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Do you know who has access to 
what? 

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This is the Identity at the 
Center podcast. 

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If you're looking for identity 
and access management talk, 

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you've come to the right place. 
And now on to the show. 

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Welcome to yet another episode 
of the Identity at the Center 

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podcast. 
Certainly been appreciating the 

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likes and ratings we've been 
getting. 

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If you like what you hear, do us
a favor, share the show with 

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other like minded individuals 
And you can also e-mail us at 

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questions at 
identity@thecenter.com. 

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I am Jeff and that is Jim's 
voice you're about to hear. 

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Jim. 
Hey, Jeff, survive the 

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hurricane. 
It's by the hurricane. 

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Well, so far anyway. 
I'm 100 miles inland and that 

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helped. 
Yeah. 

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So then I guess I'm a Hurricane 
survivor as well too, being up 

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in the Chicago area. 
That's right. 

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Yeah. 
We're joined today by Morgan 

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McNamara. 
She's one of our crack members 

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of our engineering team here at 
Identity. 

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Hello, Morgan. 
Hey, Jeff, How's it going? 

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Good. 
Thanks for joining us today. 

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Yeah, no problem. 
So Jeff, I want to clarify by 

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being a crack member, that 
doesn't mean you smoke crack, 

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right? 
They don't have. 

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Well, you know, that's a 
personal question. 

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I don't think that that's 
probably right for the podcast. 

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I think as long as the work gets
done, hey man, whatever. 

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Not that I'm condoning that 
behavior. 

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There you go. 
So today is Thursday. 

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Do you know what today is, Jim 
Morgan? 

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Take a guess other than you 
know, podcast day. 

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Thursday there's. 
It's an olasp day. 

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It's not that. 
It is the opening night of the 

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NFL. 
Bears, Packers. 

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My Bears actually are looking 
good now. 

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So there's a chance that we 
might actually beat the Packers 

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on Thursday Night Football 
tonight's open season. 

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I'm very excited about this. 
Now those teams have probably 

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played about 100 times. 
Yeah, and it's relatively even 

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even though the Packers seem 
like they've been dominating the

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Bears for the last decade or so,
the the actual overall record is

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relatively close, which is makes
it one of the better rivalries. 

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Yeah, cool. 
Morgan, do you have a team that 

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you follow in the NFL? 
God, out of obligation, I have 

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to say the Buffalo Bills. 
All right, on. 

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Yeah. 
Go Bills. 

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My dad is one of the Bills fans,
so I get you on that one. 

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He's from Newfane and Rochester 
area, so So yeah, the Bills were

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his team. 
Okay. 

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Yeah, that's like right next to 
me. 

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I'm from Buffalo, so try your 
hardest bills. 

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Jim, do you follow? 
The team Eagles. 

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That's right, Eagles. 
Of course. 

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Did you see that the Eagles 
offensive line did the ESPN Body

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Issue? 
No. 

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Yeah. 
So if. 

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If that's your thing, just not. 
Clear it's not. 

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This is the first time in 25 
years of NFL football that I'm 

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not doing a fantasy Football 
League. 

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And I gotta tell you, I find it 
to be quite free. 

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I'm actually going to be able to
watch the games, enjoy them, 

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rather than wonder, you know, 
how my running backs did or are,

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you know, having second thoughts
around not starting one guy and 

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him on the bench. 
So. 

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Yeah, no, no. 
I stopped doing it about 10 

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years ago, and I feel the same 
way. 

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It was like it's ruining the 
game for me. 

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And I did the same thing with 
fantasy baseball, where it's 

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like, you know, I was just so 
concerned with how individual 

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players were doing it that it 
was. 

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You know, ruining the sport for 
me. 

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And I'm sure there are a lot of 
people out there listening, 

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period. 
But there are a lot of people 

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out there listening who play 
fantasy sports and love it. 

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And I used to love it. 
But I'm with you, man. 

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You know it's it's freeing. 
Yeah, I just, I don't know what 

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it is. 
It just decided not to do it 

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this year and there's a certain,
you know, freedom aspect to it. 

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Anyway, all right, let's let's 
actually talk about idea access 

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management. 
And get us back on track here. 

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Today we're going to talk about 
a topic that was submitted to us

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by Neil who listens to the show.
Certainly appreciate his e-mail.

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Let me go right into here. 
What he writes, 1 area that I 

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think would be pertinent to 
discuss is around the managing 

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of identity and a multi cloud 
environment. 

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There is a growing movement 
toward vendor agnostic use of 

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cloud services and this drives 
some new thinking around how we 

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approach identity. 
Do we centralize or distribute 

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identity management? 
And he thinks that make a good 

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subject which I absolutely agree
with. 

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So wanna let's let's start off 
with you know why do companies 

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have multi cloud environments. 
Morgan, do you want to take a 

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stab at that? 
And then Jim, I'll chime in. 

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My assumption would be that, you
know, they have different 

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platforms, different languages 
that they're using, and they're 

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trying to sort of sequester each
one of those to try and make it 

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as secure as possible instead of
integrating them all together in

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a single cloud instance. 
I think that makes sense. 

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Yeah, no, that's a good answer. 
You know, Jeff, what I've found 

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is most clients that I work 
with. 

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Are either in one of two camps, 
they're either in a single cloud

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environment, so they're using 
something like AWS or Microsoft 

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Azure. 
And those are you know 

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definitely the two that I see 
the the largest uptake on at 

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least the the client base that 
we've been working with or 

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they're in a multi cloud and 
they have more than one. 

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So they have AWS and Azure 
hosting and so the ones that I 

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find that are in that second 
scenario and. 

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And to be honest, I'm not an 
expert in the features of a WS, 

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the features of Azure or any of 
the other cloud platforms, but 

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from, you know, the the level 
that I'm at, the feature, there 

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seems to be a lot of feature 
parody. 

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I'm sure there's people out 
there pulling their hair out me 

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saying that, but you know, for 
the most part I'm finding that 

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most clients aren't choosing a 
WS or Azure based on, you know, 

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this feature or that feature, 
but more. 

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Which company they align with 
better now where I see the, the 

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situation where a client has 
multiple clouds, maybe they even

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have multiple kind of instances 
within the same provider. 

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It's kind of been thrust upon 
them in that their organization 

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you know grew through 
acquisition or merger or they 

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you know purchase some software 
that. 

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That was on one of the clouds 
and they were already on the 

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other cloud or that you know 
some decisions were made within 

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their organization. 
One part of the organization 

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went Microsoft, the other part 
went a WS. 

