1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:02,760 Who has to do something to fix? Or is it just got to be an 2 00:00:02,760 --> 00:00:06,520 industry effort? Well, I can tell you for sure 3 00:00:06,520 --> 00:00:10,480 that we can't just rely on big tech and assume that these 4 00:00:10,480 --> 00:00:13,840 problems will get solved. We have to keep raising our 5 00:00:13,840 --> 00:00:15,640 voices. We have to keep having 6 00:00:15,960 --> 00:00:19,240 innovative startups that look at things differently and raise, 7 00:00:19,480 --> 00:00:21,880 raise these issues. And we have to keep bringing 8 00:00:21,880 --> 00:00:23,960 them forward in these conversations like the one we're 9 00:00:23,960 --> 00:00:26,920 having right now, so that people understand the importance of 10 00:00:26,920 --> 00:00:30,360 this and, and frankly that the people that are developing being 11 00:00:30,520 --> 00:00:35,080 these solutions come from that same inclusive, diverse 12 00:00:35,080 --> 00:00:36,600 background as the people using them. 13 00:00:37,680 --> 00:00:42,280 So in this battle for privacy and identity, are we losing? 14 00:00:42,520 --> 00:00:44,680 Is the user losing? Are we winning? 15 00:00:44,840 --> 00:00:47,160 Is it a tie? Like, where are we at and how do 16 00:00:47,160 --> 00:00:49,040 we, how do we address this battle? 17 00:00:50,160 --> 00:00:53,440 Well, on one statistic on breaches, it looks like we're 18 00:00:53,440 --> 00:00:55,400 losing. It looks like they're ever 19 00:00:55,400 --> 00:00:57,760 increasing like the data pandemic. 20 00:00:58,640 --> 00:01:02,120 On the other hand, I think we finally have reached the point 21 00:01:02,280 --> 00:01:06,160 that there are now technologies that are privacy preserving that 22 00:01:06,160 --> 00:01:10,320 are actually able to deliver the user experience that we demand 23 00:01:10,480 --> 00:01:12,480 along with the security and privacy. 24 00:01:12,480 --> 00:01:14,200 So it doesn't have to be a trade off. 25 00:01:14,320 --> 00:01:17,480 We can actually win on on all of those fronts. 26 00:01:23,440 --> 00:01:28,680 This is identity at the center if it has anything to do with 27 00:01:28,680 --> 00:01:33,280 IAM. This is the go to podcast now 28 00:01:33,280 --> 00:01:37,160 your hosts Jim McDonald and Jeff Stedman. 29 00:01:43,160 --> 00:01:44,880 Welcome to the Identity of the Center podcast. 30 00:01:44,880 --> 00:01:46,240 I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. Hey, Jim. 31 00:01:46,440 --> 00:01:47,720 Hey, Jeff, how are you? Oh. 32 00:01:47,720 --> 00:01:50,080 Not so bad yourself. You haven't been cracking up 33 00:01:50,120 --> 00:01:51,560 either. Before we hit record, you're 34 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:53,400 like, are you gonna sit like? That, yeah, Is that, Is that 35 00:01:53,400 --> 00:01:54,800 your real face? Is that what you want to throw 36 00:01:54,800 --> 00:01:56,600 on camera? Today, are you OK? 37 00:01:57,000 --> 00:01:58,320 Are you gonna breathe the whole show? 38 00:01:58,320 --> 00:02:01,080 Look, I had somebody come up to me yesterday, it was very nice 39 00:02:01,320 --> 00:02:04,720 that commented on the quality of our audio on our video. 40 00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:08,479 And that's my job here is to make everyone look and sound as 41 00:02:08,479 --> 00:02:11,880 good as possible. And I try to be perfect, full of 42 00:02:11,880 --> 00:02:13,360 my guy. Well, you can't help it. 43 00:02:13,360 --> 00:02:14,640 I'm going to say what I'm going to say. 44 00:02:14,640 --> 00:02:15,680 Yeah, you're going to say what you're going. 45 00:02:15,680 --> 00:02:17,240 To say you can't make that all sound good. 46 00:02:17,400 --> 00:02:19,040 You got to come closer with a microphone though, so other 47 00:02:19,040 --> 00:02:21,720 people can hear you. Yeah, this big crowd that we've 48 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:23,600 drawn in, right? Exactly, we're here at 49 00:02:23,600 --> 00:02:27,240 Authenticate 2024 conveniently located next to one of the food 50 00:02:27,240 --> 00:02:29,440 buffet things. So if you hear dishes and things 51 00:02:29,440 --> 00:02:32,120 like that, we're also providing entertainment for people who are 52 00:02:32,120 --> 00:02:35,400 scooping up chicken and or fish or whatever is over there. 53 00:02:35,400 --> 00:02:38,680 So yeah, we're live I. Mean, hey, we're here in San 54 00:02:38,680 --> 00:02:41,240 Diego. It's golf country. 55 00:02:41,520 --> 00:02:43,960 They've got a beautiful golf course here on site. 56 00:02:45,080 --> 00:02:49,160 I'm dressed for the occasion and but it's baseball season, so I 57 00:02:49,160 --> 00:02:52,400 was on the phone today. So this episode goes live 58 00:02:52,400 --> 00:02:55,000 November 4th. We'll have a world champion in 59 00:02:55,000 --> 00:02:59,360 the Major League Baseball. But as of today, we're two games 60 00:02:59,360 --> 00:03:02,520 into it's the American League Championship Series. 61 00:03:02,720 --> 00:03:06,120 The Yankees are up to nothing. It's on a call today with a 62 00:03:06,120 --> 00:03:10,000 bunch of folks from Cleveland, and they're not too happy at the 63 00:03:10,000 --> 00:03:11,760 moment. And oh, the Yankees are up on 64 00:03:11,760 --> 00:03:12,800 Cleveland too. Nothing. 65 00:03:12,880 --> 00:03:14,560 OK. You said a lot of baseball stuff 66 00:03:14,560 --> 00:03:16,440 and I just tuned out because I don't, I don't care about 67 00:03:16,440 --> 00:03:17,560 baseball. That's not your thing. 68 00:03:17,680 --> 00:03:19,840 Yeah, never talk about the Bears, totally different story. 69 00:03:19,840 --> 00:03:23,080 I would totally be talking about NFL Caleb Williams, but that's. 70 00:03:23,080 --> 00:03:24,560 Football. That's a different podcast. 71 00:03:25,240 --> 00:03:26,840 Exactly. So yeah, we're here to 72 00:03:26,840 --> 00:03:29,920 authenticate 2024. Today's the last day for us. 73 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:32,240 It's Wednesday, October 15th. This will go out in a couple 74 00:03:32,240 --> 00:03:35,760 weeks and I've enjoyed myself. It's been a great conference. 75 00:03:35,760 --> 00:03:37,960 We had kind of like the party last night. 76 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:41,760 There was food, there was karaoke, there was a whole bunch 77 00:03:41,760 --> 00:03:43,320 of stuff going on. It was good times. 78 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:47,680 It's like the identity of the Center podcast, education and 79 00:03:47,680 --> 00:03:49,480 entertainment. It's edutainment. 80 00:03:50,160 --> 00:03:53,560 Exactly. Yeah, What's next for us is 81 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:56,960 we've got Gartner coming up, so that will be in December and 82 00:03:56,960 --> 00:03:58,120 we've got a discount code for that. 83 00:03:58,120 --> 00:04:02,160 So if you use the code IDAC 375, guess how much money you get 84 00:04:02,160 --> 00:04:03,640 off? 250. 85 00:04:03,640 --> 00:04:07,800 Bucks, you are wrong, $375 off of your registration. 86 00:04:07,800 --> 00:04:09,080 I know it's a very convenient code. 87 00:04:09,520 --> 00:04:10,960 I have not yet put that on our website. 88 00:04:10,960 --> 00:04:12,960 I have to do that. It's on my To Do List, but we'll 89 00:04:12,960 --> 00:04:14,280 have a link in our show notes as well. 90 00:04:14,280 --> 00:04:18,959 So IDAC 375, you and I are going to be there doing something on 91 00:04:18,959 --> 00:04:21,160 stage, use case, whatever that means. 92 00:04:21,880 --> 00:04:24,240 We hope to see people there. Definitely want to give a shout 93 00:04:24,240 --> 00:04:26,720 out to RSM as well for funding us to get out here. 94 00:04:26,720 --> 00:04:28,400 That's our day job. A lot of people don't realize 95 00:04:28,400 --> 00:04:31,720 that we actually do identity consulting during the day, and 96 00:04:31,720 --> 00:04:33,720 the podcast is something at night that is totally separate, 97 00:04:33,720 --> 00:04:36,760 but they're very supportive of what we do, including sending us 98 00:04:36,760 --> 00:04:38,360 to things like. This Yeah, I mean, we've been 99 00:04:38,360 --> 00:04:41,560 doing conference coverage for like 2 1/2 years now. 100 00:04:41,880 --> 00:04:44,880 It's very expensive. We get to go to the conferences 101 00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:48,560 for for 8:00 because we're providing media coverage, but 102 00:04:48,880 --> 00:04:52,480 there's a lot of travel and I had breakfast this morning and 103 00:04:52,480 --> 00:04:54,800 it was like 40 bucks after tips so. 104 00:04:55,160 --> 00:04:58,040 Well, like, you should have just gotten breakfast here, I guess. 