1 00:00:05,280 --> 00:00:10,440 This is identity at the center. If it has anything to do with 2 00:00:10,560 --> 00:00:17,960 IAM, this is the go to podcast now your hosts Jim McDonald and 3 00:00:17,960 --> 00:00:23,160 Jeff Stedman. Welcome to the Identity at the 4 00:00:23,160 --> 00:00:25,000 Center podcast. I'm Jeff and that's Jim. 5 00:00:25,000 --> 00:00:26,680 Hey, Jim. Hey, Jeff, how are you? 6 00:00:26,680 --> 00:00:28,680 Oh, not so bad yourself. Doing great. 7 00:00:28,760 --> 00:00:32,240 I've been thinking about in advance of this episode. 8 00:00:32,240 --> 00:00:35,520 I've been thinking a lot about privacy, thinking about, you 9 00:00:35,520 --> 00:00:39,920 know, the privacy statutes within higher education and 10 00:00:39,920 --> 00:00:42,560 within healthcare. And it's funny. 11 00:00:42,560 --> 00:00:46,080 Usually when you start picking at those use cases, a lot of the 12 00:00:46,080 --> 00:00:48,440 use case surrounds famous people. 13 00:00:48,800 --> 00:00:51,160 You know you don't want to give out health records for famous 14 00:00:51,160 --> 00:00:54,840 people or the class schedules for famous people. 15 00:00:55,320 --> 00:00:58,960 And I was wondering, does that apply to you and me doing this 16 00:00:58,960 --> 00:01:00,920 podcast? I don't know if I can because I 17 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:03,600 don't ever actually really went to college or higher education. 18 00:01:03,600 --> 00:01:06,680 I think I have an economics class to my course or to my 19 00:01:06,680 --> 00:01:09,400 credit. So if you're looking for my for 20 00:01:09,400 --> 00:01:11,680 my records or my class schedule, it's gonna be pretty light. 21 00:01:11,680 --> 00:01:13,200 I don't know about I I don't know. 22 00:01:13,200 --> 00:01:15,560 I I I don't feel like that's something that should be 23 00:01:15,560 --> 00:01:17,440 publicly available. But maybe that's just me, Some 24 00:01:17,440 --> 00:01:19,240 people. Got out that you had high 25 00:01:19,240 --> 00:01:21,400 cholesterol. I mean, just one look at me. 26 00:01:21,400 --> 00:01:22,400 You probably already guessed that. 27 00:01:24,000 --> 00:01:27,480 Well, anyway, I don't know. But that's, that's what was 28 00:01:27,480 --> 00:01:30,800 going through my mind was, you know, the famous people thing 29 00:01:30,800 --> 00:01:34,320 and what is the line between famous and not famous? 30 00:01:34,320 --> 00:01:38,320 I think on the Identity at the Center podcast not famous. 31 00:01:39,200 --> 00:01:42,920 Decidedly so. Netflix or on broadcast 32 00:01:42,920 --> 00:01:46,680 television, that would that would make make you famous. 33 00:01:47,080 --> 00:01:50,400 So you know that would be a a momentous achievement if like we 34 00:01:50,400 --> 00:01:53,360 ended up as like a Netflix special, the making of identity 35 00:01:53,360 --> 00:01:55,440 at the center and hopefully it's a positive story and not one of 36 00:01:55,440 --> 00:01:59,640 those like, you know bizarre like Murder or we try to do our 37 00:01:59,640 --> 00:02:01,760 own conference and ends up like Fyre Festival or something like 38 00:02:01,760 --> 00:02:04,840 that it. Would be like identity at the 39 00:02:04,840 --> 00:02:07,040 center is a joke. Yeah, that's what it would be 40 00:02:07,040 --> 00:02:10,880 called. I did something yesterday and 41 00:02:10,880 --> 00:02:12,040 usually you hit me with something. 42 00:02:12,040 --> 00:02:13,120 I'm gonna hit you with something. 43 00:02:13,480 --> 00:02:18,440 I did something yesterday that I've done in the past and went 44 00:02:18,440 --> 00:02:20,960 and watched at a local brewery here in Asheville. 45 00:02:20,960 --> 00:02:26,320 I saw UFC, Not the UFC that you're thinking of, but a 46 00:02:26,600 --> 00:02:30,440 wrestling kind of thing. Obviously for show here in 47 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:32,520 Asheville they put together. I don't even know what UFC 48 00:02:32,520 --> 00:02:34,120 stands for. It's like urban. 49 00:02:34,120 --> 00:02:37,400 Universal Fighting Championship. Well, that's what most people 50 00:02:37,400 --> 00:02:40,120 would know it as. But it's actually wrestling and 51 00:02:40,120 --> 00:02:43,840 it's like a local Asheville, NC type thing. 52 00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:48,960 And we went, and my wife and I went, got tickets paid $10 to go 53 00:02:48,960 --> 00:02:52,000 watch a bunch of people have a good time in a in a ring set up 54 00:02:52,000 --> 00:02:54,880 inside of a brewery. And so, you know, we're 55 00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:57,800 watching, like, people come off the top ropes and, you know, the 56 00:02:57,800 --> 00:03:00,200 fights and quotation Marks and the wrestling or whatever you 57 00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:03,760 want to call it, spilling out, you know, along the sides of the 58 00:03:03,760 --> 00:03:07,120 of the brewery ring and then into the brewery itself and then 59 00:03:07,120 --> 00:03:10,440 outside. It was absolutely nuts, but it 60 00:03:10,440 --> 00:03:12,200 was, it was a good time. I think you would have enjoyed 61 00:03:12,200 --> 00:03:14,360 it, 'cause it was just kind of like, you know, stupid fun. 62 00:03:14,480 --> 00:03:17,480 Yeah, yeah. I don't even know what to say 63 00:03:17,480 --> 00:03:21,320 about that, Jeff, but I'd be surprised to find you there. 64 00:03:21,360 --> 00:03:23,840 I'd probably be at the corner of the bar drinking and be like, is 65 00:03:23,840 --> 00:03:26,920 that Jeff? Urban combat wrestling. 66 00:03:26,920 --> 00:03:27,560 That's what it was. UCW. 67 00:03:27,560 --> 00:03:29,120 No, I'm sorry. What did I say before? 68 00:03:29,880 --> 00:03:33,120 UFC. Yeah, UFC, no UCW, urban combat 69 00:03:33,120 --> 00:03:36,680 wrestling, but it was fun. It was like a, you know, Saint 70 00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:39,800 Patrick's Day, you know wrestling thing. 71 00:03:39,800 --> 00:03:44,720 And there were several chants that I cannot repeat here on a, 72 00:03:44,760 --> 00:03:47,840 you know, show friendly for kids, 'cause we know I had a lot 73 00:03:47,840 --> 00:03:49,920 of those kids tuning in for that I am talk. 74 00:03:50,680 --> 00:03:54,280 But it was, it was a good time, you know, beers, burgers and and 75 00:03:54,280 --> 00:03:55,800 wrestling. That does sound fun. 76 00:03:56,880 --> 00:03:59,720 You know what would make it even more fun Was if you had a 77 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:02,760 discount code. If it was the best discount 78 00:04:02,760 --> 00:04:05,840 code. If it was 100% off discount 79 00:04:05,840 --> 00:04:08,160 code. Unfortunately, those things 80 00:04:08,200 --> 00:04:12,120 rarely exist, but we got some good discount codes. 81 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:15,640 Yeah, we got Identiverse not 100%, but 25% off. 82 00:04:16,040 --> 00:04:21,560 We have IDV 24-I D AC25 that gets you 25% off your 83 00:04:21,560 --> 00:04:24,000 Identiverse registration stacks with early Bird. 84 00:04:24,520 --> 00:04:27,800 So use early use often. Good way to show show support 85 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:29,600 for the show. Having a hard time talking 86 00:04:29,600 --> 00:04:30,640 today. The words just aren't coming 87 00:04:30,640 --> 00:04:34,200 out. May 28th, the 31st, it's at the 88 00:04:34,200 --> 00:04:36,240 Aria Resort and Casino in Las Vegas. 89 00:04:36,800 --> 00:04:41,040 I'll be there, you'll be there. We'll be doing podcasty things 90 00:04:41,040 --> 00:04:43,360 to be determined. Our last episode is with Andy 91 00:04:43,360 --> 00:04:45,680 Hindle. He says we're gonna be doing 92 00:04:45,680 --> 00:04:47,280 podcasty things. I trust him. 93 00:04:47,520 --> 00:04:49,560 I trust that we'll be doing podcasty things. 94 00:04:50,000 --> 00:04:54,720 And that's the only thing is if if the past is any indication, 95 00:04:55,880 --> 00:04:58,200 so where are you staying? Are you gonna stay at the Aria? 96 00:04:58,520 --> 00:05:00,520 Yeah, I think right now I know you're trying to get me over to 97 00:05:00,520 --> 00:05:03,000 the Vadara, but you know, it's like an extra like 10 or 15 98 00:05:03,000 --> 00:05:04,760 minute walk from from there it's. 99 00:05:04,760 --> 00:05:08,440 Like an extra 10 or 15 steps, but OK. 100 00:05:08,640 --> 00:05:12,400 But I I'd have to go outside and you know, I mean I can stay. 101 00:05:12,800 --> 00:05:16,360 I get my record is five days indoors in Vegas and I feel like 102 00:05:16,360 --> 00:05:19,520 3 days is nothing for me. Yeah, there you go. 103 00:05:19,960 --> 00:05:22,360 The other conference we've got going on is Identity Week. 104 00:05:22,600 --> 00:05:24,960 We're actually gonna be at Identity Week America later this 105 00:05:24,960 --> 00:05:27,880 year, but they also have Europe which is in Amsterdam, June 11th 106 00:05:27,880 --> 00:05:30,520 and 12th. And the America one that Jim you 107 00:05:30,520 --> 00:05:32,360 and I will be at is September 11th and 12th. 108 00:05:32,360 --> 00:05:36,240 That's the one in Washington DC and Asia and Singapore October 109 00:05:36,240 --> 00:05:38,920 22nd, 23rd. We have a conference code for 110 00:05:38,920 --> 00:05:43,600 that one as well, IDAC 30 that gets you 30% off of that 111 00:05:43,600 --> 00:05:46,080 registration and that code is good for all of the identity 112 00:05:46,080 --> 00:05:47,240 work. Identity Week. 113 00:05:47,240 --> 00:05:48,440 See. Told you can't talk today. 114 00:05:48,920 --> 00:05:51,480 Identity Week conferences, not just the American ones. 115 00:05:51,480 --> 00:05:54,840 So if you're in Europe or Asia and you're heading to Identity 116 00:05:54,840 --> 00:05:57,120 Week, another conference code that you can use and hopefully 117 00:05:57,120 --> 00:06:00,040 save a little bit of hard earned local currency insert 118 00:06:00,040 --> 00:06:03,240 denomination here, whatever that might be for you and looking 119 00:06:03,240 --> 00:06:05,400 forward to. That Yeah, fantastic discount 120 00:06:05,400 --> 00:06:07,320 codes. So what's our main topic today? 121 00:06:07,560 --> 00:06:10,400 Yeah, so I kind of joked as we were hitting by hit record here. 122 00:06:10,400 --> 00:06:11,920 It's like, here's what I'm thinking is what we're going to 123 00:06:11,920 --> 00:06:15,560 call the show, and it's a public conversation about privacy. 124 00:06:15,600 --> 00:06:17,320 And to that end, we've got Hannah Souter. 125 00:06:17,320 --> 00:06:20,720 She's the principal product manager at GitLab and an IDID 126 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:22,880 Pro Board member. Man, I am struggling today. 127 00:06:23,480 --> 00:06:25,520 Welcome to the show, Hannah. Hey, Jim. 128 00:06:25,520 --> 00:06:26,800 Hey, Jeff. It's great to be here. 129 00:06:27,320 --> 00:06:29,640 Well, I'm the words are probably gonna come a lot better from 130 00:06:29,640 --> 00:06:32,440 you, but let's talk a little bit about your origin story. 131 00:06:32,440 --> 00:06:34,160 This is the first time you've been on our podcast and one of 132 00:06:34,160 --> 00:06:36,680 things I'd like to do is find out identity origin stories. 133 00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:40,040 How did you get into the wonderful world of identity and 134 00:06:40,040 --> 00:06:42,680 access management? Is it something that you chose 135 00:06:42,680 --> 00:06:46,280 or did it choose you? I think like most people, the 136 00:06:46,280 --> 00:06:49,800 identity and access management world chose me, but I think in a 137 00:06:49,800 --> 00:06:53,440 way I chose it as well, because after my first job and identity, 138 00:06:53,440 --> 00:06:56,120 I chose to kind of keep going down the path of identity, 139 00:06:56,120 --> 00:06:59,200 whereas I think I just as easily it could have pivoted elsewhere. 140 00:06:59,600 --> 00:07:04,000 But I really liked the niche. I really like the people I 141 00:07:04,000 --> 00:07:07,080 started to get to know. And I really like that it felt 142 00:07:07,120 --> 00:07:11,160 to me it feels very important in terms of, you know, you're kind 143 00:07:11,160 --> 00:07:14,280 of protecting an ecosystem, you're protecting people's 144 00:07:14,280 --> 00:07:17,200 information, you're protecting potentially proprietary 145 00:07:17,200 --> 00:07:19,680 information. And so I think there's a larger 146 00:07:19,680 --> 00:07:21,920 meaning behind it, which is part of the reason why I think I 147 00:07:21,920 --> 00:07:27,080 chose it. My first job in Identity so I 148 00:07:27,080 --> 00:07:31,840 was a developer way back when and eventually I started asking 149 00:07:31,840 --> 00:07:35,920 too many questions about why are we coding this and can I talk to 150 00:07:35,920 --> 00:07:39,240 the customer and are they happy with this or what do they think? 151 00:07:39,240 --> 00:07:41,200 And they're like you might like products. 