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You're listening to the identity
of the sender podcast. 

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This is the show that talks 
about identity and access 

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management and making sure you 
know who has access to what 

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let's get started. 
Welcome to the identity of the 

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center podcast, I'm Jeff. 
And that's Jim. 

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Hey, gem. 
Hey Jeff, how are you? 

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Oh, not so bad yourself. 
Hey, I'm living the dream right 

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now. 
It's kind of a nightmare. 

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No, I shouldn't say that. 
It's really not but I think 

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everybody's experience those. 
So, last week we were at the 

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conference and then this week 
came home took some time off 

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because I was moving so it 
wasn't really a vacation and 

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then you come back to work and 
it's like they always say A, the

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work will be waiting for you. 
Yes, it will be waiting for you 

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plus all the new work that's 
coming up. 

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So, yes, like I was on the 
computer, literally, till 11:30 

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last night working and I haven't
done that in a while. 

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I mean, it's just was like, a 
tidal wave came in from like 

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8:00 a.m. to 11:30 at night. 
I consider that payback for all 

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the work you gave me and 
editing. 

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All the podcasts that we did for
our from Gartner, we put out, I 

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think nine, Roads in two weeks, 
which is like a new record for 

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us which is very cool. 
It's very cool experience but 

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yeah so welcome. 
Welcome to the world of Jeff for

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the last two weeks. 
Yeah, no, I was thinking like, 

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you know, hey that putting out 
all those episodes that wasn't 

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too much work. 
Was it for me? 

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It wasn't. 
But for you, I know it was a 

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lot. 
That's a lot of work but it's 

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fun. 
We do it as a hobby, right? 

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We don't really do anything. 
This is, we don't really, like, 

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monetize the show in anyway, 
right? 

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So we don't do commercials or 
anything like that. 

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Your ability to advertise 
ourselves know, maybe that'll 

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change at some point in future 
to kind of figure things out, 

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but We Do It For the Love of the
Game. 

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And certainly, it's fun. 
Well, we don't, we don't 

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advertise for ourselves, but if 
anybody wants to hire us to do 

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more than free to do so yeah, 
definitely come. 

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Visit us at our SM.com? 
Yeah, so I mean there's a couple

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things actually working out so 
like we put all the episodes 94 

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Gartner so you haven't check 
those out. 

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You basically did a preview 
episode of like the day before 

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of what We thought we would be 
getting into and then we did 

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like a daily recap from the 
three days of the conference. 

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And then while we were there, we
also recorded specific 

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conversations that we had with 
five different guests. 

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So we have Louis Almeida, Jamie 
Lewis gross, we had head covet 

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sand, we had Vittorio Bertolucci
and bread to me from various 

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companies. 
I got them all off memory. 

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That's how fresh it is, having 
different conversations and we 

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rolled that out base. 
They all this week and for 

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kicking down and forth. 
While we're recording this on 

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Friday, the S as this will 
become our new our Labor Day. 

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Episode that goes out on Monday.
The down a few nice comments 

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about people whose lives. 
We have really good coverage of 

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the of the conference. 
I feel like that was kind of 

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part of the goal was, you know, 
for people who couldn't be 

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there, just kind of giving you 
some kind of inside picture. 

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Obviously, we're not, you know, 
news media covering it. 

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You know, this session did this 
or the session at that, but more

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getting their perspective of us 
and some of our friends of the 

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show who work who happened to be
there and we're willing to jump 

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on the jump on the podcast for a
little bit. 

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Yeah, it was pretty cool. 
I think even some folks and 

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Garner took notice and re K. 
Thanks thanked us for our 

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journalism. 
I told him, I think journalism 

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is stretchable is a little bit 
of a stretch for what we do, but

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it's very cool to get some get 
some nods from that. 

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Yeah, it was fun again. 
Think so you know to Gartner 

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really for putting on a great 
show but also are some for 

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hooking us up with that sweet. 
Sweet as you like to say 

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anything. 
Have a great, you break top one 

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now. 
I mean, yeah, that was getting 

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old. 
Keep them guessing. 

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That's, that's the way that's 
the way to roll, but yeah, 

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having a spot to record was 
definitely ideal. 

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And we're actually looking at 
doing this again. 

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I think we're looking at being 
at the authenticate 2022 

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Conference in October, will be 
in Seattle. 

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So we'll be meeting with our 
friends from the Fido. 

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I am It's looking forward to 
maybe getting and Iran and 

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Russia are the executive 
director over there. 

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And if you're going to be at the
conference, we'd love to sit 

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down and have a conversation 
either on or off the Record 

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depending on the know how it 
works. 

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But that'll be exciting to that.
For those who haven't been 

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following along. 
That's the one that Jim ditched 

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me last year and made me present
on my own 48. 

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A talk that was all his idea. 
I would have been more than 

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happy to call fall over you but 
I was sick as a dog at the 

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middle of a pandemic. 
Turned out at least a test said 

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that it did not have covered by 
it. 

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I feel like I had covid like 10 
times. 

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Yeah. 
I was sick a lot during the 

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pandemic but I'm yeah fight 
Alliance is definitely one of my

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favorite organizations. 
You know, it's kind of like as 

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well as idsa in as well as Ida 
Pro. 

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And I wanted to mention, I put a
message on the ID Pro slack 

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Channel, but just to mention 
here as well. 

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We've got a A special episode 
plan for Halloween, so Halloween

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falls on Monday this year. 
And so the idea that I came up 

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with was, what is your? 
I am Horror Story, So to 

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participate. 
So I kind of figured the episode

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format with look, like what we 
did with. 

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What's the difference between ID
and access management and 

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digital identity. 
And it's kind of like, you know,

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individuals kind of recorded 
their 3 to 4 minutes or And then

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email it to us. 
So if anybody's down, I am 

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Horror Story like I've got one 
that comes to mind my own life 

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but if any of our listeners have
one that they'd want to share, 

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basically, just sit down record,
it send it to us, reach out to 

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me ahead of time, right? 
We can't have 20 of them, just 

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to break it up into. 
So it's going to be more or less

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of a first come first, serve 
kind of thing you that or send 

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them in. 
We'll just try to figure out the

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best ones that are podcast 
friendly or we can, you know, if

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there is one Is that maybe 
aren't safe for work? 

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Hey, we can maybe talk around 
it. 

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I love hearing the stories 
because I think it's 

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interesting. 
So for my perspective, send them

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all in and we'll we'll try to 
pick the best ones. 

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Maybe I'm thinking of one in my 
own personal life. 

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I shared a too long ago, but it 
could be interesting for sure. 

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Yeah, definitely. 
And then, you know, also just 

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speaking of authenticate coming 
up. 

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That's a, you know, the The 
conference that you went to last

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year, we'll have the executive 
director of The phyto Alliance 

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and Russia are, hopefully, come 
on and do a preview. 

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He's always a good sport about 
coming on the show so I think 

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it's more a matter of just 
finding a mutually available 

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time isn't agreed to come on yet
but I'm just getting it out to 

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hit each other. 
Yeah. 

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Right. 
If he did come on I'd be 

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surprised. 
Is it good? 

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Good sport? 
Yeah. 

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Anders cool. 
What else we got? 

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Octane? 
Going up. 

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I think we're planning on doing 
something out there so octane is

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acht has customer conference 
partner and customer conference 

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in San Francisco in November. 
So I think we're tossing around 

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ideas of how maybe we do 
something around that. 

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So yeah, we're kind of like been
hitting like, the conference 

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circuit here pretty, pretty hard
over the last couple of months. 

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Yeah. 
What I love about the cover, 

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like, just take the photo 
coppers. 

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For example, if you onto the 
photo Alliance of the 

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authenticate conduct calm, and 
look at the Agenda and you just 

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look at the sessions as like, so
many good topics and so many 

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good speakers. 
So what does that mean? 

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For the podcast means we can 
have all these people in one 

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place. 
Is a, hey, can you carve an hour

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out of your schedule or you're 
already going to be there in 

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Seattle and just join us in the 
in the podcasting sweet and, you

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know, lay down the track? 
Well, I don't know if we'll have

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a sweet but some area, hopefully
the table and chairs that makes 

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it. 
This will be convenient. 

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So yeah, like a broom closet. 
Yeah, I mean that, you know, 

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that's funny you say that but a 
lot of people when they first 

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start podcast, they start in 
their closet because it has all 

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of their clothes in it. 
And the clothes do a really good

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job of like minimizing Echoes 
and things like that. 

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So yeah, there's a pro tip for 
you. 

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If you're looking to start a 
podcast, you know maybe take a 

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look at your closet and that 
might help. 

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Yeah. 
Because, you know, that'll be 

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the cheapest moment in your 
podcasting history. 

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At some point, you'll by mixers 
and And some microphones and 

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sound treatments for your walls.
All kinds of Av services for 

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editing and noise, clean up, and
nothing beats having good clean 

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audio to begin with, like that's
where you should make the 

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investment. 
So, if you're doing a podcast, 

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that's where that's where I 
would spend the money. 

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Yeah, I mean, people don't want 
to look, we started early on, we

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did not use this cool software. 
We use zoom and, you know, 

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people had poor internet 
connections. 

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It sounded horrible or if they 
had, you know, as you know, just

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like behind the curtain. 
The reason is like, with zoom, 

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it's recording it at this 
happening. 

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Whereas, with the software that 
we use, now is called Riverside,

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it does the local recording, and
then you mergers look recordings

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together. 
But if your internet is spotty, 

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you're going to get the local 
recording and it'll sound good. 

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Yeah, it's we've definitely 
upped our game for sure. 

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I'm satisfied with Mr. Rat for 
what about Auntie website? 

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Yeah. 
I mean some updates and so we're

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going to get to listener 
questions here in a minute. 

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But yeah, I made some updates to
the website, put out a brand 

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new, listen page, that has all 
of our episodes that used to be,

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just our most recent one. 
But now, all of our episodes are

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listed there in chronological 
order. 

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Most recent first, as all of our
show notes on each individual 

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page. 
So when we say like, check out 

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the show notes or they'll be a 
link in the show notes, now, 

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there's actually a place to go 
instead of trying to do it on 

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your phone to your podcast app 
or you know, ever might be a 

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little more convenient if you 
want to link directly to a show.

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There's now a permanent web link
for each episode and most 

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importantly we have joined 1999 
and added a search to the to the

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podcast list and page. 
So you can now actually type in,

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you know, a couple key words and
I'll pull back episodes that 

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where it's either in the title 
or in the show notes, so kind of

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a simple approach, but it works.
I was really impressed for the 

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search feature and it's because 
even though it's like, we joined

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1999, How many apps do you use? 
Including I am. 

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Platforms, where the search 
feature stinks? 

