 00:51:16,200 --> 00:51:18,360 But yeah, I've probably got somewhere in the region of about 859 00:51:18,360 --> 00:51:23,080 2000 kind of LP's, 12 inch records. 860 00:51:23,720 --> 00:51:28,400 So it's been a lifelong ambition to grow my collection. 861 00:51:29,440 --> 00:51:34,680 It's all soul, swing, sort of hip hop, R&B. 862 00:51:35,240 --> 00:51:43,120 The genres mainly in the sort of 70s, eighties, 90s kind of is 863 00:51:43,400 --> 00:51:45,120 where most of my collection comes from. 864 00:51:46,040 --> 00:51:48,240 I feel like vinyl's having a little bit of a resurgence here 865 00:51:48,240 --> 00:51:51,280 the last, you know, few years, but it seems like it kind of 866 00:51:51,280 --> 00:51:54,760 went away when C DS and, you know, the laser discs I think 867 00:51:54,760 --> 00:51:57,760 were were part of that as well. But was there a lull in that 868 00:51:57,760 --> 00:51:59,960 collection where it's like, man, it's just getting harder to 869 00:51:59,960 --> 00:52:04,160 find, you know, modern artists putting out their content on 870 00:52:04,160 --> 00:52:07,920 that format of vinyl? Yeah, good question. 871 00:52:07,920 --> 00:52:10,400 I've not really been buying a lot of newer stuff. 872 00:52:10,400 --> 00:52:14,920 It's mainly in that sort of 70s to 90s kind of era. 873 00:52:16,400 --> 00:52:21,320 I did probably stop buying stuff for quite a few years as I was 874 00:52:21,320 --> 00:52:25,320 working in investment banking. But then as kind of the last few 875 00:52:25,320 --> 00:52:30,760 years, I started to grow my collection again and bought a 876 00:52:30,760 --> 00:52:34,280 lot from, you know, the collectors on eBay. 877 00:52:34,280 --> 00:52:39,680 And there's a great story where I ordered a batch of albums from 878 00:52:39,680 --> 00:52:41,480 someone that I got to know very well. 879 00:52:42,760 --> 00:52:45,680 And I was just going through them cleaning some of the 880 00:52:45,680 --> 00:52:51,720 records, record cleaner and out popped out about 150 lbs in 881 00:52:51,840 --> 00:52:59,200 very, very old British notes. So I went told the guy that I 882 00:52:59,200 --> 00:53:02,840 purchased them, that I found this money in his in one of his 883 00:53:02,880 --> 00:53:06,040 record sleeves. I went to the bank, got the 884 00:53:06,040 --> 00:53:09,000 money converted because it was not legal tender anymore and 885 00:53:09,000 --> 00:53:12,600 send the money back to him. So maybe tells you a little bit 886 00:53:12,600 --> 00:53:16,560 about me that what I'm like if I'm in that kind of dilemma that 887 00:53:16,560 --> 00:53:18,960 I would definitely give the money back to the the rightful 888 00:53:18,960 --> 00:53:21,240 owner. But that was a big shock to find 889 00:53:21,280 --> 00:53:22,760 money. And apparently he does quite a 890 00:53:22,760 --> 00:53:26,800 lot hides money in his. He has 10,000 plus record 891 00:53:26,800 --> 00:53:28,840 collection. So you might start buying more 892 00:53:28,840 --> 00:53:31,520 albums from him and then any more money in all the secret 893 00:53:31,520 --> 00:53:32,880 stashes. Now, yeah, I guess I probably 894 00:53:32,880 --> 00:53:35,080 need to go through my 2000 now and see if there's any more I 895 00:53:35,080 --> 00:53:37,760 can find in there. You never know, there might be a 896 00:53:37,760 --> 00:53:41,640 few more looking out there. So of that 2000, I'm going to 897 00:53:41,640 --> 00:53:44,600 ask you to pick your first what, what's the one that you remember 898 00:53:44,600 --> 00:53:48,960 first getting? What's your best album or record 899 00:53:48,960 --> 00:53:51,160 or vinyl, I guess? And then what's your favorite 900 00:53:51,160 --> 00:53:54,480 one out of that set? Yeah, I'm not sure I can 901 00:53:54,480 --> 00:53:59,160 remember my the first one, but it would probably