152 00:07:42,400 --> 00:07:44,880 Most most of our developers don't ask this these kind of 153 00:07:44,880 --> 00:07:50,080 questions, so I ended up switching to product about 8 to 154 00:07:50,080 --> 00:07:54,680 10 years ago now. I've been there since and I was 155 00:07:54,680 --> 00:07:58,480 in developer tooling at one point just because of my 156 00:07:58,480 --> 00:08:02,760 developer background. So I worked mainly product 157 00:08:02,760 --> 00:08:07,520 managing developer APIs for a cloud platform and then one of 158 00:08:07,520 --> 00:08:11,200 the services that I inherited as part of the cloud platform was 159 00:08:11,200 --> 00:08:14,000 Identity. So it started as kind of a 160 00:08:14,240 --> 00:08:17,560 fraction of my job, and then the next role I ended up getting, 161 00:08:17,560 --> 00:08:20,600 they saw my Identity experience at the 1st place. 162 00:08:20,600 --> 00:08:22,840 They said we need someone fully in Identity. 163 00:08:23,360 --> 00:08:27,840 And then now I'm on my third sort of foray into Identity, 164 00:08:28,080 --> 00:08:30,720 specifically devoted to it now at GitLab. 165 00:08:31,200 --> 00:08:33,400 So I mentioned when I introduced you that you're a Principal 166 00:08:33,400 --> 00:08:36,159 Product Manager. And I think for one of the 167 00:08:36,159 --> 00:08:38,520 things I find really interesting about the identity field is the 168 00:08:38,520 --> 00:08:42,159 variety of roles that we have. Can you talk a little bit more 169 00:08:42,159 --> 00:08:45,520 about that role of a principal product manager, take us through 170 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:48,560 sort of like your day-to-day looks like a normal week for you 171 00:08:48,560 --> 00:08:50,640 or are they all different? You know, kind of shed some 172 00:08:50,640 --> 00:08:54,480 light into that role? I product is really varied, 173 00:08:54,480 --> 00:08:56,200 which is part of what I like about it. 174 00:08:56,200 --> 00:09:00,120 So day-to-day I work with engineering counterparts. 175 00:09:00,920 --> 00:09:03,920 I have about six or seven engineers I work with. 176 00:09:03,920 --> 00:09:05,920 I have an engineering manager I work with. 177 00:09:06,840 --> 00:09:08,880 I also work with other product managers. 178 00:09:10,280 --> 00:09:14,000 I've talked to customers a lot, at least a few times a week in 179 00:09:14,000 --> 00:09:17,120 customer meetings. These usually originate with 180 00:09:17,320 --> 00:09:20,800 sales or customer success. If a customer has a question 181 00:09:20,800 --> 00:09:24,560 about user provisioning in GitLab or, you know, how do I 182 00:09:24,560 --> 00:09:28,880 most securely authenticate? Personal access tokens seem like 183 00:09:28,880 --> 00:09:31,480 the wild Wild West. Should I turn them off or what? 184 00:09:31,480 --> 00:09:36,200 I so it's a lot about security honestly and keeping what's the 185 00:09:36,200 --> 00:09:40,040 best way that people can keep their GitLab instance secure. 186 00:09:40,760 --> 00:09:44,440 Of course I handle you know this doesn't work the way we expected 187 00:09:44,440 --> 00:09:47,960 or we need this extra logging information to make this really 188 00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:51,560 much more robust. And one of the bigger projects I 189 00:09:51,560 --> 00:09:55,520 did recently was we had gotten a ton of customer feedback that 190 00:09:55,520 --> 00:09:59,680 our static roles and permissions that we had built in were not 191 00:09:59,680 --> 00:10:02,760 sufficient anymore. People were having to grant too 192 00:10:02,760 --> 00:10:05,600 much privilege just for like one small permission. 193 00:10:06,240 --> 00:10:08,760 So we knew we had to make our model more flexible. 194 00:10:08,760 --> 00:10:12,880 So we did a deep dive. Technically, my engineers did 195 00:10:12,880 --> 00:10:16,640 that in terms of how could we take our current authorization 196 00:10:16,640 --> 00:10:20,200 model and really rip it apart and make it something that 197 00:10:20,200 --> 00:10:24,080 customers can build from the ground up and only grant the 198 00:10:24,520 --> 00:10:28,520 amount of privilege necessary to accomplish a certain task rather 199 00:10:28,520 --> 00:10:31,920 than to have to assign roles out-of-the-box. 200 00:10:32,160 --> 00:10:34,800 So that's been something I haven't had the opportunity to 201 00:10:34,800 --> 00:10:37,920 do before any other job. That's, I think that's kind of 202 00:10:37,920 --> 00:10:39,320 the power of the product manager, right? 203 00:10:39,320 --> 00:10:43,440 Being able to sort of inflict your desires and what you're 204 00:10:43,440 --> 00:10:45,480 hearing from customers, right? Say, hey, these are the features 205 00:10:45,480 --> 00:10:47,880 that we want to put in there, which I find a little bit of 206 00:10:47,880 --> 00:10:49,320 empowering. Maybe maybe it's just me, but 207 00:10:49,320 --> 00:10:51,120 it's like, hey, it'll be a neat idea if we could do this. 208 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:53,880 And you've got like the ammunition from like, yeah, the 209 00:10:53,880 --> 00:10:55,960 customers are saying they want this, like we should be doing 210 00:10:55,960 --> 00:10:58,960 this, right? Yeah, it's about customer 211 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:02,640 interest and then you know also revenue, right? 212 00:11:02,760 --> 00:11:06,120 That's a powerful story to be able to tell if there's perhaps 213 00:11:06,280 --> 00:11:09,840 identity or authentication related feature, we can tier to 214 00:11:09,840 --> 00:11:13,240 a more expensive tier of our product and try to get more 215 00:11:13,240 --> 00:11:15,400 revenue in the door. That's really powerful. 216 00:11:15,400 --> 00:11:18,600 The security and compliance use cases usually tell a powerful 217 00:11:18,600 --> 00:11:22,080 story. But the one thing about being a 218 00:11:22,120 --> 00:11:24,840 product is that, you know, my engineers are my peers. 219 00:11:24,840 --> 00:11:28,400 I'm not, I'm not their manager in any any shape or form. 220 00:11:28,720 --> 00:11:30,800 So you do have to get their buy in. 221 00:11:30,800 --> 00:11:34,240 And what I always tell them too is I want you to push back on 222 00:11:34,240 --> 00:11:35,760 me. It's like my least favorite 223 00:11:35,760 --> 00:11:38,600 teams that I've worked with are ones that just take whatever I 224 00:11:38,600 --> 00:11:41,120 say and go execute. I'm like, no, I want your 225 00:11:41,120 --> 00:11:42,720 pushback. If there's something that you 226 00:11:42,720 --> 00:11:45,720 know is going to take a really long time and it's a ton of 227 00:11:45,720 --> 00:11:49,960 effort, maybe it only delivers, you know, 5% of what we need. 228 00:11:49,960 --> 00:11:51,640 I'm open to skipping that, you know? 229 00:11:51,640 --> 00:11:54,400 So I really like engineering teams and the collaboration that 230 00:11:54,400 --> 00:11:56,400 goes on with a strong team of engineers. 231 00:11:56,480 --> 00:11:59,360 I also introduced you as a member, actually a board member 232 00:11:59,360 --> 00:12:01,800 of ID PRO. Can you talk a little bit about 233 00:12:01,800 --> 00:12:03,440 that role? What are you working on from the 234 00:12:03,440 --> 00:12:05,040 ID Pro perspective? And I guess just for Full 235 00:12:05,040 --> 00:12:07,480 disclosure, right, I'm a member, Jim, you're a member. 236 00:12:07,800 --> 00:12:09,640 I also serve on a couple of different committees for like 237 00:12:09,640 --> 00:12:13,680 CID Pro and the nomination committee for board members. 238 00:12:13,680 --> 00:12:16,840 So I remember seeing your name on that list a couple years 239 00:12:16,840 --> 00:12:19,840 back, but tell us a little bit about your role with ID Pro. 240 00:12:20,680 --> 00:12:22,600 Yeah. So being on the board of ID Pro 241 00:12:22,600 --> 00:12:26,080 has truly been an honor. I never thought that board 242 00:12:26,080 --> 00:12:28,080 member would be, you know, on my resume. 243 00:12:28,640 --> 00:12:32,360 So it's been, you know, hugely encouraging for me that others 244 00:12:32,360 --> 00:12:35,920 believed I I was capable enough. ID Pro. 245 00:12:35,920 --> 00:12:40,560 We are a a network and a certification body for identity 246 00:12:40,560 --> 00:12:44,960 professionals. I found out about ID Pro because 247 00:12:44,960 --> 00:12:50,720 my roles in Identity, I've been sort of the lone soldier of 248 00:12:51,280 --> 00:12:54,600 Identity expertise in addition to my engineers, but more from 249 00:12:54,600 --> 00:12:56,120 like a product or a business side. 250 00:12:56,400 --> 00:13:00,120 I've never worked for an Okta or a company where Identity is the 251 00:13:00,120 --> 00:13:01,760 product. I've always worked somewhere 252 00:13:01,760 --> 00:13:05,360 where Identity is part of a bigger product, right? 253 00:13:05,360 --> 00:13:06,680 And I think there's a difference there. 254 00:13:06,680 --> 00:13:08,920 And you can start to feel like, well, do I really work in 255 00:13:08,920 --> 00:13:11,800 Identity if, you know, I, I've never worked for one of the big 256 00:13:11,800 --> 00:13:15,160 names of the booths that you see at Identiverse. 257 00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:21,040 But I think a lot of companies have, you know, every product 258 00:13:21,040 --> 00:13:25,000 has identity in it, some more customized or home grown than 259 00:13:25,000 --> 00:13:27,320 others. And there need to be people that 260 00:13:27,320 --> 00:13:29,200 oversee that. So I think there's plenty of us 261 00:13:29,200 --> 00:13:31,920 out there, but I was struggling to find them and that's when I 262 00:13:31,920 --> 00:13:35,560 found ID Pro and was really excited about, Oh my gosh, 263 00:13:35,560 --> 00:13:38,160 there's actually hopefully going to be people here that I can 264 00:13:38,160 --> 00:13:41,040 talk shop with and I won't feel like the only one. 265 00:13:41,880 --> 00:13:46,080 So that's when I joined ID Pro. And being on the board, we work 266 00:13:46,080 --> 00:13:50,200 together in a team as the board. We kind of set our yearly 267 00:13:50,200 --> 00:13:53,480 strategic initiatives. We kind of decide, you know, 268 00:13:54,000 --> 00:13:57,360 this is who we are. This is our value proposition. 269 00:13:57,360 --> 00:13:59,960 Here's what we want to provide to our members so to make sure 270 00:13:59,960 --> 00:14:01,720 they're getting benefits out of their membership. 271 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:06,960 And we kind of do strategic initiatives for the year. 272 00:14:07,000 --> 00:14:10,840 And then we, along with our Executive Director, Heather 273 00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:13,320 Flanagan, execute on those priorities. 274 00:14:13,320 --> 00:14:17,080 We check in on them every month at a meeting. 275 00:14:17,760 --> 00:14:20,480 And one of the things I'm excited about that we've done so 276 00:14:20,480 --> 00:14:24,080 far this year is I think a huge part of our value prop is our 277 00:14:24,080 --> 00:14:27,800 Slack. And I would have never been one 278 00:14:27,800 --> 00:14:31,640 to be like, Oh yeah, like really excited about a Slack network. 279 00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:35,400 But I can't even tell you to be able to pop a message on Slack 280 00:14:35,400 --> 00:14:39,800 in one of the channels, ask a question and then you know get 281 00:14:40,080 --> 00:14:43,400 get the author of the SAML standard to reply to your 282 00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:45,640 message. And then ten other people who 283 00:14:45,640 --> 00:14:48,360 are have years and years of experience implementing these 284 00:14:48,360 --> 00:14:51,520 technologies. That alone is worth the price of 285 00:14:51,520 --> 00:14:54,440 membership I think in in one Slack chat. 286 00:14:54,440 --> 00:14:57,000 And it's the more active you are, the more you get back. 287 00:14:57,880 --> 00:15:02,040 And so our history used to only last, I think for 90 days and we 288 00:15:02,040 --> 00:15:06,280 recently upgraded our Slack plan and we can now have historical 289 00:15:06,880 --> 00:15:10,000 knowledge and and have all of those conversations that have 290 00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:12,600 been so valuable and now they're searchable, you can find them. 291 00:15:12,960 --> 00:15:15,720 And so I think that's one of the things I've been excited about 292 00:15:15,720 --> 00:15:18,560 so far this year. Jeff and I couldn't agree more. 293 00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:20,920 I mean, we're both ID Pro members. 294 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:23,520 We talk about the Slack channels, like the number one 295 00:15:23,520 --> 00:15:28,480 benefit because not only can you benefit from your question, but 296 00:15:28,800 --> 00:15:33,040 Jeff and I can benefit everyone as an ID Pro member can benefit 297 00:15:33,040 --> 00:15:36,400 from your question and all the people who wrote responses. 298 00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:39,960 I also think one of the great things is like, sometimes you 299 00:15:39,960 --> 00:15:42,360 get these questions that kind of stir the pot. 300 00:15:42,680 --> 00:15:45,320 And I get the sense that you like to stir the pot a little 301 00:15:45,320 --> 00:15:47,920 bit too. And that was kind of one of the 302 00:15:47,920 --> 00:15:53,240 things you wrote in the December newsletter for ID Pro, an 303 00:15:53,240 --> 00:15:56,360 article called Privacy is a Human Right. 