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Like, you have to get us failed.
Just write something guns, like 

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this works. 
Really good. 

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Yeah, I'm looking at you 
Microsoft Dynamics. 

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Yes, exactly. 
The one that that I was thinking

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of. 
Yeah, exactly. 

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So yeah, check it out. 
Idac podcast.com. 

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There is a listen Banner right 
on the front page or link on the

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top and yeah, it's I'm proud of 
the work that wasn't into it so 

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hopefully people enjoy it. 
All right, should we get to 

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actually, Talking some identity.
We spent 10 minutes like talking

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about everything except it. 
Yeah well we needed that mental 

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break. 
Yes. 

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Let's do it. 
Let's go for it. 

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All right. 
So how did this come about? 

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Basically this is a LinkedIn 
post that you put out there to 

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ask questions from folks around 
you know what is what I'd any 

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questions they have was kind of 
loosey-goosey. 

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We got a bunch of different 
things, from a few different 

225
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folks will go through these kind
of one by one. 

226
00:11:50,300 --> 00:11:52,800
We pick sort of the best ones 
that we or ones. 

227
00:11:53,000 --> 00:11:55,200
We think we can answer the best 
at least, or at least have an 

228
00:11:55,200 --> 00:11:57,000
opinion on and just kind of go 
back and forth. 

229
00:11:57,400 --> 00:11:59,500
I'll go ahead and give a give 
you the first one here. 

230
00:11:59,500 --> 00:12:03,700
This is from Eric Woodruff and 
he writes since it's a long 

231
00:12:03,700 --> 00:12:06,900
weekend and one could bet the 
threat, actors will hope all the

232
00:12:06,900 --> 00:12:09,600
admins are out on a boat 
somewhere drinking, perhaps 

233
00:12:09,600 --> 00:12:11,400
credential theft and fishing 
resistant. 

234
00:12:11,400 --> 00:12:15,800
MFA may be diving into how 
traditional MFA like OTP 

235
00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:18,100
one-time. 
Password is no match for things 

236
00:12:18,100 --> 00:12:22,900
like evil Jinx to or modish car,
which are basically open. 

237
00:12:23,300 --> 00:12:26,700
Apps that people can use to run 
like a reverse proxy or a 

238
00:12:26,700 --> 00:12:28,700
man-in-the-middle sort of attack
that would intercept those 

239
00:12:28,700 --> 00:12:30,800
codes. 
So, I think the question here 

240
00:12:30,800 --> 00:12:34,100
really is, you know, what do we 
think about fishing resistant 

241
00:12:34,100 --> 00:12:37,500
MFA and things like that, that 
might help people enjoy their 

242
00:12:37,500 --> 00:12:40,300
time on a boat drinking. 
Yeah, for sure. 

243
00:12:40,300 --> 00:12:44,300
And I think it's, you know, the 
consultant in me wants to take a

244
00:12:44,300 --> 00:12:47,700
people process and Technology 
approach of this, because I 

245
00:12:47,700 --> 00:12:51,800
think that the first part of his
question was geared towards it's

246
00:12:51,800 --> 00:12:54,000
a holiday weekend. 
And the hackers. 

247
00:12:54,000 --> 00:13:00,200
Like we think the hackers like 
to try to exploit the fact that 

248
00:13:00,400 --> 00:13:02,900
admins are not going to be 
around, I mean, that's always 

249
00:13:02,900 --> 00:13:06,900
been something we've said, I 
don't know if the data actually 

250
00:13:06,900 --> 00:13:11,800
supports that that more hacks 
happened before a three-day 

251
00:13:11,800 --> 00:13:14,600
weekend or something, but let's 
assume that that's correct. 

252
00:13:14,600 --> 00:13:20,600
I think it is that, you know, 
the first thing is you have ever

253
00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:25,200
if everybody goes out on a boat 
and Shrinking and nobody's going

254
00:13:25,200 --> 00:13:28,500
to be able to take the call and 
jump on it and that's a problem,

255
00:13:28,500 --> 00:13:31,400
right? 
So that people standpoint has to

256
00:13:31,400 --> 00:13:36,500
be that somebody's ready to jump
in, if you know, the world goes 

257
00:13:36,500 --> 00:13:40,300
to hell in a handbasket, you 
know? 

258
00:13:40,300 --> 00:13:43,700
Then I think that the process, 
I'd really what we're getting at

259
00:13:43,700 --> 00:13:49,700
here with the fishing campaigns 
is people keep falling for 

260
00:13:49,700 --> 00:13:53,500
fishing campaigns. 
They're clicking links in emails

261
00:13:53,500 --> 00:13:56,800
to go to what it looks like 
Instagram or there. 

262
00:13:57,000 --> 00:13:59,800
You know. 
And look, I understand some of 

263
00:13:59,800 --> 00:14:02,600
these things are getting really 
sophisticated. 

264
00:14:02,600 --> 00:14:06,500
You know, they send you an email
looks legit, you click the link 

265
00:14:06,800 --> 00:14:12,100
and the login page looks legit. 
However, if you were smart 

266
00:14:12,100 --> 00:14:15,200
enough or I should leave smart 
enough, let's say educated 

267
00:14:15,200 --> 00:14:18,900
enough for you. 
Have this built-in And you go 

268
00:14:18,900 --> 00:14:23,700
and look at the URL bar, you can
see you're not on the real 

269
00:14:23,700 --> 00:14:27,400
instagram.com or whatever the 
pages that they're trying to 

270
00:14:27,400 --> 00:14:30,300
fool you when you look at this. 
But even that's assuming that 

271
00:14:30,300 --> 00:14:32,300
you've got your browser 
configure to actually show the 

272
00:14:32,300 --> 00:14:36,300
full URL I guess I'm gonna bug 
me about Safari is by default it

273
00:14:36,300 --> 00:14:39,400
hides, the full You full URL. 
It just shows the first part of 

274
00:14:39,400 --> 00:14:41,100
it or maybe just the base of the
domain. 

275
00:14:41,800 --> 00:14:43,300
You know. 
I think these are things that 

276
00:14:43,700 --> 00:14:46,900
yes, you know, we hope that we 
wouldn't fall for fishing but 

277
00:14:47,000 --> 00:14:49,800
there is a reason it is So 
popular because it works. 

278
00:14:50,600 --> 00:14:54,600
Yeah, I kind of feel like I have
to built this little fish. 

279
00:14:54,600 --> 00:14:58,100
I'm in this industry and 
everything, but I've also worked

280
00:14:58,100 --> 00:15:01,000
for a few companies now that 
I've really had, you know, 

281
00:15:01,200 --> 00:15:05,100
awareness campaigns and I feel 
like I'm more aware because of 

282
00:15:05,100 --> 00:15:08,400
this awareness campaigns, I'm 
more suspicious when I see 

283
00:15:08,400 --> 00:15:11,100
something less likely to click 
on the link. 

284
00:15:11,100 --> 00:15:17,500
So that's kind of the process. 
I'd and I think what what Eric 

285
00:15:17,500 --> 00:15:22,200
is also Up in terms of 
technology is there's some 

286
00:15:24,300 --> 00:15:28,800
there's some multi-factor 
authentication methods that are 

287
00:15:28,800 --> 00:15:32,200
stronger than others. 
Obviously leveraging a one-time 

288
00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:37,500
password through SMS or email 
that's like the that's the low 

289
00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:43,500
end of the spectrum versus doing
some kind of certificate based 

290
00:15:43,500 --> 00:15:47,600
or you know, biometric or 
something. 

291
00:15:47,600 --> 00:15:51,400
That That can't be captured with
a man in the middle attack. 

292
00:15:52,500 --> 00:15:56,300
We don't have the monkey like 
how one-time passwords are. 

293
00:15:56,400 --> 00:15:59,500
Look any MFA is still better 
than no one will say, right. 

294
00:16:00,300 --> 00:16:04,800
But things like SMS for example 
has been specifically called out

295
00:16:04,800 --> 00:16:08,000
as like the Bottom Rung of the 
MFA tree. 

296
00:16:08,000 --> 00:16:12,200
It is probably the most easily 
intercepted breached you know 

297
00:16:12,400 --> 00:16:14,400
cracked whatever you know 
whatever term you want to use. 

298
00:16:14,400 --> 00:16:16,900
The basically say yeah, the MFA 
went to the wrong person or was 

299
00:16:16,900 --> 00:16:21,900
intercepted. 
When do you think SMS as a 

300
00:16:21,900 --> 00:16:25,400
one-time one-time password 
approach, or MFA approach 

301
00:16:26,000 --> 00:16:30,200
becomes no longer prevalent, 
because I feel like it's still 

302
00:16:30,200 --> 00:16:32,500
the number one method like every
single app seems like, yeah, 

303
00:16:32,500 --> 00:16:35,000
that's like it defaults to is, 
like, the minimum viable 

304
00:16:35,000 --> 00:16:37,600
product. 
When people are rolling out MFA,

305
00:16:38,200 --> 00:16:40,600
when do you think it will be 
that? 

306
00:16:40,600 --> 00:16:43,500
That is no longer the case. 
Are we talking two years? 

307
00:16:43,500 --> 00:16:49,200
Five years, ten years, never, 
oh, no, Kind of feels like that 

308
00:16:49,200 --> 00:16:52,700
never because I don't think it's
in the foreseeable future but I 

309
00:16:52,700 --> 00:16:56,600
think what could get it there as
kind of the that 52 approach 

310
00:16:57,500 --> 00:17:04,400
where if the device makers make 
it so easy to use the biometric?

311
00:17:04,400 --> 00:17:07,700
I mean it's kind of gotten 
there, but I I think so. 

312
00:17:07,700 --> 00:17:12,700
Look in terms of MFA to me, 
there's different levels, 

313
00:17:12,700 --> 00:17:15,599
there's the low rung, like we 
talked about the one-time 

314
00:17:15,599 --> 00:17:21,400
password all the way up to 
something like You became, but 

315
00:17:21,400 --> 00:17:25,599
you can't expect people to use a
UV key to go shopping on Amazon 

316
00:17:26,000 --> 00:17:28,200
or, you know, something like 
that. 

317
00:17:28,200 --> 00:17:31,200
So, you know, per carry one 
around and plug it into their 

318
00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:33,100
phone. 
Like that's not normal. 

319
00:17:33,100 --> 00:17:35,900
People don't do that, right, but
could you? 

320
00:17:35,900 --> 00:17:38,400
Yeah, exactly. 
But could you do that for 

321
00:17:39,300 --> 00:17:45,100
high-stake transactions, 
connecting to a VPN or doing 

322
00:17:45,100 --> 00:17:48,000
some kind of online banking for 
it. 