be something 902 00:53:59,160 --> 00:54:04,760 like Luther Vandross, Freddie Jackson, Marvin Gaye, probably 903 00:54:04,760 --> 00:54:08,160 something in that kind of sort of era. 904 00:54:10,240 --> 00:54:15,680 I think in terms of like kind of my most cherished kind of 905 00:54:15,680 --> 00:54:22,000 favorite album for 12 inch is probably from a British band 906 00:54:22,000 --> 00:54:29,480 called Loose Ends. Have a lot of great records out 907 00:54:29,480 --> 00:54:32,400 there. And I had the fortune to sort of 908 00:54:32,400 --> 00:54:40,080 see them play in a bar a couple of years ago and a big fanatic 909 00:54:40,080 --> 00:54:43,600 of their music. I took all my kind of albums, 910 00:54:43,600 --> 00:54:47,000 LP's with me and I was waving them around on the dance floor. 911 00:54:47,000 --> 00:54:51,520 And then at the end of the night the bands, I said look, come and 912 00:54:51,520 --> 00:54:55,400 join us. And then they signed all my my 913 00:54:55,400 --> 00:54:57,600 albums, both on the outside and the inside. 914 00:54:57,600 --> 00:55:02,000 So that was a real special moment for me. 915 00:55:03,280 --> 00:55:06,200 So what was the other question you've asked her? 916 00:55:06,280 --> 00:55:08,880 Is there a best 1? And I guess maybe best not the 917 00:55:08,880 --> 00:55:10,520 same as favorite bike? Do you have something that's 918 00:55:10,520 --> 00:55:15,440 like, oh this is a real find in in the space of vinyl? 919 00:55:15,440 --> 00:55:17,360 I don't know if it's something rare maybe or something has a 920 00:55:17,360 --> 00:55:19,400 lot of value other than sentimental. 921 00:55:20,760 --> 00:55:26,920 There was one tune by a singer called Tammy Payne, and she 922 00:55:26,920 --> 00:55:31,440 sings a song called Free that probably very few people have 923 00:55:31,440 --> 00:55:36,000 heard, but it's just one of those classic sort of soul 924 00:55:36,560 --> 00:55:39,160 songs. That first time I heard it, I 925 00:55:39,160 --> 00:55:42,440 just felt I've got to have this and it's always been in my top 926 00:55:42,440 --> 00:55:46,280 five. And it took me a year to sort of 927 00:55:46,280 --> 00:55:49,840 source this when I was at university and as a kind of poor 928 00:55:49,840 --> 00:55:54,600 student, I think I paid about 3040 lbs for it, which was a lot 929 00:55:54,600 --> 00:55:59,680 of money in in those days for just one record, but it was from 930 00:55:59,680 --> 00:56:03,560 a specialist kind of reseller. And then a few weeks later, I'm 931 00:56:03,560 --> 00:56:08,200 rumbling through a sort of a record shop and I found another 932 00:56:08,440 --> 00:56:12,200 copy of this same thing that I paid 3040 lbs for. 933 00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:14,880 And it was on for like 50 P or a pound. 934 00:56:15,360 --> 00:56:19,080 So I was guided that, you know, just in a week I played over the 935 00:56:19,080 --> 00:56:22,000 odds. But you know, but that's the one 936 00:56:22,000 --> 00:56:24,840 I probably cherish the most because it was the one I wanted 937 00:56:24,840 --> 00:56:27,280 to to get for a very, very long time. 938 00:56:27,280 --> 00:56:31,360 And it took me ages to find. But then I found two quick 939 00:56:31,360 --> 00:56:33,680 succession. So you have one for playing and 940 00:56:33,680 --> 00:56:36,400 then one for like display or you know, keeping, right? 941 00:56:38,440 --> 00:56:40,200 Jim, I want to pay it over to you. 942 00:56:40,400 --> 00:56:45,760 What is your first, best and favorite album? 943 00:56:45,840 --> 00:56:47,800 I guess I'm not sure I know. I'm pretty sure you don't click 944 00:56:47,800 --> 00:56:50,160 vinyl, but give me a first, best and favorite. 945 00:56:51,560 --> 00:56:56,640 So I'm going to mention three and interestingly none of them 946 00:56:56,640 --> 00:57:00,240 were vinyl. So the first one was 8 tracks. 