304 00:15:56,640 --> 00:15:58,920 I thought that kind of stirred the pot a little bit. 305 00:15:59,080 --> 00:16:04,520 Wonder why did you say that? Privacy has been super important 306 00:16:04,520 --> 00:16:08,200 to me over maybe the past year and a half. 307 00:16:08,600 --> 00:16:11,640 I remember it identivers, I guess it was three years ago, 308 00:16:11,640 --> 00:16:14,000 probably back when it was in Denver and we were all wearing 309 00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:15,880 masks. I heard. 310 00:16:15,960 --> 00:16:21,400 I just went to Jamie Danker's talk Introduction to Privacy and 311 00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:23,840 I remember just like scribbling down notes and being so 312 00:16:23,840 --> 00:16:30,520 interested in this topic that I went back home and I it kind of 313 00:16:30,520 --> 00:16:32,280 jived with some things, actually. 314 00:16:32,280 --> 00:16:36,440 My friends, you know, like non-technical folk, my friends 315 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:38,920 who I sit down and watch. We have a group that watches The 316 00:16:38,920 --> 00:16:43,040 Bachelor when it's out. We get together once a week and 317 00:16:43,040 --> 00:16:46,040 we watch it together and they would always be like, you know, 318 00:16:46,040 --> 00:16:48,400 you work in tech. Like is my Alexa listening to 319 00:16:48,400 --> 00:16:51,800 me, like, why did I look at that toothpaste at Target? 320 00:16:51,800 --> 00:16:55,040 And then it started getting an ad for it like is, are things 321 00:16:55,040 --> 00:16:58,600 spying on me? And I realized, like I I don't 322 00:16:58,600 --> 00:17:00,880 have a great answer for that. And yeah, I've worked in tech 323 00:17:00,880 --> 00:17:05,319 forever and it's weird. And so I'm going to start to try 324 00:17:05,319 --> 00:17:09,440 to understand that and share my learning along the way. 325 00:17:09,960 --> 00:17:14,079 So that's really how my interest in privacy came about in terms 326 00:17:14,079 --> 00:17:17,200 of sharing it with others. I wanted to do a very low 327 00:17:17,200 --> 00:17:20,400 barrier way to share, so I started an Instagram account. 328 00:17:21,280 --> 00:17:24,359 But yeah, that's where. So my interest in privacy has 329 00:17:24,359 --> 00:17:27,880 blossomed over the past year and a half or so, leading me to 330 00:17:27,880 --> 00:17:31,080 write that article. Because I do think identity and 331 00:17:31,080 --> 00:17:35,360 privacy are interlinked at this point in our journey as a 332 00:17:35,720 --> 00:17:38,720 species that lives a lot of their lives online. 333 00:17:38,960 --> 00:17:41,000 So I was really excited to write that. 334 00:17:41,360 --> 00:17:44,040 Yeah, yeah. And I think my whole point on 335 00:17:44,040 --> 00:17:46,920 like questions that kind of store the pot is more that 336 00:17:47,320 --> 00:17:50,760 different people can end up on different sides of that issue or 337 00:17:50,760 --> 00:17:52,800 find themselves. And I'm going to bring up a 338 00:17:52,800 --> 00:17:55,200 topic that I think is one of these topics, but I think it's 339 00:17:55,200 --> 00:17:57,880 OK. I think it benefits us all to 340 00:17:57,880 --> 00:18:01,000 have those conversations, hear both sides of the argument and 341 00:18:01,000 --> 00:18:02,720 then figure out which one we align with. 342 00:18:03,040 --> 00:18:06,360 As I know this one, this next question that I have for you is 343 00:18:06,360 --> 00:18:10,360 something that not everybody agrees on, maybe not everybody 344 00:18:10,360 --> 00:18:14,200 has formulated an opinion on, But I mean, we hear about, you 345 00:18:14,200 --> 00:18:18,200 know, the Internet was created without an identity layer and 346 00:18:18,200 --> 00:18:22,400 that was the big mistake. So it's kind of like, well, had 347 00:18:22,400 --> 00:18:24,760 there been an identity layer in the Internet, all of our 348 00:18:24,760 --> 00:18:27,000 problems would be solved. And I don't think that's 349 00:18:27,000 --> 00:18:29,800 necessarily true. I think we're also moving toward 350 00:18:30,040 --> 00:18:34,600 different ways to have more of our identity able to be enabled 351 00:18:34,600 --> 00:18:37,160 on the Internet. My question is, do we have a 352 00:18:37,160 --> 00:18:40,600 right as humans to be anonymous on the Internet? 353 00:18:40,720 --> 00:18:43,240 I think out of all the questions we talked about today, let's 354 00:18:43,240 --> 00:18:44,920 still be the one I'm most fuzzy on. 355 00:18:44,920 --> 00:18:47,160 My answer on right? But this should make for a good 356 00:18:47,160 --> 00:18:50,600 discussion. I think I would lean more 357 00:18:50,600 --> 00:18:55,400 towards your right to have anonymity on the Internet than I 358 00:18:55,400 --> 00:19:00,080 would on, you know, every single thing should be tied back to 359 00:19:00,440 --> 00:19:06,480 your identity. I think that people are fooling 360 00:19:06,480 --> 00:19:09,600 themselves, quite frankly, if they think they can be anonymous 361 00:19:09,600 --> 00:19:13,440 on the Internet. And I know that sometimes if 362 00:19:13,440 --> 00:19:17,640 people put enough up, enough blockers, VPN, whatever, they do 363 00:19:17,640 --> 00:19:21,440 everything right to. Yes, you can maybe be anonymous 364 00:19:21,440 --> 00:19:25,280 on the Internet. And I I think there's a a tough 365 00:19:25,280 --> 00:19:28,360 line here because you know, I think about all the bad things 366 00:19:28,360 --> 00:19:31,240 that can happen on the Internet that people are much more likely 367 00:19:31,240 --> 00:19:35,760 to do if they know I can be anonymous, right. 368 00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:39,760 But I also think that potentially, you know, 369 00:19:40,280 --> 00:19:43,440 exercising your right to free speech, if that's tied to your 370 00:19:43,440 --> 00:19:45,840 identity and the wrong party gets a hold of that data, what 371 00:19:45,840 --> 00:19:50,120 could possibly happen? I I really do worry about if 372 00:19:50,120 --> 00:19:55,440 everything is tied to This is Hannah, which a lot of it is, 373 00:19:55,440 --> 00:19:57,120 right? Even like what we watch on our 374 00:19:57,120 --> 00:20:04,480 smart TV's, they know it's me. I worry a lot about the fact 375 00:20:04,480 --> 00:20:09,440 that our worlds are so influenced by what we see. 376 00:20:09,440 --> 00:20:12,560 The ads we see, the order things are shown in the news articles 377 00:20:12,560 --> 00:20:15,000 were shown. Everything is influenced by 378 00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:16,440 like. Here's what we think Hannah 379 00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:19,280 wants to see, here's what we think she's going to click on. 380 00:20:19,720 --> 00:20:23,160 And so I think it's really hard to get an unbiased view. 381 00:20:23,200 --> 00:20:27,520 And that is my concern with not being able to be anonymous on 382 00:20:27,520 --> 00:20:29,840 the Internet, is that there's no way to get out of this sort of 383 00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:34,120 like tunnel vision that's created for you by by the 384 00:20:34,120 --> 00:20:35,240 algorithm. What do you? 385 00:20:35,240 --> 00:20:38,320 Think well, tremendous point. Let me kick the Jeff first. 386 00:20:39,400 --> 00:20:42,640 It's like anything else. It's a tool and there are good 387 00:20:42,640 --> 00:20:47,640 and bad when it comes to a non anonymity and privacy and being 388 00:20:47,640 --> 00:20:49,920 able to, you know, tribute things to people. 389 00:20:50,600 --> 00:20:52,080 I don't have the answer, that's for sure. 390 00:20:52,080 --> 00:20:56,120 I mean I my, I'm man. I cannot talk today, man. 391 00:20:56,480 --> 00:21:00,040 Context switching all the time. Things that I want to be 392 00:21:00,040 --> 00:21:03,280 private, things that I don't care and things that I can't be 393 00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:05,680 private about because they're required by law. 394 00:21:05,720 --> 00:21:07,920 I have a driver's license, or I have to pay a bill, or I have to 395 00:21:07,920 --> 00:21:12,000 do XYZ right? Or maybe I think having the 396 00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:14,880 option to toggle that flag is important. 397 00:21:14,960 --> 00:21:17,480 I don't know who controls that flag though, because I don't 398 00:21:17,480 --> 00:21:20,560 think it's something that can be on the hands of the user 100% of 399 00:21:20,560 --> 00:21:24,120 the time, the same way that it can't be in the hands of the 400 00:21:24,120 --> 00:21:27,360 service 100% of the time. So I think it's kind of like 401 00:21:27,360 --> 00:21:29,560 this wishy washy consulting depends answer. 402 00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:32,920 And I don't know if we have a good infrastructure from an 403 00:21:32,920 --> 00:21:36,440 identity perspective to be able to enable that broad of a 404 00:21:36,440 --> 00:21:39,920 thinking because right now for the most part, we're all using a 405 00:21:39,920 --> 00:21:42,520 variety of different identity providers and services and 406 00:21:42,520 --> 00:21:45,080 things like that to log in. And if I look at my, you know, 407 00:21:45,080 --> 00:21:48,120 my password wallet, I probably have a 1000 different IDs in 408 00:21:48,120 --> 00:21:49,360 there. How am I supposed to manage 409 00:21:49,360 --> 00:21:52,000 privacy without some sort of centralized tool to do that? 410 00:21:52,400 --> 00:21:54,760 Who's going to management and would I trust the person 411 00:21:55,200 --> 00:21:59,040 managing that or the persons or the company managing that to not 412 00:21:59,040 --> 00:22:01,720 do things with the data that I might potentially put into that? 413 00:22:01,720 --> 00:22:05,240 So I don't know where to go with it, but I I see both sides of 414 00:22:05,240 --> 00:22:07,240 the coin and I think there needs to be some flexibility there 415 00:22:07,240 --> 00:22:09,120 somehow. I'm not smart enough to solve it 416 00:22:09,120 --> 00:22:10,080 though. What do you think, Jim? 417 00:22:10,080 --> 00:22:12,160 Well. I think Hannah brought up a a 418 00:22:12,400 --> 00:22:16,520 fantastic point, which is do you really think you can be 419 00:22:16,520 --> 00:22:20,560 anonymous on the Internet? That might raise the question, 420 00:22:20,560 --> 00:22:24,480 But here's kind of my concern is if you took away the ability to 421 00:22:24,480 --> 00:22:31,360 be anonymous, you might get away from people who are human rights 422 00:22:31,360 --> 00:22:34,840 activists in countries where you don't have the right to free 423 00:22:34,840 --> 00:22:35,600 speech. Right. 424 00:22:35,800 --> 00:22:38,960 And where these things are tremendous threats. 425 00:22:38,960 --> 00:22:43,480 And if, you know, the government finds out who posted that, that 426 00:22:43,480 --> 00:22:45,840 person might not live another day. 427 00:22:46,240 --> 00:22:50,000 So yeah, I think it's important. I think it's, you know, at the 428 00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:53,560 state of where our society is today and it's too easy to get 429 00:22:53,560 --> 00:22:54,960 trapped into. OK. 430 00:22:55,240 --> 00:22:59,800 In the US we have like online bullying and like believe me 431 00:22:59,800 --> 00:23:03,560 that's where I would love to just take away anonymity but at 432 00:23:03,560 --> 00:23:08,120 the same time I think there's other issues and and how the the 433 00:23:08,360 --> 00:23:12,760 evolution of the of the world needs to happen in terms of you 434 00:23:12,760 --> 00:23:17,640 know oppressive regimes or you know etcetera etcetera. 435 00:23:18,160 --> 00:23:24,680 The the those things trump, you know, issues that the other 436 00:23:24,680 --> 00:23:27,440 issues I guess because it look, it's not a black and white 437 00:23:27,440 --> 00:23:31,360 issue, but I think I fall down on the side of we need to have 438 00:23:31,360 --> 00:23:34,960 anonymity on the Internet. And I that's why when I hear 439 00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:38,800 like, OK the Internet was built without an identity layer, I 440 00:23:38,800 --> 00:23:42,440 think OK, I can agree with that to the extent that there there 441 00:23:42,440 --> 00:23:44,800 still could be anonymity. All right. 442 00:23:45,000 --> 00:23:48,080 Next question for Hannah. And I think that was a good one, 443 00:23:48,080 --> 00:23:49,440 right. And that might have been the 444 00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:53,360 hardest one, but I'm wondering like, so Hannah, you talked 445 00:23:53,360 --> 00:23:57,680 about privacy as a human right. And I'm wondering is an 446 00:23:57,800 --> 00:24:01,520 inalienable in now it's going to be my turn to not be able to 447 00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:12,840 speak in in in inalienable right. 448 00:24:12,840 --> 00:24:16,560 In other words like a God-given right or is it based on or 449 00:24:16,560 --> 00:24:19,560 depend on where you happen to be or where you live or where 450 00:24:19,560 --> 00:24:22,120 you're from. So in other words, like, is it a 451 00:24:22,120 --> 00:24:23,760 human right in the United States? 