105 00:04:58,080 --> 00:04:59,360 OK, Daniel, if you didn't hear that. 106 00:04:59,680 --> 00:05:01,240 Daniel Ghazi, Whoever's approving. 107 00:05:01,240 --> 00:05:03,600 Special seat in here. Jump on calls to 630 maybe? 108 00:05:03,600 --> 00:05:05,000 That's true. OK, All right. 109 00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:06,120 Why don't we get to our main topic? 110 00:05:06,120 --> 00:05:10,200 Because this conversation is something that actually started 111 00:05:10,520 --> 00:05:14,600 a year ago. I sat next to this individual at 112 00:05:14,600 --> 00:05:17,800 one of the tables outside when the food trucks were out and she 113 00:05:17,800 --> 00:05:19,760 started to tell me about her deal. 114 00:05:20,200 --> 00:05:21,400 And we'll let her get into it in a second. 115 00:05:22,240 --> 00:05:24,920 But I'm very excited that it's only taken a year for us to get 116 00:05:24,920 --> 00:05:27,880 Tina Srivasta, who's the Co founder of Badge, back on the 117 00:05:27,880 --> 00:05:29,120 show. Or I should say, on to the show. 118 00:05:29,120 --> 00:05:32,400 So welcome to the show, Tina. So glad to be here. 119 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:34,280 Thanks so much, Jeff. It's taken a while, but we're 120 00:05:34,280 --> 00:05:36,720 here now. I want to get into a little bit 121 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:38,960 of your background here, and that's the first thing we always 122 00:05:38,960 --> 00:05:42,120 start with, is how did you get into the world of identity? 123 00:05:42,240 --> 00:05:44,520 Is it something that you chose or did it choose you? 124 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:49,120 It shows me as we found is something common among many 125 00:05:49,120 --> 00:05:52,200 identity rofessionals. So my background of all things 126 00:05:52,200 --> 00:05:56,160 in in aerospace engineering and we talked about how I'm a pilot 127 00:05:56,400 --> 00:06:01,160 and I instruct in aerodynamics at MIT. 128 00:06:01,440 --> 00:06:05,560 And after my doctorate, I went on to Raytheon where I was 129 00:06:05,720 --> 00:06:08,000 building large electronic warfare systems. 130 00:06:08,160 --> 00:06:10,960 So I was the chief engineer of our precision strike and attack 131 00:06:10,960 --> 00:06:13,800 systems. Great experience, focused very 132 00:06:13,800 --> 00:06:16,560 much on national security and defense. 133 00:06:17,080 --> 00:06:21,040 Noticed some vulnerabilities in how we transferred waveforms out 134 00:06:21,040 --> 00:06:24,680 to our sensor systems and founded a previous cybersecurity 135 00:06:24,680 --> 00:06:28,160 company to solve that problem. It was a great experience. 136 00:06:28,160 --> 00:06:31,160 We built the company from scratch, grew it ultimately sold 137 00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:34,000 to a public company, one of the leaders in Network Assurance. 138 00:06:34,320 --> 00:06:36,600 And along the way we had customers in the public and 139 00:06:36,600 --> 00:06:41,360 private sector. So US Strategic Command, Army, 140 00:06:41,440 --> 00:06:43,920 Air Force, these were some of our customers. 141 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:48,240 And that meant that I had a security clearance and that 142 00:06:48,240 --> 00:06:51,920 meant that my fingerprints, these fingerprints were stored 143 00:06:51,920 --> 00:06:55,080 in the Office of Personnel Management OPM database. 144 00:06:55,760 --> 00:06:59,680 And I got that notification in 2015 along with millions of 145 00:06:59,680 --> 00:07:03,160 others that my data had been compromised. 146 00:07:03,520 --> 00:07:06,280 And it was this eye opening moment that how do I prove that 147 00:07:06,280 --> 00:07:09,680 I'm Tina without giving up what I used to prove who I am. 148 00:07:09,680 --> 00:07:13,600 There's got to be a better way. And being a cryptography nerd, 149 00:07:13,840 --> 00:07:16,080 it allowed me to dig into the math. 150 00:07:16,080 --> 00:07:19,840 We found this 20 year open problem in this field called 151 00:07:20,120 --> 00:07:23,880 fuzzy extraction. We made a breakthrough there. 152 00:07:24,080 --> 00:07:27,760 That's a field of innovation and we have over 20 issued patents 153 00:07:28,000 --> 00:07:30,760 and that's what brought me to identity and to badge. 154 00:07:31,640 --> 00:07:34,960 So that's just a common story of Defense Department, you know, 155 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:38,120 Defense and MIT and a whole bunch of stuff. 156 00:07:39,440 --> 00:07:45,000 OK, so take me through the translation from that, that 157 00:07:45,120 --> 00:07:48,240 pivot. So you mentioned the OPM breach 158 00:07:48,520 --> 00:07:51,520 and your data was part of that, your fingerprints, I assume, and 159 00:07:51,520 --> 00:07:53,000 other biometrics on there. So you can change your 160 00:07:53,000 --> 00:07:54,200 fingerprints. At least not yet. 161 00:07:55,080 --> 00:07:57,040 What was it like to get that information from your 162 00:07:57,040 --> 00:08:02,600 perspective at that point as someone who was the breechy from 163 00:08:02,600 --> 00:08:05,440 a data perspective? Yeah, it was scary, Jeff, and 164 00:08:05,440 --> 00:08:08,160 you're absolutely right. I can't reset my fingerprints. 165 00:08:08,160 --> 00:08:11,080 It's not like a password. It's something that you know, 166 00:08:11,160 --> 00:08:14,720 now is, is a is a permanent breach of my data. 167 00:08:15,080 --> 00:08:18,280 And that it wasn't just me, but it's people with security 168 00:08:18,280 --> 00:08:22,040 clearances, which just seems to be not the kind of people whose 169 00:08:22,040 --> 00:08:24,800 data you want compromised and, and floating around. 170 00:08:25,080 --> 00:08:28,360 And that data is, of course, used to access systems. 171 00:08:28,600 --> 00:08:31,520 And So what does that mean for our security posture and the 172 00:08:31,760 --> 00:08:33,720 threat landscape that this unlocks? 173 00:08:34,000 --> 00:08:38,000 And that's really why I got to think, you know, why do we store 174 00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:40,200 these data? It seems like only a matter of 175 00:08:40,200 --> 00:08:42,280 time. We keep hearing about breaches. 176 00:08:42,360 --> 00:08:46,920 It's only a matter of time if you store very sensitive data in 177 00:08:46,920 --> 00:08:49,000 a database until it gets compromised. 178 00:08:49,200 --> 00:08:52,040 There's got to be a better way. You're a Co founder of Badge. 179 00:08:52,280 --> 00:08:54,680 Give us a real brief overview of what Badge is. 180 00:08:56,240 --> 00:08:59,960 It is based around identity without secrets. 181 00:09:00,320 --> 00:09:05,640 What we figured out how to do is to derive keys from your 182 00:09:05,640 --> 00:09:08,760 authentication factors, and these can be any authentication 183 00:09:08,760 --> 00:09:12,440 factors, biometric or otherwise. Our most popular face 184 00:09:12,640 --> 00:09:14,920 fingerprint device characteristics, PIN code, 185 00:09:14,920 --> 00:09:18,920 whatever factors you want in the time of enrollment, you provide 186 00:09:19,160 --> 00:09:23,080 your authentication factors and some kind of an e-mail address 187 00:09:23,080 --> 00:09:26,840 or username badge allows you to derive a private key and a 188 00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:29,280 public key from that information. 189 00:09:29,560 --> 00:09:33,680 And then here's the innovation. We destroy those authentication 190 00:09:33,680 --> 00:09:37,320 factors, so no biometrics are stored, no hashed credentials, 191 00:09:37,560 --> 00:09:41,440 and we destroy the private key. So all that's left is that 192 00:09:41,440 --> 00:09:44,320 public key. And that means that now on 193 00:09:44,320 --> 00:09:47,000 another device, maybe you dropped your first enrollment 194 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:50,320 device in the ocean and it's not available to bootstrap your 195 00:09:50,320 --> 00:09:53,400 identity on a new device. You can put in that e-mail 196 00:09:53,400 --> 00:09:57,520 address or username, pull down your public key, provide your 197 00:09:57,520 --> 00:10:02,560 authentication factors and re derive that private key on the 198 00:10:02,560 --> 00:10:06,480 fly locally on your device. And this is what really unlocks 199 00:10:07,360 --> 00:10:11,800 these use cases on account recovery, shared devices, owning 200 00:10:11,800 --> 00:10:14,600 your identity on whatever device you go to. 201 00:10:15,160 --> 00:10:16,240 And it's been an exciting journey. 202 00:10:16,240 --> 00:10:20,480 We just came out of stealth mode in January and we have been 203 00:10:20,480 --> 00:10:22,760 approached by some of the largest companies. 