1 00:00:09,700 --> 00:00:12,500 You're listening to the identity at the center podcast. 2 00:00:12,800 --> 00:00:14,900 This is the show that talks about identity and access 3 00:00:14,900 --> 00:00:18,000 management and making sure you know who has access to what 4 00:00:18,100 --> 00:00:27,200 let's get started. Welcome to the identity of the 5 00:00:27,200 --> 00:00:28,500 sender podcast. I'm Jeff. 6 00:00:28,500 --> 00:00:30,700 And that's Jim. Hey Jim hey Jeff. 7 00:00:30,700 --> 00:00:32,600 How's it going? Oh not so bad yourself. 8 00:00:33,000 --> 00:00:35,100 Good good. I can I use the same joke that 9 00:00:35,100 --> 00:00:38,500 use the previous episode. How do you like my my backdrop? 10 00:00:38,500 --> 00:00:41,700 How do you like my expensive books and bookshelf? 11 00:00:42,000 --> 00:00:45,900 Look so real. So many fine leather bound items 12 00:00:46,000 --> 00:00:49,600 as our friend Ron Burgundy would say you'd be shocked to know 13 00:00:49,600 --> 00:00:52,600 that it's actually a green screen that I haven't put it in 14 00:00:52,600 --> 00:00:55,300 a fifty thousand dollar. In my home. 15 00:00:55,700 --> 00:00:57,800 Yeah, it's a nice-looking Library, that's for sure. 16 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:03,100 Not now, your sad pathetic, life of having to like, get up screen 17 00:01:03,400 --> 00:01:05,200 and look around where you're at, because I I know where your 18 00:01:05,200 --> 00:01:08,000 record is. Like I like you Jim, but I know 19 00:01:08,000 --> 00:01:09,400 that that's not through the area. 20 00:01:09,700 --> 00:01:12,000 Yeah, exactly. Well, maybe someday, I mean, the 21 00:01:12,000 --> 00:01:15,600 podcast getting pretty popular, your the topic that I wanted to 22 00:01:15,607 --> 00:01:19,500 bring up is and this will be, you know, stealing from my 23 00:01:19,500 --> 00:01:24,100 predictions down the road. But I can see us being a top 10. 24 00:01:24,200 --> 00:01:27,300 Cast in the world and not, we're not just talking about I am 25 00:01:28,200 --> 00:01:31,200 which you know, that would be pretty impressive in and of 26 00:01:31,200 --> 00:01:34,700 itself. But what is the statistic for 27 00:01:35,200 --> 00:01:39,000 top podcast, a top-10 podcast, top 10%. 28 00:01:39,400 --> 00:01:42,400 I should make that clear, right? We're not going to be a top ten 29 00:01:42,500 --> 00:01:45,000 podcast in the world, top 10 percent. 30 00:01:46,100 --> 00:01:48,200 Yeah. So, you know, I've actually met 31 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:51,400 to bring this up on previous episodes, but we've been doing 32 00:01:51,500 --> 00:01:54,100 really well. Surprisingly, I think shocked, 33 00:01:54,300 --> 00:01:58,300 He's so currently, if you consider all the podcasts 34 00:01:58,300 --> 00:02:02,100 globally and there's like some 90 million episodes or something 35 00:02:02,100 --> 00:02:05,600 like that that are out there. We are actually somewhere 36 00:02:05,700 --> 00:02:13,300 between the top 25 and like 10% or 15% of all podcasts in the 37 00:02:13,300 --> 00:02:16,600 world like globally. Not just identity everything, 38 00:02:16,900 --> 00:02:19,900 which is fantastic. And certainly you know I'm going 39 00:02:19,900 --> 00:02:21,900 to I'm going to nominate everyone who's listening as 40 00:02:21,900 --> 00:02:25,000 listener of the week for being Part of that Journey. 41 00:02:25,000 --> 00:02:28,000 As we you know, started us off a little over two years ago and 42 00:02:28,000 --> 00:02:31,500 it's like, you know, I was just Jim and I listening to it but we 43 00:02:31,500 --> 00:02:33,500 certainly grown but yeah, it's pretty cool. 44 00:02:33,600 --> 00:02:35,500 Yeah. I think this is an area that is 45 00:02:35,500 --> 00:02:38,400 ripe for disruption. So if you're listening and you 46 00:02:38,400 --> 00:02:42,700 have like a product that does a good job of accurately and this 47 00:02:42,700 --> 00:02:46,400 is the key word accurately getting podcast statistics for 48 00:02:46,400 --> 00:02:50,300 listenership across every single service that's out there because 49 00:02:50,300 --> 00:02:53,300 that's the challenge. I would certainly be interested 50 00:02:53,300 --> 00:02:55,800 in hearing because Certainly products in this space that do 51 00:02:55,800 --> 00:02:58,400 it. But it seems to me that accuracy 52 00:02:58,400 --> 00:03:01,200 is a little bit of a question mark, because if you think about 53 00:03:01,200 --> 00:03:03,100 like, you know, I know most of our listeners, for example, 54 00:03:03,100 --> 00:03:05,400 listening on Apple. That just happens to be our most 55 00:03:05,400 --> 00:03:10,200 popular platform based on the stats that I see, but there have 56 00:03:10,300 --> 00:03:13,100 a podcast, you know, host and vendor is of their own. 57 00:03:13,100 --> 00:03:16,500 So, of course, they want to, you know, keep sales information, 58 00:03:16,500 --> 00:03:19,100 just like any other type of add information to themselves, they 59 00:03:19,100 --> 00:03:22,100 may or may not make some pieces available to our podcast host, 60 00:03:22,100 --> 00:03:24,100 for example, spotify's another one. 61 00:03:24,200 --> 00:03:26,600 One Google's another Amazon and it seems like there's a whole 62 00:03:26,600 --> 00:03:29,800 bunch of these other different aggregators are out there but 63 00:03:30,100 --> 00:03:32,800 yeah, based on the stats that I can see. 64 00:03:33,700 --> 00:03:37,200 We're, you know, we're in the, I would say somewhere in the top 65 00:03:37,600 --> 00:03:41,100 15 ish percent of all of all podcast worldwide which is, 66 00:03:41,300 --> 00:03:43,000 which is crazy, absolutely crazy. 67 00:03:43,500 --> 00:03:46,000 I think so too. The thing I threw out there as a 68 00:03:46,000 --> 00:03:50,900 challenge to all of our listeners is if you would prefer 69 00:03:50,900 --> 00:03:55,500 to have this be a video podcast. I can't guarantee that it'll 70 00:03:55,500 --> 00:03:59,400 happen, but let us know because going to start doing the live 71 00:03:59,400 --> 00:04:01,800 streaming. We have video cameras, we 72 00:04:02,200 --> 00:04:06,400 potentially could do it. It's a lot more work and 73 00:04:06,500 --> 00:04:10,100 honestly after watching a few live streams, you might change 74 00:04:10,100 --> 00:04:14,700 your vote but you know, let us know because I think it's 75 00:04:14,700 --> 00:04:17,700 something we've been debating whether or not people actually 76 00:04:17,700 --> 00:04:21,700 would want that. It is a lot more work that is 77 00:04:21,700 --> 00:04:25,300 for sure, audio is relatively Easy at this point for me to 78 00:04:25,300 --> 00:04:28,300 edit and, and host all that. So now we're getting to the big 79 00:04:28,300 --> 00:04:29,500 guns. But, yeah, the live streaming 80 00:04:29,500 --> 00:04:31,000 stuff will be interesting. I think we'll start there. 81 00:04:31,500 --> 00:04:33,700 The last thing I just wanted to mention is, I think this is our 82 00:04:33,700 --> 00:04:36,400 last episode for the year, right? 83 00:04:36,400 --> 00:04:42,400 So we will be back in 2022 and so we're just going to take a 84 00:04:42,407 --> 00:04:45,700 couple weeks off. Try to spend some time with the 85 00:04:45,700 --> 00:04:50,900 fam and do all that good stuff. You know, last year we decided 86 00:04:50,900 --> 00:04:54,100 to do the same thing and then the solar winds. 87 00:04:54,300 --> 00:04:59,200 Um, supply chain hack took place, and we did a special 88 00:04:59,200 --> 00:05:01,800 episode so something like that could happen again. 89 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:03,800 But at this point, we're planning on taking a few weeks 90 00:05:03,800 --> 00:05:04,900 off. Yeah. 91 00:05:04,900 --> 00:05:07,000 You're the mad man recording like Christmas Eve or something 92 00:05:07,000 --> 00:05:08,100 like that. And I was like, all right, I'll 93 00:05:08,100 --> 00:05:09,400 edit it but I'm not getting them. 94 00:05:10,300 --> 00:05:13,600 I'm on vacation too. Yeah, last one for for a few 95 00:05:13,600 --> 00:05:17,700 weeks, but we are planning to continue the live stream through 96 00:05:17,700 --> 00:05:20,500 the break here. So relatively new for us, we're 97 00:05:20,500 --> 00:05:22,700 still kind of experimenting experimenting with it but it's a 98 00:05:22,707 --> 00:05:25,700 live stream on YouTube. Follow us on Twitter at idea. 99 00:05:25,700 --> 00:05:28,100 See podcasts. That's kind of the well now it's 100 00:05:28,100 --> 00:05:32,500 when we're going live. If you go to idea CDOT live, 101 00:05:32,500 --> 00:05:36,700 that'll take you right to our YouTube channel as well so yeah. 102 00:05:36,700 --> 00:05:37,800 Hopefully people can I check it out. 103 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:40,500 It's an opportunity to interact to so you can kind of take 104 00:05:40,500 --> 00:05:42,700 comments and idea there's been like 15 minutes so it's 105 00:05:42,700 --> 00:05:45,800 something super easy for Jim and I to get on be a little more 106 00:05:45,800 --> 00:05:48,800 current with some of a topics and make that going on in the 107 00:05:48,800 --> 00:05:50,700 world. But also if there's things that 108 00:05:50,700 --> 00:05:53,600 pop up during the week, we kind of address it as a quick hitter 109 00:05:53,600 --> 00:05:59,100 so The key is, you know, light and Breezy, nice and easy, you 110 00:05:59,100 --> 00:06:02,500 know, something along those lines and right now I will try 111 00:06:02,500 --> 00:06:03,900 to do it on Friday mornings, I think. 