1 00:00:09,700 --> 00:00:12,500 You're listening to the identity of the sender podcast. 2 00:00:12,800 --> 00:00:15,700 This is a show that talks about identity and access management 3 00:00:15,700 --> 00:00:18,600 and making sure you know who has access to what let's get 4 00:00:18,600 --> 00:00:26,100 started. Welcome to the identity the 5 00:00:26,100 --> 00:00:29,500 center podcast I'm Jeff and that's Jim hey, Jim khf. 6 00:00:29,500 --> 00:00:31,600 How are, you know, not so bad yourself. 7 00:00:32,100 --> 00:00:34,200 Good good. I've got a lot on my mind these 8 00:00:34,200 --> 00:00:39,200 days, there's a lot going on in the world right now and I think 9 00:00:39,200 --> 00:00:45,300 a couple of the key topics for Our Generation to kind of figure 10 00:00:45,300 --> 00:00:47,500 out and I don't know if we'll figure it out, but it's one of 11 00:00:47,508 --> 00:00:52,900 the biggest undertones is around free speech and privacy. 12 00:00:53,300 --> 00:00:58,200 And the reason why Why I tied those two together is because I 13 00:00:58,200 --> 00:01:00,800 think that there's some kind of trade-off, right. 14 00:01:00,800 --> 00:01:05,600 There's is not most people aren't black and white about the 15 00:01:05,600 --> 00:01:08,400 topic. Like I want 100% free speech, no 16 00:01:08,400 --> 00:01:11,900 controls at all. Because the other side of that 17 00:01:11,900 --> 00:01:16,800 is there some speech that can cause you know, Clear and 18 00:01:16,808 --> 00:01:21,300 Present dangers and the same thing with privacy it's like yes 19 00:01:21,300 --> 00:01:24,600 I'm willing to give up some privacy to get some services. 20 00:01:25,100 --> 00:01:29,000 But I'm not willing to go up on my privacy and it's not like, 21 00:01:29,000 --> 00:01:32,400 I'm not willing to give up any data about myself. 22 00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:38,400 And so, you know what I wanted to pose to you is where are you 23 00:01:38,400 --> 00:01:41,300 on the Spectrum, in terms of privacy, how much of your 24 00:01:41,600 --> 00:01:44,300 private data? Are you willing to give up to 25 00:01:44,300 --> 00:01:47,300 get Services? It depends on the value of the 26 00:01:47,300 --> 00:01:50,700 service. And then, you know, Google Maps 27 00:01:50,700 --> 00:01:53,000 for example. I'm okay with location on that 28 00:01:53,400 --> 00:01:56,100 because it's so helpful for Driving when it comes to 29 00:01:56,100 --> 00:01:59,500 navigation, sharing location with friends or family or things 30 00:01:59,500 --> 00:02:03,400 like that, I don't know if it's necessarily a black and white 31 00:02:03,400 --> 00:02:08,100 decision because every service has its own value, they might 32 00:02:08,100 --> 00:02:11,200 think it's more important, that it really is to me as a user. 33 00:02:12,000 --> 00:02:14,700 And there really isn't a lot of discussions sometimes on what 34 00:02:14,700 --> 00:02:16,800 you can. And can't, you know, switch on 35 00:02:16,800 --> 00:02:18,700 or off from a privacy standpoint. 36 00:02:19,100 --> 00:02:21,400 It generally the services are like, well it's either all or 37 00:02:21,400 --> 00:02:24,700 nothing or more than you'd want to give up. 38 00:02:24,900 --> 00:02:26,800 Exchange for that service. So I would say I'm pretty 39 00:02:26,800 --> 00:02:32,000 average sure I give up some modicum of privacy but I try not 40 00:02:32,000 --> 00:02:34,100 to be too crazy about it. Just you know hit allow on 41 00:02:34,100 --> 00:02:36,800 everything that pops up on my phone you know asking for things 42 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:40,500 like oh does it does my calculator really need to take 43 00:02:40,500 --> 00:02:42,100 pictures? Probably not. 44 00:02:42,300 --> 00:02:44,300 So yeah that's that's something here. 45 00:02:44,300 --> 00:02:46,800 More on like the Android side of things Android apps doing like 46 00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:51,100 accept the permissions and and things like that but I think 47 00:02:51,100 --> 00:02:52,600 that's kind of where I fall on it. 48 00:02:52,600 --> 00:02:57,200 At least from my perspective. Yeah, I kind of feel like that 49 00:02:57,200 --> 00:03:01,700 the next question is, like, what is the role of government in 50 00:03:01,700 --> 00:03:08,500 terms of regulations for how much privacy should be 51 00:03:08,500 --> 00:03:10,700 controlled by those laws and regulations? 52 00:03:11,000 --> 00:03:15,500 I think, you know, in your PPI GDP are much more restrictive in 53 00:03:15,500 --> 00:03:19,300 terms of privacy and they wind up, you know, pulling big Tech 54 00:03:19,300 --> 00:03:23,000 into court and trying to control it a lot more and the United 55 00:03:23,000 --> 00:03:26,800 States. It's less Rolled and kind of 56 00:03:26,800 --> 00:03:30,600 Taken like a state-by-state approach, which makes things 57 00:03:30,600 --> 00:03:33,600 very complex for companies to figure out. 58 00:03:33,600 --> 00:03:36,400 Okay, you know, how do I deal with these things? 59 00:03:36,800 --> 00:03:40,000 But I think one of the things to me, that's most annoying when it 60 00:03:40,000 --> 00:03:44,600 comes to privacy, is things like when you go to a website and it 61 00:03:44,600 --> 00:03:48,300 says, except our privacy policy. In other words, you cannot get 62 00:03:48,300 --> 00:03:54,400 access to their service, their online service, unless you 63 00:03:54,400 --> 00:03:56,600 accept. Kept the privacy policy and then 64 00:03:56,600 --> 00:03:59,700 you go and you click into it and it's like, do I really want to 65 00:03:59,700 --> 00:04:03,600 read this? And for some Services, you 66 00:04:03,600 --> 00:04:05,700 really kind of don't have an option. 67 00:04:05,900 --> 00:04:09,000 So if you have to go online to pay your utility bill or to 68 00:04:09,000 --> 00:04:12,600 manage your utility bill, you know, you pretty much just have 69 00:04:12,600 --> 00:04:18,300 to accept that privacy policy. I kind of the option you can 70 00:04:18,300 --> 00:04:22,200 show up that at City Hall with a Jar, full of pennies and path, 71 00:04:22,200 --> 00:04:25,200 that way, right? I mean you're you're Oh, making 72 00:04:25,200 --> 00:04:26,900 a choice though, right? If you want to go online and 73 00:04:26,900 --> 00:04:29,800 have like, online bill pay. That is a choice, you're making. 74 00:04:30,100 --> 00:04:36,400 But as I don't have to share, is that, is that fair or something? 75 00:04:37,100 --> 00:04:40,100 But I think, no, I think that's the root of the discussion. 76 00:04:40,500 --> 00:04:44,500 I think, what do we want? This is our society 77 00:04:44,500 --> 00:04:50,000 collectively, right? What do we want from, you know, 78 00:04:50,200 --> 00:04:53,500 these Services, right? I mean, you know, just because 79 00:04:54,400 --> 00:04:56,700 ConEd might be my electric company. 80 00:04:56,700 --> 00:04:59,500 They didn't invent electricity and they don't. 81 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:03,400 And I have, I have to have electricity. 82 00:05:04,500 --> 00:05:08,600 That's a certain scenario and I picking up the utility scenario 83 00:05:08,600 --> 00:05:12,100 because you really don't have much choice if you want to have 84 00:05:12,100 --> 00:05:15,600 electric in your home, but to use their services. 85 00:05:15,600 --> 00:05:19,800 And yes, you could go down there with rolls of pennies to pay for 86 00:05:19,800 --> 00:05:21,700 the service, but that's not realistic. 87 00:05:21,900 --> 00:05:25,300 So in other words, your Kind of forced by. 88 00:05:25,400 --> 00:05:28,900 You want to have a normal life to accept privacy policy and 89 00:05:28,907 --> 00:05:32,500 then they can they can take your data now, we're talking about 90 00:05:32,500 --> 00:05:35,300 services like Facebook or something like that. 91 00:05:35,800 --> 00:05:39,000 I think now you've entered a different territory because 92 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:41,900 that's truly an optional service. 93 00:05:42,000 --> 00:05:47,200 In most cases, there are some cases where maybe it's not, but 94 00:05:47,500 --> 00:05:50,300 you know, this is Jim McDonald's own idea, right? 95 00:05:50,300 --> 00:05:53,700 And I'm going to throw it out there that I think there should 96 00:05:53,700 --> 00:05:59,400 be Classification standards for privacy policies and a company 97 00:05:59,400 --> 00:06:03,500 should say should pick one of those privacy policy. 98 00:06:03,500 --> 00:06:06,700 So, rather than saying you need to read our privacy policy and 99 00:06:06,700 --> 00:06:10,400 they could stick one sentence somewhere in the privacy policy 100 00:06:10,400 --> 00:06:15,900 that you don't like that. They have to comply to one of 101 00:06:15,900 --> 00:06:20,600 whatever it is, 45 standard, privacy policies and then most 102 00:06:20,600 --> 00:06:22,600 people can kind of understand. Okay, what are those four or 103 00:06:22,608 --> 00:06:25,300 five privacy policies? And they come to can say, we're 104 00:06:25,300 --> 00:06:27,600 following number 4. I mean, I think a standardized 105 00:06:27,600 --> 00:06:31,300 privacy policy would be helpful, but I don't think it's conducive 106 00:06:31,300 --> 00:06:35,200 to the way that the u.s. is run. You'd have 50% of the population 107 00:06:35,200 --> 00:06:38,900 but yes, 50% pappu say, no and nothing would happen. 108 00:06:39,300 --> 00:06:43,500 So I do think I do think maybe it is somewhat crazy but not 109 00:06:43,500 --> 00:06:46,900 because it's like a crazy idea just because that's the state of 110 00:06:46,900 --> 00:06:49,900 government in the u.s. at this point that's the way I'm looking 111 00:06:49,900 --> 00:06:50,900 at it. Yeah. 112 00:06:50,900 --> 00:06:53,400 Well that is pretty much the state of everything right now, 113 00:06:53,400 --> 00:06:55,700 right? But imagine if you had to like a 114 00:06:55,700 --> 00:06:58,100 standardized template, right? Sort of like a Bill of Rights 115 00:06:58,100 --> 00:07:03,200 for a consumer to be able to easily understand what it is 116 00:07:03,200 --> 00:07:05,700 that they're getting in exchange for what it is. 117 00:07:05,700 --> 00:07:07,600 They're giving away for that right? 