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Now they're coming together and 
kind of starting to manage IT 

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together. 
And so in other words, they're 

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they're kind of thrust into that
situation. 

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They really choose multicloud. 
It just kind of happened. 

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Yeah, I see as a look at like 
from a use case perspective, 

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right. 
If you're and the the idea that 

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there's different parts of the 
business that have different use

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cases kind of places what you 
just said if you're on the 

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SharePoint side or if you're you
know e-mail, you're probably 

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familiar with Azure from a cloud
perspective. 

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But there might be someone who 
is more on the Google side 

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because of the strength of the 
analytic side that they might be

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having. 
So they're more familiar with 

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that. 
They might have gone off and 

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built something Google's Cloud 
Platform, whereas you know, 

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developers might be looking at a
WS and spinning up, you know, 

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services there. 
So pulling things together is 

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certainly you know part of the 
challenge I think that comes 

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along with it, but in my mind I 
think it's it's, it kind of goes

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with that use case, right. 
So if you're an Office 365 shop,

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you're on Azure, you know 
whether you whether you like it 

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or not, you're already using 
Azure from that, from that 

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approach and then it becomes 
that that question of okay, well

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we're already using here right 
land and expand, which is you 

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know the the approach many 
software vendors will take. 

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Is why don't you use you know 
Azure for the rest of your cloud

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services whereas company might 
have you know other pockets of a

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WS and that's that's I think 
that's pretty common. 

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I think a lot of companies try 
to consolidate on one. 

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But I like the security aspect 
that Morgan you mentioned before

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around having things in kind of 
a little bit of different silo 

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where you don't have all your 
keys in one castle. 

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So yeah, I think there is 
benefit to that as well, using 

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the right tool for the job 
rather than trying to make you 

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know, one. 
One service meet all your needs 

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when it may not, may not be the 
best for the business. 

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Yeah, absolutely. 
If I could just jump in and 

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mention something interesting 
that I noticed when you guys 

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were discussing that was that 
it's almost like there's this 

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sort of resistance in a sense to
complete migration to cloud 

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infrastructure because when you 
think of implementation of a 

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cloud, it's really dissolving 
the traditional. 

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Perimeters that we've seen that 
have relied on things like a 

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firewall and VPN, it's just 
those just aren't as viable 

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anymore. 
You know you're looking at a 

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cross-platform system where 
you're trying to simplify the IT

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stack. 
That elimination of the 

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perimeter is gonna demand some 
sort of seamless implementation 

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with a centralized user 
management tool and I. 

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It almost sounds like companies 
are kind of afraid to do that, 

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and they're trying to almost 
reestablish perimeters where 

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they just tried to migrate to a 
fragmentation of it. 

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Yeah, I think the perimeter's 
gone at this point. 

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I think that's a losing effort. 
If you're trying to establish 

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printer on the cloud, Jim, what 
are some of the problems that 

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you see? 
If you're taking a multi cloud 

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approach. 
Well, I think the the biggest 

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problem is the same if you have 
a single cloud approach which is

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but you know it's it's obviously
compounded. 

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The base problem is the number 
of secrets or credentials that 

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it takes to run a large cloud 
environment. 

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You know you have secrets for 
secrets or credentials for the 

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console to access 
infrastructure. 

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Within your applications, 
they're embedded within 

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configuration files or embedded 
service accounts. 

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So the volume, the volume of the
number of credentials that you 

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have to manage is in in kind of 
a controlled fashion just 

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becomes such a a major effort 
that that's really the problem. 

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And when you go to a multicloud,
now you've compounded that you 

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have as many as twice as many 
secrets that you need to manage.

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Mm HM yeah, there's a visibility
issue too, right? 

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If it's not being if the cloud 
isn't being managed centrally 

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right, some areas probably have 
different procedures and 

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processes and policies for their
own cloud, right? 

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AWS might be managed different 
than Azure or Google and you may

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not have that visibility. 
To know who has access to what 

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was really kind of foundational 
for any IM program which it 

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would be part of the security 
strategy. 

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00:11:16,280 --> 00:11:21,120
Yeah, I mean, think of how how 
much companies struggle to. 

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Comply with their own policies 
in terms of password rotation 

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when it comes to service 
accounts, you know now you're 

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looking at a new environment 
that often times you know a 

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cloud environment that spun up 
without information security 

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having a handson role. 
Now I'm talking in generalities,

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right? 
Not every organization spun up 

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their cloud infrastructure that 
way, but now you've got 

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thousands of. 
Credentials that have to be 

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managed and passwords that need 
to be rotated in compliance. 

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And you may or may not have a 
technology solution supporting 

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that. 
So I think that's really the 

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problem. 
And then when you have 

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multicloud, they just picked up 
and repeated that the same kind 

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of problem in a second place or 
or more. 

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Or you could be talking about an
internal private cloud. 

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No matter how you look at it, 
the more places that you have to

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manage all these credentials, 
the harder the problem becomes 

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to. 
Manage. 

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00:12:20,100 --> 00:12:23,220
So it sounds like an answer 
might be some sort of 

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centralization strategy across 
the cloud or at least from a 

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management standpoint. 
I mean that's that's the answer 

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to you know. 
So I think this gets to Neil's 

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00:12:31,780 --> 00:12:34,940
question is using you know 
should we take a centralized 

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approach or distributed 
approach. 

231
00:12:36,500 --> 00:12:39,380
I'm definitely in the camp of a 
centralized approach. 

232
00:12:39,380 --> 00:12:43,220
I want centralized command to 
control centralized visibility 

233
00:12:43,220 --> 00:12:45,580
and do who has access to what 
what they've done. 

234
00:12:46,950 --> 00:12:50,350
And I want to put together some 
guidelines or best practices 

235
00:12:51,430 --> 00:12:55,790
that I can you know put into 
effect in in terms of managing 

236
00:12:55,790 --> 00:12:57,430
those identities within the 
cloud. 

237
00:12:57,830 --> 00:13:01,230
And you know I've got some some 
topics that I'd like to dive 

238
00:13:01,230 --> 00:13:05,270
into or or kind of best 
practices that I think that you 

239
00:13:05,270 --> 00:13:09,110
know and and kind of taking an 
approach of you've got to walk 

240
00:13:09,110 --> 00:13:12,310
before you run. 
Obviously, people who are 

241
00:13:12,310 --> 00:13:14,470
listening to this podcast could 
be. 