112 00:06:03,900 --> 00:06:06,700 But we may have to flex it maybe to other days of the week 113 00:06:06,700 --> 00:06:08,100 depending on kind of our schedule. 114 00:06:08,100 --> 00:06:12,400 So that's sort of the plan as we kind of move forward, but why do 115 00:06:12,400 --> 00:06:14,600 we get into our main topic for today? 116 00:06:14,800 --> 00:06:18,800 Since we want to end on a high note, we're going to talk about 117 00:06:18,800 --> 00:06:23,100 fraud reduction platforms and to help us with that conversation 118 00:06:23,100 --> 00:06:26,200 is a I guess we just had on just a few episodes ago. 119 00:06:26,300 --> 00:06:30,400 Episode 124, we talked with John Tolbert, we'd analyst and my 120 00:06:30,500 --> 00:06:32,300 managing director at Koopa charcoal. 121 00:06:32,600 --> 00:06:34,100 Welcome back to the show. John. 122 00:06:34,400 --> 00:06:37,500 Hey, thanks for having me back. Yeah, so thank you so much for 123 00:06:37,500 --> 00:06:39,400 coming back and I think this is an area that really kind of 124 00:06:39,400 --> 00:06:42,600 dovetails really well with our previous conversation around 125 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:47,900 consumer or customer. I am see I am and, you know, 126 00:06:47,900 --> 00:06:50,500 this is a capability. I think that kind of resides in 127 00:06:50,500 --> 00:06:54,400 in, in that area of, you know, how do we make sure that Now 128 00:06:54,400 --> 00:06:56,500 that we are managing our customers, right? 129 00:06:56,500 --> 00:06:59,400 That those ideas are maybe not doing things, they shouldn't be 130 00:06:59,400 --> 00:07:01,900 doing. So why don't we kind of break it 131 00:07:01,900 --> 00:07:03,400 down for the folks who are listening in? 132 00:07:03,400 --> 00:07:08,300 Might not be as familiar with this space as we get into it. 133 00:07:08,300 --> 00:07:13,200 And let's start with what is a fraud reduction platforms, fraud 134 00:07:13,200 --> 00:07:15,100 reduction, intelligence platform. 135 00:07:15,100 --> 00:07:18,700 I think of as a service, that sort of Aggregates, lots of 136 00:07:18,700 --> 00:07:24,000 different bits of intelligence about the consumer retail. 137 00:07:24,100 --> 00:07:30,500 Dale Finance, lots of different Industries and helps those 138 00:07:30,900 --> 00:07:34,000 subscribing. Customers to reduce the amount 139 00:07:34,000 --> 00:07:35,600 of fraud that they have to deal with. 140 00:07:37,000 --> 00:07:40,000 And again, you know, it is cuts across many different 141 00:07:40,000 --> 00:07:44,000 Industries, we probably think most commonly about Finance, but 142 00:07:44,300 --> 00:07:49,400 you know, retail Healthcare travel and Hospitality, you 143 00:07:49,400 --> 00:07:53,200 know, fraud has been on the increase year-over-year and you 144 00:07:53,200 --> 00:07:56,000 know the last 18 months or so covid. 145 00:07:56,000 --> 00:07:59,500 We saw new forms of fraud, you know, being generated. 146 00:07:59,500 --> 00:08:04,800 So, you know, fraud reduction intelligence platforms, help 147 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:08,900 businesses kind of stay ahead of that and reduce those unwanted 148 00:08:08,900 --> 00:08:12,000 fraudulent transactions. We had a conversation last week 149 00:08:12,000 --> 00:08:15,600 with our mean from paying around identity proofing and I know 150 00:08:15,600 --> 00:08:16,800 that's one of a kind of the major areas. 151 00:08:16,800 --> 00:08:18,300 So I think that's kind of included. 152 00:08:18,300 --> 00:08:21,800 But are there other other areas of fraud reduction that are kind 153 00:08:21,800 --> 00:08:25,300 of seen as like a core? In C or capability. 154 00:08:25,300 --> 00:08:28,100 Yeah. I call it six major capabilities 155 00:08:28,100 --> 00:08:30,800 and yep. Identity proofing is definitely 156 00:08:31,100 --> 00:08:33,000 one of the really important ones there. 157 00:08:33,900 --> 00:08:38,500 It's good in many cases to be able to tie the right individual 158 00:08:38,500 --> 00:08:44,400 to a digital account and, you know, depending on regulations 159 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:47,900 and the type of transaction. It is, that's actually required 160 00:08:47,900 --> 00:08:51,500 to be able to do that. So, I did any proofing is a very 161 00:08:51,500 --> 00:08:53,900 important fraud reduction technique. 162 00:08:54,600 --> 00:08:57,700 But then we also have things like compromised, credential 163 00:08:57,700 --> 00:09:02,000 intelligence in a knowing where maybe a credential has been 164 00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:06,800 misused recently that can be a factor that can help, you know, 165 00:09:06,900 --> 00:09:11,900 throw an alarm, then we have things like user, behavioral 166 00:09:11,900 --> 00:09:18,500 analysis, device intelligence behavioral Biometrics and bought 167 00:09:18,500 --> 00:09:23,600 detection and bought management was the major six major areas of 168 00:09:23,600 --> 00:09:25,900 fraud reduction. Relevance what are some of the 169 00:09:25,900 --> 00:09:28,200 threats that I guess these kind of platforms? 170 00:09:28,200 --> 00:09:30,500 Try to solve? I know, we see we tend to see, 171 00:09:31,300 --> 00:09:35,400 you know, themes, I think from a cycle of where the attacks are 172 00:09:35,400 --> 00:09:36,900 coming from and what they're trying to look at obviously, 173 00:09:36,900 --> 00:09:40,300 ransomware is kind of a big one right now, but when it comes to, 174 00:09:40,400 --> 00:09:43,100 you know, the fraud reduction side of things, what are some of 175 00:09:43,100 --> 00:09:45,000 the common threats that that are out there? 176 00:09:45,200 --> 00:09:48,900 It's a woman who's in most Industries are worried about our 177 00:09:48,900 --> 00:09:52,300 account takeover and it is exactly what it sounds like you 178 00:09:52,300 --> 00:09:54,200 know, taking over somebody's account. 179 00:09:54,400 --> 00:09:58,700 Often, unfortunately, it's too easy to do that because they're 180 00:09:58,700 --> 00:10:02,200 still password-based authentication out there or, you 181 00:10:02,200 --> 00:10:06,100 know, in some cases, maybe those passwords are backed up by 182 00:10:06,200 --> 00:10:09,900 knowledge-based authentication. Security questions, you know 183 00:10:09,900 --> 00:10:13,800 asking you know, mother's maiden name, what high school, did you 184 00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:17,400 go to or something like that? All that information is publicly 185 00:10:17,400 --> 00:10:20,400 available if a fraudster wants to search for it. 186 00:10:20,400 --> 00:10:25,000 So unfortunately, it's in those cases where You're using 187 00:10:25,000 --> 00:10:28,200 password authentication backed up by K B. 188 00:10:28,200 --> 00:10:32,000 A then it's all too easy to take over accounts. 189 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:37,200 So that's another reason why we recommend heartily multi-factor 190 00:10:37,200 --> 00:10:39,500 authentication wherever we possibly can? 191 00:10:40,600 --> 00:10:44,200 But yeah, I can't take over. I'd say is a number one, concern 192 00:10:44,600 --> 00:10:47,200 globally, and then, there's also new account fraud. 193 00:10:47,800 --> 00:10:51,700 Sometimes you'll call it account opening fraud, or synthetic 194 00:10:51,700 --> 00:10:54,000 fraud, and that one's a little bit different. 195 00:10:54,000 --> 00:10:57,100 That's Are you take bits and pieces of pii personal 196 00:10:57,100 --> 00:11:01,800 information, and try to use that to assemble an account? 197 00:11:02,300 --> 00:11:05,500 And fraudsters do that again for financial reasons. 198 00:11:05,500 --> 00:11:09,000 They're trying to build accounts to, you know, be mule accounts, 199 00:11:09,000 --> 00:11:13,300 move money Around Here There and Everywhere and information that, 200 00:11:13,300 --> 00:11:17,000 you know, might be obtainable from Healthcare, records or 201 00:11:17,000 --> 00:11:21,500 education records, you know, names address date of birth, 202 00:11:21,500 --> 00:11:23,600 other pieces of information, you know. 203 00:11:23,600 --> 00:11:27,300 Just how you Building a digital account, normally can be pieced 204 00:11:27,300 --> 00:11:30,500 together by fraudsters, to create an account that then 205 00:11:30,500 --> 00:11:33,600 resembles a real person, but it's not the real person. 206 00:11:33,600 --> 00:11:36,700 And they're going to most likely use it for some sort of illegal 207 00:11:36,700 --> 00:11:40,000 activity. So I'd say there's the top two. 208 00:11:40,400 --> 00:11:44,700 There are also things like Sims swap attacks, you know, getting 209 00:11:45,200 --> 00:11:49,500 a mobile operator to sort of reassign where a number of rings 210 00:11:49,500 --> 00:11:53,100 to, and this is one of the or where text go. 211 00:11:53,100 --> 00:11:56,800 This is one of the reasons like SMS OTP one-time passwords, you 212 00:11:56,800 --> 00:12:00,400 know getting a text on your phone, to get you into a site 213 00:12:00,500 --> 00:12:04,100 can be problematic. Because if there's a Sim swap 214 00:12:04,100 --> 00:12:09,100 on, on one end of the channel, then the fraudster can then 215 00:12:09,100 --> 00:12:12,700 direct those password, reset requests or authentication 216 00:12:12,700 --> 00:12:15,300 requests to a device that they control. 