118 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:10,600 Instead of you have like these stupid and user license 119 00:07:10,600 --> 00:07:14,500 agreement that pop up that are written and you know, legalese 120 00:07:14,500 --> 00:07:17,400 and lawyer speak and hide all kinds of weird terms and 121 00:07:17,400 --> 00:07:20,500 conditions on the inside that, oh, you can opt out, but it's on 122 00:07:20,500 --> 00:07:24,200 page. 74 this tiny little checkbox right or you Have to 123 00:07:24,200 --> 00:07:27,500 like, write in a letter. It's like, opt out at something, 124 00:07:27,500 --> 00:07:31,000 like, I'd be totally in favor of like, simplifying that quite a 125 00:07:31,000 --> 00:07:34,000 bit, but this is a very litigious Society. 126 00:07:34,300 --> 00:07:38,100 Remember, like all the years, you've been an it and how many 127 00:07:38,400 --> 00:07:42,100 eula's end-user license agreements, you've clicked 128 00:07:42,100 --> 00:07:47,200 accept and didn't read, you've agreed to those contracts and I 129 00:07:47,207 --> 00:07:50,800 think with privacy policies, the same thing, happens all the 130 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:53,400 time. We just don't have time to read 131 00:07:53,400 --> 00:07:57,100 everyone. Well you know what losing you 132 00:07:57,100 --> 00:07:58,400 know, we've been talking about MFA, right? 133 00:07:58,400 --> 00:08:02,000 And my face, Pam, and this fatigue that comes with, you 134 00:08:02,000 --> 00:08:04,300 know, always having to like approve these messages on my 135 00:08:04,300 --> 00:08:07,400 phone to push notifications. Like, I know it's not me and it 136 00:08:07,407 --> 00:08:10,900 was not me trying to get in but invariably some percentage of 137 00:08:10,900 --> 00:08:13,600 population Just Hits allowed because they get tired of it. 138 00:08:13,800 --> 00:08:17,800 That is exactly what we do with you was like 20 years ago at 139 00:08:17,800 --> 00:08:20,300 some point, we got tired of it and we just clicked accept and 140 00:08:20,300 --> 00:08:22,600 we want it right on through. So now we're doing the same 141 00:08:22,600 --> 00:08:25,900 thing with I know what, LMFAO fatigue or push notification 142 00:08:25,900 --> 00:08:27,700 fatigue, or whatever it is, but we've talked about it a few 143 00:08:27,700 --> 00:08:30,700 times on the show. Why don't we pivot? 144 00:08:30,800 --> 00:08:33,700 Well, let's I want to get to our main topic, which is voice 145 00:08:33,700 --> 00:08:35,900 Biometrics a couple of housekeeping things. 146 00:08:35,900 --> 00:08:38,600 Before we do get started, though this is a second last show of 147 00:08:38,700 --> 00:08:40,900 the year for us. So we're going to take a few 148 00:08:40,900 --> 00:08:45,300 weeks off for winter. Break 2,700 minutes of podcasts 149 00:08:45,300 --> 00:08:47,700 went out this year, so I think we've earned a little bit of 150 00:08:47,700 --> 00:08:50,500 time off to kind of regroup. We are working on some pretty 151 00:08:50,500 --> 00:08:54,500 cool stuff for 2023. So we'll hit episode Red pretty 152 00:08:54,500 --> 00:08:57,900 early on I think probably like February maybe March at the 153 00:08:57,900 --> 00:09:00,800 latest I would imagine at this point we got some conference 154 00:09:00,800 --> 00:09:04,000 things that were working on so definitely, you know, people 155 00:09:04,000 --> 00:09:07,000 stay tuned with that hit that subscribe or follow button. 156 00:09:07,000 --> 00:09:09,200 That totally helps us out, you know, it's a free way to 157 00:09:09,200 --> 00:09:12,900 basically support the show so that is highly encouraged. 158 00:09:14,400 --> 00:09:15,500 I've got to tell you a quick story. 159 00:09:15,500 --> 00:09:18,800 So I was in the airport the other night and I was talking 160 00:09:18,800 --> 00:09:24,800 with Wayne and somebody was like like He's dropping on her 161 00:09:24,800 --> 00:09:27,900 conversation. I mentioned to Wayne about the 162 00:09:27,900 --> 00:09:32,600 the podcast and so this guy turns around sarcastically off 163 00:09:32,600 --> 00:09:35,200 the podcast. I spent like 15 minutes 164 00:09:35,200 --> 00:09:39,500 explaining the podcast and he was like all he wanted to find 165 00:09:39,500 --> 00:09:43,000 it on his podcast app and everything. 166 00:09:43,000 --> 00:09:45,000 He's like, I'm gonna listen, I'm gonna listen, I'm like all right 167 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:46,800 great leave us a five-star rated. 168 00:09:46,800 --> 00:09:49,600 He's like, well I'll have to listen to podcast first. 169 00:09:49,900 --> 00:09:53,100 Well, yeah, I was like, oh yeah. Well, you just took him for like 170 00:09:53,200 --> 00:09:54,700 15 minutes. I time, dude. 171 00:09:54,700 --> 00:09:58,200 I think you owe me something. Yeah, leave a rating. 172 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:00,900 Five stars is always preferred. You know, if you hate it you say 173 00:10:00,900 --> 00:10:02,900 I really hate it a lot. It was five stars worth. 174 00:10:02,900 --> 00:10:06,200 I hate that's fine too, right? I mean, either way is good, but 175 00:10:06,200 --> 00:10:08,400 yeah, yeah, follow subscribe, so pick. 176 00:10:08,400 --> 00:10:10,000 That's kind of issue. We have two stats last time, 177 00:10:10,000 --> 00:10:12,600 but, like, less than half of people who routinely turned in 178 00:10:12,600 --> 00:10:16,000 or actually subscribe to just tune in and hear our drivel 179 00:10:16,600 --> 00:10:18,800 every week. So why don't we get to voice 180 00:10:18,800 --> 00:10:20,200 Biometrics? Because they think that's kind 181 00:10:20,200 --> 00:10:23,600 of where we want to take the take today's conversation. 182 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:27,200 Especially some of the areas around privacy concerns. 183 00:10:27,200 --> 00:10:29,600 That kind of Jim brought up, but voice is a big part of that as 184 00:10:29,600 --> 00:10:31,700 well, but I think just the technology in general is pretty 185 00:10:31,700 --> 00:10:34,500 cool. I actually rolled it out two 186 00:10:34,500 --> 00:10:36,900 decades now. Well, 15 years ago, let's call 187 00:10:36,900 --> 00:10:39,200 it. It's kind of my first foray into 188 00:10:39,200 --> 00:10:41,900 that area and I'm really happy and excited that we're able to 189 00:10:41,900 --> 00:10:44,700 have our guests on with us. She is melting men. 190 00:10:44,700 --> 00:10:47,900 She's a program director with Booz Allen Hamilton and a voice 191 00:10:47,900 --> 00:10:49,700 biometric and an identity Zealot. 192 00:10:49,700 --> 00:10:52,200 So welcome to the show, Mel, thanks for having me. 193 00:10:53,300 --> 00:10:56,100 Yeah, so, You for taking the time, it's a Friday afternoon 194 00:10:56,100 --> 00:10:58,300 and this is going to go live. Mondays is going to be kind of a 195 00:10:58,300 --> 00:11:00,900 quick turnaround for us. And I think one of the things 196 00:11:00,900 --> 00:11:02,600 that we always like to find out the first time we have someone 197 00:11:02,600 --> 00:11:05,600 to show is sort of their career Journey especially when it comes 198 00:11:05,600 --> 00:11:08,500 to sort of the identity work and maybe even specifically The 199 00:11:08,500 --> 00:11:10,300 Voice Biometrics tough, which you've really kind of 200 00:11:10,308 --> 00:11:13,300 specialized in it sounds like how did you get to where you 201 00:11:13,300 --> 00:11:16,500 are? Is this, is this identity and 202 00:11:16,600 --> 00:11:18,600 Biometrics area? Something that you chose? 203 00:11:18,600 --> 00:11:21,300 Or did it Choose You? Little bit of both. 204 00:11:22,300 --> 00:11:24,200 You know, I was in the identity space. 205 00:11:24,700 --> 00:11:28,700 I'm a lot older, I think than you guys but I started my career 206 00:11:28,700 --> 00:11:33,100 about 33 years ago and almost immediately jumped in. 207 00:11:33,600 --> 00:11:37,000 After my webcasting phase don't judge. 208 00:11:37,000 --> 00:11:41,500 It was a good one back then but then I kind of got my foray into 209 00:11:41,500 --> 00:11:46,500 IDM identity, access management and I loved it but the more I 210 00:11:46,508 --> 00:11:52,500 got into it the more I was able to see through Less than always 211 00:11:52,500 --> 00:11:58,800 legal means the user names and passwords and eat including MFA. 212 00:11:58,800 --> 00:12:02,400 They just start cutting. They're not they're so easy to 213 00:12:02,400 --> 00:12:06,900 break and I don't mean that for everybody but the hacker 214 00:12:06,900 --> 00:12:10,500 community in the black hats around identity it's super easy 215 00:12:10,500 --> 00:12:15,300 to break pretty much anything that's out there today until you 216 00:12:15,300 --> 00:12:20,100 talk about Biometrics and you know obviously iPhone or Apple. 