204 00:10:22,880 --> 00:10:27,560 We've announced partnerships with Okta, Ping Identity, Cisco, 205 00:10:27,560 --> 00:10:31,400 Tallis, Cyber, Ark, Radiant Logic, and many of those 206 00:10:31,440 --> 00:10:34,880 companies are here. We just talked about, we can see 207 00:10:34,880 --> 00:10:38,040 the booths that authenticate from Cisco and Tallis. 208 00:10:38,040 --> 00:10:41,720 They're actually demonstrating our integrations and and showing 209 00:10:41,960 --> 00:10:44,240 the blogs that they've put out in the last few weeks. 210 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:47,200 So very exciting. It's a great story to see that 211 00:10:47,200 --> 00:10:50,040 happen. And yes, I wish I'd heard of 212 00:10:50,040 --> 00:10:51,400 some of those companies that you mentioned. 213 00:10:51,400 --> 00:10:52,520 They're just not working on space. 214 00:10:53,360 --> 00:10:55,440 Let's talk a little bit about Authenticate 2024 though, 215 00:10:55,440 --> 00:10:57,480 because I think you've had a couple of talks you've done 216 00:10:57,480 --> 00:10:58,720 here. Tell me about some of the 217 00:10:58,720 --> 00:11:00,760 conversations that you've had here at the conference. 218 00:11:01,880 --> 00:11:03,800 It's been a great experience being here. 219 00:11:03,920 --> 00:11:08,000 We presented yesterday with Bill Wright, former Executive 220 00:11:08,000 --> 00:11:13,920 Director of USAA Bank and Fido board member and the the wealth 221 00:11:13,920 --> 00:11:16,320 of experience he brings has been fantastic. 222 00:11:16,480 --> 00:11:21,040 We discussed specifically how to deploy passwordless 223 00:11:21,040 --> 00:11:24,800 authentication in financial regulated environments. 224 00:11:24,960 --> 00:11:28,080 This is very critical. You have to be compliant with 225 00:11:28,080 --> 00:11:31,080 these privacy regulations. You have to be able to adhere, 226 00:11:31,080 --> 00:11:34,000 adhere to the strictest standards and we talked through 227 00:11:34,120 --> 00:11:37,120 that guidance how you can achieve that and some of the 228 00:11:37,120 --> 00:11:40,320 specific use cases that badge is addressing in the space. 229 00:11:41,560 --> 00:11:46,320 Hey, Tina, I think that what Jeff said about, you know, being 230 00:11:46,320 --> 00:11:50,040 kind of a different archetype coming into the security space, 231 00:11:50,400 --> 00:11:52,360 I love the perspective that you bring. 232 00:11:52,360 --> 00:11:57,160 I love kind of this kind of technical edge, obviously that's 233 00:11:57,160 --> 00:12:02,720 within the space, but love the the approach what I wanted to 234 00:12:02,720 --> 00:12:05,360 ask about. So you've also been invited to 235 00:12:05,840 --> 00:12:13,760 brief the, what is it the, the US Congressional AI Committee or 236 00:12:13,760 --> 00:12:18,760 I'm sorry, the AI Caucus on AI and privacy and wanted to get a 237 00:12:18,760 --> 00:12:24,040 little bit more on that. Of course, Jim, yes, it was a 238 00:12:24,040 --> 00:12:27,720 huge honor to receive that recognition of badges impact on 239 00:12:27,720 --> 00:12:31,240 privacy and what it can mean for national security. 240 00:12:31,400 --> 00:12:34,960 When we talked about the advancing threats of AI, of 241 00:12:34,960 --> 00:12:37,840 generative AI and what does that mean for people? 242 00:12:37,840 --> 00:12:41,120 Well, in one example, it means that you can have much more 243 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:44,640 sophisticated phishing attacks. So we've talked about phishing, 244 00:12:44,880 --> 00:12:50,240 phishing emails, the emails that are meant to look like they came 245 00:12:50,240 --> 00:12:53,080 from somebody that you know or somebody that you trust to 246 00:12:53,120 --> 00:12:55,920 coerce a user into clicking on a link. 247 00:12:56,640 --> 00:13:00,520 These types of emails are, you know, used to be easy to flag. 248 00:13:00,800 --> 00:13:04,240 They had a lot of typos or the English didn't quite make sense. 249 00:13:04,480 --> 00:13:07,000 Now with AI, they're very sophisticated. 250 00:13:07,000 --> 00:13:09,400 They can be very effective. I kind of miss the Nigerian 251 00:13:09,400 --> 00:13:11,360 Princess though. I mean, I was really hoping one 252 00:13:11,360 --> 00:13:13,400 of those would pay off for me. So nostalgic. 253 00:13:14,320 --> 00:13:16,480 Yeah, exactly. And so, so people that feel 254 00:13:16,480 --> 00:13:19,360 like, hey, I'm very good at detecting these, I don't get 255 00:13:19,360 --> 00:13:22,080 trapped with these. They're finding more and more 256 00:13:22,200 --> 00:13:25,520 that they are in fact getting getting stumped by these. 257 00:13:25,720 --> 00:13:28,320 And so one of the things that's really critical is to have 258 00:13:28,560 --> 00:13:30,680 phishing resistant authentication. 259 00:13:30,800 --> 00:13:34,080 That was one of the things we were recognized for at RSA with 260 00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:37,560 the Global Infosec Award and being phishing resistant MFA, 261 00:13:37,760 --> 00:13:41,280 but also on the recovery side. So on account recovery, this is 262 00:13:41,280 --> 00:13:43,240 a a critical issue. It was something that I 263 00:13:43,240 --> 00:13:46,600 presented on at Authenticate this week was when you think 264 00:13:46,600 --> 00:13:50,640 about The MGM casino hack, you know what happened there? 265 00:13:51,160 --> 00:13:55,520 Well, they took advantage of the account recovery scheme, 266 00:13:55,680 --> 00:14:00,040 pretending to be an employee and gained access to the system and 267 00:14:00,040 --> 00:14:04,080 perpetrated a ransomware attack. And so this is, this is really 268 00:14:04,080 --> 00:14:09,120 critical because when your authentication is bound to a 269 00:14:09,120 --> 00:14:13,360 phone, for instance, if you lose that phone, then how do you 270 00:14:13,360 --> 00:14:14,880 authenticate? Well, you can't. 271 00:14:14,880 --> 00:14:16,800 So you fall back to account recovery. 272 00:14:16,800 --> 00:14:19,800 You call in, oh, you know, I lost my device, I forgot my 273 00:14:19,800 --> 00:14:21,840 password. You have to let me back in. 274 00:14:22,160 --> 00:14:25,120 Unfortunately, a lot of the account recovery is the weakest 275 00:14:25,120 --> 00:14:29,280 link in the identity system. The account recovery social 276 00:14:29,280 --> 00:14:31,440 engineering, what you brought up with the phishing emails. 277 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:37,120 I actually, as an example of the reverse, I got a e-mail from my 278 00:14:37,120 --> 00:14:39,240 insurance company saying click this link. 279 00:14:39,760 --> 00:14:41,560 Like, no way am I falling for that. 280 00:14:41,920 --> 00:14:45,320 You know, I know better. Then I get a text message from 281 00:14:45,320 --> 00:14:48,880 them and a chain of text messages that I've talked to the 282 00:14:48,880 --> 00:14:50,680 insurance company. So that's legit. 283 00:14:51,120 --> 00:14:55,120 But they almost have to design their emails now so that, you 284 00:14:55,120 --> 00:14:58,680 know, the US, the, the folks like us who are smart enough to 285 00:14:58,680 --> 00:15:01,600 avoid spam, don't think their emails are spam. 286 00:15:02,560 --> 00:15:06,720 I wanted to go back to this congressional committee again 287 00:15:06,920 --> 00:15:10,400 and kind of I, you know, Congress isn't thought of as the 288 00:15:10,400 --> 00:15:15,240 most technically savvy votes. So how do you take what you're 289 00:15:15,240 --> 00:15:18,360 presenting to them on and turn it into real world 290 00:15:18,360 --> 00:15:20,760 recommendations that they can do something about? 291 00:15:21,360 --> 00:15:24,600 Yeah, great question, Jim. And it was really great and 292 00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:28,280 refreshing to see this bipartisan caucus talking about 293 00:15:28,280 --> 00:15:31,560 this issue and the importance of privacy and what can we put in 294 00:15:31,560 --> 00:15:34,440 place today. One of the main reasons that we 295 00:15:34,440 --> 00:15:38,000 were invited to this talk is that the need is out there to 296 00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:41,680 share with the world that, hey, there now exists technology that 297 00:15:41,680 --> 00:15:45,760 eliminates the need for central databases of biometrics. 298 00:15:45,920 --> 00:15:48,960 We've seen with the BIPA legislation, the Biometric 299 00:15:48,960 --> 00:15:52,200 Information Privacy Act, which started in Illinois, but now we 300 00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:55,920 have dozens of other states with similar modeled legislation 301 00:15:55,920 --> 00:16:00,120 pending, that the storage of biometric data is quite 302 00:16:00,120 --> 00:16:02,240 prevalent. And when you think about the 303 00:16:02,240 --> 00:16:06,080 companies that are storing this data, it's somewhat surprising, 304 00:16:06,080 --> 00:16:08,560 right? BNSF, Railroad, White Castle, 305 00:16:08,560 --> 00:16:11,920 you know, why does White Castle burgers need that Rite Aid, All 306 00:16:11,920 --> 00:16:15,120 of the types of companies that are storing this biometric data 307 00:16:15,360 --> 00:16:17,200 and you ask, you know, why are they storing it? 308 00:16:17,200 --> 00:16:20,200 Well, in many cases, they're just trying to authenticate 309 00:16:20,320 --> 00:16:22,600 their users, authenticate their workforce. 