217 00:12:16,100 --> 00:12:20,300 So, that's closely related, but different means to get there. 218 00:12:20,400 --> 00:12:25,000 I think I use Casey brought up their job with the Opening. 219 00:12:25,300 --> 00:12:29,100 That's the one that I've kind of become most familiar with in the 220 00:12:29,400 --> 00:12:31,800 fraud reduction. I think it's interesting color 221 00:12:31,800 --> 00:12:34,600 fraud reduction rather than fraud prevention, right. 222 00:12:34,600 --> 00:12:38,000 It's kind of acknowledging that. Even with these Solutions, 223 00:12:38,000 --> 00:12:40,500 you're not preventing fraud. You're just making it more 224 00:12:40,500 --> 00:12:46,100 difficult for the fraudster to do their, do their Dirty Deeds. 225 00:12:47,400 --> 00:12:50,400 But, you know, kind of back to that account opening, to me, 226 00:12:50,400 --> 00:12:53,000 that's the, when you talked about the pi. 227 00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:56,700 It's, you know, To give a real world example, is when you go 228 00:12:56,700 --> 00:13:01,800 into an application, they say okay, which of these four of 229 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:03,700 these four streets of you ever lived on, right? 230 00:13:03,700 --> 00:13:06,700 And we'll list for streets and it's just that one that jumps 231 00:13:06,700 --> 00:13:09,700 out of your like, oh yeah, I've lived there 20 years ago or I 232 00:13:09,708 --> 00:13:13,000 lived there when I was a teenager or something like that. 233 00:13:13,000 --> 00:13:15,200 As you know, you slept which one of these cars. 234 00:13:15,200 --> 00:13:18,000 Have you ever owned? You're like wow how does this 235 00:13:18,000 --> 00:13:19,200 thing? Know so much about me? 236 00:13:19,200 --> 00:13:25,000 Well, you know the big major Credit Agencies know that Value. 237 00:13:25,000 --> 00:13:28,200 And I mean, correct me if I'm wrong but aren't those some of 238 00:13:28,200 --> 00:13:30,000 the biggest players in this space? 239 00:13:30,100 --> 00:13:34,600 Yeah, both globally and especially in the US, credit 240 00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:37,400 rating agencies have a lot of information about all the 241 00:13:37,400 --> 00:13:39,500 consumers. So, you know, much of that 242 00:13:39,500 --> 00:13:44,200 information is authoritative a lot of name address pairs. 243 00:13:44,200 --> 00:13:47,800 All that information is available from places like that. 244 00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:51,500 But then, you know, there's also different kinds of sources like, 245 00:13:51,800 --> 00:13:55,400 you know, local government agencies, DMV, These different 246 00:13:55,400 --> 00:13:58,400 types of licenses that have been issued taxes. 247 00:13:58,400 --> 00:14:03,200 There's there's information that can be used to construct those 248 00:14:03,200 --> 00:14:06,600 accounts outside of credit rating agencies to write very. 249 00:14:06,600 --> 00:14:09,400 Yeah, it seems that there's a whole business model around 250 00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:14,000 aggregating that data and then there's a business model around 251 00:14:14,400 --> 00:14:18,800 how Who's the who builds the best mouse trap to use that data 252 00:14:19,100 --> 00:14:22,600 to create a fraud reduction of the most high-profile prevention 253 00:14:22,800 --> 00:14:26,600 fraud reduction platform. You know, usually where I see 254 00:14:26,600 --> 00:14:28,600 the. So we split our time on the 255 00:14:28,600 --> 00:14:33,300 podcast, talking about Enterprise identity management, 256 00:14:33,400 --> 00:14:37,700 you know how things are used to manage your Workforce and 257 00:14:38,500 --> 00:14:41,800 customer identity management. When I think of fraud reduction 258 00:14:42,600 --> 00:14:46,500 my mind usually goes to the consumer customer, I am 259 00:14:46,500 --> 00:14:49,400 platform. Is that generally the rule are 260 00:14:49,400 --> 00:14:54,000 there also some Enterprise use cases that that benefit from 261 00:14:54,400 --> 00:14:56,600 Frog production. Yeah, I think, I think your ride 262 00:14:56,600 --> 00:14:59,800 most immediately. We think of how this can benefit 263 00:14:59,800 --> 00:15:02,600 consumers and consumer facing organizations. 264 00:15:03,700 --> 00:15:07,700 But, you know, a lot of the mechanics of how this is done 265 00:15:07,800 --> 00:15:11,000 can be used behind the scenes, just a way for Enterprise 266 00:15:11,000 --> 00:15:14,300 authentication. So, you know, we want not only 267 00:15:14,300 --> 00:15:18,400 to see Enterprises using multi-factor authentication to 268 00:15:18,400 --> 00:15:23,400 protect their assets but also risk-based authentication. 269 00:15:23,400 --> 00:15:29,200 So a Lot of the same types of risk engines that can evaluate 270 00:15:29,400 --> 00:15:32,500 bits and pieces of information about consumers, a transaction 271 00:15:32,500 --> 00:15:36,700 time can also be used to look at how an employee logging in from 272 00:15:36,700 --> 00:15:39,000 a different location. You know, give it a risk score. 273 00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:43,900 So you know, technology behind that can be very similar, it 274 00:15:43,900 --> 00:15:47,400 comes down to you know, what are the information sources? 275 00:15:47,700 --> 00:15:53,000 How do you prioritize those factors in policies and then 276 00:15:53,000 --> 00:15:55,900 what do you want to do with you? I mean, one of the things I've 277 00:15:56,400 --> 00:16:00,200 always kind of wondered or thought about like, wow, you 278 00:16:00,200 --> 00:16:07,000 could really choose this kind of identity verification so many 279 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:08,900 ways, including Enterprise, use cases. 280 00:16:08,900 --> 00:16:15,800 But what I've kind of heard is that the these very expensive to 281 00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:19,800 use this fraud production methodology to kind of use a 282 00:16:20,600 --> 00:16:23,800 just to pick on one of the big players in the space. 283 00:16:24,300 --> 00:16:28,400 Orion to use an experience application to sc's questions. 284 00:16:28,400 --> 00:16:31,000 It's not Penny's, it's more than that. 285 00:16:31,700 --> 00:16:34,000 And obviously, when you're, we're talking about opening a 286 00:16:34,000 --> 00:16:38,500 bank account or opening an account to trade cryptocurrency 287 00:16:38,500 --> 00:16:44,400 or something like that. It's Uber important to verify 288 00:16:44,400 --> 00:16:49,800 that identity versus other scenarios where, you know, in 289 00:16:49,800 --> 00:16:52,400 like a retail environment as long as you're able to provide 290 00:16:52,900 --> 00:16:56,500 some level of verification. Chin, it's good enough. 291 00:16:56,500 --> 00:17:00,000 Well, I think, you know, again, kind of unfortunately with the 292 00:17:00,000 --> 00:17:04,599 rise of covid, we've seen some interesting technology 293 00:17:04,599 --> 00:17:08,599 applications though of let's call it fraud reduction 294 00:17:08,599 --> 00:17:12,000 technology, the identity proofing piece especially for 295 00:17:12,000 --> 00:17:16,400 onboarding new employees. So again, you know, there are 296 00:17:16,400 --> 00:17:19,400 certain pieces of information, you need to put together 297 00:17:19,400 --> 00:17:21,599 depending on, you know what jurisdiction? 298 00:17:21,599 --> 00:17:24,000 You're in order to onboard an employee. 299 00:17:24,700 --> 00:17:27,599 So you know, these remote identity proofing. 300 00:17:27,599 --> 00:17:31,500 Gaps have become quite popular in the last year and a half or 301 00:17:31,500 --> 00:17:33,500 so. And I think that's only going to 302 00:17:33,500 --> 00:17:38,400 continue to gain in popularity and that's a direct application 303 00:17:38,400 --> 00:17:41,800 of, you know, a type of fraud reduction technology for an 304 00:17:41,800 --> 00:17:45,700 Enterprise use case. I think we're seeing more more 305 00:17:45,700 --> 00:17:47,600 use cases come out of this because I think of you know the 306 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:51,600 current pandemic situation and and vaccine cards, right? 307 00:17:51,600 --> 00:17:53,500 So I think a lot of organizations are trying to 308 00:17:53,500 --> 00:17:56,600 figure out how They comply with maybe local orders on 309 00:17:56,700 --> 00:17:59,000 vaccination, status for employees, you know, Federal 310 00:17:59,000 --> 00:18:01,700 contractors, for example, in the u.s., you know, whatever 311 00:18:01,700 --> 00:18:04,400 government mandates are kind of out there when it comes to that 312 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:08,000 is how do you securely gather that data rather just say I'm 313 00:18:08,008 --> 00:18:10,000 just going to put it on our company's SharePoint site? 314 00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:11,600 Right? I don't think that's that's 315 00:18:11,600 --> 00:18:14,900 probably the way to go with it. So I'm seeing you know 316 00:18:15,100 --> 00:18:19,600 organizations take these third tarp third-party approach to try 317 00:18:19,600 --> 00:18:22,900 and gather that information. So I'm wondering if fraud 318 00:18:22,900 --> 00:18:26,800 reduction platforms is also play in the role in the secure 319 00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:30,200 collection of some of this data to kind of facilitate that in a 320 00:18:30,208 --> 00:18:32,700 way that maybe people are more comfortable, at least on the 321 00:18:32,700 --> 00:18:34,400 Enterprise side. I'm wondering. 