217 00:12:20,300 --> 00:12:24,400 Came out pretty staunchly with facial Rec. 218 00:12:25,400 --> 00:12:28,900 I know I'm sure every one of us is done the facial dance or 219 00:12:28,900 --> 00:12:31,100 you're trying to get the face and then you have to do the iris 220 00:12:31,100 --> 00:12:35,300 dance and you know, it just wasn't, it wasn't feasible and 221 00:12:35,300 --> 00:12:42,200 mass use and so VB voice Biometrics became hot for me. 222 00:12:43,900 --> 00:12:47,000 As I saw that there was a lot more that could be done with 223 00:12:47,000 --> 00:12:54,700 voice then just Identification. So obviously that's the impetus 224 00:12:54,700 --> 00:13:01,500 behind the explosion of VB, but where science has at the science 225 00:13:01,500 --> 00:13:04,500 Community has evolved it got super sexy. 226 00:13:04,600 --> 00:13:07,500 So I rode that I'm all about the super sexy. 227 00:13:07,500 --> 00:13:12,500 So yeah, we are absolutely and You know, I know we're going to 228 00:13:12,500 --> 00:13:16,300 get super deep maybe we can start a look, you know, at the 229 00:13:16,300 --> 00:13:21,500 basics of kind of, for those who aren't familiar with how voice 230 00:13:21,500 --> 00:13:23,300 Biometrics Works, how does it work? 231 00:13:23,300 --> 00:13:27,100 But then take us all the way to that privacy topic, that was 232 00:13:27,100 --> 00:13:31,200 bringing up, like, is my Amazon Alexa spying on me, but let's 233 00:13:31,200 --> 00:13:33,500 not go there yet. Let's start with the, you know, 234 00:13:33,500 --> 00:13:35,900 has Voice. Bio generally work. 235 00:13:36,100 --> 00:13:39,900 So spoiler alert. Yes, it is. 236 00:13:39,900 --> 00:13:45,100 Secondly VB is it's a very slick process. 237 00:13:46,100 --> 00:13:49,800 There's lots of variations and how you can deploy VB. 238 00:13:50,000 --> 00:13:54,800 There are lots of various models, there's a lot of 239 00:13:54,800 --> 00:14:00,000 different approaches, there's just all kinds of options 240 00:14:00,000 --> 00:14:01,900 depending on a multitude of factors. 241 00:14:01,900 --> 00:14:05,100 As you would imagine with any technology you got to understand 242 00:14:05,100 --> 00:14:07,500 the business requirements that are supporting the operational 243 00:14:07,500 --> 00:14:11,100 or the mission goals that VB needs to support. 244 00:14:11,200 --> 00:14:12,900 Port. And then based on that, there 245 00:14:12,900 --> 00:14:15,600 are actually options now although you wouldn't think so, 246 00:14:15,600 --> 00:14:19,000 given a lot of the banks and such or still retaining audio 247 00:14:19,000 --> 00:14:24,300 and they're still leveraging capabilities that are almost as 248 00:14:24,300 --> 00:14:28,600 old as I am. And so things have evolved. 249 00:14:29,700 --> 00:14:33,700 If anyone in the fence serve Community is paying attention. 250 00:14:33,700 --> 00:14:35,500 Things have evolved. Take a second. 251 00:14:35,500 --> 00:14:39,600 Look at where VB and and Biometrics are today for 252 00:14:39,600 --> 00:14:42,100 identity management and fraud. Prevention. 253 00:14:42,200 --> 00:14:46,100 Okay, so you said the Alexa is spying on me. 254 00:14:46,100 --> 00:14:52,300 What does that mean? Are they just trying to gather? 255 00:14:52,600 --> 00:14:57,400 Okay, this person needs to go and buy some new, you know, some 256 00:14:57,400 --> 00:15:03,400 new cups and coffee mugs or they actually like, looking for 257 00:15:03,400 --> 00:15:05,400 things and Reporting them to the police. 258 00:15:07,000 --> 00:15:11,100 Yeah, so I mean they're obviously capabilities in the 259 00:15:11,100 --> 00:15:15,100 intelligence community and the federal government levels that 260 00:15:15,100 --> 00:15:20,600 are looking for Words keywords that, you know, your phraseology 261 00:15:20,600 --> 00:15:25,700 and the mix context in which it's uttered. 262 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:32,000 But that's not really the job of Alexa as you guys were talking 263 00:15:32,000 --> 00:15:35,400 about earlier, the whole privacy bit and there's a lot of trust 264 00:15:35,400 --> 00:15:40,100 right now. On the containers or the the 265 00:15:41,200 --> 00:15:47,400 holders of your private, your pii, your personal, identifying 266 00:15:47,400 --> 00:15:49,800 information and your you got to trust and right? 267 00:15:49,800 --> 00:15:53,600 And it's even devoid of having some sort of, Bill of Rights for 268 00:15:53,600 --> 00:15:57,800 consumers, or what have you you literally could end up as the 269 00:15:57,800 --> 00:16:02,000 South Park episode, where their Human Centipede or you are truly 270 00:16:02,000 --> 00:16:05,800 being protected by the audio and the use of it that's being 271 00:16:05,800 --> 00:16:10,200 captured. Mel, I kind of Wonder like, you 272 00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:14,900 know, I think one of the voice applications I use the most is 273 00:16:14,900 --> 00:16:19,500 Siri right? The Apple version of boy's voice 274 00:16:19,500 --> 00:16:23,300 recognition and I can't believe how bad it is sometimes. 275 00:16:23,500 --> 00:16:25,700 So it is what does that mean indication of? 276 00:16:25,700 --> 00:16:29,900 I mean is an indication of like it could be improved, or is it 277 00:16:29,900 --> 00:16:33,700 an indication of just like some of the basics of different 278 00:16:33,700 --> 00:16:38,600 people talking differently? So it's the it's their Universal 279 00:16:38,600 --> 00:16:42,400 Baseline model which is one of the it's like the transmission 280 00:16:43,200 --> 00:16:47,800 of voice Biometrics, right? And so the more understands and 281 00:16:47,800 --> 00:16:50,700 how they are, if they are, which I'm sure they are. 282 00:16:51,000 --> 00:16:53,300 But I don't have specifics. But as long as they're applying 283 00:16:53,300 --> 00:16:58,000 Ai and ml outside of what a white paper refers to it, as if 284 00:16:58,000 --> 00:17:02,600 they're genuinely applying learning capabilities to their 285 00:17:02,600 --> 00:17:09,000 Baseline construct, then that will get Mm better over time but 286 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:10,700 it's further than where they are, right? 287 00:17:10,800 --> 00:17:13,800 Because, yeah, it's pretty bad. You shouldn't have to repeat 288 00:17:13,800 --> 00:17:16,599 yourself. Their capabilities that are 289 00:17:16,599 --> 00:17:20,700 being used in the Department of Defense today and in the 290 00:17:20,700 --> 00:17:25,800 Department of Homeland Security, where lives depend on the 291 00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:29,400 efficacy of that voice capture in the translation of it. 292 00:17:29,900 --> 00:17:35,300 So the technology is there, it just has to be committed to by 293 00:17:35,300 --> 00:17:39,700 the Vidor of the service and I don't want to, I'm not slamming 294 00:17:39,700 --> 00:17:43,800 them because it is a costly Endeavor, but the fact that it 295 00:17:43,800 --> 00:17:45,500 already exists, makes it less costly. 296 00:17:45,500 --> 00:17:48,900 You don't have to go create it, and it's a diverse build thing. 297 00:17:48,900 --> 00:17:52,300 And, you know, they have lots of tncs things to consider. 298 00:17:52,300 --> 00:17:56,400 But yes, you are being spied on, but it's so I never really did 299 00:17:56,400 --> 00:18:00,300 address, why, right? So it's not just to learn and 300 00:18:00,300 --> 00:18:04,600 evolve their capability if they're smart, which I know at 301 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:09,700 least one of the large Voicebank holders is, they are turning you 302 00:18:09,700 --> 00:18:13,400 into a predictive marketing machine, right? 303 00:18:13,400 --> 00:18:16,700 So that's how they make their money is through advertisers 304 00:18:17,200 --> 00:18:19,300 services. And Licensing is never where the 305 00:18:19,300 --> 00:18:21,800 money's at. It's always in the services 306 00:18:21,800 --> 00:18:26,600 associated with it. So they make Bank cold hard 307 00:18:26,600 --> 00:18:31,200 money from the ability to predict what Jeff Steadman is 308 00:18:31,200 --> 00:18:35,300 going to buy after he purchases that tent? 309 00:18:35,500 --> 00:18:37,700 Is he going to be looking? For a camper, is he going to be 310 00:18:37,708 --> 00:18:40,900 looking for a place in Arizona, right? 311 00:18:40,900 --> 00:18:45,700 It's an amalgamation of what you're buying and how are you 312 00:18:45,700 --> 00:18:47,300 searching? And what are you all totally 313 00:18:47,300 --> 00:18:50,300 doing with it? Are you a giver meeting 314 00:18:50,300 --> 00:18:54,200 Charities? What do we serve you to make our 315 00:18:54,200 --> 00:18:58,100 platform? The most valuable to our 316 00:18:58,100 --> 00:19:03,200 advertisers as we possibly can? So do they want to know that you 317 00:19:03,200 --> 00:19:06,200 know you yelled at your wife and no, they don't. 318 00:19:06,300 --> 00:19:09,300 Are that, although, that audio is absolutely there. 319 00:19:09,300 --> 00:19:11,800 You can go here it on all platforms. 320 00:19:12,100 --> 00:19:15,500 You can go and hear all of the audio that's been captured and 321 00:19:15,500 --> 00:19:19,100 delete it, but that doesn't mean that it's being triple deleted 322 00:19:19,100 --> 00:19:21,700 on there. And so it, once it's out there, 323 00:19:21,700 --> 00:19:24,400 it's out there. But you can hear what's being 324 00:19:24,400 --> 00:19:28,900 saved from your utterances. I feel like that this is where 325 00:19:28,900 --> 00:19:31,500 the Ron Swanson death of him learning what a computer does 326 00:19:31,700 --> 00:19:34,300 and then him just walking out to the dumpster and just throwing, 327 00:19:34,500 --> 00:19:37,000 let's give her the doctor is where that might be. 328 00:19:37,100 --> 00:19:41,100 That's very um, yeah, I mean, I think people, you know, if the 329 00:19:41,100 --> 00:19:43,900 product is free, you're the product is kind of some kind of 330 00:19:43,900 --> 00:19:46,700 way to look at it is, yeah, advertising, I'm sure I'm lumped 331 00:19:46,700 --> 00:19:49,900 in with other folks, and it's just another key metric around. 332 00:19:50,300 --> 00:19:52,900 Well, Jeff just by guitar and he's trying to learn how to 333 00:19:52,900 --> 00:19:54,700 play. And, you know, if you are video 334 00:19:54,700 --> 00:19:57,800 with me, you can see there's one of the background, I am I Suck. 335 00:19:57,800 --> 00:20:00,300 So, but at some point, I'm probably gonna be looking for 336 00:20:00,300 --> 00:20:03,200 lessons or maybe a guitar, sand or guitar picks, right? 