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This is identity at the center. 
If it has anything to do with I 

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am this is the go-to podcast. 
So if you're a beginner or an 

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expert or anyone in between 
you've found your new home 

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welcome to Identity at the 
center now your host Jim 

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McDonald and Jeff Steadman 
Welcome to the identity of the 

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center podcast I'm Jeff and 
that's Jim. 

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Hey Jim. 
Hey Jeff, how are you? 

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Not so bad yourself. 
Good. 

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You're laughing because you see 
me smiling. 

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As you know I got something 
funny. 

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Something do I don't know. 
It's funny. 

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You've been on a roller of the 
whole bunch of Downers recently.

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So hopefully it's funny. 
Yeah, yeah. 

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Well I think this one's kind of 
funny so I normally don't do 

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this but I mean everybody knows 
this is the trust and identity 

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talk with email or so even I got
together a little bit earlier to

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talk about What we're going to 
talk about and we came up with 

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an idea, which is that 
everybody's going to think we're

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going to talk about zero trust, 
right? 

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As part of trust and identity 
and we came up with a drinking 

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game idea. 
So anytime someone says zero 

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trust on this episode, you got 
to do a shot but if we're not 

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talking zero trust that drink 
then nobody's gonna be drinking 

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or is that the intent? 
Well, the idea is that I think 

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somebody's going to say at some 
point but Yeah, I mean the 

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intent. 
Probably best thing for you is 

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not to be doing shots because I 
asked you about what you're 

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going to do tonight. 
And by the way, it is Friday. 

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So it's Friday night and you're 
going to be working on 

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statements work. 
So yeah, it's a funny Friday we 

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shots. 
Yeah, I'm currently in Boston, 

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still recording from a hotel 
room. 

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And yeah, I will be working on 
what we statements of work, 

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which is a good thing. 
That means that, you know, 

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people are engaging with us to 
do stuff, not going to complain 

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about that. 
Not the most exciting Friday, 

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but that's fine. 
And yeah, and then I fly home 

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Saturday and then I think I turn
around and fly back out on 

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Tuesday, so I got a pretty busy 
schedule. 

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Actually, for travel, I think 
I'm on the road, every week 

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until the end of March right now
and for those traveling men. 

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Yeah, I'm a traveling man. 
And right now it's today is 

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February 17th. 
So I think when this goes out, 

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I'll be a couple weeks later but
that's probably, that's part of 

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the reason why I'm traveling so 
much as we're recording kind of 

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work around that travel 
schedule, so good times. 

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Yeah, I was going to make. 
I was going to make a comment 

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about your back. 
And being so cool for a hotel 

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like most hotels on have 
ceilings that look like that. 

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It looks like you're out of a 
ski lodge or something, but as 

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actually, it made me reflect on 
its on a couple calls this week 

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with identity access management 
professionals. 

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And it seems like 50% of people 
in identity and access 

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management play instruments, 
primarily the guitar. 

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And I mean, what better guests 
to have on the podcast that you 

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may learn. 
When we're going to talk about, 

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you know, playing rock and roll 
and doing identity and access 

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management. 
Yeah. 

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ZZ off Fame. 
So, you know, it's cool to have 

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her on and she can bring her 
golden pipes. 

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I think to the, to the episode, 
before we get to that, we're 

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going to be at Gartner in a 
couple weeks, right? 

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So we're going to be onstage and
hopefully having a very 

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interesting and different show 
that maybe people are used to it

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Gartner, when we talked with, 
Enrique and Becky. 

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It's on. 
I know you think it's going to 

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go. 
I think it's doing a fantastic. 

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I mean a lot of the questions 
that the community of already 

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sent our way are really good. 
I think, what your point you 

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pointed out in an earlier 
episode which was the idea that 

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a lot of the questions are 
coming from the same angle. 

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So we're going to have to like 
combine those because we only 

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have like a half hour on stage 
so we can ask 20 questions. 

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But if we get three or four or 
five, really good questions, I 

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think it'll be fantastic. 
Then, of course, hard questions.

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Do not just softballs right, 
exactly. 

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Yeah. 
Not like, like we do on the on 

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the podcast, right, but it's 
gonna be more like Meet the 

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Press. 
No, I mean, of course, 

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professional of course Matic, 
right. 

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All that stuff, but all that 
goes, hopefully questions that 

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you haven't heard before asked. 
And answered, you know, millions

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of times before in different 
ways. 

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Yeah. 
I'm trying to find another 

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conference but good different. 
I'm excited about the 

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conference. 
I'm also excited about the idea 

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to center community event that 
we're going to be holding on 

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Tuesday night. 
So anybody is a listener of the 

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podcast, regular listener, want 
to get out and meet Jeff and I 

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meet other people who listen to 
the podcast, please reach out 

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and make sure that we get you 
that registration link so you 

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can sign up. 
I think space is going to be 

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somewhat limited. 
So why should they get ahold of 

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you send a message on LinkedIn? 
I think the best way to send a 

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message on. 
Tin. 

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I mean, we might just through 
the link right on LinkedIn, but 

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I'm a little worried about like 
that turning into some kind of 

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like spam bot program. 
You know, we wind up getting I 

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just kind of thousands of stuff 
like that. 

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Yeah, yeah, exactly. 
So, all those kind of things, 

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but best case, I think, just 
reach out to me and you and, you

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know, anybody who's out there 
listening to the podcast on a 

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regular basis, we'd like to 
confirm you anyway. 

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You're personally invited. 
How about that? 

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All right, why do we get to our 
topic which is trust in 

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identity. 
We've got Eve. 

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Mailer again, she's the chief 
technology officer at Ford Rock.

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Welcome back to the show. 
Eve, it is such a pleasure to be

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here guys. 
It's and I guess I'm going to 

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see you at at Gartner because 
that's kind of around the corner

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for me. 
Yeah, exciting stuff. 

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And maybe if we get lucky, we 
might even hear. 

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Sabrina who I hear is traveling 
with you. 

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She is currently. 
Traveling with me. 

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That's my little Pomeranian 
Chihuahua miniature poodle up. 

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So we'll be lucky if we get to 
hear that. 

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We always encourage our guests 
and their pets to come on. 

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And we have yet to have one make
a peep on the show. 

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So yeah, that's not that bad. 
Yeah. 

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Now it now for sure it'll happen
right? 

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Well, so we were looking back 
into our many archives of shows 

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now and you've been on the show 
now three and a half times. 

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You were way back with us very 
early on episode number 48, we 

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talked about um a episode 116, 
we talk through for Drought 

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consumer identity breach report 
which is really fascinating 

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report. 
So I'm looking forward to the 

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next one that comes out and then
we did also obviously today but 

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the half episode is the one we 
did around? 

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What is the difference between 
digital identity and identity 

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and access management? 
And we asked identity friends, 

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you know what was their take on 
it and you were kind enough to 

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send in a response? 
What I want to do now is 

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actually play You said and this 
would have been 50 episodes. 

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Now. 
Roughly so almost a year. 

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These are busy. 
Yeah, we're not so over here. 

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So I'm going to play it and 
let's see what you said and then

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going to see if has your 
Viewpoint or answer change. 

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Let me play that clip now. 
Identity language has been a 

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contentious subject for a long 
time thinking back to the 

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beginnings of iiw, the internet 
identity Workshop, the original 

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effort by that Community was to 
actually Develop a lexicon 

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comprehensive lexicon. 
It was tough going then and I 

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think it's always tough going in
this area. 

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How I see digital identity as a 
phrase is that it applies to the

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users of or the interactors with
identity technology. 

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And I see, I am as being about 
the implementation of identity 

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technology in whatever guys. 
So, when it comes to digital 

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identity, the kind of the user 
perspective, you know, most 

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people interact with identity in
a way that actually isn't all 

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that Pleasant identity theft is 
probably the first thing that 

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comes to mind. 
And a lot of times that 

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interaction is actually in an 
offline fashion versus an online

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runtime authentication. 
For example, fashion When it 

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comes to I am that term itself 
is, is a bucket for a lot of 

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other different things and 
sometimes they overlap. 

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But I am sometimes there may be 
a little bit apart. 

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So identity management, kind of 
life cycle, considerations 

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access management, really all 
the runtime considerations and 

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also governance and 
administration which gets into 

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the world of really operational 
things. 

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And there's this phrase that I 
really like lately bolts, which 

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is business, operational, legal 
Technical and societal. 

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So that's kind of the game that 
you get into when you talk about

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both the above, the water user 
considerations and the below, 

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the water, implementer 
considerations one, of the 

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things that I find when I just 
talked with ordinary people out 

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there who don't do what I do 
about, what you could call the 

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jobs to be done of digital 
identity. 

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Is that all of the things people
expect to get from this sort of 

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Technology It cross Cuts would 
things businesses want as well. 

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You know, I have a new Venn 
diagram about this where, I 

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think, in terms of protection, 
and personalization, and 

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payment, and people, so there 
are unique needs among all of 

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those categories and they cross 
cut quite a lot of things like 

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achieving security is actually 
something that's welcomed by 

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people. 
And by businesses, it applies 

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across all of the identity 
language. 

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Okay, so a couple things there, 
Eve one, I love that you called 

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other people. 
Ordinary People not weirdos in 

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the identity space. 
Second of all has your thoughts 

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on, you know what you said 
there? 

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Change it all evolved or do you 
still think they hold true? 

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Um, I I still represent those 
remarks I suppose, I would say 

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my understanding of the of the 
distinction, between the user 

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perspective and the implemented 
perspective has deepened. 

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Since you know since that time 
you guys know I run the 

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Innovation Labs here at Ford 
Rock and and you know I've been 

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working this great team and all 
last year we were putting 

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together a kind of a fully 
articulated long-term Vision so 

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that we could be the Change. 
We want to see in the world for 

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our customers and for their 
users and the topics all broke 

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out really neatly into identity 
users and identity implementers.

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And I think, empathizing with 
users and interactors is 

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something we can obviously do 
more of. 

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It's one of the toughest things 
to do and when I go out to speak

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with our customers, who are, you
know, there to tend to be large 

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Enterprises, many of them have. 
June's for the next hundred 

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years because some of them have 
been around 100 years. 

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And you know here they are doing
digital transformation and 

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everything they kind of they do 
care a lot about the 

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implementation, right? 
They want to do that, right? 

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But the reason they do it is for
all the people who interact 

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whether its Workforce or 
consumer or whatever. 

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So I kind of find a split useful
in my daily job, so that's good.

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So we're still on the same path.
I thought was interesting about 

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that. 
Clip was an end. 

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I still say to this day when we,
when we got all the answers back

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it seems like everybody in the 
The identity space had a 

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different answer and I like 
them. 

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All right. 
I listen to them. 

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Yeah, that's good, that's good. 
No, I agree with that one. 

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Well, this works right them? 
No, I don't wanna Force Franco. 

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Well, that's the interesting 
part, right? 

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It was nobody was wrong. 
Like, I felt like everybody was 

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right. 
And I think that sometimes, you 

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know, speaks to maybe a little 
complexity sometimes and the 

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Nuance that gets lost in 
identity conversations and that 

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context matters. 
And you know, where do you? 

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You know, what is your 
definition of digital identity? 