323
00:17:48,100 --> 00:17:51,200
In certain scenarios, I think it
is reasonable, but I think 

324
00:17:51,200 --> 00:17:54,300
there's always going to be those
lower risks use cases. 

325
00:17:54,300 --> 00:17:58,800
And I mean, heck, we know, there
are still sites out there that 

326
00:17:58,800 --> 00:18:01,500
aren't even at that level of 
using it as mess. 

327
00:18:01,500 --> 00:18:07,100
So I think it's really the level
of assurance that's required. 

328
00:18:07,300 --> 00:18:09,900
And there's always gonna be 
there's low level Assurance use 

329
00:18:09,900 --> 00:18:16,800
cases, where SMS will be good 
enough I guess as that's kind of

330
00:18:16,800 --> 00:18:19,900
a pessimistic View. 
I think that's the the 

331
00:18:19,900 --> 00:18:23,700
technology side is that you got 
to go up the ladder in terms of 

332
00:18:23,700 --> 00:18:27,100
level of assurance, if they use 
cases higher and I think they 

333
00:18:27,100 --> 00:18:28,600
need to think about a 
critically. 

334
00:18:28,600 --> 00:18:33,300
Like if getting into the VPN is 
low level Assurance then 

335
00:18:33,300 --> 00:18:36,000
somebody could escalate to a 
higher level account. 

336
00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:40,500
So if only requiring like a 
higher level account for our 

337
00:18:40,500 --> 00:18:44,700
higher level of assurance for an
admin account, what if somebody 

338
00:18:44,700 --> 00:18:48,900
gets into the vpm as a low-level
account and then Then somehow is

339
00:18:48,900 --> 00:18:52,800
able to elevate their privileges
or Elevate to another account. 

340
00:18:53,700 --> 00:18:54,900
Yeah. 
I mean, you were talking. 

341
00:18:55,300 --> 00:18:56,700
You know what? 
Take a risk-based approach. 

342
00:18:56,700 --> 00:18:59,200
I think to it again. 
MFA still better than nothing. 

343
00:18:59,300 --> 00:19:03,100
Yes, traditional MFA. 
Which is really the question, 

344
00:19:03,100 --> 00:19:06,200
right? 
Is that as good as stronger, 

345
00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:10,000
what versions know. 
Is it more fishing resistant? 

346
00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:12,400
MFA, yes, but I don't know if 
we're there yet. 

347
00:19:12,400 --> 00:19:14,300
So like, you talk about my 
certificates and really, I think

348
00:19:14,300 --> 00:19:17,900
now, we're starting again to 
like pass keys on devices, which

349
00:19:17,900 --> 00:19:19,800
is sort of a new kind of Fido 
standard. 

350
00:19:19,800 --> 00:19:22,100
I don't remember the exact 
technical term Vittorio. 

351
00:19:22,100 --> 00:19:24,500
Helped us out. 
Yeah, Last week when recording, 

352
00:19:24,500 --> 00:19:26,400
but there are certainly a lot, 
it's a mouthful. 

353
00:19:26,400 --> 00:19:31,000
So I prefer passkeys as a name, 
it's still better than nothing 

354
00:19:31,000 --> 00:19:34,200
it. 
But the end the day, you know, 

355
00:19:34,200 --> 00:19:35,700
how do these man-in-the-middle 
attacks work? 

356
00:19:36,000 --> 00:19:39,100
Is they trick you into going to 
a nefarious website. 

357
00:19:39,400 --> 00:19:41,400
So security awareness training 
for sure. 

358
00:19:41,500 --> 00:19:45,000
Right, making where that doing 
random fishing camp, simulated 

359
00:19:45,000 --> 00:19:46,000
fishing campaigns. 
Right? 

360
00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:49,000
Kind of checking up on your, on 
your employees and things like 

361
00:19:49,000 --> 00:19:50,500
that dry. 
If you are a customer 

362
00:19:50,500 --> 00:19:54,200
environment, making them aware 
of where they Can and can't get 

363
00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:57,200
help from what they should be 
looking for, you know, giving 

364
00:19:57,200 --> 00:20:00,600
tips on looking at the, you 
know, the full URL watching for 

365
00:20:00,900 --> 00:20:03,300
misspelled or, you know, domain 
squatters right. 

366
00:20:03,300 --> 00:20:06,100
Things like that. 
I think is always a concern, but

367
00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:09,100
that, I think, I think it's my 
two cents about. 

368
00:20:09,100 --> 00:20:10,900
I think we, I think we've beaten
that one up. 

369
00:20:10,900 --> 00:20:14,100
Pretty good. 
Okay, so let's move on to the 

370
00:20:14,100 --> 00:20:16,500
next question. 
I was submitted by Ian saying, 

371
00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:21,800
and it goes like this. 
Why does modernization always 

372
00:20:21,800 --> 00:20:26,200
seem to stop at today's 
Standards preparing for what's 

373
00:20:26,200 --> 00:20:29,300
next. 
Seems to be punted to the next 

374
00:20:29,300 --> 00:20:32,200
round of quote-unquote 
modernization. 

375
00:20:33,500 --> 00:20:36,500
I think it's because we are 
still playing catch-up for the 

376
00:20:36,500 --> 00:20:38,100
most part. 
Like, if you're doing 

377
00:20:38,100 --> 00:20:42,900
modernization, I think that is a
thinly veiled, excuse to bring 

378
00:20:42,900 --> 00:20:46,600
your whatever you're trying to 
modernize technology process. 

379
00:20:46,600 --> 00:20:49,200
Whatever might be into something
that you probably should have 

380
00:20:49,200 --> 00:20:53,800
done like five years ago, maybe 
even 10 years ago, say feel like

381
00:20:53,800 --> 00:20:57,800
organizations are for the most 
part, not on The Cutting Edge of

382
00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:00,700
the technology. 
They are doing, just enough to 

383
00:21:00,700 --> 00:21:04,300
get by to either make the 
business run at the most cost 

384
00:21:04,300 --> 00:21:06,800
efficient way possible because 
bleeding edge is usually 

385
00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:11,200
expensive usually introduces 
more risk you know it would be 

386
00:21:11,200 --> 00:21:16,600
nice to be you know more modern 
I think as a as an organization 

387
00:21:16,600 --> 00:21:18,800
when it comes to the technology 
and services you're putting out 

388
00:21:18,800 --> 00:21:21,500
there but I think of things like
password list that we're seeing 

389
00:21:21,500 --> 00:21:25,900
such rapid iteration. 
Roo not only the use cases of 

390
00:21:25,900 --> 00:21:28,400
how it actually works and keep 
things secure, but also the 

391
00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:32,300
methods of delivery, you know, 
things like that, where you 

392
00:21:32,300 --> 00:21:33,400
could call it modern. 
Yeah. 

393
00:21:33,400 --> 00:21:35,600
We were modern two years ago 
when we first started. 

394
00:21:35,600 --> 00:21:38,700
Look at password list. 
And now, what are we looking at 

395
00:21:38,700 --> 00:21:39,900
now? 
We're get past keys. 

396
00:21:40,100 --> 00:21:44,000
So, okay, so what's your 
definition of modern because it 

397
00:21:44,000 --> 00:21:48,700
keeps changing and how often do 
you continually upgrade the 

398
00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:51,100
technology that you've got to 
stay modern. 

399
00:21:51,100 --> 00:21:55,200
It's too expensive to do that. 
So I feel like you know, the 

400
00:21:55,200 --> 00:21:56,500
reason it doesn't happen is 
money. 

401
00:21:57,300 --> 00:22:00,800
Most organizations don't have 
budgets to install. 

402
00:22:00,800 --> 00:22:06,400
A brand new ID P, MF a 
conditional adaptive password 

403
00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:09,400
lists identity governance 
privileged access management, 

404
00:22:09,400 --> 00:22:12,400
Cloud infrastructure and title 
that management, like all this 

405
00:22:12,400 --> 00:22:14,200
stuff. 
They can't do this every year so

406
00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:16,100
you go in Cycles. 
It's basically okay, you're 

407
00:22:16,100 --> 00:22:18,000
buying a product. 
Let's hope to get five years out

408
00:22:18,000 --> 00:22:21,300
of it before we even think about
trying to do a replacement or to

409
00:22:21,300 --> 00:22:23,200
do a major upgrade or something 
like that. 

410
00:22:23,400 --> 00:22:26,300
Unless there is a very clear, 
reason I clear and present 

411
00:22:26,300 --> 00:22:31,500
danger or some sort of 
unmitigated evil risk or audit 

412
00:22:31,500 --> 00:22:35,200
finding where it forces you to 
do it it comes down to money. 

413
00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:39,500
What do you think? 
Yeah, I think I think 

414
00:22:39,500 --> 00:22:44,100
improvements and standards the 
way I took those was, you know, 

415
00:22:44,700 --> 00:22:49,200
I think it's very reliant on 
upgrades to Hardware. 

416
00:22:50,500 --> 00:22:54,800
So for talking about like, you 
know, Omer Technologies like 

417
00:22:54,800 --> 00:22:58,200
iPhones and things like that. 
Think about how fast they move 

418
00:22:58,200 --> 00:23:01,400
from version to version, but 
then there are still people who 

419
00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:05,100
are on older iPhones back. 
There are some people, like I 

420
00:23:05,600 --> 00:23:07,800
had a painter, come and paint my
house. 

421
00:23:08,200 --> 00:23:13,300
I asked him if we could use like
cash app or then know, I was 

422
00:23:13,300 --> 00:23:16,800
pretty much open to whatever 
your I don't have any of that. 

423
00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:19,600
And he had a flip phone and he's
taking pictures of the place of 

424
00:23:19,608 --> 00:23:21,400
the flip phone. 
I'm thinking, oh my goodness, 

425
00:23:21,600 --> 00:23:24,700
this guy. 
So out of date, the Is like, you

426
00:23:24,700 --> 00:23:28,900
know the bank that I go to wants
to do business with him just as 

427
00:23:28,900 --> 00:23:32,100
much as they want to do business
with me even those Technologies 

428
00:23:32,100 --> 00:23:35,200
out of date. 
So they, you know, the standards

429
00:23:35,200 --> 00:23:40,000
have to take into account all 
the folks who have the old 

430
00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:45,300
technology and then I think the 
I think the other thing is that,

431
00:23:45,700 --> 00:23:49,400
you know, the responsibility to 
be secure. 

432
00:23:50,100 --> 00:23:53,000
Generally does not fall on the 
end-user. 

433
00:23:53,300 --> 00:23:55,600
Al's on the company, providing 
the service. 