242
00:13:15,700 --> 00:13:19,500
In different organizations that 
have that are a different point 

243
00:13:19,500 --> 00:13:23,860
in their life cycle that have 
different types of applications 

244
00:13:23,860 --> 00:13:26,820
are running in different clouds.
So I'm going to kind of start at

245
00:13:26,820 --> 00:13:30,060
the most basic level in terms of
here are the approaches that I 

246
00:13:30,060 --> 00:13:33,660
think need to be tackled and 
then we'll get into the more 

247
00:13:33,660 --> 00:13:35,860
advanced stuff all. 
Right, let's hit it. 

248
00:13:35,860 --> 00:13:39,380
What's #1? 
OK, so starting on you know from

249
00:13:39,380 --> 00:13:43,060
the basics strong authentication
practices, so. 

250
00:13:44,560 --> 00:13:48,160
You know, starting with the 
assumption that you've got good 

251
00:13:48,160 --> 00:13:52,240
practices for managing identity.
So just thinking of your 

252
00:13:52,240 --> 00:13:55,800
employees, including the 
population of people who do 

253
00:13:56,120 --> 00:13:59,400
administrative developer 
functions in the cloud, that 

254
00:13:59,400 --> 00:14:02,160
you've got good life cycle 
management or identity 

255
00:14:02,160 --> 00:14:05,880
governance practices. 
For those people today, you know

256
00:14:05,880 --> 00:14:09,600
who works here, who gets access 
to what And most importantly, 

257
00:14:09,800 --> 00:14:12,640
when they leave that, you're 
cutting off that access if you 

258
00:14:12,640 --> 00:14:15,790
have that and you kind of. 
Centralize that, say around your

259
00:14:15,790 --> 00:14:21,750
Active Directory, then you can 
plug in your access to the cloud

260
00:14:22,030 --> 00:14:25,710
through your corporate single 
sign on solution or Pam 

261
00:14:25,710 --> 00:14:28,150
solution. 
I think you know either one of 

262
00:14:28,150 --> 00:14:31,790
those technologies is kind of 
trying to solve this problem, 

263
00:14:31,790 --> 00:14:35,070
but what I see the most is 
organizations starting with 

264
00:14:35,390 --> 00:14:40,030
managing the console kind of the
management interface for their 

265
00:14:40,030 --> 00:14:43,750
cloud and. 
Regarding that providing single 

266
00:14:43,750 --> 00:14:46,750
sign on to that with their SSO 
solution, so like pop there or 

267
00:14:46,750 --> 00:14:50,550
ping or or one login or 
something like that and then 

268
00:14:50,910 --> 00:14:54,910
ideally on top of like a Pam. 
Solution work with with that 

269
00:14:55,270 --> 00:14:57,950
approach as well something. 
Like, I mean a Pam. 

270
00:14:57,950 --> 00:15:02,310
Cyber or Cyber? 
Yeah, a lot of those, a lot of 

271
00:15:02,310 --> 00:15:07,830
those vendors have solutions 
developed around Azure and AWS 

272
00:15:07,910 --> 00:15:10,790
specifically. 
I think AWS is probably the one 

273
00:15:10,790 --> 00:15:14,730
that. 
I see addressed the most, but I 

274
00:15:14,730 --> 00:15:20,010
think every solution that's 
trying to tackle this problem is

275
00:15:20,010 --> 00:15:22,970
really focused on providing a 
solution for a WS as well. 

276
00:15:22,970 --> 00:15:26,810
It's Microsoft, so yeah, there 
are there are solutions out 

277
00:15:26,810 --> 00:15:30,930
there that would allow you to 
use your Pam solution, which has

278
00:15:30,930 --> 00:15:34,810
its own set of benefits. 
Those benefits are kind of more 

279
00:15:34,810 --> 00:15:37,500
down the line of. 
More advanced benefits and what 

280
00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:39,980
I was planning on going through 
at the moment, because what I 

281
00:15:39,980 --> 00:15:43,220
wanted to talk about next was, 
you know with authentication. 

282
00:15:43,220 --> 00:15:46,300
So if we're just talking about 
access to the console at the 

283
00:15:46,300 --> 00:15:51,260
moment and providing single sign
on using your account that has 

284
00:15:51,260 --> 00:15:55,380
good I GA practices around it. 
That's getting disabled when you

285
00:15:55,380 --> 00:15:58,660
leave the organization. 
On top of that I want to layer 

286
00:15:58,700 --> 00:16:00,820
multifactor authentication 
because. 

287
00:16:01,280 --> 00:16:04,120
You know your your web console 
is going to be available over 

288
00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:07,080
the open Internet, and we want 
to make sure that we're 

289
00:16:07,080 --> 00:16:10,560
providing a very strong 
authentication to log in. 

290
00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:13,160
So you've got MFA, you got 
strong credentials. 

291
00:16:14,320 --> 00:16:18,680
Morgan, I know you had some 
experience working through AWS. 

292
00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:23,440
When you're logging into AWS, 
did you did you have MFA enabled

293
00:16:23,840 --> 00:16:26,320
when you were trying to get 
access to the console? 

294
00:16:26,780 --> 00:16:29,980
So when I was setting up access 
to the console, I actually 

295
00:16:30,020 --> 00:16:36,100
because I directly signed in 
through Aws's web browser, I did

296
00:16:36,100 --> 00:16:39,940
not have to do multi factor. 
Okay. 

297
00:16:39,980 --> 00:16:42,140
So that might be a 
recommendation for a former 

298
00:16:43,420 --> 00:16:46,620
former client, a former 
colleague, right? 

299
00:16:47,260 --> 00:16:47,940
Yeah. 
Really. 

300
00:16:47,980 --> 00:16:49,900
Yeah, Really. 
At this point, password only 

301
00:16:49,900 --> 00:16:52,100
isn't good enough, right? 
I think that's kind of like 

302
00:16:52,100 --> 00:16:54,500
preaching something that we say 
all the time. 

303
00:16:54,540 --> 00:16:58,260
You got to put MFA everywhere as
much as you can, especially on 

304
00:16:58,260 --> 00:17:00,740
the cloud. 
You know, it's like every week 

305
00:17:00,740 --> 00:17:03,980
there's like a new article 
around how you know, someone's 

306
00:17:03,980 --> 00:17:06,339
cloud got breached. 
You know S3 bucket wasn't 

307
00:17:06,339 --> 00:17:08,740
configured correctly and it was 
exposed. 