322 00:18:34,400 --> 00:18:35,500 And it's kind of open question, right? 323 00:18:35,500 --> 00:18:39,000 I think I'm just curious. If if, if you see it like that 324 00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:41,100 John or if there's other ways that maybe I should be thinking 325 00:18:41,100 --> 00:18:43,300 about as well, you know, I think that's an interesting 326 00:18:43,300 --> 00:18:49,400 possibility, I have not. I don't have any answers right 327 00:18:49,400 --> 00:18:53,600 now about is this something that's actively going on you 328 00:18:53,600 --> 00:18:58,500 know in a Commercially available product for me, especially, you 329 00:18:58,500 --> 00:19:02,500 know, in our Locale. But it does seem like if there 330 00:19:02,500 --> 00:19:07,200 were authoritative sources of information about vaccination 331 00:19:07,200 --> 00:19:10,800 status than, yeah, that would be something that could be built 332 00:19:10,800 --> 00:19:15,900 in. I'm surprised there hasn't been 333 00:19:16,600 --> 00:19:21,200 a bit more uptake on Solutions like that same thing with like, 334 00:19:21,200 --> 00:19:23,800 you know, decentralized, I didn't a blockchain based 335 00:19:23,800 --> 00:19:29,100 identity for these kinds of covid, related, use cases. 336 00:19:29,400 --> 00:19:30,400 Yeah. Give it 20 minutes. 337 00:19:30,400 --> 00:19:33,600 I think is fast, Aztec moves, somebody like primary building 338 00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:37,000 an app that right or their re-engineering. 339 00:19:37,000 --> 00:19:39,300 Business process under existing at the kind of account for that 340 00:19:39,300 --> 00:19:42,500 use case. Speaking of use cases, what are 341 00:19:42,500 --> 00:19:46,200 some of the He use cases that really these products are trying 342 00:19:46,200 --> 00:19:47,900 to solve because I know it's really the collection of the 343 00:19:47,900 --> 00:19:49,900 data, right? So it's kind of out is okay, 344 00:19:49,900 --> 00:19:53,200 this is Jeff and he is who he says he is and I think of the 345 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:55,600 typical use case of onboarding a new employee. 346 00:19:55,900 --> 00:19:59,300 I need to show some sort of documentation that I allowed to 347 00:19:59,300 --> 00:20:02,000 work whether it's an ID or some sort of government thing, 348 00:20:02,000 --> 00:20:05,700 whatever it might be at least in the u.s., what are some of the, 349 00:20:05,700 --> 00:20:09,200 you know, other use cases that this sort of helps with. 350 00:20:09,500 --> 00:20:12,900 Well, you know again, looking at those types of fraud. 351 00:20:13,000 --> 00:20:15,200 There's a lot of different variations and account. 352 00:20:15,200 --> 00:20:19,300 Takeover fraud, for example. So there's you know, probably 353 00:20:19,300 --> 00:20:24,100 rarely one off attacks on on people's accounts these days. 354 00:20:24,100 --> 00:20:26,600 You know, we often hear about credential stuffing attacks 355 00:20:26,600 --> 00:20:31,400 using information from perhaps the dark web combinations of 356 00:20:31,400 --> 00:20:34,500 usernames and passwords to go out and sort of spray that 357 00:20:34,500 --> 00:20:35,800 against a bunch of different sites. 358 00:20:35,800 --> 00:20:40,200 See if people have reused passwords between sites and then 359 00:20:40,200 --> 00:20:42,600 you know if they have you can take those accounts over if 360 00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:46,700 you've Her best word for it, you know. 361 00:20:46,700 --> 00:20:50,500 So, some of these more High Assurance kind of, use cases, I 362 00:20:50,500 --> 00:20:53,100 think that we've been hinting at, you know, with like 363 00:20:53,100 --> 00:20:58,100 employment verification and, you know, the need to concretely 364 00:20:58,500 --> 00:21:01,400 identify where a person has lived over the years. 365 00:21:02,100 --> 00:21:06,600 There also, you know, lower Assurance kinds of use cases 366 00:21:06,600 --> 00:21:10,000 that you know maybe certain kinds of businesses retail. 367 00:21:10,400 --> 00:21:16,900 They don't necessarily Need that rich history or, you know really 368 00:21:17,500 --> 00:21:23,700 strongly assured identity for, you know, purchasing certain 369 00:21:23,700 --> 00:21:26,400 kinds of goods online or buying food at a grocery store. 370 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:29,300 So you don't need that. But you do want to be assured. 371 00:21:29,300 --> 00:21:31,500 That, you know, this isn't a fraudulent transaction, 372 00:21:31,500 --> 00:21:36,100 especially if it's a, you know, card-not-present kind of online 373 00:21:36,500 --> 00:21:40,900 transaction. So yeah, there's there's lots of 374 00:21:40,900 --> 00:21:44,200 different applications to this. That's I think we see many 375 00:21:44,200 --> 00:21:47,300 different approaches in fraud reduction because there's the 376 00:21:47,300 --> 00:21:51,500 identity of who proofing, but now we see lots and lots more 377 00:21:51,500 --> 00:21:53,600 use of like behavioral Biometrics. 378 00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:58,800 So you know for retail use case just having an assurance that 379 00:21:59,200 --> 00:22:02,000 the person who's using the device is the same person that 380 00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:05,400 registered, you know, in many cases, that's enough to lower 381 00:22:05,400 --> 00:22:08,600 the risk, significantly enough to allow transactions to go 382 00:22:08,600 --> 00:22:10,700 through. So those are some of the 383 00:22:10,700 --> 00:22:13,100 advantages things like behavioral bias, Magic's could 384 00:22:13,100 --> 00:22:16,900 bring to fraud reduction John going to get up on my soapbox. 385 00:22:16,900 --> 00:22:20,800 Here, you talked a little bit about when you're going over to 386 00:22:20,800 --> 00:22:23,900 six areas of fraud, reduction. One of the areas that I think 387 00:22:23,900 --> 00:22:27,600 you mentioned, I don't want to verify that, I got this right is 388 00:22:28,100 --> 00:22:32,400 knowing when an account has been compromised elsewhere, right? 389 00:22:32,400 --> 00:22:37,000 So this is something that I've seen and I'm going to just call 390 00:22:37,000 --> 00:22:39,100 out. I think Microsoft was saying 391 00:22:39,300 --> 00:22:44,700 look across our You know our Office 365 or Azure environment, 392 00:22:44,800 --> 00:22:49,000 plus Microsoft Live, plus plus plus all these different plus 393 00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:51,500 Hotmail. You know we've got all this 394 00:22:51,500 --> 00:22:56,600 these logins billions of logins per day we know which which 395 00:22:56,600 --> 00:22:59,100 accounts potentially been compromised, plus, we're in a 396 00:22:59,108 --> 00:23:03,300 Consortium with Facebook and Google who by the way, don't 397 00:23:03,300 --> 00:23:05,900 compete on the access management side of the house. 398 00:23:06,700 --> 00:23:10,000 You know to me it's kind of like, you know, they're using 399 00:23:10,000 --> 00:23:13,600 that. That's Security as a business 400 00:23:13,600 --> 00:23:17,900 differentiator, which concerns me a little bit, right? 401 00:23:17,900 --> 00:23:22,300 Because I feel like that's something that potentially puts 402 00:23:22,300 --> 00:23:25,500 them in a anti-competitive position. 403 00:23:25,800 --> 00:23:28,100 I don't know if that's something you can talk about but I wanted 404 00:23:28,100 --> 00:23:30,300 to throw it out there. Yeah, I probably wouldn't come 405 00:23:30,300 --> 00:23:34,400 in too much on that other than to say, yeah, there's there's an 406 00:23:34,400 --> 00:23:37,500 advantage in having lots of login and transactions 407 00:23:37,700 --> 00:23:39,700 transaction information to review. 408 00:23:40,300 --> 00:23:44,300 I think there are are definite patterns that can be detected. 409 00:23:44,300 --> 00:23:48,000 And the more information you have potentially, the more 410 00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:52,300 accurate you can be with those predictions and there does seem 411 00:23:52,300 --> 00:23:57,500 to be in in some cases silos of information where, you know, a 412 00:23:57,500 --> 00:24:01,700 particular vendor in this space. They can aggregate information 413 00:24:01,700 --> 00:24:05,300 about what they see across all their customers, but, you know, 414 00:24:05,300 --> 00:24:09,500 if there aren't information sharing mechanisms in place 415 00:24:09,500 --> 00:24:14,400 between vendors, then You know that could tend to limit the 416 00:24:14,400 --> 00:24:17,600 amount of transaction information available for 417 00:24:17,600 --> 00:24:19,400 analysis. You know, I think this is where 418 00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:23,100 we've seen a competitive Advantage kind of breakout from 419 00:24:23,100 --> 00:24:25,900 a war between the top vendors. Any authentication space, 420 00:24:26,100 --> 00:24:28,000 Microsoft talks about their signals that they get from 421 00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:30,900 across their Microsoft stack right of all youth in occasions. 