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Compared to I am, right? 
That was the question and 

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everyone's got a different 
Viewpoint, what did find 

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interesting, was the one person 
who sent in their response, Adam

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from Texas A&M, he's not an 
identity, vendor reseller 

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consultant, right? 
He's running it in the real 

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world as I'll call it. 
Yeah, yeah. 

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Doing identity for, you know, 
for real things and he had a 

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00:12:19,100 --> 00:12:21,500
totally different answer than 
everyone else again, not wrong, 

228
00:12:21,500 --> 00:12:23,400
or not, right compared to 
everyone else's, but was just a 

229
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totally different different 
definition. 

230
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So It was fascinating. 
Correction. 

231
00:12:27,900 --> 00:12:31,500
Yeah, how it all worked out. 
We're going to talk about trust 

232
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today and I think before we get 
too far along, I'm not going to 

233
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say the Z word because we're not
talking about that. 

234
00:12:37,500 --> 00:12:39,800
Not only way to get drunk floor 
there, you know, pull over to 

235
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the side of the road. 
You know, dude, do bad things or

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maybe and what I'd like to 
figure out first is, you know, 

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that definition? 
What are we calling trust? 

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Like how do you, how do you 
define it to people that you 

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interact with it's so tough. 
I actually had a really good 

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00:12:57,000 --> 00:12:59,000
conversation with my bass player
back. 

241
00:12:59,000 --> 00:13:01,400
When I was in Seattle about 
this, he was a psychologist by 

242
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training and he defined it as 
just you know, sort of feeling 

243
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like you had a guarantee of 
somebody's next behavior and it 

244
00:13:11,600 --> 00:13:14,400
didn't necessarily mean good 
behavior like you know if 

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somebody in your family you know
constantly got drunk or whatever

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00:13:17,400 --> 00:13:23,200
and you know, acted badly, you 
could trust that they were going

247
00:13:23,200 --> 00:13:25,600
to do something, right? 
And that's not necessarily a 

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good thing. 
Thing. 

249
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I thought that was interesting, 
but in our line of work, you 

250
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know, I think people sort of 
keep on trying to steer around 

251
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the word because it just means 
so many different things to 

252
00:13:35,200 --> 00:13:37,800
different audiences. 
We pick different words like 

253
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Assurance, right? 
So recently I was, I was 

254
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speaking, I guess was a TI C on 
what it means to package, ethics

255
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into a technology stack. 
And I had found a couple of 

256
00:13:51,900 --> 00:13:54,500
different definitions and I 
think these are my two favorite 

257
00:13:54,500 --> 00:13:57,100
definitions. 
One of them comes from Rachel 

258
00:13:57,100 --> 00:13:59,900
botsman, who's a, she's an 
expert in digital trust. 

259
00:14:00,900 --> 00:14:04,500
And she did this Ted Talk on how
we've stopped trusting 

260
00:14:04,500 --> 00:14:06,800
institutions and started 
trusting strangers. 

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And her definition was trust, is
a confident relationship to the 

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unknown. 
And I kind of like that one 

263
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because I think, particularly, 
from the perspective of the 

264
00:14:19,400 --> 00:14:22,200
individuals that we serve, so 
kind of like those identity 

265
00:14:22,200 --> 00:14:27,400
users, I think it talks to what 
what they're looking for. 

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00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:32,500
They want sort of certainty, 
some level of certainty, maybe 

267
00:14:32,500 --> 00:14:35,700
it harks back to my bass player 
/ psychologist. 

268
00:14:37,200 --> 00:14:39,300
But there's another definition 
that I liked and I like to pair 

269
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with it and this comes from my 
colleague, Alan Foster. 

270
00:14:41,600 --> 00:14:45,400
You many folks know, and his 
definition is Trust is shared 

271
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vulnerability, the consequences 
and I think this one's, it's 

272
00:14:49,600 --> 00:14:52,500
important in a certain way, it 
puts an onus. 

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00:14:52,500 --> 00:14:55,700
First of all on the non-person 
entities, in the equation, you 

274
00:14:55,700 --> 00:14:58,700
can sort of, okay, if it's 
shared or you can even imagine 

275
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like employee-employer 
relationship. 

276
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You know, it has to be shared. 
That's what contracts try and 

277
00:15:03,300 --> 00:15:04,600
do. 
It covers even 

278
00:15:04,600 --> 00:15:08,900
business-to-business Notions of 
trust and it points. 

279
00:15:08,900 --> 00:15:11,600
The way towards figuring out. 
This is one of my favorite 

280
00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:13,800
subjects. 
The incentives in an ecosystem. 

281
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Because if you can figure out, 
who's involved, durable the 

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consequences that incentivizes 
bad behavior. 

283
00:15:20,600 --> 00:15:22,600
And I was thinking about this a 
little bit when I was listening 

284
00:15:22,600 --> 00:15:26,600
to your great podcast with Sarah
recently because you were, you 

285
00:15:26,608 --> 00:15:29,300
guys were talking about the 
tension between enabling 

286
00:15:29,300 --> 00:15:32,900
anonymity online for, you know, 
being able to make comments, you

287
00:15:32,900 --> 00:15:35,300
know, for people who are in 
tough situations and the desire 

288
00:15:35,300 --> 00:15:38,400
to authenticate to protect 
against that invulnerability to 

289
00:15:38,400 --> 00:15:40,900
consequences. 
So that's what I like to think 

290
00:15:40,900 --> 00:15:43,200
about. 
Well, what's the real job to be 

291
00:15:43,208 --> 00:15:44,900
done here? 
Thinking about, you know, 

292
00:15:45,300 --> 00:15:49,100
product management framework 
that I mentioned before you want

293
00:15:49,100 --> 00:15:52,600
to ensure that the real goal, 
the quarter inch hole in the 

294
00:15:52,608 --> 00:15:56,300
wall versus the quarter inch 
drill bit in the situation is 

295
00:15:56,600 --> 00:16:00,100
ensure, everyone has 
consequences for bad digital 

296
00:16:00,100 --> 00:16:02,700
behavior and that includes four 
people which is why we 

297
00:16:02,700 --> 00:16:05,200
authenticate now but you know 
there's people are proposing 

298
00:16:05,200 --> 00:16:08,400
different ways to do that. 
So if anybody who tuned in to 

299
00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:12,100
this podcast, hoping to hear 
about trust between active 

300
00:16:12,100 --> 00:16:16,200
directory, domains or I think 
technical like that is probably 

301
00:16:16,200 --> 00:16:18,600
already stopped the episode, 
right? 

302
00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:20,900
We're going to be talking about 
a different kind of trust. 

303
00:16:20,900 --> 00:16:24,000
We're not going to talk about 
zero, trust drink up. 

304
00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:28,000
This will be my third drinking 
game by the way, actually forth 

305
00:16:28,000 --> 00:16:30,100
because I invented one about 
password list yesterday. 

306
00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:34,300
Okay, okay, well you're on the 
right show, so we're going to 

307
00:16:34,308 --> 00:16:39,600
talk about trust in three 
different stovepipes if you will

308
00:16:39,600 --> 00:16:43,500
or three different context. 
So it's trust in the practice of

309
00:16:43,500 --> 00:16:47,700
I I am trust and bios and Trust 
in. 

310
00:16:47,700 --> 00:16:51,500
I am vendors and by the way you 
work for one of those so you're 

311
00:16:51,500 --> 00:16:54,700
the perfect guest to talk about 
that but I think first and 

312
00:16:54,700 --> 00:16:57,500
foremost, you know, we'd be 
we're going to talk about that 

313
00:16:57,500 --> 00:17:03,000
trust in the practice of I am. 
And how could we not talk about 

314
00:17:03,000 --> 00:17:05,900
self Sovereign ID and verifiable
credentials? 

315
00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:11,599
I think trust is a major thing 
that needs to be talked about in

316
00:17:11,599 --> 00:17:14,200
those two topics. 
Don't you? 

317
00:17:14,200 --> 00:17:16,400
Just go ahead and riff. 
I mean I know this is something 

318
00:17:16,400 --> 00:17:19,400
you think a lot about, I like 
riffing. 

319
00:17:21,000 --> 00:17:24,200
I don't play guitar though. 
Yeah. 

320
00:17:24,599 --> 00:17:27,900
And and you know, you're 
referring to, you know, ad trust

321
00:17:27,900 --> 00:17:31,600
kind of trust domains people. 
Often in our line of work. 

322
00:17:31,600 --> 00:17:33,800
Put things into buckets 
technical trust in business 

323
00:17:33,800 --> 00:17:37,600
trust. 
And really, what, I think 

324
00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:41,300
decentralized identity tries to 
do is to sort of marry those, in

325
00:17:41,300 --> 00:17:42,600
a way. 
I mean, like I was just talking 

326
00:17:42,600 --> 00:17:43,700
to folks from the trust, 
overripe. 

327
00:17:43,900 --> 00:17:45,800
He Foundation where that's 
literally what they're trying to

328
00:17:45,808 --> 00:17:48,100
do. 
They have two stacks that unify,

329
00:17:48,100 --> 00:17:49,000
that's what they're trying to 
do. 

330
00:17:50,000 --> 00:17:54,700
But like, even with technical 
trust in the mix, I can't help 

331
00:17:54,700 --> 00:17:57,300
but get a little bit 
philosophical because you know 

332
00:17:57,500 --> 00:18:00,100
if you look way back to kind of 
like the beanie of the really 

333
00:18:00,100 --> 00:18:03,200
exciting blockchain 
conversation, that was my first 

334
00:18:03,200 --> 00:18:06,600
drinking game, it was about 
making things quote trust list. 

335
00:18:06,600 --> 00:18:10,400
Some people put it that way. 
That was kind of how a lot of 

336
00:18:10,400 --> 00:18:13,300
these conversations started and 
that is ironic with respect to 

337
00:18:13,300 --> 00:18:19,500
that zero thing, trustless trust
free now with zero. 

338
00:18:21,900 --> 00:18:25,400
Hey I'm I got this shot right up
to my lips at the moment. 

339
00:18:25,800 --> 00:18:27,800
I am. 
So going for a drink Friday 

340
00:18:27,800 --> 00:18:29,200
night, I don't write statements 
work. 

341
00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:33,200
I'm just saying, guys, but it 
sounds like a lot of fun. 

342
00:18:34,200 --> 00:18:39,300
So, decentralized architectures 
generally are You know, they're 

343
00:18:39,300 --> 00:18:43,600
making a pitch or evenly 
Distributing vulnerability to 

344
00:18:43,600 --> 00:18:47,200
consequences and I might 
describe that as, you know more 

345
00:18:47,200 --> 00:18:51,100
like resilient Mutual trust, 
write a better job of mutual, 

346
00:18:51,100 --> 00:18:55,900
trust, something like that, 
here's the challenge and 

347
00:18:55,900 --> 00:18:59,400
decentralized systems. 
There's always the possibility, 

348
00:18:59,400 --> 00:19:03,200
indeed, it's kind of a 
likelihood that over time. 

