1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:02,880 It's like you're sitting in a lake and what we're doing is 2 00:00:03,120 --> 00:00:06,240 we're we're, we're, we're trying to force the attackers to create 3 00:00:06,240 --> 00:00:09,840 ripples in the water so we can see potentially where the threat 4 00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:12,000 is. It's forcing them to use 5 00:00:12,000 --> 00:00:16,239 techniques which are noisy, that they make it more difficult for 6 00:00:16,239 --> 00:00:18,840 them. And ultimately they deter them 7 00:00:19,160 --> 00:00:21,400 to going looking for another victim who doesn't have these 8 00:00:21,400 --> 00:00:23,040 types of technology controls in place. 9 00:00:28,600 --> 00:00:33,760 This is identity at the center if it has anything to do with 10 00:00:33,840 --> 00:00:38,400 IAM. This is the go to podcast now 11 00:00:38,400 --> 00:00:42,320 your hosts Jim McDonald and Jeff Stedman. 12 00:00:48,560 --> 00:00:50,280 Welcome to the Identity at the Center podcast. 13 00:00:50,280 --> 00:00:51,840 I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. Hey, Jim. 14 00:00:52,240 --> 00:00:54,560 Hey, Jeff, how are you? Not so bad yourself. 15 00:00:55,200 --> 00:00:57,680 Good. So I, I had an interesting thing 16 00:00:57,680 --> 00:01:02,080 happen earlier today where I had a, a video call with somebody 17 00:01:02,080 --> 00:01:06,080 who I've been interacting with at work for quite a while. 18 00:01:06,080 --> 00:01:09,920 And he said, Jim, you win the award, you look nothing like 19 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:14,440 your headshot. And so I, I didn't take it as a 20 00:01:14,440 --> 00:01:18,040 compliment or an insult, but it just made me think I need to 21 00:01:18,040 --> 00:01:21,680 update my headshot. So next conference that we go 22 00:01:21,680 --> 00:01:24,720 to, I'm carving out the time to get a new headshot. 23 00:01:25,080 --> 00:01:26,600 Well, you just missed Identiverse had them. 24 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:28,080 I mean that's the issue where I get mine done. 25 00:01:28,080 --> 00:01:30,240 You're that or Gartner. Get Gartner later this year 26 00:01:30,240 --> 00:01:32,320 maybe. I felt like I was busy the 27 00:01:32,320 --> 00:01:36,960 entire time at Identiverse so I didn't get it done, but maybe 28 00:01:36,960 --> 00:01:40,160 you can, like in post production, put a little picture 29 00:01:40,160 --> 00:01:43,560 of my headshot so folks can see how different it is and see if 30 00:01:43,560 --> 00:01:46,080 they agree. Why a lot of pictures of you and 31 00:01:46,160 --> 00:01:50,680 only some of them look like you? Your LinkedIn picture is like a 32 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:55,160 a a super AI enhanced version. Is that your ideal state? 33 00:01:55,160 --> 00:01:56,440 Is that what you're trying to manifest? 34 00:01:56,600 --> 00:02:00,200 Yeah, like my jaw is like 20% bigger. 35 00:02:00,200 --> 00:02:03,640 I've got way more hair. I mean, like, yeah, better skin. 36 00:02:03,920 --> 00:02:07,120 So why not? Why not use technology for good? 37 00:02:07,800 --> 00:02:10,919 Until until you get sold the product that is not on the tin. 38 00:02:11,640 --> 00:02:14,280 Yeah, exactly. Well, you know, the other thing 39 00:02:14,280 --> 00:02:16,600 I love about conferences is the swag. 40 00:02:16,960 --> 00:02:21,040 And I'm holding a piece of swag today, which is football or 41 00:02:21,040 --> 00:02:25,160 soccer themed, and it's a stress ball. 42 00:02:25,440 --> 00:02:27,920 And when I got it, they're like, oh, you want two of them? 43 00:02:27,920 --> 00:02:30,720 I said, oh, you can take three if you want. 44 00:02:30,800 --> 00:02:32,920 I was like, well, I only have two hands on it. 45 00:02:32,920 --> 00:02:34,880 So I didn't want to stretch it in their bag and take it home. 46 00:02:35,080 --> 00:02:36,920 Yeah, that's pretty much what it came down to. 47 00:02:36,920 --> 00:02:39,200 And I was like, I don't have three stress balls worth of 48 00:02:39,200 --> 00:02:41,920 stress. I'm I'm trying to keep it much 49 00:02:41,920 --> 00:02:43,880 more chill than that. Well, somebody out there is 50 00:02:43,880 --> 00:02:45,440 probably like, give me that damn stress ball. 51 00:02:45,440 --> 00:02:47,440 I like I I, I don't have enough stress balls. 52 00:02:48,120 --> 00:02:50,040 Yeah, exactly. Exactly. 53 00:02:50,760 --> 00:02:52,520 Well, let's see what else. Speaking of conferences, before 54 00:02:52,520 --> 00:02:55,640 we get to our main topic and guess, we've got Identity Week 55 00:02:55,840 --> 00:02:59,800 coming up. That is September 11th and 12th. 56 00:02:59,880 --> 00:03:02,560 We've got the America's Conference in Washington DC. 57 00:03:02,800 --> 00:03:05,560 You and I are going to both be at that doing podcasting things 58 00:03:05,560 --> 00:03:07,800 and I think I'm hosting a panel or something. 59 00:03:07,800 --> 00:03:13,760 We'll figure it out. Yeah, IDAC 30 gets you 30% off 60 00:03:13,760 --> 00:03:16,200 of your registration for that. And that code is also good for 61 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:17,520 the Asia conference in Singapore. 62 00:03:17,520 --> 00:03:20,880 So if you're going to that on October 22nd or 23rd, you can 63 00:03:20,880 --> 00:03:24,160 use the same code for both. Maybe you can be like Thanos and 64 00:03:24,160 --> 00:03:26,280 have like your identity conference, you know, Gauntlet 65 00:03:26,280 --> 00:03:28,760 and go to like all of them. If you went to Europe earlier 66 00:03:28,760 --> 00:03:30,320 this year, same code work for that. 67 00:03:30,320 --> 00:03:32,040 So they've been great partners for us. 68 00:03:33,160 --> 00:03:36,040 Also, if somebody works in government, they should just 69 00:03:36,040 --> 00:03:39,960 reach out to us because we might be able to help them get in for 70 00:03:39,960 --> 00:03:41,720 free. If they're allowed, yes, 71 00:03:41,920 --> 00:03:43,320 sometimes there's rules and stuff like that. 72 00:03:43,320 --> 00:03:49,840 But yes, if you are needy of a pass and you qualify as a, you 73 00:03:49,840 --> 00:03:53,560 know, governments basically it's like what I like a customer, a 74 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:55,680 real person, not a vendor in this space. 75 00:03:56,120 --> 00:03:59,080 Reach out, let me know and we'll see what we can do for you. 76 00:03:59,080 --> 00:04:01,720 But for all the other peons out there like you and me, 77 00:04:02,320 --> 00:04:05,360 Conference code Ida C30 for identity week. 78 00:04:06,320 --> 00:04:08,400 Let's see what else we got authenticate after that. 79 00:04:08,520 --> 00:04:13,240 That is October 14th, the 16th in Carlsbad, CA, just north of 80 00:04:13,240 --> 00:04:15,160 San Diego, which is a suite location. 81 00:04:15,360 --> 00:04:17,800 What a terrible place to go. Yeah, I know. 82 00:04:18,000 --> 00:04:19,959 I love Southern California weather. 83 00:04:19,959 --> 00:04:22,480 I think it's like the best on earth, but that's just me. 84 00:04:23,320 --> 00:04:24,960 We've got a conference code for that one as well. 85 00:04:24,960 --> 00:04:31,400 IDAC 15, you get IDID AC15, you get 15% off of your registration 86 00:04:31,400 --> 00:04:32,000 for that one. So we're. 87 00:04:32,000 --> 00:04:33,800 Excited. We've been guaranteed you will 88 00:04:33,800 --> 00:04:36,360 not find a better code than that Guaranteed. 89 00:04:36,480 --> 00:04:39,960 If you get out there while it's still early bird pricing, get 90 00:04:39,960 --> 00:04:43,400 the 15% off and the better pricing, because when the 91 00:04:43,400 --> 00:04:48,320 pricing goes up, the 15% off, well, I guess it goes up in 92 00:04:48,320 --> 00:04:51,080 terms of dollars, but not in terms of percent. 93 00:04:51,520 --> 00:04:53,200 So here's the problem with discount codes, right? 94 00:04:53,200 --> 00:04:57,040 Is to get the maximum value, you have to wait till the very end 95 00:04:57,040 --> 00:04:59,840 when it's most expensive, which is really dumb, right, if you 96 00:04:59,840 --> 00:05:01,560 think about it. But yes, it stacks with 97 00:05:01,560 --> 00:05:02,800 whatever. So if you want to save even more 98 00:05:02,800 --> 00:05:05,560 money, right, register early, register often, that sort of 99 00:05:05,560 --> 00:05:07,240 thing. Jimmy and I will be there doing 100 00:05:07,240 --> 00:05:10,040 podcast again, podcasty things and I'm not sure for, I'm not 101 00:05:10,040 --> 00:05:11,800 sure where we'll fit into the schedule, but I know we've been 102 00:05:11,800 --> 00:05:13,440 having some discussions with the team about that. 103 00:05:13,960 --> 00:05:15,920 And so as we get more information, we will keep you 104 00:05:15,920 --> 00:05:17,760 updated. We've got some good ideas. 105 00:05:17,760 --> 00:05:20,920 I think it's going to be. I have an idea that I've been I 106 00:05:20,920 --> 00:05:24,320 have a couple ideas that I've been trying to pull off for 107 00:05:24,640 --> 00:05:27,480 literally years now and we just haven't figured out a way to do 108 00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:29,920 it. One of them we've done once in a 109 00:05:29,920 --> 00:05:32,400 very long time ago when we first started the podcasts. 110 00:05:33,320 --> 00:05:35,880 The other one, I've been thinking about a way to try and 111 00:05:35,880 --> 00:05:38,680 do it in a way that doesn't injure people. 112 00:05:38,680 --> 00:05:41,520 Let's just put it that way. But I think we'd make for a fun 113 00:05:41,520 --> 00:05:43,200 episode if we can figure out how to do it. 114 00:05:43,200 --> 00:05:45,720 So both of those. People would not be a good idea, 115 00:05:46,160 --> 00:05:47,440 right? And I don't want to get injured 116 00:05:47,440 --> 00:05:48,680 doing this. This is supposed to be a safe 117 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:52,080 place for identity, and I don't want to feel bad for that. 118 00:05:53,160 --> 00:05:54,760 OK, so those are our conferences. 119 00:05:54,960 --> 00:05:56,840 Anything else you want to mention before we get going? 120 00:05:57,200 --> 00:05:59,520 No, let's get into it. We have a great guest today. 121 00:05:59,800 --> 00:06:02,920 Yeah, we've got Joseph Carson. He's a chief security scientist 122 00:06:03,160 --> 00:06:04,800 and advisory. See so at Delinia. 123 00:06:04,800 --> 00:06:08,280 Welcome to the show, Joseph. Many thanks Jeff and Jim. 124 00:06:08,280 --> 00:06:11,120 It's a pleasure to be here and really excited to to have a a 125 00:06:11,640 --> 00:06:13,760 intriguing and insightful discussion with you today. 