434
00:23:55,600 --> 00:23:59,400
So you know if you say whose 
responsibility is it to keep my 

435
00:23:59,400 --> 00:24:04,000
account at Wells Fargo secure is
it my responsibility or Wells 

436
00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:05,800
Fargo? 
Most people say it's Wells, 

437
00:24:05,800 --> 00:24:09,000
Fargo's responsibility, my 
password needs to be as long as 

438
00:24:09,000 --> 00:24:12,700
what they say, it needs to be. 
And my multi-factor has got to 

439
00:24:12,700 --> 00:24:16,700
be whatever they say, it needs 
to be and I'm going to, I have 

440
00:24:16,700 --> 00:24:20,900
to follow those rules if I went 
access but they try to keep my 

441
00:24:21,100 --> 00:24:23,200
data secure, it's not my 
responsibility. 

442
00:24:23,700 --> 00:24:26,100
Now you and I may see it 
differently because we're in 

443
00:24:26,100 --> 00:24:28,900
this industry. 
I think, you know, the 

444
00:24:29,200 --> 00:24:32,200
quote-unquote man on the street 
and it feels like the 

445
00:24:32,200 --> 00:24:37,400
responsibility lies on the 
company, that's providing it 

446
00:24:37,400 --> 00:24:39,000
now. 
So they've got the 

447
00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:42,400
responsibility for security and 
they don't want to alienate 

448
00:24:42,400 --> 00:24:44,500
customers that don't have the 
technology. 

449
00:24:44,500 --> 00:24:47,600
So if Wells Fargo, all of a 
sudden said, the only people who

450
00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:50,600
can access their account are 
people who have, you know, this 

451
00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:52,800
biometric support from this 
version. 

452
00:24:53,300 --> 00:24:56,300
So basically if you have an 
iPhone 7, you can't be a 

453
00:24:56,300 --> 00:24:58,700
customer here anymore. 
You need to withdraw your 

454
00:24:58,900 --> 00:25:01,200
millions of dollars from our 
bank because we don't want you 

455
00:25:01,200 --> 00:25:03,000
here. 
That's not going to happen. 

456
00:25:03,300 --> 00:25:04,700
So that's good. 
That's that's that. 

457
00:25:04,700 --> 00:25:06,900
That is not going to fly. 
That's not going to happen. 

458
00:25:06,900 --> 00:25:09,400
So that's my feeling is, like, 
that's the holding back 

459
00:25:09,400 --> 00:25:14,400
modernization is old Hardware. 
Old Hardware. 

460
00:25:15,100 --> 00:25:16,900
I can see that. 
I mean, I still think money is 

461
00:25:16,900 --> 00:25:20,400
the answer. 
Well, yeah, I mean it always 

462
00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:22,700
ties back to mommy's home. 
All right. 

463
00:25:22,700 --> 00:25:24,800
Sure, do the next one. 
Yeah, let's do the next one. 

464
00:25:25,700 --> 00:25:28,300
Okay, so this is from our guy. 
Chris power, who we actually 

465
00:25:28,300 --> 00:25:29,700
we're able to meet out at 
Gartner. 

466
00:25:30,600 --> 00:25:34,000
Chris is a big Sox fan meeting 
like actually on your feet 

467
00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:37,100
socks. 
So kudos to him for that and 

468
00:25:37,100 --> 00:25:40,000
collecting socks off by Gartner.
He actually came up with a 

469
00:25:40,000 --> 00:25:41,500
bunch. 
So I'm going to try to 

470
00:25:41,500 --> 00:25:44,500
paraphrase some of these can 
Jumping on the socks thing 

471
00:25:44,500 --> 00:25:45,900
before you go any further, I 
got. 

472
00:25:45,900 --> 00:25:48,900
So I kind of felt like after 
that conversation with him was 

473
00:25:48,900 --> 00:25:52,400
like this is the first time that
I've ever heard somebody going 

474
00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:54,700
to the vendor Hall. 
I kind of like scoping the place

475
00:25:54,700 --> 00:25:57,000
out to find something wear 
socks. 

476
00:25:57,200 --> 00:26:01,500
So if you're listening and you 
do a booth at a conference, you 

477
00:26:01,500 --> 00:26:03,300
know Sox, might be a good 
giveaway. 

478
00:26:04,400 --> 00:26:07,800
Yeah, I think it's interesting 
because I know he is, it sounds 

479
00:26:07,800 --> 00:26:10,700
like he's into it. 
I think Ian Glaser from 

480
00:26:10,700 --> 00:26:14,300
Salesforce has also into it and 
then Someone else I read his. 

481
00:26:14,300 --> 00:26:16,900
I was all unlike my LinkedIn or 
Twitter feeds and stuff like 

482
00:26:16,900 --> 00:26:18,800
that. 
Where I saw people comparing 

483
00:26:19,300 --> 00:26:22,300
security-related socks. 
So there is definitely a market 

484
00:26:22,300 --> 00:26:25,000
out there for socks now. 
Didn't we? 

485
00:26:25,000 --> 00:26:28,100
Look at like the possibility of 
socks that they're, you know, 

486
00:26:28,100 --> 00:26:31,900
getting custom Sox's not a 
trivial matter right there, 

487
00:26:31,900 --> 00:26:34,100
expensive. 
Any type of merchandise is 

488
00:26:34,100 --> 00:26:36,600
expensive weave. 
We are looking at it. 

489
00:26:36,600 --> 00:26:40,700
I think trying to figure out how
that would work, but at least of

490
00:26:40,700 --> 00:26:42,500
decent quality. 
Can you get some paper thin 

491
00:26:42,500 --> 00:26:47,800
socks from Some low quality type
thing probably, but it's going 

492
00:26:47,800 --> 00:26:48,900
to do it. 
Do it right man. 

493
00:26:48,900 --> 00:26:50,500
Spend the money. 
That's right. 

494
00:26:50,600 --> 00:26:54,300
Anyway, so shout-out to Chris. 
So his question is really 

495
00:26:54,300 --> 00:26:58,700
looking at the best ways to 
manage layered access. 

496
00:26:59,300 --> 00:27:02,500
So, by layered access, what he 
means and he gives an example is

497
00:27:02,700 --> 00:27:06,100
application. 
A is managed by the I am team to

498
00:27:06,100 --> 00:27:08,100
get into it. 
Initially let's say something 

499
00:27:08,100 --> 00:27:08,900
your single sign. 
Alright. 

500
00:27:08,900 --> 00:27:12,000
So basically like the 
authentication is controlled by 

501
00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:14,700
one team. 
But once you're inside the 

502
00:27:14,700 --> 00:27:17,800
application, the application and
once you're inside that 

503
00:27:17,800 --> 00:27:21,000
application, there are other 
entitlements or access controls,

504
00:27:21,300 --> 00:27:23,600
maybe your administrator or 
powers or something like that, 

505
00:27:23,600 --> 00:27:27,200
where you can gain additional 
access within that application. 

506
00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:31,200
So, you know, the perspective 
he's taking here is we've taken 

507
00:27:31,200 --> 00:27:34,000
the position that business 
owners and vendors who have this

508
00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:36,300
ability to take on the 
responsibility. 

509
00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:41,600
Meaning the ability to escalate 
within a specific application, 

510
00:27:42,000 --> 00:27:44,700
take on the responsibility. 
And the audit findings that come

511
00:27:44,700 --> 00:27:48,200
from adding access, when they 
surpass or go around the I am 

512
00:27:48,200 --> 00:27:52,300
team, this release is me and 
this case Chris from the 

513
00:27:52,300 --> 00:27:55,100
response from that 
responsibility on paper, but not

514
00:27:55,100 --> 00:27:59,300
from the threat and the risk 
that these business and vendors 

515
00:27:59,300 --> 00:28:03,000
these businesses and vendors 
making changes on their own, if 

516
00:28:03,000 --> 00:28:06,500
something would happen to occur 
the call to resolve, it would 

517
00:28:06,500 --> 00:28:09,400
start with the IM team, of 
course rights like, hey, why 

518
00:28:09,400 --> 00:28:11,700
does someone have incorrect 
access to your application? 

519
00:28:11,700 --> 00:28:13,200
Well, let's start with the top 
of the chain. 

520
00:28:13,300 --> 00:28:16,000
Jane and then you start doing 
this, you know, root cause 

521
00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:19,200
analysis and said, oh well we 
only control one part of the 

522
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:21,300
authentication. 
Someone else is controlling it. 

523
00:28:21,900 --> 00:28:25,600
What are your thoughts on the 
management of that layering of 

524
00:28:25,600 --> 00:28:30,900
access? 
So my thoughts on managing I am 

525
00:28:31,000 --> 00:28:35,100
managing access period. 
Is that the business makes the 

526
00:28:35,100 --> 00:28:41,400
decision on who gets access to 
what and I am team provides the 

527
00:28:41,400 --> 00:28:44,500
tools to do that in a Controlled
fashion. 

528
00:28:44,700 --> 00:28:49,100
So even the example he gave is 
saying, okay well I am team 

529
00:28:49,100 --> 00:28:53,600
manages the single sign-on so 
ultimately you know to get 

530
00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:55,800
single sign-on to an app. 
They don't give everybody a 

531
00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:57,900
single sign-on to every app, 
right? 

532
00:28:57,900 --> 00:29:00,300
Ellie Give the apps that you 
need. 

533
00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:03,000
Well, who's going to decide who 
would apps? 

534
00:29:03,000 --> 00:29:07,400
Jeff Steadman needs access to 
what groups he goes into an 

535
00:29:07,400 --> 00:29:11,000
active directory. 
That enable him to see that icon

536
00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:14,400
in his single sign-on. 
That's Would be the business. 

537
00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:21,300
What I also think is like when 
you gets to entitlements, it's 

538
00:29:21,300 --> 00:29:24,400
really then finer grain. 
Either groups in active 

539
00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:29,100
directory or maybe is provision 
into the application with 

540
00:29:29,100 --> 00:29:32,900
certain entitlements. 
Whether it's groups or some 

541
00:29:32,900 --> 00:29:37,600
other attributes that drive 
access typically use a tool like

542
00:29:37,600 --> 00:29:40,500
identity governance and 
administration like a South 

543
00:29:40,500 --> 00:29:45,000
points, avian omata, you know, 
along those lines, I'll Amos or 

544
00:29:45,200 --> 00:29:48,400
clear sky. 
I that can narrow name every 

545
00:29:48,400 --> 00:29:51,200
single idea by somebody else, 
right? 

546
00:29:51,400 --> 00:29:58,500
But the idea being that it goes 
to the business and the business

547
00:29:58,900 --> 00:30:02,900
I person in the business decide?
Yes, you get access or no, you 

548
00:30:02,900 --> 00:30:07,000
don't get access and then the 
system ideally if it's fully, 

549
00:30:07,000 --> 00:30:09,200
automated, would provision that 
backs us. 

