1
00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:05,320
Some misinformation would be the
spread of information that is 

2
00:00:05,320 --> 00:00:10,440
false or inaccurate or without 
the intent of doing so. 

3
00:00:10,440 --> 00:00:13,080
So people that maybe, I don't 
know, I can think of my 

4
00:00:13,080 --> 00:00:15,480
grandmother. 
Maybe she finds something funny 

5
00:00:15,480 --> 00:00:18,840
or something scary and then she 
shares that online, but that 

6
00:00:18,840 --> 00:00:23,200
happens to be false. 
Then this information is on the 

7
00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:28,040
other hand the spread of false 
information, but with the intent

8
00:00:28,400 --> 00:00:32,560
to create chaos or confusion 
when some event happens. 

9
00:00:32,880 --> 00:00:35,400
Yeah. 
And how, I mean, how does that 

10
00:00:35,840 --> 00:00:38,720
manifest when in terms of 
technology are we talking about 

11
00:00:38,960 --> 00:00:43,600
social media regular, you know, 
what do you call it legacy media

12
00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:46,960
or is it all the above? 
Yeah, I think misinformation, 

13
00:00:46,960 --> 00:00:48,560
disinformation has always 
existed. 

14
00:00:48,600 --> 00:00:51,560
If we look back in history, 
across time, there's always been

15
00:00:51,560 --> 00:00:56,200
some people that have knowledge 
and they decide to shape it in a

16
00:00:56,200 --> 00:00:59,240
way to spread it to, let's say, 
the masses. 

17
00:00:59,640 --> 00:01:02,560
I know you can go to the Roman 
times and see Julius Caesar, the

18
00:01:02,560 --> 00:01:07,120
famous book, the Gaelic Wars, 
and he, you know, wrote it in a 

19
00:01:07,120 --> 00:01:08,760
way that would help his own 
cause. 

20
00:01:08,760 --> 00:01:15,040
So I think that we can trace 
this, let's say, spread in a 

21
00:01:15,040 --> 00:01:18,520
very massive scale. 
If we look at the printing press

22
00:01:19,360 --> 00:01:23,440
in 1440, here in Germany, in 
mines so not far from Berlin, 

23
00:01:24,080 --> 00:01:27,320
there was this Goldsmith named 
Johann Gutenberg, and he 

24
00:01:27,320 --> 00:01:32,080
developed this printing press 
and that enable editors and 

25
00:01:32,080 --> 00:01:35,320
people to spread information in 
a much faster way. 

26
00:01:40,840 --> 00:01:45,880
This is identity at the center 
if it has anything to do with 

27
00:01:45,920 --> 00:01:50,520
IAM. 
This is the go to podcast now 

28
00:01:50,520 --> 00:01:54,400
your hosts Jim McDonald and Jeff
Steadman. 

29
00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:02,120
Welcome to the Identity at the 
Center podcast. 

30
00:02:02,120 --> 00:02:03,520
I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. 
Hey, Jim. 

31
00:02:03,560 --> 00:02:04,920
Hey, Jeff, how are you? 
Oh. 

32
00:02:04,920 --> 00:02:09,320
Not so bad yourself. 
Doing great here at EIC 2025 

33
00:02:09,479 --> 00:02:13,400
early in Germany and just having
a fantastic time. 

34
00:02:13,640 --> 00:02:17,120
Did I mention how awesome of a 
job Marina has been doing 

35
00:02:17,120 --> 00:02:20,320
keeping things organized? 
She's she's walking across 

36
00:02:20,320 --> 00:02:22,600
behind the cameras right now, 
but she's the MVP that was even 

37
00:02:22,600 --> 00:02:24,880
said got a smile that that's 
that's something we'll take. 

38
00:02:25,560 --> 00:02:29,280
Martin, make sure you you, you 
hear this message right? 

39
00:02:29,520 --> 00:02:33,240
Marina is kicking some butt. 
Yeah, been a good show. 

40
00:02:34,520 --> 00:02:36,240
We've got a guest with us that 
we're going. 

41
00:02:36,240 --> 00:02:39,840
So another episode here from the
stage of EIC, introduce 

42
00:02:39,840 --> 00:02:41,880
Alejandro Leal. 
He's the senior analyst with 

43
00:02:41,880 --> 00:02:43,800
Governor Cole. 
Welcome to the show, Alejandro. 

44
00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:44,960
Thank you, Jeff. 
Thank you, Jim. 

45
00:02:45,160 --> 00:02:46,400
Happy to be here. 
Yeah. 

46
00:02:46,400 --> 00:02:47,760
So thanks so much for taking the
time. 

47
00:02:48,160 --> 00:02:49,640
I know you're very busy. 
You've got like a bunch of 

48
00:02:49,640 --> 00:02:51,400
different sessions, so 
definitely appreciate you taking

49
00:02:51,400 --> 00:02:53,400
that. 
But let's start with your 

50
00:02:53,400 --> 00:02:54,880
background. 
How did you get into the 

51
00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:56,840
identity space? 
Is it something that you chose 

52
00:02:56,840 --> 00:02:58,640
or did it choose you? 
Chose me. 

53
00:02:58,640 --> 00:03:01,640
I think like many in the 
industry, it found me. 

54
00:03:01,840 --> 00:03:04,920
I was mainly studying my 
bachelor's in international 

55
00:03:04,920 --> 00:03:09,160
relations in Poland, and it was 
in my last semester when I had 

56
00:03:09,160 --> 00:03:13,560
to write a paper on the impact 
of technology in International 

57
00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:15,880
Security. 
And that's when I became very 

58
00:03:15,880 --> 00:03:19,800
interested in how technology 
impacts businesses. 

59
00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:21,800
People cite the politics in 
general. 

60
00:03:22,240 --> 00:03:25,640
And then I did a master's degree
in Estonia on technology 

61
00:03:25,640 --> 00:03:27,200
governance and digital 
transformation. 

62
00:03:27,560 --> 00:03:31,320
And after that I found this job 
at Copingoco and here I am. 

63
00:03:32,600 --> 00:03:34,320
Well qualified for that, I would
say. 

64
00:03:34,640 --> 00:03:38,520
Yeah, I hope so. 
One of the topics that you talk 

65
00:03:38,520 --> 00:03:42,360
a lot about is misinformation 
and disinformation first. 

66
00:03:42,360 --> 00:03:45,040
Could you kind of define that 
for us? 

67
00:03:45,040 --> 00:03:48,640
What is the difference? 
Yes, I think it's important to 

68
00:03:49,160 --> 00:03:52,080
to distinguish these two. 
There's a lot of misconceptions 

69
00:03:52,080 --> 00:03:54,200
out there. 
I think some misinformation 

70
00:03:54,200 --> 00:03:59,120
would be the spread of 
information that is false or 

71
00:03:59,120 --> 00:04:03,680
inaccurate or without the intent
of doing so. 

72
00:04:03,680 --> 00:04:06,320
So people that maybe, I don't 
know, I can think of my 

73
00:04:06,320 --> 00:04:09,200
grandmother, maybe she finds 
something funny or something 

74
00:04:09,200 --> 00:04:12,640
scary and then she shares that 
online, but that happens to be 

75
00:04:12,640 --> 00:04:16,480
false. 
Then this information is on the 

76
00:04:16,480 --> 00:04:20,320
other hand, the spread of false 
information. 

77
00:04:20,320 --> 00:04:25,080
But we didn't intend to create 
chaos or confusion when some 

78
00:04:25,080 --> 00:04:26,600
event happens. 
Yeah. 

79
00:04:26,600 --> 00:04:30,600
And how, I mean, how does that 
manifest when in terms of 

80
00:04:30,600 --> 00:04:35,280
technology we're talking about 
social media regular, you know, 

81
00:04:35,440 --> 00:04:38,000
what do they call it legacy 
media or is it all the above? 

82
00:04:38,680 --> 00:04:41,240
Yeah, I think misinformation, 
this information has always 

83
00:04:41,240 --> 00:04:43,280
existed. 
If we look back in history, 

84
00:04:43,280 --> 00:04:47,920
across time, there's always been
some people that have knowledge 

85
00:04:47,920 --> 00:04:51,920
and they decide to shape it in a
way to spread it to, let's say, 

86
00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:54,200
the masses. 
I know you can go to the Roman 

87
00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:57,800
times and see Julius Caesar, the
famous book The Catholic Wars, 

88
00:04:57,800 --> 00:05:01,800
and he, you know, wrote it in a 
way that would help his own 

89
00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:04,680
cause. 
So I think that we can trace 

90
00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:09,640
this, let's say, spread in a 
very massive scale. 