349
00:19:03,200 --> 00:19:07,100
Sometimes very quickly, you get 
what I call Insidious re 

350
00:19:07,100 --> 00:19:10,500
centralization. 
Which messes with the incentives

351
00:19:10,500 --> 00:19:13,300
in one way or another. 
So through exchanges through 

352
00:19:13,300 --> 00:19:17,500
aggregated Services, you look at
the crypto world and and you can

353
00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:21,500
imagine looking at that in light
of decentralized identity 

354
00:19:21,500 --> 00:19:24,600
verifiable credentials and so 
that verifiable credentials 

355
00:19:24,600 --> 00:19:28,100
World. 
It kind of makes a run at being 

356
00:19:28,100 --> 00:19:31,500
able to trust that it was 
something was issued properly. 

357
00:19:31,500 --> 00:19:35,100
Some piece of information was 
issued by somebody you care 

358
00:19:35,100 --> 00:19:38,100
about and you know exact yeah 
I'd go for that. 

359
00:19:38,100 --> 00:19:43,200
I leave that and also making 
Services more trustworthy. 

360
00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:45,800
I can't say that without sort of
air quotes in this particular 

361
00:19:45,800 --> 00:19:51,300
show, for example, through a 
technique of revocation allowing

362
00:19:51,300 --> 00:19:55,100
somebody to like share piece of 
data and then pull it back in a 

363
00:19:55,108 --> 00:19:58,200
technological sense. 
Not making a, you know, right of

364
00:19:58,200 --> 00:20:00,100
a razor request. 
You know, I'm saying, 

365
00:20:01,900 --> 00:20:05,900
unfortunately, you know, even 
sharing a few little pieces of 

366
00:20:05,908 --> 00:20:08,500
information are very likely to 
be correlated. 

367
00:20:08,700 --> 00:20:12,500
Well, it doesn't take much and 
that's a kind of Insidious re 

368
00:20:12,500 --> 00:20:15,000
centralization that it's easy to
kind of just sort of skip over 

369
00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:18,200
in our thinking. 
So I think we still have a tough

370
00:20:18,600 --> 00:20:21,400
road ahead of us in improving 
things. 

371
00:20:21,400 --> 00:20:23,800
We have to be very careful how 
we Implement and very careful 

372
00:20:23,800 --> 00:20:27,200
how we set up systems and very 
careful how we setup ecosystems.

373
00:20:27,800 --> 00:20:29,700
Yeah. 
How we Implement kind of segues 

374
00:20:29,700 --> 00:20:33,900
into my next question or my next
topic which was really thinking 

375
00:20:33,900 --> 00:20:38,400
about organizations or I am 
practitioners trusting there. 

376
00:20:38,600 --> 00:20:42,100
I deep he's so whether it's an 
on-prem product or a product in 

377
00:20:42,100 --> 00:20:46,900
the cloud to authenticate users 
and to do it with high levels of

378
00:20:46,900 --> 00:20:51,100
certainty that there are systems
laying the right people in. 

379
00:20:51,100 --> 00:20:54,600
Not the not the wrong people, 
but there's an aspect of 

380
00:20:54,600 --> 00:20:57,800
configurability. 
So, even in the cloud, you can 

381
00:20:58,300 --> 00:21:00,300
set your own password policy, 
things like that. 

382
00:21:00,300 --> 00:21:03,400
So it's kind of a shared 
responsibility, right? 

383
00:21:03,400 --> 00:21:06,700
It's not like how I trust them 
to do the job for me. 

384
00:21:07,600 --> 00:21:11,200
There's still some of it that 
falls back on the practitioner 

385
00:21:11,200 --> 00:21:14,200
the organization. 
Yeah. 

386
00:21:14,200 --> 00:21:19,000
So our let me ask, are you 
thinking about work, force users

387
00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:21,800
when you talk about that or just
all kind of any users. 

388
00:21:22,200 --> 00:21:24,300
I think you could be any, I 
think it could be any. 

389
00:21:25,200 --> 00:21:28,800
So I mean obviously I think the 
responsibility does go in kind 

390
00:21:28,800 --> 00:21:32,300
of all directions. 
And what's interesting is giving

391
00:21:32,300 --> 00:21:39,500
choice to end users, doesn't 
have to drain In assurance out 

392
00:21:39,500 --> 00:21:41,700
of a system. 
I mean, that's one of the things

393
00:21:41,700 --> 00:21:48,300
that missed 800-637-8170 shared 
language about, you know the 

394
00:21:48,300 --> 00:21:52,500
quality of what you know some 
authentication that's been made 

395
00:21:52,500 --> 00:21:55,600
or the quality of all the 
backing systems. 

396
00:21:55,900 --> 00:21:58,900
And so I think that you can give
choice in that context in a 

397
00:21:58,900 --> 00:22:02,600
really interesting way and by 
the way, giving choice to users 

398
00:22:02,900 --> 00:22:05,700
is a way of giving them that 
confidence. 

399
00:22:05,700 --> 00:22:09,000
And I would say, allowing To 
trust you being trustworthy 

400
00:22:09,900 --> 00:22:12,700
because you're all anybody 
really wants is convenience and 

401
00:22:12,700 --> 00:22:15,300
value and control. 
So if you can give them some 

402
00:22:15,300 --> 00:22:20,400
control while assuring yourself 
that you know, quality hasn't 

403
00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:23,500
degraded in, you know, how 
you're testing them. 

404
00:22:24,100 --> 00:22:26,300
I think that's super powerful. 
I'm not something. 

405
00:22:26,300 --> 00:22:29,400
You know, it's something we do 
actually inside for Dracula with

406
00:22:29,400 --> 00:22:33,300
our, with our own, how we log 
into our own systems allows, a 

407
00:22:33,308 --> 00:22:35,800
great deal of choice including 
like Fido authenticators. 

408
00:22:36,900 --> 00:22:41,300
So I put the fact that you're 
going to be on the show out on 

409
00:22:41,300 --> 00:22:46,400
the ID Pro slack Channel and 
friend of the show Simon Moffat.

410
00:22:46,400 --> 00:22:48,600
Who by the way I'm sure you 
remember. 

411
00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:50,700
As a former forgerock. 
Yeah, yeah. 

412
00:22:50,700 --> 00:22:52,100
He's a friend of weird rock to 
me. 

413
00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:57,100
Yeah, friend of for drug to and 
he commented on that topic that 

414
00:22:57,100 --> 00:23:03,000
I was mentioning that the user 
Trust of the IDP is an even more

415
00:23:03,000 --> 00:23:06,600
interesting question. 
And so my question is, how do 

416
00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:09,000
Idps become more trusted by 
user. 

417
00:23:09,000 --> 00:23:13,900
So how do you move that? 
Move that bar move that line 

418
00:23:13,900 --> 00:23:17,500
and, you know, thinking of it 
from a practitioner perspective?

419
00:23:17,500 --> 00:23:20,200
I always go down to kind of like
the basics. 

420
00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:23,800
So, is this getting to the point
of saying that if I have 

421
00:23:23,800 --> 00:23:28,600
stronger controls by, you know, 
require things like MFA. 

422
00:23:28,600 --> 00:23:34,400
Now, I'm going to increase my 
level of trust with the user 

423
00:23:34,400 --> 00:23:36,400
right? 
As is that kind of what he's 

424
00:23:36,400 --> 00:23:37,900
getting. 
Being at or is there something 

425
00:23:38,100 --> 00:23:41,000
beneath the surface? 
I thought it was an intriguing 

426
00:23:41,000 --> 00:23:44,600
question and I really you know, 
shout out to Simon for a very 

427
00:23:44,600 --> 00:23:48,200
intriguing question. 
I do think, you know, people 

428
00:23:48,200 --> 00:23:50,900
aren't generally aware of. 
You know what an IDP is, they 

429
00:23:50,900 --> 00:23:54,200
probably don't really know how 
to spell or capitalized. 

430
00:23:54,200 --> 00:24:00,800
IDP, they do have relationships 
with service providers and the 

431
00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:03,200
service Predator might be in an 
IDP role, might be an 

432
00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:08,200
architectural and the Paul's 
relationship with their service 

433
00:24:08,200 --> 00:24:10,600
providers in their life. 
It's kind of changing and people

434
00:24:10,600 --> 00:24:18,500
are getting more suspicious 
cynical Savvy and there was a 

435
00:24:18,500 --> 00:24:22,800
had a great opportunity to do a 
white paper along with one 

436
00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:25,900
trust. 
And one of the things that one 

437
00:24:25,900 --> 00:24:28,100
of the stats that we were 
quoting from their this from a 

438
00:24:28,108 --> 00:24:32,900
couple years ago, Edelman is the
the pr agency, huge PR agency. 

439
00:24:32,900 --> 00:24:35,900
And it does this annual trust 
barometer, which seems relevant 

440
00:24:35,900 --> 00:24:37,600
to this conversation. 
Ian and so from a couple of 

441
00:24:37,608 --> 00:24:42,300
years ago, they found that 60% 
of their upon the respondents 

442
00:24:42,600 --> 00:24:46,900
were saying that their default 
tendency is to distrust 

443
00:24:46,900 --> 00:24:48,500
something until they see 
evidence. 

444
00:24:48,500 --> 00:24:51,100
That is trustworthy. 
So that I mean that's kind of a 

445
00:24:51,400 --> 00:24:56,700
number to put to my assertion 
and forty percent of the 

446
00:24:56,700 --> 00:24:59,100
respondents said there are 
Brands they love but no longer 

447
00:24:59,100 --> 00:25:00,800
buy from because they don't 
trust them. 

448
00:25:01,300 --> 00:25:05,100
Now I'm one of those 40 percent 
at the high plurality, right? 

449
00:25:06,700 --> 00:25:11,500
A recent survey for Magna and 
catch found that 74% of 

450
00:25:11,500 --> 00:25:13,700
respondent Highly value data 
privacy. 

451
00:25:13,700 --> 00:25:17,500
And this was about 20 percent 20
percentage points more than 

452
00:25:17,500 --> 00:25:21,000
other modern, ethical issues of 
the day like sustainability. 

453
00:25:21,800 --> 00:25:23,900
And I think it makes sense to me
because it like it could 

454
00:25:23,900 --> 00:25:27,000
personally affect you, right? 
It can, it can mess up your life

455
00:25:27,300 --> 00:25:28,800
if you can't rely on some of 
these things. 

456
00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:34,800
So I do think there's a role for
how practitioners Implement 

457
00:25:34,800 --> 00:25:37,300
these systems and there's an 
Awful lot to do with the 

458
00:25:37,308 --> 00:25:40,800
experience design, which is part
of implementation of identity. 

459
00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:46,200
No question about it. 
It's also about ensuring there's

460
00:25:46,200 --> 00:25:51,500
auditability and transparency 
for some time. 

461
00:25:51,500 --> 00:25:54,300
Now, I've talked about this kind
of, I don't know, modern data, 

462
00:25:54,300 --> 00:25:59,400
privacy 2.0 pyramid of things 
that kind of make up privacy, 

463
00:25:59,400 --> 00:26:02,400
and at the bottom is data 
protection. 

464
00:26:02,700 --> 00:26:04,500
You know, that's what the 
original data protection 

465
00:26:04,500 --> 00:26:07,700
directive in Europe was called, 
and What they meant by privacy 

466
00:26:07,700 --> 00:26:10,900
but we piled more stuff on as 
requirements. 

467
00:26:11,200 --> 00:26:15,100
So in a modern kind of GDP are 
and all of its cousins era data 

468
00:26:15,100 --> 00:26:17,500
transparency. 
You know what you tell people, 

469
00:26:17,500 --> 00:26:19,500
you know about them. 
What you tell them you want from

470
00:26:19,500 --> 00:26:23,200
them is, it's, you know, 
becoming equally as important. 