126 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:16,280 Well, I'm glad you were able to set aside the time. 127 00:06:16,680 --> 00:06:19,840 I'm, I already know that you're a pros pro 'cause you have your 128 00:06:19,840 --> 00:06:22,720 own podcast doing, you know, talking about cybersecurity. 129 00:06:22,720 --> 00:06:24,120 And we're gonna get into that a little bit. 130 00:06:24,600 --> 00:06:25,920 But let's just set the table here. 131 00:06:26,040 --> 00:06:28,440 How did you get into the world of identity and access 132 00:06:28,440 --> 00:06:29,800 management? Let's find out what your origin 133 00:06:29,800 --> 00:06:31,680 story looks like. Is it something that you chose 134 00:06:31,680 --> 00:06:33,960 or did it choose you? Absolutely. 135 00:06:33,960 --> 00:06:37,000 It's a really great question. And for me, you know, my journey 136 00:06:37,000 --> 00:06:39,480 in this entire industry, my, my career has been close to 30 137 00:06:39,480 --> 00:06:42,440 years now and that's how long I've been in the industry. 138 00:06:42,440 --> 00:06:46,320 And you know, I started off my career in the early 90s working 139 00:06:46,320 --> 00:06:48,800 in system administration. So keeping systems up and 140 00:06:48,800 --> 00:06:51,880 running mainframes, you know, doing OS migrations. 141 00:06:51,880 --> 00:06:55,440 I was a COBOL programmer if anyone can remember COBOL so. 142 00:06:55,640 --> 00:06:57,200 That's bringing a lot more money doing that now. 143 00:06:58,880 --> 00:07:01,120 True, true. So that's really kind of where 144 00:07:01,120 --> 00:07:04,240 my career started. Late 90s, early 2000s, I 145 00:07:04,240 --> 00:07:06,440 switched into focusing around cybersecurity. 146 00:07:07,480 --> 00:07:10,080 I originally, kind of, I'm originally from Belfast, 147 00:07:10,080 --> 00:07:12,400 Northern Ireland. That's where I originally, I've 148 00:07:12,400 --> 00:07:14,760 travelled around the world, I've lived in Australia, America, 149 00:07:14,760 --> 00:07:18,440 Canada, and it was about 20 years, just over 20 years ago 150 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:23,760 where I made a move to Estonia. And it was my kind of expertise 151 00:07:23,760 --> 00:07:27,400 in cybersecurity in in coming to Estonia, where that was my 152 00:07:27,400 --> 00:07:30,000 convergence of both the security and identity. 153 00:07:30,440 --> 00:07:33,480 When I moved to Estonia in the early 2000s, they just started 154 00:07:33,480 --> 00:07:36,920 their journey in digital identity and it was something 155 00:07:36,920 --> 00:07:39,880 that became very foundation to their entire society. 156 00:07:40,080 --> 00:07:42,840 They started the journey in the 90s focusing on paperless 157 00:07:42,840 --> 00:07:46,440 society, but it was the early 2000s when they really seen that 158 00:07:46,440 --> 00:07:49,640 in order to be successful, digital identity was key to 159 00:07:49,640 --> 00:07:53,640 making that something to grow the society, to have interrupt 160 00:07:53,640 --> 00:07:57,040 ability to be able to accelerate and do things much more online. 161 00:07:57,480 --> 00:08:00,040 So early 2000s was, you know, what they referred to back then 162 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:03,520 was Extro and that was a system that basically had several key 163 00:08:03,520 --> 00:08:07,640 ingredients, which was digital signature, digital signing and 164 00:08:07,640 --> 00:08:10,480 also a non repudiation, which was basically built around 165 00:08:10,480 --> 00:08:13,400 blockchain. And they implemented that across 166 00:08:13,400 --> 00:08:16,680 all of their information systems, all of their government 167 00:08:16,680 --> 00:08:19,520 services. And that was where, you know, 168 00:08:19,520 --> 00:08:22,320 using my skills and working with the government back then, that 169 00:08:22,320 --> 00:08:25,760 allowed me to see, you know, the convergence of the importance of 170 00:08:25,760 --> 00:08:29,560 security and also how important it was to protect identities and 171 00:08:29,560 --> 00:08:31,720 what security controls and what risks they had. 172 00:08:32,120 --> 00:08:33,799 And it's been, you know, it's been up and down. 173 00:08:33,799 --> 00:08:35,039 You know, it hasn't been plain sailing. 174 00:08:35,039 --> 00:08:37,120 They've had great positives. You know, they've been able to 175 00:08:37,120 --> 00:08:40,919 do voting online. So not just electronic voting, 176 00:08:40,919 --> 00:08:45,280 but Internet voting, online banking, online tax returns and 177 00:08:45,280 --> 00:08:48,080 that systems progressed, but we also had a massive cyber attack 178 00:08:48,080 --> 00:08:51,680 back in 2007 that showed weaknesses in the system and, 179 00:08:51,920 --> 00:08:54,680 and the importance of resiliency is as well to make sure that 180 00:08:54,680 --> 00:08:58,040 systems continue operating and there's continuum improvements 181 00:08:58,040 --> 00:08:59,920 over that. And even to the point where, you 182 00:08:59,920 --> 00:09:03,040 know, they saw that, you know, they needed to be decentralized 183 00:09:03,040 --> 00:09:06,240 even further, not just having decentralized identity, but also 184 00:09:06,240 --> 00:09:09,480 decentralized in the government systems to the point where they 185 00:09:09,480 --> 00:09:12,400 actually created the idea of a data embassy was the ability to, 186 00:09:12,400 --> 00:09:14,360 you know, decentralize the government outside of the 187 00:09:14,360 --> 00:09:17,120 country in other locations. So that was really kind of, you 188 00:09:17,120 --> 00:09:19,640 know, working with the historian government and getting very 189 00:09:19,640 --> 00:09:22,680 closely tied. That's where my cybersecurity 190 00:09:22,680 --> 00:09:25,160 skills became very kind of overlapping in the identity 191 00:09:25,160 --> 00:09:27,640 world. And then it was around 2015 192 00:09:27,640 --> 00:09:32,000 where I decided that not just focusing on cybersecurity for 193 00:09:32,000 --> 00:09:36,000 things like endpoints and and applications and systems, I then 194 00:09:36,000 --> 00:09:39,320 moved my career to purely focusing on identity security. 195 00:09:39,960 --> 00:09:43,400 So the last 10 years I've been really heavily kind of focusing 196 00:09:43,400 --> 00:09:46,560 my cybersecurity kind of expertise on protecting 197 00:09:46,560 --> 00:09:49,240 identities. There's a lot there that I want 198 00:09:49,240 --> 00:09:52,920 to unpack and I think I want to start with Delineia itself. 199 00:09:52,920 --> 00:09:55,480 So you work for Delineia and I guess for, for people who aren't 200 00:09:55,480 --> 00:09:59,800 familiar, Delineia is a, is not a new company, right? 201 00:09:59,800 --> 00:10:02,160 It's a combination of a couple, but we can, I'll let you explain 202 00:10:02,160 --> 00:10:04,480 that you're better than I can. So I want to ask you about what 203 00:10:04,480 --> 00:10:06,800 is Delineia, what you know, what would you say you do? 204 00:10:07,160 --> 00:10:10,760 And then tell me about your role as a chief security scientists. 205 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:13,120 What does that even mean in the real world? 206 00:10:13,120 --> 00:10:15,840 Tell me about your day-to-day. So, so that's a great question. 207 00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:17,680 So just to kind of for the audience with a bit of 208 00:10:17,720 --> 00:10:21,320 background, you know, Delineia is, is a new kind of name or 209 00:10:21,320 --> 00:10:23,600 brand in the industry, but it's not a new vendor. 210 00:10:24,080 --> 00:10:26,880 It was the consolidation or convergence of both Psychotic, 211 00:10:27,200 --> 00:10:30,400 which provided, you know, vaulting capabilities and 212 00:10:30,400 --> 00:10:33,280 Centrify, which provided basically, you know, privileged 213 00:10:33,280 --> 00:10:36,440 elevation capabilities as those two companies joining together, 214 00:10:36,600 --> 00:10:39,560 which then, you know, coming up with the name was it was one of 215 00:10:39,560 --> 00:10:42,040 the most difficult things you have can do in this industry is 216 00:10:42,040 --> 00:10:45,480 what they call it a company. And delineate comes from the 217 00:10:45,600 --> 00:10:48,320 term delineate, which is the defining the boundaries of the 218 00:10:48,320 --> 00:10:49,840 space. So so that's where the company 219 00:10:49,840 --> 00:10:53,240 came from. My role in the company is as a 220 00:10:53,240 --> 00:10:56,040 security scientist is primarily it's it's a security researcher. 221 00:10:56,440 --> 00:10:59,480 I use my skills to really kind of look at all of the threats 222 00:10:59,480 --> 00:11:02,640 that's out there in the world that really focus on 223 00:11:02,640 --> 00:11:06,560 compromising and, you know, stealing and breaching and 224 00:11:06,560 --> 00:11:09,600 getting access to digital identities and using my 225 00:11:09,600 --> 00:11:11,960 understanding kind of how attackers, what techniques 226 00:11:11,960 --> 00:11:14,120 they're using, how they're being successful. 227 00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:16,960 So I do a lot of research. I spent a lot of time basically 228 00:11:16,960 --> 00:11:19,160 in my lab. I'm basically uncovering, 229 00:11:19,160 --> 00:11:22,160 recreating, looking at the events, looking at indicators of 230 00:11:22,160 --> 00:11:24,760 compromise, looking how attackers are abusing those 231 00:11:25,080 --> 00:11:27,080 controls that we've got in place to bypass them. 232 00:11:27,480 --> 00:11:30,280 And then I ultimately then create content from that, 233 00:11:30,960 --> 00:11:32,520 whether it being in the form of books. 234 00:11:32,520 --> 00:11:34,520 I've wrote six books to date already. 235 00:11:35,160 --> 00:11:38,680 I write, I write tons of white papers throughout the year, 236 00:11:39,640 --> 00:11:43,400 blogs, do webinars, speak at conferences. 237 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:46,680 So if you look at the role, it's, you know, part of the, the 238 00:11:46,680 --> 00:11:48,680 role is, is, is the research side. 239 00:11:49,040 --> 00:11:51,880 The second part is creating educational content to help 240 00:11:51,880 --> 00:11:55,320 people learn about these threats and what's the best practices to 241 00:11:55,320 --> 00:11:57,320 mitigate them. And then the third part of my 242 00:11:57,320 --> 00:12:00,000 role is really, you know, educating the industry and 243 00:12:00,000 --> 00:12:02,080 community. So I spend a large force of my 244 00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:04,920 time yearly is going to conferences, going to events, 245 00:12:04,920 --> 00:12:07,480 doing workshops, going to organizations. 