308
00:17:08,980 --> 00:17:11,619
I mean there's just, there's so 
many things that can go wrong 

309
00:17:12,020 --> 00:17:14,700
and I think that's what scares 
maybe some of the people who may

310
00:17:14,700 --> 00:17:17,980
be more hesitant to adopt the 
cloud, going back to a point 

311
00:17:17,980 --> 00:17:20,980
where you know, Morgan, you made
earlier, but it's coming. 

312
00:17:21,220 --> 00:17:24,060
I mean, you just can't start 
putting, you know, racks and 

313
00:17:24,060 --> 00:17:26,060
racks of servers in your 
environment where you've got to 

314
00:17:26,060 --> 00:17:27,859
do a good job of securing access
to them. 

315
00:17:28,970 --> 00:17:31,250
And you talk about 
authentication and and I from my

316
00:17:31,250 --> 00:17:34,170
perspective, I look at it as 
you've got to know what you've 

317
00:17:34,170 --> 00:17:36,330
got before you can protect it. 
So you got to know who has 

318
00:17:36,330 --> 00:17:38,210
access to what. 
You got to know what all the 

319
00:17:38,210 --> 00:17:40,250
different counts are. 
Especially if you're working off

320
00:17:40,250 --> 00:17:43,130
the compounded problem where 
you're using multicloud and you 

321
00:17:43,130 --> 00:17:46,290
have different, you know, 
vendors get that inventory in 

322
00:17:46,290 --> 00:17:49,650
place, know what the accounts 
are, know what the permissions 

323
00:17:49,650 --> 00:17:52,410
are, start to figure out which 
ones are human and which ones 

324
00:17:52,410 --> 00:17:55,170
are machine, right. 
So a lot of development takes 

325
00:17:55,170 --> 00:17:58,490
place, so you want to make sure 
that you identify. 

326
00:17:58,870 --> 00:18:00,710
You know what's actually 
controlled by a person will 

327
00:18:00,710 --> 00:18:04,070
might be more programmatic and 
then I would look to centralized

328
00:18:04,070 --> 00:18:05,350
as well. 
So I certainly agree with that 

329
00:18:05,350 --> 00:18:07,870
approach. 
Maybe putting something in front

330
00:18:07,870 --> 00:18:11,710
of it like the SSO solution 
makes sense, and then using the 

331
00:18:11,710 --> 00:18:16,510
MFA that's part of the SSO 
solution to get access to the 

332
00:18:16,510 --> 00:18:19,230
cloud environment in my mind 
would probably be a good, you 

333
00:18:19,230 --> 00:18:22,350
know, first step towards that. 
Yeah, I mean, that's what I 

334
00:18:22,350 --> 00:18:24,610
really. 
Feel strongly about is that you 

335
00:18:24,610 --> 00:18:27,530
know from a console perspective,
because I think that's where 

336
00:18:27,810 --> 00:18:31,050
someone can inflict the most, 
the most damage, right? 

337
00:18:31,050 --> 00:18:36,730
They can settings, they can 
allow themselves access to many 

338
00:18:36,730 --> 00:18:42,530
of the, you know instances, the 
server instances or the platform

339
00:18:42,530 --> 00:18:45,450
services through the console. 
So if they can get into the 

340
00:18:45,450 --> 00:18:50,410
console with a very, you know, 
very strict role or a very high 

341
00:18:50,410 --> 00:18:53,800
level role, they could. 
Do a lot of damage. 

342
00:18:53,800 --> 00:18:57,920
So it's kind of basic blocking 
tackling of using your SSO 

343
00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:03,400
solution, MFA, strong password 
policy and then using any other 

344
00:19:03,400 --> 00:19:05,080
policies that make business 
sense. 

345
00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:08,000
I mean there, if you don't, you 
shouldn't have people accessing 

346
00:19:08,000 --> 00:19:11,920
during certain times of the day 
or from different IP ranges than

347
00:19:11,920 --> 00:19:14,280
your corporate network. 
Then go ahead and put those 

348
00:19:14,320 --> 00:19:18,200
policies in place. 
Anything you can do to restrict 

349
00:19:18,200 --> 00:19:22,120
access to just those folks that 
should be accessing? 

350
00:19:22,510 --> 00:19:25,510
That environment, all the 
better. 

351
00:19:26,470 --> 00:19:28,270
And one of these vendors also 
have things like conditional 

352
00:19:28,270 --> 00:19:31,670
access right, so you can do 
things around geolocation, you 

353
00:19:31,670 --> 00:19:34,110
know, device fingerprinting, you
know, that sort of thing. 

354
00:19:34,310 --> 00:19:36,430
It's becoming pretty commonplace
today, yeah. 

355
00:19:36,750 --> 00:19:39,390
Yeah, I remember when that used 
to be like, ooh wow, we're cool 

356
00:19:39,390 --> 00:19:40,950
because, you know, we can do 
this and others can't. 

357
00:19:40,950 --> 00:19:43,670
But now it's almost a standard 
feature amongst most. 

358
00:19:44,470 --> 00:19:46,030
Right, Access management 
providers. 

359
00:19:46,630 --> 00:19:49,190
So now it's kind of looking for 
ways to differentiate between 

360
00:19:49,190 --> 00:19:51,350
those. 
You know I see things that like 

361
00:19:51,510 --> 00:19:55,310
Casha Corp, you know they 
specialize in you know cloud 

362
00:19:55,310 --> 00:19:57,870
management, DevOps that's those 
sorts of things that might be 

363
00:19:57,870 --> 00:20:01,350
interesting to look at. 
One area that I think is has a 

364
00:20:01,350 --> 00:20:03,870
lot of potential would be more 
of a like a just in time 

365
00:20:03,870 --> 00:20:08,270
provisioning of Access where. 
People don't have permissions 

366
00:20:08,270 --> 00:20:10,630
all the time, right. 
They get them just when they 

367
00:20:10,630 --> 00:20:12,790
need them and then those 
permissions are pulled back or 

368
00:20:12,870 --> 00:20:14,790
you know what are the roles are 
the entitlements are they give 

369
00:20:14,790 --> 00:20:16,950
them access. 
You know there's products out 

370
00:20:16,950 --> 00:20:19,150
there like plain ID. 
You can even do something you 

371
00:20:19,150 --> 00:20:22,030
know through it through an IGA 
tool, identity governance 

372
00:20:22,030 --> 00:20:24,750
administration tool like you 
have potentially sale pointing 

373
00:20:24,790 --> 00:20:28,510
or savians or things like Oracle
or I BM you know those sorts of 

374
00:20:28,750 --> 00:20:30,350
right. 
It's a lot more complicated 

375
00:20:30,350 --> 00:20:33,310
though when you're trying to do 
it that way because you really 

376
00:20:33,310 --> 00:20:35,940
have to know, you know, what are
the permissions and then who's 

377
00:20:35,940 --> 00:20:37,460
going to approve it. 
If it's something that's 

378
00:20:37,460 --> 00:20:40,580
critical from like a time frame 
perspective, you know, is that 

379
00:20:40,580 --> 00:20:43,180
approver available to put that 
in there. 