422 00:24:30,900 --> 00:24:35,300 They have, you know and I think I think at this point we're 423 00:24:35,300 --> 00:24:39,800 starting to see the beginnings of what might be called 424 00:24:40,200 --> 00:24:41,900 monopolistic. A hater when it comes to 425 00:24:41,900 --> 00:24:44,500 authentication and logins. So this is purely my opinion. 426 00:24:44,500 --> 00:24:46,000 So please don't hold anyone else accountable. 427 00:24:46,000 --> 00:24:52,100 But I see things like Microsoft Facebook, Google and some of the 428 00:24:52,100 --> 00:24:54,100 big IDP players that are out there, right? 429 00:24:54,100 --> 00:24:57,400 Social logins where they're collecting a lot of information 430 00:24:57,400 --> 00:25:00,400 from the notification standpoint but they're not necessarily 431 00:25:00,400 --> 00:25:02,500 sharing it. You know Google and Microsoft 432 00:25:02,500 --> 00:25:05,000 are not sharing, their authentication signals with each 433 00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:07,700 other because I think that it's seen a little bit as a 434 00:25:07,700 --> 00:25:10,300 competitive Advantage for the security. 435 00:25:10,300 --> 00:25:13,800 They can provide for their Their users and I know that certain 436 00:25:13,800 --> 00:25:17,900 governments are more tolerant of monopolistic Behavior like that 437 00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:23,800 at some point. Does this type of data enter 438 00:25:23,800 --> 00:25:26,700 into that realm of well, hold on a second, we need more 439 00:25:26,700 --> 00:25:31,000 interoperability and if you don't do it voluntarily we're 440 00:25:31,000 --> 00:25:34,800 going to kind of make you do it, which obviously opens up 441 00:25:34,800 --> 00:25:37,500 government and all the feelings that go around, you know, big 442 00:25:37,500 --> 00:25:38,800 government, little government. What you saying? 443 00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:43,200 Say, you know can and can't do. But if if the current Trend 444 00:25:43,200 --> 00:25:47,900 continues where Microsoft Google and let's say, log in with 445 00:25:47,900 --> 00:25:52,100 Facebook, continue to dominate login box is around the world. 446 00:25:52,300 --> 00:25:55,500 At some point, does it enter that enter that state? 447 00:25:55,600 --> 00:25:58,200 Now, Apple has started to fight back a little bit with their D 448 00:25:58,200 --> 00:26:02,400 Central, not decentralized, but with their obfuscated user ID, 449 00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:04,500 but now they're collecting data as well, right? 450 00:26:04,500 --> 00:26:07,100 So, they know what you're logging into and I'm just 451 00:26:07,100 --> 00:26:09,000 curious. John, I won't put you on the 452 00:26:09,000 --> 00:26:13,000 spot but it was That I would just kind of occurring to me as 453 00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:16,100 we were kind of talking about this authentication strategy of 454 00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:22,100 this consolidation of user authentication information at 455 00:26:22,100 --> 00:26:25,400 what point? Do we really need to open it up 456 00:26:25,700 --> 00:26:28,400 for the benefit of others or do we leave it as a competitive 457 00:26:28,400 --> 00:26:30,100 Advantage for these organizations to take advantage 458 00:26:30,100 --> 00:26:34,400 of and build better products on? Well, you know, I I think I 459 00:26:34,400 --> 00:26:39,400 would say there is value in the compromised credential 460 00:26:39,400 --> 00:26:45,400 intelligence, peace to this. But even so there are other 461 00:26:45,500 --> 00:26:51,100 things that that consumer facing organizations would want to 462 00:26:51,108 --> 00:26:55,000 consider besides just the Compromised credential until, 463 00:26:55,600 --> 00:26:58,000 you know, there's user behavioral analysis, and that's 464 00:26:58,000 --> 00:27:01,300 something that they could do potentially on their own or, you 465 00:27:01,300 --> 00:27:04,600 know, through interaction with their fraud reduction 466 00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:08,700 intelligence platform, vendor, you know, thinking about 467 00:27:08,800 --> 00:27:14,100 financial transactions. For example, going beyond the 468 00:27:14,100 --> 00:27:18,700 login, it's good to know what the pattern of transactions has 469 00:27:18,700 --> 00:27:22,700 been for a user over a given month, six months or a year, you 470 00:27:22,700 --> 00:27:24,700 know. So that if Suddenly there's a 471 00:27:24,708 --> 00:27:29,000 request to transfer thirty thousand dollars to someone 472 00:27:29,000 --> 00:27:33,500 that's there's no history of that in the users behavioral 473 00:27:33,500 --> 00:27:37,800 profile then that should you know raise a red flag and stop 474 00:27:37,800 --> 00:27:43,200 that transaction until there's some other kind of implicit or 475 00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:46,200 explicit I mean authorization from the user. 476 00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:52,000 So yes, login information is useful but there are other 477 00:27:52,000 --> 00:27:55,800 things like you ba The behavioral Biometrics device 478 00:27:55,800 --> 00:28:00,500 intelligence device intelligence, I think is, you 479 00:28:00,500 --> 00:28:03,900 know what we think about strong authentication and needing, you 480 00:28:03,900 --> 00:28:06,900 know, two out of three different, kinds of factors. 481 00:28:06,900 --> 00:28:11,000 That device intelligence is in many cases, just as important 482 00:28:11,000 --> 00:28:15,700 as, as others because then you'll, you can find out, IP 483 00:28:15,700 --> 00:28:20,100 reputation device reputation, you know, typical location 484 00:28:20,100 --> 00:28:23,100 history for a device. I think that's something that's 485 00:28:23,100 --> 00:28:26,400 just As important as all the other factors as well. 486 00:28:26,400 --> 00:28:30,600 So we'll be back in person at conferences. 487 00:28:30,600 --> 00:28:33,100 Is some point. Anybody who wants to discuss 488 00:28:33,100 --> 00:28:37,000 this further for a beer? I would love to to dive into 489 00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:40,200 this topic, but let's get back on track. 490 00:28:40,200 --> 00:28:45,100 Do it for a bit here, John, and I wanted to talk about kind of 491 00:28:45,100 --> 00:28:48,300 the approach. So evaluating the market, you 492 00:28:48,300 --> 00:28:51,500 know, as a consumer, or somebody who's representing an 493 00:28:51,500 --> 00:28:56,400 organization that has A need for a fraud reduction platform. 494 00:28:57,100 --> 00:28:59,800 I'm wondering in your mind, two things. 495 00:28:59,800 --> 00:29:02,800 One is, you know, what should I be looking for? 496 00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:07,200 And the second is, you know, from the standpoint of who in 497 00:29:07,200 --> 00:29:11,900 that organization is, it should be, you know, doing the shopping 498 00:29:11,900 --> 00:29:15,000 or brought to the table as the shopping is being performed. 499 00:29:15,100 --> 00:29:20,600 I think, you know, when we talk about who's responsible for 500 00:29:20,600 --> 00:29:23,400 securing an organization, most people are going to point. 501 00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:28,800 To the CIO or the ciso, they're not going to point to the 502 00:29:28,800 --> 00:29:31,200 business. So you guys are responsible for 503 00:29:31,500 --> 00:29:34,400 securing the data but this is one of those technologies that 504 00:29:34,600 --> 00:29:38,100 sort of blurs, the line. And I feel like there needs to 505 00:29:38,100 --> 00:29:42,500 be participation from that business side in the selection 506 00:29:42,500 --> 00:29:45,400 of a frog production platform, right? 507 00:29:45,400 --> 00:29:48,300 I'm just wondering do you kind of share that perspective and 508 00:29:48,300 --> 00:29:51,700 then again, you know, again the kind of the beginning of the 509 00:29:51,700 --> 00:29:54,600 question was any kind of what Should I be looking forward to 510 00:29:54,600 --> 00:29:58,200 kind of help me decide? Which platform makes sense for 511 00:29:58,200 --> 00:30:02,700 me, you know, in a way you're setting up to answer your own 512 00:30:02,700 --> 00:30:07,400 question, I think you need to know your business in order to 513 00:30:07,400 --> 00:30:13,600 know what to look for. So yes, to a degree, CIO ciso, 514 00:30:13,600 --> 00:30:16,200 should probably be involved with these are more business-driven, 515 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:20,300 kinds of decisions. So let's say you're in again in 516 00:30:20,300 --> 00:30:24,500 retail or travel hospitality. Mystery like that. 517 00:30:25,600 --> 00:30:29,700 The business people probably have a better handle on the 518 00:30:29,700 --> 00:30:36,400 kinds of threats, that may arise purely from the fraud side. 519 00:30:36,700 --> 00:30:39,000 Then say those who are charged with taking care of the 520 00:30:39,000 --> 00:30:45,000 infrastructure. Most of these are delivered as 521 00:30:45,000 --> 00:30:47,600 services or almost all of them really are delivered as 522 00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:50,100 services. So, this is something that you 523 00:30:50,100 --> 00:30:54,000 hook up to Via API. This is a service that you call 524 00:30:54,000 --> 00:30:56,800 at runtime, you know? Direction until service. 