452 00:24:23,760 --> 00:24:28,080 But if you're in North Korea, you don't have that human right. 453 00:24:28,680 --> 00:24:32,400 Well, I think that's certainly the way it is right now. 454 00:24:32,400 --> 00:24:36,000 I mean I don't even think that we have, we don't have any, you 455 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:40,080 know, legislation here in the US that does make privacy a human 456 00:24:40,080 --> 00:24:41,840 right. That's why I felt like, you 457 00:24:41,840 --> 00:24:45,040 know, worldwide this is still just very much in its infancy 458 00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:47,400 and that's why I wanted to bring it up in the, in the article I 459 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:50,080 wrote. In my opinion, it is an 460 00:24:50,080 --> 00:24:53,200 inalienable right. It should not be available to 461 00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:55,960 certain people. I've seen a trending towards, 462 00:24:56,360 --> 00:24:59,480 well, we're going to, you know, if you want to use a certain 463 00:24:59,480 --> 00:25:03,480 social media platform and you want to use it with more privacy 464 00:25:03,480 --> 00:25:05,960 controls, then you're going to have to pay a certain amount a 465 00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:08,360 month. And then anyone who can't afford 466 00:25:08,360 --> 00:25:13,680 it gets, you know, their data, you know, taken away and sold to 467 00:25:13,680 --> 00:25:15,320 brokers. And I don't think that's right 468 00:25:15,320 --> 00:25:16,360 either. I don't think it should be 469 00:25:16,360 --> 00:25:19,800 something that only people with a certain financial privilege 470 00:25:19,800 --> 00:25:22,160 can afford. So I feel pretty strongly on 471 00:25:22,160 --> 00:25:24,680 this one that it should be an inalienable right. 472 00:25:24,680 --> 00:25:27,120 I just think that we're far away from that. 473 00:25:27,120 --> 00:25:32,160 What do you think, Chuff? Again, depends, I think are you 474 00:25:32,160 --> 00:25:34,440 know, are we saying that you don't have the right to privacy 475 00:25:34,560 --> 00:25:37,720 as a consumer or as an enterprise worker or in what 476 00:25:37,720 --> 00:25:40,040 context? I would say, again, it's not 477 00:25:40,040 --> 00:25:43,280 black and white. Some contexts I do not have that 478 00:25:43,280 --> 00:25:45,760 right. I need to be, you know 479 00:25:45,760 --> 00:25:48,120 accountable for whatever actions I take. 480 00:25:48,480 --> 00:25:51,680 And there are other situations where you know, I I can't or I 481 00:25:51,680 --> 00:25:55,720 shouldn't be to preserve physical security or emotional 482 00:25:55,720 --> 00:25:57,880 or mental security, right. Things like that. 483 00:25:58,440 --> 00:26:00,600 I I, I don't, I don't even know. I don't know how to answer the 484 00:26:00,600 --> 00:26:02,760 question because I think it's against that contact switching. 485 00:26:02,760 --> 00:26:04,920 And Hannah, you keep throwing me for a loop here and say, OK, 486 00:26:04,920 --> 00:26:06,400 well, I agree with that. I don't agree with them. 487 00:26:06,400 --> 00:26:07,800 So wait a second. Which context are we talking 488 00:26:07,800 --> 00:26:10,000 about here? You know, how do we, how do we 489 00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:12,800 even think about something like this where, you know, we're very 490 00:26:12,800 --> 00:26:16,680 fortunate the three of us live in the United States and we're 491 00:26:16,680 --> 00:26:18,560 able to have a certain amount of free speech. 492 00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:23,720 Not every person has that benefit or that luxury, and that 493 00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:26,720 has varying degrees of repercussions depending where 494 00:26:26,720 --> 00:26:28,760 you're at in the right How do you protect somebody? 495 00:26:28,840 --> 00:26:31,880 Yeah, and I think even just thinking to my day job at 496 00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:34,600 GitLab, right, it's another context specific thing. 497 00:26:34,600 --> 00:26:39,560 Because if you want to push, you know, code changes to production 498 00:26:39,560 --> 00:26:42,920 for example, we're gonna need a very high level assurance that 499 00:26:43,240 --> 00:26:45,920 you are who you say you are. And maybe you have to go through 500 00:26:45,920 --> 00:26:49,960 several step up authentication methods to prove, hey, that's 501 00:26:49,960 --> 00:26:51,560 actually Hannah behind the keyboard. 502 00:26:51,960 --> 00:26:56,600 And the further those go, the less privacy perhaps you could 503 00:26:56,600 --> 00:26:59,200 say you have. But it's all a trade off, right? 504 00:26:59,200 --> 00:27:02,000 It's like, is it worth it to have the level of assurance to 505 00:27:02,000 --> 00:27:04,280 do a potentially destructive action? 506 00:27:05,320 --> 00:27:09,960 Yeah, I kind of feel like there's certain privacy that is 507 00:27:10,120 --> 00:27:14,840 a human right. I think that you can put 508 00:27:14,840 --> 00:27:19,720 yourself in certain situations where you give up privacy. 509 00:27:20,440 --> 00:27:24,480 So for example, you walk into a store, it's a privately owned 510 00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:29,920 store if they are doing some kind of eye or they're watching 511 00:27:29,920 --> 00:27:33,280 your eyes in terms of like what you're looking at and then 512 00:27:33,680 --> 00:27:36,440 feeding that information to a third party. 513 00:27:36,640 --> 00:27:38,320 But here's where I think it breaks down. 514 00:27:38,560 --> 00:27:41,160 If you're doing those things and the person doesn't know you're 515 00:27:41,160 --> 00:27:44,400 doing those things, I think that's where it should break 516 00:27:44,400 --> 00:27:47,280 down. You know, and I think that's the 517 00:27:47,280 --> 00:27:50,640 problem with like, privacy policies, for example, is like, 518 00:27:50,960 --> 00:27:55,000 OK, if I'm going into a store and they're scanning my face and 519 00:27:55,000 --> 00:27:58,360 saying, oh, there's Jim McDonald and, oh, he looked at the Crest 520 00:27:58,360 --> 00:28:01,040 White strips. And now we're going to sell that 521 00:28:01,040 --> 00:28:04,800 information back to some marketing firm and we're going 522 00:28:04,800 --> 00:28:07,160 to tie his e-mail address to it. And we're just going to start 523 00:28:07,160 --> 00:28:09,080 and they're going to do whatever they want to do. 524 00:28:09,440 --> 00:28:12,640 Now they know he wants Crest or he's interested in Crest white 525 00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:15,880 strips and they're just going to start spamming him or something. 526 00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:19,360 I don't think that's right. So that that's kind of where I, 527 00:28:19,360 --> 00:28:24,720 I I think if people understand what they're getting into. 528 00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:27,880 But I also think that the counterbalance to that is that 529 00:28:29,120 --> 00:28:32,560 sometimes like, oh, you know, if like you go to the airport, 530 00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:36,080 we're going to start like, you know, scanning your face and 531 00:28:36,480 --> 00:28:39,560 knowing who you are as you're walking through the hallways or 532 00:28:39,800 --> 00:28:42,000 if you're on a public St. we're going to do those things. 533 00:28:42,000 --> 00:28:44,200 So we're always going to know where you are at any given time. 534 00:28:44,840 --> 00:28:48,440 I don't think that's, you know, if even if you know that's 535 00:28:48,440 --> 00:28:51,680 what's happening, you don't really have a choice of not 536 00:28:51,680 --> 00:28:53,680 walking on the streets. You know, what are you supposed 537 00:28:53,680 --> 00:28:57,000 to do to go live in the woods? Yeah, exactly. 538 00:28:57,000 --> 00:29:00,680 And I that's one of the things as I've been sort of talking 539 00:29:00,680 --> 00:29:04,560 about privacy in public that I've tried to be very clear on 540 00:29:04,560 --> 00:29:07,320 is that it's not all or nothing, right. 541 00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:11,720 Just because you you like you can share your photos on 542 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:14,000 Facebook, right? But just understand what the 543 00:29:14,000 --> 00:29:17,320 implications of that are and maybe it's worth the trade off 544 00:29:17,320 --> 00:29:19,200 to you, right? Like maybe it's, you know it's 545 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:21,280 really convenient to share the photos of your kid with the 546 00:29:21,280 --> 00:29:24,320 grandparents on Facebook. But hey, maybe you should make 547 00:29:24,320 --> 00:29:25,880 sure they're at least private, right. 548 00:29:25,880 --> 00:29:28,880 So there's like a balance, and it doesn't have to be all or 549 00:29:28,880 --> 00:29:31,880 nothing. And just because you use a 550 00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:36,000 certain platform doesn't mean that it's all a lost cause for 551 00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:37,960 your privacy. And oh, what does it matter? 552 00:29:37,960 --> 00:29:40,920 They can know everything about me because, you know, that's 553 00:29:40,920 --> 00:29:42,200 fine. I'm boring, right? 554 00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:45,000 It's like the common, you know, who cares? 555 00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:48,440 But I think, I think it can get potentially hairy, right? 556 00:29:48,440 --> 00:29:50,440 We were talking about walking into stores. 557 00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:54,160 You're looking at white strips advertising it to you. 558 00:29:54,160 --> 00:29:57,240 Yeah, that seems fairly benign. And I, some people even love 559 00:29:57,240 --> 00:30:00,160 those targeted advertisements. Like, yeah, I wanted to buy 560 00:30:00,160 --> 00:30:01,560 that. So thanks for reminding me. 561 00:30:02,040 --> 00:30:06,520 But what I'd be worried about is, oh, let's, you know, oh, 562 00:30:06,520 --> 00:30:10,120 gosh, Based on her last visit six months ago. 563 00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:11,560 Yeah. She's gained weight. 564 00:30:13,120 --> 00:30:14,600 What does that mean about her health? 565 00:30:14,600 --> 00:30:15,880 Right. And can we combine that with 566 00:30:15,880 --> 00:30:19,800 some other records from an online therapy place that's 567 00:30:19,800 --> 00:30:22,280 gotten hacked? And now we can tell that, you 568 00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:24,800 know, I postulate that a certain thing is going on. 569 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:28,160 And now my health insurance company knows, and they that's 570 00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:31,120 what I worry about, is kind of like a next step into how this 571 00:30:31,120 --> 00:30:33,920 could go wrong. Yeah, I can see that, Jeff, your 572 00:30:33,920 --> 00:30:37,680 love of chicken and waffles is causing your your cholesterol to 573 00:30:37,680 --> 00:30:39,840 go up, right? Things like that. 574 00:30:42,040 --> 00:30:46,400 So Hannah, you had mentioned about the Amazon election, 575 00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:48,320 whether or not it's listening to you. 576 00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:51,440 And I've had conversation with people, so I don't really have 577 00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:54,600 the inside information. We did have a guest on the the 578 00:30:54,600 --> 00:30:56,920 show at one point who's like, absolutely, it's listening to 579 00:30:56,920 --> 00:31:00,400 you and I, here's the the dots that I've connected. 580 00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:03,720 It's like, does it require some human being to sit there and 581 00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:06,320 listen to what you're saying? No. 582 00:31:06,520 --> 00:31:09,680 With artificial intelligence, they can do speech to text, load 583 00:31:09,680 --> 00:31:14,440 that into some big data database somewhere and like just scan 584 00:31:14,440 --> 00:31:19,360 through it in seconds, right. So I think it definitely could 585 00:31:19,360 --> 00:31:21,440 be. Whether or not it is, I don't 586 00:31:21,440 --> 00:31:23,040 know. I don't think we know for sure. 587 00:31:23,040 --> 00:31:25,680 It is the person who mentioned that was not speaking on behalf 588 00:31:25,680 --> 00:31:27,240 of Amazon. So if you're Amazon listening, 589 00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:30,640 don't sue us, we don't know. But the same thing applies for 590 00:31:30,640 --> 00:31:33,000 any of these services, right, That has a Voice Assistant And 591 00:31:33,000 --> 00:31:36,560 it just seems like the correlation of different points 592 00:31:36,560 --> 00:31:39,200 of data is what's taking place. And they think about Jim, 593 00:31:39,200 --> 00:31:41,600 earlier you said choice. And I think that's one of the 594 00:31:41,600 --> 00:31:45,800 big parts of this is if you're walking to a store to get Crest 595 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:48,600 White strips, we'll just stay with that thing and you don't 596 00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:50,560 have a choice. It's the only place that you can 597 00:31:50,560 --> 00:31:52,760 go to sell it. And the only way you can buy is 598 00:31:52,760 --> 00:31:56,040 by going in and giving up your information. 