246 00:12:07,480 --> 00:12:11,120 They invite me in and, you know, asking me to provide my 247 00:12:11,120 --> 00:12:15,640 expertise into helping them redefine their identity strategy 248 00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:18,160 to make sure that they have security and resiliency in 249 00:12:18,160 --> 00:12:20,120 place. So that would be my kind of 250 00:12:20,400 --> 00:12:23,440 day-to-day. It's not always in that equal 251 00:12:23,480 --> 00:12:26,760 percentage of terms, but that's what a lot of my time is spent 252 00:12:26,800 --> 00:12:29,320 on as as well as doing the podcast as well. 253 00:12:29,960 --> 00:12:32,040 Yeah, when I asked about that before I get to the podcast, I 254 00:12:32,040 --> 00:12:34,080 feel like that, no offense, but that's like the thing that I'm 255 00:12:34,080 --> 00:12:36,520 interested in as a podcaster as well. 256 00:12:36,800 --> 00:12:39,280 But tell me about Cupid Cybersecurity Conference. 257 00:12:39,640 --> 00:12:41,480 I know you have an affiliation with those guys as well, right? 258 00:12:41,920 --> 00:12:43,440 Absolutely. So so Cupid I get. 259 00:12:43,560 --> 00:12:47,840 Basically I was invited as a speaker like 10 plus years ago. 260 00:12:47,840 --> 00:12:49,600 Maybe it was actually 11 or 12 years ago. 261 00:12:50,040 --> 00:12:52,320 And one of the things I found about the conference is Cuba's a 262 00:12:52,320 --> 00:12:54,200 very small conference. It's a very niche conference. 263 00:12:54,200 --> 00:12:56,920 It's based in Prague, but they also hold conferences elsewhere. 264 00:12:56,920 --> 00:12:59,000 They have sometimes events in New York. 265 00:12:59,000 --> 00:13:01,280 They've got events in Bratislava and others. 266 00:13:02,040 --> 00:13:05,120 But I was invited to be a speaker and I loved the 267 00:13:05,120 --> 00:13:06,240 conference. I loved the event. 268 00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:09,840 It was so niche, but the quality and the conversations that you 269 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:12,440 have with the community was so intriguing. 270 00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:16,680 I learned so much, I met so many amazing people, even my other 271 00:13:16,680 --> 00:13:20,240 older ego, which is sometimes, you know, myself and Dave Lewis 272 00:13:20,280 --> 00:13:22,680 look very much alike. So sometimes they confuse us. 273 00:13:23,480 --> 00:13:25,520 And I actually met Dave Lewis at the conference for the first 274 00:13:25,520 --> 00:13:27,640 time there as well. We were speaking together. 275 00:13:27,880 --> 00:13:31,920 So basically over the years, I, I enjoyed it so much that my 276 00:13:31,920 --> 00:13:35,200 participation now is part of the speaking Bureau, which I, I 277 00:13:35,200 --> 00:13:37,680 really enjoy. So it's the ability to look for 278 00:13:37,680 --> 00:13:40,600 getting, you know, the next great speakers in the industry, 279 00:13:40,800 --> 00:13:45,400 those who's coming up with some new idea or new, you know, kind 280 00:13:45,400 --> 00:13:47,920 of research. And I get to review all of the, 281 00:13:47,920 --> 00:13:51,960 the, the call for papers for the events and then helping select 282 00:13:51,960 --> 00:13:54,200 the ones that ultimately get to speak at the conference. 283 00:13:54,720 --> 00:13:56,920 So my kind of role there is really kind of helping make sure 284 00:13:56,920 --> 00:14:00,440 that, you know, my expertise as a speaker previously is helping 285 00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:04,080 me, you know, let's say mentor and bring in the next generation 286 00:14:04,080 --> 00:14:07,600 of speakers And they tend to start there and then move into 287 00:14:07,600 --> 00:14:09,080 other bigger conferences or what they will. 288 00:14:10,040 --> 00:14:12,640 And your experience as a entertainer, dare I say it, 289 00:14:12,640 --> 00:14:14,960 right, as a podcaster, right? It's kind of like what we're 290 00:14:14,960 --> 00:14:17,960 doing here. So 401 Access denied. 291 00:14:17,960 --> 00:14:20,440 Tell me about that podcast. Absolutely. 292 00:14:20,440 --> 00:14:23,680 So, so many, many, many years ago, you know, and around the 293 00:14:23,680 --> 00:14:26,840 late, you know, 2019 or so I was being, I was being a guest on 294 00:14:26,840 --> 00:14:28,240 many podcasts and I really enjoy it. 295 00:14:28,480 --> 00:14:31,000 I enjoy coming on podcasts and I enjoy, you know, speaking with, 296 00:14:31,400 --> 00:14:33,880 you know, amazing people like yourselves 'cause I, I learn a 297 00:14:33,880 --> 00:14:36,760 lot as the conversation's always enlightening. 298 00:14:36,760 --> 00:14:39,680 I was, I like to, to be, you know, learn things. 299 00:14:39,680 --> 00:14:43,640 That's my goal as as I'm a continuous student and one 300 00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:47,080 basically COVID had happened and you find, you know, you weren't 301 00:14:47,080 --> 00:14:48,800 travelling anywhere. I wasn't going to advance. 302 00:14:49,160 --> 00:14:52,160 And I thought at the time, you know, what better way to stay 303 00:14:52,160 --> 00:14:54,880 connected with my peers was to start a podcast. 304 00:14:55,800 --> 00:15:00,120 So started the podcast almost four years ago now. 305 00:15:00,800 --> 00:15:05,560 I said we'd be maybe 3 1/2 four years and it was a way for me 306 00:15:05,560 --> 00:15:09,120 just to stay connected with my peers and having conversations 307 00:15:09,120 --> 00:15:12,840 and, and every you know, it was a it's a bi weekly podcast and 308 00:15:12,840 --> 00:15:14,640 it was thought leaders in the start of shady space. 309 00:15:14,640 --> 00:15:17,600 So it was the opportunity for me just to spend an hour every 310 00:15:17,600 --> 00:15:20,640 couple of weeks talking with friends and we turned into a 311 00:15:20,640 --> 00:15:26,000 podcast and said now a few years later, we're over 110 plus, you 312 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:30,760 know, 115 podcast episodes, just under 400,000 listens across the 313 00:15:30,760 --> 00:15:33,000 episodes. And we do both audio and video 314 00:15:33,000 --> 00:15:34,640 across all the most common platforms. 315 00:15:35,120 --> 00:15:36,560 But we have so many amazing guests. 316 00:15:36,560 --> 00:15:39,760 I've had the likes of Jeff White, who is an amazing 317 00:15:39,760 --> 00:15:43,520 journalist who basically was the author of Lazarus Heist and 318 00:15:43,520 --> 00:15:47,200 Rince. I've had the head of NATO cyber 319 00:15:47,200 --> 00:15:51,440 defence on talking about how NATO are protecting, you know, 320 00:15:51,440 --> 00:15:55,560 countries from security attacks. I've had the head of Europol on 321 00:15:55,560 --> 00:15:58,920 talking about how they're, you know, helping bring cyber 322 00:15:58,920 --> 00:16:01,680 criminals to justice who use digital means. 323 00:16:01,680 --> 00:16:04,920 So it's, it's for me, it's, it's, it's just an opportunity 324 00:16:04,920 --> 00:16:08,400 to, to have fun conversations and, and learn. 325 00:16:09,160 --> 00:16:12,760 So yeah, so the podcast for me is, is it's, it's become, you 326 00:16:12,760 --> 00:16:17,080 know, it's, it's become a passion of mine and to, to 327 00:16:17,080 --> 00:16:19,480 really continue. So it's absolutely we we've got 328 00:16:19,760 --> 00:16:22,600 a lot of similarities in, in, in areas that we can share notes 329 00:16:22,600 --> 00:16:24,640 later. But yeah, the podcast is, it's a 330 00:16:24,640 --> 00:16:28,520 fun, it's a fun podcast similar to this for a open discussion, 331 00:16:29,040 --> 00:16:33,560 talking about industry topics, trends, what's happening, what 332 00:16:33,560 --> 00:16:36,040 techniques are used, and sometimes even just a fun 333 00:16:36,040 --> 00:16:39,360 discussion to, to give the audience something, you know, of 334 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:42,680 a, of a learning and lightning. And so they can be, you know, a 335 00:16:42,680 --> 00:16:45,440 family on the wall kind of observing and, and listening. 336 00:16:45,440 --> 00:16:47,920 And, and at the end, they, they have something that they can 337 00:16:47,920 --> 00:16:51,040 take back to their, their personal career or the company 338 00:16:51,040 --> 00:16:54,040 as well. Yeah, that's also a great name 339 00:16:54,040 --> 00:16:56,880 for the podcast. You know, Jeff and I, we love 340 00:16:56,880 --> 00:17:01,280 podcasting so much and we have, you know, behind the scenes. 341 00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:03,600 He and I will talk about a lot of things and we're like, yeah, 342 00:17:03,600 --> 00:17:06,560 if we had a talked about that on the podcast, we probably would 343 00:17:06,560 --> 00:17:09,079 get cancelled. So we had thought about, OK, 344 00:17:09,079 --> 00:17:13,520 well, maybe we'd have a podcast where we'd have avatars and our 345 00:17:13,520 --> 00:17:16,960 faces would be potatoes. We call it call it Potato Head 346 00:17:16,960 --> 00:17:21,000 chat, but I think maybe what we could call it would be four O 4 347 00:17:21,000 --> 00:17:25,119 not found. You know, that could be our 348 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:30,040 podcast, but you said a lot, Joseph, that interested me and 349 00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:33,560 one of them was just the very fact that First off, I think 350 00:17:33,560 --> 00:17:35,800 you're our first guest from Estonia. 351 00:17:35,800 --> 00:17:38,160 So bravo for that. It's an honor. 352 00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:40,520 Thank you. It's an honor for. 353 00:17:40,520 --> 00:17:42,120 Us no pressure. You're only representing the 354 00:17:42,120 --> 00:17:44,240 everybody. You're only representing the 355 00:17:44,240 --> 00:17:47,680 entire country. Yeah, but it's, I kind of feel 356 00:17:47,680 --> 00:17:52,240 like a scenario has been put up on a pedestal in terms of we all 357 00:17:52,240 --> 00:17:55,400 see what's happening from what, you know, the art of the 358 00:17:55,400 --> 00:17:58,080 possible, if you will. You're actually doing some of 359 00:17:58,080 --> 00:18:00,520 those things around decentralized identity and 360 00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:04,560 things like that. But I if there's some things 361 00:18:04,560 --> 00:18:07,200 that really people aren't aware of, I'd love for you to point 362 00:18:07,200 --> 00:18:10,080 those out. But also, I think, you know, 363 00:18:10,080 --> 00:18:12,920 we've heard about different people's opinions on the 364 00:18:12,920 --> 00:18:17,040 challenges of why what Estonia is doing hasn't really been 365 00:18:17,040 --> 00:18:20,400 replicated in other places. And I'd love to hear your 366 00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:22,680 thoughts on that. Absolutely. 