471
00:26:23,200 --> 00:26:26,300
It's starting to be mandated. 
And then, at that tippy top is 

472
00:26:26,300 --> 00:26:27,900
data control. 
What controls do you? 

473
00:26:27,900 --> 00:26:31,100
Give people? 
What choices do you give people?

474
00:26:31,300 --> 00:26:35,900
And all of that adds up to 
different kind of knobs and 

475
00:26:35,900 --> 00:26:38,000
buttons. 
And you know switches that you 

476
00:26:38,000 --> 00:26:42,500
can use to engender trust from 
people. 

477
00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:44,000
That was a good question by 
Simon. 

478
00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:47,600
I think it very nuanced, I don't
want to build them up too much 

479
00:26:47,600 --> 00:26:52,400
because he also asked if you get
royalties on sam'l Integrations 

480
00:26:53,600 --> 00:26:55,900
and I was thinking like how 
amazing would that be? 

481
00:26:56,300 --> 00:26:58,300
That would be amazing. 
But you know we wouldn't be 

482
00:26:58,300 --> 00:27:02,700
talking to you if you were here 
World here have a standard and 

483
00:27:02,800 --> 00:27:06,500
of course you know in 2001 when 
we finished version 1 of Sam 

484
00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:09,200
We're like see our world here. 
It is, go use it, but you may 

485
00:27:09,200 --> 00:27:12,800
now begin and it took to like 
2005. 

486
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:15,900
So I learned to listen that I 
live five years in the future 

487
00:27:16,500 --> 00:27:19,700
but yeah, no royalties. 
That's why, you know, I'm sorry 

488
00:27:19,700 --> 00:27:21,900
for you but it's lucky for us 
because we probably wouldn't be 

489
00:27:21,908 --> 00:27:25,800
talking if you were anybody was,
I guess that speaks to like 

490
00:27:25,800 --> 00:27:29,100
just, you know, the open source 
of having Open Standards, why 

491
00:27:29,100 --> 00:27:31,500
they were so important to not 
walk behind, you know, some sort

492
00:27:31,500 --> 00:27:34,300
of cost I think. 
But I just thought that was 

493
00:27:34,300 --> 00:27:43,200
funny that I mean, you know, I 
did write a book once sgml the 

494
00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:47,000
precursor to XML but you know, 
we used in sam'l and other 

495
00:27:47,000 --> 00:27:51,000
things and I did get royalties 
off of that and it wasn't enough

496
00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:53,700
to retire and I can assure you. 
Although with the advance I 

497
00:27:53,700 --> 00:27:57,800
bought a pool cue the time. 
I was playing a lot of 

498
00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:00,900
Billiards, I'm not good, but 
that was what I chose to do and 

499
00:28:00,900 --> 00:28:04,500
I was working for a company in 
Ann Arbor and I this was before 

500
00:28:04,500 --> 00:28:07,600
all the constraints and I could 
like walk onto A plane with with

501
00:28:07,600 --> 00:28:11,400
a pool cue and Cody an arm. 
So it's kind of cool. 

502
00:28:11,400 --> 00:28:13,300
My story of royalties. 
Yeah. 

503
00:28:13,300 --> 00:28:15,700
No. 
That part kind of like if you 

504
00:28:15,700 --> 00:28:19,100
were getting royalties from 
sam'l, it kind of reminds me of 

505
00:28:19,100 --> 00:28:23,700
that scene in office space where
Peters like you know, the penny 

506
00:28:23,700 --> 00:28:25,600
tray. 
Well, that's where people are 

507
00:28:25,600 --> 00:28:27,700
taking full pennies. 
I'm only talking about a 

508
00:28:27,700 --> 00:28:32,500
fraction of a penny. 
So yeah. 

509
00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:34,200
Yeah. 
Out of two. 

510
00:28:34,500 --> 00:28:38,200
So back on like my very simple 
level of thinking I think you 

511
00:28:38,500 --> 00:28:42,400
kind of like went way deeper but
I did have a follow-up to that 

512
00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:46,500
which was I've heard people make
this statement that having 

513
00:28:46,500 --> 00:28:50,100
passed wordless somehow makes 
people feel like it's less 

514
00:28:50,100 --> 00:28:52,200
secure. 
I think if somebody thinks is 

515
00:28:52,200 --> 00:28:54,500
less secure that would reduce 
their trust. 

516
00:28:54,500 --> 00:28:59,700
So what do you think of that? 
I did have some experiences and 

517
00:28:59,700 --> 00:29:01,600
this is back when I was at 
Forrester and I had some 

518
00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:04,300
conversations with some 
Financial Services folks. 

519
00:29:04,300 --> 00:29:07,800
And I think certainly experience
is more recently, born this out 

520
00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:12,600
as well. 
Certain folks that you're trying

521
00:29:12,600 --> 00:29:14,400
to protect like high-net-worth 
individuals. 

522
00:29:14,400 --> 00:29:18,100
For example, can become very 
suspicious if they just sort of 

523
00:29:18,100 --> 00:29:23,600
silently get into their service 
and you know I had heard of hard

524
00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:27,300
tokens you know authenticators 
being used with that. 

525
00:29:27,400 --> 00:29:32,700
If it population specifically to
like give them confidence that 

526
00:29:32,700 --> 00:29:36,000
everything was safe. 
I do think that it's going to 

527
00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:38,600
end up being sort of 
experiential and generational 

528
00:29:38,600 --> 00:29:41,100
over time. 
You know like the conversations 

529
00:29:41,100 --> 00:29:45,500
I used to have with people on 
planes 10, 15 years ago about 

530
00:29:45,500 --> 00:29:48,400
what do you do? 
Well, you end up, you can talk 

531
00:29:48,400 --> 00:29:50,900
to Sarah, you're here of users 
and passwords. 

532
00:29:50,900 --> 00:29:52,700
I do that. 
It was like, then you have the 

533
00:29:52,708 --> 00:29:54,700
conversation about how much you 
hate passwords and I kind of 

534
00:29:54,700 --> 00:29:57,300
still happens now. 
But more often I run into, 

535
00:29:57,500 --> 00:30:01,000
People these days who use 
password managers who have a 

536
00:30:01,000 --> 00:30:03,300
password strategy and I've 
always likened it to. 

537
00:30:03,300 --> 00:30:06,700
Well, you have a house key 
strategy, you know, so more 

538
00:30:06,700 --> 00:30:09,200
people have a password strategy 
because they see what's going 

539
00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:11,000
on. 
They've gotten more Savvy about 

540
00:30:11,000 --> 00:30:16,800
that and I do think that as a 
short as those service providers

541
00:30:16,900 --> 00:30:22,800
idps provide visible assurances 
to a user about. 

542
00:30:22,800 --> 00:30:25,900
You know, it doesn't the 
personalization aspect, you 

543
00:30:25,900 --> 00:30:27,000
know, in the little clip you 
play it. 

544
00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:29,000
I was You about this Venn 
diagram, where I've got, you 

545
00:30:29,008 --> 00:30:31,800
know, protection and 
personalization and payments and

546
00:30:31,800 --> 00:30:38,200
people, it's personalization can
be valuable mutually and 

547
00:30:38,300 --> 00:30:41,600
ensuring that that person knows 
that, you know who they are, and

548
00:30:41,600 --> 00:30:44,300
they know who you are. 
And, like, you know, that 

549
00:30:44,300 --> 00:30:47,200
actually is that helps you build
the relationship between you 

550
00:30:47,500 --> 00:30:49,500
that's valuable stuff. 
And so, I think there's lots of 

551
00:30:49,500 --> 00:30:54,400
ways to do that and password 
list experiences. 

552
00:30:54,400 --> 00:30:57,200
As you know, we see them in 
their best expression with, you 

553
00:30:57,200 --> 00:31:02,400
know, Really, well-orchestrated 
Journey will give those signals,

554
00:31:02,600 --> 00:31:03,900
I think so. 
I think it's going to be 

555
00:31:03,900 --> 00:31:05,200
possible to do. 
I don't know. 

556
00:31:05,208 --> 00:31:09,100
I was just talking with folks 
this week, saying, you know, how

557
00:31:09,200 --> 00:31:12,600
movies started to have this 
like, modern TVs, have this 

558
00:31:12,600 --> 00:31:17,000
faster frame rate than they used
to and movies. 

559
00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:19,100
Start looking really weird. 
You know, they did it so they 

560
00:31:19,100 --> 00:31:21,800
can capture Sports Action. 
And yet now it makes movies look

561
00:31:21,800 --> 00:31:26,000
like a bad soap operas. 
And I really hated that and, you

562
00:31:26,008 --> 00:31:28,800
know, sort of argued with With 
my husband about like what frame

563
00:31:28,800 --> 00:31:31,900
rate we should set and will 
forever is how you knew you were

564
00:31:31,900 --> 00:31:34,600
watching a soap opera, because 
we do it different than anything

565
00:31:34,600 --> 00:31:37,200
else. 
I'm a high frame rate fanatic, I

566
00:31:37,200 --> 00:31:43,100
love 60 frames or more, but I 
get the purity of a 24 or 30. 

567
00:31:43,600 --> 00:31:45,900
There were, there was also, 
like, you know, I'm thinking of 

568
00:31:46,200 --> 00:31:49,100
like Monty Python sketch has 
because they only used film when

569
00:31:49,100 --> 00:31:52,600
they went Outdoors to to record.
So you can tell whether it's 

570
00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:54,400
been doors, are not divorcing, 
just for that. 

571
00:31:54,500 --> 00:31:59,500
But in any case, my point being 
People can get used to the new 

572
00:31:59,500 --> 00:32:02,900
paradigm, I think. 
And I think, as long as those 

573
00:32:02,900 --> 00:32:07,100
signals are there presented to 
them, I mean, authentication is 

574
00:32:07,100 --> 00:32:11,800
moving to that direction that 
Bob Blakely called 20 years ago.

575
00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:16,700
You know, from authentication to
recognition being recognized in 

576
00:32:16,700 --> 00:32:22,400
a non-creepy respectful fashion 
is going to become the way of 

577
00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:24,400
doing things. 
And I think, you know, I was a 

578
00:32:24,408 --> 00:32:27,700
skeptic ten years ago, literally
ten years ago and a Couple 

579
00:32:27,700 --> 00:32:29,600
months. 
When I was at Forrester, I wrote

580
00:32:29,600 --> 00:32:34,100
a blog post called, kill your 
password policies. 

581
00:32:34,100 --> 00:32:37,900
Because remember, Matt Honan was
on the cover of wired with the 

582
00:32:37,900 --> 00:32:39,800
long read. 
That was about how he got hacked

583
00:32:39,800 --> 00:32:41,600
and passwords, or a nightmare 
and blah, blah, blah. 

584
00:32:41,700 --> 00:32:43,100
And that was all true and it is 
true. 

585
00:32:43,600 --> 00:32:45,900
And my reaction then was, I 
think it's going to be really 

586
00:32:45,900 --> 00:32:51,200
hard to root out static, shared 
Secrets really hard, so in in 

587
00:32:51,300 --> 00:32:53,900
service of a better experience, 
get rid of those stupid password

588
00:32:53,900 --> 00:32:57,000
policies that are doing nothing,
you know, bit strength is not 

589
00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:58,600
helping us. 
Essentially. 