550
00:30:09,500 --> 00:30:13,300
It doesn't, it's going to issue 
a ticket, but then ultimately, 

551
00:30:13,300 --> 00:30:15,600
if there's a breakdown, like, 
somebody gets a ticket. 

552
00:30:15,700 --> 00:30:19,500
It and doesn't follow the ticket
or they provide access. 

553
00:30:19,500 --> 00:30:22,900
That shouldn't be given, if you 
have the right Tools in place 

554
00:30:22,900 --> 00:30:26,900
from, I am perspective that have
that automation or issue a 

555
00:30:26,900 --> 00:30:29,200
ticket. 
And someone breaks process, you 

556
00:30:29,200 --> 00:30:33,500
have to be able to identify who 
broke process, but it sounds to 

557
00:30:33,500 --> 00:30:38,300
me, like what Chris is saying is
that they've got a single 

558
00:30:38,300 --> 00:30:42,000
sign-on tool, but they don't 
have an IGA system in place. 

559
00:30:42,300 --> 00:30:45,300
While could be that but I think 
what happens in the real world, 

560
00:30:45,300 --> 00:30:46,900
too. 
You might have the single 

561
00:30:46,900 --> 00:30:49,900
sign-on tool but you don't 
actually control the permissions

562
00:30:49,900 --> 00:30:53,700
within the application itself. 
Like sap might be a good example

563
00:30:53,700 --> 00:30:57,000
where there's like an sap team 
who is responsible for 

564
00:30:57,300 --> 00:31:01,200
maintaining access within sap 
but the front door might be 

565
00:31:01,200 --> 00:31:03,500
controlled through an active 
directory authentication. 

566
00:31:03,500 --> 00:31:06,000
For example. 
So I think that's the risk. 

567
00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:07,400
Right? 
Is okay. 

568
00:31:07,400 --> 00:31:08,900
Well the I am team is doing the 
right thing. 

569
00:31:08,900 --> 00:31:12,500
They have like defined processes
but somewhere along the way the 

570
00:31:12,500 --> 00:31:15,200
business decided that they did 
not want to hand over. 

571
00:31:15,700 --> 00:31:19,800
The provisioning of the actual 
entitlements within the specific

572
00:31:19,800 --> 00:31:23,700
application to a centralized 
team that does that work, or 

573
00:31:23,700 --> 00:31:27,900
that centralized team doesn't 
have policies or standards or 

574
00:31:27,900 --> 00:31:30,100
things like that, that align 
with sort of the organizational.

575
00:31:30,100 --> 00:31:33,400
I am policies. 
So I see Chris's Point here is 

576
00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:36,500
like, okay, well, we can only 
control so far because we're 

577
00:31:36,500 --> 00:31:39,200
only doing this part. 
We're only really doing the 

578
00:31:39,200 --> 00:31:41,900
authentication part of it. 
The authorizations are being 

579
00:31:41,900 --> 00:31:45,600
managed by someone else in their
own application that we do not. 

580
00:31:45,600 --> 00:31:49,600
Have connectivity to into or 
integration, for example. 

581
00:31:49,600 --> 00:31:53,500
So I can have an IGA tool, but I
might not have a connector that 

582
00:31:53,500 --> 00:31:57,100
is provisioning, the actual 
permissions within the account, 

583
00:31:57,100 --> 00:31:58,100
they happens quite a bit. 
Right. 

584
00:31:58,100 --> 00:32:01,400
So I think you know, from a risk
perspective the risk doesn't go 

585
00:32:01,400 --> 00:32:04,200
away, it becomes a business 
decision to say. 

586
00:32:04,200 --> 00:32:06,800
Okay well how do we want to 
manage the risk to your point? 

587
00:32:06,800 --> 00:32:08,300
I think the business owns the 
risk. 

588
00:32:08,300 --> 00:32:12,700
They have made the decision not 
to integrate with the Enterprise

589
00:32:12,700 --> 00:32:15,200
standard identity and access 
management. 

590
00:32:15,700 --> 00:32:19,600
Meant system to the, to the 
degree, that absolves the 

591
00:32:19,608 --> 00:32:22,000
business from complying with 
their audit requirements. 

592
00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:24,800
Like, that's something about was
take back to say, okay, well, 

593
00:32:25,100 --> 00:32:27,400
you know, if you want an easy 
button, put it in active, 

594
00:32:27,400 --> 00:32:29,300
directory, or Azure active 
directory. 

595
00:32:29,500 --> 00:32:33,000
And because my IJ platform is 
fully managing active directory,

596
00:32:33,000 --> 00:32:35,700
or Azure active directory, I 
will control both the 

597
00:32:35,700 --> 00:32:37,700
authentication and the 
authorization. 

598
00:32:38,200 --> 00:32:41,400
But if you've got an application
that sits outside of that, out 

599
00:32:41,400 --> 00:32:44,200
of sight of that management 
chain, I'm not going to be 

600
00:32:44,200 --> 00:32:45,600
responsible for it because I 
can't control. 

601
00:32:45,700 --> 00:32:47,700
What? 
And I would never agree to say, 

602
00:32:47,700 --> 00:32:49,600
I will own the audit 
responsibility for an 

603
00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:52,500
application that I cannot 
control the authorizations in. 

604
00:32:53,700 --> 00:32:55,400
So I think that's where the 
business comes in. 

605
00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:57,400
And is I think it's part of the,
I am program. 

606
00:32:57,400 --> 00:32:59,100
I think this is, you know, an 
agreement that gets made 

607
00:32:59,100 --> 00:33:01,400
somewhere. 
Maybe, you know, executive 

608
00:33:01,400 --> 00:33:04,700
levels or some other management 
levels to, basically say, okay, 

609
00:33:04,700 --> 00:33:07,200
here's what we're responsible 
for, but by the way, because 

610
00:33:07,200 --> 00:33:11,000
you're not using the, I am easy 
button that we've created, you 

611
00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:13,000
are going to take on these 
responsibilities. 

612
00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:16,700
You need to show your audit 
Trail for Who requested access 

613
00:33:16,700 --> 00:33:21,100
was, it approved keep that for, 
you know, X number of months 

614
00:33:21,100 --> 00:33:24,500
years, whatever you know 
regulation you need to comply 

615
00:33:24,500 --> 00:33:27,400
with things. 
For example, if you ever decide 

616
00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:30,600
that you do want to hop on the I
am trained and become fully 

617
00:33:30,600 --> 00:33:32,200
managed. 
Great, let's talk about that. 

618
00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:35,000
But until that happens, I will 
not accept ownership of your 

619
00:33:35,000 --> 00:33:37,800
audit findings. 
Have a good day application 

620
00:33:37,800 --> 00:33:39,900
owner team. 
That that's the way that I would

621
00:33:39,900 --> 00:33:42,600
look at it. 
No, I mean you made a lot of 

622
00:33:42,600 --> 00:33:46,000
great points certain when you 
fart at escp example we Seen 

623
00:33:46,000 --> 00:33:49,200
that over and over again. 
I think what It ultimately comes

624
00:33:49,200 --> 00:33:54,100
down to is if an application or 
platformer how we want to look 

625
00:33:54,100 --> 00:33:57,300
at is going to do their own 
identity and access management. 

626
00:33:57,400 --> 00:34:02,200
They still need to be in 
compliance with the information 

627
00:34:02,200 --> 00:34:04,600
security policies. 
Essentially, they have to do 

628
00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:09,800
what the I am platforms are 
doing with the same level of 

629
00:34:09,800 --> 00:34:15,199
adherence, to controls and being
tested and, But ultimately comes

630
00:34:15,199 --> 00:34:18,300
back. 24. 
The decision-maker standpoint to

631
00:34:18,300 --> 00:34:23,600
decision makers, should be the 
business and the IM system, 

632
00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:28,800
whether Central or its sap GRC, 
they need to be able to show the

633
00:34:28,800 --> 00:34:32,600
audit Trail and who approve the 
access and collecting all the 

634
00:34:32,600 --> 00:34:36,500
same information that's required
of the IGA system. 

635
00:34:38,000 --> 00:34:40,500
I think it's kind of feeds also 
to hit the second question. 

636
00:34:40,500 --> 00:34:44,400
He sent us, which is around work
audit balance, which is a pun 

637
00:34:44,400 --> 00:34:48,400
off, work life balance very In a
regulated Industries, it's hard 

638
00:34:48,400 --> 00:34:51,500
to balance the work I have 
because I don't want an audit 

639
00:34:51,500 --> 00:34:55,300
finding against the work. 
I have to assure our identities 

640
00:34:55,300 --> 00:34:57,200
are safe. 
So, now, basically, what we're 

641
00:34:57,200 --> 00:35:00,900
saying is balancing water what, 
you know, the stuff I have to do

642
00:35:00,900 --> 00:35:03,200
that is going to be an audit 
finding or maybe was not in 

643
00:35:03,207 --> 00:35:06,500
funding versus the thing that I 
know I should be doing from a 

644
00:35:06,500 --> 00:35:09,800
general identity and access 
management hygiene perspective. 

645
00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:11,100
There are certainly some 
overlap. 

646
00:35:11,600 --> 00:35:14,700
But what ends up happening is 
this prioritization that? 

647
00:35:14,700 --> 00:35:17,600
If every, if Every time an audit
finding comes out, that becomes 

648
00:35:17,600 --> 00:35:21,400
like the fire and it wins, when 
you're trying to, you know, 

649
00:35:21,500 --> 00:35:25,100
versus all the things we should 
be doing and this is almost like

650
00:35:25,100 --> 00:35:26,300
the modernization question 
earlier. 

651
00:35:26,300 --> 00:35:28,200
It's like, there's a bunch of 
things that you should be doing,

652
00:35:28,400 --> 00:35:31,700
but if you're constantly playing
catch up on stuff, you know, 

653
00:35:31,800 --> 00:35:33,400
what is that balance? 
Look like where. 

654
00:35:33,600 --> 00:35:35,200
I have a list of a lot of things
I need to correct. 

655
00:35:35,200 --> 00:35:38,300
Every year, hopefully, you're 
making progress and it's not the

656
00:35:38,300 --> 00:35:40,900
same audit findings. 
Otherwise you've got problems 

657
00:35:40,900 --> 00:35:42,900
but I think it goes along with 
that as well. 

658
00:35:42,900 --> 00:35:44,900
Which is, you know, what is that
mindset? 

659
00:35:44,900 --> 00:35:48,700
That that If that needs to take 
place from basically walkable 

660
00:35:49,000 --> 00:35:50,500
and say, okay, well we're just 
going to dress these Auto 

661
00:35:50,500 --> 00:35:53,700
findings and not really solve 
the bigger picture versus trying

662
00:35:53,700 --> 00:35:55,700
to be more strategic for my New 
Perspective. 