337 00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:06,100 And I'm in a certain age range. All of these are data points 338 00:20:06,100 --> 00:20:09,700 that come together to kind of formulate, who is what is this 339 00:20:09,700 --> 00:20:14,700 entity look like, and the voice Biometrics that I'm providing. 340 00:20:14,700 --> 00:20:17,900 Whenever I talk to Siri Google, I'm sure you just activated a 341 00:20:17,908 --> 00:20:21,700 bunch of stuff out there, right? Alexa, whatever may be all feeds 342 00:20:21,700 --> 00:20:22,600 into that. What? 343 00:20:22,600 --> 00:20:27,400 I find a little bit interesting is At this point, we've got Siri 344 00:20:27,700 --> 00:20:31,200 at least in the consumer side of got Syrian, we've got Google, it 345 00:20:31,200 --> 00:20:33,500 sounds like a Lexus. Having some issues because 346 00:20:33,500 --> 00:20:37,500 Amazon is reading articles about how Alexa is not doing great and 347 00:20:37,500 --> 00:20:40,800 they may shut that down or pair of back considerably, Microsoft 348 00:20:40,800 --> 00:20:43,500 got out of the Cortana game a while back. 349 00:20:44,000 --> 00:20:47,800 So I don't either winners and losers already in this space 350 00:20:47,800 --> 00:20:50,900 when it comes to the voice side. Not really. 351 00:20:51,400 --> 00:20:53,800 I think it's more the value prop ride. 352 00:20:53,800 --> 00:20:57,700 So they're not seeing a Lot of Roi on the invoice, the 353 00:20:57,700 --> 00:21:00,600 Investments they've made in their voice capabilities. 354 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:03,800 Primarily because in my never humble opinion, they missed the 355 00:21:03,808 --> 00:21:07,800 boat on why to do it to begin with, or if you're doing it 356 00:21:08,000 --> 00:21:11,300 while you're doing it for its initial intended, purpose, 357 00:21:11,900 --> 00:21:16,000 expand your purview beyond what you operationally decided to 358 00:21:16,000 --> 00:21:21,300 invoke or that led you to invoke the use of Voice or the creation 359 00:21:21,300 --> 00:21:24,700 of that capability and they miss the boat. 360 00:21:25,300 --> 00:21:28,900 So I don't necessarily say it would say that there's a player. 361 00:21:29,400 --> 00:21:33,800 It's the how, right? So you could it's like I would 362 00:21:33,800 --> 00:21:38,300 liken it to you. Could find a bazillion, really 363 00:21:38,300 --> 00:21:43,100 good C sharp developers but if they don't know architecture, 364 00:21:43,100 --> 00:21:47,000 you're not going to want them to build to be some. 365 00:21:47,100 --> 00:21:50,100 It's very, it's a really crappy analogy. 366 00:21:51,700 --> 00:21:55,900 I'm trying to give a better one, but my point is that It's about 367 00:21:55,900 --> 00:22:01,700 Who and the experiences of the deployer and there are lots of 368 00:22:01,700 --> 00:22:04,700 algorithms out there and they have multiple purposes and they 369 00:22:04,700 --> 00:22:08,300 serve better and different options to the point that 370 00:22:08,300 --> 00:22:13,300 there's now multi algorithmic Fusion, where, you know, there's 371 00:22:13,300 --> 00:22:19,100 these eight algorithms, that nail it for most of your 372 00:22:19,100 --> 00:22:23,200 Universal Baseline population, and then you put them together. 373 00:22:23,200 --> 00:22:27,700 And then you, you lesson, And lessen, your false, your 374 00:22:28,700 --> 00:22:30,600 duration. It takes to authenticate your 375 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:34,200 duration to time is money, especially the call centers, 376 00:22:35,000 --> 00:22:35,800 right? It's like what? 377 00:22:35,800 --> 00:22:38,600 I think the industry standard is a dollar, something a minute, 378 00:22:38,800 --> 00:22:41,900 that's insane. Your Roi is sucked up the 379 00:22:41,900 --> 00:22:43,900 minute, you get a dumb customer, right? 380 00:22:43,900 --> 00:22:45,300 Are you good? And I Karen. 381 00:22:45,800 --> 00:22:48,100 I think there's none of those out there and, of course not. 382 00:22:49,300 --> 00:22:53,100 But when you get those, their profitability in the cost to do 383 00:22:53,100 --> 00:22:58,700 business is Trashed, right? So they have to look at all the 384 00:22:58,700 --> 00:23:02,300 different scenarios where they could salvage or expedite or 385 00:23:02,300 --> 00:23:06,700 minimize that unpredictable expense Associated. 386 00:23:06,700 --> 00:23:10,600 So, let me pivots like slightly because I want to talk about 387 00:23:10,600 --> 00:23:13,100 deep fakes. And how does that impact things 388 00:23:13,100 --> 00:23:16,100 like voice Biometrics? And we've seen a lot of news 389 00:23:16,100 --> 00:23:18,900 headlines around it, you know. I think the whole Jordan Peele 390 00:23:18,900 --> 00:23:22,000 Obama saying, what you know, was was popular. 391 00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:23,500 I don't know, it seems like 10 years ago. 392 00:23:23,500 --> 00:23:29,200 It was probably like to How impactful are deep audio fakes 393 00:23:29,200 --> 00:23:33,900 to the efficacy of trying to do, you know, strong identification 394 00:23:33,900 --> 00:23:36,100 or authentication through voice biometric. 395 00:23:36,700 --> 00:23:39,400 So right now that there's a lot of dependencies there, that's a 396 00:23:39,400 --> 00:23:46,700 loaded question but to date it is absolutely avoidable as the 397 00:23:46,700 --> 00:23:51,400 Technologies evolve for deep things, especially around audio. 398 00:23:51,500 --> 00:23:55,000 It's going to be tough. So the industry needs to be 399 00:23:55,100 --> 00:24:01,300 Typically Progressive in figuring out how to stay in the 400 00:24:01,300 --> 00:24:07,800 proper place for the betterment of black hats and convert them. 401 00:24:08,000 --> 00:24:11,500 That's all I can start converting them now so that, you 402 00:24:11,500 --> 00:24:15,000 know, as this evolves or there because I would say, we're 403 00:24:15,000 --> 00:24:19,700 probably at a, at most three to five years threshold to somebody 404 00:24:19,700 --> 00:24:23,900 being able to have an epic deep fake maker. 405 00:24:24,500 --> 00:24:28,000 But We're not going to be able to contend with, so that's kind 406 00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:32,900 of why the Department of Defense and DHS are evolving Beyond a 407 00:24:32,908 --> 00:24:37,100 single biometric. So while VB is absolute, there's 408 00:24:37,100 --> 00:24:40,500 so many things you can do with it when you fuse it with other 409 00:24:40,600 --> 00:24:46,500 biometric. Modalities your false positives 410 00:24:46,800 --> 00:24:49,100 are almost completely eliminated. 411 00:24:49,200 --> 00:24:52,700 I mean, it's measurably significant. 412 00:24:52,700 --> 00:24:57,800 When you talk about Multimodal. But it's complicated you know 413 00:24:57,800 --> 00:25:01,100 and if they're not if they're not Progressive enough and their 414 00:25:01,100 --> 00:25:04,600 dedication to Biometrics it's a tough it's a tough pitch to 415 00:25:04,600 --> 00:25:07,800 make. But once you dig in and you look 416 00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:13,100 at the ROI compared to a single modality, it gets much much more 417 00:25:13,100 --> 00:25:14,900 palatable of a conversation to have. 418 00:25:15,900 --> 00:25:19,200 You've mentioned this concept of fusion a couple times. 419 00:25:19,500 --> 00:25:22,500 Can you explain what that is to my simple brain? 420 00:25:22,700 --> 00:25:26,300 No you're fine. So it's really each independent 421 00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:31,300 biometric modality being fused together from a score point of 422 00:25:31,308 --> 00:25:33,400 view. So I've taken a score say from 423 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:36,300 your voice, I'm taking a score from your facial. 424 00:25:36,300 --> 00:25:41,500 I'm taking a score from your from an old factory biometric 425 00:25:41,800 --> 00:25:47,000 and I'm fusing those together to say, either your Bad guy or 426 00:25:47,000 --> 00:25:49,800 infusing them together to say this guy could walk through this 427 00:25:49,800 --> 00:25:53,600 door without having to present a card without it, which can be 428 00:25:53,600 --> 00:25:59,900 stolen without having to do the iris stance or obfuscated with 429 00:25:59,900 --> 00:26:04,300 contact lenses or violate. You know, successfully penetrate 430 00:26:04,300 --> 00:26:08,300 the security measure. It makes that nearly impossible 431 00:26:08,500 --> 00:26:12,300 because you may be amazing fakin one, but you're never going to 432 00:26:12,300 --> 00:26:15,100 be amazing at faking free. So it allows you to set the 433 00:26:15,100 --> 00:26:17,500 threshold. For entry significantly, higher 434 00:26:18,600 --> 00:26:24,000 thereby, always accompanying, creating a lot more structure 435 00:26:24,000 --> 00:26:27,800 and security. You said olfactory biometric. 436 00:26:28,200 --> 00:26:30,400 So as at the sense of smell. Yes, it is. 437 00:26:30,400 --> 00:26:32,600 The sense of smell. Okay, this is news to me, I 438 00:26:32,608 --> 00:26:34,400 guess, I'm not open my Biometrics game but I didn't 439 00:26:34,400 --> 00:26:37,100 realize that that was something that was out there and I, I'm 440 00:26:37,100 --> 00:26:41,200 intrigued very much how stinky a person is, no, no. 441 00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:44,400 So or what is it, something else UT met. 442 00:26:44,500 --> 00:26:50,300 So, it's used for me A lot of purposes, but the, the entree of 443 00:26:50,300 --> 00:26:56,400 olfactory came from bombs and drugs. 444 00:26:56,400 --> 00:27:00,000 So you have residual that you can't wash off, right? 