590
00:32:58,600 --> 00:33:02,100
And now we all know that and is 
took it out of 800 actually 

591
00:33:02,100 --> 00:33:05,400
degree and so we're in a better 
place now and people have 

592
00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:10,300
learned and now we're on to the 
MFA profiling bombing, but I do 

593
00:33:10,300 --> 00:33:13,700
have to remind you, that Venn 
diagrams was the original. 

594
00:33:13,700 --> 00:33:19,000
I am drinking game. 
So remember, diagrams were 

595
00:33:19,400 --> 00:33:21,500
wasn't a drinking game around 
Venn diagrams. 

596
00:33:21,500 --> 00:33:23,200
How did I just that one? 
Know. 

597
00:33:23,200 --> 00:33:26,100
I'm kind of tongue-in-cheek 
saying that but it was like Venn

598
00:33:26,100 --> 00:33:29,200
diagrams or everywhere. 
Are and like every I am 

599
00:33:29,200 --> 00:33:32,900
conference right, people just 
love the Venn diagrams. 

600
00:33:32,900 --> 00:33:37,300
Where were I would say identity 
sea shanties 1.0. 

601
00:33:40,800 --> 00:33:44,400
So you know what this whole 
conversation gets me thinking 

602
00:33:44,400 --> 00:33:47,800
about, like trust is really not 
a black-and-white issue, right? 

603
00:33:47,800 --> 00:33:53,700
Because there are times where I 
had that low Assurance of 

604
00:33:53,700 --> 00:33:58,900
requirement access to a website 
to, you know, Get access to my 

605
00:33:58,900 --> 00:34:03,800
son's baseball teams website. 
I will tell you though, when it 

606
00:34:03,800 --> 00:34:06,800
says, do you want to save this 
credit card, like heck no? 

607
00:34:07,100 --> 00:34:08,800
Heck, no. 
Do I want to see my credit card 

608
00:34:08,800 --> 00:34:11,900
on this website? 
But, you know, just kind of that

609
00:34:11,900 --> 00:34:14,100
level of trust is not always the
same. 

610
00:34:14,100 --> 00:34:17,500
Whether you're talking about, 
you know, high risk assets 

611
00:34:17,500 --> 00:34:21,100
versus low risk assets that 
you're trying to access and 

612
00:34:21,300 --> 00:34:24,800
Lorraine all'd from the ID Pro 
slack Channel throughout a 

613
00:34:24,808 --> 00:34:27,300
question. 
She wanted to get your thoughts 

614
00:34:27,300 --> 00:34:34,699
on the nist. 863 Dash C draft, 
For with draft revision, for 

615
00:34:35,100 --> 00:34:39,000
which, you know, is the level of
assurance guideline from nist. 

616
00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:43,500
So what are your thoughts? 
Yeah, and that's great. 

617
00:34:43,500 --> 00:34:46,199
Great question. 
We've definitely been digging 

618
00:34:46,199 --> 00:34:48,500
into it. 
We're not done digging into it, 

619
00:34:48,500 --> 00:34:50,699
you know. 
It's it's getting better and 

620
00:34:50,699 --> 00:34:53,100
better for sure. 
You know I reference getting rid

621
00:34:53,100 --> 00:34:57,100
of the the appendix from from 
rev one. 

622
00:34:57,600 --> 00:34:59,700
I think going to rev to the 
whole thing about. 

623
00:34:59,700 --> 00:35:02,300
Well make sure that it's you 
know super it strengthened and 

624
00:35:02,500 --> 00:35:06,500
learn that, that wasn't, you 
know, in the top five list of 

625
00:35:06,500 --> 00:35:11,800
things we want to do the initial
thoughts that I have around ways

626
00:35:11,800 --> 00:35:17,400
to comment, mostly have to do 
with finding ways to give 

627
00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:21,500
guidance around that, that 
notion of fine-grained, 

628
00:35:21,600 --> 00:35:27,900
contextual adaptive intelligent 
Dynamic Assurance levels and for

629
00:35:27,900 --> 00:35:31,500
a long time, I've called this 
Ela a pie, like, he know, No. 

630
00:35:31,900 --> 00:35:34,100
How do you get into the cracks 
of the keyboard when it comes to

631
00:35:34,100 --> 00:35:38,300
level some assurance and and 
figure out how to make it more 

632
00:35:38,300 --> 00:35:41,800
Dynamic? 
And that makes me first of all 

633
00:35:41,800 --> 00:35:45,700
think AI as a technology and 
technique you to apply and maybe

634
00:35:45,700 --> 00:35:50,200
we'll talk more about that. 
But I actually went over to talk

635
00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:53,400
with folks who are familiar with
one of our UK government 

636
00:35:53,400 --> 00:35:55,000
customers, whose kind of in the 
same boat. 

637
00:35:55,000 --> 00:35:58,000
As, you know, the customers, the
direct customers have missed to 

638
00:35:58,000 --> 00:36:01,300
say, you know, we'll do you have
any recommendations and what I 

639
00:36:01,400 --> 00:36:05,100
Was this particular UK 
government customer has what 

640
00:36:05,100 --> 00:36:09,600
they call a transactional 
risking model and I quite like 

641
00:36:09,600 --> 00:36:15,700
it and it goes into more depth 
on transactions and sessions and

642
00:36:15,700 --> 00:36:20,900
on behavior and on operational 
rules and, you know, maybe that,

643
00:36:20,900 --> 00:36:22,800
maybe I'll come by rev 7. 
I don't know. 

644
00:36:22,800 --> 00:36:25,000
It's like something that, you 
know, they keep on deepening. 

645
00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:31,000
But that's the that whole kind 
of dynamic - is remains a Hot 

646
00:36:31,000 --> 00:36:31,500
Topic. 
Epic. 

647
00:36:31,500 --> 00:36:34,300
It will continue be Hot Topic. 
So you mentioned AI, which is a 

648
00:36:34,308 --> 00:36:37,200
hot-button word for me. 
I'm a big fan of all the 

649
00:36:37,200 --> 00:36:41,200
different tools that have come 
out and the democratization of 

650
00:36:41,400 --> 00:36:43,500
being able to leverage 
technology like that. 

651
00:36:45,000 --> 00:36:49,800
And you mentioned by us and 
where are these tools being 

652
00:36:49,800 --> 00:36:52,500
developed trained on right? 
It's being trained on. 

653
00:36:52,700 --> 00:36:54,900
Let's take Jackie Beauty, right?
We've been talk about this. 

654
00:36:55,000 --> 00:36:56,600
We should just call it a tie 
into Center at some point 

655
00:36:56,600 --> 00:37:02,900
because we keep Check EPT has 
been, you know, basically 

656
00:37:02,900 --> 00:37:05,600
learning from the internet up 
through, I think 2021 is what 

657
00:37:05,600 --> 00:37:10,700
its data says good for and based
on what it's been learning, 

658
00:37:11,400 --> 00:37:14,500
there are still some questions 
around bias and where do you get

659
00:37:14,500 --> 00:37:17,100
answers from? 
And are they accurate? 

660
00:37:17,100 --> 00:37:20,500
Which I think is probably the 
most important thing is, is the 

661
00:37:20,500 --> 00:37:26,100
data fact or not Iran. 
A little experiment on myself. 

662
00:37:26,100 --> 00:37:27,900
Typing, it ends, like, tell me 
about me. 

663
00:37:28,000 --> 00:37:29,700
First of all, it didn't know who
I was like, all right, well, 

664
00:37:29,800 --> 00:37:32,200
Thanks, dude. 
So they had to give the core 

665
00:37:32,200 --> 00:37:33,600
processor, okay? 
Right. 

666
00:37:33,600 --> 00:37:37,300
Say oh, I work at our SMI host, 
identity centers, they do that 

667
00:37:37,300 --> 00:37:38,800
Jeff Steadman. 
Okay great cool. 

668
00:37:39,300 --> 00:37:41,700
And then it started spitting out
some stuff that some of it was 

669
00:37:41,700 --> 00:37:44,600
not true. 
Apparently, I've been promoted 

670
00:37:44,700 --> 00:37:48,700
apparently and I am a partner 
with ourselves, so Daniel run 

671
00:37:48,700 --> 00:37:50,200
with it. 
Thank you very much, right? 

672
00:37:50,200 --> 00:37:52,300
Yeah, exactly. 
I started skating. 

673
00:37:53,100 --> 00:37:57,200
Yeah, exactly. 
And then me being part of other 

674
00:37:57,200 --> 00:37:59,500
industry. 
Groups identity ecosystem. 

675
00:37:59,800 --> 00:38:02,700
Never even heard of that thing. 
I've certainly support idea, 

676
00:38:02,700 --> 00:38:06,300
say, for example, but I'm not a 
member of it and it just leaves 

677
00:38:06,300 --> 00:38:09,800
me down this path of okay well I
you know it's one of those 

678
00:38:09,800 --> 00:38:12,000
things where I get so excited as
I call this is gonna be so cool 

679
00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:17,000
and we when we figure it out and
when we can trust it and that 

680
00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:22,000
bias is still there that lack of
transparency of where the data 

681
00:38:22,000 --> 00:38:23,800
is coming from. 
You know if it was something was

682
00:38:23,808 --> 00:38:26,200
like oh well this is where I 
pulled it from. 

683
00:38:26,200 --> 00:38:28,700
For example, why can go and 
correct that piece of 

684
00:38:28,700 --> 00:38:31,900
information So it's not citing 
it, which I think is a little 

685
00:38:31,900 --> 00:38:35,000
bit different than what being 
has, Microsoft Bing has 

686
00:38:35,000 --> 00:38:36,900
announced, and I'm in part of 
the beta. 

687
00:38:36,900 --> 00:38:40,000
So I actually get to play around
with a, you know, the the chat 

688
00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:43,400
GPT integration within the Bing 
search which I would never use, 

689
00:38:43,400 --> 00:38:45,600
you know. 
Yeah. 

690
00:38:45,600 --> 00:38:50,700
So I know Sydney the code name 
and they have actually taken a 

691
00:38:50,800 --> 00:38:53,800
pretty unique approach where 
they actually site in the 

692
00:38:53,800 --> 00:38:55,900
answer, where they're pulling 
the information from. 

693
00:38:56,300 --> 00:38:58,400
So, it'll say, well here's the 
answer and then we'll give a 

694
00:38:58,400 --> 00:39:00,200
little, you know, footnote Of 
say, okay. 

695
00:39:00,200 --> 00:39:02,800
Well, this part came from this 
website and this other part came

696
00:39:02,800 --> 00:39:05,900
from this other website, but 
you're still dealing with. 

697
00:39:05,900 --> 00:39:07,400
Okay. 
Well, why did it pick that 

698
00:39:07,400 --> 00:39:11,000
website versus another website 
and that bias that exists. 

699
00:39:11,000 --> 00:39:13,700
And I'm just curious. 
What, where do you see this 

700
00:39:13,700 --> 00:39:17,100
going from like a bias and a 
trust perspective on that. 