380
00:20:43,580 --> 00:20:45,420
We see these challenges 
sometimes of a privileged access

381
00:20:45,420 --> 00:20:48,020
management side too, right? 
Just even inside the firewall, 

382
00:20:48,340 --> 00:20:51,820
people getting access to servers
and there's this stigma of red 

383
00:20:51,820 --> 00:20:54,340
tape that kind of goes around 
privileged access management 

384
00:20:54,340 --> 00:20:58,140
processes that could easily, you
know, happen on on the cloud 

385
00:20:58,140 --> 00:20:59,320
side too. 
Right. 

386
00:20:59,680 --> 00:21:03,440
Yeah, we're, I think privilege 
access management really gets 

387
00:21:03,440 --> 00:21:07,080
you the most mileage is beyond 
just accessing the console when 

388
00:21:07,080 --> 00:21:10,800
you start getting into managing 
your server instances and 

389
00:21:11,040 --> 00:21:13,720
managing the accounts that have 
access. 

390
00:21:13,720 --> 00:21:19,600
So one of the other tips or keys
that I have is, you know, making

391
00:21:19,600 --> 00:21:25,230
sure that each person. 
Who has to access servers has 

392
00:21:25,430 --> 00:21:27,990
their own set of credentials 
that you're not sharing 

393
00:21:27,990 --> 00:21:30,510
credentials over a group of 
people. 

394
00:21:30,510 --> 00:21:36,430
So for example, if you're using 
a Linux instance on on the a WS 

395
00:21:36,430 --> 00:21:43,950
EC2 server, those keys should be
individually individually 

396
00:21:45,270 --> 00:21:48,990
provisioned per person. 
So private keys should be 

397
00:21:48,990 --> 00:21:53,130
private to the user where? 
Privilege access management 

398
00:21:53,130 --> 00:21:56,210
system could be really 
advantageous when it comes to 

399
00:21:56,210 --> 00:22:01,930
managing those instances is to 
allow temporary access. 

400
00:22:02,210 --> 00:22:05,530
Person doesn't actually need to 
know the password to the account

401
00:22:05,530 --> 00:22:09,010
on that server. 
And then of course you could set

402
00:22:09,010 --> 00:22:12,370
the the firewall rules on the 
console to only allow the only 

403
00:22:13,530 --> 00:22:16,800
allow. 
The IP address with the IP range

404
00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:20,160
that the privilege access 
management server exists on to 

405
00:22:20,160 --> 00:22:23,240
actually access the server. 
So then you have some network 

406
00:22:23,240 --> 00:22:26,400
access controls, you know, 
additional network access 

407
00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:29,320
controls guarding access to that
server. 

408
00:22:29,320 --> 00:22:35,360
So some good and that's kind of 
basic blocking and tackling for 

409
00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:38,480
the enterprise. 
So a lot of the best practices 

410
00:22:38,480 --> 00:22:41,720
for managing your server 
environment in the enterprise 

411
00:22:42,040 --> 00:22:45,210
move over to. 
Managing the servers in the 

412
00:22:45,210 --> 00:22:48,930
cloud as well Jeff, one thing 
you mentioned about Hoshi Corp, 

413
00:22:49,010 --> 00:22:53,170
I mean what I would recommend 
for anybody who's listening to 

414
00:22:53,170 --> 00:22:56,370
go out to their website, watch 
some of the the videos that they

415
00:22:56,370 --> 00:23:00,210
have posted their their tech 
talks with their their Co CTO's.

416
00:23:00,210 --> 00:23:05,490
I mean those guys are both 
really, really bright and and 

417
00:23:05,490 --> 00:23:08,770
they really understand the space
and they can walk you through a 

418
00:23:08,770 --> 00:23:14,020
lot of the ways to approach. 
Now their focus is primarily I 

419
00:23:14,020 --> 00:23:20,460
think around managing DevOps, 
managing really secrets in the 

420
00:23:20,620 --> 00:23:24,660
in the cloud. 
And the secrets a lot of times 

421
00:23:24,660 --> 00:23:28,100
are go back to if you're looking
at this from a developer 

422
00:23:28,100 --> 00:23:30,820
sampling, you're publishing 
applications out to the cloud. 

423
00:23:31,060 --> 00:23:32,940
But I think that's a lot of what
we're talking about today, 

424
00:23:32,940 --> 00:23:34,580
managing A multicloud 
environment. 

425
00:23:34,580 --> 00:23:38,100
So I think that's a really good 
vendor to bring up. 

426
00:23:38,490 --> 00:23:41,690
Relative to this discussion, you
know I think that DevOps is 

427
00:23:41,690 --> 00:23:45,090
something that you don't want to
forget about. 

428
00:23:45,090 --> 00:23:48,010
How do you deploy apps without 
hard coding secrets? 

429
00:23:48,250 --> 00:23:50,330
So you look at technologies like
Hash Core. 

430
00:23:51,490 --> 00:23:55,450
It's a way to have your 
applications programmatically go

431
00:23:55,450 --> 00:23:58,090
out and fetch your secrets 
rather than having to hard code 

432
00:23:58,090 --> 00:24:02,010
them into configuration files. 
In the same with your DevOps 

433
00:24:02,010 --> 00:24:07,130
tools like the Kubernetes not 
having to hard code all those 

434
00:24:07,130 --> 00:24:10,990
credentials. 
Into into something that can be 

435
00:24:10,990 --> 00:24:14,110
seen by multiple people within 
the organization. 

436
00:24:14,390 --> 00:24:16,510
Yeah, that takes a lot of work 
though too, because if you 

437
00:24:16,510 --> 00:24:19,340
haven't built out applications 
with that in mind, right. 

438
00:24:19,380 --> 00:24:24,420
If more of like a legacy type 
approach trying to go back and 

439
00:24:24,780 --> 00:24:28,860
reconfigure applications to use 
the programmatic means to pull 

440
00:24:28,860 --> 00:24:31,260
keys from vaults and those sorts
of things can take some time. 