599 00:31:56,040 --> 00:31:59,240 In this case, is that really where we want to be where you're 600 00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:02,000 in a position where you only have, you don't have a choice. 601 00:32:02,120 --> 00:32:05,960 Essentially this is the way you have to do that versus maybe 602 00:32:05,960 --> 00:32:07,320 there is an alternative method, right? 603 00:32:07,320 --> 00:32:10,080 Maybe you have to drive an extra 2 miles to get to a location 604 00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:13,120 that doesn't do that. You made the decision to go into 605 00:32:13,120 --> 00:32:17,080 that private enterprise that theoretically told you what it 606 00:32:17,080 --> 00:32:19,440 was doing. But we had a conversation with a 607 00:32:19,440 --> 00:32:22,880 few weeks ago with Laura Gomez Martin and from our team here 608 00:32:22,880 --> 00:32:25,680 about privacy. And I kind of got on her case a 609 00:32:25,680 --> 00:32:28,760 little bit not, you know, not mean or anything, but these 610 00:32:29,200 --> 00:32:32,880 Eulas that we see out there, it's buried in, you know, walls 611 00:32:32,880 --> 00:32:35,680 of wiggle texts, and you really don't have a choice. 612 00:32:35,800 --> 00:32:37,200 It's really the only viable option. 613 00:32:37,360 --> 00:32:40,800 Are you gonna drive 45 minutes extra to get Crest White strips 614 00:32:40,960 --> 00:32:45,720 or milk or bread or gasoline or X thing? 615 00:32:45,960 --> 00:32:49,040 If you don't have the choice, then I think we run into issues. 616 00:32:49,040 --> 00:32:51,840 And then the correlation of the data that's being collected, I 617 00:32:51,840 --> 00:32:52,920 think is the other problem point. 618 00:32:53,280 --> 00:32:56,480 So yes, you might have all these different, you know, points of 619 00:32:56,480 --> 00:32:58,560 data, but until they're correlated, that's what truly 620 00:32:58,560 --> 00:33:01,120 makes it powerful. And that's what concerns me is 621 00:33:01,120 --> 00:33:03,640 some of these situations where it's like, oh, I know I visited 622 00:33:03,640 --> 00:33:05,880 this website over here. Of course there's a cookie. 623 00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:09,000 It tracked that I went to this other website and then I visited 624 00:33:09,000 --> 00:33:11,800 a physical location and then I drove my car somewhere and my 625 00:33:11,800 --> 00:33:14,400 phone knew where I was going because I wanted Google Maps to 626 00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:16,600 run. You put all that stuff together 627 00:33:16,600 --> 00:33:19,760 and guess what? Now you've got correlation of 628 00:33:19,760 --> 00:33:23,240 data that can be potentially extremely damaging or 629 00:33:23,240 --> 00:33:26,440 potentially extremely helpful. Hey, I get an e-mail every month 630 00:33:26,480 --> 00:33:29,320 of my Google travels. I traveled this many miles 631 00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:31,960 around the world and I went to these locations and my photos 632 00:33:31,960 --> 00:33:33,720 are Geo tagged. I love that. 633 00:33:33,720 --> 00:33:36,280 Do I love the fact that it could be used for other purposes? 634 00:33:36,920 --> 00:33:39,120 No. But that's that's where we are 635 00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:40,040 right now. Right. 636 00:33:40,240 --> 00:33:43,960 And it would be nice and perhaps there is this, I don't know, but 637 00:33:43,960 --> 00:33:48,200 if you had some granularity and being able to opt out on the 638 00:33:48,200 --> 00:33:51,000 Google front, it wasn't just like a mass all of my 639 00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:53,360 information from maps and use it. 640 00:33:53,360 --> 00:33:56,000 It would be like, oh, how nice would it be if I could get the 641 00:33:56,000 --> 00:33:58,760 check box that showed me my Pretty Little map. 642 00:33:58,760 --> 00:34:01,560 But then I didn't have to let them, you know, package it up 643 00:34:01,560 --> 00:34:04,560 and sell it or whatever they do with it or target me with ads 644 00:34:04,560 --> 00:34:07,560 for it. So I think we have a ways to go 645 00:34:07,560 --> 00:34:10,520 in offering better privacy controls to consumers. 646 00:34:10,880 --> 00:34:12,880 Yeah. My feeling also when it comes to 647 00:34:12,880 --> 00:34:16,760 human right, we can't look at like, here's how it is, You 648 00:34:16,760 --> 00:34:20,920 know, we have HIPAA laws in the United States, maybe in Mexico 649 00:34:20,920 --> 00:34:22,199 or in Canada. They're different. 650 00:34:22,199 --> 00:34:23,760 Maybe, let's just say they're lesser. 651 00:34:23,760 --> 00:34:25,639 I don't know, they might be stronger. 652 00:34:25,639 --> 00:34:28,560 But let's assume that for the sake of argument, they're 653 00:34:28,560 --> 00:34:30,639 lesser. I think when we talk about a 654 00:34:30,639 --> 00:34:33,239 human right, we should be talking about the way it should 655 00:34:33,239 --> 00:34:35,760 be, right. And when we're, we use Crest 656 00:34:35,760 --> 00:34:38,280 White strips as the example, it's kind of an innocuous 657 00:34:38,280 --> 00:34:40,280 example. But if you were to go and get 658 00:34:40,280 --> 00:34:45,000 some kind of medical procedure done or you're buying like birth 659 00:34:45,000 --> 00:34:48,840 control or something, that it's just nobody else's business, 660 00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:50,679 right? And you don't want that 661 00:34:50,679 --> 00:34:54,440 information to become public or you don't want some insurance 662 00:34:54,440 --> 00:34:57,880 company to use it to say, oh, we're going to deny you 663 00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:02,320 insurance because you had this procedure, you have a shorter 664 00:35:02,320 --> 00:35:06,360 lifespan or you have some kind of disease or here's another 665 00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:09,280 example, You get your DNA worked up, right? 666 00:35:09,280 --> 00:35:14,160 And you want to know for yourself, OK, am I likely to 667 00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:18,360 more likely to catch these diseases or whatever, You don't 668 00:35:18,360 --> 00:35:20,240 want that information to become public. 669 00:35:20,320 --> 00:35:22,600 You don't want that information to be sold. 670 00:35:23,080 --> 00:35:27,440 So to me it's the human right pieces about how it should be, 671 00:35:27,680 --> 00:35:30,440 not the way it is. Yeah, totally agree. 672 00:35:30,920 --> 00:35:32,440 All right. Let's shift topics a little bit 673 00:35:32,440 --> 00:35:35,240 because I think we've started to talk about this, but maybe not 674 00:35:35,240 --> 00:35:37,600 head on. And I think it's just that 675 00:35:37,600 --> 00:35:39,800 expectation of privacy as an employee. 676 00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:43,160 I think so far we've been talking about this maybe more 677 00:35:43,160 --> 00:35:46,680 from a consumer perspective. Typically, we're not a captive 678 00:35:46,680 --> 00:35:48,880 audience, right? We do have choices for the most 679 00:35:48,880 --> 00:35:50,560 part. But if you're an employee, you 680 00:35:50,560 --> 00:35:54,240 may not have as much choice. What are my expectations of 681 00:35:54,240 --> 00:35:58,320 privacy as a employee and how might that be different from the 682 00:35:58,320 --> 00:35:59,760 consumer side of things? What do you think, Hannah? 683 00:36:00,720 --> 00:36:05,360 I think your expectations as an employee go down, right. 684 00:36:05,360 --> 00:36:09,200 I have found that anytime I'm employed, I'm given pretty 685 00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:13,920 thorough policies to sign off on that says, hey, you know, here's 686 00:36:14,720 --> 00:36:17,160 if you're working on the work computer, here's what we're 687 00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:20,280 recording about you or could in theory record about you. 688 00:36:21,560 --> 00:36:25,760 So I think it's been at least pretty transparently disclosed. 689 00:36:26,440 --> 00:36:28,560 Hopefully that's the case for others as well. 690 00:36:28,760 --> 00:36:34,000 But I do think when you're an employee you have a lot less, 691 00:36:34,160 --> 00:36:37,440 you need to have a lot less expectations And again, you 692 00:36:37,440 --> 00:36:41,360 know, balancing sort of privacy and security, a lot of these 693 00:36:41,960 --> 00:36:46,560 things are kind of, you know, given under the well, we need to 694 00:36:46,560 --> 00:36:49,560 know exactly what our employees are doing for security purposes. 695 00:36:50,520 --> 00:36:53,960 And that does certainly have merit whenever you're dealing 696 00:36:53,960 --> 00:36:57,760 with, you know, intellectual property and keeping it sort of 697 00:36:57,760 --> 00:37:02,040 within your company's ecosystem. So I guess my personally my 698 00:37:02,040 --> 00:37:05,480 expectations as as an employee are pretty low, but at least I 699 00:37:05,480 --> 00:37:06,880 feel like I know what I'm in for. 700 00:37:06,880 --> 00:37:08,440 What What's been your experience? 701 00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:15,560 I'll add my my thoughts on it. My concern is that you know IT 702 00:37:15,640 --> 00:37:20,120 administrators are the ones who have access to your 703 00:37:20,120 --> 00:37:23,520 communications, at least your electronic communications. 704 00:37:23,560 --> 00:37:27,120 And my concern is, is like, you know, what if the IT 705 00:37:27,120 --> 00:37:30,240 administrator says, oh, I'd like to start reading Hannah's 706 00:37:30,240 --> 00:37:33,880 emails. Oh, she's having a a argument 707 00:37:33,880 --> 00:37:36,000 with her spouse or something like that. 708 00:37:36,000 --> 00:37:39,200 And you know, like somebody goes and abuses that. 709 00:37:39,200 --> 00:37:42,080 I absolutely think that is not acceptable. 710 00:37:42,720 --> 00:37:48,560 But I do think that the company has the requirement to watch for 711 00:37:48,560 --> 00:37:52,480 certain things that you're not exfiltrating the company's data 712 00:37:52,480 --> 00:37:57,360 or you know doing other things that is like corporate espionage 713 00:37:57,360 --> 00:38:01,240 kind of stuff. But it it I think it stops right 714 00:38:01,240 --> 00:38:03,720 there. And I think that if the company 715 00:38:03,720 --> 00:38:09,000 is going to put itself in that position, then it's required to 716 00:38:09,000 --> 00:38:11,960 make sure that that data is not being abused. 717 00:38:11,960 --> 00:38:15,240 Otherwise, it sets itself up for potential lawsuits. 718 00:38:15,560 --> 00:38:17,480 Well, I think this is an area though where most companies 719 00:38:17,480 --> 00:38:20,600 would have a policy statement somewhere that says, look, this 720 00:38:20,600 --> 00:38:24,000 is company property. You know, we may allow some, you 721 00:38:24,000 --> 00:38:26,200 know, adjacent use for convenience and things like 722 00:38:26,200 --> 00:38:27,800 that. But you know, if you're using 723 00:38:27,800 --> 00:38:31,480 your work e-mail to do it, all of your transactions, that's on 724 00:38:31,480 --> 00:38:37,200 you as the end user really not understanding or not adhering or 725 00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:39,120 even thinking about that type of privacy. 726 00:38:39,120 --> 00:38:42,760 So what is the responsibility of the individual to say, oh, I 727 00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:46,880 should probably have my own e-mail account to do this and 728 00:38:46,880 --> 00:38:50,440 not do everything through my atwork.com e-mail address, 729 00:38:50,440 --> 00:38:54,680 whatever that might look like. Now if an IT person is snooping 730 00:38:54,680 --> 00:38:56,680 my traffic, they're running Wireshark and they're putting 731 00:38:56,680 --> 00:38:59,360 together packets and doing things to get into my e-mail and 732 00:38:59,360 --> 00:39:02,960 my personal e-mail. Again, bad situation, but my 733 00:39:02,960 --> 00:39:06,720 responsibility as to myself would be of course I'm not gonna 734 00:39:06,720 --> 00:39:09,720 use my work account for that kind of thing, but there's lots 735 00:39:09,720 --> 00:39:12,200 of people who do. I have been in those situations 736 00:39:12,200 --> 00:39:14,360 from a security operations standpoint, doing the forensics 737 00:39:14,360 --> 00:39:17,400 analysis and people do dumb stuff all the time. 738 00:39:18,400 --> 00:39:20,640 I think it's gotten better probably or at least more known. 