91
00:05:10,000 --> 00:05:15,000
If we look at the printing press
in 1440 here in Germany and in 

92
00:05:15,000 --> 00:05:18,680
mines so not far from Berlin, 
there was this Goldsmith name 

93
00:05:18,680 --> 00:05:21,520
Johann Gutenberg. 
And he developed this printing 

94
00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:27,360
press and that enable editors 
and people to spread information

95
00:05:27,360 --> 00:05:32,760
in a much faster way. 
And that led to in long term, it

96
00:05:32,760 --> 00:05:36,400
led to the Reformation, it led 
to the religious conflicts in 

97
00:05:36,400 --> 00:05:39,520
Europe, led to the 30 Years war 
here in Germany. 

98
00:05:40,640 --> 00:05:46,320
And that caused people to start,
let's say, moving from from 

99
00:05:46,320 --> 00:05:48,440
speaking Latin to the 
vernacular. 

100
00:05:48,800 --> 00:05:52,160
So in a way it's a good thing 
because he democratizes the 

101
00:05:52,160 --> 00:05:54,240
ability of people to 
communicate, to learn new 

102
00:05:54,240 --> 00:05:57,400
things, to acquire knowledge. 
But I think that it can also 

103
00:05:57,400 --> 00:06:01,520
have some consequences that 
people don't really plan ahead. 

104
00:06:02,120 --> 00:06:03,600
I think it's true for most 
technology, right? 

105
00:06:03,600 --> 00:06:09,280
It's the intent was probably 
maybe hopefully pure and then 

106
00:06:09,360 --> 00:06:12,000
gets corrupted or you know, 
we'll look at other ways to use 

107
00:06:12,000 --> 00:06:13,520
it. 
You know, a hammer is a tool 

108
00:06:13,960 --> 00:06:15,120
that could be for any number of 
things. 

109
00:06:15,120 --> 00:06:19,080
And I guess you know, from a 
misinformation, disinformation. 

110
00:06:19,080 --> 00:06:21,280
You mentioned that intent. 
That really is probably the key 

111
00:06:21,280 --> 00:06:26,040
part is you're trying to further
a goal with one and the other 

112
00:06:26,040 --> 00:06:30,640
one is a mistake of some sort or
something on those lines. 

113
00:06:31,080 --> 00:06:33,920
What can we actually do about it
though? 

114
00:06:34,040 --> 00:06:38,960
How do we know if something is, 
you know, misinformation versus 

115
00:06:38,960 --> 00:06:41,480
disinformation? 
Because I feel like at this 

116
00:06:41,480 --> 00:06:44,520
point there's so much out there 
that's like, well, how do we 

117
00:06:44,520 --> 00:06:47,520
believe and who do we believe 
in, you know, with AI, what do 

118
00:06:47,520 --> 00:06:49,680
we believe? 
Is that really Alejandra sitting

119
00:06:49,680 --> 00:06:52,400
there or is it Alejandra AI 
twin, right, something like 

120
00:06:52,400 --> 00:06:53,560
that? 
Like what can we do about that? 

121
00:06:53,960 --> 00:06:56,800
Yeah, If we step back and look 
at these examples that I 

122
00:06:56,800 --> 00:06:59,800
mentioned of the printing press,
I think back then there was a 

123
00:06:59,800 --> 00:07:01,800
small number of people that 
could read and write. 

124
00:07:02,760 --> 00:07:09,160
And for example, many people 
would print books on how to burn

125
00:07:09,160 --> 00:07:11,720
witches, for example. 
So that was clearly a 

126
00:07:12,680 --> 00:07:16,760
intentional way of spreading 
ideas that maybe wasn't that 

127
00:07:16,760 --> 00:07:21,000
nice, but it also led to the 
spread of religious texts or 

128
00:07:21,160 --> 00:07:25,480
political texts or scientific 
texts that could be accessible 

129
00:07:25,480 --> 00:07:29,640
for everyone in the population. 
But if we look at today, I think

130
00:07:29,640 --> 00:07:32,360
most people should know how to 
read and write. 

131
00:07:33,120 --> 00:07:37,880
But it looks like all of the 
things that we see and read are 

132
00:07:37,880 --> 00:07:42,160
more are getting more confusing,
are getting more difficult to 

133
00:07:42,160 --> 00:07:44,520
distinguish they're true or 
they're not true. 

134
00:07:45,760 --> 00:07:48,160
And maybe later we can talk 
about what are some of the 

135
00:07:48,160 --> 00:07:52,040
potential solutions. 
But I think that the the scale 

136
00:07:52,040 --> 00:07:56,560
and the scope of misinformation 
and disinformation today is on 

137
00:07:56,560 --> 00:07:57,240
another level. 
I. 

138
00:07:57,240 --> 00:08:01,080
Think there's those words are 
used to sometimes discredit 

139
00:08:01,080 --> 00:08:06,120
ideas as well so to say Oh yeah,
I talked to Alejandro and he 

140
00:08:06,120 --> 00:08:09,840
gave me all this misinformation 
or disinformation. 

141
00:08:09,840 --> 00:08:14,480
I think sometimes those terms 
get loosely used, but the intent

142
00:08:14,480 --> 00:08:18,160
is so important because you use 
the example of your grandma saw 

143
00:08:18,160 --> 00:08:24,120
some article maybe about a 
medicine and reposted it because

144
00:08:24,120 --> 00:08:27,000
she wants people to have all 
this good information that it's 

145
00:08:27,000 --> 00:08:29,680
false. 
It's a kind of at least a 

146
00:08:29,680 --> 00:08:33,960
disservice to everybody, but she
didn't mean to harm people. 

147
00:08:34,080 --> 00:08:39,120
Yes, that's true. 
But I think that a few years 

148
00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:45,920
ago, you could always provide 
this grandma example because for

149
00:08:45,920 --> 00:08:48,480
people like in the industry or 
younger people, it's easier to 

150
00:08:48,480 --> 00:08:50,600
distinguish. 
OK, that's completely false. 

151
00:08:51,160 --> 00:08:53,680
But that's getting more 
difficult today, and it's going 

152
00:08:53,680 --> 00:08:55,640
to keep getting more difficult 
in the future. 

153
00:08:56,120 --> 00:09:02,000
And I think that with the use of
generative AI, it's going to get

154
00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:05,480
even more complicated. 
My colleague John Tolbert, which

155
00:09:05,480 --> 00:09:09,000
I think you guys know, know him 
very well, he recently shared 

156
00:09:09,000 --> 00:09:12,960
with us a news article on some 
lawyers, I believe in the US. 

157
00:09:12,960 --> 00:09:16,760
They shared a brief to the 
judge. 

158
00:09:18,120 --> 00:09:20,800
They were looking at a case and 
then the judge noticed that 

159
00:09:20,800 --> 00:09:26,480
there were more than 30 mistakes
and they used ChatGPT to 

160
00:09:26,480 --> 00:09:30,200
summarize the case. 
It created like fake cases and 

161
00:09:30,200 --> 00:09:31,080
things like. 
That it did. 

162
00:09:31,360 --> 00:09:32,440
It did. 
Not a very well. 

163
00:09:33,320 --> 00:09:36,160
John said LLMS do not care about
the truth. 

164
00:09:36,600 --> 00:09:39,760
You know, it's text prediction, 
so I kind. 

165
00:09:39,760 --> 00:09:44,760
Of have a theory that the LLMS 
are too embarrassed to admit 

166
00:09:44,760 --> 00:09:49,640
when they don't do something. 
Make something up to not feel 

167
00:09:49,640 --> 00:09:51,760
embarrassed. 
So that's what that is human 

168
00:09:51,800 --> 00:09:54,400
emotion every single LLM and and
interface. 

169
00:09:54,400 --> 00:09:57,920
So it says use at your own risk.
You know they're washing their 

170
00:09:57,920 --> 00:10:00,720
hands of any sort of 
responsibility that anything 

171
00:10:00,720 --> 00:10:05,120
that puts out on it is accurate,
right, whether it's reporting or

172
00:10:05,120 --> 00:10:07,960
if you're trying to do something
with AI voices, right, like are 

173
00:10:07,960 --> 00:10:13,160
we defer April first episode. 
It's just use at your own risk. 

174
00:10:13,280 --> 00:10:16,560
Yes, yes. 
So let's talk a bit about how 

175
00:10:16,560 --> 00:10:20,040
did this start because I feel 
like personally, everything 

176
00:10:20,040 --> 00:10:25,080
starts as misinformation until 
you can prove the intent is this

177
00:10:25,080 --> 00:10:27,320
information. 
How does I guess how did things 

178
00:10:27,320 --> 00:10:29,080
start? 
You know, maybe before and you 

179
00:10:29,080 --> 00:10:30,920
kind of talked about, you know, 
I think going back to Roman 

180
00:10:30,920 --> 00:10:35,440
times, but how do we look at it 
now and from a origination 

181
00:10:35,440 --> 00:10:38,720
standpoint of where does 
misinformation start and then 

182
00:10:38,720 --> 00:10:40,240
when does it convert to 
disinformation? 