441
00:24:31,260 --> 00:24:33,420
So it's definitely not something
that happens from an overnight 

442
00:24:33,420 --> 00:24:35,620
perspective. 
But I think I think Ashley Corp 

443
00:24:35,620 --> 00:24:37,420
would be a good one to look at. 
You know maybe something like 

444
00:24:37,420 --> 00:24:40,060
Plain ID as well if you're 
looking for more like a just in 

445
00:24:40,060 --> 00:24:41,220
time provisioning. 
I think they have some 

446
00:24:41,220 --> 00:24:44,060
interesting use cases that that 
might be helpful for people who 

447
00:24:44,060 --> 00:24:48,570
are looking at managing access 
to cloud environments. 

448
00:24:48,930 --> 00:24:51,690
The other thing I think you 
brought up a good point about, 

449
00:24:52,290 --> 00:24:55,690
you know, it's a lot of work. 
I don't think that I am program 

450
00:24:55,690 --> 00:25:00,730
manager can go in and and and 
you know be confrontational if 

451
00:25:00,730 --> 00:25:03,250
you will, about trying to 
implement security. 

452
00:25:03,250 --> 00:25:05,890
You really have to partner with 
the development team. 

453
00:25:05,890 --> 00:25:09,570
They have to see the value and 
having checks and balances and 

454
00:25:09,570 --> 00:25:13,610
see the value in. 
You know, the visibility that 

455
00:25:13,610 --> 00:25:15,810
they can get and the 
manageability that they can get.

456
00:25:16,330 --> 00:25:21,530
A lot of times you run into kind
of the mindset that, well, 

457
00:25:21,530 --> 00:25:24,130
there's only 10 people in the 
department. 

458
00:25:24,130 --> 00:25:27,690
They've all worked here, you 
know, 3, three or more years. 

459
00:25:27,690 --> 00:25:30,450
We trust them. 
The thing is, some security is, 

460
00:25:30,490 --> 00:25:34,250
you know, not about trusting 
people, it's about being, you 

461
00:25:34,250 --> 00:25:37,350
know? 
Being able to not have to rely 

462
00:25:37,350 --> 00:25:39,910
on trust. 
It's being sure that you have 

463
00:25:39,910 --> 00:25:42,870
the security controls that 
everybody knows that hey, if you

464
00:25:42,870 --> 00:25:45,270
try to do something, we're going
to know about it. 

465
00:25:45,710 --> 00:25:50,270
And I think from an IM program 
manager perspective, the way I'd

466
00:25:50,270 --> 00:25:55,710
look at it is to try to partner 
with the manager of applications

467
00:25:55,710 --> 00:25:58,550
because I think that, you know, 
they're going to have to adopt 

468
00:25:58,550 --> 00:26:02,870
this technology more or less 
willingly for it to be a success

469
00:26:03,190 --> 00:26:06,190
and. 
They should look at the I M team

470
00:26:06,190 --> 00:26:08,350
as a partner. 
Somebody can provide 

471
00:26:08,670 --> 00:26:14,270
administration of that of these 
platforms and be a proper checks

472
00:26:14,270 --> 00:26:18,190
and balances that. 
Can allow them to focus on 

473
00:26:18,190 --> 00:26:20,870
development and not have to 
focus on security as much, 

474
00:26:21,030 --> 00:26:23,790
right. 
So I think hopefully that helps 

475
00:26:23,910 --> 00:26:26,870
kind of put at least our 
opinions around that for Neil 

476
00:26:26,870 --> 00:26:29,870
and maybe other folks who were 
having some more questions. 

477
00:26:29,870 --> 00:26:32,230
I think to sum it up right, 
we're we're fans of centralizing

478
00:26:32,230 --> 00:26:34,870
it, but you got to have good 
policy procedure you know back 

479
00:26:34,870 --> 00:26:37,550
ending that you know the right 
kind of technology approach and 

480
00:26:37,550 --> 00:26:40,590
how you'd want to manage the 
permissions and making sure you 

481
00:26:40,590 --> 00:26:43,390
don't forget about humans and 
non humans, right the 

482
00:26:43,390 --> 00:26:47,040
programmatic side of things, 
DevOps etcetera, getting access 

483
00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:50,560
to the cloud. 
I'd like to kind of pivot back a

484
00:26:50,560 --> 00:26:55,000
little bit to Morgan and kind of
talk a little bit about her 

485
00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:57,240
background, cuz I think she's 
got kind of an interesting story

486
00:26:57,240 --> 00:27:01,200
where you know how people, if 
you remember one of our first 

487
00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:04,360
episodes was, you know, how 
people got into I M most of us 

488
00:27:04,360 --> 00:27:06,320
kind of fell into it. 
And I think Morgan's another 

489
00:27:06,320 --> 00:27:10,250
good example of that. 
Morgan has an amazing LinkedIn 

490
00:27:10,250 --> 00:27:13,330
profile, by the way, which I 
will definitely link in the show

491
00:27:13,330 --> 00:27:14,650
notes. 
So kudos to you. 

492
00:27:14,650 --> 00:27:20,730
Morgan definitely shows off some
of the writing skills there. 

493
00:27:20,810 --> 00:27:25,090
Maybe you can talk Morgan, about
how you got, how you, how you 

494
00:27:25,090 --> 00:27:27,490
know, how did you get into I am 
I guess let's start there. 

495
00:27:27,940 --> 00:27:31,060
Yeah, sure. 
So as I mentioned kind of before

496
00:27:31,060 --> 00:27:36,900
the call, I was an English 
major, originally graduated and 

497
00:27:36,980 --> 00:27:39,580
did some writing for online news
journals. 

498
00:27:39,940 --> 00:27:44,860
But there was a shift to paying 
writers in terms of publishing 

499
00:27:45,060 --> 00:27:48,660
where, you know, there was no 
actual monetary value attached 

500
00:27:48,660 --> 00:27:52,500
to your quote, UN quote payment.
So from there I kind of pivoted 

501
00:27:52,500 --> 00:27:58,540
and went into code. 
Someone who obviously has a 

502
00:27:58,820 --> 00:28:02,300
respect for language. 
I figured the language of 

503
00:28:02,300 --> 00:28:05,220
computers might be something 
pretty fascinating, and I was 

504
00:28:05,220 --> 00:28:08,420
not wrong. 
Definitely in some regards kind 

505
00:28:08,420 --> 00:28:13,260
of being a professional student,
which I loved, I started 

506
00:28:13,260 --> 00:28:17,860
attending the local weekly OWOSS
meetings that we have in Austin.