367 00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:25,240 So, so one of the things is, you know, Estonia started this 368 00:18:25,240 --> 00:18:27,960 journey back in the early 90s when the first became, you know, 369 00:18:28,000 --> 00:18:30,640 it was the re independence from the Soviet Union. 370 00:18:31,080 --> 00:18:33,360 And just, I was, I think it's important to start with the 371 00:18:33,760 --> 00:18:35,920 background is why they went on this journey because that's so 372 00:18:35,920 --> 00:18:38,320 fun. It's so critical is back in the 373 00:18:38,320 --> 00:18:41,240 early 90s, one of the major challenges when they became re 374 00:18:41,240 --> 00:18:44,160 independence from, from the Soviet Union was land ownership. 375 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:47,960 And that was basically, you know, when you have a occupying 376 00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:52,240 country, who decides what your education is and decides what 377 00:18:52,240 --> 00:18:54,760 history is? They can change history to be 378 00:18:54,760 --> 00:18:57,640 whatever they want it to be. They can teach in schools their 379 00:18:57,640 --> 00:19:01,000 version of history or their, you know, alternate facts and, and 380 00:19:01,000 --> 00:19:03,400 their perspective of things. And, and it really means that, 381 00:19:03,400 --> 00:19:06,640 you know, history can be forgotten and lost over time if 382 00:19:06,640 --> 00:19:08,160 that is something that continues. 383 00:19:08,600 --> 00:19:12,320 So in the early 90s when, you know, they, they had this kind 384 00:19:12,320 --> 00:19:16,160 of reforming of government and they went into the Land 385 00:19:16,160 --> 00:19:17,560 Registry. And of course, the Land Registry 386 00:19:17,560 --> 00:19:20,040 was all kind of modified. So one of the biggest problems 387 00:19:20,040 --> 00:19:23,200 they had was finding out who owned really what land. 388 00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:26,680 And, you know, people coming, who'd left the country from 389 00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:29,040 Canada. They were coming back from UK 390 00:19:29,040 --> 00:19:32,560 from US all back to Estonia to look at, you know, the families, 391 00:19:32,560 --> 00:19:35,760 birthplaces and you know, where graves and and visit. 392 00:19:36,040 --> 00:19:39,320 And they find all of a sudden this land and manners and houses 393 00:19:39,320 --> 00:19:41,680 built on it and they started reclaiming that. 394 00:19:42,480 --> 00:19:46,040 So made a massive issue. And as I still me was kind of it 395 00:19:46,040 --> 00:19:48,200 was also, you know, the early 90s was the birth of CERN. 396 00:19:48,200 --> 00:19:50,840 It was the, you know, digital computing, decentralized 397 00:19:50,840 --> 00:19:53,040 computing, where desktops were going into everyone's homes. 398 00:19:53,480 --> 00:19:57,080 And so at that time, they said, let's find a way to make sure 399 00:19:57,280 --> 00:19:59,440 that our history can never be erased again. 400 00:19:59,880 --> 00:20:02,080 That was the fundamental that I mean, that was the basis. 401 00:20:02,080 --> 00:20:04,760 Let's make sure that no matter what occupying country that they 402 00:20:04,760 --> 00:20:08,280 cannot erase history. And through the 90s they did all 403 00:20:08,280 --> 00:20:11,800 this research. It was late kind of 9697 when 404 00:20:11,800 --> 00:20:14,920 the few and, and, and Estonia was, was prime at that time 405 00:20:15,160 --> 00:20:18,960 because it was the kind of in the Soviet Union, it was where 406 00:20:18,960 --> 00:20:20,920 all the cryptographers were. It's where all the 407 00:20:20,960 --> 00:20:24,480 mathematicians were, you know, computer scientists. 408 00:20:24,760 --> 00:20:27,240 So that was the right mix of knowledge and education and 409 00:20:27,240 --> 00:20:30,160 bringing those people together. And they said find a solution. 410 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:34,400 And in the 9697 they came up with basically time stamping was 411 00:20:34,400 --> 00:20:36,160 one of the fundamental capabilities. 412 00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:39,160 And that that research is what turned into the birth of their 413 00:20:39,160 --> 00:20:42,800 digital identity because they said is in a physical world. 414 00:20:42,800 --> 00:20:46,360 We want to make sure that in an online digital world also that 415 00:20:46,360 --> 00:20:48,000 we cannot change history as well. 416 00:20:48,440 --> 00:20:52,160 And that whole research spent that, you know, digital identity 417 00:20:52,160 --> 00:20:53,840 became one of the finding pieces. 418 00:20:54,040 --> 00:20:57,280 It was actually digital identity was originally tried in Finland 419 00:20:57,600 --> 00:21:01,160 and field, but it was actually in Estonia where they were able 420 00:21:01,160 --> 00:21:04,240 to make it successful because what they showed was what was 421 00:21:04,240 --> 00:21:07,160 the critical thing that Estonia was successful was showing the 422 00:21:07,160 --> 00:21:09,560 value. That's what all the countries, 423 00:21:09,560 --> 00:21:11,840 other countries who have tried this have put it as an 424 00:21:11,840 --> 00:21:15,680 enforcement as you know, it's, it's you had to do it because it 425 00:21:15,680 --> 00:21:18,160 you know what'll make us better. But what what they weren't doing 426 00:21:18,160 --> 00:21:20,800 was showing the value. That was the that was and that 427 00:21:20,800 --> 00:21:23,000 was also education. That was years of education 428 00:21:23,000 --> 00:21:25,240 before had to show the citizens what's coming. 429 00:21:25,600 --> 00:21:29,080 And the value was that you can go fill in your tax form and 430 00:21:29,080 --> 00:21:32,520 spend half a day standing in queue, parking your car, filling 431 00:21:32,520 --> 00:21:34,560 in forms. Or you can go and use this new 432 00:21:34,560 --> 00:21:37,120 online system with a digital identity that you can do it in 433 00:21:37,120 --> 00:21:40,400 15 to 20 minutes. And people are like, you know, 434 00:21:40,520 --> 00:21:44,840 there's there's no like if I even want to save half of my day 435 00:21:44,840 --> 00:21:47,680 wasted time, I can do it online and get it done with. 436 00:21:47,680 --> 00:21:50,520 And not only can I do it online with the tax office, but I can 437 00:21:50,520 --> 00:21:54,160 now do my banking online, I can do my population register 438 00:21:54,160 --> 00:21:57,320 online, I can do my vehicle license online, everything. 439 00:21:57,320 --> 00:22:00,240 It just started that snowball fact is that when people started 440 00:22:00,240 --> 00:22:05,160 seeing the value and how much time it was saving them, they 441 00:22:05,160 --> 00:22:08,000 basically quickly migrated to using the digital online 442 00:22:08,000 --> 00:22:10,080 services that came with that digital identity. 443 00:22:10,640 --> 00:22:12,760 And of course, with that comes all the security, you know, 444 00:22:12,800 --> 00:22:15,400 capabilities. And one of the things that some 445 00:22:15,400 --> 00:22:17,160 of the government was like, well, you know, we want to make 446 00:22:17,160 --> 00:22:20,520 sure that people have trust in the system because trust is one 447 00:22:20,520 --> 00:22:22,760 of the fundamentals. And one of the ways that the 448 00:22:22,760 --> 00:22:25,840 government tried to get around is that so that they're not seen 449 00:22:25,840 --> 00:22:30,640 as the ability to change history was that they use blockchain. 450 00:22:30,760 --> 00:22:33,920 So 2002, 2003 was implemented blockchain, the bases. 451 00:22:34,200 --> 00:22:36,320 And of course, we know blockchain and cryptocurrencies 452 00:22:36,320 --> 00:22:38,640 and audit, you know, one repeat all of those things. 453 00:22:39,360 --> 00:22:42,560 But the fundamental piece there was to make sure that they go 454 00:22:42,560 --> 00:22:45,600 through the concatenation, they get the root hash. 455 00:22:45,960 --> 00:22:48,560 And then what they actually do is they take that root hash and 456 00:22:48,560 --> 00:22:50,640 they print it in the Financial Times newspaper. 457 00:22:50,920 --> 00:22:53,320 So that means that even the government themselves cannot 458 00:22:53,320 --> 00:22:56,000 change history after that event has occurred. 459 00:22:56,360 --> 00:22:58,520 And that's what builds trust. It's builds trust in the 460 00:22:58,520 --> 00:23:00,360 society. Societies start trusting because 461 00:23:00,560 --> 00:23:03,160 they can self audit the government and they can also 462 00:23:03,160 --> 00:23:05,440 check the audit logs and everything else to see, you 463 00:23:05,440 --> 00:23:09,040 know, has anything been changed. So that's where, you know, 464 00:23:09,040 --> 00:23:10,840 Estonia's been really kind of cycle. 465 00:23:10,840 --> 00:23:13,240 The problem is that when other countries have looked at this 466 00:23:13,840 --> 00:23:17,200 and tried to replicate it, they started thinking, well, 467 00:23:17,200 --> 00:23:20,680 Estonia's a small country, it's got 1.31 point, 4 million 468 00:23:20,680 --> 00:23:22,280 people. That's why they were successful. 469 00:23:22,280 --> 00:23:23,560 Oh, they started with a clean slate. 470 00:23:23,560 --> 00:23:25,080 They don't have the legacy systems. 471 00:23:25,680 --> 00:23:29,240 That's why they were successful. It's a very well connected on, 472 00:23:29,240 --> 00:23:33,200 you know, society technically wise from mobile data and 473 00:23:33,440 --> 00:23:35,360 online. That's why they're successful. 474 00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:38,000 Yes, those are all reasons why they're successful. 475 00:23:38,280 --> 00:23:40,880 But what they've been able to do is being able to look and 476 00:23:40,880 --> 00:23:44,760 understand education in the society, doing the services, 477 00:23:44,760 --> 00:23:48,880 showing the value, showing the trust, building auditability 478 00:23:49,080 --> 00:23:51,560 from the citizens to the government, showing it's a front 479 00:23:51,560 --> 00:23:53,600 door, that this is a way. And one of the things that's 480 00:23:53,600 --> 00:23:57,080 over time built is that the citizens, you know, the last 481 00:23:57,080 --> 00:24:00,120 time a citizen visit has visited a government office, it's 482 00:24:00,120 --> 00:24:04,560 probably in in years, you know, even for voting and for renewing 483 00:24:04,560 --> 00:24:07,280 licenses and registration and changing your address. 