739 00:39:20,800 --> 00:39:22,800 But it does happen. You know, you get the the 740 00:39:22,800 --> 00:39:25,960 occasional e-mail, always sent it to the wrong address or you 741 00:39:25,960 --> 00:39:28,240 know you're in your address book of my work address, some 742 00:39:28,240 --> 00:39:31,240 personal address and you know, maybe there's some some you 743 00:39:31,240 --> 00:39:33,280 know, weird thing that goes to 1 address and not the other. 744 00:39:33,720 --> 00:39:36,800 But you certainly hope you fix that in subsequent threads. 745 00:39:37,160 --> 00:39:39,080 But I think there is some personal responsibility when it 746 00:39:39,080 --> 00:39:42,880 comes to the usage of a company, resources and understanding. 747 00:39:42,880 --> 00:39:45,800 Like, OK, yeah, like the organization, this belongs to 748 00:39:45,800 --> 00:39:48,760 them and they could do something with that data if they wanted 749 00:39:48,760 --> 00:39:50,040 to. And they have every right to do 750 00:39:50,040 --> 00:39:51,080 that. It is their property. 751 00:39:51,120 --> 00:39:52,960 Hannah, what do you? Think, yeah, I think that's very 752 00:39:52,960 --> 00:39:55,960 well said that there is a responsibility there on the 753 00:39:55,960 --> 00:39:59,520 employee side. One thing I'm curious about, 754 00:39:59,520 --> 00:40:03,720 Jeff, since you mentioned your sort of forensic background 755 00:40:03,720 --> 00:40:05,880 there. What I've always wondered on 756 00:40:06,440 --> 00:40:10,680 using a work computer for encrypted things like iMessage, 757 00:40:10,680 --> 00:40:12,800 right? Can your company still read 758 00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:14,280 that? I'm honestly not sure. 759 00:40:14,760 --> 00:40:16,320 There are ways to get around it now. 760 00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:20,200 It's been 15 years before I message was around that I was 761 00:40:20,200 --> 00:40:23,440 doing this type of stuff, but there are still ways to do that. 762 00:40:23,560 --> 00:40:27,280 To break the encryption on it. You typically need the device or 763 00:40:27,280 --> 00:40:29,240 at least a forensic copy of the device to do that. 764 00:40:29,240 --> 00:40:33,640 But I don't want to like say yes or no as of now, because the 765 00:40:33,640 --> 00:40:36,840 last time I did it we were still using Lotus Notes for e-mail. 766 00:40:37,200 --> 00:40:38,840 So that just goes how far back it was. 767 00:40:40,080 --> 00:40:43,680 Yeah, OK. There's also situations where, 768 00:40:43,920 --> 00:40:49,360 like on your desktop hard drive, you might have your W twos or 769 00:40:49,720 --> 00:40:53,840 other kind of tax forms that you downloaded from the the 770 00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:58,640 company's HR portal, so there's ways that people could access 771 00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:01,640 that. I guess your point though is 772 00:41:01,640 --> 00:41:03,760 well taken. I can see why companies say 773 00:41:04,240 --> 00:41:07,760 don't use your personal device for any personal stuff. 774 00:41:08,200 --> 00:41:10,080 Yeah, 'cause they don't want to be responsible for it, and maybe 775 00:41:10,080 --> 00:41:12,040 it's they don't care. They're trying to protect the 776 00:41:12,040 --> 00:41:14,680 users who maybe just don't clean up after themselves. 777 00:41:15,160 --> 00:41:18,400 A a company device to me is a public portal. 778 00:41:18,760 --> 00:41:21,240 I wouldn't do anything on my corporate computer that I 779 00:41:21,240 --> 00:41:24,800 wouldn't do at a kiosk, in a library or, you know, whatever 780 00:41:24,800 --> 00:41:26,440 it may be. Not that I would ever use any of 781 00:41:26,440 --> 00:41:28,520 those. But that same idea right? 782 00:41:28,520 --> 00:41:32,800 Of this is not a a trusted device for my personal 783 00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:36,360 information, that kind of thing. Yeah, I completely agree. 784 00:41:36,360 --> 00:41:39,840 I think that's I think people should be careful and and you 785 00:41:39,840 --> 00:41:42,480 know be judicious with what they do on their on their work 786 00:41:42,480 --> 00:41:45,720 computer for sure. There's another saying out there 787 00:41:45,840 --> 00:41:49,520 that if you aren't paying for a product, then you probably are 788 00:41:49,520 --> 00:41:50,960 the product. And this is one that I I 789 00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:53,960 definitely believe there is some truth to and I point back to my 790 00:41:53,960 --> 00:41:55,560 own experiences. I don't pay for Google. 791 00:41:55,560 --> 00:41:58,800 Well, I do, but not not the services I use like Google Maps 792 00:41:58,800 --> 00:42:02,440 and things like that. So they're clearly collecting my 793 00:42:02,800 --> 00:42:06,280 traffic information, right, to make sure that traffic, you 794 00:42:06,280 --> 00:42:08,360 know, they can show the green line or the red line in Google 795 00:42:08,360 --> 00:42:11,640 Maps. And I'm sacrificing that bit of 796 00:42:11,640 --> 00:42:15,640 privacy to enhance the map, the map application. 797 00:42:15,760 --> 00:42:18,200 My benefit, no, can't talk again. 798 00:42:18,360 --> 00:42:22,120 My benefit from it is I don't have to go to you know a AAA 799 00:42:22,120 --> 00:42:27,000 store and buy a triptych to do a cross country, you know, journey 800 00:42:27,000 --> 00:42:28,960 like we have to, you had to do like 20 years ago. 801 00:42:30,040 --> 00:42:31,560 Do you believe in that statement? 802 00:42:31,680 --> 00:42:34,440 Does that make sense that if you're not paying for a product, 803 00:42:34,440 --> 00:42:36,680 then you probably are the product and meaning that your 804 00:42:36,680 --> 00:42:38,440 data is probably what's being used? 805 00:42:39,120 --> 00:42:42,360 Absolutely. I think I've said this to my 806 00:42:42,360 --> 00:42:47,000 Instagram audience and I've put it in a lot of the content that 807 00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:50,000 I've written as sort of a principle to keep in mind, 808 00:42:50,000 --> 00:42:53,960 right, that nothing is free. You are giving up your data in 809 00:42:53,960 --> 00:42:58,920 exchange for a service. And I think as long as you 810 00:42:58,920 --> 00:43:03,360 realize that and you're OK with the trade off, then fine. 811 00:43:03,360 --> 00:43:07,720 But it's the fact that the it's so opaque to most people and 812 00:43:07,720 --> 00:43:10,080 they don't realize exactly what's happening or they they 813 00:43:10,080 --> 00:43:12,200 know some data is being collected. 814 00:43:12,200 --> 00:43:14,920 But you know, there's the small text about, oh, it may be shared 815 00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:17,120 with third parties. And then before you know it, 816 00:43:17,120 --> 00:43:20,840 your data is replicated copy after copy with data brokers. 817 00:43:20,840 --> 00:43:24,080 And it's basically impossible to peel back at that point and 818 00:43:24,080 --> 00:43:29,920 regain possession of. So I agree that if you're not 819 00:43:29,920 --> 00:43:37,240 buying it, you are the product. I've tried to get away from 820 00:43:37,400 --> 00:43:41,080 certain things as best as I can. It's really hard to untangle 821 00:43:41,080 --> 00:43:44,720 yourself from some of these products like Gmail for example. 822 00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:51,040 I moved over to Proton e-mail address, which I pay for. 823 00:43:51,040 --> 00:43:54,560 They have a very transparent privacy policy that they're not 824 00:43:54,560 --> 00:43:58,920 selling your data, but it does. It costs more than even like a 825 00:43:59,040 --> 00:44:03,320 Google Business account. And you have the pain of, like 826 00:44:03,320 --> 00:44:05,240 most people don't know me at that e-mail address. 827 00:44:05,240 --> 00:44:09,240 So do I I can I ever actually get rid of my 10 year old Gmail? 828 00:44:09,440 --> 00:44:13,040 Probably not. So it's a very powerful, sticky 829 00:44:13,040 --> 00:44:14,520 thing. And it's, I don't want to act 830 00:44:14,520 --> 00:44:16,960 like it's, you know, easy. Oh, just switch to all the, you 831 00:44:16,960 --> 00:44:20,200 know, privacy products because again, you have financial 832 00:44:20,200 --> 00:44:23,240 barriers. There's usability barriers. 833 00:44:23,240 --> 00:44:26,800 I'm not familiar with those. For example, I use Google 834 00:44:26,800 --> 00:44:29,120 Photos, right? I know they're scanning 835 00:44:29,120 --> 00:44:32,200 everything about those photos. They I take a picture in the 836 00:44:32,200 --> 00:44:34,880 kitchen, they probably know what's in my pantry door that's 837 00:44:34,880 --> 00:44:38,280 open, right? But I'm willing to live with 838 00:44:38,280 --> 00:44:42,440 that because it's easy to use, it's easy for me to share things 839 00:44:42,440 --> 00:44:44,560 on there. So I think as long as you're 840 00:44:44,560 --> 00:44:48,360 understanding the trade-offs, I think it is what it is and 841 00:44:48,360 --> 00:44:50,560 you're definitely the product and maybe that's OK. 842 00:44:51,120 --> 00:44:52,880 I mean, I think understanding that trade off is probably the 843 00:44:52,880 --> 00:44:54,520 most important thing. I'm a Google Photos person 844 00:44:54,520 --> 00:44:57,000 myself, right? And I'm looking at my my Google 845 00:44:57,000 --> 00:44:59,840 Chromecasts with Google TV, which is a terrible name for a 846 00:44:59,840 --> 00:45:01,960 product by the way. Google, if you're listening and 847 00:45:01,960 --> 00:45:04,840 I have an album that is my dog photos, and every time I pick a 848 00:45:04,840 --> 00:45:08,840 picture of one of my dogs, it's using its Google magic to add it 849 00:45:08,840 --> 00:45:11,880 automatically to my photo album and it just magically appears on 850 00:45:11,880 --> 00:45:14,960 my TV, which I think is great. My wife and I love that. 851 00:45:16,760 --> 00:45:21,440 Yeah, see, it's not all bad. Jim, I know that you've had some 852 00:45:21,440 --> 00:45:24,160 concerns or maybe some questions is probably a better way to put 853 00:45:24,160 --> 00:45:28,640 it around pictures and those getting uploaded and becoming 854 00:45:28,640 --> 00:45:32,880 property. I wanna ask you about this and 855 00:45:33,000 --> 00:45:36,760 kind of maybe get Hannah's take on this, but we just talked 856 00:45:36,760 --> 00:45:39,280 about Google Photos, right? You're uploading pictures and 857 00:45:39,280 --> 00:45:40,920 you're doing something about that. 858 00:45:41,040 --> 00:45:44,840 And I think this concept of all uploaded pictures become the 859 00:45:44,840 --> 00:45:49,360 property of that company is a real problem I have with that. 860 00:45:50,000 --> 00:45:52,680 Unless it's very clearly stated, I'm probably not going to use 861 00:45:52,680 --> 00:45:55,480 that platform. Where do you see that most 862 00:45:55,480 --> 00:45:56,640 often? Is that something you've come 863 00:45:56,640 --> 00:45:58,440 across, you know? What are your thoughts on that? 864 00:45:58,440 --> 00:46:00,080 Because I'd love to hear Hannah's comments after that. 865 00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:04,920 You know, I heard this in the early Facebook days, so I'm not 866 00:46:04,920 --> 00:46:09,160 even sure if it's it's ever true then or if it's still true now. 867 00:46:09,480 --> 00:46:14,040 But my understanding back in the day was that you agree as part 868 00:46:14,040 --> 00:46:17,440 of the end User License agreement that any photos you 869 00:46:17,440 --> 00:46:21,920 upload become the property of Facebook or you know via 870 00:46:21,920 --> 00:46:26,520 Instagram up the property of I guess meta is the the right 871 00:46:26,520 --> 00:46:29,760 term. Now my concern is then, OK, 872 00:46:29,760 --> 00:46:31,680 where might those pictures show up? 873 00:46:32,960 --> 00:46:36,080 And if there are pictures of like you and your family or 874 00:46:36,080 --> 00:46:42,400 pictures of you and whoever, could they show up and at some 875 00:46:42,400 --> 00:46:45,640 point you don't want them to be on the home page of Facebook? 876 00:46:45,840 --> 00:46:49,000 Now, I think that Meta's probably smarter than just to 877 00:46:49,000 --> 00:46:52,640 take Hannah's one of Hannah's pictures from her Instagram 878 00:46:52,640 --> 00:46:57,800 profile and throw it on the instagram.com website, But I 879 00:46:57,800 --> 00:46:59,320 don't know. I don't know if that's true. 880 00:46:59,440 --> 00:47:03,400 I think the language that I typically see is transferable, 881 00:47:03,640 --> 00:47:08,440 sublicensable, royalty free, worldwide license, all this, you 882 00:47:08,440 --> 00:47:11,240 know, legal gobbledygook, where it's OK. 883 00:47:11,440 --> 00:47:14,640 I uploaded a picture of one of my dogs and I'll just use Google 884 00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:15,880 for that example. I don't know if they're doing 885 00:47:15,880 --> 00:47:19,400 this or not, but I uploaded a picture and part of that service 886 00:47:19,400 --> 00:47:20,920 says, OK, I have one of these things. 887 00:47:20,920 --> 00:47:23,080 Can they make a copy of that picture, then do what they want 888 00:47:23,080 --> 00:47:25,040 with it? Who owns the copy of the 889 00:47:25,040 --> 00:47:26,400 original? I don't know. 890 00:47:26,920 --> 00:47:28,960 And are they with? Maybe. 