507
00:28:18,900 --> 00:28:23,820
Through that, I met someone who.
Is one of the board members for 

508
00:28:23,860 --> 00:28:27,980
a hospital application called 
Open EMR, and that's open source

509
00:28:27,980 --> 00:28:31,340
and charity based. 
All the developer activity on 

510
00:28:31,340 --> 00:28:37,940
that is out of people's own 
pockets and time through that, 

511
00:28:39,060 --> 00:28:43,340
the person who kind of recruited
me onto the project saw how. 

512
00:28:43,820 --> 00:28:47,020
Willing I was to learn and to 
kind of experiment with things. 

513
00:28:47,020 --> 00:28:51,220
So he kind of threw me towards 
the AWS implementation where we 

514
00:28:51,220 --> 00:28:56,780
migrated the patient document 
database to Cloud Native and 

515
00:28:56,780 --> 00:29:00,900
that's really how I fell into 
Identity Access Management and 

516
00:29:00,900 --> 00:29:02,780
here you are. 
How long did it take to do that 

517
00:29:02,780 --> 00:29:07,700
migration? 
Gosh, I'm gonna say a couple 

518
00:29:07,900 --> 00:29:11,200
months. 
Maybe two months And that was 

519
00:29:11,200 --> 00:29:13,960
what re architecting the 
application, moving data stores 

520
00:29:13,960 --> 00:29:17,840
around. 
Yeah, my personal involvement 

521
00:29:17,840 --> 00:29:22,040
with it was a little more spotty
because I was learning and self 

522
00:29:22,040 --> 00:29:28,240
teaching and also working on 
codebase infrastructure at that 

523
00:29:28,240 --> 00:29:31,270
point as well with Open EMR. 
So I was kind of being thrown 

524
00:29:31,270 --> 00:29:34,750
around there. 
I think that's fascinating. 

525
00:29:34,750 --> 00:29:42,470
It's such an interesting pivot 
to go from English major writing

526
00:29:42,710 --> 00:29:46,230
into technology like that, I 
guess. 

527
00:29:46,710 --> 00:29:49,670
What are some of the languages 
that I guess what was the first 

528
00:29:49,670 --> 00:29:53,110
language that you learned on the
IT side of things? 

529
00:29:53,510 --> 00:29:56,630
Yeah, so when I first got 
interested in this. 

530
00:29:57,450 --> 00:29:59,730
And I say this as in coding in 
general. 

531
00:30:00,610 --> 00:30:06,210
I went to OWASP and I was 
initially just filling an A 

532
00:30:06,210 --> 00:30:11,410
notebook as a dictionary 
basically with terminology and I

533
00:30:11,410 --> 00:30:14,530
was like OK, does anyone have 
any recommendations for what I 

534
00:30:14,530 --> 00:30:17,770
should start with? 
And someone said Python, so 

535
00:30:17,770 --> 00:30:21,890
that's actually where I started.
I wish I would have started with

536
00:30:21,890 --> 00:30:24,690
like. 
Code Academy's command line, 

537
00:30:24,770 --> 00:30:28,650
because my knowledge quickly 
became kind of Swiss cheese 

538
00:30:28,650 --> 00:30:32,330
esque, and they had to go back a
lot of times, kind of backtrack 

539
00:30:32,330 --> 00:30:35,650
and fill in knowledge holes to 
understand really why things 

540
00:30:35,650 --> 00:30:37,210
were happening and how they 
happened. 

541
00:30:38,010 --> 00:30:45,530
But Python was first, and then I
moved on to HTML, CSS, SQL. 

542
00:30:45,770 --> 00:30:49,810
That was fascinating. 
Jim, I think you probably have a

543
00:30:49,810 --> 00:30:54,100
question or two. 
Yeah, so actually one of the 

544
00:30:54,100 --> 00:30:57,540
things I just did want to close 
out one other last point that I 

545
00:30:57,540 --> 00:31:01,020
wanted to make on the best 
practice. 

546
00:31:01,500 --> 00:31:06,380
I think it's just around logging
and make sure they have logging 

547
00:31:06,700 --> 00:31:11,860
centrally set up to identify 
problems and and setting up 

548
00:31:12,660 --> 00:31:18,300
alerting and it kind of triggers
me into another thought so. 

549
00:31:18,680 --> 00:31:22,760
One of the things I I started 
off this discussion around why 

550
00:31:23,120 --> 00:31:26,480
organizations end up in 
multicloud and I said, well the 

551
00:31:26,720 --> 00:31:29,280
clouds seem pretty comparable. 
So in other words, if you're 

552
00:31:29,280 --> 00:31:34,440
down kind of the checkbox list 
of, you know, does it have a 

553
00:31:34,440 --> 00:31:37,400
Nosql database, does it have 
logging, It's like yes, yes, 

554
00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:40,400
yes, they all operate a little 
bit differently. 

555
00:31:40,400 --> 00:31:43,440
You know, they mostly follow 
some open standards and they 

556
00:31:43,440 --> 00:31:45,880
have some proprietary connectors
and so. 

557
00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:52,040
It's probably not super easy to 
just pick up an application and 

558
00:31:52,040 --> 00:31:54,680
run it in both environments and 
expect that it. 

559
00:31:55,040 --> 00:31:58,000
You can't only do that at a very
thin level, right? 

560
00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:00,800
You have to integrate to the 
logging solution. 

561
00:32:00,800 --> 00:32:06,000
So at at many of the tiers of 
the application you have to make

562
00:32:06,000 --> 00:32:08,480
them specific to the cloud that 
you're running in. 

563
00:32:08,800 --> 00:32:13,520
And that's why I think it makes 
it harder to consolidate clouds 

564
00:32:13,520 --> 00:32:17,000
as well as like you can't just. 
Pick up all your applications in

565
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:18,520
one. 
If you're using the platform 

566
00:32:18,520 --> 00:32:22,120
services of the cloud, you're 
running everything on server 

567
00:32:22,120 --> 00:32:25,320
instances, sure. 
But if you're using the logging 

568
00:32:26,520 --> 00:32:30,640
service of the of your cloud 
provider, when you migrate that 

569
00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:35,520
application from, you know, from
AWS to Microsoft or vice versa, 

570
00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:38,680
you're going to have to 
reengineer that application some

571
00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:42,280
to work with the logging service
of your new cloud. 

572
00:32:42,600 --> 00:32:44,620
So. 
That was just something I wanted

573
00:32:44,620 --> 00:32:47,820
to throw in there as well is 
that, you know, the idea of 

574
00:32:47,940 --> 00:32:50,620
multicloud will probably be 
around with us for a long time 

575
00:32:50,620 --> 00:32:55,020
because it's not just as easy as
moving a bunch of server 

576
00:32:55,020 --> 00:32:57,260
instances from one environment 
to the other. 