310 00:16:22,800 --> 00:16:25,960 And so, you know, people show up to work at different locations. 311 00:16:25,960 --> 00:16:28,720 They need to prove it's them and get to work, and having a 312 00:16:28,720 --> 00:16:32,200 central database of biometrics is a quick way to do that. 313 00:16:32,400 --> 00:16:34,200 Now. Unfortunately, it's also a very 314 00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:37,480 ripe target for attack. Well, with BADGE you can 315 00:16:37,480 --> 00:16:40,800 actually convert an existing database of biometrics into 316 00:16:40,800 --> 00:16:44,040 public keys, eliminating that threat surface but still 317 00:16:44,040 --> 00:16:46,760 allowing users to authenticate on any device. 318 00:16:48,000 --> 00:16:51,800 So we get jaded, I think, to the number of attacks that we see 319 00:16:51,800 --> 00:16:55,800 coming across the wire. It seems like every week I get 320 00:16:55,800 --> 00:16:59,120 3510 emails. Your data is part of a breach. 321 00:16:59,680 --> 00:17:01,040 OK, great. What am I supposed to do about 322 00:17:01,040 --> 00:17:03,440 that? I want to give a, a, a shout out 323 00:17:03,440 --> 00:17:04,960 to Kyle, who's sitting here off camera. 324 00:17:05,240 --> 00:17:08,720 He came up with this, this, this term of a data pandemic, which I 325 00:17:08,720 --> 00:17:11,920 think we're in where, you know, there's all this data that's out 326 00:17:11,920 --> 00:17:14,599 there. And it's becoming more and more 327 00:17:14,599 --> 00:17:17,040 available through means that they're not supposed to be 328 00:17:17,040 --> 00:17:20,200 available. So, you know, maybe the answer 329 00:17:20,200 --> 00:17:23,599 to this is simple, but why are data breaches so commonplace 330 00:17:23,599 --> 00:17:24,640 today? And do you think that we've 331 00:17:24,640 --> 00:17:29,480 gotten jaded as a society or an an industry that's like, OK, 332 00:17:30,000 --> 00:17:32,240 you're not going to go change your fingerprints, right? 333 00:17:32,760 --> 00:17:33,800 What? How do we approach that? 334 00:17:34,480 --> 00:17:37,320 Yeah, that's a great question. And and I agree that your 335 00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:40,080 discussion with Kyle really brought out, you know, it's like 336 00:17:40,080 --> 00:17:43,480 a, it feels like a data pandemic that we, we have these 337 00:17:43,480 --> 00:17:47,120 conferences year after year about how we can protect these 338 00:17:47,120 --> 00:17:48,840 issues. But what we're actually seeing 339 00:17:48,840 --> 00:17:53,040 is the numbers are going up. It's now over 80% of data 340 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:56,720 breaches are due to the theft of identity credentials. 341 00:17:57,000 --> 00:18:00,400 So what are we doing as an identity, the industry to really 342 00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:03,440 turn the tide? And that 80% I believe is from 343 00:18:03,440 --> 00:18:06,560 the Verizon data breach report. And that number has not changed. 344 00:18:06,560 --> 00:18:10,520 I mean, I look at it every year and I think since 2018 or 2019, 345 00:18:10,520 --> 00:18:14,440 it's been the same pretty consistent 80% of breaches have 346 00:18:14,440 --> 00:18:16,240 something to do with a compromise credential. 347 00:18:16,240 --> 00:18:17,960 So what are we supposed to do about that? 348 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:21,400 And the other thing is we're actually making the problem 349 00:18:21,440 --> 00:18:26,480 worse by putting more and more data into these databases, such 350 00:18:26,480 --> 00:18:29,480 as biometric data, which as you pointed out, Jeff, you, you 351 00:18:29,480 --> 00:18:32,320 can't reset and it's in more and more places. 352 00:18:32,360 --> 00:18:36,160 You actually can't get into the Disney World theme parks in 353 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:39,040 Florida without scanning your biometrics, having them stored 354 00:18:39,040 --> 00:18:42,280 in a central database. When you go through the airports 355 00:18:42,280 --> 00:18:46,320 with clear, you know, that's 20 million users biometrics stored 356 00:18:46,320 --> 00:18:48,760 in a central database in New York on a server. 357 00:18:49,080 --> 00:18:53,280 And the problem is that we don't have the luxury to redo this in 358 00:18:53,360 --> 00:18:55,960 10 years. We need to get it right now and 359 00:18:55,960 --> 00:19:00,280 we need to prevent this type of OPM scale breach from happening 360 00:19:00,280 --> 00:19:02,800 to the average American consumers. 361 00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:06,240 And we have the tools today to make that possible. 362 00:19:06,320 --> 00:19:09,360 And we need to think critically about what are the tools 363 00:19:09,360 --> 00:19:12,440 available and what are what are the protections we actually can 364 00:19:12,440 --> 00:19:17,200 offer to consumers today. So, Tina and we live in this 365 00:19:17,200 --> 00:19:21,680 world of the digital economy. We really can't be an equal 366 00:19:21,680 --> 00:19:26,520 member of society without your identity and this digital world. 367 00:19:26,520 --> 00:19:29,680 So what are some of the challenges in making sure that 368 00:19:29,960 --> 00:19:35,480 access to the economy and access to services provided by the 369 00:19:35,480 --> 00:19:38,760 government etcetera, as we become higher and higher tech, 370 00:19:39,000 --> 00:19:41,400 how do we make sure that that's available to everyone? 371 00:19:41,400 --> 00:19:44,880 What are the challenges to that? I love that question, Jim. 372 00:19:44,880 --> 00:19:48,960 I think it's really critical. We found that identity is really 373 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:53,160 the way that people access the economy, that access education, 374 00:19:53,160 --> 00:19:56,880 access healthcare, access their banking and financial 375 00:19:56,880 --> 00:19:58,880 information. And so you've reached a 376 00:19:58,880 --> 00:20:04,400 situation where access to identity needs to be a right and 377 00:20:04,400 --> 00:20:07,600 therefore it needs to be inclusive to all people. 378 00:20:08,040 --> 00:20:12,560 Sometimes we live in this Silicon Valley bubble and we 379 00:20:12,560 --> 00:20:15,760 create these solutions. And when you step back you 380 00:20:15,760 --> 00:20:20,160 realize, oh, not only do I need an iPhone, but I need a backup 381 00:20:20,160 --> 00:20:23,840 iPhone in order to recover my account if anything happens to 382 00:20:23,840 --> 00:20:26,080 my first iPhone. And it's got to be at least an 383 00:20:26,080 --> 00:20:28,280 iPhone 15 or something like that. 384 00:20:28,280 --> 00:20:29,000 Yeah. Yeah. 385 00:20:29,000 --> 00:20:30,480 It's easy to fall into that trap. 386 00:20:30,560 --> 00:20:33,640 Yeah, exactly, Jim. And I think that's the issue is 387 00:20:33,640 --> 00:20:37,200 that when you think about the world or even just the United 388 00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:40,120 States, that's not a reality for most people. 389 00:20:40,280 --> 00:20:44,840 People use shared workstations in library to access things. 390 00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:47,840 And when we think about, OK, hey, we're adding security by 391 00:20:47,840 --> 00:20:51,080 having an MFA requirement, well, what are we actually doing? 392 00:20:51,080 --> 00:20:54,560 We're saying that you actually have to be bound to a physical 393 00:20:54,560 --> 00:20:57,160 hardware device. Well, that's not always an 394 00:20:57,160 --> 00:20:59,840 option. The other thing is if that 395 00:20:59,840 --> 00:21:04,160 particular phone is the route that allows you to access your 396 00:21:04,160 --> 00:21:08,080 information, we have to think about places where not every 397 00:21:08,080 --> 00:21:11,520 individual has ownership and control over that device. 