484 00:24:07,600 --> 00:24:09,560 It's been years since they've had the visit office. 485 00:24:10,600 --> 00:24:12,320 And that's one of the things is that, you know, the government 486 00:24:12,320 --> 00:24:15,280 has got the point where that that with the value of the 487 00:24:15,280 --> 00:24:17,800 citizens is two things is that they don't have to talk to a 488 00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:21,240 government official. And, and at the same time, 489 00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:23,680 they're reducing waste of time. And the calculation of that, if 490 00:24:23,680 --> 00:24:27,920 you get into, you know, even the value of, of saving of time is 491 00:24:27,920 --> 00:24:33,000 that they calculate it in basically GDP, they say per year 492 00:24:33,320 --> 00:24:35,880 and there are about five to six days GDP, say per year. 493 00:24:36,120 --> 00:24:38,320 And that calculates into about 2 1/2 billion EUR. 494 00:24:38,760 --> 00:24:42,000 So you show, you know, the value of the value of the value and 495 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:45,360 that's what's critical. So over time, Estonia society is 496 00:24:45,360 --> 00:24:48,200 really kind of that's become, it's actually ingrained in the 497 00:24:48,200 --> 00:24:51,560 culture now. And it means that also when 498 00:24:51,560 --> 00:24:54,640 things like COVID happen, people could still work safely. 499 00:24:54,720 --> 00:24:56,520 They could work from home very easily. 500 00:24:57,400 --> 00:25:00,480 It was actually interesting because typically Estonians, if 501 00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:03,200 you see a bus stop that will stand as far apart as possible 502 00:25:03,200 --> 00:25:05,960 from each other. And they said when when they 503 00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:09,960 removed that restrictions of two meters, they were unhappy 504 00:25:10,200 --> 00:25:13,240 because now they could, they could go back to further 505 00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:16,240 distance away. So it really gets into, you 506 00:25:16,240 --> 00:25:20,320 know, that now it's become so ingrained that even, you know, 507 00:25:20,320 --> 00:25:23,920 voting majority this year and last year when the voting in the 508 00:25:23,920 --> 00:25:28,360 elections is more people voted online than in person. 509 00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:31,320 And that shows that, you know, it become it's now that 510 00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:34,960 generation changed as well, where the the next generation 511 00:25:34,960 --> 00:25:37,880 are starting to become those digital nomads, natives. 512 00:25:38,840 --> 00:25:41,960 And, and they're continuing that evolution as well as in in 513 00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:45,320 recent years, they've also added artificial intelligence into 514 00:25:45,320 --> 00:25:48,200 that mix as well. And with artificial 515 00:25:48,200 --> 00:25:51,520 intelligence, you know, to the point where things have done 516 00:25:51,520 --> 00:25:54,040 really well as things like the medical records and E 517 00:25:54,040 --> 00:25:57,000 prescriptions and E voting and all of those things have done 518 00:25:57,000 --> 00:26:00,160 fantastic. But for me, this what was 519 00:26:00,520 --> 00:26:03,880 artificial intelligence agent, which is known as CRAT. 520 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:06,720 Now, interestingly, I had a big conversation with the CIO at the 521 00:26:06,720 --> 00:26:14,520 time seems secret. So and he's the CIO and he was 522 00:26:14,520 --> 00:26:16,120 talking about this crat, crat, Crat. 523 00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:19,280 And and if you understand kind of Estonian, you know, 524 00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:22,560 methodological history, Crat is a little creature. 525 00:26:22,560 --> 00:26:24,720 So it's it's a story, story fairy tale. 526 00:26:25,080 --> 00:26:28,720 And it's this creature that at night time, it comes into your 527 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:33,720 room when you're sleeping and it steals your, your kind of your 528 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:35,960 thoughts and your memories for its master. 529 00:26:36,480 --> 00:26:39,440 And I'm going, how is the government going to sell this to 530 00:26:39,440 --> 00:26:42,360 the citizens? How, how are they going to take 531 00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:46,440 crap that's going to be a government technology that's 532 00:26:46,440 --> 00:26:48,400 going to come and steal your memories when you're sleeping? 533 00:26:48,400 --> 00:26:50,760 How, how are citizens going to accept this? 534 00:26:51,680 --> 00:26:53,840 And it wasn't until later when I started seeing the 535 00:26:53,920 --> 00:26:56,480 implementation of it was that it's really about 536 00:26:56,480 --> 00:26:59,520 interoperability. So Sony has done a really great 537 00:26:59,520 --> 00:27:01,920 job in dropping, but across multiple systems, I can 538 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:04,920 authenticate in one area. I can laterally move across 539 00:27:05,080 --> 00:27:09,560 depending on what let's say trust or or risk level that you 540 00:27:09,560 --> 00:27:12,040 come in under at the beginning. That will determine how you can 541 00:27:12,040 --> 00:27:13,960 laterally move across systems without having to re 542 00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:17,480 authenticate again. And you know, the idea is that 543 00:27:17,480 --> 00:27:22,240 when you fill in like let's say you do a process one time, such 544 00:27:22,240 --> 00:27:24,800 as, you know, let's say a postal package comes, you have to do a 545 00:27:24,800 --> 00:27:27,440 declaration about what that package is. 546 00:27:27,560 --> 00:27:29,120 You might have to pay import tax. 547 00:27:29,320 --> 00:27:32,600 Then you have to go and pay to the bank and do the exchange. 548 00:27:32,600 --> 00:27:35,040 And then you have to tell the post office where to send that 549 00:27:35,040 --> 00:27:37,480 package. And you do that one time, the 550 00:27:37,480 --> 00:27:41,040 crap bot remembers the what you did. 551 00:27:41,320 --> 00:27:44,720 And the next time that same activity comes again, you can 552 00:27:44,720 --> 00:27:47,440 say repeat the same process that I did last time. 553 00:27:47,760 --> 00:27:50,440 So it's really the automation. It becomes the citizen's 554 00:27:50,440 --> 00:27:53,520 assistant to remembering all the things I've done in the past. 555 00:27:53,840 --> 00:27:57,360 So when I realized, you know, the crap bot, it's, it's not 556 00:27:57,360 --> 00:27:59,480 stealing the memories, what it's saying, it's remembering my 557 00:27:59,480 --> 00:28:03,400 preferences and choices so that the next time things come, so 558 00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:07,360 I'm not wasting my time, I can just simply ask my the crap or 559 00:28:07,360 --> 00:28:09,400 the AI assistant to do it for me. 560 00:28:09,640 --> 00:28:13,200 I still have to authenticate myself, yes. 561 00:28:13,480 --> 00:28:17,560 And I still have to authorize the action of the bot to do the 562 00:28:17,560 --> 00:28:21,080 action or the task that I want to do still is those actions. 563 00:28:21,400 --> 00:28:24,120 But there's no typing. There's no, you know, decision 564 00:28:24,120 --> 00:28:26,240 making. I just say do what I did before. 565 00:28:26,720 --> 00:28:31,160 So that's really about making the user experience more simple. 566 00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:35,120 I can tell for one thing from, you know, that answer to that 567 00:28:35,120 --> 00:28:40,400 one question, the reason why Martin Cooper recommended you 568 00:28:40,400 --> 00:28:42,280 for the podcast, he's like, you've got to get this guy on 569 00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:45,920 the podcast. Very insightful, knows 570 00:28:45,920 --> 00:28:48,680 everything about every or a lot about everything. 571 00:28:49,040 --> 00:28:50,640 You surround myself with smart people. 572 00:28:51,480 --> 00:28:52,960 Surround yourself with smart people. 573 00:28:52,960 --> 00:28:54,920 That's that's a smart thing to do. 574 00:28:55,760 --> 00:28:58,560 But as you're going, I'm, I'm sitting here like I've got to 575 00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:02,520 pick your brain on a topic that's specific to the identity 576 00:29:02,520 --> 00:29:06,160 space and one that I'm hot on, but I want to see where you 577 00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:09,600 fall. So this idea of ITDR, really, 578 00:29:09,600 --> 00:29:14,440 it's like identity intelligent monitoring in my book. 579 00:29:14,760 --> 00:29:16,640 And then there's the response part. 580 00:29:17,000 --> 00:29:19,560 Let's set that aside because I think that's just an automation 581 00:29:19,560 --> 00:29:22,400 piece and etcetera. And maybe there's way more to it 582 00:29:22,400 --> 00:29:27,080 than that, but it's really about identity intelligent monitoring, 583 00:29:27,600 --> 00:29:30,320 at least for me. I want to know what you think of 584 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:33,880 ITDR and where do you see it five years down the road? 585 00:29:34,000 --> 00:29:35,920 I think that's the real question. 586 00:29:36,440 --> 00:29:38,760 That's a, that's a fantastic question and it really gets into 587 00:29:38,760 --> 00:29:43,080 a lot of the things I've been doing research wise into looking 588 00:29:43,080 --> 00:29:45,080 at. A lot of the activities I do is 589 00:29:45,080 --> 00:29:48,560 I get sometimes called into these, you know, massive data 590 00:29:48,560 --> 00:29:51,400 breaches or incidents. So I'm used as a subject matter 591 00:29:51,400 --> 00:29:53,000 expert. So I'm sometimes allowed to go 592 00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:55,920 in and help organizations to become victims to recover. 593 00:29:56,120 --> 00:29:58,120 It could be, you know, data extortion attack. 