183
00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:42,320
Am I? 
Is that make sense to how I 

184
00:10:42,320 --> 00:10:43,280
describe that? 
Yes, yes. 

185
00:10:43,280 --> 00:10:47,560
I think we need to look at where
this information is flowing and 

186
00:10:47,560 --> 00:10:49,240
that's taking place in 
cyberspace. 

187
00:10:49,560 --> 00:10:53,560
So in the digital landscape, in 
theory, we should all have an 

188
00:10:53,560 --> 00:10:55,680
identity. 
That's why we're here at the IC.

189
00:10:56,360 --> 00:11:00,840
But in many cases, we see false 
information being spread, 

190
00:11:01,200 --> 00:11:04,280
perhaps by a bot, perhaps by a 
anonymous account. 

191
00:11:04,840 --> 00:11:08,840
And maybe people would share 
that because they may be in a 

192
00:11:08,840 --> 00:11:13,760
sort of echo chamber or the 
thing that they read and see it 

193
00:11:13,760 --> 00:11:16,320
matches what they believe or 
what they are afraid of. 

194
00:11:16,840 --> 00:11:20,560
So they might share that with 
intention of spreading 

195
00:11:20,560 --> 00:11:23,480
information and maybe telling 
their friends what's going on 

196
00:11:23,880 --> 00:11:26,480
and they don't really know the 
source of this information. 

197
00:11:27,280 --> 00:11:30,800
But then we also see the other 
aspect, the other dimension, 

198
00:11:30,800 --> 00:11:36,000
which is this information. 
And I think that the origin is 

199
00:11:36,800 --> 00:11:41,200
very clear with the intention of
creating a narrative from a 

200
00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:45,720
particular event or a situation.
And as I said earlier, you know,

201
00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:49,280
back then, few years ago with 
the grandma example, it was easy

202
00:11:49,280 --> 00:11:52,840
to distinguish these things. 
But now with generative AII 

203
00:11:52,840 --> 00:11:56,280
think from a business 
perspective, we need to be very,

204
00:11:57,320 --> 00:12:00,720
we need to understand this issue
because there's been cases of 

205
00:12:00,720 --> 00:12:05,400
false information affecting 
business practices, businesses 

206
00:12:05,400 --> 00:12:09,760
that have been acquired or 
businesses that are talking to 

207
00:12:09,760 --> 00:12:12,240
investors. 
And then there's some online 

208
00:12:12,240 --> 00:12:15,480
narrative that is trying to 
affect such developments. 

209
00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:18,640
Yeah, I, you know, I was 
thinking, as you're talking 

210
00:12:18,640 --> 00:12:22,800
earlier about two major 
scenarios, business and 

211
00:12:22,800 --> 00:12:25,640
politics, right. 
And you see, I think 

212
00:12:25,760 --> 00:12:30,080
misinformation can happen quite 
innocently where people hold a 

213
00:12:30,080 --> 00:12:34,120
belief and they say that belief.
And you know, in some cases it's

214
00:12:34,120 --> 00:12:36,960
hard to tell what is true. 
Maybe there are some things that

215
00:12:36,960 --> 00:12:40,360
are factual, some things are 
opinion and you can never prove 

216
00:12:40,360 --> 00:12:46,200
an opinion wrong probably. 
But then also on the the 

217
00:12:46,200 --> 00:12:49,680
business side, you know, just 
conversations that we have, I 

218
00:12:49,680 --> 00:12:53,920
might have some beliefs that are
incorrect, but if I knew that 

219
00:12:53,920 --> 00:12:56,520
they were incorrect, I wouldn't 
repeat them. 

220
00:12:57,120 --> 00:13:01,880
But on the disinformation side, 
from a business standpoint, I 

221
00:13:01,880 --> 00:13:06,480
could potentially be saying, oh,
that other software vendor, 

222
00:13:06,840 --> 00:13:09,080
they're not good because of XY 
and Z. 

223
00:13:09,240 --> 00:13:13,640
And I know that's not true or I 
know that they are addressing 

224
00:13:13,640 --> 00:13:18,120
it, or I use some recent breach 
to say, oh, you know, they were 

225
00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:21,320
asleep at the wheel knowing very
well that maybe that could have 

226
00:13:21,320 --> 00:13:26,080
happened to almost anybody. 
So that I think though, where we

227
00:13:26,080 --> 00:13:30,480
see it a lot also is in the 
political realm where we here 

228
00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:38,400
with things like like election 
interference and maybe some 

229
00:13:38,400 --> 00:13:42,520
countries trying to become 
involved in sway elections in 

230
00:13:42,520 --> 00:13:44,240
other countries and things like 
that. 

231
00:13:44,960 --> 00:13:49,800
But I also think we are more 
susceptible to disinformation in

232
00:13:49,800 --> 00:13:53,960
the political realm because 
people are becoming more and 

233
00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:56,480
more ingrained into the 
political process of holding 

234
00:13:56,480 --> 00:14:01,040
their beliefs more firmly than 
ever, I think. 

235
00:14:01,360 --> 00:14:05,960
And they're more likely to 
believe disinformation if it, 

236
00:14:06,840 --> 00:14:10,080
you know, backs up what they 
already believe, if it, if it 

237
00:14:10,080 --> 00:14:13,120
aligns with what they believe, 
and if it doesn't, then they'll 

238
00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:15,160
disinformation. 
Yes. 

239
00:14:15,240 --> 00:14:17,600
Well, we were talking about a 
little bit about philosophy 

240
00:14:17,600 --> 00:14:19,680
earlier. 
I know this is an identity 

241
00:14:19,680 --> 00:14:23,640
podcast, but if we look at the 
current narrative from a 

242
00:14:23,640 --> 00:14:27,640
philosophical standpoint, it's 
this postmodern narrative that 

243
00:14:27,720 --> 00:14:29,880
there are no truths on the 
interpretations. 

244
00:14:30,560 --> 00:14:34,520
Of course, that's a very vague 
sentence because there are 

245
00:14:34,520 --> 00:14:36,880
course roots that we can see 
from a scientific point of view,

246
00:14:36,880 --> 00:14:41,040
etcetera. 
But I think many people, you 

247
00:14:41,040 --> 00:14:45,080
know, when I turn like 21, for 
example, I, I was like, OK, now 

248
00:14:45,080 --> 00:14:49,120
I'm an adult, no more BS. 
Now it's time to like, I don't 

249
00:14:49,120 --> 00:14:52,120
know, behave like an adult. 
And then I started to see that 

250
00:14:52,680 --> 00:14:55,440
political leaders or even 
business leaders, they sometimes

251
00:14:55,440 --> 00:14:58,240
spread information that it's not
true. 

252
00:14:58,560 --> 00:15:01,800
And they clearly don't have good
intentions when doing this. 

253
00:15:02,160 --> 00:15:05,080
So I think it ultimately comes 
to responsibility from the top 

254
00:15:05,080 --> 00:15:07,320
level. 
And I know that we're all humans

255
00:15:07,320 --> 00:15:09,840
and we all have our own biases. 
We have our our own 

256
00:15:09,840 --> 00:15:14,640
preconditions, but I think 
there's no responsibility from 

257
00:15:14,960 --> 00:15:17,240
from people on top. 
Then this is going to create 

258
00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:21,200
even more chaos and things are 
going to be more complicated and

259
00:15:21,200 --> 00:15:24,400
not only politics in sports. 
You know, I was watching one 

260
00:15:24,760 --> 00:15:26,440
game last night, my favorite 
team lost. 

261
00:15:26,720 --> 00:15:29,640
I was very angry this morning. 
And I started to see comments 

262
00:15:30,280 --> 00:15:33,080
from people from the other team,
from the rivals saying all these

263
00:15:33,080 --> 00:15:34,160
things. 
And I'm like, no, that's not 

264
00:15:34,160 --> 00:15:36,160
true. 
So yeah, we can see that. 

265
00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:39,640
You can talk for disinformation 
of the comments section. 

266
00:15:40,200 --> 00:15:45,000
Yes, yes, sometimes it's a funny
area, but you can see many 

267
00:15:45,000 --> 00:15:47,200
comments that are just not 
factual. 

268
00:15:48,040 --> 00:15:51,040
Yeah. 
So, I mean, a lot of 

269
00:15:51,040 --> 00:15:54,600
disinformation seems to be in 
the news cycle, right? 