701
00:39:17,100 --> 00:39:19,200
A I said the word because it 
seems like that's a little bit 

702
00:39:19,500 --> 00:39:22,300
counter to what we want and 
security which is this binary 

703
00:39:22,300 --> 00:39:24,300
decision, right? 
Either you're good or your bag 

704
00:39:24,900 --> 00:39:28,300
and there isn't a yaxha between.
I mean I think it's possible. 

705
00:39:28,300 --> 00:39:30,900
First of all to So those are the
last little thing. 

706
00:39:30,900 --> 00:39:33,600
You said, it's possible for us 
to start answering those 

707
00:39:33,600 --> 00:39:37,200
questions of you're in or you're
out in a more fine-grained way. 

708
00:39:37,500 --> 00:39:40,600
And to change our decision more 
more often. 

709
00:39:40,800 --> 00:39:44,200
And I think you know, there are 
different kinds of AI and large 

710
00:39:44,200 --> 00:39:47,800
language models are a kind of AI
that you know it's practically 

711
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:50,900
Mad Libs, right? 
It's filling in blanks and it's 

712
00:39:50,900 --> 00:39:54,300
using the data that started out,
you know, written by humans, who

713
00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:56,500
may have been incorrect, or 
lying, or whatever. 

714
00:39:56,900 --> 00:40:01,900
And so, it's not meant for the 
purpose of Of being true and 

715
00:40:01,900 --> 00:40:04,900
we'd have to ask it to do a lot 
of things to assure ourselves, 

716
00:40:04,900 --> 00:40:08,900
that something is true and 
there's a lot of usefulness. 

717
00:40:08,900 --> 00:40:11,900
Even even with that, I mean 
there's plenty of, you know, I 

718
00:40:11,900 --> 00:40:15,600
don't know, Junior reporters 
writing things, getting things 

719
00:40:15,600 --> 00:40:16,900
wrong in needing an editor, 
right? 

720
00:40:16,900 --> 00:40:23,600
It's not, it's not so surprising
the, the key, I think you put 

721
00:40:23,600 --> 00:40:27,600
your finger right on it is 
there's a branch of a, I 

722
00:40:27,600 --> 00:40:32,300
literally called explainable AI.
Xai for short and I think it's 

723
00:40:32,300 --> 00:40:34,600
really important if at all 
possible. 

724
00:40:35,000 --> 00:40:39,300
For adopters of AI technology to
strive for explain ability, 

725
00:40:39,600 --> 00:40:42,200
there's another term 
interpretability which means 

726
00:40:42,200 --> 00:40:45,000
more like, you know, it's 
properly understood if you think

727
00:40:45,000 --> 00:40:47,700
about like meaningful consent 
guidelines and sort of like 

728
00:40:47,700 --> 00:40:49,800
that, you know, did somebody 
understand what you're telling 

729
00:40:49,800 --> 00:40:51,200
it where you got the 
information. 

730
00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:57,400
So I think my colleague, Steve 
enema happened to just publish 

731
00:40:58,300 --> 00:41:01,000
really nice post. 
On for drug community. 

732
00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:03,000
So community that for 
direct.com, if you want to check

733
00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:06,800
it out called creating 
trustworthy AI as it happens and

734
00:41:07,300 --> 00:41:10,900
he's partly relaying some of the
good work that nist has done 

735
00:41:10,900 --> 00:41:12,200
here. 
So they have a special 

736
00:41:12,200 --> 00:41:15,800
publication 1270 towards a 
standard for identifying and 

737
00:41:15,800 --> 00:41:18,500
managing bias in artificial 
intelligence and other work. 

738
00:41:18,500 --> 00:41:25,100
So it that special publication 
lays out a bunch of examples of,

739
00:41:25,100 --> 00:41:31,600
you know, concerning results in 
Ai and And where we come down on

740
00:41:31,900 --> 00:41:36,200
the advice and that post is, you
know, yes, harm can be real 

741
00:41:36,700 --> 00:41:38,800
familiarize yourself with 
explainable. 

742
00:41:38,800 --> 00:41:43,100
AI and interpretable, AI course,
you have to make ethical 

743
00:41:43,100 --> 00:41:47,800
management of consent around 
sharing data using data and the 

744
00:41:47,808 --> 00:41:51,400
storage of data management, you 
know, data, governance a guiding

745
00:41:51,400 --> 00:41:55,000
principle and these are the 
sorts of things that will 

746
00:41:55,000 --> 00:42:00,200
increase confidence in. 
I would say really every kind of

747
00:42:00,200 --> 00:42:02,000
AI. 
And so the kind of AI that, you 

748
00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:05,000
know, we specialize in, I would 
call it helps intelligent 

749
00:42:05,000 --> 00:42:10,600
decisioning and decisioning in 
identity is largely about 

750
00:42:10,600 --> 00:42:13,300
authorization, although not 
always, it could be finer 

751
00:42:13,300 --> 00:42:19,200
grained, like, you know, allow 
them to cut a PO of this size 

752
00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:23,900
but not that size or, you know, 
step up and test them harder if 

753
00:42:23,900 --> 00:42:26,900
they try and do this other thing
or in circumstances that look 

754
00:42:26,900 --> 00:42:29,500
suspicious, you know, you That 
is a kind of funny, it's like 

755
00:42:29,700 --> 00:42:34,000
turning my CEO friend. 
Raj talks about, you know, what 

756
00:42:34,000 --> 00:42:38,400
seems like a dumb tool without 
that help can become a very 

757
00:42:38,400 --> 00:42:41,300
smart tool. 
I mean, and even that means 

758
00:42:41,400 --> 00:42:43,300
explain ability. 
And and that's a, that's a 

759
00:42:43,308 --> 00:42:44,900
stance. 
That's a principle that we 

760
00:42:44,900 --> 00:42:48,500
uphold in what we do when you're
doing any kind of decisioning 

761
00:42:48,500 --> 00:42:50,800
and you always want to be able 
to sort of bottom out with the 

762
00:42:50,800 --> 00:42:53,200
some sort of human oversight. 
So I recommend people take a 

763
00:42:53,200 --> 00:42:56,000
look at that post just for like 
a just kind of an overview of 

764
00:42:56,200 --> 00:42:59,000
current state of the art and get
a Advice. 

765
00:42:59,600 --> 00:43:01,600
Yeah, if you can send me the 
link, I'll be sure to add it to 

766
00:43:01,600 --> 00:43:03,100
our show notes for people to 
check out. 

767
00:43:03,200 --> 00:43:07,100
Absolutely, I had a question and
maybe it sounds stupid, but 

768
00:43:07,100 --> 00:43:11,400
maybe it's not. 
Would we even recognize bias? 

769
00:43:11,700 --> 00:43:15,700
How would we even recognize it? 
I think it's quite difficult, 

770
00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:20,400
there's some the post relays, 
some some discussion there as 

771
00:43:20,400 --> 00:43:21,600
well. 
They're from a different, I 

772
00:43:21,600 --> 00:43:23,600
think from a different nests 
document if I'm not mistaken 

773
00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:28,300
about the ways that people fool 
themselves, I mean, you know, A 

774
00:43:28,308 --> 00:43:32,600
human beings are valued judgment
machines. 

775
00:43:34,600 --> 00:43:39,700
So everything we do is intended 
to make patterns, see, patterns 

776
00:43:39,700 --> 00:43:43,000
and quite often get it wrong or 
just, you know, the world is 

777
00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:45,300
full of nuance for human beings 
and their brains. 

778
00:43:45,500 --> 00:43:49,000
So, there's some good advice 
about, you know, sort of how not

779
00:43:49,000 --> 00:43:54,200
to fool yourself. 
And there's a, there's a concept

780
00:43:54,300 --> 00:43:58,100
in this is actually in the 
rationalist community which I 

781
00:43:58,700 --> 00:44:02,700
Sometimes frequent online. 
The concept is steel Manning, 

782
00:44:03,100 --> 00:44:05,300
you know, like a straw man 
argument is kind of like a straw

783
00:44:05,300 --> 00:44:07,000
argument is. 
Well, it's too easy of the 

784
00:44:07,000 --> 00:44:09,200
knockdown. 
That's, that's no tested. 

785
00:44:09,200 --> 00:44:14,000
All Steel Manning is when you 
imagine the all the best 

786
00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:18,400
Arguments for the thing that you
hate or vice versa, you know, 

787
00:44:18,400 --> 00:44:22,200
all the all the totally awful, 
you know, Chiller arguments 

788
00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:26,900
against the thing you love and 
like do the work, do the work to

789
00:44:27,000 --> 00:44:30,300
steal. 
Or implementation against that 

790
00:44:30,300 --> 00:44:32,400
and then enemy transparent about
what you found. 

791
00:44:32,500 --> 00:44:37,400
I could sit here and gripe about
AI all day because I and I do it

792
00:44:37,400 --> 00:44:41,200
all the time, but, you know, it 
feels like every call center you

793
00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:45,100
dial into these days is like 
answered by somebody who are 

794
00:44:45,100 --> 00:44:49,400
answered by a an AI voice. 
I'm a person. 

795
00:44:49,600 --> 00:44:53,600
I can understand complex. 
Question some join operator I 

796
00:44:53,607 --> 00:44:58,700
want to talk to her. 
No no 000 and it's like Well I 

797
00:44:58,700 --> 00:45:00,800
can really help you just give me
your question. 

798
00:45:00,800 --> 00:45:02,300
Okay. 
Well I have questions about my 

799
00:45:02,300 --> 00:45:04,600
bill. 
I'm sorry I didn't understand 

800
00:45:04,600 --> 00:45:06,800
that. 
It's like, okay, operator needs 

801
00:45:06,800 --> 00:45:08,900
us. 
I'm gonna pull my hair out 

802
00:45:09,000 --> 00:45:12,900
anyway. 
Yeah, it's I mean that, that is 

803
00:45:12,900 --> 00:45:17,000
exactly that sort of like the 
vocal uncanny valley of, you 

804
00:45:17,000 --> 00:45:21,100
know, you just if you have that 
level of Suspicion going in, it 

805
00:45:21,100 --> 00:45:24,600
doesn't help for them to keep 
going down that path. 

806
00:45:24,600 --> 00:45:26,000
And they should just make it 
easy. 

807
00:45:26,700 --> 00:45:28,200
Yeah, it's a human. 
Why? 

808
00:45:28,300 --> 00:45:31,700
I also think that it just it 
carries over to the next time 

809
00:45:31,700 --> 00:45:35,400
you hear one of those systems as
the phone and said, like poor 

810
00:45:35,400 --> 00:45:40,000
implementation of Technology 
just bills, that lack of trust 

811
00:45:40,000 --> 00:45:42,800
that you have for the 
technology, I guess that they 

812
00:45:42,800 --> 00:45:44,500
can expend. 
As I think you're saying it can 

813
00:45:44,500 --> 00:45:47,500
extend to sort of, you know, all
service providers to all 

814
00:45:47,500 --> 00:45:51,000
retailers to all everybody maybe
to all employers. 

815
00:45:51,000 --> 00:45:54,200
I mean, it's a heavy burden, and
it's why being modest in our 

816
00:45:54,200 --> 00:45:58,500
aims is a good idea. 
When we deploy systems, Don't 

817
00:45:58,500 --> 00:46:00,800
feel like on the chat GPT from 
heard. 