398 00:21:11,760 --> 00:21:15,440 So one example in particular, Jeff, that we talked about that 399 00:21:15,440 --> 00:21:18,480 really means a lot to me and that I wanted to share on the 400 00:21:18,480 --> 00:21:23,160 show is, is with women. When you talk about a domestic 401 00:21:23,200 --> 00:21:28,080 relationship, in some cases women don't have full autonomy 402 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:33,160 and control over that device. And if that device is sufficient 403 00:21:33,200 --> 00:21:38,120 to access your healthcare data, your banking data, it means that 404 00:21:38,360 --> 00:21:43,560 that privacy and that autonomy is not afforded to women in that 405 00:21:43,640 --> 00:21:45,480 that domestic relationship all the time. 406 00:21:45,800 --> 00:21:49,000 We need to have the ability that when I'm in possession of that 407 00:21:49,000 --> 00:21:52,680 device, I can recover my data, access my information, but then 408 00:21:52,680 --> 00:21:56,440 as soon as I'm not, no one else with that device can access that 409 00:21:56,440 --> 00:21:58,440 information. And it's becoming more and more 410 00:21:58,440 --> 00:22:02,680 critical today as we think about healthcare privacy and the need 411 00:22:02,680 --> 00:22:07,320 for people in All in all areas to have that access and 412 00:22:07,360 --> 00:22:10,800 inclusivity. And I think that's, you know, 413 00:22:11,080 --> 00:22:13,840 This is why I like doing this podcast and having these 414 00:22:13,840 --> 00:22:17,880 conversations because that, that idea of a domestic abuse 415 00:22:17,880 --> 00:22:21,560 situation never occurred to me. And that's why I like him in his 416 00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:23,840 conversations. Like ever since you've said 417 00:22:23,840 --> 00:22:26,680 that, it's been in my mind, I was like, oh, yes, this is 418 00:22:26,680 --> 00:22:30,680 something that we as an industry need to figure out how to solve 419 00:22:30,680 --> 00:22:33,600 and how to protect folks who are in those types of scenarios. 420 00:22:33,600 --> 00:22:35,720 And it, it can be that it can be, you know, access issues, you 421 00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:39,160 know, whatever it may be, the, the availability of being able 422 00:22:39,160 --> 00:22:40,880 to have a digital identity in the 1st place. 423 00:22:40,880 --> 00:22:44,360 There's still a lot of places that don't have modern cell 424 00:22:44,360 --> 00:22:46,360 phones, modern technologies where they're able to take 425 00:22:46,360 --> 00:22:48,120 advantage of that. But I think that's, I think 426 00:22:48,120 --> 00:22:50,920 that's one of the things that I really appreciate about one, 427 00:22:50,920 --> 00:22:53,480 having met you last year. And then you putting that bug in 428 00:22:53,480 --> 00:22:55,880 my ear of like, yeah, I haven't thought about that. 429 00:22:55,880 --> 00:22:59,920 And, you know, that's probably me as a male and the role I'm 430 00:22:59,920 --> 00:23:00,880 in. I haven't thought about that. 431 00:23:00,880 --> 00:23:03,120 And I think that's why we want to have conversations like this, 432 00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:06,280 to bring those things up, because I'm sure there are other 433 00:23:06,280 --> 00:23:09,720 people that are out there that, yeah, Tina, tell them, you know. 434 00:23:10,080 --> 00:23:12,760 Yeah, I'm really glad about that and I'm glad that it had an 435 00:23:12,760 --> 00:23:15,400 impact and I appreciate that because we have to have these 436 00:23:15,400 --> 00:23:17,200 conversations. We have to talk about 437 00:23:17,400 --> 00:23:19,760 inclusivity, making sure everyone has access. 438 00:23:19,920 --> 00:23:22,960 Another, you know, part of it is accessibility, how to make sure 439 00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:25,200 that these technologies are accessible. 440 00:23:25,360 --> 00:23:28,400 That's something that at badge we care about deeply in making 441 00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:31,360 sure we have that testing and feedback from different 442 00:23:31,360 --> 00:23:34,960 accessibility. You know, a lot of the ways, you 443 00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:37,880 know, we're here at authenticate at the Fido conference, there's 444 00:23:37,880 --> 00:23:41,280 a requirement that, hey, you have to use AQR code in order to 445 00:23:41,280 --> 00:23:44,720 make certain flows work while holding up a camera with AQR 446 00:23:44,720 --> 00:23:47,360 code lining it up for people that are visually impaired. 447 00:23:47,360 --> 00:23:50,840 It's just a non starter. And we really need to offer 448 00:23:50,840 --> 00:23:54,240 optionality to folks that that keep in mind and take into 449 00:23:54,240 --> 00:23:58,080 account our full user population are the 8 billion people on the 450 00:23:58,080 --> 00:23:59,280 planet. And we need to make sure 451 00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:02,920 everybody has the access to that identity so that they can access 452 00:24:02,920 --> 00:24:04,800 the economy and participate fully. 453 00:24:05,440 --> 00:24:07,920 You know that that idea of having options, I think is is 454 00:24:07,920 --> 00:24:09,600 really the key part there because there's a lot of people 455 00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:12,520 CEO well, we just put in pass keys, we're done. 456 00:24:12,800 --> 00:24:14,120 And it's like, OK, wait a second. 457 00:24:14,120 --> 00:24:16,000 That's just one option that's out there. 458 00:24:16,320 --> 00:24:18,560 It's the I'll use a Marvel analogy. 459 00:24:18,560 --> 00:24:21,600 It's one of the arrows in Hawkeye's quiver and there's an 460 00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:24,360 arrow for everything. Jim's rolling is his who is 461 00:24:24,360 --> 00:24:28,000 Hawkeye now, but there's options that are out there and and it 462 00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:31,560 doesn't have to be A1 size all it's, you know, solution for 463 00:24:31,560 --> 00:24:33,480 people so. I'm with you on the marble. 464 00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:35,000 Marble and Hawkeye, so all. Right. 465 00:24:35,600 --> 00:24:36,960 Cool Hawkeye. Not cool. 466 00:24:37,000 --> 00:24:39,840 I thought Hawkeye was on. Match Yeah, I'm sure you did 467 00:24:39,840 --> 00:24:41,240 that. Just that just highlights the 468 00:24:41,240 --> 00:24:44,560 age difference. Here, we're not that far apart. 469 00:24:45,120 --> 00:24:48,760 I'm gonna go with it. So, so Tina, I think this is one 470 00:24:48,760 --> 00:24:52,880 of many use cases where you have the, the shared device and this 471 00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:57,000 problem could take place. I'm wondering in your mind, 472 00:24:57,000 --> 00:25:00,000 whose responsibility is it to take this on? 473 00:25:00,000 --> 00:25:03,360 Because it seems to me that, you know, you have the device 474 00:25:03,360 --> 00:25:06,880 manufacturer, you have the, the telecom company, you have the 475 00:25:06,880 --> 00:25:10,520 applications that require this second factor. 476 00:25:11,080 --> 00:25:12,560 Who has to do something to fix it? 477 00:25:12,560 --> 00:25:14,960 Or is it just got to be an industry effort? 478 00:25:16,360 --> 00:25:19,960 Well, I can tell you for sure that we can't just rely on big 479 00:25:19,960 --> 00:25:22,880 tech and assume that these problems will get solved. 480 00:25:23,040 --> 00:25:25,520 We have to keep raising our voices. 481 00:25:25,520 --> 00:25:28,600 We have to keep having innovative startups that look at 482 00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:31,560 things differently and raise, raise these issues. 483 00:25:31,720 --> 00:25:33,760 And we have to keep bringing them forward in these 484 00:25:33,760 --> 00:25:36,800 conversations like the one we're having right now, so that people 485 00:25:36,800 --> 00:25:40,000 understand the importance of this and, and frankly that the 486 00:25:40,000 --> 00:25:44,920 people that are developing these solutions come from that same 487 00:25:45,040 --> 00:25:47,680 inclusive, diverse background as the people using them. 488 00:25:48,760 --> 00:25:53,320 So in this battle for privacy and identity, are we losing? 489 00:25:53,600 --> 00:25:55,760 Is the user losing? Are we winning? 490 00:25:55,920 --> 00:25:58,200 Is it a tie? Like, where are we at and how do 491 00:25:58,200 --> 00:26:03,360 we address this battle? Well, on one statistic on 492 00:26:03,360 --> 00:26:05,080 breaches, it looks like we're losing. 