270
00:15:54,920 --> 00:16:00,720
And I guess what is the 
transition of how this impacts 

271
00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:03,560
identity? 
Yeah. 

272
00:16:03,560 --> 00:16:07,520
So there are many, I guess, 
potential solutions out there, 

273
00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:10,640
but I think it ultimately comes 
down to identity, to digital 

274
00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:13,120
identity, because as I said 
earlier, the spread of this 

275
00:16:13,120 --> 00:16:15,000
information is taking place in 
cyberspace. 

276
00:16:15,880 --> 00:16:19,680
And in theory, we should all 
have an identity if we want to 

277
00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:21,960
post something on a social media
platform. 

278
00:16:22,480 --> 00:16:24,960
But then there's a problem that 
each social platform has 

279
00:16:24,960 --> 00:16:28,080
different rules, different 
regulations. 

280
00:16:28,520 --> 00:16:30,720
They have they have a different 
approach to how their social 

281
00:16:30,720 --> 00:16:33,760
media works. 
So it's really difficult to keep

282
00:16:33,760 --> 00:16:36,480
track of who, who is who, who's 
saying what. 

283
00:16:37,160 --> 00:16:39,800
But there's some, there's stock 
here in Europe. 

284
00:16:40,200 --> 00:16:43,880
The Spanish Prime Minister Pedro
Sanchez in in January, he said 

285
00:16:43,880 --> 00:16:51,040
that maybe Europeans can tie the
European wallet with social 

286
00:16:51,040 --> 00:16:54,560
media accounts. 
So you can always know who's 

287
00:16:54,560 --> 00:16:56,440
saying what. 
And maybe that could prevent 

288
00:16:56,760 --> 00:17:00,080
misinformation, but that also 
creates more problems with the 

289
00:17:00,080 --> 00:17:03,000
social media platforms and also 
when it comes to privacy, many 

290
00:17:03,120 --> 00:17:05,240
citizens will be skeptical to 
that. 

291
00:17:05,680 --> 00:17:09,480
I also wonder, and I'd love to 
hear your feedback on this, 

292
00:17:10,040 --> 00:17:17,160
whether or not the Internet 
needs a anonymity feature. 

293
00:17:17,480 --> 00:17:23,359
So let's say you're in a country
and you are an oppressed group 

294
00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:27,920
and you need to use the Internet
to get information out. 

295
00:17:28,319 --> 00:17:34,280
But if the authorities maybe saw
who was posting this, it could 

296
00:17:34,280 --> 00:17:38,560
be bad news for you, right? 
So having anonymity in that 

297
00:17:38,560 --> 00:17:41,320
context is a good thing. 
Yes, yes. 

298
00:17:41,640 --> 00:17:46,280
I think that's kind of reminds 
me of a kind of like a clash 

299
00:17:46,280 --> 00:17:51,400
between do we want more privacy 
rights or do we want more 

300
00:17:51,640 --> 00:17:58,320
truthful content, Right. 
Because I guess we can make 

301
00:17:58,320 --> 00:18:03,720
things happen so the Internet 
will be, you know, having only 

302
00:18:03,720 --> 00:18:06,440
truthful things. 
But how is that going to work? 

303
00:18:06,680 --> 00:18:08,800
Yeah. 
Philosophically, it's almost 

304
00:18:08,800 --> 00:18:15,000
like the right to privacy and 
secrecy versus safety and 

305
00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:18,120
security and surveillance and 
things like that. 

306
00:18:18,160 --> 00:18:20,080
Well, even still, who decides 
what's true? 

307
00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:23,720
Yes, yes, exactly. 
That's sort of also a big thing,

308
00:18:23,720 --> 00:18:25,240
yeah. 
The arbiter of truth. 

309
00:18:25,240 --> 00:18:26,840
That's right, I volunteer as 
tribute. 

310
00:18:26,840 --> 00:18:29,040
I will. 
I will decide what is. 

311
00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:30,280
True. 
I don't know if I'd want that 

312
00:18:30,280 --> 00:18:32,920
job. 
Boy oh boy, I don't know if I'd 

313
00:18:32,920 --> 00:18:35,680
want that job. 
I mean, I think it would be cool

314
00:18:35,680 --> 00:18:39,200
if some sopranational 
organization like the UN could 

315
00:18:39,200 --> 00:18:44,360
have some sort of platform where
scientific and factual 

316
00:18:44,360 --> 00:18:47,560
information is there and people 
maybe can access that somehow. 

317
00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:51,560
But again, who's saying what's 
true? 

318
00:18:51,720 --> 00:18:57,400
It seems like right now it's 
kind of the purview of the 

319
00:18:57,400 --> 00:18:59,400
company that runs the platform, 
right? 

320
00:18:59,400 --> 00:19:06,640
So like X or Facebook can decide
whether or not to put a warning 

321
00:19:06,920 --> 00:19:11,520
on a post that it hasn't been 
vetted or, you know, some other 

322
00:19:11,520 --> 00:19:15,520
organization says this is not 
true, something like that, 

323
00:19:15,520 --> 00:19:17,960
right? 
And is that the right place 

324
00:19:17,960 --> 00:19:19,920
where it should be? 
Or do you think that it should 

325
00:19:19,920 --> 00:19:23,680
be in some kind of neutral third
party sands? 

326
00:19:24,440 --> 00:19:26,760
That's a good question. 
I'm not really sure. 

327
00:19:26,760 --> 00:19:30,040
I think that as I said earlier, 
I think it ultimately comes with

328
00:19:31,560 --> 00:19:37,040
to having responsibilities of 
the owners of these social media

329
00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:43,640
platforms should try to look at 
the impact of their technologies

330
00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:46,320
and see if there's anything they
can do about it. 

331
00:19:46,320 --> 00:19:50,200
Because we are in a, let's say, 
capitalist system that is driven

332
00:19:50,200 --> 00:19:53,360
by profit. 
And then is that going to be 

333
00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:56,840
beneficial for them in the long 
run if they change the whole 

334
00:19:57,320 --> 00:20:01,280
dynamics within or is that going
to be good for people? 

335
00:20:01,280 --> 00:20:04,240
So I think it's it really 
depends. 

336
00:20:04,640 --> 00:20:05,880
I think. 
I don't know how you see it. 

337
00:20:05,880 --> 00:20:07,840
As what what? 
The way I see it, I think it's 

338
00:20:07,840 --> 00:20:11,520
as complex as the whole idea of 
decentralized identity and 

339
00:20:11,520 --> 00:20:17,120
identity wallets because I think
so first to start with, I think 

340
00:20:17,120 --> 00:20:22,360
that companies like X and Meta 
would love to hand this off to 

341
00:20:22,360 --> 00:20:26,720
some third party and say you 
deal with it and we don't have 

342
00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:29,320
to worry about it. 
I disagree. 

343
00:20:29,960 --> 00:20:33,640
Well, let me finish my thought. 
OK, So I think they would love 

344
00:20:33,640 --> 00:20:36,960
to get it off their plate 
because they've taken a lot of 

345
00:20:36,960 --> 00:20:43,560
heat over it over the years. 
But I think that if we said 

346
00:20:43,560 --> 00:20:46,680
there's going to be some arbiter
of the truth and you'd turn out,

347
00:20:46,680 --> 00:20:49,840
the UNI can tell you right now a
lot of people in the United 

348
00:20:49,840 --> 00:20:52,640
States would not trust what 
would come out of the UN. 

349
00:20:52,640 --> 00:20:57,680
And I'm not giving my opinion on
that one way or the other, but I

350
00:20:57,760 --> 00:21:03,120
can tell you I'm the same. 
I think if some arbiter was in 

351
00:21:03,120 --> 00:21:06,600
the United States, folks in 
Europe would say, hey, you know,

352
00:21:06,920 --> 00:21:10,280
can it be trusted? 
And so, and then that's not even

353
00:21:10,280 --> 00:21:13,000
taking the rest of the world 
into into account, right? 

354
00:21:14,280 --> 00:21:18,320
And so I think it ultimately 
does fall back on the platform 

355
00:21:18,680 --> 00:21:22,520
that they have to do it and 
they're, they have to deal with 

356
00:21:22,520 --> 00:21:27,760
this chaos right now of nobody's
ever going to be happy with what

357
00:21:27,760 --> 00:21:30,400
they're doing, right? 
Or, or if somebody's happy, that

358
00:21:30,400 --> 00:21:31,880
means somebody else is not 
happy. 

359
00:21:32,720 --> 00:21:33,760
What? 
What we're going to. 

360
00:21:33,760 --> 00:21:37,280
Disagree with yeah. 
So I mean, I think you look at 

361
00:21:37,280 --> 00:21:39,040
the business where you talk 
about the business model. 