594 00:29:58,120 --> 00:30:00,960 It could be from a identity theft, an insider, or it could 595 00:30:00,960 --> 00:30:04,080 be from a data breach right through to ransomware victims. 596 00:30:04,520 --> 00:30:08,040 So one of my expertise is going in and you know, let's take, you 597 00:30:08,040 --> 00:30:10,680 know, one of the skills that I have is going through all of the 598 00:30:10,680 --> 00:30:13,960 event logs, all of the scene logs, all of the activities to 599 00:30:13,960 --> 00:30:17,440 identify, you know, the attack path that the attackers came in 600 00:30:17,600 --> 00:30:21,120 and how they moved around, how they gained access, how they 601 00:30:21,120 --> 00:30:23,480 elevated privileges. So that's a lot of the research 602 00:30:23,480 --> 00:30:25,800 that I do. And the great thing is that when 603 00:30:25,800 --> 00:30:29,280 we look at new kind of areas, technologies and and advancement 604 00:30:29,280 --> 00:30:34,160 such as text response, IDTR is that they're taking the skill 605 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:37,600 set that I have and automating my knowledge to be able to do it 606 00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:41,120 repeatable faster. And be able to make sure that 607 00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:44,160 either in a pre beat breach that you'll be able to identify 608 00:30:44,160 --> 00:30:47,480 potential attackers much earlier or that in a post breach, to be 609 00:30:47,480 --> 00:30:50,080 able to accelerate and find out potentially how they moved 610 00:30:50,080 --> 00:30:53,080 around, how they gain access and therefore being able to mitigate 611 00:30:53,080 --> 00:30:55,200 and lock them out. And because typically, you know, 612 00:30:55,200 --> 00:30:57,320 in those scenarios, the attackers typically are still 613 00:30:57,320 --> 00:30:59,640 high persistence, they're still on your network and you want to 614 00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:03,080 find it as quickly as possible. So it's a really great way to be 615 00:31:03,080 --> 00:31:06,320 able to look at all of the different methods or techniques 616 00:31:06,320 --> 00:31:09,920 that attackers currently use and look across your identity fabric 617 00:31:09,920 --> 00:31:13,000 or identity framework or identity event logs and 618 00:31:13,000 --> 00:31:16,640 information to be able to quickly determine is there any 619 00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:19,640 indicators of an attack happening on your network 620 00:31:19,640 --> 00:31:21,600 immediately. And then you get into that 621 00:31:21,600 --> 00:31:23,760 response pieces that let's take remediation. 622 00:31:23,760 --> 00:31:26,800 Let's maybe, you know, stop that person from having an access, 623 00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:30,320 let's change the password, potentially enforce a re 624 00:31:30,320 --> 00:31:33,400 authentication. Let's level up their security 625 00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:35,480 controls and require multi factor authentication. 626 00:31:35,840 --> 00:31:39,720 Let's monitor that session. Let's turn it into a, let's say 627 00:31:39,720 --> 00:31:41,840 a, a, a non recorded session to recorded session. 628 00:31:42,200 --> 00:31:45,760 And then start looking at the, the activities and context of 629 00:31:45,760 --> 00:31:49,160 what that person's been doing. Let's prevent them having access 630 00:31:49,160 --> 00:31:52,080 to more sensitive data, maybe customer data or financial 631 00:31:52,080 --> 00:31:54,480 information. So it's really taking the action 632 00:31:54,800 --> 00:31:58,080 and limiting the attack surface that that, you know, identity 633 00:31:58,080 --> 00:32:01,040 has on the, on the infrastructure, whether on 634 00:32:01,040 --> 00:32:03,480 premise where it would be in the edge or in the cloud or, you 635 00:32:03,480 --> 00:32:06,080 know, in your data. So for me that, you know, that 636 00:32:06,200 --> 00:32:10,680 ITDR is a massive array of, of, of really value to organizations 637 00:32:10,680 --> 00:32:15,000 because it can help you. One is to cover discover attacks 638 00:32:15,000 --> 00:32:17,640 and threats much earlier and prevent them leading into 639 00:32:17,640 --> 00:32:20,720 something of very big catastrophe or in a post breach. 640 00:32:20,960 --> 00:32:24,560 It can help you identify quickly the attack path and then make 641 00:32:24,560 --> 00:32:27,160 sure you're able to shut the door and put better security 642 00:32:27,160 --> 00:32:29,640 controls that would, you know, allow that attacker to move 643 00:32:29,640 --> 00:32:31,960 around. Now it's kind of where it's 644 00:32:31,960 --> 00:32:36,960 going is we're having this big kind of, let's say, acceleration 645 00:32:36,960 --> 00:32:39,640 into, you know, we've had the identity access management space 646 00:32:39,640 --> 00:32:42,440 for a long time. You know, we've had basically 647 00:32:42,440 --> 00:32:47,880 SSOMSAID, PS:, all of that IDAS side of things. 648 00:32:48,240 --> 00:32:50,680 And what we're seeing is that converging, it's really turning 649 00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:53,360 into an authentication experience end to end. 650 00:32:53,720 --> 00:32:56,560 So the authentication is really about, you know, me kind of 651 00:32:56,840 --> 00:32:59,440 proving I'm really me. That's all to me, what we're 652 00:32:59,440 --> 00:33:00,760 saying. And and I've talked to, you 653 00:33:00,760 --> 00:33:04,360 know, my kind of vision in this space is that it's an evolution 654 00:33:04,360 --> 00:33:07,440 of basically where we've had bring your own device, you know, 655 00:33:07,520 --> 00:33:10,840 I'd say 15 years ago to where, you know, the last five years 656 00:33:10,840 --> 00:33:14,160 has been bring your own office, working remotely, people 657 00:33:14,160 --> 00:33:15,840 bringing their own printers and their own devices. 658 00:33:16,120 --> 00:33:19,160 And it's moving into where you start seeing this conversions of 659 00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:22,840 the consumer identity, where it's bring your own identity. 660 00:33:23,200 --> 00:33:26,440 And I really do see that in that authentication space, there will 661 00:33:26,440 --> 00:33:28,920 be an IDP that's, you know, you're bringing on Zente, but 662 00:33:29,080 --> 00:33:31,800 organizations may want to add more security controls and, and, 663 00:33:31,800 --> 00:33:34,680 and you know, verification to that to trusted ID. 664 00:33:34,680 --> 00:33:37,040 PS So there'll be different levels of, you know, 665 00:33:37,480 --> 00:33:39,600 authentication. So that's where you're starting 666 00:33:39,600 --> 00:33:42,760 to see that whole IM direction. And then the other side of it is 667 00:33:42,760 --> 00:33:46,000 basically where you've had things like Palm and IDDR and 668 00:33:46,400 --> 00:33:50,840 you've had chem and auth, your authentication, even multi 669 00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:52,480 factor authentication falls into that area. 670 00:33:52,760 --> 00:33:53,960 And they're all convergence as well. 671 00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:56,240 They're all moving into an authorization experience. 672 00:33:56,600 --> 00:34:00,360 It's all about now, OK, Joe's come in and I've proven who I am 673 00:34:00,360 --> 00:34:04,360 from authentication role. Now what am I allowed to do 674 00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:07,240 after I've proven who I am? What things can I do? 675 00:34:07,240 --> 00:34:09,280 You know, can I access the server? 676 00:34:09,280 --> 00:34:11,760 Can I log into this application? Can I view this data? 677 00:34:11,760 --> 00:34:13,679 Can I make these changes? And that's really the 678 00:34:13,679 --> 00:34:16,239 authorization experience. And then sitting across that's a 679 00:34:16,239 --> 00:34:19,760 whole governance layer about, you know, what has Joe been 680 00:34:19,760 --> 00:34:22,000 doing across the network? And that's where you can take 681 00:34:22,000 --> 00:34:25,080 all of those pieces and put it into IDDR and determine about, 682 00:34:25,360 --> 00:34:28,280 you know, should I be, you know, logging in at that time? 683 00:34:28,360 --> 00:34:31,480 Should I be accessing that system and have I ever done it 684 00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:33,960 before? And then determining, you know, 685 00:34:33,960 --> 00:34:37,600 OK, if that's a baseline, let's make sure that we put a risk 686 00:34:37,600 --> 00:34:40,920 score against that so that the IDDR can say this is something 687 00:34:40,920 --> 00:34:43,840 of an anomaly that we should actually either send to a seam 688 00:34:44,880 --> 00:34:47,679 out of additional security controls or just going to be a 689 00:34:47,679 --> 00:34:50,159 bit more cautious with this particular session activity. 690 00:34:50,520 --> 00:34:52,960 So this really getting into and, and it's moving, you know, 691 00:34:52,960 --> 00:34:55,320 there's two major areas. I've been talking to a lot of 692 00:34:55,320 --> 00:34:58,880 analysts over the last year, and this is turning into an identity 693 00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:03,080 security posture management, which is then combining with 694 00:35:03,080 --> 00:35:04,400 data security posture management. 695 00:35:04,600 --> 00:35:06,960 We're starting to see more identity controls moving away 696 00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:10,360 from the the me and those identity controls moving to the 697 00:35:10,360 --> 00:35:12,360 data. And the data will then in, in, 698 00:35:12,360 --> 00:35:15,880 in a dynamic way, determine whether I'm allowed the access 699 00:35:15,880 --> 00:35:17,720 real time. So it's going to be an 700 00:35:17,720 --> 00:35:19,960 interesting space. But the one thing that's going 701 00:35:19,960 --> 00:35:23,960 to change to, to, to Jim, your question is that a lot of these 702 00:35:23,960 --> 00:35:26,800 ALAI algorithms will be self learning. 703 00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:29,000 And, and my role in the future might be just training the 704 00:35:29,000 --> 00:35:32,080 algorithm. It'll be taking the new threats 705 00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:35,880 and indicators of compromise and showing the algorithm how to 706 00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:39,560 detect and then applying that across, you know, entire 707 00:35:39,560 --> 00:35:43,880 platforms and entire data sets to be able to quickly identify 708 00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:45,880 potentially areas of, of threats. 