577
00:32:57,540 --> 00:33:00,420
Yeah, I can't believe it. 
I totally skipped over the fact 

578
00:33:00,420 --> 00:33:03,580
that you gotta be able to prove 
everything right, So I'm glad 

579
00:33:03,580 --> 00:33:06,060
you brought us back to that. 
No, no problem. 

580
00:33:06,530 --> 00:33:10,530
Yeah, actually with that that 
brings to mind, you know, 

581
00:33:10,530 --> 00:33:14,770
identity federation in the cloud
trail with AWS where you know 

582
00:33:14,770 --> 00:33:17,850
you have a log of information 
about people who even requested 

583
00:33:17,850 --> 00:33:20,930
in based on their IAM 
identities. 

584
00:33:21,450 --> 00:33:24,570
So when you have decentralized 
logging, you have that single 

585
00:33:24,570 --> 00:33:29,370
point of access to all salient 
logs that are created across 

586
00:33:29,490 --> 00:33:33,070
accounts regions. 
Which is really critical for 

587
00:33:33,070 --> 00:33:37,070
security, right? 
But if it's fractured with a 

588
00:33:37,070 --> 00:33:42,510
distributed database, I would 
think that you really lose a lot

589
00:33:42,510 --> 00:33:46,390
of data integrity because of the
complexity introduced there. 

590
00:33:46,710 --> 00:33:50,830
And then I would question kind 
of handling failures. 

591
00:33:50,910 --> 00:33:55,350
You know how you distinguish 
site failure and link failure? 

592
00:33:55,950 --> 00:33:56,990
Yeah, and one of the things that
the. 

593
00:33:57,430 --> 00:34:00,290
Applications across. 
Across multiple clouds. 

594
00:34:00,330 --> 00:34:03,010
So this is one of the things 
that I've been thinking about is

595
00:34:03,010 --> 00:34:08,130
that if you have a cloud like if
one of your goals is to 

596
00:34:08,130 --> 00:34:11,409
distribute an environment, 
distribute an application, I 

597
00:34:11,409 --> 00:34:15,090
don't feel like you have to have
it running at AWS time. 

598
00:34:15,090 --> 00:34:17,570
Microsoft. 
So if one goes down, the others 

599
00:34:17,570 --> 00:34:21,610
available because if you look at
AWS or Microsoft, they've got 

600
00:34:21,929 --> 00:34:24,010
data centers in around the 
world. 

601
00:34:24,010 --> 00:34:27,449
So I guess you know, if you're 
really paranoid about your, you 

602
00:34:27,449 --> 00:34:30,270
know. 
The entire company going down, 

603
00:34:30,550 --> 00:34:34,270
that's one thing. 
But you know from a geographical

604
00:34:34,270 --> 00:34:38,909
load balancing perspective, 
they've got data centers in 

605
00:34:38,909 --> 00:34:41,389
different regions of the US and 
throughout the world. 

606
00:34:42,190 --> 00:34:46,270
So my thinking is that you know 
if you're, if you were starting 

607
00:34:46,270 --> 00:34:50,110
out today, I'm like let's start 
our our migration to the cloud, 

608
00:34:50,350 --> 00:34:54,989
you'd pick one vendor and spin 
up services in. 

609
00:34:55,440 --> 00:34:57,720
More than one geographical 
location? 

610
00:34:57,720 --> 00:35:00,720
You wouldn't say Hey, let's go 
to two different vendors in case

611
00:35:00,720 --> 00:35:03,000
we lose a vendor. 
Yeah, you don't want to 

612
00:35:03,000 --> 00:35:05,040
overcomplicate it, especially if
you're just starting out. 

613
00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:07,440
Right. 
And then I mean, if you're going

614
00:35:07,440 --> 00:35:11,200
to go to the cloud, I mean it's 
kind of like level one is just 

615
00:35:11,480 --> 00:35:15,560
spinning up server instances. 
The real benefit you get is if 

616
00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:18,840
you get a level 2, Level 3, 
which is to leverage the 

617
00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:21,080
platform services for your 
applications. 

618
00:35:21,080 --> 00:35:24,080
So if you're using a. 
A common logging platform. 

619
00:35:24,080 --> 00:35:29,800
If you're using a common no SQL 
database or SQL database, but 

620
00:35:29,800 --> 00:35:34,720
it's as a as a service. 
Again, those services are going 

621
00:35:34,720 --> 00:35:37,960
to look slightly different from 
cloud to cloud or from vendor to

622
00:35:37,960 --> 00:35:41,480
vendor and your applications 
aren't going to be able to point

623
00:35:41,800 --> 00:35:45,120
exactly the same way across 
multiple clouds. 

624
00:35:45,480 --> 00:35:47,040
Right on. 
I think that's probably a good 

625
00:35:47,040 --> 00:35:48,640
spot. 
We can leave it for now. 

626
00:35:49,880 --> 00:35:51,400
I certainly appreciate the 
conversation. 

627
00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,920
Hopefully Neil and others get 
some value out of what we talked

628
00:35:54,920 --> 00:35:56,800
about today. 
Morgan, appreciate you taking 

629
00:35:56,800 --> 00:35:58,640
the time to join us. 
Welcome to the team. 

630
00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:00,400
Welcome to the party. 
Yeah. 

631
00:36:00,400 --> 00:36:03,040
Thank you for having me, Jim. 
Go Bears. 

632
00:36:06,240 --> 00:36:07,560
Go Bills. 
Right Morgan. 

633
00:36:07,960 --> 00:36:10,960
Yeah, Go Bills. 
Kind of, kind of. 

634
00:36:10,960 --> 00:36:11,840
All right. 
All right. 

635
00:36:12,080 --> 00:36:14,640
We're going to leave it there. 
Appreciate folks taking time to 

636
00:36:14,640 --> 00:36:16,920
listen to us. 
Hopefully you got some value out

637
00:36:16,920 --> 00:36:18,720
of it. 
Feel free to like, subscribe, 

638
00:36:18,760 --> 00:36:23,200
listen, tell your friends, share
the show, and we'll be talking 

639
00:36:23,200 --> 00:36:30,000
to you on the next one. 
You've been listening to the 

640
00:36:30,000 --> 00:36:34,160
Identity at the Center podcast. 
To access all episodes, visit 

641
00:36:34,160 --> 00:36:35,800
identity@thecenter.com.