362
00:21:39,840 --> 00:21:43,200
If I am a social network, my 
entire business model is based 

363
00:21:43,200 --> 00:21:47,400
on eyeballs looking at screens. 
I do not want people going away 

364
00:21:47,400 --> 00:21:50,000
from my screen because that's 
how I'm going to serve up ads, 

365
00:21:50,680 --> 00:21:52,840
engagement, right, whatever want
to measure that for. 

366
00:21:52,840 --> 00:21:57,200
So I would not want to hand off 
anything to do with my app or my

367
00:21:57,200 --> 00:22:01,120
service to a third party that 
could potentially draw people 

368
00:22:01,120 --> 00:22:04,360
away from that. 
I'm saying that's good. 

369
00:22:04,520 --> 00:22:08,680
What if it was an API that 
somehow you pulled the info and 

370
00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:11,800
then you presented the data? 
We get into another scenario 

371
00:22:11,800 --> 00:22:14,200
where it's OK, well, do you 
trust that API or not? 

372
00:22:14,440 --> 00:22:17,960
And 50% of the population is 
going to believe one thing, 50% 

373
00:22:17,960 --> 00:22:19,720
of the population's going to 
believe the other. 

374
00:22:20,280 --> 00:22:22,920
And this becomes more of a 
question of is there a 

375
00:22:22,920 --> 00:22:25,040
difference between truth and 
fact? 

376
00:22:25,440 --> 00:22:27,440
Yes. 
If we can't all agree that 2 + 2

377
00:22:27,480 --> 00:22:30,880
= 4, now we're not even speaking
the same language. 

378
00:22:31,240 --> 00:22:33,240
That's right. 
I think what you said about the 

379
00:22:33,240 --> 00:22:35,840
business perspective is a sort 
of microcosm to what you were 

380
00:22:35,840 --> 00:22:39,680
saying, Jim, on the, let's say 
the US giving up their 

381
00:22:39,680 --> 00:22:42,840
sovereignty to the UN or some 
other third party. 

382
00:22:43,320 --> 00:22:47,720
I think that it's not only in 
the US, but I think everywhere 

383
00:22:47,720 --> 00:22:51,880
in the world, people will be 
skeptical to give up that to 

384
00:22:51,880 --> 00:22:54,240
some other organization that 
they don't have any 

385
00:22:54,720 --> 00:22:58,800
accountability or transparency 
or any information on what are 

386
00:22:58,800 --> 00:23:00,880
these people? 
What are they deciding? 

387
00:23:01,880 --> 00:23:04,240
And that also has a dimension 
from from a business perspective

388
00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:06,800
how that's going to impact if 
you have a local business in the

389
00:23:06,800 --> 00:23:09,120
States or like anywhere in the 
world. 

390
00:23:10,160 --> 00:23:12,120
So I want to tie this back to 
digital identity because we are 

391
00:23:12,120 --> 00:23:14,040
an identity practice. 
So we're getting philosophical, 

392
00:23:14,040 --> 00:23:15,720
which is great. 
I think these are important 

393
00:23:15,720 --> 00:23:18,880
matters discussed because I 
think this ties well back to 

394
00:23:19,280 --> 00:23:23,400
identity verification. 
What is a truth behind or fact 

395
00:23:23,400 --> 00:23:26,720
maybe behind? 
Is this really Alejandro or 

396
00:23:26,920 --> 00:23:30,040
someone pretend to be Alejandra 
or Jim or Jeff or whoever, 

397
00:23:30,080 --> 00:23:33,200
right? 
What are the things that, from a

398
00:23:33,200 --> 00:23:37,880
misinformation standpoint, how 
does that tie back to 

399
00:23:37,880 --> 00:23:40,080
establishing that verified 
credential or whatever it may 

400
00:23:40,080 --> 00:23:40,960
be? 
Yeah. 

401
00:23:41,000 --> 00:23:43,560
I think there are several 
options on how to handle this. 

402
00:23:43,560 --> 00:23:48,080
I think 1 would be, I guess to 
label AI generated content, but 

403
00:23:48,520 --> 00:23:49,760
there's also some challenges 
there. 

404
00:23:50,160 --> 00:23:54,200
I think the use of verifiable 
credentials could potentially be

405
00:23:54,560 --> 00:23:56,960
a good alternative. 
We still need to see, for 

406
00:23:56,960 --> 00:23:59,280
example, here in Europe, there's
still lots of developments 

407
00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:02,960
around the EI. 
Does all these 2728 countries 

408
00:24:02,960 --> 00:24:05,640
have to agree? 
So we still don't really know 

409
00:24:05,640 --> 00:24:08,960
the use cases and how it's going
to look like, but I think 

410
00:24:08,960 --> 00:24:11,880
there's potential there. 
But I think as I said earlier, 

411
00:24:11,880 --> 00:24:15,440
responsibilities key because if 
a company is going to develop 

412
00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:19,400
their own AI Gen. 
AI model, their own LLM, then 

413
00:24:19,760 --> 00:24:25,000
they have to look at their data.
It has to be, you know, 

414
00:24:25,040 --> 00:24:27,280
transparent. 
It has to be been. 

415
00:24:28,120 --> 00:24:30,720
They have to maybe implement 
RAG. 

416
00:24:31,280 --> 00:24:36,400
There are many different ways 
that these LLMS can be trained. 

417
00:24:36,400 --> 00:24:39,320
So the information that they're 
going to provide is not only 

418
00:24:39,320 --> 00:24:42,720
going to be true, but also going
to be useful for the business or

419
00:24:42,720 --> 00:24:44,640
for the customer that they're 
trying to target. 

420
00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:51,200
Yeah, it's a really interesting 
conundrum because you could say,

421
00:24:51,200 --> 00:24:56,360
well, go to your AI and say make
me a picture of this political 

422
00:24:56,360 --> 00:24:58,840
leader. 
Make them two feet tall, right? 

423
00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:03,560
And make their hair stick up and
make it like 8 inches sticking 

424
00:25:03,560 --> 00:25:07,680
up from their head should be. 
Describing a troll doll. 

425
00:25:08,560 --> 00:25:11,080
Exactly what I was doing, but 
put it on the end of a pencil, 

426
00:25:11,120 --> 00:25:15,320
right? 
Should the AI say no I can't do 

427
00:25:15,320 --> 00:25:19,280
that because that doesn't that's
not what that person looks like.

428
00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:23,320
Or should the AI engine do that 
for you? 

429
00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:25,200
So is the AI an arbiter of 
truth? 

430
00:25:26,080 --> 00:25:28,320
Exactly. 
Or the company that that makes 

431
00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:31,360
the AI like they have to put 
enough guardrails on it. 

432
00:25:31,360 --> 00:25:33,160
So where does that 
responsibility fall? 

433
00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:35,400
Yeah, But I think that could 
lead to more maybe 

434
00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:38,880
fragmentation, different models 
having their own proof, like 

435
00:25:38,880 --> 00:25:41,360
Deep Sig. 
You asked them about Taiwan and 

436
00:25:41,800 --> 00:25:43,320
Tiananmen Square and then 
they're going to tell you 

437
00:25:43,320 --> 00:25:45,600
something completely wrong. 
Is it better to have more 

438
00:25:45,600 --> 00:25:50,080
fragmentation or do you want to 
see a finite number, maybe a 

439
00:25:50,080 --> 00:25:53,080
half dozen AI models? 
Well, who decides? 

440
00:25:53,280 --> 00:25:55,520
Yeah. 
Yeah, but what? 

441
00:25:55,520 --> 00:25:57,320
What do you think? 
Is is better? 

442
00:25:57,600 --> 00:26:00,720
What do you think? 
I don't know if I have an answer

443
00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:03,800
for it. 
I don't know what is there. 

444
00:26:03,840 --> 00:26:07,600
It's, it's moving too quickly. 
And I think there's, there we, 

445
00:26:07,600 --> 00:26:10,640
we, we haven't agreed on what 
even the standard will be for 

446
00:26:10,640 --> 00:26:12,520
that. 
I think MCP model contacts 

447
00:26:12,520 --> 00:26:16,040
protocol is certainly all the 
rage right now as it's sorely 

448
00:26:16,040 --> 00:26:17,280
needed, right. 
It's been described As for the 

449
00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:22,680
USBC of that area. 
But I don't know who should be 

450
00:26:22,680 --> 00:26:25,280
making those decisions. 
Yeah, it's moving too fast, like

451
00:26:25,280 --> 00:26:28,600
you say, and regulators are not 
keeping track of what's 

452
00:26:28,600 --> 00:26:29,920
happening. 
Many of them don't have a 

453
00:26:29,960 --> 00:26:32,760
technical knowledge, so it's 
sometimes hard for them to 

454
00:26:32,760 --> 00:26:35,640
understand how these systems 
work. 