709 00:35:46,240 --> 00:35:48,600 Ultimately what we're doing here is, you know, we're really 710 00:35:48,840 --> 00:35:52,800 accelerating the ability to, to, you know, I, I will say it's 711 00:35:52,800 --> 00:35:55,800 like, it's like you're sitting in a lake and what we're doing 712 00:35:55,800 --> 00:35:59,120 is we're, we're, we're, we're trying to force the attackers to 713 00:35:59,120 --> 00:36:02,720 create ripples in the water so we can see potentially where the 714 00:36:02,720 --> 00:36:05,200 threat is. It's forcing them to use 715 00:36:05,200 --> 00:36:09,440 techniques which are noisy, that they make it more difficult for 716 00:36:09,440 --> 00:36:13,280 them and ultimately they deter them to going looking for 717 00:36:13,280 --> 00:36:14,880 another victim. He doesn't have these types of 718 00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:19,200 technology controls in place. I love that analogy of the lake, 719 00:36:19,640 --> 00:36:23,640 you know, you, you, you, we, we, we get into the space of 720 00:36:23,680 --> 00:36:26,560 identity and access management and digital identity. 721 00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:29,080 And we've done a show on this that's been one of our more 722 00:36:29,080 --> 00:36:31,480 popular ones. We went out and we asked a whole 723 00:36:31,480 --> 00:36:34,600 bunch of people what is the difference between digital 724 00:36:34,600 --> 00:36:36,920 identity and identity and access management? 725 00:36:37,480 --> 00:36:40,840 And we've gotten a different answer every time. 726 00:36:41,600 --> 00:36:44,280 So I'm going to ask you, Joseph, what is the difference between 727 00:36:44,280 --> 00:36:46,520 digital identity and identity and access management? 728 00:36:46,880 --> 00:36:48,920 It is a great question. And sometimes they've been used 729 00:36:49,280 --> 00:36:52,800 inter exchangeable, but a digital identity is what 730 00:36:52,800 --> 00:36:58,040 associates me to basically authentication or an online 731 00:36:58,040 --> 00:36:59,600 system. It's it's, it's the person. 732 00:36:59,960 --> 00:37:02,080 It's tying it back to me as the human. 733 00:37:02,080 --> 00:37:05,160 A digital identity, when you look at IMIM, sits across 734 00:37:05,160 --> 00:37:07,760 multiple types of identities, not just human, but machines, 735 00:37:07,760 --> 00:37:12,160 but keys, code, systems. So identity access management 736 00:37:12,160 --> 00:37:15,320 is, you know, more about the authentication and the access 737 00:37:15,320 --> 00:37:18,040 control side. A digital entity identity is 738 00:37:18,040 --> 00:37:21,120 just a static object that, you know, associates to me. 739 00:37:22,720 --> 00:37:26,480 So you think about, you know, I always go back to it. 740 00:37:26,480 --> 00:37:28,440 It's how this industry's progressed over time. 741 00:37:28,440 --> 00:37:31,680 We have to look back at where we started off and sometimes it was 742 00:37:31,680 --> 00:37:33,880 basically, you know, in this space, we used to call it 743 00:37:33,880 --> 00:37:36,400 account management. You know, it used to be account 744 00:37:36,400 --> 00:37:40,640 management because we only had one or maybe 2 and it kind of 745 00:37:40,640 --> 00:37:45,240 goes back to the object and it was so, so tied back to me and 746 00:37:45,240 --> 00:37:47,160 it was the association. So when I look at, you know, 747 00:37:47,160 --> 00:37:50,320 even how you know, it's tied back in Estonia today is the 748 00:37:50,640 --> 00:37:56,080 digital gently is association as me and it's the attributes to me 749 00:37:56,080 --> 00:37:59,120 as the human. And it's my digital DNA for 750 00:37:59,120 --> 00:38:02,760 online activity. And I might have multiple 751 00:38:03,200 --> 00:38:06,600 identities, digital identities that associates back to me. 752 00:38:07,640 --> 00:38:10,200 So it's, it's, you know, I'm the connection between them. 753 00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:14,880 When you look at IMIM is the policies that'll determines what 754 00:38:14,880 --> 00:38:18,240 I can do with each of those individual identities to target 755 00:38:18,240 --> 00:38:21,560 systems, to applications, to code, to resources. 756 00:38:21,840 --> 00:38:26,840 So it's the IM pieces, the tie to my, of my digital identity to 757 00:38:26,840 --> 00:38:30,280 a target system. So it's, it's, it's, it's almost 758 00:38:30,320 --> 00:38:34,200 like a, an object of, of an extension, but a digital 759 00:38:34,200 --> 00:38:37,000 identity is ultimately, you know, association with me as the 760 00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:41,720 human. May I go back and forth on do 761 00:38:41,720 --> 00:38:45,920 things have identities? And I generally come down on no, 762 00:38:45,920 --> 00:38:49,440 they don't. And I think folks in our 763 00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:52,320 industry, the majority say yes to you. 764 00:38:53,080 --> 00:38:58,720 Devices have identities and things have identities. 765 00:38:58,720 --> 00:39:03,520 So, you know, I've got a thermometer or thermostat on my 766 00:39:03,520 --> 00:39:07,360 wall and it can connect and it's got an IP address. 767 00:39:08,920 --> 00:39:10,720 I don't think it has an identity. 768 00:39:11,000 --> 00:39:13,560 I think it's a device that belongs to me. 769 00:39:13,800 --> 00:39:17,000 I'm the identity. I mean, let's say you so. 770 00:39:18,840 --> 00:39:20,680 It's a great question and great point. 771 00:39:21,240 --> 00:39:24,520 I, I do can, I mean calling it a digital identity because I'm all 772 00:39:24,520 --> 00:39:26,760 association digital identities back to the human side. 773 00:39:27,480 --> 00:39:30,640 It can have, you know, the machine identity side of things. 774 00:39:30,640 --> 00:39:34,120 You know, it really evolved from how to manage asset management. 775 00:39:34,360 --> 00:39:36,400 That's ultimately kind of where it started from when we think 776 00:39:36,400 --> 00:39:39,080 about even it has its foundations going back to 777 00:39:39,080 --> 00:39:41,880 license management. License management is really 778 00:39:41,880 --> 00:39:44,080 where all of this started was, you know, we look back to even 779 00:39:44,080 --> 00:39:46,960 Microsoft licenses. It was, you know, five pieces of 780 00:39:46,960 --> 00:39:50,760 hardware that was used to basically create a a GUID that 781 00:39:50,760 --> 00:39:52,960 would then tie back that this machine's using that. 782 00:39:53,880 --> 00:39:56,840 So it was a really to kind of do asset management and tagging in 783 00:39:56,840 --> 00:39:59,160 some regards. But what we started seeing is, 784 00:39:59,160 --> 00:40:01,200 you know, and not necessarily, you know, I. 785 00:40:02,760 --> 00:40:05,600 We might not have devices that have owners as well associated 786 00:40:05,600 --> 00:40:07,320 back to humans. Those devices might be doing 787 00:40:07,320 --> 00:40:09,600 workloads, they might be just doing processing. 788 00:40:09,600 --> 00:40:14,400 It might be a workload needing having access to a specific 789 00:40:14,400 --> 00:40:16,320 piece of data or computational power. 790 00:40:17,200 --> 00:40:19,200 But you know, calling it an identity. 791 00:40:19,560 --> 00:40:22,320 I agree that, you know, maybe the term is not right, but it 792 00:40:22,320 --> 00:40:26,600 does have some type of asset tagging, which which, you know, 793 00:40:27,080 --> 00:40:30,600 it just means that you have to be able to somewhat understand 794 00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:34,240 that it's this piece of code that's doing the the, you know, 795 00:40:34,240 --> 00:40:38,880 the access or is this, you know, specific machine that the access 796 00:40:38,880 --> 00:40:41,320 is coming from. So you do have to have some sort 797 00:40:41,320 --> 00:40:43,360 of tagging and asset identification. 798 00:40:44,560 --> 00:40:46,880 And I think that's just, you know, some, some people has just 799 00:40:46,880 --> 00:40:48,880 made it simpler. I used to call it non human 800 00:40:48,880 --> 00:40:52,280 identities, people called machine identities, asset 801 00:40:52,280 --> 00:40:55,560 identities, asset tags. There's lots of different names 802 00:40:55,560 --> 00:41:01,720 we can call it, but ultimate, it's ultimate to to to source of 803 00:41:01,720 --> 00:41:04,480 origin of what, you know, what the specific resource is doing 804 00:41:04,840 --> 00:41:06,120 and why does it need to have access. 805 00:41:06,120 --> 00:41:08,400 And I think one of the biggest things is as we moved to cloud, 806 00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:11,840 it was a it was a lot more as we moved to just just in time 807 00:41:11,840 --> 00:41:14,280 access. We need to have some ways and 808 00:41:14,280 --> 00:41:16,520 that that gets into the challenge of doing digital 809 00:41:16,520 --> 00:41:19,000 forensics and cloud and and that's why we need to have some 810 00:41:19,000 --> 00:41:22,720 sort of at least asset association or tagging so. 811 00:41:23,400 --> 00:41:24,560 I think we could get to the point. 812 00:41:24,560 --> 00:41:26,080 I think it's easier to just call it an identity. 813 00:41:26,720 --> 00:41:29,320 I think we could get to the point of with robotics and 814 00:41:29,320 --> 00:41:34,640 artificial intelligence, where it's so indiscernible that the 815 00:41:35,880 --> 00:41:39,560 AI is doing so many human activities that it actually 816 00:41:39,560 --> 00:41:43,280 becomes an identity. I agree. 817 00:41:43,280 --> 00:41:47,720 So I mean AI agents you know do have an identity associated to 818 00:41:47,720 --> 00:41:50,240 them. It's simply just an account that 819 00:41:50,240 --> 00:41:53,800 it gives it some type of access or, you know, authorization into 820 00:41:54,040 --> 00:41:56,760 performing a specific task. And that could be basically a 821 00:41:56,760 --> 00:42:00,080 persistent, you know, authorization or could be just 822 00:42:00,080 --> 00:42:02,240 in time authorization or just in time access. 823 00:42:03,120 --> 00:42:05,960 But absolutely right is that, you know, I, I, I don't see them 824 00:42:05,960 --> 00:42:09,040 as, you know, becoming sentient, you know, that they become 825 00:42:09,040 --> 00:42:11,840 operating in their own, making their own decisions. 