525 00:30:57,500 --> 00:31:02,000 So it's not something that necessarily needs to involve 526 00:31:02,100 --> 00:31:04,400 the, the security infrastructure directly. 527 00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:08,600 So I think of it more as a business decision and having the 528 00:31:08,600 --> 00:31:11,700 Business Leaders involved in making those kinds of 529 00:31:11,700 --> 00:31:13,700 selections. I think makes the most sense. 530 00:31:13,800 --> 00:31:14,500 Yeah. I think that makes sense, 531 00:31:14,500 --> 00:31:16,600 because at the end the day, right? 532 00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:20,800 The business of third data. And if I'm in the position of 533 00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:22,900 saying, okay, we need to have this capability. 534 00:31:23,200 --> 00:31:25,200 Who's going to help me Define what the rules are to even? 535 00:31:25,300 --> 00:31:27,300 Identify a pattern of fraud, right? 536 00:31:27,500 --> 00:31:29,700 The business is going to help me make that decision. 537 00:31:29,700 --> 00:31:32,600 So if I, you know, I guess for my own personal perspective is 538 00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:36,000 like, okay, I'm going to give a tool and then someone's gonna 539 00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:37,800 make me use a tool. I should at least have hopefully 540 00:31:37,800 --> 00:31:39,100 have a say in what tool is being used. 541 00:31:39,100 --> 00:31:41,900 I think having that input is it would probably make a lot of 542 00:31:41,900 --> 00:31:45,200 sense and I think of things now of other areas that Miss might 543 00:31:45,200 --> 00:31:49,900 stretch into things like kyc or know your customer or am L 544 00:31:49,900 --> 00:31:52,700 anti-money. Laundering are these are these 545 00:31:52,700 --> 00:31:55,500 types of capabilities and services part of that first Rod 546 00:31:55,500 --> 00:31:59,900 reduction platform or is, are those separate capabilities. 547 00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:03,500 How does that work? That is built into, many of the 548 00:32:03,500 --> 00:32:06,500 solutions. Many of the solutions that I 549 00:32:06,500 --> 00:32:10,700 reviewed this time around, do have those kinds of capabilities 550 00:32:10,700 --> 00:32:15,500 for do it both kyc and I am l in, you know, in some cases, 551 00:32:15,500 --> 00:32:19,700 even more, you know, pep compliance politically exposed 552 00:32:19,700 --> 00:32:24,400 persons effect, lists things like that can be checked for a 553 00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:28,500 bed. Auction time so that those are, 554 00:32:29,900 --> 00:32:32,600 you know, have a smaller audience maybe than some of the 555 00:32:32,600 --> 00:32:36,300 broader lower Assurance, kinds of customers, they may be 556 00:32:36,300 --> 00:32:39,700 dealing with but it's extremely important that they comply with 557 00:32:39,700 --> 00:32:46,300 those regulations to. So, yes, to succinctly answer am 558 00:32:46,300 --> 00:32:50,900 L, KY C is built into many of these solutions that are out 559 00:32:50,900 --> 00:32:51,700 there today. Yeah. 560 00:32:51,700 --> 00:32:54,000 And, and this is an area that you did did some recent 561 00:32:54,000 --> 00:32:56,400 reporting on, right? I think it was June of this year 562 00:32:56,400 --> 00:33:00,900 2021 that you had the leadership quadrant for the fraud reduction 563 00:33:00,900 --> 00:33:02,800 intelligence platform. So I have a link to that in our 564 00:33:02,800 --> 00:33:07,500 show notes so that people can check that out any anything that 565 00:33:07,500 --> 00:33:10,100 you want to kind of tease people who might be interested. 566 00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:12,500 Yeah, there's there's a lot of content. 567 00:33:12,500 --> 00:33:15,600 There's a lot of variety in the solutions that are out there. 568 00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:20,700 There's a like a base set of capabilities that needed to be 569 00:33:20,700 --> 00:33:23,900 in there but I think going through it carefully. 570 00:33:24,300 --> 00:33:26,400 I mean, if you're in the market, Ticket for this kind of a 571 00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:28,100 product service. Really. 572 00:33:28,800 --> 00:33:32,700 Then you look at look at the details, see who covers your 573 00:33:32,700 --> 00:33:37,600 industry, your particular technical requirements and make 574 00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:40,900 decisions based on that. So I think what we'll try to do 575 00:33:40,900 --> 00:33:44,400 now is pull us back up out of the the heavy-duty fraud 576 00:33:44,400 --> 00:33:47,800 conversation and since this is the end of the year and we 577 00:33:47,800 --> 00:33:50,500 typically end a little bit on a lighter note, it would not be an 578 00:33:50,500 --> 00:33:54,500 end of your show of any sort. If we didn't do some sort of 579 00:33:54,500 --> 00:33:58,800 predictions, 20:22. So what I'd like to do is take 580 00:33:58,800 --> 00:34:00,800 us around the room and we'll start with you, John and then go 581 00:34:00,808 --> 00:34:05,500 to gym, what are your identity predictions for 2022? 582 00:34:05,500 --> 00:34:06,800 And they can be good or bad, right? 583 00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:10,199 I'll leave it up to you if you want to be a an optimist or a 584 00:34:10,207 --> 00:34:14,000 pessimist, well, I'm gonna go out on a limb here and say that 585 00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:17,000 we will probably still be entering passwords and answering 586 00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:19,300 security questions here and there. 587 00:34:20,199 --> 00:34:25,100 That's, that's a real stretch. Well, you know, okay. 588 00:34:25,300 --> 00:34:29,900 Okay, so on a more serious note, you know this identity proofing 589 00:34:29,900 --> 00:34:35,000 piece I coming at this from both the fraud reduction side as well 590 00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:38,900 as the consumer identity side, I'm seeing much much more 591 00:34:38,900 --> 00:34:43,500 interesting this especially the different gradations of how that 592 00:34:43,500 --> 00:34:48,000 might be included into the transaction level analysis. 593 00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:52,900 I think in 2022, we're going to see a greater emphasis on 594 00:34:52,900 --> 00:34:56,300 identity proofing even, you know, amongst Different kinds of 595 00:34:56,308 --> 00:35:01,200 consumer facing sites. I think that will Avail itself 596 00:35:01,900 --> 00:35:05,300 as add-ons through a lot of the cin solutions that are out 597 00:35:05,300 --> 00:35:07,700 there. Sounds like a byproduct, right? 598 00:35:07,700 --> 00:35:13,400 Of the pandemic and the less in person, but still need to verify 599 00:35:13,400 --> 00:35:16,700 identities and validate statuses of maybe bits of pieces of 600 00:35:16,700 --> 00:35:19,400 information. So I'm on board with that Jim. 601 00:35:19,400 --> 00:35:21,900 What about yourself from a production standpoint? 602 00:35:21,900 --> 00:35:24,800 What do you see for 2022? You know, Jeff and I'm typically 603 00:35:24,800 --> 00:35:30,800 a very A optimistic person. But the thing I wanted to come 604 00:35:30,900 --> 00:35:33,100 through as some kind of prediction that wasn't just 605 00:35:33,100 --> 00:35:36,300 like, hey, I think more people are going to move to the cloud 606 00:35:36,900 --> 00:35:40,200 because I think that one is kind of like John's, you know, 607 00:35:40,800 --> 00:35:42,200 password still going to be around. 608 00:35:42,500 --> 00:35:44,200 I mean, here's what I'm worried about. 609 00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:49,500 I'm worried about continued. Escalation of, not only 610 00:35:49,500 --> 00:35:52,500 ransomware but, you know, potentially state-sponsored 611 00:35:53,300 --> 00:35:59,200 hacking events that Start to blur the line between computer 612 00:35:59,700 --> 00:36:04,500 hacking and physical military intervention, and that this 613 00:36:04,500 --> 00:36:10,500 continues to create more tension between the United States and 614 00:36:10,500 --> 00:36:14,000 China and Russia and to the point that maybe some of it 615 00:36:14,300 --> 00:36:17,400 boils over into military level conflict. 