493 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:08,160 It looks like they're ever increasing like the data 494 00:26:08,160 --> 00:26:11,320 pandemic. On the other hand, I think we 495 00:26:11,320 --> 00:26:15,360 finally have reached the point that there are now technologies 496 00:26:15,360 --> 00:26:19,200 that are privacy preserving that are actually able to deliver the 497 00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:23,000 user experience that we demand along with the security and 498 00:26:23,000 --> 00:26:25,080 privacy. So it doesn't have to be a trade 499 00:26:25,080 --> 00:26:27,800 off. We can actually win on on all of 500 00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:30,760 those fronts. I feel like it's like a tug of 501 00:26:30,760 --> 00:26:31,840 war. It's. 502 00:26:32,120 --> 00:26:34,120 It's a title work. Total work. 503 00:26:34,120 --> 00:26:39,360 And I also feel like on the privacy front, it's there's 504 00:26:39,360 --> 00:26:41,000 there's some buffs going on, right? 505 00:26:41,000 --> 00:26:43,520 If you ever go to your iPhone, you see who's been tracking you 506 00:26:43,920 --> 00:26:46,840 or you go to a website now and it says, do you accept these 507 00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:50,720 cookies? You almost just reflexively say 508 00:26:50,720 --> 00:26:52,520 accept. You want to get past that so you 509 00:26:52,520 --> 00:26:55,160 can obviously you went to the website for a reason. 510 00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:59,280 Now all of a sudden you've given them permission to track you or 511 00:26:59,360 --> 00:27:02,680 Eve said you could say deny and they still may track you. 512 00:27:02,680 --> 00:27:04,920 They may have something on the website that's tracking you. 513 00:27:06,160 --> 00:27:09,960 So I, I feel like we're losing on the privacy front. 514 00:27:10,480 --> 00:27:15,400 I think we're making gains in the, the breach area. 515 00:27:15,400 --> 00:27:19,040 Like I do believe you're right that if you look at the breach 516 00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:24,920 statistics, but I also I see the vendors in his vendor hall, how 517 00:27:24,920 --> 00:27:29,360 many folks are trying to fight the good fight in that respect? 518 00:27:29,360 --> 00:27:32,680 But I just kind of feel like until we have a good regulatory 519 00:27:32,680 --> 00:27:36,440 environment around privacy, we're not going to to make 520 00:27:36,600 --> 00:27:40,560 progress. Well, I mean, let's let's look 521 00:27:40,560 --> 00:27:42,760 at GDPR, right? I think that was something that 522 00:27:43,000 --> 00:27:48,360 really sparked a lot of behavior in EU and then that behavior has 523 00:27:48,360 --> 00:27:50,400 started to filter over into the US as well. 524 00:27:51,040 --> 00:27:52,400 But I think that was also one of the reasons. 525 00:27:52,400 --> 00:27:55,000 Now you have a pop up on every website that says, Hey, we're 526 00:27:55,000 --> 00:27:59,960 going to be tracking you. And if you either you're opting 527 00:27:59,960 --> 00:28:02,880 in and you're using a service or you're not, you know, it's, I 528 00:28:02,880 --> 00:28:04,240 don't know what the right answer is. 529 00:28:04,280 --> 00:28:07,560 I maybe it's regulation, but then the, the counter to that 530 00:28:07,560 --> 00:28:09,520 would be OK. Well, what about people who 531 00:28:09,520 --> 00:28:10,800 don't care about the regulations anyway? 532 00:28:10,920 --> 00:28:12,840 Criminals, they're not, they don't care about regulation. 533 00:28:13,320 --> 00:28:17,720 So again, it's another area where we have yet another quiver 534 00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:19,320 arrow coming out of the quiver. It's OK. 535 00:28:19,320 --> 00:28:22,600 Well, regulation's part of it, but you know, people aren't 536 00:28:22,600 --> 00:28:26,160 going to follow the law. So we look at the vendors in 537 00:28:26,160 --> 00:28:29,520 this vendor hall that we're in now and say, OK, can they help 538 00:28:29,520 --> 00:28:30,760 us? And maybe it's a layered 539 00:28:30,760 --> 00:28:33,080 approach and things like that. It is a layered approach. 540 00:28:33,120 --> 00:28:35,440 It is and I agree with you, Jeff, because you know, one of 541 00:28:35,440 --> 00:28:37,920 the things that Bill Wright and I talked about at our 542 00:28:37,920 --> 00:28:41,160 authenticate talk was about, you know, the regulation in the 543 00:28:41,160 --> 00:28:43,800 financial industry in particular and the importance of having 544 00:28:43,800 --> 00:28:46,040 compliance solutions on that side. 545 00:28:46,360 --> 00:28:49,480 But broader to your, to your point, Jim, when you feel like, 546 00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:51,680 you know, we're using this fight, well, let's think about 547 00:28:51,800 --> 00:28:56,600 when we first had the Internet, we had this idea that you can, 548 00:28:57,080 --> 00:28:59,760 you know, access whatever you want, talk to whoever you want. 549 00:28:59,760 --> 00:29:02,440 It was this beautiful world, but that's not what it's turned out 550 00:29:02,440 --> 00:29:03,880 to be. The way you just described it. 551 00:29:03,880 --> 00:29:07,160 It's very frustrating. You have to provide all of this 552 00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:09,480 data so you can just prove who you are. 553 00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:11,920 You can access your stuff, then you get locked out, then you 554 00:29:11,920 --> 00:29:14,240 don't have your phone, then you have to, then you give up on 555 00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:16,560 your cart because, you know, it's just wasn't worth the 556 00:29:16,560 --> 00:29:20,120 hassle in the 1st place. I think that we're going to a 557 00:29:20,120 --> 00:29:22,920 point where people look back on this age and it it kind of looks 558 00:29:22,920 --> 00:29:26,040 like a dark age and that the world is going to be so 559 00:29:26,040 --> 00:29:29,200 seamless. You can you can get up out of a 560 00:29:29,200 --> 00:29:33,680 swimming pool, walk up to any device you know, access your 561 00:29:33,800 --> 00:29:37,440 data securely, walk away from that device and not leave any 562 00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:41,200 trace behind. Go up to any system, whether 563 00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:45,000 you're in a mall, in a store, in a virtual experience, be able to 564 00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:49,080 prove who you are. And that big question that today 565 00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:52,280 is lingering over us. How do I prove who I am without 566 00:29:52,280 --> 00:29:55,520 ceding it to some Big Brother or central database? 567 00:29:55,680 --> 00:29:59,040 I think that that problem is, is what we're on a mission to solve 568 00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:01,360 so that. The big question like who is 569 00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:05,360 that Big Brother that we trust? Because I don't think there's 570 00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:10,080 one that everybody trusts. I think that there cannot be a 571 00:30:10,080 --> 00:30:13,040 Big Brother because I don't think that you'll ever reach a 572 00:30:13,040 --> 00:30:14,880 point where you should be able to trust one. 573 00:30:15,480 --> 00:30:17,960 The way out of this has to be you. 574 00:30:18,600 --> 00:30:22,760 You are the root of your identity and you don't have to 575 00:30:22,760 --> 00:30:25,760 trust anyone. That has to be the way out of 576 00:30:25,760 --> 00:30:28,720 it. Not having a Big Brother and yet 577 00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:31,960 working in an interoperable community where you can prove 578 00:30:31,960 --> 00:30:35,680 who you are to any data, any application, any service, 579 00:30:35,680 --> 00:30:38,640 anywhere in the world. To me, that's terrifying. 580 00:30:38,680 --> 00:30:41,760 If you think about the normal user out there, they just click, 581 00:30:41,760 --> 00:30:45,560 OK, OK, accept whatever, and they're giving away their data, 582 00:30:45,600 --> 00:30:48,880 their privacy rights, whatever, ever the things in exchange for 583 00:30:48,880 --> 00:30:50,000 whatever it is they're trying to do. 584 00:30:50,080 --> 00:30:52,240 And I get it right. I use Google Maps and I'm fine 585 00:30:52,240 --> 00:30:54,640 with that. So they know where I am, or at 586 00:30:54,640 --> 00:30:55,760 least they know where my phone is. 587 00:30:56,280 --> 00:30:59,480 So I'm trading a little bit of privacy, maybe a lot of privacy, 588 00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:02,240 in exchange for being able to know where I'm going to go. 589 00:31:02,400 --> 00:31:06,200 And I don't have to have a AAA triptych printed out in my car. 590 00:31:06,560 --> 00:31:10,040 The problem would. Be so say I trust Google to have 591 00:31:10,040 --> 00:31:13,720 my information where I am if they start selling it to other 592 00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:17,520 parties like, oh, he's near Brooks Brothers now Brooks 593 00:31:17,520 --> 00:31:20,800 Brothers says I'm going to start sending you a bunch of 594 00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:25,040 advertisements or text messages like that's cringy to me. 595 00:31:25,480 --> 00:31:27,040 Cringy, but. Do you click on the ad? 596 00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:28,600 Oh yeah. I really wasn't the market for 597 00:31:28,600 --> 00:31:30,160 that. Yeah, but I used to kind of. 598 00:31:30,360 --> 00:31:33,480 A safer example, but yeah. You know there could be some. 599 00:31:33,480 --> 00:31:36,960 Company that you don't know where that data goes so perks 600 00:31:36,960 --> 00:31:42,040 brothers traded it off with click.com now where does that 601 00:31:42,040 --> 00:31:44,680 data go who has access to that data and there's a lot of these 602 00:31:44,680 --> 00:31:46,720 large. Data brokers that are collecting 603 00:31:46,720 --> 00:31:49,400 all this information and that is their entire business model. 