947 00:57:00,560 --> 00:57:06,360 And so get this, I don't know if you remember, but in the 80s, 948 00:57:06,440 --> 00:57:11,800 early 80s to put in magazines, Columbia Records would put these 949 00:57:11,800 --> 00:57:17,280 inserts where you can tape a penny to It was like a postcard 950 00:57:18,160 --> 00:57:22,200 and mark off a bunch of albums that you wanted and you get them 951 00:57:22,200 --> 00:57:24,600 in a track format or vinyl format. 952 00:57:24,920 --> 00:57:29,040 So I ordered like, I forget it. I think it was like 6 for a 953 00:57:29,040 --> 00:57:30,920 penny. I thought, look, this the best 954 00:57:30,920 --> 00:57:34,640 bargain ever. I was like 6 years old and I got 955 00:57:35,400 --> 00:57:38,640 Devo. You remember that song Whip it? 956 00:57:39,640 --> 00:57:46,760 I got Michael Jackson, Thriller, and I got Led Zeppelin 4, 957 00:57:47,200 --> 00:57:50,680 Stairway to Heaven and I loved it. 958 00:57:50,680 --> 00:57:54,840 My mom was not happy because then she had to buy like 5 more 959 00:57:54,840 --> 00:57:59,200 albums at full price, which I think was like $30.00 an album. 960 00:57:59,560 --> 00:58:02,040 So anyway, yeah that was a funny story. 961 00:58:02,280 --> 00:58:07,240 So that's first I think best I'm going to say. 962 00:58:07,240 --> 00:58:13,320 So I had, you know, I was into hip hop music before they even 963 00:58:13,320 --> 00:58:17,720 called it hip hop music. It was Beastie Boys licensed to 964 00:58:17,720 --> 00:58:21,520 ILL on cassette. I played that thing and flipped 965 00:58:21,520 --> 00:58:26,240 over my tape deck so many times that all of the ink on it was 966 00:58:26,240 --> 00:58:28,680 worn off. So I mean, it must have played 967 00:58:28,680 --> 00:58:32,000 that so many times. I think eventually the cassette 968 00:58:32,000 --> 00:58:34,480 player ate the tape. Remember, that used to happen, 969 00:58:34,840 --> 00:58:40,400 like, get garbled up. And then as far as favorite, I 970 00:58:40,400 --> 00:58:43,360 think I'm going to go to my college days on CD. 971 00:58:43,880 --> 00:58:49,600 I'm going to pick Pearl Jam 10 because I must have played that 972 00:58:49,600 --> 00:58:53,840 a million times. And that was such like an anthem 973 00:58:54,080 --> 00:58:57,800 of that grunge era. And I've loved music ever since. 974 00:58:57,800 --> 00:59:01,040 And I've had other things. But those three events stick out 975 00:59:01,040 --> 00:59:03,480 in my mind as first, best, favorite. 976 00:59:04,200 --> 00:59:08,840 Jeff, your turn. Well, those are good ones and, 977 00:59:08,840 --> 00:59:12,720 and I got into music probably much later than both of you. 978 00:59:12,720 --> 00:59:17,520 I don't think I got my first album until I was probably 979 00:59:17,920 --> 00:59:20,720 either senior in high school or just out of high school. 980 00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:24,960 I just, it wasn't a thing that I did, but I very remember, very 981 00:59:24,960 --> 00:59:27,640 much remember getting CDs. That's how I started. 982 00:59:27,680 --> 00:59:29,960 I I mean, I had cassettes and stuff like that, but it was all 983 00:59:29,960 --> 00:59:32,240 just like, you know, you'd tape it off the radio, you know, that 984 00:59:32,240 --> 00:59:34,840 kind of thing. But the first C DS I bought were 985 00:59:34,840 --> 00:59:37,120 two. It was Offspring, the smash 986 00:59:37,120 --> 00:59:39,560 album and Green Day's Dookie album. 987 00:59:40,000 --> 00:59:42,480 Those are the first two things that I ever bought. 988 00:59:43,120 --> 00:59:45,640 So that's the first. Let's see. 989 00:59:45,640 --> 00:59:53,400 The best is probably a box set from Metallica called Live Blank 990 00:59:53,680 --> 00:59:57,120 Binge and Purge. And they had a double CD of a, 991 00:59:57,120 --> 00:59:59,520 of a live show that they did. I think it was in Mexico. 