663
00:35:55,700 --> 00:35:59,700
That would solve potentially 
audit findings in the future. 

664
00:35:59,800 --> 00:36:03,600
That would arise from not having
a strategy or a program in 

665
00:36:03,600 --> 00:36:05,000
place. 
What do you think? 

666
00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:07,800
Well, I think the thing that 
comes to mind to such act to 

667
00:36:07,800 --> 00:36:11,700
know what is the source of the 
audit findings and is a 

668
00:36:11,700 --> 00:36:15,400
predictable because if the 
source of the audit findings is,

669
00:36:15,600 --> 00:36:19,000
Is hey, we've got an ancient 
access management system or an 

670
00:36:19,000 --> 00:36:21,700
ancient, you know, provisioning 
tool. 

671
00:36:21,700 --> 00:36:25,100
That's not really doing what a 
modern IGA does. 

672
00:36:25,700 --> 00:36:28,200
Or we don't have a good 
privileged access management 

673
00:36:28,200 --> 00:36:31,200
tool or we're shifting to the 
cloud and we don't have her 

674
00:36:31,200 --> 00:36:34,500
framework for managing access 
there or maybe it's all the 

675
00:36:34,500 --> 00:36:37,700
above were completely under 
invested that. 

676
00:36:37,700 --> 00:36:41,100
Maybe you can attack it by 
saying we need to make these 

677
00:36:41,100 --> 00:36:42,800
shows. 
You can vestments as an 

678
00:36:43,100 --> 00:36:46,600
organization. 
Now, you also have to That some 

679
00:36:46,600 --> 00:36:50,400
were, his ations it's almost 
like their strategy is to stay 

680
00:36:50,400 --> 00:36:54,900
under invested and on this very 
unfortunate because we from the 

681
00:36:54,900 --> 00:36:59,400
clients in the past that they 
call us after they paid a major 

682
00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:03,600
Ransom, you know, to rent 
somewhere gangs because they 

683
00:37:03,600 --> 00:37:08,900
were under invested and very 
vulnerable to being attacked, or

684
00:37:08,900 --> 00:37:12,100
they have some kind of major 
incident or major audit finding 

685
00:37:12,100 --> 00:37:15,400
and, you know, it's like, okay 
now the house is on fire. 

686
00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:19,700
Now we're going to call in the 
big guns and usually the 

687
00:37:19,700 --> 00:37:23,200
situation is they've gone, 10 
years and under invested. 

688
00:37:23,300 --> 00:37:26,700
Now I think a big reason is of 
fish. 

689
00:37:26,700 --> 00:37:30,000
Strategic decision was made like
we're going to Outsource. 

690
00:37:30,000 --> 00:37:34,400
I am as just a function we don't
want to run and then it gets 

691
00:37:34,400 --> 00:37:37,100
into this mode of just 
maintenance just maintain what 

692
00:37:37,100 --> 00:37:39,700
we have. 
I mean five years in the I am 

693
00:37:39,700 --> 00:37:42,700
industry is an eternity. 
I'd say five years ago. 

694
00:37:42,900 --> 00:37:45,400
It wasn't even Baseline standard
that you need that. 

695
00:37:45,600 --> 00:37:48,700
Mme everywhere. 
I would say anybody would argue 

696
00:37:48,700 --> 00:37:52,700
that you don't need them. 
If they everywhere now is crazy 

697
00:37:53,400 --> 00:37:54,600
right? 
You have to look at your 

698
00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:56,700
environment from a zero trust 
perspective. 

699
00:37:57,300 --> 00:37:59,300
So I guess that's you know to 
Chris's. 

700
00:38:01,100 --> 00:38:05,000
If you can kind of like predict 
what those audit was going to 

701
00:38:05,000 --> 00:38:09,600
cost us on a findings and is due
to, you know, things that can be

702
00:38:10,200 --> 00:38:12,900
addressed with investment. 
I think you have to push to make

703
00:38:12,900 --> 00:38:17,400
that investment and If your 
organization is cotton, 

704
00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:21,500
critically underinvested in 
molten vest, I think your 

705
00:38:21,500 --> 00:38:24,200
options are one. 
You've got to figure out how to 

706
00:38:24,800 --> 00:38:28,900
convince people that is worth, 
carry about and worth investing 

707
00:38:28,900 --> 00:38:32,600
in or, you know, potentially 
just think like this 

708
00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:34,900
organization never going to 
invest, and we're just going to 

709
00:38:34,900 --> 00:38:38,000
continue on this cycle. 
And, you know, you question 

710
00:38:38,000 --> 00:38:40,500
whether or not, that's what the 
place you want to be. 

711
00:38:41,200 --> 00:38:42,100
Yeah. 
If you're not investing, you're 

712
00:38:42,100 --> 00:38:44,300
accepting the risk. 
That's the bottom line. 

713
00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:46,600
Like that's that's pretty much 
Even when you are investing, 

714
00:38:46,600 --> 00:38:49,500
your you're accepting certain 
levels of risk, but you should 

715
00:38:49,500 --> 00:38:53,400
be investing to reduce risk, but
anytime you don't spend money to

716
00:38:53,500 --> 00:38:58,400
fix something that's risk and 
you know, that's just no way 

717
00:38:58,400 --> 00:39:00,300
around it. 
Let's shift a little bit because

718
00:39:00,300 --> 00:39:03,000
he he came up another one tools 
and Technology. 

719
00:39:03,300 --> 00:39:05,900
He's looking for a tool. 
That will tell him at the 

720
00:39:05,900 --> 00:39:10,000
entitlement layer when the last 
time it was used in order to 

721
00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:14,200
reduce aging access his 
requirements, at least in a base

722
00:39:14,200 --> 00:39:17,800
level is it has to An active 
directory and third-party 

723
00:39:17,800 --> 00:39:21,000
applications. 
I think a tool like that sounds 

724
00:39:21,000 --> 00:39:23,500
really nice. 
I don't know if something like 

725
00:39:23,500 --> 00:39:27,200
that exists because I feel like 
this is extremely dependent on 

726
00:39:27,900 --> 00:39:34,400
logging and what logs are kept 
by the entitlements applicator 

727
00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:36,300
the application that has the 
entitlements in it. 

728
00:39:36,300 --> 00:39:37,900
So active directory, obviously 
has logs. 

729
00:39:38,300 --> 00:39:40,800
I would feel probably okay with 
that the third party 

730
00:39:40,800 --> 00:39:43,100
applications though, you just 
don't know what you're going to 

731
00:39:43,100 --> 00:39:47,800
get from a log in perspective. 
Hey was this do they even track 

732
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:50,500
1? 
Entitlement is used beyond the 

733
00:39:50,500 --> 00:39:52,500
initial authentication or 
authorization chain? 

734
00:39:54,000 --> 00:39:59,100
Yeah I mean you're right on like
you know there are some well I 

735
00:39:59,100 --> 00:40:04,000
don't think there's going to be 
one tool that that kind of you 

736
00:40:04,000 --> 00:40:07,400
know pulls all this together 
without logs and I think the 

737
00:40:07,400 --> 00:40:13,300
ultimate answer is having a Sim 
tool like a Splunk or elastic 

738
00:40:13,300 --> 00:40:17,200
stack that can pull this data. 
It in and you create reports 

739
00:40:17,200 --> 00:40:22,100
that can make sense of it. 
I think there are some access 

740
00:40:22,100 --> 00:40:28,900
management tools that you know 
can filter at a coarse-grained 

741
00:40:28,900 --> 00:40:32,500
authentication level and but 
ultimately it still comes back 

742
00:40:32,500 --> 00:40:35,900
to spitting out, there's logs 
and when you throw active 

743
00:40:35,900 --> 00:40:39,300
directory into the scope I think
there's so many different ways 

744
00:40:39,300 --> 00:40:41,200
to authenticate to active 
directory. 

745
00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:45,200
Ultimately, you're pulling the 
active directory security logs. 

746
00:40:45,500 --> 00:40:48,600
I think, you know, to me, the 
logging to make sure you're 

747
00:40:48,600 --> 00:40:52,200
capturing the data that you 
want, centralizing, the logs, 

748
00:40:52,300 --> 00:40:57,700
and then building reports to, 
you know, make sense of the of 

749
00:40:57,700 --> 00:41:02,000
the log data to help filter it, 
to just what's important and 

750
00:41:02,000 --> 00:41:07,600
potentially setting up alerts so
that you know anything that's 

751
00:41:07,600 --> 00:41:11,900
like really bad, you're getting 
alerted on, this sounds like a 

752
00:41:11,900 --> 00:41:16,300
lot of custom work to me to try 
them, get all All the logs and 

753
00:41:16,300 --> 00:41:20,900
then, you know, basically, 
you're looking through all the 

754
00:41:20,900 --> 00:41:23,100
authentications that take place 
that's almost like this needs to

755
00:41:23,100 --> 00:41:25,900
be at the authentication level 
for each application. 

756
00:41:26,400 --> 00:41:28,900
Suck up, all those 
authentication transactions. 

757
00:41:28,900 --> 00:41:32,100
So to speak into that log and 
then try to come up with some 

758
00:41:32,100 --> 00:41:35,300
sort of logic or tree that says,
hey, look for this specific 

759
00:41:35,300 --> 00:41:37,900
authorization chain. 
And if you see this specific 

760
00:41:37,900 --> 00:41:41,500
word, which should map back to 
an entitlement name somewhere, 

761
00:41:41,500 --> 00:41:44,200
or maybe it's even a word, it 
could be some sort of primary 

762
00:41:44,200 --> 00:41:48,200
key that if, you know, Slate's 
from one thing to another you 

763
00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:50,000
know, maybe this is an untapped 
space, maybe there's already 

764
00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:52,500
products out there that exist. 
So if you know of something, you

765
00:41:52,500 --> 00:41:55,200
know, hit us up here, you know, 
ahead and send a message just on

766
00:41:55,200 --> 00:41:57,700
LinkedIn. 
We'd love to like talk and 

767
00:41:57,700 --> 00:41:59,100
figure it out. 
Maybe it helps Chris out as 

768
00:41:59,100 --> 00:42:03,600
well, but I feel like this is a 
very custom a custom thing that 

769
00:42:03,600 --> 00:42:06,500
needs to be built, which to me, 
sounds like it's going to be 

770
00:42:06,500 --> 00:42:08,700
pretty expensive. 
Yeah, yeah. 

771
00:42:08,700 --> 00:42:11,400
Sounds like something. 
Maybe the FBI has just something

772
00:42:11,500 --> 00:42:13,600
but it sounds to me, like, 
premise question. 