445 00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:05,600 And so having a dog isn't always possible, who's trained to 446 00:27:05,800 --> 00:27:10,600 identify, and it's difficult for them to segment between like, 447 00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:14,600 I'm if you followed Casey Anthony that trial where they 448 00:27:14,600 --> 00:27:19,400 said the Smell of maggots produce the same smell as a 449 00:27:19,408 --> 00:27:24,700 decaying carcass to a dog. So that doesn't happen and all 450 00:27:24,700 --> 00:27:26,900 Factory Biometrics. And that's what? 451 00:27:27,300 --> 00:27:31,700 What drove the introduction of olfactory Biometrics, but it's 452 00:27:31,700 --> 00:27:34,200 super cool because then when you get nervous, you actually emit a 453 00:27:34,208 --> 00:27:38,400 smell, it's a heat sink. There's a heat sink pattern as 454 00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:41,600 well that we can look at. So, when we put all that 455 00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:44,200 together, we know if you're a nervous wreck, which means you 456 00:27:44,208 --> 00:27:47,800 probably did something wrong. Or if you're fixing to come 457 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:52,300 shoot somebody because you've got a bomb hidden in a backpack, 458 00:27:52,600 --> 00:27:55,900 you know. So, olfactory has become pretty 459 00:27:55,900 --> 00:28:00,700 sweet with identifying bag. There's probably not a whole lot 460 00:28:00,700 --> 00:28:02,300 and Industry were that's applicable. 461 00:28:02,300 --> 00:28:05,600 I've been like the airports train stations, you know, 462 00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:09,500 Transportation modalities. But yeah, it's super cool, 463 00:28:09,500 --> 00:28:12,800 right? How important is the quality of 464 00:28:12,800 --> 00:28:15,500 the audio with the identity of the sender? 465 00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:19,700 Strive for excellent audio. Yeah but you know, when you're 466 00:28:19,700 --> 00:28:25,100 here at the pregame show pregame was it's always many hurdles to 467 00:28:25,300 --> 00:28:28,700 overcome. But how important is it that the 468 00:28:28,700 --> 00:28:34,200 quality of the input or the recording is at a high level, to 469 00:28:34,500 --> 00:28:38,400 avoid false positives? Or is that just a factor if 470 00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:40,400 that's a factor you have to contend with it, right? 471 00:28:40,900 --> 00:28:45,200 But it has evolved so far and doing sound separation. 472 00:28:45,600 --> 00:28:47,900 And if you're have any familiarity with natural 473 00:28:47,900 --> 00:28:52,600 language processing and how far that has come, that's it's 474 00:28:52,600 --> 00:28:57,900 giving us a very targeted method of separating sound from voice 475 00:28:59,000 --> 00:29:03,700 but in the cases of identifying fraud or Bad actors in certain 476 00:29:03,700 --> 00:29:08,700 scenarios obviously in the dod, it's important to hear what's 477 00:29:08,700 --> 00:29:11,900 around as much as it is to hear what they're saying, how they're 478 00:29:11,900 --> 00:29:13,800 saying it. I'm so quality. 479 00:29:15,000 --> 00:29:21,300 So the give Factor there is I need more audio if it's really 480 00:29:21,300 --> 00:29:26,200 bad quality, as opposed to if you're sitting in this scenario 481 00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:30,100 where our audio is on fleet, that's right. 482 00:29:30,100 --> 00:29:34,000 I can capture you in literally a second half of audio. 483 00:29:35,100 --> 00:29:36,700 But yeah, so that's where that is. 484 00:29:36,700 --> 00:29:40,500 Now, if you're recording and it's like three seconds in a 485 00:29:40,500 --> 00:29:44,600 subway, station is probably, maybe not enough. 486 00:29:44,900 --> 00:29:50,300 Not for one time if you are in and out of different places, 487 00:29:50,300 --> 00:29:54,200 like when you call your bank and want to use the audio 488 00:29:54,200 --> 00:29:59,100 authentication or the voice authentication, if you've had a 489 00:29:59,108 --> 00:30:03,400 cold before and if and of called into the bank, if you have 490 00:30:03,400 --> 00:30:08,600 called from a Subway, if you've called from the airport standing 491 00:30:08,600 --> 00:30:14,500 underneath, you know, the allowed jet engine it, learns 492 00:30:14,500 --> 00:30:15,900 right. That's the machine learning 493 00:30:15,900 --> 00:30:19,800 elements and beauty that is that lays in voice biometric modern, 494 00:30:19,800 --> 00:30:23,200 voice Biometrics. So yeah, there's a lot of 495 00:30:23,200 --> 00:30:24,100 factors there. Ma'am. 496 00:30:24,700 --> 00:30:29,600 I could see you as an expert witness in a trial where you had 497 00:30:29,600 --> 00:30:35,200 like three seconds of audio recorded in a subway station and 498 00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:39,400 then you start running through the scientific like all right 499 00:30:39,400 --> 00:30:44,500 we're 78 percent sure based on this and 48 percent. 500 00:30:44,500 --> 00:30:45,700 Sure. Based on this. 501 00:30:45,700 --> 00:30:50,300 And therefore, we have a 99% shortness that this is the same 502 00:30:50,300 --> 00:30:52,100 person. Absolutely. 503 00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:55,100 So. Okay, well I think we'd beat 504 00:30:55,100 --> 00:30:58,800 that one, pretty good but I wanted to bring up kind of in 505 00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:02,900 the I am space where I've run into voice Biometrics a few 506 00:31:02,900 --> 00:31:06,100 times as like, hmm. I wonder if this would be a good 507 00:31:06,100 --> 00:31:08,800 application. I'd like to get your opinion so 508 00:31:08,800 --> 00:31:12,400 it's what we call, quote, unquote, the cleanroom scenario. 509 00:31:12,500 --> 00:31:18,500 So it's the idea that we want to Do MFA, but the person who's in 510 00:31:18,500 --> 00:31:21,800 the clean room, whether it's, you know, the typical like 511 00:31:22,200 --> 00:31:26,000 situation where somebody's wearing like a bunny suit or, 512 00:31:26,100 --> 00:31:28,600 you know, potentially it's like in our prison. 513 00:31:28,600 --> 00:31:32,300 But anyway the person can't bring in their phone so you 514 00:31:32,300 --> 00:31:38,400 can't send them a second Factor. The question is, is that a good 515 00:31:38,400 --> 00:31:44,500 scenario to use voice because my understanding was is that like 516 00:31:44,500 --> 00:31:50,000 with a lot of Biometrics you have device specificity right so 517 00:31:50,000 --> 00:31:52,500 you have to go through the registration on each device. 518 00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:57,100 But with boys the voice is being stored in kind of a central 519 00:31:57,300 --> 00:32:02,200 location or the voice fingerprint, which is probably 520 00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:05,300 just the number along, no long strand. 521 00:32:05,500 --> 00:32:07,800 A am I thinking about this right? 522 00:32:08,100 --> 00:32:11,300 You're absolutely right. And if you're talking about like 523 00:32:11,300 --> 00:32:15,300 it, especially if you look at jail or prisons, it's a hell of 524 00:32:15,300 --> 00:32:19,700 a use case, right? Because you voices absolutely 525 00:32:19,700 --> 00:32:21,300 there. Everybody talks about what you 526 00:32:21,300 --> 00:32:22,600 gonna do when you get a deaf person. 527 00:32:22,900 --> 00:32:29,800 So I mean not that that happens all the time but there is 528 00:32:30,500 --> 00:32:33,900 something to be said about that being a perfect case for Fusion 529 00:32:34,000 --> 00:32:37,600 because not only Will you identify you'll be able to tell 530 00:32:37,600 --> 00:32:40,700 if they have bad intentions. So if somebody's coming in and 531 00:32:40,700 --> 00:32:44,200 they're hiding something, you know, even the best people 532 00:32:44,200 --> 00:32:48,100 readers there's always someone who's going to be better more 533 00:32:48,100 --> 00:32:51,400 Charming or more effective at getting something in. 534 00:32:51,400 --> 00:32:57,700 That's bad, it's super cool. Use case for biometric Fusion. 535 00:32:58,700 --> 00:33:03,800 So I think that that kind of Central Storage of the 536 00:33:03,900 --> 00:33:08,000 fingerprint of The Voice, Just kind of one of the advantages 537 00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:12,900 are differentiators between VB and other forms of Biometrics, 538 00:33:13,300 --> 00:33:16,300 but I think the other thing is, you know, in a lot of those 539 00:33:16,300 --> 00:33:18,700 scenarios. If somebody's wearing a bunny 540 00:33:18,700 --> 00:33:22,000 suit right there, they're not going to be able to do a 541 00:33:22,000 --> 00:33:25,500 fingerprint, they're not going to be able to necessarily do 542 00:33:26,100 --> 00:33:28,000 facial recognition, things like that. 543 00:33:28,000 --> 00:33:32,600 So it might be one of the few scenarios where boys are voice. 544 00:33:32,600 --> 00:33:36,700 Might be one of the few options. And I guess what I'd like to 545 00:33:36,700 --> 00:33:41,000 also ask is, you know, are there other use cases that you see 546 00:33:41,000 --> 00:33:43,600 voice? Use them a lot for 547 00:33:43,900 --> 00:33:47,200 authentication? Where it makes sense other than 548 00:33:47,200 --> 00:33:49,400 fin serve well. So, so good. 549 00:33:49,900 --> 00:33:52,800 Tell me what you mean, by that Financial Services. 550 00:33:53,200 --> 00:33:56,300 No, I'm sorry, I need that part. What do you mean in terms of 551 00:33:56,500 --> 00:33:59,400 using voice for Finn serve as that? 552 00:33:59,400 --> 00:34:03,900 Just like when you call the call center sometimes but like Bank 553 00:34:03,900 --> 00:34:07,100 of America, for example. As doing, I don't know if they 554 00:34:07,500 --> 00:34:11,699 have rolled it out, nationally or globally yet, but they've 555 00:34:11,699 --> 00:34:14,100 created banking centers that don't have people. 