992 00:59:59,560 --> 01:00:01,320 It had a video performance. Yeah. 993 01:00:01,880 --> 01:00:03,280 Just a great, just a great thing. 994 01:00:03,280 --> 01:00:05,160 But it was like a full box set and it had like a, you know, 995 01:00:05,240 --> 01:00:08,240 chest or whatever. And I don't know if I 996 01:00:08,240 --> 01:00:10,920 necessarily have a favorite album. 997 01:00:11,360 --> 01:00:13,680 I feel like there's so many good ones out there. 998 01:00:14,000 --> 01:00:19,760 And my listening patterns have changed into more of a hunt and 999 01:00:19,760 --> 01:00:22,000 Peck. You know, pick one song from 1000 01:00:22,000 --> 01:00:24,840 this artist and then go to this other song from another artist. 1001 01:00:25,800 --> 01:00:27,440 There's a lot of really good albums. 1002 01:00:27,440 --> 01:00:29,760 But you know, maybe it's actually, you know, maybe I'm 1003 01:00:29,760 --> 01:00:33,360 going to go with Korn. I love the Untouchables album. 1004 01:00:33,360 --> 01:00:37,160 I think it's fantastic. So I'm going to I'm going to go 1005 01:00:37,160 --> 01:00:39,520 with that as my final answer. Jim Korn. 1006 01:00:39,800 --> 01:00:42,480 You are a hard rocker, man. I got to give you that. 1007 01:00:42,480 --> 01:00:46,640 Give that to your three choices. We're all basically heavy metal. 1008 01:00:47,280 --> 01:00:49,480 It was a choice between, you know, rock. 1009 01:00:49,760 --> 01:00:51,600 There's some electronic albums I like too. 1010 01:00:51,600 --> 01:00:55,520 But yeah, I just remember playing the Untouchables album 1011 01:00:55,520 --> 01:00:57,920 over and over and over and over again in the car. 1012 01:00:58,920 --> 01:01:02,160 And, you know, that was on my, I think at the time I had like one 1013 01:01:02,160 --> 01:01:04,680 of those CD discman things, right, that you'd have in your 1014 01:01:04,680 --> 01:01:08,240 car and use the cassette tape adapter to get it into your 1015 01:01:08,240 --> 01:01:10,720 stereo and, you know, all that good stuff. 1016 01:01:10,720 --> 01:01:13,120 But I don't know allow it does does any of the stuff. 1017 01:01:13,320 --> 01:01:16,720 Just a final joke. Yeah, Yeah, I was just about to 1018 01:01:16,720 --> 01:01:19,920 say those are a set of non human identities that I don't 1019 01:01:19,920 --> 01:01:22,240 recognize and have not discovered. 1020 01:01:23,600 --> 01:01:28,080 You could argue, you could argue that all those things, vinyl, CD 1021 01:01:28,080 --> 01:01:30,880 are all potentially non human identities as well. 1022 01:01:32,200 --> 01:01:33,840 Identity, right? They won't have a code. 1023 01:01:33,840 --> 01:01:36,440 So. We got to hit stop and record a 1024 01:01:36,440 --> 01:01:39,400 new one where we argue about that for the next half hour. 1025 01:01:41,080 --> 01:01:42,880 But we want to establish provenance, right? 1026 01:01:42,880 --> 01:01:44,120 It's like also the same thing too. 1027 01:01:44,120 --> 01:01:46,480 It's like, what is the the provenance of this album? 1028 01:01:46,800 --> 01:01:48,800 Is it legit? Is it, I mean, at some point 1029 01:01:48,800 --> 01:01:52,120 it's going to be is this AI or is this X band right doing the 1030 01:01:52,120 --> 01:01:54,360 real thing? So that'll be interesting when 1031 01:01:54,360 --> 01:01:57,080 we start talking about non human identities for non human 1032 01:01:57,080 --> 01:02:02,320 identities. All right, this has been in just 1033 01:02:02,320 --> 01:02:03,520 a fascinating conversation. All that. 1034 01:02:03,520 --> 01:02:05,240 I'm glad you were able to get you onto the show. 1035 01:02:05,560 --> 01:02:07,920 I feel like kind of finally this happened. 