455
00:26:36,520 --> 00:26:39,320
So yeah, I think more 
fragmentation could lead to more

456
00:26:40,520 --> 00:26:42,560
competition, but more chaos as 
well. 

457
00:26:43,080 --> 00:26:45,120
But also, who decides that? 
So it's. 

458
00:26:45,360 --> 00:26:48,200
Yeah. 
But so with the example I just 

459
00:26:48,200 --> 00:26:51,400
painted, I thought of another 
thing, which was, let's say we 

460
00:26:51,440 --> 00:26:55,440
we wanted a political figure to 
look funny like that. 

461
00:26:55,840 --> 00:26:58,480
Is that free speech or is that 
hate speech? 

462
00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:03,400
Depends on what your perspective
is. 

463
00:27:03,400 --> 00:27:06,600
It might be more dependent on 
where in the world you're you 

464
00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:10,080
live and where you're from. 
But that's two ways to look at 

465
00:27:10,080 --> 00:27:15,520
the exact same set of facts. 
Well, if we live in a democratic

466
00:27:15,520 --> 00:27:20,000
society, I think that would be 
considered free speech. 

467
00:27:20,480 --> 00:27:22,640
But at the same time, 
misinformation and 

468
00:27:22,640 --> 00:27:25,960
disinformation are challenges to
democratic systems. 

469
00:27:26,040 --> 00:27:29,280
But I think in some countries, 
they, if you were to take that 

470
00:27:29,280 --> 00:27:33,360
same model and say, take this 
religious figure and make them 

471
00:27:33,360 --> 00:27:37,000
look ridiculous, print that 
picture and now people start 

472
00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:40,840
forwarding it on the Internet. 
It's considered hate speech and 

473
00:27:40,840 --> 00:27:43,080
you can be arrested for it in 
some places. 

474
00:27:43,360 --> 00:27:46,280
Yeah, yeah. 
This is kind of a downer of an 

475
00:27:46,280 --> 00:27:47,440
episode, man. 
Hey, man. 

476
00:27:47,760 --> 00:27:49,360
This is my kind of episode. 
This is. 

477
00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:51,720
Like you're, you're like all 
into this. 

478
00:27:51,720 --> 00:27:54,200
Yeah, I'm loving it. 
I mean, I think the challenge, 

479
00:27:54,200 --> 00:27:56,160
right, is I don't think we have 
the answers yet, right? 

480
00:27:56,600 --> 00:28:00,920
We, we recognize the problem or 
the beginnings maybe, of the 

481
00:28:00,920 --> 00:28:03,840
problem, 'cause I'm sure we'll 
find new and creative ways to 

482
00:28:03,840 --> 00:28:06,840
misuse anything. 
This is just the latest 

483
00:28:06,840 --> 00:28:08,840
invention that we're grappling 
with. 

484
00:28:08,840 --> 00:28:12,440
OK what do we do about this? 
I feel like there's a a play 

485
00:28:12,440 --> 00:28:17,120
here somewhere for authenticity 
and maybe it's a digital 

486
00:28:17,120 --> 00:28:19,800
watermark. 
You know, maybe it is something 

487
00:28:19,800 --> 00:28:23,960
where, you know, there is some 
sort of system to say, OK, if it

488
00:28:23,960 --> 00:28:27,040
was AI generated, make it very 
clear. 

489
00:28:27,080 --> 00:28:30,800
And maybe that doesn't stand up 
in a court of law or it's 

490
00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:32,920
immediately flagged as, yeah, 
that's not real. 

491
00:28:33,440 --> 00:28:37,240
But when you have technologies 
right now that are so good at 

492
00:28:37,240 --> 00:28:40,680
making fakes, yeah, fakes and 
and they're hilarious. 

493
00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:42,560
And I don't want to stifle the 
innovation because I can see a 

494
00:28:42,560 --> 00:28:43,640
lot. 
I mean, we've used to food 

495
00:28:43,640 --> 00:28:46,440
podcast and you know, stuff like
that, but it is a problem. 

496
00:28:47,000 --> 00:28:50,400
And so how do we, you know, 
verify the authenticity of 

497
00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:52,920
something is a really part of 
this and bring it back to the 

498
00:28:52,920 --> 00:28:54,240
identity side. 
It's the same thing, right? 

499
00:28:54,440 --> 00:28:56,680
What we don't want to do is have
a bunch of fake IDs and 

500
00:28:56,680 --> 00:28:59,040
credentials that have 
proliferated. 

501
00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:01,280
You we're younger, right? 
You have fake ID. 

502
00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:02,680
Not saying that I did. 
But. 

503
00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:05,840
People would get a fake driver's
license and someone that kind of

504
00:29:05,840 --> 00:29:07,520
looked like them, and that would
pass. 

505
00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:09,160
They get them into the bar, 
right, to do whatever. 

506
00:29:09,160 --> 00:29:13,160
Maybe the same thing can happen 
also in the digital world is 

507
00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:17,040
what happens if I replicate 
something, somebody's active on 

508
00:29:17,040 --> 00:29:21,360
Prem, Active Directory account, 
and it looks and acts and 

509
00:29:21,360 --> 00:29:23,920
behaves like a person, but it's 
not really them. 

510
00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:26,520
Yeah. 
You know, I think the I was 

511
00:29:26,520 --> 00:29:30,760
thinking the most dangerous 
model is like some kind of 

512
00:29:30,760 --> 00:29:34,480
disinformation that started 
World War three or something 

513
00:29:34,480 --> 00:29:37,480
like that, right? 
So someone put out information 

514
00:29:37,480 --> 00:29:42,960
that a nuclear kind of attack 
took place, and if you weren't 

515
00:29:42,960 --> 00:29:47,840
able to authenticate that that 
information was correct, maybe 

516
00:29:47,840 --> 00:29:51,400
some country acts on that. 
That's the worst case scenario. 

517
00:29:51,400 --> 00:29:54,880
But then I was thinking, you 
know, you can then take it down 

518
00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:58,600
several levels in terms of the 
global scale and say, hey, 

519
00:29:58,600 --> 00:30:01,400
there's police officers going 
from door to door, but they're 

520
00:30:01,400 --> 00:30:03,960
not really police officers, so 
protect yourself. 

521
00:30:04,360 --> 00:30:06,840
And it's like fake. 
And then a police officer shows 

522
00:30:06,840 --> 00:30:10,280
up in somebody store and the 
person takes the negative action

523
00:30:10,280 --> 00:30:13,760
against that police officer, 
thinking they're a fake person, 

524
00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:15,800
right? 
And that could be a life or 

525
00:30:15,800 --> 00:30:18,760
death event. 
So there's been cases like that 

526
00:30:18,760 --> 00:30:23,840
of people committing crimes or 
other things to other people 

527
00:30:24,360 --> 00:30:26,960
based on false information they 
found online. 

528
00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:29,640
And I think another challenge. 
I know we're talking a lot about

529
00:30:29,640 --> 00:30:31,800
challenges and I hope, hey at 
least. 

530
00:30:32,000 --> 00:30:34,720
Shine a light on it not sending 
all the answers, but at least be

531
00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:36,840
aware of them. 
Yes, we can't fix what we don't 

532
00:30:36,840 --> 00:30:38,920
know about. 
Yes, so let's know about it. 

533
00:30:39,240 --> 00:30:42,160
Another one would be that many 
of the conversations on digital 

534
00:30:42,160 --> 00:30:46,280
identity, like here at EIC or 
all the conferences that we see 

535
00:30:46,280 --> 00:30:51,000
in the States, it's taking place
mainly in the Western world. 

536
00:30:51,400 --> 00:30:55,440
And whatever comes out from 
these conversations affects the 

537
00:30:55,440 --> 00:30:57,920
Global South. 
And that's another area where 

538
00:30:58,480 --> 00:31:01,960
many people don't really have a 
saying of how these technologies

539
00:31:01,960 --> 00:31:04,400
are going to impact not only 
their businesses, but their 

540
00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:07,240
politics, their own echo 
chambers, etcetera. 

541
00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:11,280
So I think it's also important 
to try to have the sort of, if 

542
00:31:11,280 --> 00:31:16,560
we cannot have AUN implementing 
something, at least we can try 

543
00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:21,360
to have a global conversation. 
I don't know how, but it's 

544
00:31:21,360 --> 00:31:22,880
important. 
To it's important to. 

545
00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:24,120
Keep it going like this for 
example. 