818
00:46:00,800 --> 00:46:03,400
A lot of people talk about like 
a, this could take away our 

819
00:46:03,400 --> 00:46:08,300
jobs, but I actually think that 
where a I could flip the script 

820
00:46:08,300 --> 00:46:11,400
is actually just make us more 
productive because I find myself

821
00:46:11,400 --> 00:46:14,800
doing like routine tasks over 
and over again throughout my 

822
00:46:14,800 --> 00:46:17,400
day. 
If I had some kind of true 

823
00:46:17,400 --> 00:46:21,700
virtual assistant that could be 
automated that it could just 

824
00:46:21,700 --> 00:46:25,000
talk to me and I could tell it 
everything I need done, it could

825
00:46:25,000 --> 00:46:28,200
go and do it. 
I'd get huge value out of that. 

826
00:46:28,300 --> 00:46:31,700
I would be much more productive.
I spend my time researching and 

827
00:46:31,700 --> 00:46:34,400
getting smarter. 
Yeah and I did. 

828
00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:38,600
So a few months ago I was 
starting to generate all my 

829
00:46:38,600 --> 00:46:42,800
weird illustrations in my talks 
and my presentations using Dolly

830
00:46:42,800 --> 00:46:45,800
to and they do get more and 
more. 

831
00:46:45,900 --> 00:46:50,900
I don't know hallucinogenic and 
and I was talking to somebody at

832
00:46:50,900 --> 00:46:53,700
work is like well this is just 
an affront that's not art. 

833
00:46:53,700 --> 00:46:55,500
And I say well the same thing 
was said about photography in 

834
00:46:55,500 --> 00:47:00,300
the beginning just so you know. 
Um, I actually find a lot of 

835
00:47:00,300 --> 00:47:02,900
creativity and like, people have
already written novels and 

836
00:47:02,900 --> 00:47:05,500
illustrator, graphic novels with
some of these things. 

837
00:47:05,500 --> 00:47:12,400
And like, obviously the engine 
didn't come up with itself, we 

838
00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:15,000
what comes after no code. 
This. 

839
00:47:16,100 --> 00:47:17,600
This is what comes after, no 
code. 

840
00:47:17,600 --> 00:47:20,900
And that's a new kind of 
democratization that it's 

841
00:47:20,900 --> 00:47:26,600
uncomfortable for, you know, the
high Priests of whatever do that

842
00:47:26,600 --> 00:47:29,600
thing. 
It's very Fertile for folks who 

843
00:47:30,700 --> 00:47:32,700
want to be able to do it because
there's a lot of folks who need 

844
00:47:32,700 --> 00:47:34,600
the results. 
You know, it's beneficial. 

845
00:47:35,200 --> 00:47:38,800
Yeah, the example I always hear 
is the, you know, the electric 

846
00:47:38,800 --> 00:47:42,100
light, put it out, put people 
out of business who went around 

847
00:47:42,100 --> 00:47:46,800
late street lights, you know? 
But at the end Humanity, I think

848
00:47:46,800 --> 00:47:50,700
that the potential of automation
with AI, you know? 

849
00:47:50,700 --> 00:47:54,100
If all you do is repeatable 
mundane tasks. 

850
00:47:54,600 --> 00:47:58,700
Yes, I think you could. 
It's going to force you to Get 

851
00:47:58,700 --> 00:48:01,900
out of that business and do 
something that actually should 

852
00:48:01,900 --> 00:48:04,800
be more empowering. 
This is, I mean, this is kind of

853
00:48:04,800 --> 00:48:07,900
creative destruction, right? 
Yes, just automation, right? 

854
00:48:07,900 --> 00:48:09,600
It's not. 
Yeah, it's just automation. 

855
00:48:09,700 --> 00:48:11,100
Well, as we're talking about, 
right? 

856
00:48:11,100 --> 00:48:13,500
I mean, this is It's a species 
of automating. 

857
00:48:13,500 --> 00:48:16,100
Something automating, and 
scaling something, and those are

858
00:48:16,100 --> 00:48:18,700
very powerful things and they 
can be used for ill as well as 

859
00:48:18,700 --> 00:48:22,700
good. 
But and so you know, speaking of

860
00:48:22,700 --> 00:48:25,500
trusting, all these things, how 
do we make these systems that 

861
00:48:25,500 --> 00:48:27,000
are starting to become so 
powerful? 

862
00:48:28,300 --> 00:48:31,500
How do we get a level of letting
them do more, rather than 

863
00:48:31,600 --> 00:48:35,300
locking them down? 
And, and it's through, explain 

864
00:48:35,300 --> 00:48:38,900
ability, interpretability 
openness transparency. 

865
00:48:40,100 --> 00:48:43,500
That's so before we completely 
go off the rails. 

866
00:48:44,200 --> 00:48:47,600
I did want to hit this third 
area which was trusted vendors. 

867
00:48:47,900 --> 00:48:51,500
Again, perfect person to have on
here because as somebody who's 

868
00:48:51,500 --> 00:48:56,500
the CTO for a company that 
creates cyber security software,

869
00:48:58,300 --> 00:49:01,600
you know, what is it? 
That is needed to build trust in

870
00:49:01,600 --> 00:49:04,400
your company and what can 
destroy that trust? 

871
00:49:05,600 --> 00:49:08,000
Huh. 
This is where I'm tempted to 

872
00:49:08,000 --> 00:49:11,000
reach for that pyramid. 
I was describing before again 

873
00:49:11,300 --> 00:49:17,700
because protection transparency 
and giving customers control I 

874
00:49:17,700 --> 00:49:21,500
think are all really good 
elements of achieving that 

875
00:49:21,500 --> 00:49:24,800
trust, you know. 
Lots of lots of things can go 

876
00:49:24,800 --> 00:49:26,200
wrong. 
I think everybody knows when 

877
00:49:26,200 --> 00:49:29,300
you're using a software vendor 
as a spender, whatever it is, 

878
00:49:30,400 --> 00:49:32,700
it's understood that nothing is 
perfect. 

879
00:49:32,700 --> 00:49:38,900
However, to maintain the Chip, 
you need to have unassailable 

880
00:49:38,900 --> 00:49:42,800
transparency, you mentioned the 
consumer identity breach report 

881
00:49:42,800 --> 00:49:45,200
that I'd come on and talked 
about at one point. 

882
00:49:45,800 --> 00:49:47,900
One of the things that we were 
watching last year. 

883
00:49:47,900 --> 00:49:49,500
We published, we're working on 
the new one. 

884
00:49:49,500 --> 00:49:50,800
The fifth. 
This will be our fifth annual 

885
00:49:51,000 --> 00:49:53,500
anniversary one. 
So you know, stay tuned, but 

886
00:49:53,500 --> 00:49:58,600
we're watching breach 
notification, delays, lengthen, 

887
00:49:59,100 --> 00:50:02,800
even as we see mandates, 
starting to encroach, to make 

888
00:50:02,800 --> 00:50:09,000
you do it and like And the best 
way to be trustworthy is to have

889
00:50:09,000 --> 00:50:11,800
what I think an open Baby World,
they call this compete, not 

890
00:50:11,800 --> 00:50:15,600
comply mindset, how do you 
become a leader in in that 

891
00:50:15,600 --> 00:50:20,000
openness how do you become a 
leader in doing better and I 

892
00:50:20,000 --> 00:50:22,300
just think that's best way for 
some reason. 

893
00:50:22,300 --> 00:50:26,400
I feel like this is an area that
companies just plain struggle 

894
00:50:26,400 --> 00:50:30,800
with is getting the breaches. 
The breach notifications out the

895
00:50:30,800 --> 00:50:32,300
transparency, whatever it may 
be. 

896
00:50:33,400 --> 00:50:36,500
I just In the Playbook happen, 
over and over and over again 

897
00:50:36,500 --> 00:50:39,200
where, you know, here's one that
was hand, okay, everybody, you 

898
00:50:39,200 --> 00:50:42,100
know, everybody is going to get 
breached at some point, right? 

899
00:50:42,100 --> 00:50:44,100
How you handle it? 
I think is more important at 

900
00:50:44,100 --> 00:50:47,700
this point because it back in my
day, when you got breached it 

901
00:50:47,707 --> 00:50:49,300
was game over, your company was 
done. 

902
00:50:49,300 --> 00:50:51,500
Now, it seems like everybody's 
getting breach for some reason 

903
00:50:52,000 --> 00:50:56,600
and it's not the, you know, the 
death knell that used to be but 

904
00:50:56,800 --> 00:51:01,300
every it's just seems like every
company sucks at handling 

905
00:51:01,300 --> 00:51:03,000
breeches with period. 
Like they just, yeah, they're 

906
00:51:03,008 --> 00:51:06,800
just not good at it. 
Did you just say back in my day?

907
00:51:06,900 --> 00:51:08,800
Back in my day? 
Yes, I did. 

908
00:51:08,800 --> 00:51:10,300
And you pulled that out of my 
lawn. 

909
00:51:14,500 --> 00:51:17,200
Parse uphill in the snow both 
ways. 

910
00:51:18,500 --> 00:51:21,000
Yeah, it's true. 
That more companies are getting 

911
00:51:21,000 --> 00:51:23,700
experience with it and it's 
being sort of democratizing, the

912
00:51:23,700 --> 00:51:26,900
sense of it's not just the mega 
corporations, you know, having 

913
00:51:26,900 --> 00:51:30,000
you know, their billions of 
Records breached its smaller 

914
00:51:30,000 --> 00:51:32,700
players, smaller Enterprises. 
And we showed this actually in 

915
00:51:32,700 --> 00:51:38,900
our, in our report last year. 
It's it is becoming a little bit

916
00:51:38,900 --> 00:51:42,100
like, you know, password 
knowledge, a fact of life. 

917
00:51:42,800 --> 00:51:48,400
And I think, what would really 
be killer is lack of good faith,

918
00:51:48,400 --> 00:51:52,000
transparency. 
And I almost feel like everybody

919
00:51:52,000 --> 00:51:54,600
should just put out a dirty 
laundry report monthly just to 

920
00:51:54,600 --> 00:52:00,900
get into the Habit, it's making 
the same mistake twice and it's 

921
00:52:00,900 --> 00:52:03,200
making the wrong choice, 
whatever that might be in 

922
00:52:03,200 --> 00:52:06,500
configuration or whatever, be 
the easiest choice for their 

923
00:52:06,500 --> 00:52:09,100
customers. 
So there's some commitments that

924
00:52:09,100 --> 00:52:12,300
any company can make there and 
survived some bad storms. 

925
00:52:12,600 --> 00:52:16,800
I feel like one of the areas 
that creates a vulnerability in 

926
00:52:16,800 --> 00:52:21,900
this respect is Cloud delivered 
services. 

927
00:52:21,900 --> 00:52:24,200
So identity is a service, for 
example. 

928
00:52:25,600 --> 00:52:28,700
And I got, I think that's keeps,
I am practitioners up at night 

929
00:52:28,700 --> 00:52:33,500
knowing that they put trust in a
company and that they may be 

930
00:52:33,500 --> 00:52:37,200
running some software for 
example, like, like the 

931
00:52:37,200 --> 00:52:40,200
solarwinds incident, right? 
I think that I'm not trying to 

932
00:52:40,200 --> 00:52:43,700
pick on solar winds, but it's 
probably one of the biggest 

933
00:52:44,600 --> 00:52:48,900
breaches of our career as a 
supply chain in incident that 

934
00:52:49,500 --> 00:52:52,200
affected. 
So many organizations while now 

935
00:52:52,200 --> 00:52:56,900
I'm putting so much trust in 
identity as a service. 