556 00:34:14,900 --> 00:34:19,199 So you can literally walk up to a screen that is about below 557 00:34:19,199 --> 00:34:21,800 your waist to probably depending on your height. 558 00:34:21,800 --> 00:34:23,400 Of course. For me, it's like a foot over my 559 00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:25,400 head. So I would say it's probably a 560 00:34:25,400 --> 00:34:30,300 four or five foot tall screen with AI, it has an artificial 561 00:34:30,300 --> 00:34:34,300 agent, on the other side, and I don't have to authenticate, I 562 00:34:34,308 --> 00:34:37,300 exist. So that I never saw some in the 563 00:34:37,300 --> 00:34:40,800 near, the subway stations on Broadway in New York City. 564 00:34:41,199 --> 00:34:45,900 There's a couple in Columbus, we're such a test a test Market, 565 00:34:45,900 --> 00:34:48,500 it's silly. We get the first flavor of lays 566 00:34:48,500 --> 00:34:52,000 when they first release it to see how we do, which can be good 567 00:34:52,000 --> 00:34:54,000 or bad depending on all right. Exactly. 568 00:34:55,100 --> 00:34:56,800 Cinnamon Toast Crunch flavored Doritos. 569 00:34:56,800 --> 00:35:02,900 No, thank you. Anyways, so they they the use 570 00:35:02,900 --> 00:35:07,100 case there is wicked cool because You literally don't have 571 00:35:07,100 --> 00:35:10,600 to do anything but walk in and conduct your business. 572 00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:15,800 It's a sweet use case if you think about applying that theory 573 00:35:16,100 --> 00:35:20,400 to something like Walmart think of how Walmart could use that 574 00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:22,300 from a predictive marketing point of view. 575 00:35:22,300 --> 00:35:24,700 So they follow a pattern of life, right? 576 00:35:24,700 --> 00:35:26,900 Or pattern of your existence throughout a store. 577 00:35:27,600 --> 00:35:29,000 They have security cameras anyway. 578 00:35:29,000 --> 00:35:33,000 So use that data, right? So, watch where they're going 579 00:35:33,000 --> 00:35:36,000 and what are they buying? And then, Order. 580 00:35:36,200 --> 00:35:40,300 And so what would they like Leah by an Impulse buy at the 581 00:35:40,300 --> 00:35:43,700 register? Or you noticed when these 582 00:35:43,700 --> 00:35:47,700 products are close to these products and this one gets 583 00:35:47,700 --> 00:35:50,700 purchased because it's right behind them and increased sales 584 00:35:50,700 --> 00:35:54,700 of these items. So it's we got to stop thinking 585 00:35:54,700 --> 00:35:56,600 that it's just about authentication. 586 00:35:56,600 --> 00:36:01,900 It's about making I'm a capitalist. 587 00:36:01,900 --> 00:36:04,900 Can you tell? It's making money and it's 588 00:36:04,900 --> 00:36:06,400 making me. Money more effectively, which 589 00:36:06,400 --> 00:36:10,100 would drive costs down. I think the economic 590 00:36:10,100 --> 00:36:13,300 ramifications are pretty big. If we get out of our own way and 591 00:36:13,300 --> 00:36:19,900 stop worrying about the false connotation of Biometrics, being 592 00:36:20,000 --> 00:36:23,600 an invasion of privacy, because it's not, we're not holding your 593 00:36:23,600 --> 00:36:25,800 voice. We're retaining your audio. 594 00:36:26,100 --> 00:36:30,000 We're triple hashing. Creating a big long. 595 00:36:30,000 --> 00:36:34,700 Number that if you stole it, even if I send it to you, you 596 00:36:34,700 --> 00:36:36,900 would not be able. First identify, even that it's 597 00:36:36,900 --> 00:36:40,200 yours. All right, so there is no pii 598 00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:44,500 involved in. VB it just It Isn't. 599 00:36:45,000 --> 00:36:48,400 So once we get out of that and stop worrying about that, then 600 00:36:48,400 --> 00:36:51,000 we could talk about what can really be done with by my church 601 00:36:51,300 --> 00:36:55,600 soapbox off. So what about scenarios where 602 00:36:55,600 --> 00:36:58,800 you definitely do not want to use like the opposite, right? 603 00:36:58,900 --> 00:37:01,300 We talked about a couple use cases here where yeah makes 604 00:37:01,300 --> 00:37:05,400 sense, you know, prison or a jail or financial services or Or 605 00:37:05,600 --> 00:37:07,700 retail in general. We think being able to walk up 606 00:37:07,700 --> 00:37:11,000 and say, hey, I want to know about a quarter pounder with 607 00:37:11,000 --> 00:37:13,500 cheese. Only onions and fries and a 608 00:37:13,508 --> 00:37:15,700 coke, right? Rather than talking to a person, 609 00:37:15,700 --> 00:37:19,300 which appears to be going by the wayside, or going after those 610 00:37:19,300 --> 00:37:22,700 one stupid little iPads and keying in your own order, right? 611 00:37:22,700 --> 00:37:24,100 The might actually have the order, right? 612 00:37:24,100 --> 00:37:27,300 So I'm good right? Yeah, I'm okay with that part 2. 613 00:37:27,300 --> 00:37:31,200 But what's the opposite of this? Like, where did where is voice 614 00:37:31,200 --> 00:37:36,000 Biometrics never to be used? I don't think it exists. 615 00:37:37,100 --> 00:37:39,800 There's no scenario where it just doesn't make sense, to 616 00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:43,300 apply voice Biometrics as part of the authentication string or 617 00:37:43,300 --> 00:37:47,700 the identification not for me. Even I like a loud loud. 618 00:37:47,700 --> 00:37:52,300 Place quiet place place maybe with a lot of voices like an 619 00:37:52,300 --> 00:37:56,600 airport or a subway station. No isolation false, anything 620 00:37:56,600 --> 00:37:59,100 like that we already do it, right? 621 00:37:59,100 --> 00:38:03,100 There's a there's an effort that was done by the Air Force and 622 00:38:03,100 --> 00:38:06,300 and the Department of Defense is SNT program which is their 623 00:38:06,300 --> 00:38:08,900 science and Technology. It's kind of like the evaluation 624 00:38:08,900 --> 00:38:13,400 space for the Department of Defense where they literally can 625 00:38:13,400 --> 00:38:17,700 authenticate a pilot standing at his aircraft while it's running 626 00:38:18,900 --> 00:38:22,800 the they can do all kinds of Funky Cold Medina stuff. 627 00:38:23,000 --> 00:38:27,800 Now that I can't think of a single scenario where it would 628 00:38:27,800 --> 00:38:31,800 not be a relevant possibility, okay. 629 00:38:32,100 --> 00:38:36,700 How about it might be capable but what point does the cost? 630 00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:40,800 The benefit are these scenarios where it's super expensive to 631 00:38:40,800 --> 00:38:42,000 have, you know? Okay. 632 00:38:42,000 --> 00:38:45,600 Well do we really need to be able to identify a pilot outside 633 00:38:45,600 --> 00:38:47,700 of his F-16 while the engines are running? 634 00:38:47,900 --> 00:38:51,000 Yes, you can imagine if that's cheap to do not see. 635 00:38:51,200 --> 00:38:56,900 It's well that would not be on the heavier side of cost. 636 00:38:57,500 --> 00:39:00,700 It's really what what drives cost and biotin voice. 637 00:39:00,700 --> 00:39:05,400 Biometrics speed speed to authenticate the thresholds 638 00:39:05,400 --> 00:39:07,700 you're willing to accept. Depth. 639 00:39:07,900 --> 00:39:13,400 And then that's about it. That's probably it speed and 640 00:39:13,400 --> 00:39:21,800 accuracy or those metrics that a buyer of software can really 641 00:39:21,800 --> 00:39:26,000 gauge or get that information from a software vendor. 642 00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:31,400 So if I'm in the market for a VB solution, are those the things 643 00:39:31,400 --> 00:39:36,300 that I should be looking at and are they metrics that the vendor 644 00:39:36,300 --> 00:39:40,100 will Provide and I can rely on their answers. 645 00:39:40,700 --> 00:39:44,200 Okay, well I got me until you threw in the end telling the 646 00:39:44,200 --> 00:39:46,200 truth part. Yeah. 647 00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:48,600 So I mean there's a lot of variation there too. 648 00:39:48,600 --> 00:39:51,000 It's kind of like I feel like I'm not giving you any straight 649 00:39:51,000 --> 00:39:55,300 answers but it's true. I mean, when you look at, if 650 00:39:55,300 --> 00:39:58,300 you're in the market for VB solution, you need to solidly 651 00:39:58,300 --> 00:40:04,500 understand why and what are your requirements meaning like, do I 652 00:40:04,500 --> 00:40:09,600 have an alternative flow that It's less expensive if I give up 653 00:40:09,600 --> 00:40:13,700 but a percentage or if I require a little slightly longer 654 00:40:13,700 --> 00:40:18,500 elongation of audio acquisition. You got to look at all that 655 00:40:18,500 --> 00:40:21,100 before you have the conversations of percentages. 656 00:40:21,700 --> 00:40:25,400 But like in a, in a financial entity, you're not going to want 657 00:40:25,700 --> 00:40:31,600 anything less than 99.9% by even would prefer a hundred, but 100 658 00:40:31,600 --> 00:40:38,000 isn't gonna happen, but if I can acquire a positive ID, A hundred 659 00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:40,800 and a hundred percent confidence in three seconds. 660 00:40:40,800 --> 00:40:43,300 I'm n. But if it's 30 seconds, which I 661 00:40:43,308 --> 00:40:46,200 know some banks are still on that old Antiquated technology 662 00:40:46,200 --> 00:40:49,500 where I got to run my mouth and tell you 5 times. 663 00:40:49,500 --> 00:40:52,200 How much I love my to use my voice as my password. 664 00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:54,000 No, thanks. Not going to happen. 