604 00:31:49,400 --> 00:31:51,800 I don't wanna get too far down into that, but no, I think 605 00:31:51,800 --> 00:31:53,640 that's a great. Point and Jim, it's exactly what 606 00:31:53,640 --> 00:31:55,520 you said. You don't know where that data 607 00:31:55,520 --> 00:32:01,280 goes and the fact of the matter is if that data is stored, you 608 00:32:01,280 --> 00:32:05,120 can't just rely on the promises of a company as to what they're 609 00:32:05,120 --> 00:32:08,480 going to do with that. Their incentives will change and 610 00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:11,120 if they have the ability to monetize it or they reach a 611 00:32:11,120 --> 00:32:13,480 different situation, that'll be what happens. 612 00:32:13,680 --> 00:32:17,920 There was recently a Bloomberg article about Worldcoin and it 613 00:32:17,920 --> 00:32:20,520 highlighted the the fact that there are these different 614 00:32:20,520 --> 00:32:23,440 incentives. My Co founder, Doctor Charles 615 00:32:23,440 --> 00:32:27,680 Herder pointed out that hey, whatever the promises are that 616 00:32:27,680 --> 00:32:31,000 they're making today, they may not be able to uphold those 617 00:32:31,000 --> 00:32:33,200 promises later. The only way you know as a 618 00:32:33,200 --> 00:32:36,920 consumer for sure that those promises are there is if they 619 00:32:36,920 --> 00:32:40,720 technically, physically cannot monetize the data. 620 00:32:40,720 --> 00:32:43,160 If they don't have the data, they can't monetize it. 621 00:32:43,400 --> 00:32:44,600 That's kind of where I was going with it too. 622 00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:46,040 It's like. We're really good at giving away 623 00:32:46,040 --> 00:32:48,720 data. We're terrible at taking away 624 00:32:48,720 --> 00:32:51,360 data and may not even have the ability to do that. 625 00:32:51,360 --> 00:32:53,600 Right. If I give an application or 626 00:32:53,600 --> 00:32:57,200 whatever permission to do something, I might uninstall 627 00:32:57,200 --> 00:33:00,600 that app three months later, a year later, and I never pulled 628 00:33:00,600 --> 00:33:01,960 back those rights. That's right. 629 00:33:02,040 --> 00:33:03,000 And that data is still out there. 630 00:33:03,240 --> 00:33:04,280 Yeah. Revocation. 631 00:33:04,280 --> 00:33:08,720 Is critical and as consumers we need to demand it because if you 632 00:33:08,720 --> 00:33:12,000 don't have revocation, then then you don't have, you don't know 633 00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:14,120 where that data went and that's really fundamental for. 634 00:33:14,120 --> 00:33:15,520 Identity, right? We see this a lot in our day 635 00:33:15,520 --> 00:33:18,880 jobs is companies are really good at giving access to people, 636 00:33:19,520 --> 00:33:22,320 but they're really bad about taking access away when somebody 637 00:33:22,320 --> 00:33:25,560 moves, you know, a group or it gets transferred or promoted or 638 00:33:25,560 --> 00:33:28,000 whatever it may be. It's very similar to the 639 00:33:28,000 --> 00:33:30,000 consumer mindset as well as we're really good at giving away 640 00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:31,960 our data in exchange for a service. 641 00:33:32,480 --> 00:33:34,360 Not so good about flying that back. 642 00:33:34,920 --> 00:33:37,480 Yeah, I was about to. Say Tina had her slam dunk 643 00:33:37,960 --> 00:33:42,040 dropped the mic moment when she said take her own identity with 644 00:33:42,040 --> 00:33:45,120 us, control our identity. I do think that's the best 645 00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:46,600 answer. I think some of the concerns 646 00:33:46,600 --> 00:33:49,840 you're bringing up are completely legitimate, but I 647 00:33:49,840 --> 00:33:52,080 also think that's the future, right. 648 00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:54,400 So that's maybe where we're heading. 649 00:33:55,480 --> 00:33:57,840 Heck, maybe five years. I think that would be very 650 00:33:57,840 --> 00:34:00,320 optimistic. Five years down the road, that's 651 00:34:00,320 --> 00:34:02,080 where we are. But what about today? 652 00:34:02,240 --> 00:34:05,200 What can consumers do today? And by the way, we're all 653 00:34:05,200 --> 00:34:06,560 consumers. Even though we're in the 654 00:34:06,560 --> 00:34:10,440 industry, we're still consumers. What can consumers do to start 655 00:34:10,560 --> 00:34:13,880 safeguarding their privacy and security today? 656 00:34:14,600 --> 00:34:17,360 Jim, I actually think it's. Closer than you realize. 657 00:34:17,360 --> 00:34:19,280 And that's what we're excited about. 658 00:34:19,280 --> 00:34:22,239 I mean that's why we're here at Authenticate is that these 659 00:34:22,239 --> 00:34:25,040 technologies have actually reached the point where now as a 660 00:34:25,040 --> 00:34:28,719 consumer you can demand that privacy, you can demand 661 00:34:28,920 --> 00:34:34,320 revocation, you can say no, I don't want 23andMe to have my 662 00:34:34,320 --> 00:34:36,679 data and to sell it to the highest bidder. 663 00:34:36,880 --> 00:34:39,639 And I think we've reached a point as consumers that we have 664 00:34:39,639 --> 00:34:43,000 a voice and we can influence that and there exist 665 00:34:43,120 --> 00:34:44,920 technologies. Again, that was the the point of 666 00:34:44,920 --> 00:34:49,320 the the bipartisan AI Caucus, to highlight that there now exists 667 00:34:49,320 --> 00:34:51,560 technologies that can make that possible. 668 00:34:53,239 --> 00:34:55,840 I kind of snorted because. When he said the 23 Mei yes, 669 00:34:56,199 --> 00:34:57,680 reading I was reading that article the other day. 670 00:34:57,680 --> 00:34:59,440 I'm like, all right, well, I never did it. 671 00:34:59,720 --> 00:35:02,760 And I know that there is strong feelings by the way, I see the 672 00:35:02,760 --> 00:35:05,800 benefit for it. But that's a. 673 00:35:05,800 --> 00:35:08,240 Awful lot of data to have out there, yeah. 674 00:35:08,240 --> 00:35:10,160 And it's like. It's your health data, 675 00:35:10,160 --> 00:35:13,160 essentially, like, oh, you've got a gene that makes you 676 00:35:13,160 --> 00:35:16,760 susceptible to this certain illness. 677 00:35:17,440 --> 00:35:20,080 And now what? Is that open and sellable to 678 00:35:20,080 --> 00:35:22,440 insurance companies? Yeah. 679 00:35:22,440 --> 00:35:24,640 And then they raise your rates. Because or an insurance. 680 00:35:24,640 --> 00:35:27,560 Data broker that sells it to every insurance company. 681 00:35:27,840 --> 00:35:29,920 Like that's yeah, that's not where we want to be. 682 00:35:29,920 --> 00:35:31,760 Those are the nightmare scenarios. 683 00:35:32,280 --> 00:35:34,800 I thought you were talking about how we heard a big cheer in the 684 00:35:34,800 --> 00:35:36,320 background as Tina started talking. 685 00:35:36,320 --> 00:35:38,000 And I was like, yeah, Tina's used to that. 686 00:35:38,000 --> 00:35:39,120 She. Always gets cheers whenever 687 00:35:39,120 --> 00:35:41,440 she's talking. Why don't we start to wrap 688 00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:42,920 things up because you've been very generous at the time. 689 00:35:42,920 --> 00:35:44,880 We've got a keynote that's going to start here in a little bit. 690 00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:49,520 I want to talk about some of the activities that have taken place 691 00:35:49,520 --> 00:35:53,280 here at Authenticate. Last night was the party. 692 00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:56,560 As I mentioned, there was karaoke and to my surprise, I 693 00:35:56,560 --> 00:35:59,000 turned around, I was front row and I look and I see there's a 694 00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:02,240 bunch of people and they start singing Katy Perry's Firework. 