936
00:52:57,400 --> 00:52:59,800
They may be running software 
that gets hacked. 

937
00:52:59,800 --> 00:53:03,000
They may get hacked themselves. 
You know, what's the? 

938
00:53:03,000 --> 00:53:05,900
I am practitioner to do, you 
know, it's funny. 

939
00:53:05,900 --> 00:53:10,000
I guess I'll mention the breach 
report again, just because what 

940
00:53:10,000 --> 00:53:14,400
we found last year was that 
supply chain attacks, were up 

941
00:53:14,400 --> 00:53:16,500
two hundred and ninety-seven 
percent. 

942
00:53:17,800 --> 00:53:23,900
That's a big deal. 
And this is where all right, I 

943
00:53:23,900 --> 00:53:26,100
guess it's time for drinking 
zero. 

944
00:53:26,100 --> 00:53:29,400
Trust architecture. 
Came up with, I mean, it is kind

945
00:53:29,400 --> 00:53:33,000
of right here for us on a Friday
night for the listeners. 

946
00:53:33,000 --> 00:53:35,200
Maybe this realism. 
There's but it came up with this

947
00:53:35,200 --> 00:53:38,100
concept of the s bomb the 
software bill of materials. 

948
00:53:39,100 --> 00:53:45,900
And I really think that's a good
idea because it sort of speaks 

949
00:53:45,900 --> 00:53:48,800
this trend towards proper 
inventorying of everything. 

950
00:53:48,800 --> 00:53:51,800
You know, GDP are Requires, 
proper inventorying, a personal 

951
00:53:51,800 --> 00:53:57,000
data, and that zero thing, 
really is starting to require 

952
00:53:57,000 --> 00:54:00,300
proper inventorying of, like all
the software that you're using 

953
00:54:00,400 --> 00:54:04,700
in whatever guys. 
So I kind of feel like that is a

954
00:54:04,700 --> 00:54:06,800
way to start having that 
conversation. 

955
00:54:06,800 --> 00:54:12,000
Obviously General Supply Chain 
management, vendor management is

956
00:54:12,800 --> 00:54:16,300
that's what it sort of comes 
down to and and it can learn the

957
00:54:16,300 --> 00:54:20,400
lessons actually of some of the 
if you think about the Duration 

958
00:54:20,400 --> 00:54:26,600
Assurance level work in this 
that allows for assessment of an

959
00:54:26,600 --> 00:54:30,000
IDC, to be of any sort of third 
party that you're working with 

960
00:54:30,200 --> 00:54:33,500
and accreditation of assessors 
and all the rest of it. 

961
00:54:33,500 --> 00:54:34,800
So, there's so much going on 
this base. 

962
00:54:34,800 --> 00:54:36,800
I feel like we could talk for 
probably like ours. 

963
00:54:37,200 --> 00:54:39,200
And I hear a little like 
dangling. 

964
00:54:39,500 --> 00:54:42,900
Maybe that's Sabrina's collars. 
Sorry. 

965
00:54:43,200 --> 00:54:45,400
No, it's fine. 
I was really hoping this would 

966
00:54:45,400 --> 00:54:49,800
be the time that we would get, 
you know, the pet on on cam and 

967
00:54:50,000 --> 00:54:53,500
And I on the identities that are
podcast but it is a document 

968
00:54:53,500 --> 00:54:56,600
fed. 
I think speaking they got in 

969
00:54:56,600 --> 00:54:59,800
fed, it is a Friday night, why 
don't we start to wrap things up

970
00:54:59,800 --> 00:55:01,400
so that you can get on with your
weekend? 

971
00:55:01,400 --> 00:55:03,600
I can get on with writing my 
statements of work which is 

972
00:55:03,600 --> 00:55:06,900
super exciting. 
But before we go we do like to 

973
00:55:06,900 --> 00:55:10,100
end on a lighter note. 
We're all going to be in Dallas 

974
00:55:10,100 --> 00:55:13,800
area Grapevine, Texas for 
Gartner, in a few weeks and that

975
00:55:13,800 --> 00:55:15,700
is your neck of the woods. 
So one looking forward to 

976
00:55:15,700 --> 00:55:18,700
actually being able to give you 
a fist bump in real life but for

977
00:55:18,700 --> 00:55:21,000
the people who are, you know, 
Congregating down there who 

978
00:55:21,000 --> 00:55:24,100
aren't from that area. 
What's a little-known place? 

979
00:55:24,100 --> 00:55:27,900
That people should try to go out
of their way to grab a bite to 

980
00:55:27,900 --> 00:55:29,400
eat or drink or something like 
that. 

981
00:55:29,400 --> 00:55:30,600
That we should check out while 
we're there. 

982
00:55:30,700 --> 00:55:32,800
Yeah. 
Oh there's a dog you're hearing.

983
00:55:32,800 --> 00:55:37,700
Yeah, sorry. 
So yeah I'm so excited. 

984
00:55:37,700 --> 00:55:42,300
People are going to be in my 
neck of the woods and so I live 

985
00:55:42,300 --> 00:55:44,700
really close to Grapevine and of
course it's going to be at the 

986
00:55:44,700 --> 00:55:46,900
Gaylord Texan so it's kind of I 
actually found out that the 

987
00:55:46,908 --> 00:55:49,800
Gaylord Texan is the largest 
game. 

988
00:55:50,800 --> 00:55:55,200
And for those who've been to 
Gaylord Rockies for identifiers.

989
00:55:55,200 --> 00:55:58,100
That's the smallest Taylor, just
for the record. 

990
00:55:59,000 --> 00:56:03,500
And so what I would love to 
recommend to everybody is if you

991
00:56:03,500 --> 00:56:07,500
want some good barbecue and I'm 
going to say good barbecue 

992
00:56:07,500 --> 00:56:12,200
experience, then I do recommend 
Hard Eight, there's one really 

993
00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:15,600
not far. 
They keep the The Smokers going,

994
00:56:15,600 --> 00:56:19,800
like 24/7 and you walk up and 
you order by the pound. 

995
00:56:19,900 --> 00:56:21,600
And it's just a super cool 
experience. 

996
00:56:21,600 --> 00:56:28,700
And I also love, there's a town 
called Carrollton, and it's got 

997
00:56:28,700 --> 00:56:32,500
some amazing Korean food. 
It's also not far. 

998
00:56:32,900 --> 00:56:37,300
And so, if you're going to reach
out and experience the the 

999
00:56:37,300 --> 00:56:40,200
general area, that's what I say 
you gotta do. 

1000
00:56:40,200 --> 00:56:43,400
Okay, well, you had me at 
24-hour smoker. 

1001
00:56:43,700 --> 00:56:46,700
This is set it up. 
Hard hard eight, as in the 

1002
00:56:46,700 --> 00:56:49,900
number Ocho barbecue, so that's 
definitely going to be. 

1003
00:56:50,000 --> 00:56:52,000
The list for sure. 
What was the other? 

1004
00:56:52,000 --> 00:56:53,500
Uh-oh. 
Uh-oh. 

1005
00:56:55,100 --> 00:56:57,500
Yeah, exactly. 
I'm glad you got the reference. 

1006
00:56:58,600 --> 00:57:00,900
Okay, we're going to go ahead 
and get things wrapped up. 

1007
00:57:01,900 --> 00:57:04,000
You know, Eve, you've been 
generous as always with your 

1008
00:57:04,000 --> 00:57:05,700
time with us. 
Super appreciate it. 

1009
00:57:05,700 --> 00:57:08,500
You coming on, especially on a 
Friday night and taking time out

1010
00:57:08,500 --> 00:57:11,800
for us, and sharing your wisdom 
with us and the listeners are 

1011
00:57:11,800 --> 00:57:13,700
out there. 
I'll have links in our show 

1012
00:57:13,700 --> 00:57:16,000
notes to reach out to. 
You can connect with you on 

1013
00:57:16,000 --> 00:57:19,100
LinkedIn there Sabrina. 
Oh, what a good little puffer. 

1014
00:57:19,300 --> 00:57:21,100
Sorry guys. 
As you know, this is Audio Only,

1015
00:57:21,100 --> 00:57:23,200
but we got to see. 
We got finally got to see some 

1016
00:57:23,200 --> 00:57:27,100
remix. 
Yeah, so we'll have show that 

1017
00:57:27,100 --> 00:57:29,900
makes it our show notes. 
You can connect with Yvonne 

1018
00:57:30,100 --> 00:57:32,100
LinkedIn will have linked to 
forgerock. 

1019
00:57:32,300 --> 00:57:35,000
I did find this CTO Lounge on 
the for direct Community 

1020
00:57:35,000 --> 00:57:36,300
website. 
They actually has a few 

1021
00:57:36,300 --> 00:57:38,000
different articles on AI and 
stuff like that. 

1022
00:57:38,000 --> 00:57:43,000
So yeah, do that and also 
explain a i.org so that if 

1023
00:57:43,000 --> 00:57:45,000
you're interested in sort of 
that area, you can kind of see 

1024
00:57:45,000 --> 00:57:47,100
what that's been working on and,
of course, links for a gym and 

1025
00:57:47,100 --> 00:57:51,500
myself to connect on LinkedIn. 
If you Are you know looking for 

1026
00:57:51,500 --> 00:57:54,100
a very interesting conversation 
at Gartner. 

1027
00:57:54,200 --> 00:57:56,600
We're going to be on stage, you 
know, talking with Enrique I'm 

1028
00:57:56,600 --> 00:58:00,300
Becky send us your deepest 
darkest hardest questions for 

1029
00:58:00,300 --> 00:58:03,600
Gardner was a still time. 
Send it over to us. 

1030
00:58:03,700 --> 00:58:08,400
Sent to us via LinkedIn and 
we'll try to get try to identify

1031
00:58:08,400 --> 00:58:11,100
some themes and include that for
part of the discussion will have

1032
00:58:11,100 --> 00:58:12,700
their. 
So we'll go ahead and leave it 

1033
00:58:12,700 --> 00:58:14,700
there for this week. 
You can find us on the web 

1034
00:58:14,900 --> 00:58:18,600
identity at the center.com. 
We're also on Twitter at IDC 

1035
00:58:18,600 --> 00:58:20,700
podcast. 
And we'll go ahead and wrap it 

1036
00:58:20,700 --> 00:58:22,400
up there. 
Thanks everyone for listening, 

1037
00:58:22,400 --> 00:58:23,900
and we'll talk with you all in 
the next one. 

1038
00:58:25,600 --> 00:58:28,700
You've been listening to 
Identity at the center. 

1039
00:58:29,200 --> 00:58:33,200
We hope you've enjoyed the show,
make sure to like rate and 

1040
00:58:33,200 --> 00:58:36,800
review and we'll be back soon, 
but in the meantime, hit the 

1041
00:58:36,800 --> 00:58:41,300
website at identity at the 
center.com and find us on 

1042
00:58:41,300 --> 00:58:48,400
Twitter at idac podcast. 
See you next time on identity at

1043
00:58:48,400 --> 00:58:49,300
the center