546
00:31:24,360 --> 00:31:28,880
So what do you now? 
Let's turn this into some action

547
00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:31,360
we can take. 
What do you recommend people do 

548
00:31:31,360 --> 00:31:35,480
for themselves to not fall 
victim to mis and 

549
00:31:35,480 --> 00:31:38,880
disinformation? 
And what can they recommend to 

550
00:31:38,880 --> 00:31:42,600
people in their lives to, you 
know, whether it's people that 

551
00:31:42,600 --> 00:31:46,800
they're responsible for work or 
family members to protect 

552
00:31:46,800 --> 00:31:50,160
themselves? 
Think being responsible, what 

553
00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:55,200
you're saying online is a part 
of who you are in a way and 

554
00:31:55,200 --> 00:31:57,200
you're sharing something about 
you. 

555
00:31:57,880 --> 00:31:59,280
And many people don't see it 
that way. 

556
00:31:59,280 --> 00:32:03,280
Many people see cyberspace, sure
as an extension of themselves, 

557
00:32:03,280 --> 00:32:07,160
but they don't really understand
that whatever you share online 

558
00:32:07,160 --> 00:32:11,400
can have consequences. 
So responsibility would be one. 

559
00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:15,080
Another one would be to have 
critical thinking that's I mean 

560
00:32:15,080 --> 00:32:19,040
sounds easy sounds. 
Common sense not so common. 

561
00:32:19,800 --> 00:32:22,120
Yes. 
So I don't know how it could 

562
00:32:23,440 --> 00:32:27,520
lead in the next few years, 
maybe even having in schools 

563
00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:32,200
critical thinking skills or 
lessons on how to distinguish 

564
00:32:32,560 --> 00:32:34,800
false and truth in the online 
world. 

565
00:32:35,000 --> 00:32:38,120
Sounds a little bit silly. 
You know the Gram example, it's 

566
00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:39,640
easy to distinguish what's true 
or false. 

567
00:32:39,640 --> 00:32:42,280
But imagine in five, in 10 
years, in 20 years. 

568
00:32:43,280 --> 00:32:47,440
In your own world, if you spot 
misinformation, different 

569
00:32:47,440 --> 00:32:51,960
disinformation like our comments
section, do you post something 

570
00:32:51,960 --> 00:32:54,040
to call it out? 
No, I don't. 

571
00:32:54,120 --> 00:32:57,160
You don't, do you? 
Probably not. 

572
00:32:57,480 --> 00:32:59,680
Good counter. 
I'm. 

573
00:33:00,200 --> 00:33:01,080
Curious. 
I don't. 

574
00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:04,360
Really go into social media 
other than LinkedIn. 

575
00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:08,240
I think that would be it's. 
Like the last safe place. 

576
00:33:08,280 --> 00:33:10,760
Yeah, it's like the last safe 
place. 

577
00:33:10,760 --> 00:33:15,880
But there are times where I 
disagree with somebody and I 

578
00:33:15,880 --> 00:33:18,480
usually don't. 
I usually just say OK. 

579
00:33:18,600 --> 00:33:20,760
Don't feed the trolls. 
Yeah, I don't. 

580
00:33:20,840 --> 00:33:24,120
I guess if you distinguish if is
this disinformation, then 

581
00:33:24,120 --> 00:33:27,000
there's really no reason to 
engage because maybe it's a bot,

582
00:33:27,000 --> 00:33:29,960
maybe it's someone that has a 
narrative and they're not going 

583
00:33:29,960 --> 00:33:33,240
to change their mind. 
They're just going to keep I 

584
00:33:33,240 --> 00:33:35,880
guess making that the comment is
going to be more visible. 

585
00:33:36,600 --> 00:33:39,200
But if it's misinformation, if 
it's a friend or someone that 

586
00:33:39,200 --> 00:33:42,480
you know, maybe you can have a 
civilized response. 

587
00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:46,400
But I'm curious to know if you 
ever had any, let's say, 

588
00:33:46,800 --> 00:33:49,880
conversations in your comments 
on these podcasts or some? 

589
00:33:50,960 --> 00:33:53,440
We've got pretty good fans, you 
know, people who support us say,

590
00:33:53,440 --> 00:33:57,320
I think kind of get what we do. 
There is always going to be, I 

591
00:33:57,320 --> 00:34:00,000
think the threat of it. 
I deal with a lot of spam on our

592
00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:02,160
YouTube channel. 
You probably never see it, but a

593
00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:05,520
lot of them are seed values for 
Bitcoin wallets and things like 

594
00:34:05,520 --> 00:34:07,840
that. 
They post into the comments and 

595
00:34:08,120 --> 00:34:10,760
reject. 
Not happening, right, But it 

596
00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:12,360
does happen. 
Now it's not is that 

597
00:34:12,360 --> 00:34:15,000
disinformation? 
No, but it's clearly not 

598
00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:18,080
information and it's clearly not
relevant or authentic to 

599
00:34:18,080 --> 00:34:19,760
whatever it is they're posting 
on, right? 

600
00:34:19,760 --> 00:34:24,679
I don't need a 16 code words, 
but I was like, and it starts 

601
00:34:24,679 --> 00:34:27,159
with I liked your episode and it
just doesn't make any sense, 

602
00:34:27,159 --> 00:34:29,480
right. 
So there I think there's some of

603
00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:31,840
that. 
I think the other thing too is I

604
00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:33,840
think there's a natural 
inclination where if it doesn't 

605
00:34:33,840 --> 00:34:37,600
affect me and less likely to do 
something about it. 

606
00:34:37,600 --> 00:34:41,040
And I think that's just probably
more, you know, human part of it

607
00:34:41,040 --> 00:34:46,080
is if someone went out there and
said something bad about me or 

608
00:34:46,080 --> 00:34:49,080
something about maybe the 
podcast and we know it's not 

609
00:34:49,080 --> 00:34:51,199
true, you and I would fight 
that. 

610
00:34:51,199 --> 00:34:51,880
That's. 
Much. 

611
00:34:51,920 --> 00:34:53,480
More difficult. 
That hasn't happened yet. 

612
00:34:53,560 --> 00:34:56,199
No, it hasn't yet. 
And nobody's called us on, you 

613
00:34:56,199 --> 00:34:57,560
know, You mean the best looking 
podcast. 

614
00:34:57,680 --> 00:35:00,600
Articles sometimes where I'm 
like, oh, I want to say 

615
00:35:00,600 --> 00:35:04,800
something, but I usually just 
restrain myself because I don't 

616
00:35:04,800 --> 00:35:07,080
want to put negative energy into
the world. 

617
00:35:07,680 --> 00:35:11,080
Even if the article is negative 
energy, I usually just say to 

618
00:35:11,080 --> 00:35:12,320
myself, I shouldn't have read 
that. 

619
00:35:13,120 --> 00:35:17,120
That just made me unhappy. 
I think that requires courage 

620
00:35:17,120 --> 00:35:20,280
because sometimes you really 
want to express something that 

621
00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:23,400
you sometimes could trigger you.
But that's again what I said 

622
00:35:23,400 --> 00:35:26,120
earlier, the responsibility part
and the critical thinking, which

623
00:35:26,120 --> 00:35:30,400
are two human components. 
We can maybe talk about other 

624
00:35:30,480 --> 00:35:33,640
technical solutions to this 
problem, but I think the human 

625
00:35:33,640 --> 00:35:37,200
is the source of the whole 
conversation we're having today.

626
00:35:37,520 --> 00:35:39,360
Yeah. 
All right. 

627
00:35:39,480 --> 00:35:41,920
Well, that was heavy, man, that.
Was. 

628
00:35:42,440 --> 00:35:43,160
Heavy. 
That was heavy. 

629
00:35:43,160 --> 00:35:44,320
Let's try to lighten it up a 
little bit. 

630
00:35:45,000 --> 00:35:47,880
You did mention philosophy and 
you mentioned your before you 

631
00:35:47,880 --> 00:35:49,560
hit record, you know that you 
like to read. 

632
00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:52,200
So I was, I told you, I was 
going to ask you like, what's a 

633
00:35:52,200 --> 00:35:56,200
good book or something that 
people in the identity space 

634
00:35:56,200 --> 00:35:58,360
should read? 
And then I jokingly said 

635
00:35:58,360 --> 00:36:01,760
something like the Art of War 
and like, well, maybe what's 

636
00:36:01,760 --> 00:36:03,960
something that people should 
check out, maybe in the book 

637
00:36:03,960 --> 00:36:07,640
world that they can consume to 
maybe enlighten them from an 

638
00:36:07,640 --> 00:36:09,960
identity standpoint, maybe their
thoughts and viewpoints. 

639
00:36:10,160 --> 00:36:14,000
I think that there's an essay 
written by a German philosopher 

640
00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:17,000
called The Question Concerning 
technology. 