695 00:36:02,600 --> 00:36:06,960 And on the end, who do I see but Tina rocking it out there? 696 00:36:07,120 --> 00:36:09,640 Awesome. My hat's off to anybody who is 697 00:36:09,640 --> 00:36:12,280 willing to go up in karaoke because this is what I sound 698 00:36:12,280 --> 00:36:14,960 like, not singing. Just imagine what it sounds like 699 00:36:14,960 --> 00:36:15,600 singing. It is. 700 00:36:15,760 --> 00:36:16,960 It does not get any better, folks. 701 00:36:18,120 --> 00:36:21,040 So how did you get up there? Did somebody make you do it? 702 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:22,640 Did you go up there of your own accord? 703 00:36:22,720 --> 00:36:27,960 Spill the beans. I can't hide my excitement and 704 00:36:27,960 --> 00:36:31,720 enthusiasm to sing Katy Perry with my my friends. 705 00:36:31,720 --> 00:36:33,680 And, you know, we're all just having a blast. 706 00:36:33,840 --> 00:36:37,160 This identity community has become so close and tighten it 707 00:36:37,320 --> 00:36:40,360 and that it's just a it's just a fun time every time we're here 708 00:36:40,560 --> 00:36:42,880 together. And and that's the group that I 709 00:36:42,880 --> 00:36:45,600 love to hang out with wherever we are, whether it's an 710 00:36:45,600 --> 00:36:49,560 identiverse or an authenticate and, you know, getting together 711 00:36:49,560 --> 00:36:53,880 and it's not always about, you know, one thing or the other. 712 00:36:53,880 --> 00:36:57,800 We may debate stand or we may debate rollouts, but when we get 713 00:36:57,800 --> 00:37:01,320 together, ultimately we're all trying to make identity better 714 00:37:01,320 --> 00:37:03,040 for the world. We're all united by that 715 00:37:03,040 --> 00:37:04,560 mission. And so we can get together and 716 00:37:04,560 --> 00:37:06,760 have fun. And yes, I had quite a few 717 00:37:06,760 --> 00:37:08,200 cheers. Thank you very much. 718 00:37:08,200 --> 00:37:09,880 So we, I think we all did a great job. 719 00:37:10,680 --> 00:37:13,400 And with all my buddies up there, I wasn't alone. 720 00:37:14,000 --> 00:37:15,440 But yeah, it was, it was a lot of fun. 721 00:37:16,000 --> 00:37:17,800 So is karaoke something? That you've done before. 722 00:37:17,800 --> 00:37:20,480 You like to do it. Is this a one time thing? 723 00:37:20,480 --> 00:37:22,840 And I only have the video from last night and that's the only 724 00:37:22,840 --> 00:37:25,000 copy that exists. You have a video, I have some. 725 00:37:25,040 --> 00:37:27,760 Video I talk about might end up in. 726 00:37:27,760 --> 00:37:30,920 This little podcast video. Maybe not. 727 00:37:31,080 --> 00:37:32,200 I don't know I'm. Already. 728 00:37:32,200 --> 00:37:36,040 Living to regret it. Most of my singing is reserved 729 00:37:36,040 --> 00:37:38,480 for the car. Well, if I protect your. 730 00:37:38,480 --> 00:37:40,520 Privacy. We're we're good like that. 731 00:37:40,520 --> 00:37:41,560 There you go. I'll blur. 732 00:37:41,720 --> 00:37:44,120 I'll put a. Blur over it when I first when 733 00:37:44,120 --> 00:37:46,600 I. First soloed as a pilot, the 734 00:37:46,600 --> 00:37:49,680 first thing I started doing was singing in that cockpit and it 735 00:37:49,680 --> 00:37:53,200 was amazing so I'll. Blur your face and I'll put 736 00:37:53,200 --> 00:37:55,400 something like definitely not Tina with an arrow. 737 00:37:56,120 --> 00:37:58,040 I'm sure that's totally fine. Truly privacy. 738 00:37:58,040 --> 00:38:01,200 Preserving and then your DNA. Sequence. 739 00:38:01,680 --> 00:38:02,560 Yeah. Yeah, exactly. 740 00:38:02,600 --> 00:38:03,840 There you go, Jim. Are you a? 741 00:38:03,840 --> 00:38:06,840 Karaoke guy. I know you are because I've seen 742 00:38:06,840 --> 00:38:08,360 you. You've seen me karaoke. 743 00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:11,800 Yeah, so, you know, I'll do a country tune or two like some 744 00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:14,480 Morgan Wallace from Riley Green. Those are my favorites. 745 00:38:14,720 --> 00:38:17,000 I sing a lot in the shower, but not in public. 746 00:38:18,040 --> 00:38:21,560 My partner Denise obviously is a very good singer. 747 00:38:22,360 --> 00:38:26,480 I would have loved to have had her come out and sing some heart 748 00:38:26,680 --> 00:38:28,840 for Andrew Shikiar. That's crazy on you. 749 00:38:28,880 --> 00:38:31,040 Totally missed opportunity. Yeah, you were too busy with 750 00:38:31,040 --> 00:38:31,720 the. Yankees. 751 00:38:32,240 --> 00:38:35,000 I mean, look, I've. Watched like 120 games during 752 00:38:35,000 --> 00:38:36,320 the regular season. What? 753 00:38:36,320 --> 00:38:37,920 I'm not going to watch them in locked over. 754 00:38:38,240 --> 00:38:41,280 Kind of crazy, but I did what I had to do. 755 00:38:41,720 --> 00:38:44,480 Well, I'm not a karaoke. Guy, I like to watch it, but I 756 00:38:44,480 --> 00:38:46,720 cannot sing so I don't even bother. 757 00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:50,320 Hey, we'll get you up there. I will I. 758 00:38:50,320 --> 00:38:53,720 Will run out of the room. I will toss chairs in front of 759 00:38:53,720 --> 00:38:57,240 you so you can't chase me. That's how opposed to getting up 760 00:38:57,240 --> 00:38:59,280 there that I would be. Well, you are in front of a mic. 761 00:38:59,360 --> 00:39:00,720 Right now, yeah, this thing is I'll do this. 762 00:39:00,720 --> 00:39:03,320 This is fine all day, but as soon as the the tune starts to 763 00:39:03,320 --> 00:39:05,000 come out like no, nobody wants to hear that. 764 00:39:05,000 --> 00:39:08,320 Trust me, we got to hack. The next podcast to put in the 765 00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:12,080 music and the background and get you grooving like a groove, you 766 00:39:12,080 --> 00:39:12,760 know? Yeah, we. 767 00:39:12,760 --> 00:39:15,720 Actually. Changed our our podcast song 768 00:39:15,840 --> 00:39:19,480 beginning of the podcast Doo Doo Doo Doo Doo and we got so many 769 00:39:19,480 --> 00:39:21,000 complaints. People loved it. 770 00:39:21,000 --> 00:39:22,200 Yeah, they like the Jingle. So we've just. 771 00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:23,600 Kept it. So we've kept the yeah. 772 00:39:23,920 --> 00:39:25,440 All right, let's get to this. Keynote, we're going to wrap 773 00:39:25,440 --> 00:39:27,200 things up for this week. Tina, thank you so much for 774 00:39:27,200 --> 00:39:28,520 joining us. Hope to have you back on the 775 00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:31,520 near future. See you probably conferences 776 00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:33,280 later this year, Gartner or something like that. 777 00:39:34,240 --> 00:39:37,640 You can find us on the web, IDC podcast.com yes, Jim, we have a 778 00:39:37,640 --> 00:39:40,800 YouTube channel, yes, idacpodcast.tv. 779 00:39:40,800 --> 00:39:43,520 So we're putting videos like this and all of our episodes up 780 00:39:43,520 --> 00:39:45,240 there as well. So like and subscribe, do all 781 00:39:45,240 --> 00:39:47,400 the fun things like that. I'll have a link in our show 782 00:39:47,400 --> 00:39:49,800 notes to where people connect with Tina and to learn more 783 00:39:49,800 --> 00:39:54,520 about Badge Badge Inc inc.com. We'll get you more information 784 00:39:54,520 --> 00:39:55,920 about that. And yeah, you can connect with 785 00:39:55,920 --> 00:39:57,720 Jim and I and let us know what you think about these episodes. 786 00:39:57,720 --> 00:40:00,080 And this is our final episode of Authenticate. 787 00:40:00,080 --> 00:40:02,880 So definitely want to thank Fight Alliance, Andrew, Adrian, 788 00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:06,280 Megan for bringing us out here and helping coordinate the 789 00:40:06,280 --> 00:40:07,800 Family Feud thing was so much fun. 790 00:40:08,080 --> 00:40:10,080 I hope we can do that again at some point in the future. 791 00:40:10,320 --> 00:40:13,080 And then again, RSM for funding our travel and getting out here 792 00:40:13,080 --> 00:40:15,720 and paying for Jim's $40 breakfast this morning. 793 00:40:15,720 --> 00:40:17,640 Yeah, it's wonderful. All right, we'll go ahead and 794 00:40:17,640 --> 00:40:20,120 talk with. Everyone else later and see you 795 00:40:20,120 --> 00:40:24,840 in the next one you've been listening to. 796 00:40:24,920 --> 00:40:28,800 Identity at the Center. We hope you've enjoyed the show. 797 00:40:29,000 --> 00:40:33,080 Make sure to like, rate and review, and we'll be back soon. 798 00:40:33,360 --> 00:40:35,640 But in the meantime, hit the website at 799 00:40:35,640 --> 00:40:42,000 identity@thecenter.com. See you next time on Identity at 800 00:40:42,000 --> 00:40:42,920 the Center.