1036 01:02:07,920 --> 01:02:09,840 So that's great. I'm looking forward to seeing 1037 01:02:09,840 --> 01:02:12,840 you on Identiverse next week. And for the time, people of 1038 01:02:12,840 --> 01:02:14,880 times listen this, you know, your workshop will have been 1039 01:02:14,880 --> 01:02:16,720 overdone have been done at that point. 1040 01:02:16,720 --> 01:02:19,480 So would encourage people to go check out the Identiverse. 1041 01:02:19,480 --> 01:02:20,680 I think things are going to be recorded. 1042 01:02:20,680 --> 01:02:22,560 I'm not sure if your workshop is going to be well let. 1043 01:02:22,560 --> 01:02:24,120 Do you know if that's if that's the case? 1044 01:02:25,200 --> 01:02:31,120 Yeah, workshop will be recorded, but the pavilion sessions won't. 1045 01:02:31,120 --> 01:02:37,240 But yeah, I'm looking forward to seeing you both there with some 1046 01:02:37,240 --> 01:02:39,520 crazy things that you're going to do at the Pavilion and 1047 01:02:40,200 --> 01:02:43,040 looking forward to spending some time with you next week. 1048 01:02:44,280 --> 01:02:45,320 Yeah, that's going to be a lot of fun. 1049 01:02:45,320 --> 01:02:47,120 So we'll go ahead and wrap it up for this week. 1050 01:02:47,200 --> 01:02:50,760 I'll have links in our show notes to while it's a LinkedIn 1051 01:02:50,760 --> 01:02:53,680 page, as well as the non human identity management group and 1052 01:02:53,680 --> 01:02:56,960 HIM g.org. You go check out there For more 1053 01:02:56,960 --> 01:02:58,560 information, which has a lot of good content. 1054 01:02:58,560 --> 01:03:00,720 So, you know, hats off to you for a while for really kind of 1055 01:03:00,720 --> 01:03:05,120 spearheading this and and taking the mantle of of Mr. Nhi. 1056 01:03:05,200 --> 01:03:08,360 So I'm not sure what the next step is past Mr. Would it be? 1057 01:03:08,360 --> 01:03:11,640 Do we just go to different languages like Senor NHI? 1058 01:03:11,880 --> 01:03:14,480 Do we go to like professor or doctor like have you? 1059 01:03:14,600 --> 01:03:17,040 Do you have a graduation strategy for Mr. NHI? 1060 01:03:17,440 --> 01:03:21,080 Someone's already started to call me the father of NHI and 1061 01:03:21,080 --> 01:03:24,480 then the Godfather of NHI, so maybe that's the natural 1062 01:03:24,640 --> 01:03:26,560 evolution. Godfather sounds nice. 1063 01:03:26,560 --> 01:03:30,280 I meant to ask, when you were in Germany, were you hair NHI? 1064 01:03:31,280 --> 01:03:33,040 No, that didn't come up, thankfully. 1065 01:03:33,040 --> 01:03:37,200 All right, next time. Well, thank you so much for 1066 01:03:37,200 --> 01:03:40,360 being with us here and yeah, spending your time and, and 1067 01:03:40,360 --> 01:03:42,000 helping us understand the space a little bit more. 1068 01:03:42,000 --> 01:03:43,720 We'll go ahead and wrap for this week. 1069 01:03:44,000 --> 01:03:46,520 You can find us on the web, IDC, podcast.com. 1070 01:03:46,720 --> 01:03:48,640 Do all the things that Jim asked you to do earlier in the 1071 01:03:48,800 --> 01:03:51,280 episode, like subscribe, share with your friends, share with 1072 01:03:51,280 --> 01:03:53,640 your enemies, share with your agentic AII don't care. 1073 01:03:53,960 --> 01:03:56,080 As long as people listen, that's all that matters. 1074 01:03:56,440 --> 01:03:59,600 So with that, thanks for watching and or listening and 1075 01:03:59,600 --> 01:04:01,120 we'll talk with you all in the next one. 1076 01:04:04,000 --> 01:04:06,960 You've been listening to Identity at the Center. 1077 01:04:07,280 --> 01:04:11,400 We hope you've enjoyed the show. Make sure to like, rate and 1078 01:04:11,400 --> 01:04:15,040 review, and we'll be back soon. But in the meantime, hit the 1079 01:04:15,040 --> 01:04:18,440 website at identity@thecenter.com. 1080 01:04:19,040 --> 01:04:23,160 See you next time on Identity at the Center.