773
00:42:13,600 --> 00:42:17,000
He's talking about the The 
entire winter and entitlement is

774
00:42:17,000 --> 00:42:23,200
actually used, then you not only
have to say, okay, Jeff logged 

775
00:42:23,200 --> 00:42:26,900
in as an administrator but here 
actually use the administrator 

776
00:42:26,900 --> 00:42:30,300
access. 
So I, you know what, I kind of 

777
00:42:30,300 --> 00:42:34,000
think we're one place that we 
do, see that is with Kim 

778
00:42:34,000 --> 00:42:39,100
software. 
So it's going in to Amazon, for 

779
00:42:39,100 --> 00:42:43,900
example, and finding out when a 
role was actually used, and if 

780
00:42:43,900 --> 00:42:48,200
that rolls not being, Stanley 
says you Jeff is now using that 

781
00:42:48,200 --> 00:42:52,300
role but that's you know 
basically that's leveraging data

782
00:42:52,300 --> 00:42:55,400
that Amazon has and brawl the 
cloud providers have. 

783
00:42:55,600 --> 00:43:00,300
So it's almost doing like log 
analysis from this Cloud vendor 

784
00:43:00,300 --> 00:43:03,200
so it kind of goes back to our 
answer but it's also very 

785
00:43:03,200 --> 00:43:05,000
specific to Cloud 
infrastructure. 

786
00:43:05,000 --> 00:43:11,800
I don't think a similar tool set
exists for you know non Cloud 

787
00:43:12,000 --> 00:43:15,000
platforms. 
Yeah, that's a good point. 

788
00:43:15,000 --> 00:43:17,300
You know, the Kim space might 
offer some solution. 

789
00:43:17,300 --> 00:43:21,100
There are they think about too 
is just because it entitlement 

790
00:43:21,100 --> 00:43:24,100
isn't being used, doesn't mean 
it should go away. 

791
00:43:24,200 --> 00:43:27,300
I think of things like fire call
or other sets of like emergency 

792
00:43:27,300 --> 00:43:31,100
break glass type accesses where 
you hope that the you never have

793
00:43:31,100 --> 00:43:35,600
to use them or they use very 
sparingly, you know, if that if 

794
00:43:35,600 --> 00:43:38,600
you have, you know, I'm, I would
imagine go to some sort of 

795
00:43:38,600 --> 00:43:40,500
portal say, oh, yeah, that's you
know, that's the emergency 

796
00:43:40,500 --> 00:43:41,500
access. 
Don't worry about that. 

797
00:43:41,500 --> 00:43:43,300
That's fine to leave where it 
is, or whatever. 

798
00:43:43,400 --> 00:43:47,500
B versus taking more like an 
automated process. 

799
00:43:47,500 --> 00:43:51,200
I know there's there's one one 
client that we're kind of 

800
00:43:51,200 --> 00:43:55,100
talking with in our professional
life where like things like 

801
00:43:55,100 --> 00:43:57,800
out-of-band access. 
For example, like how do you 

802
00:43:57,800 --> 00:44:01,300
detect accesses and entitlements
that are being granted? 

803
00:44:01,500 --> 00:44:04,900
And you know we're looking at a 
combination of our PA robotic 

804
00:44:04,900 --> 00:44:08,400
process automation, you know 
logging things like that to try 

805
00:44:08,400 --> 00:44:11,700
to come up with some ways to 
kind of address that that unique

806
00:44:11,700 --> 00:44:14,100
use case, which is emitted. 
Ooh, pretty advancement. 

807
00:44:14,100 --> 00:44:15,900
A lot of, I think a lot of 
organizations still trickling 

808
00:44:15,900 --> 00:44:20,900
the basics but it is something 
that, you know, that that we're 

809
00:44:20,900 --> 00:44:22,900
working on in our professional 
life. 

810
00:44:23,700 --> 00:44:25,600
Let's get to the next one, which
is a culture question. 

811
00:44:25,600 --> 00:44:29,100
I like this one because it's 
gets more to the people side of 

812
00:44:29,100 --> 00:44:31,800
identity. 
Chris works with a wonderful 

813
00:44:31,800 --> 00:44:34,200
team. 
Now mostly virtual and spend a 

814
00:44:34,200 --> 00:44:36,600
lot of time grinding provision 
requests. 

815
00:44:36,600 --> 00:44:40,000
I feel your pain. 
Chris, how do you remind them of

816
00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:41,900
the importance of the work they 
do. 

817
00:44:42,200 --> 00:44:43,700
How do you reward them? 
Away. 

818
00:44:44,200 --> 00:44:47,600
So I think the idea here is 
that, you know, I'll go back to 

819
00:44:47,600 --> 00:44:50,700
my old id admin days and kind of
how I got into identity was. 

820
00:44:51,000 --> 00:44:54,300
You're basically processing 
requests tickets emails, 

821
00:44:54,600 --> 00:44:58,700
walk-ups maybe not so many 
walk-ups recently you know, Iams

822
00:44:59,000 --> 00:45:01,800
where there's you know you have 
to create accounts for some 

823
00:45:01,800 --> 00:45:05,100
reason or add permissions are 
entitlements and it's, You Know,

824
00:45:05,100 --> 00:45:08,600
It's a Grind, e work, sometimes,
especially if you're in a big 

825
00:45:08,600 --> 00:45:11,800
organization, or you have a lot 
of tickets or requests coming 

826
00:45:11,800 --> 00:45:14,000
in. 
You know, how do you You how do 

827
00:45:14,000 --> 00:45:15,800
you a stress, the importance of 
what they do? 

828
00:45:16,000 --> 00:45:18,400
I mean, really, you're talking 
about the first line of defense 

829
00:45:19,000 --> 00:45:22,300
for an organization. 
It all starts with identity, but

830
00:45:22,500 --> 00:45:26,800
when you working on, you know, 
100 tickets a day, or maybe 10 

831
00:45:26,800 --> 00:45:28,600
tickets today is really matter. 
Right. 

832
00:45:28,600 --> 00:45:31,600
How do you keep the focus for a 
team that that's sort of their 

833
00:45:31,600 --> 00:45:34,900
primary primary role is to just 
do that permissioning for 

834
00:45:34,900 --> 00:45:39,100
people? 
I think it's also comes back to 

835
00:45:39,100 --> 00:45:42,300
kind of people management what I
want, which is make sure that 

836
00:45:42,300 --> 00:45:45,400
you are In touch with their 
people, you're having the water 

837
00:45:45,400 --> 00:45:48,400
once, they have an opportunity 
new, you care about them. 

838
00:45:48,900 --> 00:45:53,400
They know that the work that 
they're doing is important to 

839
00:45:53,400 --> 00:45:59,800
the organization and they know 
that if they have a concern or 

840
00:45:59,900 --> 00:46:02,500
something, coming up in their 
life that you're going to listen

841
00:46:02,500 --> 00:46:05,300
to them and do what you can to 
help them. 

842
00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:09,600
I mean, so to me, it's kind of 
like, if you talk about the work

843
00:46:09,600 --> 00:46:12,300
culture and how do you keep 
people from going crazy, it's 

844
00:46:12,600 --> 00:46:15,300
know that they're not. 
Alone, even though there may be 

845
00:46:15,300 --> 00:46:19,300
physically alone at home and but
that they're part of something 

846
00:46:19,300 --> 00:46:23,300
bigger and they're valued and 
that you're going to be there 

847
00:46:23,300 --> 00:46:25,600
for them. 
If they have, if they need a 

848
00:46:25,900 --> 00:46:29,600
mirror, I think I feel like the 
last couple years because of the

849
00:46:29,600 --> 00:46:34,400
pandemic organizations, have 
gotten better at this of helping

850
00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:37,000
people understand their role 
with the organization. 

851
00:46:37,000 --> 00:46:40,400
Why they're important because 
such a such a focus was paid on 

852
00:46:40,400 --> 00:46:43,300
the mental health side of 
things, you know, for folks. 

853
00:46:43,500 --> 00:46:46,300
I think is a good thing. 
I think it starts a lot of it as

854
00:46:46,300 --> 00:46:49,700
that messaging from the top you 
know and making sure that you 

855
00:46:49,700 --> 00:46:52,800
know as a manager of a team like
that for example promoting the 

856
00:46:52,800 --> 00:46:57,900
success of my team to other 
managers and people that might 

857
00:46:57,900 --> 00:46:59,300
be above me and the 
organization. 

858
00:46:59,500 --> 00:47:02,500
Here's what we do. 
Here's why it's important and 

859
00:47:02,500 --> 00:47:06,100
getting that message to them and
having those folks help Cascade 

860
00:47:06,100 --> 00:47:10,800
that message back down to folks,
this is a lesson I took from a 

861
00:47:10,800 --> 00:47:13,300
few of the Cecil's that I've 
worked for in the past. 

862
00:47:13,600 --> 00:47:19,500
And Burt where that thank you of
what we're doing, you know is a 

863
00:47:19,500 --> 00:47:22,900
powerful motivator, you know. 
Not everyone is motivated by 

864
00:47:23,800 --> 00:47:26,800
money or tokens of thing. 
Whatever that might look like 

865
00:47:26,800 --> 00:47:29,100
gifts. 
Sometimes I love will tokens. 

866
00:47:29,200 --> 00:47:30,800
I do yeah, I do have tokens of 
money. 

867
00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:34,700
Don't get me wrong, but yeah, a 
sincere. 

868
00:47:34,700 --> 00:47:37,900
Thank you and acknowledgement of
the work that was done, is 

869
00:47:37,900 --> 00:47:40,300
certainly helpful. 
And I think that's, you know, 

870
00:47:40,300 --> 00:47:45,000
it's not always the end, all be 
all but At least recognizing, 

871
00:47:45,000 --> 00:47:48,100
maybe even seasonal spikes. 
Okay, we know we're going into a

872
00:47:48,107 --> 00:47:52,300
busy time, you know, maybe it's 
open enrollment for example or 

873
00:47:52,600 --> 00:47:56,000
it's the first day back after 
holidays and everyone seems to 

874
00:47:56,000 --> 00:47:58,700
have forgotten their password. 
So, you know, you're gonna get a

875
00:47:58,707 --> 00:48:01,100
lot of password calls because 
they just don't feel like they 

876
00:48:01,100 --> 00:48:02,900
want to take advantage of, 
self-service, password, 

877
00:48:02,900 --> 00:48:04,200
whatever, reason, not saying 
that. 

878
00:48:04,200 --> 00:48:06,200
These things haven't happened to
me in the past. 

879
00:48:06,200 --> 00:48:08,700
I'm just, you know, throwing 
examples out there, right? 

880
00:48:08,700 --> 00:48:12,200
But I think, you know, I think 
part of it is making sure that I

881
00:48:12,200 --> 00:48:13,400
think the biggest parts were 
just being aware. 