616 00:36:17,400 --> 00:36:20,000 So that's my concern. I don't know. 617 00:36:20,000 --> 00:36:22,200 That's definitely not ending on a lighter note. 618 00:36:22,200 --> 00:36:25,500 All right, we'll just the the goal of this segment but that's 619 00:36:25,500 --> 00:36:26,900 my real. Star in a movie, we saw with 620 00:36:26,900 --> 00:36:31,100 the, you know, the pipeline hacking this year. 621 00:36:32,200 --> 00:36:37,100 I think a message was sent that, you know, the rent somewhere, 622 00:36:37,100 --> 00:36:41,500 Crews need to really back off. But there's just so much 623 00:36:41,500 --> 00:36:45,500 opportunity to make money with attacks like that where you have 624 00:36:45,600 --> 00:36:47,600 companies that are going to have to pay. 625 00:36:48,900 --> 00:36:52,600 And they've, you know, under invested in technology and then 626 00:36:52,600 --> 00:36:56,400 plus the reports that you keep seeing come out with Zero day 627 00:36:56,400 --> 00:37:00,000 vulnerabilities in software has gotten so complex as listening 628 00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:05,100 to listening to a podcast from couple charcoal actually say, 629 00:37:05,100 --> 00:37:08,300 okay? Casey live has a fantastic 630 00:37:08,300 --> 00:37:12,700 podcast that I recommend people check out and Martin was talking 631 00:37:12,700 --> 00:37:18,900 about the amount of lines of code that go into traditional 632 00:37:18,900 --> 00:37:21,500 software product. And it's almost impossible 633 00:37:21,500 --> 00:37:25,800 nowadays, not to have bugs, inherent in complex. 634 00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:28,800 For program. So I think you know zero-day 635 00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:33,300 vulnerabilities continue to be found which means that every 636 00:37:33,300 --> 00:37:38,700 organization is vulnerable and, you know, anyway, I don't want 637 00:37:38,700 --> 00:37:43,800 to harp on that that - prediction but I can I don't see 638 00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:46,200 anything that's going to turn the tide in the other direction 639 00:37:46,200 --> 00:37:49,700 to me just seems like. The problem is getting worse and 640 00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:52,200 at some point the government's going to have to step in and 641 00:37:52,200 --> 00:37:55,800 say, you know, we can't fight this with ones and zeros. 642 00:37:55,900 --> 00:37:59,700 Okay, so yeah, I'm good. I don't know if I necessarily 643 00:38:00,200 --> 00:38:02,700 more positive one. I feel like it's a little bit of 644 00:38:02,700 --> 00:38:07,400 a Debbie Downer situation, but I think I think we're going to see 645 00:38:07,400 --> 00:38:08,800 a couple things. I think we'll continue to see 646 00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:13,100 zero trust be sort of like the the marketing term du jour for 647 00:38:13,200 --> 00:38:14,700 organization. Shifting that we've already seen 648 00:38:14,700 --> 00:38:17,600 that kind of this year. Kind of take hold, I think just 649 00:38:17,600 --> 00:38:20,600 based on the slow moving moving trains that a lot of 650 00:38:20,600 --> 00:38:24,200 organizations are is 2022, will really be when. 651 00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:27,600 Okay, now we've got room, Budget to kind of address some of those 652 00:38:27,600 --> 00:38:30,100 things for this hybrid, environment of people working 653 00:38:30,100 --> 00:38:32,900 from home remote. I think VPN will still be 654 00:38:32,900 --> 00:38:35,400 around, but I think it's days are starting to get numbered and 655 00:38:35,400 --> 00:38:38,300 I think it will start to see more of that zero trust Edge, 656 00:38:38,300 --> 00:38:43,400 kind of process be in place. I think I'm going to see a lot 657 00:38:43,400 --> 00:38:47,500 more organizations struggle internally if they have not 658 00:38:47,500 --> 00:38:51,700 invested in just the basics of identity management, you know, 659 00:38:51,800 --> 00:38:54,000 Jim you and I the work that we do, we see a lot of kind of 660 00:38:54,000 --> 00:38:56,600 immature organizations, just by the nature of We work on. 661 00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:59,800 And, you know, they don't, they're using basic processes, 662 00:38:59,800 --> 00:39:03,900 things are manual, and they've really fallen behind where they 663 00:39:03,900 --> 00:39:07,400 should be at this stage of the game where they don't have, you 664 00:39:07,400 --> 00:39:11,000 know, dedicated IGA tool sets, they're kind of doing things and 665 00:39:11,300 --> 00:39:13,800 Lotus Notes or other things, right? 666 00:39:13,900 --> 00:39:18,200 You know, we joked about several months ago, you know around hey 667 00:39:18,200 --> 00:39:20,800 if you're using Lotus, Notes successfully and you're really 668 00:39:20,800 --> 00:39:22,500 happy with that. As an IM platform, please come 669 00:39:22,500 --> 00:39:25,800 on the show and tell me I'm wrong 0, people have come. 670 00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:28,100 To be on that one just as an update if you want to look back 671 00:39:28,100 --> 00:39:30,600 on that. But I think you know just from 672 00:39:30,800 --> 00:39:33,300 maturity standpoint. If you're not doing the blade 673 00:39:33,400 --> 00:39:36,600 basic blocking and tackling and add any perspective, you know, 674 00:39:36,800 --> 00:39:39,800 even just the basics of identity governance automated onboarding 675 00:39:39,800 --> 00:39:41,700 off-boarding at a just for active directory. 676 00:39:41,700 --> 00:39:46,400 Even basic access reviews, basic privileged access management. 677 00:39:46,400 --> 00:39:50,800 That means more than just, I have this Vault and I put 678 00:39:50,800 --> 00:39:52,800 passwords in there but they don't rotate. 679 00:39:52,900 --> 00:39:55,300 You know, there's no discovery of those things, you're not 680 00:39:55,300 --> 00:39:57,400 doing anything. Unlike session management. 681 00:39:57,400 --> 00:40:00,400 You don't have MFA pin place or even adaptive or conditional 682 00:40:00,400 --> 00:40:04,400 rules in place, like that's the basics and I think it's so hard 683 00:40:04,400 --> 00:40:08,000 to catch up if you don't keep up with it. 684 00:40:08,300 --> 00:40:11,400 So what we typically see, at least from my perspective is, is 685 00:40:11,400 --> 00:40:14,800 this hurry up and wait and then you stop investing and all of a 686 00:40:14,800 --> 00:40:16,500 sudden what used to be considered? 687 00:40:16,500 --> 00:40:18,900 Great was. Yeah, you're barely cutting it 688 00:40:19,000 --> 00:40:21,500 and you're having to spend a lot of money doing any number of 689 00:40:21,500 --> 00:40:25,800 things manual, you know, support for things fraud. 690 00:40:26,000 --> 00:40:28,100 Issues that might come up because you're not you don't 691 00:40:28,100 --> 00:40:29,300 have the appropriate behavior analytic. 692 00:40:29,300 --> 00:40:33,300 So unfortunately I think I'll continue to see a lot of those 693 00:40:33,300 --> 00:40:36,300 organizations that just have invested internally and identity 694 00:40:37,300 --> 00:40:40,700 and I think hopefully, the positive spin on. 695 00:40:40,700 --> 00:40:45,700 That will be that they took this last year and realized, oh crap. 696 00:40:45,700 --> 00:40:48,900 We really need to get our identity hats on and kind of fix 697 00:40:48,900 --> 00:40:51,500 some of these systems systemic issues that might be present 698 00:40:51,500 --> 00:40:54,100 organization. So that's going to be my my 699 00:40:54,100 --> 00:40:57,400 prediction. John, do you want to weigh in? 700 00:40:57,400 --> 00:41:01,400 Do you think are we - Nancy's here or Debbie? 701 00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:04,000 Downers, for free people who are familiar with Saturday Night 702 00:41:04,000 --> 00:41:08,100 Live? Well, don't leave it to me to be 703 00:41:08,100 --> 00:41:13,700 the optimistic one that's not a good idea for the voice of 704 00:41:13,700 --> 00:41:19,300 reason and Santa Yeah. I mean there will continue to be 705 00:41:19,300 --> 00:41:20,300 attacks. I'm sure. 706 00:41:20,300 --> 00:41:22,800 Ransom ransomware is not going to go away. 707 00:41:23,400 --> 00:41:27,100 If it makes the criminals money frauds, not going to go away all 708 00:41:27,100 --> 00:41:32,500 these things mutate and change. I mean the real world. 709 00:41:32,500 --> 00:41:38,300 Analogs are really good examples. 710 00:41:38,300 --> 00:41:41,000 You know, things like viruses themselves, you know, these 711 00:41:41,000 --> 00:41:45,000 things change, we have to kind of retool and adapt our own 712 00:41:45,000 --> 00:41:51,000 processes to Deal with it. So in those that do a better job 713 00:41:51,000 --> 00:41:53,800 at that are going to be more resilient against different 714 00:41:53,800 --> 00:41:56,100 kinds of attacks. So Jeff what I was going to add 715 00:41:56,100 --> 00:41:58,800 based on what you're talking about with organizations that 716 00:41:58,800 --> 00:42:02,100 are laggers that are closer to the starting line than the art 717 00:42:02,100 --> 00:42:05,400 at the Finish Line. It reminds me of that one meme 718 00:42:05,400 --> 00:42:09,900 where there's a you can see a lion and these these two 719 00:42:10,500 --> 00:42:13,100 envelopes are talking one elipsis. 