891 00:47:28,960 --> 00:47:33,520 But I agreed to that when I took advantage of, you know, having a 892 00:47:33,520 --> 00:47:36,040 dynamic photo album with my dogs in it. 893 00:47:36,040 --> 00:47:37,280 Right. I've got cute dogs. 894 00:47:37,280 --> 00:47:39,240 I mean, I hope I get it, you know, a little bit of kickback 895 00:47:39,240 --> 00:47:40,640 from Google if that happens, But. 896 00:47:42,040 --> 00:47:43,120 But I think that's the issue, right? 897 00:47:43,120 --> 00:47:44,760 It's a copy of the original. It's not. 898 00:47:44,760 --> 00:47:47,280 Oh, we didn't use the original. We used a copy of it. 899 00:47:47,280 --> 00:47:48,400 Does that make? You sold. 900 00:47:48,440 --> 00:47:53,560 What if they sold pictures of you and your wife and millions 901 00:47:53,560 --> 00:47:59,040 of other people to a retailer, and then they used AI technology 902 00:47:59,040 --> 00:48:03,000 to do facial recognition. Now you walk into that retailer 903 00:48:03,360 --> 00:48:07,360 and they knew all this stuff about you or they say, Oh well 904 00:48:07,360 --> 00:48:10,640 now Jeff was looking at the Crest white strips and they they 905 00:48:10,640 --> 00:48:14,120 start pushing those ads to your your profile. 906 00:48:14,240 --> 00:48:16,320 Yeah, they use this podcast. They heard us talking about it. 907 00:48:16,320 --> 00:48:18,400 It's the part of the training data. 908 00:48:19,080 --> 00:48:22,480 Who owns the podcast, Jeff? Is it really you and me or is it 909 00:48:22,680 --> 00:48:24,840 actually the each podcast platform? 910 00:48:24,840 --> 00:48:26,800 People own it. This is a podcast for the 911 00:48:26,800 --> 00:48:28,280 people, by the people. Come on. 912 00:48:28,520 --> 00:48:30,200 Man, I'm with you. I'm with you, man. 913 00:48:31,080 --> 00:48:33,600 Well, and I think back to what I said earlier, right, is that 914 00:48:33,600 --> 00:48:37,120 it's the images. And then even if they're not 915 00:48:37,600 --> 00:48:40,920 selling the images, they're probably inferring attributes, 916 00:48:40,960 --> 00:48:44,080 right, or things in our images about us. 917 00:48:44,600 --> 00:48:48,480 And then these huge data profiles are built up by the 918 00:48:48,480 --> 00:48:52,680 data brokers who then, you know, package this information and 919 00:48:52,680 --> 00:48:55,760 sell it. And then I think you know it 920 00:48:55,760 --> 00:48:58,040 like, like I said at the beginning, like the fact that 921 00:48:58,480 --> 00:49:01,760 perhaps when I try to go look at the news and try to get an 922 00:49:01,760 --> 00:49:04,560 understanding of what's going on in the world, and I'm seeing 923 00:49:04,560 --> 00:49:08,560 some version of it that is different because they think, 924 00:49:08,560 --> 00:49:12,200 oh, this is the, this is the version Hannah will interact 925 00:49:12,200 --> 00:49:14,280 with, right. But my friend opens the computer 926 00:49:14,280 --> 00:49:16,120 and says what's going on in the world and they might get a 927 00:49:16,120 --> 00:49:20,080 completely different sense of what's going on because the 928 00:49:20,160 --> 00:49:24,400 output is all influenced by the data that is they had about us. 929 00:49:24,400 --> 00:49:29,240 So that's one thing I think is unique to sort of the past five 930 00:49:29,240 --> 00:49:33,480 to 10 years in terms of how tailored our experiences are 931 00:49:33,480 --> 00:49:35,880 that we may not even realize it. So I think you bring up early 932 00:49:35,880 --> 00:49:37,720 interesting point because I feel like we're going into an 933 00:49:37,720 --> 00:49:39,800 electric an election cycle here in the US right. 934 00:49:40,200 --> 00:49:42,640 And it's pretty clear that there are red states, blue States and 935 00:49:42,640 --> 00:49:45,040 purple states. And I do find it interesting to 936 00:49:45,040 --> 00:49:48,480 say, OK, well, you know, if someone has leans towards these 937 00:49:48,480 --> 00:49:52,360 specific sites or whatever, could that data be manipulated 938 00:49:52,360 --> 00:49:55,960 to show me things that would put me either for or against, right. 939 00:49:55,960 --> 00:49:57,720 Those situations. I do think that's interesting 940 00:49:57,720 --> 00:50:00,280 idea of, you know, maybe this is an AI thing. 941 00:50:00,280 --> 00:50:02,880 I don't know. But people are constantly trying 942 00:50:02,880 --> 00:50:03,920 to tailor their marketing, right. 943 00:50:03,920 --> 00:50:06,080 I mean, we use this for the podcast as well as like, hey, 944 00:50:06,480 --> 00:50:08,960 how do we get content that people want to listen to or 945 00:50:08,960 --> 00:50:11,440 watch or whatever it may be? You know, and we're just a 946 00:50:11,440 --> 00:50:13,000 stupid little podcast about identity. 947 00:50:13,800 --> 00:50:16,000 You know, I have to imagine that the larger media networks are 948 00:50:16,000 --> 00:50:19,040 probably doing their own analytics to say, oh, we know 949 00:50:19,040 --> 00:50:23,120 that, you know, this age demographic in this region that 950 00:50:23,120 --> 00:50:26,520 also looked at Crest White strips, you know, watch this 951 00:50:26,520 --> 00:50:28,040 sort of, you know, thing. Right. 952 00:50:28,080 --> 00:50:31,760 And I think I think that's an important point is, you know, if 953 00:50:32,320 --> 00:50:34,880 and and sometimes maybe it's not even changing the facts of the 954 00:50:34,880 --> 00:50:39,560 story, it's how the story is worded or other things right. 955 00:50:39,560 --> 00:50:42,160 They can kind of move you in One Direction or the other, 956 00:50:42,160 --> 00:50:44,360 depending on, you know, the goal of the of the service. 957 00:50:45,280 --> 00:50:48,800 I think what you're what you're fed online, definitely. 958 00:50:48,800 --> 00:50:51,360 I mean, I noticed it myself and I I feel like I'm pretty aware 959 00:50:51,360 --> 00:50:55,200 of it, but even I can notice like, OK, you know, oh, it seems 960 00:50:55,200 --> 00:50:57,920 like every I'll notice myself saying things like, oh, it seems 961 00:50:57,920 --> 00:51:01,040 like everyone is talking about, you know, this And I say that to 962 00:51:01,040 --> 00:51:02,440 someone else and they're like, what? 963 00:51:02,480 --> 00:51:06,200 Like, so I often times I catch myself wondering like, how much 964 00:51:06,200 --> 00:51:09,960 is that really true or how much is it just like continually 965 00:51:09,960 --> 00:51:13,600 feeding what I'm being shown and it's making me perceive things 966 00:51:13,920 --> 00:51:15,800 in a different way. And we're all living our lives 967 00:51:15,800 --> 00:51:18,680 so much online now that I think everyone sort of has their own 968 00:51:19,120 --> 00:51:21,400 perception of things that are going on, what's important, 969 00:51:21,400 --> 00:51:23,400 what's not. And it's really hard to know the 970 00:51:23,400 --> 00:51:25,080 truth. Would you know you were being 971 00:51:25,080 --> 00:51:27,280 radicalized one way or the other? 972 00:51:27,480 --> 00:51:30,480 However you want to find that if it was a slow progression over 973 00:51:30,480 --> 00:51:33,600 time based off the data coming in about you and your other 974 00:51:33,600 --> 00:51:35,760 activities, it might start with just a small little thing. 975 00:51:35,760 --> 00:51:38,440 It's like next thing you know, you know you keep reading about 976 00:51:38,440 --> 00:51:41,320 how Quest white strips actually turn your teeth black. 977 00:51:41,320 --> 00:51:43,080 It's like, Oh well, must be true, right. 978 00:51:43,080 --> 00:51:46,400 I see 1000 different articles about that and only one that 979 00:51:46,400 --> 00:51:49,200 says it's good versus someone else like Jim who's out there, 980 00:51:49,200 --> 00:51:50,640 he's buying them. He's like, yeah, these are great 981 00:51:50,640 --> 00:51:53,160 And he's in, you know Crest white strip fan club, these are 982 00:51:53,160 --> 00:51:55,240 things that the Crest you know the the best thing sliced bread. 983 00:51:55,560 --> 00:51:57,240 And he's in the maybe he gets one article. 984 00:51:57,240 --> 00:52:00,240 He's like, oh, that's nonsense. Like, how would you even know 985 00:52:00,280 --> 00:52:02,760 that you're being pitched one way or another? 986 00:52:02,760 --> 00:52:05,440 I find that really scary. And now I've got my tinfoil hat 987 00:52:05,440 --> 00:52:05,880 on. So I should. 988 00:52:05,880 --> 00:52:07,200 Probably say, yeah, I know, me too. 989 00:52:07,200 --> 00:52:08,840 I know it can quickly veer into that. 990 00:52:08,840 --> 00:52:10,720 And I don't like when I start to sound like that. 991 00:52:10,720 --> 00:52:13,040 But you know, it's it's an interesting question. 992 00:52:13,120 --> 00:52:14,920 It's an interesting thing to ask yourself, right? 993 00:52:14,920 --> 00:52:16,440 And maybe just become more aware of it. 994 00:52:16,480 --> 00:52:19,840 Yeah, such such a cool topic. I think we go for another hour. 995 00:52:19,840 --> 00:52:23,760 But Hannah, you've been such an awesome guest, and I wanted to 996 00:52:23,760 --> 00:52:26,880 finish with, you know, you've been kind of this privacy 997 00:52:26,880 --> 00:52:32,160 evangelist for over a year now, and I'm wondering, like, what 998 00:52:32,160 --> 00:52:33,920 have you learned? What's been your biggest take 999 00:52:33,920 --> 00:52:37,680 away? I think my biggest take away on 1000 00:52:37,880 --> 00:52:43,200 privacy evangelism is that people care about human the 1001 00:52:43,200 --> 00:52:46,240 human side of it. They don't care about a specific 1002 00:52:46,240 --> 00:52:49,480 technology like. All of my most engaging and 1003 00:52:49,480 --> 00:52:54,760 sticky things that I've done were like videos, little reels 1004 00:52:54,800 --> 00:52:59,760 of me doing things like, oh, I this is what, like I logged in 1005 00:52:59,760 --> 00:53:02,320 without a password and it's like I'm looking at me and then I 1006 00:53:02,320 --> 00:53:04,480 flip the camera around and I touched my Ubikey, right? 1007 00:53:04,720 --> 00:53:08,080 Like that was so popular. I don't know why, but I think 1008 00:53:08,080 --> 00:53:13,080 talking about, you know, Fido and talking about Ubikey didn't 1009 00:53:13,080 --> 00:53:16,480 connect nearly as much as seeing a person not have to put in a 1010 00:53:16,480 --> 00:53:18,920 password and just touch something and now they're logged 1011 00:53:18,920 --> 00:53:20,360 in. And that's what really drives 1012 00:53:20,360 --> 00:53:24,000 the point home. I did another post where I took 1013 00:53:24,040 --> 00:53:28,160 a photo of my Christmas tree and I said, you know, if I posted 1014 00:53:28,160 --> 00:53:31,040 this photo of my Christmas tree online, what would I be giving 1015 00:53:31,040 --> 00:53:34,320 away about myself? And then I put a little tag that 1016 00:53:34,320 --> 00:53:36,720 went over each ornament and it was like my favorite vacation 1017 00:53:36,720 --> 00:53:38,160 spot. How many people are in my 1018 00:53:38,160 --> 00:53:42,080 family, the ages of people in my family, like one of my favorite 1019 00:53:42,080 --> 00:53:44,040 foods. It's like all the different 1020 00:53:44,040 --> 00:53:47,760 things you can potentially be showing about yourself just in a 1021 00:53:47,840 --> 00:53:51,000 in an innocent seeming picture. So I think taking things out of 1022 00:53:51,000 --> 00:53:54,960 like digital and technology and putting them into humanity and, 1023 00:53:55,320 --> 00:53:58,040 you know, just everyday objects around the house and framing 1024 00:53:58,040 --> 00:54:00,680 privacy that way seems to have resonated the most of people. 1025 00:54:01,160 --> 00:54:03,960 That's a great experiment, being able to like, use those tracking 1026 00:54:04,240 --> 00:54:07,880 tags right and pixels the opposite way, 'cause they think 1027 00:54:08,040 --> 00:54:09,880 maybe people are familiar with it, but maybe not. 1028 00:54:09,880 --> 00:54:12,960 But you open an e-mail or whatever website, there's 1029 00:54:12,960 --> 00:54:15,960 usually a tracking pixel somewhere in it that is tracking 1030 00:54:15,960 --> 00:54:17,280 what you're doing. It's just a little pixel. 1031 00:54:17,280 --> 00:54:19,400 You would never note it. It's white on white background 1032 00:54:19,400 --> 00:54:21,120 probably, or black on black background. 1033 00:54:21,240 --> 00:54:25,240 And yeah, that data gets correlated, stored for somewhere 1034 00:54:25,280 --> 00:54:28,560 and then correlated back to something about yes. 1035 00:54:28,960 --> 00:54:31,400 So when you're answering those secret questions, right, It's 1036 00:54:31,400 --> 00:54:35,680 like, OK, either use the truth or make sure you remember your 1037 00:54:35,680 --> 00:54:38,560 lie, whatever that is, right? Yep. 1038 00:54:38,880 --> 00:54:40,120 Yep. Exactly. 1039 00:54:40,920 --> 00:54:42,520 All right, well, this. I feel like we got pretty heavy 1040 00:54:42,520 --> 00:54:43,960 here, but I really enjoyed the conversation. 