882
00:48:13,500 --> 00:48:16,500
Are of the value making sure 
that the team understands it, 

883
00:48:16,500 --> 00:48:20,000
but also promoting your team, 
especially for managers and 

884
00:48:20,000 --> 00:48:23,300
other folks who are leading 
people in these types of roles 

885
00:48:23,300 --> 00:48:26,700
is, make sure that people know 
what it is, that your team does 

886
00:48:26,700 --> 00:48:29,400
and why it's important and 
enlist their aid. 

887
00:48:29,700 --> 00:48:31,600
And making sure that that 
message is getting around and 

888
00:48:31,600 --> 00:48:33,700
have a Cascade down, is a big 
thing. 

889
00:48:35,400 --> 00:48:38,900
You know, I as you're going 
through that, I thought of a 

890
00:48:38,900 --> 00:48:42,200
session at the five-day 
conference that I saw listed 

891
00:48:42,200 --> 00:48:47,000
that I'm definitely going to sit
in this called The Forgotten how

892
00:48:47,000 --> 00:48:50,900
we all started with the contact 
center then forgot to secure it 

893
00:48:50,900 --> 00:48:54,000
properly. 
You know, it's like we all like 

894
00:48:54,000 --> 00:48:57,300
started out in that kind of 
position and then when we go 

895
00:48:57,300 --> 00:49:02,600
through security it's it's not 
are you no mountain high enough 

896
00:49:02,600 --> 00:49:04,900
of a priority for us to get it 
right? 

897
00:49:05,200 --> 00:49:09,900
That's the global security 
engineer from CVS Health John 

898
00:49:09,900 --> 00:49:12,500
Poirier. 
So reach out to him and see if 

899
00:49:12,500 --> 00:49:15,700
maybe we can we can meet up with
them while we're at the 

900
00:49:15,700 --> 00:49:17,600
conference. 
Yeah that would be cool. 

901
00:49:17,600 --> 00:49:19,400
I didn't say I think it's a 
really good question. 

902
00:49:19,400 --> 00:49:21,500
I'm I think that's probably 
where we'll go ahead and leave 

903
00:49:21,500 --> 00:49:23,800
it for this week. 
We've it's Labor Day. 

904
00:49:23,800 --> 00:49:25,500
We've labored through a bunch of
questions. 

905
00:49:25,500 --> 00:49:27,000
I feel like our work here is 
done. 

906
00:49:28,100 --> 00:49:30,800
We'll end on a lighter note 
which was also submitted by 

907
00:49:31,000 --> 00:49:32,500
somebody out there. 
I don't think they knew they 

908
00:49:32,500 --> 00:49:35,000
were submitting a letter or note
but we're going to treat it as 

909
00:49:35,100 --> 00:49:38,200
As such, let's go with it. 
And it's from Kurt Greening, 

910
00:49:38,800 --> 00:49:43,600
what tool program policy or 
settings that if implemented 

911
00:49:43,600 --> 00:49:46,200
would help reduce the chance 
that you would be called into 

912
00:49:46,200 --> 00:49:49,400
work because of an IM emergency 
on Labor Day. 

913
00:49:50,800 --> 00:49:52,100
So what is it that you're going 
to implement? 

914
00:49:52,100 --> 00:49:53,700
That's going to make it. 
Make sure that you can be on 

915
00:49:53,700 --> 00:49:57,400
that boat drinking somewhere or 
at least, you know, not, not 

916
00:49:57,400 --> 00:49:58,700
have to do some work on Labor 
Day. 

917
00:49:59,300 --> 00:50:02,800
Well, I guess the serious answer
would be what a talked about 

918
00:50:02,800 --> 00:50:05,000
earlier is like, you're going to
have to take your turn. 

919
00:50:05,200 --> 00:50:08,900
In our recent uptick for turn, 
but if everybody taking their 

920
00:50:08,900 --> 00:50:11,400
turn then it shouldn't be 
anybody's turn. 

921
00:50:11,400 --> 00:50:17,300
Every time of holiday shows up, 
my funny answer was my 

922
00:50:17,300 --> 00:50:20,800
technology would be an airplane 
and get on that airplane and go 

923
00:50:20,800 --> 00:50:23,300
somewhere. 
If that doesn't have Wi-Fi, like

924
00:50:23,500 --> 00:50:28,600
Belize or Bora Bora, that was my
five response to Kurt, he's a 

925
00:50:28,607 --> 00:50:30,700
good egg. 
I met with him out in the 

926
00:50:31,200 --> 00:50:35,600
Gartner as well. 
Uncle how about you Mike Let's 

927
00:50:35,600 --> 00:50:40,500
see, I think self-service, you 
know, reset your own password, 

928
00:50:41,800 --> 00:50:44,300
you know, make a wit, make 
people aware that you know what 

929
00:50:44,300 --> 00:50:47,100
they think it is emergency may 
not be truly an emergency, 

930
00:50:47,100 --> 00:50:48,800
right? 
Don't I remember back to my 

931
00:50:48,800 --> 00:50:52,300
pager days of Walgreens, you 
know, don't page me at 3 a.m. 

932
00:50:52,500 --> 00:50:55,000
because you can't get access to 
the corporate menu you know for 

933
00:50:55,000 --> 00:50:56,900
the cafeteria tomorrow because 
you're trying to plan your 

934
00:50:56,900 --> 00:50:59,500
meals, I will not be very happy 
about that. 

935
00:51:00,200 --> 00:51:03,100
You know, I think taking a risk 
based approach to escalation I 

936
00:51:03,107 --> 00:51:07,300
think my fun answer would be 
Setting an out of office and 

937
00:51:07,300 --> 00:51:09,200
making it very clear that you're
not checking email. 

938
00:51:09,500 --> 00:51:13,600
Good luck, godspeed. 
And you know notify the next of 

939
00:51:13,600 --> 00:51:16,000
kin so to speak is the way that 
I would look at it. 

940
00:51:16,100 --> 00:51:17,800
Yeah. 
Don't put your cell phone in 

941
00:51:17,800 --> 00:51:22,400
your email signature. 
Yeah, I have mine. 

942
00:51:22,400 --> 00:51:25,100
I do. 
That's the only number that I 

943
00:51:25,100 --> 00:51:29,700
use, but yeah, I think that's I,
you know, you have to draw 

944
00:51:29,700 --> 00:51:31,900
boundaries. 
Fortunately, I think a lot of 

945
00:51:31,908 --> 00:51:34,400
people especially the, it space 
are aware that they sometimes 

946
00:51:34,400 --> 00:51:35,900
get you have. 
They're in a support position. 

947
00:51:35,900 --> 00:51:39,600
You might get called in on days 
off or weekends or holidays. 

948
00:51:40,300 --> 00:51:42,500
I can certainly remember having 
to create a whole bunch of 

949
00:51:42,500 --> 00:51:47,700
accounts because of a mismanaged
onboarding, New Years Eve, for 

950
00:51:47,700 --> 00:51:51,400
example. 
So it just I think if you can 

951
00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:53,700
plan ahead and try to head off 
as much of things, you know, 

952
00:51:53,700 --> 00:51:56,900
people can enjoy it but and 
first cats culture question. 

953
00:51:56,900 --> 00:52:01,400
So if you have those people who 
don't respect the boundaries and

954
00:52:01,400 --> 00:52:05,300
they go ahead and like violate 
the work lifetime, Your 

955
00:52:05,300 --> 00:52:09,900
employees just, you know, 
recognize your employees and to 

956
00:52:09,900 --> 00:52:12,100
whatever extent you can kind of 
stand up for them. 

957
00:52:12,100 --> 00:52:15,800
Let people know like, hey, you 
know, calling them at home just 

958
00:52:15,800 --> 00:52:17,300
because you have their phone 
number. 

959
00:52:17,600 --> 00:52:19,000
Yeah. 
It doesn't make it right. 

960
00:52:19,800 --> 00:52:21,400
Yeah. 
I remember back in the day would

961
00:52:21,400 --> 00:52:24,600
be like okay well just you know 
work from home today or hey 

962
00:52:24,600 --> 00:52:27,100
leave early you know on Friday 
or whatever it's kind of makeup.

963
00:52:27,100 --> 00:52:29,800
Make it try to make it Equitable
I think for both sides right 

964
00:52:29,800 --> 00:52:31,600
ever. 
We all have a part to play in it

965
00:52:31,600 --> 00:52:33,600
so be a good human being is my 
motto. 

966
00:52:33,700 --> 00:52:36,900
That's pretty much it. 
All right, what do you think? 

967
00:52:36,900 --> 00:52:37,800
Should we go ahead and leave it 
there? 

968
00:52:38,500 --> 00:52:41,200
I think so. 
Okay, hopefully everyone is 

969
00:52:41,200 --> 00:52:44,200
enjoying their Labor Day. 
The end of summer officially 

970
00:52:44,200 --> 00:52:46,600
here. 
At least in the US we'll go 

971
00:52:46,600 --> 00:52:49,500
ahead and wrap it up. 
Check out our website, idac 

972
00:52:49,500 --> 00:52:54,100
podcast.com, check us out on 
Twitter at IDC podcast. 

973
00:52:54,100 --> 00:52:56,200
Follow us, always love to engage
with folks. 

974
00:52:56,200 --> 00:53:00,900
If you got show topics 
questions, concerns grievances, 

975
00:53:01,600 --> 00:53:05,500
you know accolades you can set 
them all, send us send So us on 

976
00:53:05,500 --> 00:53:08,200
LinkedIn after you connect there
and we'll be happy to chat. 

977
00:53:08,200 --> 00:53:10,000
So hopefully we get to meet some
more Folks at some of these 

978
00:53:10,000 --> 00:53:13,700
conferences that are coming up. 
So, authentic 8 2022 in Seattle 

979
00:53:13,700 --> 00:53:16,600
by the final group or final 
lines of should say and then 

980
00:53:16,700 --> 00:53:20,300
potentially octane, which is put
on by OCTA in San Francisco in 

981
00:53:20,300 --> 00:53:22,800
November. 
And who knows what next year 

982
00:53:23,100 --> 00:53:25,600
from it perspective. 
So with that, we'll go ahead and

983
00:53:25,600 --> 00:53:28,100
leave it for this week. 
Thanks everyone for listening, 

984
00:53:28,200 --> 00:53:30,100
and we'll talk with you all in 
the next one. 

985
00:53:34,400 --> 00:53:36,200
Thanks for listening. 
Turning to the identity at the 

986
00:53:36,200 --> 00:53:38,800
center podcast, if you like what
you heard, don't forget to 

987
00:53:38,800 --> 00:53:41,800
subscribe and visit us on the 
web and identity at the 

988
00:53:41,800 --> 00:53:42,800
center.com.