665 00:40:54,000 --> 00:40:58,400 I'm just gonna hit zero like a vicious lie right that. 666 00:40:58,400 --> 00:41:03,400 No, that's clearly annoying but I guess I want a clarification 667 00:41:03,400 --> 00:41:07,100 on that. So is it 30 seconds if I know Oh 668 00:41:07,107 --> 00:41:11,200 okay. It's claiming to be Mel dial and 669 00:41:11,200 --> 00:41:15,200 so I just have to check this boys against what I know for Mel 670 00:41:15,400 --> 00:41:18,400 or is it? You are one of my 200 million 671 00:41:18,400 --> 00:41:22,100 customers and now I have to use your voice to figure out, which 672 00:41:22,100 --> 00:41:23,500 of those two hundred million customers. 673 00:41:23,500 --> 00:41:25,500 Are you therein lies? The rub gym? 674 00:41:25,500 --> 00:41:28,400 That is absolutely. The differentiator 675 00:41:28,400 --> 00:41:33,000 algorithmically is inclusionary logic versus exclusionary logic 676 00:41:33,100 --> 00:41:39,300 and the voice Biometrics algorithmic approach, It sounds 677 00:41:39,400 --> 00:41:42,000 like it wouldn't make any difference but when you look at 678 00:41:42,000 --> 00:41:45,600 it scientifically, the data is there that if I already know you 679 00:41:45,600 --> 00:41:50,700 exist, like if there was a global voice biometric database 680 00:41:50,700 --> 00:41:57,200 of everyone to authenticate anything then it's going to be 681 00:41:57,200 --> 00:42:00,900 100%. Inclusionary logic meaning can I 682 00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:04,600 I don't even look to see if you're excluded from the data 683 00:42:04,600 --> 00:42:07,900 set. Exclusionary logic is Is where 684 00:42:07,900 --> 00:42:13,400 they look at it and say. So can I exclude her from being 685 00:42:13,400 --> 00:42:18,700 any other entity than Mel demon and so that algorithmically and 686 00:42:18,700 --> 00:42:22,300 how you forge? The process is where that 687 00:42:22,300 --> 00:42:25,600 becomes a differentiator so what's next for voice 688 00:42:25,600 --> 00:42:28,100 Biometrics? Like what's the cool thing 689 00:42:28,100 --> 00:42:31,600 coming up that we need to be aware of so it's here but 690 00:42:31,800 --> 00:42:37,400 sentiment and intention are wicked. 691 00:42:37,800 --> 00:42:41,700 And now it's here but it's not widely used yet. 692 00:42:42,200 --> 00:42:47,800 I think it's worth looking at. If you're in an industry, there 693 00:42:47,800 --> 00:42:51,900 are so many use cases. Where sentiment and phraseology 694 00:42:52,100 --> 00:42:57,200 is really under estimated right now. 695 00:42:57,500 --> 00:43:02,000 There's a lot of value there even if it's good versus bad or 696 00:43:02,000 --> 00:43:06,000 if it's there really irritated or they say they're irritated, 697 00:43:06,000 --> 00:43:08,800 they're really not or They make a false claim. 698 00:43:09,400 --> 00:43:14,800 It's not like a lie detector but if you're multimodal fusing you 699 00:43:14,800 --> 00:43:18,900 absolutely have a lie detector capability and multimodal fused 700 00:43:18,900 --> 00:43:22,500 Biometrics. So it depends on your industry 701 00:43:22,500 --> 00:43:25,300 of course. But sentiment phraseology is 702 00:43:25,300 --> 00:43:29,100 wicked cool. And that is the factor. 703 00:43:29,300 --> 00:43:37,800 Allowing that deception versus well-intended in the Also, the 704 00:43:37,800 --> 00:43:42,100 biometric I've kind of seen that that sentiment in some recent 705 00:43:42,100 --> 00:43:44,300 Sci-Fi films, and TV shows that it watching. 706 00:43:44,600 --> 00:43:46,300 It's like, you know, you have the scanners, I call the 707 00:43:46,300 --> 00:43:48,600 person's lying, just by the way, they're talking, how do you 708 00:43:48,600 --> 00:43:52,300 establish sentiment? Like how does a normal person do 709 00:43:52,300 --> 00:43:54,700 this? Or is it just the massive amount 710 00:43:54,700 --> 00:43:57,600 of data that's out there and correlating it across the other 711 00:43:57,600 --> 00:43:59,800 modes? That is not my area of 712 00:43:59,800 --> 00:44:03,200 expertise. There's a couple wicked cool 713 00:44:03,200 --> 00:44:08,800 scientists who are doing nothing but that and that the only 714 00:44:08,800 --> 00:44:12,000 company I know right now who's really nailing it is next video 715 00:44:12,400 --> 00:44:15,500 which was bought by nice systems. 716 00:44:16,500 --> 00:44:19,800 They're the only company I've seen that has truly made some 717 00:44:19,800 --> 00:44:23,400 strides there and how do you send him outside of the 718 00:44:23,400 --> 00:44:26,000 government space? It's used all over and 719 00:44:26,000 --> 00:44:32,300 government but for different purposes but the industry talk 720 00:44:32,300 --> 00:44:34,400 to the scientists over a next idea. 721 00:44:35,500 --> 00:44:37,000 Okay. I think it's probably a show 722 00:44:37,000 --> 00:44:39,000 topic. Maybe 2023 given where we're at 723 00:44:39,000 --> 00:44:40,300 right now in the air. Yeah. 724 00:44:40,300 --> 00:44:42,000 I think I'm deaf agreed that one out. 725 00:44:43,700 --> 00:44:47,000 What about AI when it comes to voice Biometrics? 726 00:44:47,300 --> 00:44:51,100 And the use cases, I'm thinking here is data from Star Trek, a 727 00:44:51,100 --> 00:44:55,100 walking talking Android that is a, you know, symbol chroma of a 728 00:44:55,107 --> 00:44:57,800 human being. Do you think at some point that 729 00:44:57,800 --> 00:45:00,500 they would have their own vows biometric? 730 00:45:00,500 --> 00:45:02,700 Or would it be maybe something else behind this? 731 00:45:02,700 --> 00:45:06,800 Seems like micro service API calls based on Bluetooth or 732 00:45:06,800 --> 00:45:08,500 Wi-Fi. Signals that the robot is 733 00:45:08,500 --> 00:45:10,900 generating or things like that, I would. 734 00:45:11,000 --> 00:45:13,300 So I would say the capabilities exist today. 735 00:45:14,300 --> 00:45:18,800 I know that there's a couple a eyes that are fully functional 736 00:45:18,800 --> 00:45:23,200 and can do voice activated things. 737 00:45:24,200 --> 00:45:25,800 But I guess the question is should they? 738 00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:27,500 And how far do you want to take that? 739 00:45:27,800 --> 00:45:32,300 But how that happens, it's going to evolve but at this point I 740 00:45:32,300 --> 00:45:34,800 would say it can be on board. Absolutely, you can have on 741 00:45:34,800 --> 00:45:37,500 board until robots, take over the world and we have to all 742 00:45:37,500 --> 00:45:41,100 Will Smith mute so there's I don't know. 743 00:45:41,100 --> 00:45:44,400 Remember the name of it there's it's all over the place right 744 00:45:44,400 --> 00:45:50,400 now where it mostly actually in them and asia-pac region where 745 00:45:50,400 --> 00:45:55,200 they're generating whole songs. Whole artists 100% with AI. 746 00:45:56,400 --> 00:45:59,900 But I'm too old to remember the name and this is full-on 747 00:45:59,900 --> 00:46:02,200 original. I guess. 748 00:46:02,200 --> 00:46:05,100 Scores or songs or interesting upgrade. 749 00:46:05,300 --> 00:46:07,800 Yeah, I've seen them do. I've heard my daughter's really 750 00:46:07,800 --> 00:46:13,600 into this and I've heard EDM, I've heard an opera singer. 751 00:46:14,300 --> 00:46:16,500 The who wasn't really officer was an AI. 752 00:46:17,300 --> 00:46:22,900 I've heard, what's that? You said have ever leader Jim. 753 00:46:24,400 --> 00:46:26,000 What's the name of that genre of music? 754 00:46:26,200 --> 00:46:31,600 Are they country top? No, I didn't hear country. 755 00:46:31,600 --> 00:46:35,200 I forget. But it's like an evolved gen Z 756 00:46:35,900 --> 00:46:39,100 genre of music. But I forgive you yet, so it's 757 00:46:39,100 --> 00:46:41,100 super cool. It's there and it's only going 758 00:46:41,100 --> 00:46:44,600 to get better. This is that is the Fidelity of 759 00:46:44,600 --> 00:46:48,500 that audio there or is it still mechanical sounding? 760 00:46:48,600 --> 00:46:50,000 Oh, no. Not even a little bit 761 00:46:50,800 --> 00:46:53,200 interesting. So I think when the yeah, 762 00:46:53,200 --> 00:46:58,400 gotcha, well I think when, you know, You can take data points 763 00:46:58,400 --> 00:47:00,300 and big data and crunch it all together. 764 00:47:00,400 --> 00:47:03,600 I mean, they already know like beats for a minute what people 765 00:47:03,600 --> 00:47:08,200 like and what, you know, how to construct songs, so that people 766 00:47:08,200 --> 00:47:11,800 are attracted to them. Now, take that and start taking 767 00:47:11,800 --> 00:47:15,900 what kind of voices people are tend to like and you mix all 768 00:47:15,900 --> 00:47:19,300 that together and hit the themes that people like and now all of 769 00:47:19,300 --> 00:47:24,900 a sudden you just have an algorithm algorithmically you 770 00:47:24,900 --> 00:47:28,500 know made to be popular. Or song or even just customized 771 00:47:28,500 --> 00:47:30,200 right to a person's flavor profile. 772 00:47:30,200 --> 00:47:33,600 Yeah, now when I like our EDM Jim likes this country, right? 773 00:47:33,600 --> 00:47:35,700 We're going to have different opinions over everything at 774 00:47:35,700 --> 00:47:38,700 different point. Why you are our own unique 775 00:47:38,700 --> 00:47:43,000 listening sound pattern, right? We could essentially generate 776 00:47:43,500 --> 00:47:48,400 audio on the Fly that matches with our mood or whatever our 777 00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:50,500 preferences. Our I think that is fascinating. 778 00:47:50,700 --> 00:47:54,300 It is fascinating, it's like Spotify unwrapped on steroids 779 00:47:54,300 --> 00:47:55,900 basically. Yeah. 780 00:47:57,300 --> 00:47:59,700 All right, you we've been talking awful lot here. 781 00:47:59,900 --> 00:48:03,700 I want to close out on a lighter note and got a couple options. 