1041 00:54:43,960 --> 00:54:46,440 I want to lighten up the mood. As we kind of wrap things up, 1042 00:54:46,520 --> 00:54:48,560 we'll end on a lighter note. I've actually got two. 1043 00:54:48,640 --> 00:54:52,920 One's from Jim, one's from me. Jim, I'm gonna go first because 1044 00:54:52,920 --> 00:54:55,480 I think yours is more fun maybe than mine. 1045 00:54:55,480 --> 00:55:00,560 But Hannah, question for you, what's the most unexpected thing 1046 00:55:00,920 --> 00:55:04,080 that we would find if we looked at your music playlist right 1047 00:55:04,080 --> 00:55:07,520 now, whether you're using Apple Music, Spotify, or something 1048 00:55:07,520 --> 00:55:09,200 else? Like, what's the most surprising 1049 00:55:09,200 --> 00:55:11,720 thing where it's like, well, that's not Hannah Hannah's 1050 00:55:11,720 --> 00:55:16,160 changed. I think to anyone who doesn't 1051 00:55:16,160 --> 00:55:21,440 know me, it would be surprising that I have a ton of really 1052 00:55:21,440 --> 00:55:27,120 hardcore late 90s and early 2000s rap in my playlist. 1053 00:55:27,360 --> 00:55:29,800 Super hardcore. I still really like rap and hip 1054 00:55:29,800 --> 00:55:32,760 hop. But you know, back then it was 1055 00:55:32,880 --> 00:55:36,720 just super hardcore rapping. And I still love that music to 1056 00:55:36,720 --> 00:55:40,680 work out too, and I think most people would probably be 1057 00:55:40,680 --> 00:55:42,520 surprised by that at first. All right. 1058 00:55:42,760 --> 00:55:44,560 Give me some artists. So you're talking about late, 1059 00:55:44,960 --> 00:55:49,400 late 90s, two thousand? Yeah, like Snoop. 1060 00:55:49,440 --> 00:55:53,880 Dogg, Eminem, Doctor Dre, the old Lil Wayne. 1061 00:55:55,440 --> 00:55:59,520 Yeah, all things like that Kid, Cudi, Chamillionaire and Nellie. 1062 00:55:59,520 --> 00:56:02,200 Oh yeah, I could go. I could go on and on thinking, 1063 00:56:02,440 --> 00:56:04,880 thinking back to my CDs in the CD player of Nellie. 1064 00:56:06,760 --> 00:56:09,120 I I I can get behind that. That's not bad, Jim. 1065 00:56:09,120 --> 00:56:11,360 How about yourself, 'cause I feel like it's all country music 1066 00:56:11,360 --> 00:56:13,840 and I'm hope, I'm hopeful that there will be something good in 1067 00:56:13,840 --> 00:56:17,600 there. There's lots of good country 1068 00:56:17,600 --> 00:56:21,440 music in there. There's lots of good old classic 1069 00:56:21,440 --> 00:56:26,200 rock, new rock, medium rock, like, you know, like the, what 1070 00:56:26,200 --> 00:56:31,440 do you call that, grunge rock. But here's one that's going to 1071 00:56:31,440 --> 00:56:34,120 stand out. The Ambien Zone. 1072 00:56:34,360 --> 00:56:39,240 Just Music Cafe Volume four. And the song is called 1073 00:56:39,240 --> 00:56:44,480 Weightless by Marconi Union and it's just one of those like New 1074 00:56:44,480 --> 00:56:49,920 age kind of like sounds with no, no vocals and you just play it 1075 00:56:49,920 --> 00:56:53,480 and just like when you want to meditate and it puts you into a 1076 00:56:53,480 --> 00:56:55,840 meditative state. And I love it. 1077 00:56:56,240 --> 00:56:58,520 I I use it just for that very purpose. 1078 00:56:58,520 --> 00:57:01,200 But I don't have, I have a few songs like that. 1079 00:57:01,200 --> 00:57:04,320 But I think everybody should check that out. 1080 00:57:04,640 --> 00:57:07,720 They need some way to relax and get into its own. 1081 00:57:08,440 --> 00:57:12,400 I use that for focus because I can't, you know, read and write 1082 00:57:12,400 --> 00:57:15,040 while also listening to someone sing or talk. 1083 00:57:15,400 --> 00:57:17,440 So I need the. I need the ones without lyrics 1084 00:57:17,440 --> 00:57:19,440 as well to. I use it for focus though, when 1085 00:57:19,440 --> 00:57:21,560 I really need to do something and concentrate. 1086 00:57:23,040 --> 00:57:26,720 What about you, Jeff? Man, I am all over the place 1087 00:57:26,720 --> 00:57:28,120 when it comes to music. I don't. 1088 00:57:28,240 --> 00:57:29,960 I'm trying to think it'll be shocking. 1089 00:57:29,960 --> 00:57:33,840 I mean, I listen to a lot of rock. 1090 00:57:34,960 --> 00:57:37,960 I I like EDM, even though I can't dance for crap. 1091 00:57:38,840 --> 00:57:42,240 I think part of that is like instrumental, like dance music. 1092 00:57:43,040 --> 00:57:45,120 I love Lady Gaga. I think she's great. 1093 00:57:45,200 --> 00:57:46,840 I don't. I like her old stuff better than 1094 00:57:46,840 --> 00:57:48,800 her new stuff. I know, controversial, but like 1095 00:57:49,160 --> 00:57:52,720 the song Telephone with Beyoncé and Lady Gaga, that's my jam, 1096 00:57:52,720 --> 00:57:54,000 right? I could do that all day long, 1097 00:57:55,200 --> 00:57:57,200 but maybe that's the most controversial. 1098 00:57:57,200 --> 00:57:59,480 But the one thing I just. I can't get behind is like 1099 00:57:59,800 --> 00:58:02,720 country music bothers me. You don't like Chris Stapleton? 1100 00:58:02,920 --> 00:58:04,640 I don't. I'll tell you, I do have 1101 00:58:04,880 --> 00:58:09,600 Mexicoma on my playlists. From who sings that it's what's 1102 00:58:09,600 --> 00:58:12,000 the country guy sing. Name me country artist. 1103 00:58:12,000 --> 00:58:13,840 Cause it's Mexicoma. Tim McGraw. 1104 00:58:13,840 --> 00:58:16,040 I think it is. Oh yeah, that's it. 1105 00:58:16,040 --> 00:58:17,120 You're right. It's Tim McGraw. 1106 00:58:17,200 --> 00:58:18,440 I just looked it up real quick. OK. 1107 00:58:18,440 --> 00:58:20,000 Yeah. So you're quicker on the on the 1108 00:58:20,000 --> 00:58:23,960 scrolling I was that's Jim maybe that surprises surprises you 1109 00:58:23,960 --> 00:58:25,960 that I have a Tim McGraw song on my list. 1110 00:58:26,120 --> 00:58:29,920 Yeah, even 1 surprises me 'cause you're pretty, you're pretty 1111 00:58:29,920 --> 00:58:31,960 firm in your hatred of country music. 1112 00:58:31,960 --> 00:58:34,800 And it's not for lack of trying, 'cause my wife is a big fan, and 1113 00:58:34,800 --> 00:58:37,280 we play this game every once in a while where we'll just like, 1114 00:58:37,280 --> 00:58:38,360 hey, what do you want to do? I don't know. 1115 00:58:38,360 --> 00:58:39,920 We're just kind of sitting there begging for the TV. 1116 00:58:39,920 --> 00:58:42,640 We'll fire up the Apple TV or whatever it may be, and just 1117 00:58:42,640 --> 00:58:46,000 start playing music for each other and telling each other why 1118 00:58:46,000 --> 00:58:47,600 we like the song that we're listening to. 1119 00:58:48,280 --> 00:58:51,720 So it's like. Do you like Texas hold 'em by 1120 00:58:51,720 --> 00:58:53,880 Beyoncé? Because that's kind of like lady 1121 00:58:53,880 --> 00:58:56,520 pop rap slash country. Is that the new one? 1122 00:58:57,240 --> 00:58:58,920 Yeah. I have not listened to it yet, 1123 00:58:59,440 --> 00:59:01,560 OK? Maybe that'll be another country 1124 00:59:01,560 --> 00:59:02,360 song you like. I'll. 1125 00:59:02,360 --> 00:59:03,880 Have to listen to it, yeah. And see. 1126 00:59:03,880 --> 00:59:06,200 Yeah, I don't know. I haven't listened to it yet. 1127 00:59:06,200 --> 00:59:07,560 So. And we we won't play it here and 1128 00:59:07,560 --> 00:59:10,320 get a copyright strike. So we've tried that before. 1129 00:59:10,320 --> 00:59:14,080 We've run into issues. So yeah, yeah, I. 1130 00:59:14,520 --> 00:59:16,000 Don't know. All right, Jim, So my lighter 1131 00:59:16,000 --> 00:59:20,560 note question is very brief. Are you a pineapple on pizza 1132 00:59:20,560 --> 00:59:23,080 person? Let's start with our yes, let's 1133 00:59:23,080 --> 00:59:25,000 say you, Hannah, Pineapple on pizza. 1134 00:59:25,440 --> 00:59:27,040 Yes. All right, my turn. 1135 00:59:27,360 --> 00:59:30,400 So I say I had pineapple on my pizza last night. 1136 00:59:30,680 --> 00:59:33,160 I actually enjoyed it. But here's the deal. 1137 00:59:33,520 --> 00:59:36,920 I woke up like a bunch of times with heartburn last night and it 1138 00:59:36,920 --> 00:59:41,320 was kind of unusual for me. So I'm not sure if I can 1139 00:59:41,320 --> 00:59:44,920 attribute that to the pineapple, but I'm kind of attributing that 1140 00:59:44,920 --> 00:59:48,200 to the pineapple. So while it tasted good, I don't 1141 00:59:48,200 --> 00:59:49,600 know if I can deal with the heartburn. 1142 00:59:49,640 --> 00:59:52,400 What about you, Jeff? I'm glad that we asked this 1143 00:59:52,400 --> 00:59:54,520 catching last because we're just gonna have to close out this 1144 00:59:54,520 --> 00:59:57,240 conversation with Hannah because pineapple does not belong on 1145 00:59:57,240 --> 01:00:00,080 pizza. Sorry, I have a traditionalist 1146 01:00:00,320 --> 01:00:02,080 'cause everybody knows how traditional I am. 1147 01:00:02,640 --> 01:00:06,040 But no, I I'm not a pineapple on pizza person. 1148 01:00:07,080 --> 01:00:09,360 I respect your choice, Hannah. I do not agree with it. 1149 01:00:09,360 --> 01:00:12,040 How about that? So at Identiverse, I should 1150 01:00:12,040 --> 01:00:14,400 approach you with a giant slice of pineapple pizza. 1151 01:00:14,400 --> 01:00:16,920 And I would, I would be very polite to say, oh, thank you. 1152 01:00:16,920 --> 01:00:20,120 And then I'd like fake eat it like so it's like, I can put it 1153 01:00:20,120 --> 01:00:21,840 like, you know. Take a picture of. 1154 01:00:21,840 --> 01:00:25,720 People and then go right into the garbage or hand it out to 1155 01:00:25,720 --> 01:00:28,320 the next person I find. Hey, Hannah, got you this pizza, 1156 01:00:28,480 --> 01:00:28,920 Hannah. There you. 1157 01:00:28,920 --> 01:00:32,520 Go and then pass it along, yeah. So I would be very, you know, 1158 01:00:32,520 --> 01:00:34,600 diplomatic about it. I just, I don't know, There's 1159 01:00:34,600 --> 01:00:37,240 something about the combination sweet and like greasy. 1160 01:00:37,240 --> 01:00:39,960 Salty just doesn't do it for me. I just think that's the whole 1161 01:00:39,960 --> 01:00:42,040 point of it. Yeah, I like that combo. 1162 01:00:42,200 --> 01:00:44,240 Yeah, well, hey, teach, throw. Not everyone can be perfect, 1163 01:00:44,240 --> 01:00:48,200 right? All right, let's go ahead and 1164 01:00:48,200 --> 01:00:49,920 wrap it up. We're up over an hour again. 1165 01:00:49,920 --> 01:00:52,280 We always try to keep these like, closer to 45 minutes and, 1166 01:00:52,280 --> 01:00:54,400 like, fail miserably. But when the conversation. 1167 01:00:54,400 --> 01:00:57,000 An hour and 3 minutes is the perfect episode length. 1168 01:00:57,200 --> 01:00:59,520 And by the time I get this cut down a little bit, we'll 1169 01:00:59,520 --> 01:01:03,840 probably be like 101, maybe 60 minutes, but I'll keep talking 1170 01:01:03,840 --> 01:01:06,040 to inflate that number. But no, when the conversation's 1171 01:01:06,040 --> 01:01:07,680 flowing, right, we just keep on going with it. 1172 01:01:07,760 --> 01:01:11,000 So, Hannah, thank you so much for taking the time with us. 1173 01:01:11,160 --> 01:01:15,040 Thank you for all you do for ID Pro as a regular old member. 1174 01:01:15,720 --> 01:01:17,840 Let's keep the Slack channel going because definitely, I 1175 01:01:17,840 --> 01:01:20,760 think we're all fans of that. I'll put a link in our show 1176 01:01:20,760 --> 01:01:23,560 notes to your profile. And I think we talked about that 1177 01:01:23,560 --> 01:01:26,680 article, which originally appeared as an ID Pro kind of 1178 01:01:26,680 --> 01:01:28,960 e-mail. So there's really not right now 1179 01:01:28,960 --> 01:01:31,440 a public way to get to it. But hopefully by the time this 1180 01:01:31,440 --> 01:01:33,880 goes, this episode goes live. I think we talked about maybe 1181 01:01:33,880 --> 01:01:35,880 putting on like on your LinkedIn channel or something like that 1182 01:01:35,880 --> 01:01:37,040 so people can go and check it out. 1183 01:01:37,040 --> 01:01:41,440 So keep an eye out for that. Let's see what else we're on the 1184 01:01:41,440 --> 01:01:44,400 web. idacpodcast.com. We're on Twitter or X or 1185 01:01:44,400 --> 01:01:47,000 whatever it's called when you listen to this at IDAC podcast, 1186 01:01:47,000 --> 01:01:48,760 if it even still exists. By the time people listen to 1187 01:01:48,760 --> 01:01:52,480 this, we'll be on Mastodon at IDAC podcast. 1188 01:01:53,200 --> 01:01:55,280 You think so? Elon hasn't run into the ground 1189 01:01:55,280 --> 01:01:56,960 yet. Yeah, he's got enough money to 1190 01:01:56,960 --> 01:01:59,880 make it through sheer dollars and cents just to make it 1191 01:01:59,880 --> 01:02:01,680 moving. As long as I keep buying 1192 01:02:01,680 --> 01:02:06,480 Tesla's, let's see, we're on Mastodon, at IDAC podcast, at 1193 01:02:06,480 --> 01:02:09,800 Infosec, dot exchange, connect with Gemini and LinkedIn, like 1194 01:02:09,800 --> 01:02:12,800 subscribe, do all that cool stuff that helps us get great 1195 01:02:12,800 --> 01:02:16,280 guests just like Hannah. And with that, we'll go ahead 1196 01:02:16,280 --> 01:02:18,720 and leave it for this week. Thanks everyone for listening 1197 01:02:18,720 --> 01:02:20,080 and we'll talk with you all in the next one. 1198 01:02:21,680 --> 01:02:24,680 You've been listening to Identity at the Center. 1199 01:02:25,000 --> 01:02:29,080 We hope you've enjoyed the show. Make sure to like, rate and 1200 01:02:29,080 --> 01:02:32,720 review and we'll be back soon. But in the meantime, hit the 1201 01:02:32,720 --> 01:02:36,840 website at identity@thecenter.com and find 1202 01:02:36,840 --> 01:02:44,280 us on Twitter at IDAC Podcast. See you next time on Identity at 1203 01:02:44,280 --> 01:02:45,240 the Center.