641
00:36:17,000 --> 00:36:21,560
It was, I think, published in 
1954 by a philosopher named 

642
00:36:21,560 --> 00:36:24,440
Martin Heidegger. 
And he talks about that 

643
00:36:24,440 --> 00:36:27,240
technology is not a means to an 
end. 

644
00:36:27,480 --> 00:36:30,640
It's not an instrument, but it's
a revelation of being. 

645
00:36:30,720 --> 00:36:32,640
It's a revelation of what it 
means to be human. 

646
00:36:33,440 --> 00:36:39,480
And he warns us that if we keep 
relying too much on this 

647
00:36:39,480 --> 00:36:42,240
technological framework, we're 
going to start looking at the 

648
00:36:42,240 --> 00:36:45,040
world through that lens, through
that frame. 

649
00:36:45,600 --> 00:36:48,640
And that could lead to, I don't 
know, environmental 

650
00:36:48,640 --> 00:36:52,600
catastrophes, etcetera. 
I know maybe that wasn't the 

651
00:36:52,600 --> 00:36:56,000
most possible and happy. 
You sound like me. 

652
00:36:56,320 --> 00:36:58,240
That's what I do every every 
week. 

653
00:36:58,240 --> 00:37:00,080
There's a real chemistry having 
here, yeah. 

654
00:37:00,360 --> 00:37:02,720
My wife calls me at grandpa, so 
I guess yeah, well. 

655
00:37:02,920 --> 00:37:05,400
No, but I think it's important 
to recognize some of that stuff,

656
00:37:05,400 --> 00:37:07,280
right? 
I mean, this maybe this episode 

657
00:37:07,280 --> 00:37:10,040
is a little bit more of a 
downer, but it's mostly because 

658
00:37:10,400 --> 00:37:13,080
this is a real challenge, right?
And then there's plenty of 

659
00:37:13,080 --> 00:37:15,520
things that we can talk through 
is OK, like I said, we don't 

660
00:37:15,520 --> 00:37:18,600
have all the answers, but at 
least we can shine a light on 

661
00:37:18,600 --> 00:37:20,680
and say, what are we going to do
about this? 

662
00:37:20,680 --> 00:37:22,880
Because we can't just bury our 
head in the sand and say 

663
00:37:23,560 --> 00:37:26,560
whatever, right? 
Whether it's, you know, someone 

664
00:37:26,640 --> 00:37:29,720
using in, you know, credentials 
to do bad things, which still is

665
00:37:29,720 --> 00:37:32,560
the majority of attacks. 
There was our friend Jason 

666
00:37:32,560 --> 00:37:34,240
Kenahan this morning from, from 
Telus. 

667
00:37:34,240 --> 00:37:37,040
He had a keynote. 
And you know, over a third of 

668
00:37:37,040 --> 00:37:39,280
all Internet traffic is 
malicious bot activity. 

669
00:37:39,760 --> 00:37:43,960
So whether you know it or not, 
it's happening and whether 

670
00:37:43,960 --> 00:37:46,320
you're doing something about 
doesn't, just because you're not

671
00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:47,840
doing something about it doesn't
mean it's stopping. 

672
00:37:47,840 --> 00:37:48,960
And so it's just going to keep 
going. 

673
00:37:48,960 --> 00:37:51,320
So I think I think it is 
important to have discussions 

674
00:37:51,320 --> 00:37:53,760
like this and. 
It's a wake up call because for 

675
00:37:53,760 --> 00:37:56,480
example, this essay, if you read
about it, then you could maybe 

676
00:37:56,480 --> 00:37:59,520
have a different understanding 
of what technology is and that 

677
00:37:59,520 --> 00:38:03,560
could impact the way you conduct
business or you do your IM 

678
00:38:03,600 --> 00:38:06,120
programs. 
You will think it's not just for

679
00:38:06,120 --> 00:38:08,960
technical efficiency, but we're 
talking about humans, we're 

680
00:38:08,960 --> 00:38:13,040
talking about identities. 
So let's try to have a clear 

681
00:38:13,040 --> 00:38:17,640
perspective and a nice framework
that will work for the human. 

682
00:38:18,720 --> 00:38:21,640
I feel like there's a Black 
Mirror episode here that we can 

683
00:38:21,640 --> 00:38:23,400
get into. 
I watched the, the, the newest 

684
00:38:23,400 --> 00:38:25,160
season, the first episode of my 
way here. 

685
00:38:25,680 --> 00:38:28,040
It's like, Oh my gosh, I, I 
talked about like this whole AI 

686
00:38:28,040 --> 00:38:31,680
and like, you know, making an 
imprint of your brain and you 

687
00:38:31,680 --> 00:38:33,240
got to watch this because I 
don't know if you've, you've 

688
00:38:33,240 --> 00:38:37,520
seen it, but it is I, it got me 
thinking about like what that 

689
00:38:37,520 --> 00:38:41,160
would be like in the future. 
I'm, I'm almost through Better 

690
00:38:41,160 --> 00:38:43,640
Call Saul, OK. 
And everybody I tell who I'm, 

691
00:38:43,760 --> 00:38:46,480
I'm watching it, they're like, 
oh, it's so good, really good. 

692
00:38:46,480 --> 00:38:48,720
Yeah. 
So I'm I'm going to be ready to 

693
00:38:48,720 --> 00:38:51,480
dive into something else. 
Buck mirrors are great because 

694
00:38:51,480 --> 00:38:54,520
they're like 45 minutes to an 
hour roughly and they're all 

695
00:38:54,520 --> 00:38:57,720
self-contained. 
So you can watch one and kind of

696
00:38:58,200 --> 00:39:00,040
be done with it. 
And you might want to be done 

697
00:39:00,040 --> 00:39:02,880
with it because they're they're 
generally not happy stories, 

698
00:39:02,920 --> 00:39:04,720
right? 
But it's. 

699
00:39:04,720 --> 00:39:06,960
Like today's episode? 
Yes, yeah, yeah. 

700
00:39:07,440 --> 00:39:09,720
But they are good and they're 
thought provoking and it's like,

701
00:39:09,720 --> 00:39:12,040
oh, exactly, I haven't thought 
about that before. 

702
00:39:12,040 --> 00:39:14,360
And I think if that's what you 
take away from, that's good, 

703
00:39:14,480 --> 00:39:15,760
right? 
You're expanding your horizons, 

704
00:39:15,760 --> 00:39:18,040
you're expanding it. 
So I'm going to ask you for the 

705
00:39:18,040 --> 00:39:20,920
link that I can put in our show 
notes for that so people can 

706
00:39:20,920 --> 00:39:23,280
check it out. 
Thank you so much for taking the

707
00:39:23,280 --> 00:39:24,880
time with us. 
I said you have like I was 

708
00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:27,080
looking through your list, you 
have like 5 different panels and

709
00:39:27,080 --> 00:39:28,200
talks and things that you're 
doing. 

710
00:39:28,240 --> 00:39:29,240
Yeah, you're a busy. 
Guy yeah. 

711
00:39:29,240 --> 00:39:30,560
So taking the time off for this 
has been great. 

712
00:39:30,560 --> 00:39:31,760
Thank you pretty much. 
Happy to be here. 

713
00:39:31,920 --> 00:39:33,520
Yeah. 
So we'll go ahead and wrap it up

714
00:39:33,520 --> 00:39:36,640
there for this episode on behalf
of Jim. 

715
00:39:36,640 --> 00:39:38,560
Thanks everybody for watching 
and are listening. 

716
00:39:38,560 --> 00:39:41,800
Check us out on the web, IDC 
podcast.com, like subscribe, 

717
00:39:41,800 --> 00:39:45,160
share. 
This is information, not not. 

718
00:39:45,280 --> 00:39:48,440
We are information, definitely 
not disinformation, and we try 

719
00:39:48,440 --> 00:39:50,640
to get it right. 
We try not to have missing. 

720
00:39:50,760 --> 00:39:51,720
Right, exactly. 
Yeah. 

721
00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:54,360
And if we are, call us on it, 
let us know so we can fix it. 

722
00:39:55,120 --> 00:39:57,440
OK, that's it. 
Thanks everyone, and we'll talk 

723
00:39:57,440 --> 00:40:02,600
with everyone in the next one. 
You've been listening to 

724
00:40:02,640 --> 00:40:06,560
Identity at the Center. 
We hope you've enjoyed the show.

725
00:40:06,720 --> 00:40:10,840
Make sure to like, rate and 
review, and we'll be back soon. 

726
00:40:11,120 --> 00:40:13,400
But in the meantime, hit the 
website at 

727
00:40:13,400 --> 00:40:19,760
identity@thecenter.com. 
See you next time on Identity at

728
00:40:19,760 --> 00:40:20,640
the Center.