782 00:48:03,700 --> 00:48:06,400 And the one that I'm going to pick here, is you have your own 783 00:48:06,400 --> 00:48:10,600 late-night talk show who do you invite as your first guest 784 00:48:10,800 --> 00:48:12,600 melting? Then it's the melting man show 785 00:48:12,900 --> 00:48:15,800 hearing, I don't know every night at end on NBC. 786 00:48:16,600 --> 00:48:18,300 Who's your first guest on your new show? 787 00:48:18,700 --> 00:48:21,800 Do they have to be alive? No II didn't specify so you can 788 00:48:21,800 --> 00:48:23,500 pick. Anybody want really, Jeff? 789 00:48:23,600 --> 00:48:25,500 That's hard. I would have like a hundred and 790 00:48:25,500 --> 00:48:27,400 twenty people. Pull off the bat that I would 791 00:48:27,400 --> 00:48:30,500 say. I want to pick one or maybe pick 792 00:48:30,500 --> 00:48:34,800 a wine up two or three guests. All right. 793 00:48:34,900 --> 00:48:41,700 I would want Harriet Tubman because she was a badass, I 794 00:48:41,700 --> 00:48:48,300 would want George Washington. And then modern day, I would 795 00:48:48,300 --> 00:48:52,400 want. The creators of South Park, 796 00:48:53,900 --> 00:48:55,400 Matt. And was that Matt Striker? 797 00:48:55,400 --> 00:48:56,600 Interesting. Yeah, okay. 798 00:48:57,900 --> 00:49:01,900 That's a lot years. That's a strong opening night, 799 00:49:01,900 --> 00:49:04,300 right? I didn't think of historical 800 00:49:04,300 --> 00:49:06,800 figures. I my mind went right to Elon 801 00:49:06,800 --> 00:49:09,200 Musk. Oh, he's I have such a 802 00:49:09,200 --> 00:49:13,100 girl-crush on him. Oh, be still my heart. 803 00:49:13,700 --> 00:49:16,400 Yeah, that's that's my choice. What about you Jeff? 804 00:49:18,300 --> 00:49:20,000 Yeah, I'm torn. So I'm going to pick two and 805 00:49:20,000 --> 00:49:23,200 cheat. That's why I gave Mel cover to 806 00:49:23,200 --> 00:49:26,400 pick whatever she wanted. I'm going with George Carlin. 807 00:49:28,100 --> 00:49:32,000 As the opening guess and then Jon Stewart is sort of on the 808 00:49:32,000 --> 00:49:35,400 bench there as well. Hurry up, that's who I would 809 00:49:35,400 --> 00:49:38,400 start with why I'm a fan of comedy, and I think it would be 810 00:49:38,400 --> 00:49:43,400 just a fascinating conversation, given how popular Carlin has 811 00:49:43,400 --> 00:49:46,800 been for decades, especially even him and he passed away, you 812 00:49:46,800 --> 00:49:49,900 know, few years back. But he's still such an influence 813 00:49:49,900 --> 00:49:52,700 for a lot of comics and a lot of the genres of Comedy that are 814 00:49:52,700 --> 00:49:57,300 out there now, feed off of sort of that, you know, not 815 00:49:57,300 --> 00:50:02,000 necessarily Political but socio, societal kind of observations 816 00:50:02,000 --> 00:50:05,100 and things like that. And I think Jon Stewart took it 817 00:50:05,100 --> 00:50:09,200 to more of the political level of it, which I thought was just 818 00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:12,100 hilarious. And I can, I could I could watch 819 00:50:12,100 --> 00:50:14,600 The Daily Show from from years and years on end. 820 00:50:14,600 --> 00:50:18,000 And Trevor Noah, you know, was his last show was last night, so 821 00:50:18,000 --> 00:50:20,900 we were watching that one last night, but I would go with 822 00:50:20,900 --> 00:50:23,700 George Carlin and Jon Stewart as the two that I would have on 823 00:50:23,700 --> 00:50:25,500 there and then somebody historical. 824 00:50:25,500 --> 00:50:27,300 I think would be cool to have like Abraham Lincoln. 825 00:50:27,800 --> 00:50:31,800 You know what movie were you gonna go see things like that. 826 00:50:32,100 --> 00:50:37,100 What movie? Yeah, movies back then I've got 827 00:50:37,100 --> 00:50:40,800 a, I've got a share, my George Harlem story. 828 00:50:40,800 --> 00:50:47,300 So yeah, one of my co-workers 15 years ago or something this guy 829 00:50:47,300 --> 00:50:51,900 was hilarious and name was Patrick Gibbons and his father 830 00:50:51,900 --> 00:50:54,900 was a drill sergeant in the Marines. 831 00:50:54,900 --> 00:50:58,600 So you think like his dad must have Have been some kind of 832 00:50:58,600 --> 00:51:02,400 like, you know, jerk like really, like overbearing and I 833 00:51:02,408 --> 00:51:05,100 just couldn't imagine because this guy was just so funny. 834 00:51:05,400 --> 00:51:08,400 Well, turns out his father, the drill sergeant in the Marines, 835 00:51:08,600 --> 00:51:11,800 when he was a kid was best friends with George Carlin. 836 00:51:12,200 --> 00:51:13,800 Nah. Yes. 837 00:51:13,900 --> 00:51:16,700 As friends that grew up together and some guy like everything, 838 00:51:16,700 --> 00:51:18,100 mr. George Carlin here. 839 00:51:18,200 --> 00:51:20,900 Yeah. You know, I guess six degrees. 840 00:51:20,900 --> 00:51:22,900 Exactly. I don't have the anti three 841 00:51:22,900 --> 00:51:25,600 degrees now, right? Yeah, because I'm Jimmy, right, 842 00:51:25,600 --> 00:51:27,200 we're both connected. Yeah. 843 00:51:27,900 --> 00:51:30,000 We're not hit the same rank my all right. 844 00:51:30,000 --> 00:51:32,400 One of my Idols. So I think I think we'll go 845 00:51:32,408 --> 00:51:34,400 ahead and leave it there for this week Mel you been really 846 00:51:34,400 --> 00:51:36,400 generous to the time I want to ask for two more minutes. 847 00:51:36,900 --> 00:51:39,600 What is something that people should take away from this 848 00:51:39,600 --> 00:51:41,500 conversation about voice Biometrics? 849 00:51:41,900 --> 00:51:48,000 If anything going in wrapping up 22 going into 2023, what do I 850 00:51:48,000 --> 00:51:51,400 need to know? Biometrics is not a privacy 851 00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:54,300 concern. It's not pii. 852 00:51:55,000 --> 00:51:58,600 And number two, use it. There's a use case for it 853 00:51:58,600 --> 00:52:01,400 everywhere, the end. Okay. 854 00:52:01,400 --> 00:52:03,300 Do you need two minutes Jimbo yourself? 855 00:52:03,300 --> 00:52:04,700 Final thoughts for this week? Yeah. 856 00:52:04,700 --> 00:52:09,500 My final thoughts are, I reached out to Mel on a, you know, I saw 857 00:52:09,500 --> 00:52:12,900 her connected to Becky archambault at Gartner. 858 00:52:13,000 --> 00:52:16,500 It didn't know Mel from, you know, anybody else or reached 859 00:52:16,500 --> 00:52:19,900 out super awesome person, Person. 860 00:52:20,000 --> 00:52:24,200 I think you reach out to her and make a connection. 861 00:52:24,900 --> 00:52:27,900 But also, I mean, I would encourage you to take a chance 862 00:52:27,900 --> 00:52:32,900 and anybody who's out there who you think you'd like to, you 863 00:52:32,900 --> 00:52:36,800 know, make a connection with not to try and sell them something 864 00:52:36,800 --> 00:52:39,800 please. But just to, you know, spark 865 00:52:39,800 --> 00:52:42,700 that conversation or be connected and follow them or 866 00:52:42,700 --> 00:52:46,100 whatever, go for it. Well, the worst they can do is 867 00:52:46,100 --> 00:52:49,200 blow you off or black, you disconnect? 868 00:52:50,500 --> 00:52:54,300 Yeah, that hurt over it. Yeah, there you go. 869 00:52:54,300 --> 00:52:57,200 No, I think, you know, I think it's okay to ask for help right. 870 00:52:57,200 --> 00:53:00,600 There are the problems that a lot of us face especially in any 871 00:53:00,600 --> 00:53:02,700 space have probably been solved before. 872 00:53:03,200 --> 00:53:04,500 Right. And then the stronger, your 873 00:53:04,500 --> 00:53:07,600 network is the more people, you know, and more people that you, 874 00:53:07,900 --> 00:53:11,000 that, you know, and that they know can help you get to that 875 00:53:11,000 --> 00:53:12,800 answer quicker, right? We don't need to solve 876 00:53:12,800 --> 00:53:15,700 everything for the first time, so yeah, ask for help. 877 00:53:15,800 --> 00:53:17,900 I think that's ask for advice, right? 878 00:53:17,900 --> 00:53:20,200 See how other people are doing? That's why I'm a big fan of 879 00:53:20,200 --> 00:53:23,500 organizations like ID Pro, for example, and the slack Channel 880 00:53:23,500 --> 00:53:25,800 they have, right? And you know, this podcast will 881 00:53:25,800 --> 00:53:29,400 bring all kinds of viewpoints, you know, to, to the conscious 882 00:53:29,400 --> 00:53:31,300 level. Hopefully, if you're not already 883 00:53:31,300 --> 00:53:35,600 subconscious after listening. So, that's, I think, you know, 884 00:53:35,600 --> 00:53:37,200 be aware of that. And I think Mel if you're cool 885 00:53:37,200 --> 00:53:40,300 with it, we typically will put our guests LinkedIn connection 886 00:53:40,300 --> 00:53:42,900 into our show notes. And if they have questions, they 887 00:53:42,908 --> 00:53:45,300 can reach out and you know, maybe tell you that you're 888 00:53:45,300 --> 00:53:47,400 wrong, or maybe that you're right, or maybe somewhere in 889 00:53:47,400 --> 00:53:49,200 between, right. I've been wrong. 890 00:53:50,300 --> 00:53:52,400 It's rare but it happens go to you. 891 00:53:52,600 --> 00:53:55,700 If you tell Mel she's wrong, expect a response. 892 00:53:56,600 --> 00:53:59,300 Probably a scientific way. Over analysed one. 893 00:53:59,800 --> 00:54:01,800 Okay we're gonna go ahead and leave it for this week. 894 00:54:02,400 --> 00:54:05,500 Want to thank everyone for listening and you can find us on 895 00:54:05,500 --> 00:54:07,300 the web by Danny at the center.com. 896 00:54:07,400 --> 00:54:12,900 We're on Twitter so far still at idac podcast and yeah with that 897 00:54:12,900 --> 00:54:14,900 we'll go ahead and leave it for this week mellow thanks you so 898 00:54:14,900 --> 00:54:17,400 much for taking the time. Jim as always thanks for the 899 00:54:17,408 --> 00:54:19,200 time and we'll talk with everyone. 900 00:54:19,300 --> 00:54:24,400 One in the next one. Thanks for listening to the 901 00:54:25,400 --> 00:54:27,200 podcast. If you like what you heard, 902 00:54:27,200 --> 00:54:30,500 don't forget to subscribe and visit us on the web and identity 903 00:54:30,500 --> 00:54:31,400 at the center.com.