720 00:42:13,100 --> 00:42:16,000 The other I don't have to be faster than lion. 721 00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:18,100 I just have to be faster than you. 722 00:42:18,100 --> 00:42:19,900 That's the old. How do you run away from a bear, 723 00:42:19,900 --> 00:42:21,500 right? You don't be the fastest on 724 00:42:21,900 --> 00:42:23,100 Skype you faster than your friends. 725 00:42:23,400 --> 00:42:25,000 Yeah. It's just got to be faster your 726 00:42:25,000 --> 00:42:28,300 friend and I mean what how that applies to what we're talking 727 00:42:28,300 --> 00:42:31,700 about is there's so many of the fraudsters out there that are 728 00:42:31,700 --> 00:42:36,100 looking for Easy Pickins. A lot of them are not computer, 729 00:42:36,100 --> 00:42:40,300 scientists who can come up with the zero day, there are people 730 00:42:40,300 --> 00:42:44,200 who can download scripts and go on the dark web and download 731 00:42:44,300 --> 00:42:49,200 tools and work their way into Your environment and then run 732 00:42:49,200 --> 00:42:51,500 Mimi cats and on your active directory. 733 00:42:51,800 --> 00:42:56,100 But once they own your active directory, they own, you you 734 00:42:56,100 --> 00:43:00,800 pretty much are in a position where you can't conduct 735 00:43:00,800 --> 00:43:05,200 business. And so I know that's you have to 736 00:43:05,200 --> 00:43:07,900 be faster than your friend or you have to be faster than the 737 00:43:07,900 --> 00:43:10,600 other envelope. You don't want to be the total 738 00:43:10,600 --> 00:43:12,800 lagger that is just sitting pray. 739 00:43:12,800 --> 00:43:17,000 Yeah, exactly. All right, so somewhat I don't 740 00:43:17,000 --> 00:43:19,500 feel, we were successful in ending, I don't know, I don't 741 00:43:19,500 --> 00:43:21,900 know. But I think it was interesting 742 00:43:21,900 --> 00:43:25,100 from a thought-provoking perspective to say, okay, you 743 00:43:25,100 --> 00:43:28,500 know, what are your thoughts going into 2022? 744 00:43:28,500 --> 00:43:29,700 Like what do you see happening right? 745 00:43:29,700 --> 00:43:33,800 Is this the year passwords will die again for the 10th year in a 746 00:43:33,800 --> 00:43:35,100 row? Who knows? 747 00:43:35,100 --> 00:43:36,900 Right. I'm optimistic. 748 00:43:36,900 --> 00:43:40,200 I think there's a place for it but you know, we'll see before 749 00:43:40,200 --> 00:43:42,000 we wrap up here. Any final thoughts? 750 00:43:42,000 --> 00:43:44,800 John is, we kind of anything we've talked about today whether 751 00:43:44,800 --> 00:43:50,200 it's the Diction side for 2022 or the fraud reduction kind of 752 00:43:50,200 --> 00:43:51,500 components. We talked about before. 753 00:43:51,700 --> 00:43:55,300 What are some final things you want to leave with us for 20 21? 754 00:43:55,900 --> 00:43:58,000 No pressure. Well, I guess I would say, you 755 00:43:58,000 --> 00:44:03,600 know, just thinking back on fraud reduction, there has been 756 00:44:03,700 --> 00:44:06,200 a massive Evolution fraud techniques. 757 00:44:06,200 --> 00:44:10,600 And what I find valuable about the solutions that are out there 758 00:44:10,600 --> 00:44:15,000 in frog reduction spaces, they evolve as well, you know, and I 759 00:44:15,000 --> 00:44:20,200 think there's, There's Hope in that just like there is for 760 00:44:20,200 --> 00:44:24,800 identity management in general. Yes, there are organizations out 761 00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:30,800 there that don't have as mature infrastructures or processes and 762 00:44:30,800 --> 00:44:34,600 places they should. But you know there are those of 763 00:44:34,600 --> 00:44:38,000 us who are part of this community that are willing to 764 00:44:38,000 --> 00:44:42,100 help and provide assistance and guidance in that. 765 00:44:42,100 --> 00:44:47,800 So I think that you know, taking a look at The kinds of work that 766 00:44:47,800 --> 00:44:51,200 you're doing with the podcast and others in the industry here. 767 00:44:51,200 --> 00:44:55,500 I think that maybe that should give us a way to end positively. 768 00:44:56,500 --> 00:44:59,400 I think I think John just called us Heroes and I'm going to take 769 00:44:59,400 --> 00:45:00,900 it. I think that's at least that's 770 00:45:00,900 --> 00:45:02,900 what I'm going to glean from that. 771 00:45:03,200 --> 00:45:05,600 So but yeah, I think you're totally right, John? 772 00:45:05,600 --> 00:45:07,500 Right. There's a bunch of I am Heroes 773 00:45:07,500 --> 00:45:09,300 that are running around. If you're listening to this, 774 00:45:09,300 --> 00:45:12,800 you're probably an IM hero for your organization, or your 775 00:45:12,800 --> 00:45:16,200 providing iom, heroics for some other organization, whatever. 776 00:45:16,300 --> 00:45:18,200 It looks like so, well done. John. 777 00:45:18,200 --> 00:45:19,900 I like that. Jim. 778 00:45:19,900 --> 00:45:21,400 How about yourself? Final thoughts? 779 00:45:21,700 --> 00:45:24,100 Yeah. Silver Lining here is that for 780 00:45:24,100 --> 00:45:26,800 folks who are looking for a career where they can make a 781 00:45:26,800 --> 00:45:30,600 difference, I make an excellent living identity. 782 00:45:30,600 --> 00:45:35,100 Access management or information, security, Fantastic 783 00:45:35,100 --> 00:45:38,800 Field. I encourage anyone who's 784 00:45:38,800 --> 00:45:43,500 interested to, you know, tap into us as resources tap into 785 00:45:43,500 --> 00:45:48,200 the community, I'd love to see. More universities, put together 786 00:45:48,400 --> 00:45:52,200 degree programs. Focus on information, security 787 00:45:52,200 --> 00:45:55,000 and identity, and access management. 788 00:45:55,600 --> 00:45:59,300 It's just, it's a field where right now there are more, 789 00:45:59,700 --> 00:46:03,300 there's more jobs than there are people to fill those jobs. 790 00:46:03,300 --> 00:46:08,100 So, I mean, maybe overall in the economy that's always the, that 791 00:46:08,100 --> 00:46:10,400 is where we are across all Industries. 792 00:46:10,600 --> 00:46:13,900 But it seems like this problem you've good economy or bad 793 00:46:15,100 --> 00:46:17,400 identity and access management. Judgment and information 794 00:46:17,400 --> 00:46:21,000 security are, you know, white-hot fields. 795 00:46:21,000 --> 00:46:24,000 That you could you could build a great career and plus you can be 796 00:46:24,000 --> 00:46:27,100 one of the the weirdos that actually picked identity and it 797 00:46:27,107 --> 00:46:30,600 just fall into it by accident. Like my theory is that most 798 00:46:30,600 --> 00:46:32,100 people did anyway. But yeah, it's a great 799 00:46:32,100 --> 00:46:35,800 Community, tons of great resources out there and tons of 800 00:46:35,808 --> 00:46:39,900 great people who are totally interested in sharing the 801 00:46:39,900 --> 00:46:42,000 knowledge, right? This a lot of this is not 802 00:46:42,300 --> 00:46:44,800 competitive Secret Sauce where people are not willing to share 803 00:46:44,800 --> 00:46:48,500 it, so, We encourage people who are interested, check it out, 804 00:46:48,500 --> 00:46:51,000 tons of resources. We've had some folks in the past 805 00:46:51,000 --> 00:46:52,800 that have been, you know, getting back to the community as 806 00:46:52,800 --> 00:46:54,900 well. I think it's people like Andrew 807 00:46:55,300 --> 00:47:00,600 and David, and things like that. Where there's just tons of 808 00:47:00,600 --> 00:47:02,400 resources out there that's community-driven. 809 00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:04,900 So, so there we go. We brought it back to the 810 00:47:04,900 --> 00:47:06,600 positivity side of things, so that's good. 811 00:47:07,700 --> 00:47:08,900 We're going to go ahead and end it there. 812 00:47:09,700 --> 00:47:12,200 I think, you know, this has been a great year for us and we 813 00:47:12,200 --> 00:47:15,500 certainly hope to see the continued growth and 814 00:47:15,500 --> 00:47:18,900 listenership that we have all around the world and hope people 815 00:47:18,900 --> 00:47:21,300 have a great holiday season here, over the next few weeks 816 00:47:21,300 --> 00:47:23,400 while we take a break. So, again, just a reminder, we 817 00:47:23,400 --> 00:47:27,500 will take a break here for a few weeks for podcasting, but we are 818 00:47:27,500 --> 00:47:30,600 going to continue theoretically, some of the live streams. 819 00:47:30,600 --> 00:47:33,900 So, keep an eye on Twitter at idac podcast, that's where we'll 820 00:47:33,900 --> 00:47:36,000 announce it. And we'll be streaming on 821 00:47:36,000 --> 00:47:38,200 YouTube here and there, over the holiday break. 822 00:47:38,200 --> 00:47:41,100 So, come join us there for some quick conversations. 823 00:47:41,100 --> 00:47:43,000 So with that, we'll go ahead and leave it. 824 00:47:43,000 --> 00:47:46,200 Thank you so much John. Thank you so much Jim and we 825 00:47:46,300 --> 00:47:48,600 we'll talk with everyone in 2022. 826 00:47:48,800 --> 00:47:54,300 Thanks. Thanks for listening to the 827 00:47:54,300 --> 00:47:57,200 identity at the center podcast. If you like what you heard, 828 00:47:57,200 --> 00:48:00,500 don't forget to subscribe and visit us on the web and identity 829 00:48:00,500 --> 00:48:01,700 at the center.com.