826 00:42:12,760 --> 00:42:15,920 There's two things that I refer to as when we look at AI agents 827 00:42:15,920 --> 00:42:19,400 or even I look at the AI bot that it's only created with the 828 00:42:19,400 --> 00:42:22,400 Kraft bot. It's an, it's an assistant to 829 00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:25,480 humans. It's not to replace humans, It's 830 00:42:25,480 --> 00:42:28,040 just to augment the decisions we make. 831 00:42:28,920 --> 00:42:31,600 And it's either two things. It's either basically assisted 832 00:42:31,600 --> 00:42:34,720 technology, meaning that it's going to provide, let's say 833 00:42:35,080 --> 00:42:38,760 augmented intelligence to helping me make decisions, which 834 00:42:38,760 --> 00:42:42,800 is, you know, I'm going to decide the action that that AI 835 00:42:42,800 --> 00:42:45,680 agent will take. It will show me options and I 836 00:42:45,680 --> 00:42:48,640 will decide which one to take. Then once we'll get to a certain 837 00:42:48,640 --> 00:42:52,480 point is we'll make, let's say autonomous actions, meaning that 838 00:42:52,720 --> 00:42:55,280 I will allow that agent to operate on my behalf. 839 00:42:55,800 --> 00:42:59,200 But I want to be able to audit, you know, you know, explain 840 00:42:59,200 --> 00:43:02,480 ability into how that will actually, you know, that that 841 00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:05,320 result will happen. And of course, they will be 842 00:43:05,320 --> 00:43:08,440 potentially less, you know, harmful or, or damaging types of 843 00:43:08,440 --> 00:43:11,880 actions, but things you might just say, you know, file my tax 844 00:43:11,880 --> 00:43:14,720 returns on my behalf. And, you know, I, I don't need 845 00:43:14,720 --> 00:43:16,000 to, you know, just show me the results. 846 00:43:16,120 --> 00:43:17,400 I don't want to have to deal with it. 847 00:43:17,800 --> 00:43:20,000 I've done it the same way for the last five years in a row. 848 00:43:20,240 --> 00:43:23,280 Why would they do the same? Or even voting, you know, I 849 00:43:23,280 --> 00:43:26,440 voted the same way the last few years, unless I'm going to 850 00:43:26,440 --> 00:43:29,240 change my decision. Maybe, you know, you're going, 851 00:43:29,240 --> 00:43:32,640 you know, intervene with the algorithm and say I I'm having 852 00:43:32,640 --> 00:43:34,920 questions or, you know, you might put, you know, responses 853 00:43:34,920 --> 00:43:36,920 in. But a lot of times, you know, 854 00:43:36,920 --> 00:43:39,560 what we're going to be able to do is that they will be, you 855 00:43:39,560 --> 00:43:42,080 know, extensions. It's, it's not going to be 856 00:43:42,080 --> 00:43:44,320 identities by themselves. It'll be an extension tour 857 00:43:44,320 --> 00:43:48,640 identity as identity assistants. I, I think that's what they 858 00:43:48,640 --> 00:43:50,920 originally were, were trying to do many years ago when we had 859 00:43:50,920 --> 00:43:53,920 these virtual assistants and we had Clippy and other types of, 860 00:43:53,920 --> 00:43:58,240 you know, assistants for us. But ultimately it's it's really 861 00:43:58,240 --> 00:44:00,680 there to to make our wall. I'm waiting for Clippy to come 862 00:44:00,680 --> 00:44:03,280 back with you. Know now one. 100% more AI and 863 00:44:03,280 --> 00:44:06,400 it's like writing your paper for you and it's like, no, you get 864 00:44:06,400 --> 00:44:09,760 the paper clip. I have to ignore it, but that's, 865 00:44:09,800 --> 00:44:12,400 I mean, it becomes an assistant to us that that's what it's 866 00:44:12,400 --> 00:44:14,760 truly there. So, so I do like, you know, you 867 00:44:14,760 --> 00:44:17,680 know, the things that copilot's doing is is pretty impressive 868 00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:21,760 and other, you know, degenerative AI capabilities. 869 00:44:21,800 --> 00:44:27,320 It's really there to extend my kind of where I can then focus 870 00:44:27,320 --> 00:44:30,240 on the things that I really enjoy doing and and and automate 871 00:44:30,240 --> 00:44:33,000 the things that are just mundane and repetitive that's are not 872 00:44:33,000 --> 00:44:35,680 interesting that you know. That's where it's at now, but it 873 00:44:35,680 --> 00:44:38,440 could be in the future where it's much more evolved. 874 00:44:38,440 --> 00:44:42,120 And you can say, all right, AII want you to build a whole 875 00:44:42,120 --> 00:44:46,560 business of AI robots, right? And you could do that for the 876 00:44:46,560 --> 00:44:50,000 purposes of, hey, I want to start, start a law firm. 877 00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:53,840 So start creating and training all of these lawyers in 878 00:44:53,840 --> 00:44:56,000 different areas. Not even lawyers. 879 00:44:56,000 --> 00:44:58,360 Lawyer bots. Lawyer bot things, right? 880 00:44:58,360 --> 00:45:00,680 I mean, this is the worst it will ever be. 881 00:45:01,400 --> 00:45:03,920 Like it's right, No? It it can, it can get, it can 882 00:45:03,920 --> 00:45:05,400 get a lot worse than we can take. 883 00:45:05,560 --> 00:45:07,600 A lot worse for the same. Abilities like you. 884 00:45:07,680 --> 00:45:10,040 Set them off for evil? Yeah, no. 885 00:45:10,080 --> 00:45:12,320 Because because the. Capability right now, yeah. 886 00:45:12,360 --> 00:45:15,240 Because the worst it'll ever be, it will get more capable over 887 00:45:15,240 --> 00:45:16,240 time. Absolutely. 888 00:45:16,240 --> 00:45:18,720 I mean, what, what basically attackers are simply just taking 889 00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:20,880 the same basically, you know, algorithms and they're taking 890 00:45:20,880 --> 00:45:24,240 the card grills off so you can get, you can get, you know, the 891 00:45:24,240 --> 00:45:25,760 safe one and you can get the unsafe 1. 892 00:45:26,960 --> 00:45:29,880 So, so we're, we're in this situation where that, you know, 893 00:45:29,880 --> 00:45:32,960 we're trying to do it for good, but attackers can simply take 894 00:45:32,960 --> 00:45:34,640 the same thing and take the protection off it. 895 00:45:34,920 --> 00:45:39,760 Guaranteed that that the adversary is going to take AI 896 00:45:39,760 --> 00:45:41,400 and try to teach you how to steal. 897 00:45:42,600 --> 00:45:46,040 I mean it. It's only it's 100% certain, 898 00:45:46,040 --> 00:45:48,320 right? Go target this crypto exchange 899 00:45:48,320 --> 00:45:51,960 and steal all this big, you know, Bitcoin right and just 900 00:45:51,960 --> 00:45:53,560 give it, you know, the instructions about what you want 901 00:45:53,560 --> 00:45:55,320 to say. So absolutely, you know, there's 902 00:45:55,320 --> 00:45:57,960 going to be these separations of, you know, technology can 903 00:45:57,960 --> 00:46:00,000 always be used for good or bad, but we can't we're in a 904 00:46:00,000 --> 00:46:01,840 situation right now where we can't change that. 905 00:46:02,040 --> 00:46:04,080 We're, we're, we're, we're committed, we're going forward, 906 00:46:04,080 --> 00:46:07,240 it's going to happen, but we just have to become very aware. 907 00:46:07,240 --> 00:46:10,560 I, I really think the explained ability is, is very important 908 00:46:11,360 --> 00:46:14,000 out there and and there's will be areas that will become 909 00:46:14,000 --> 00:46:17,480 heavily regulated as well. It's only a matter of time, you 910 00:46:17,640 --> 00:46:20,520 know, so, but I mean, the good thing is right now is attackers 911 00:46:20,520 --> 00:46:24,440 are not using it that much. They're using it to analyze data 912 00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:26,480 dumps. So when they exfiltrate and they 913 00:46:26,480 --> 00:46:29,840 steal data from an organization, they might say, hey, hey, you 914 00:46:29,880 --> 00:46:34,560 know, AI go on determine how much I can, I can, I can try to 915 00:46:34,560 --> 00:46:36,120 get ransomware from this organization. 916 00:46:36,320 --> 00:46:39,360 How well is their finances? So, and it will tell you, you 917 00:46:39,440 --> 00:46:41,280 know, here's the ransomware, here's what their insurance is 918 00:46:41,280 --> 00:46:43,000 covering, here's what you can request. 919 00:46:43,320 --> 00:46:45,880 And therefore, you know, it's so the intelligence and data 920 00:46:45,880 --> 00:46:49,240 analysis is happening. Definitely they've been using it 921 00:46:49,240 --> 00:46:50,960 for improved fish fishing capabilities. 922 00:46:50,960 --> 00:46:54,880 So one thing is in Estonia, the language has been protecting the 923 00:46:54,880 --> 00:46:57,400 country and society for many years because the language is 924 00:46:57,400 --> 00:47:00,480 very difficult. And what attackers have been 925 00:47:00,480 --> 00:47:04,920 able to do is that the real to do campaigns using generative AI 926 00:47:04,920 --> 00:47:08,200 to do automatic translations. And those translations are so 927 00:47:08,200 --> 00:47:10,120 good. They're, you know, to the point 928 00:47:10,120 --> 00:47:12,760 now the language is no longer protecting society. 929 00:47:12,920 --> 00:47:14,920 And it just means that, you know, citizens now have to 930 00:47:14,920 --> 00:47:18,720 become better aware of phishing campaigns, social engineering 931 00:47:18,960 --> 00:47:21,400 that are trying to steal their their passwords and credentials 932 00:47:21,400 --> 00:47:23,320 and access to do damaging things. 933 00:47:23,320 --> 00:47:27,200 So it just means that generative AI is it's lowering the bar and 934 00:47:27,200 --> 00:47:30,840 it's making them better quality. So lowering the bar, meaning 935 00:47:30,840 --> 00:47:34,120 more people can, you know, be online criminals with just a 936 00:47:34,120 --> 00:47:37,160 computer and Internet connection and improving the quality. 937 00:47:37,160 --> 00:47:40,280 Meaning that we're, you know, the, you know, the e-mail coming 938 00:47:40,280 --> 00:47:43,440 from Africa from your long lost cousin, you know, that has 939 00:47:43,440 --> 00:47:47,040 inherited billions to now where it's basically very 940 00:47:47,040 --> 00:47:49,600 sophisticated. Very, you know, hard to tell the 941 00:47:49,600 --> 00:47:52,720 difference between real communications, real messages, 942 00:47:52,720 --> 00:47:56,880 and those who are abusive. I mean, Can you imagine having 943 00:47:56,880 --> 00:47:59,760 an AI go off and say hey go take a look at Shodan, find 944 00:47:59,760 --> 00:48:01,720 everything that's usually a default password and then try to 945 00:48:01,720 --> 00:48:07,040 breach it? That's exactly lowering the bar 946 00:48:07,280 --> 00:48:09,400 and giving you better, better quality capabilities. 947 00:48:10,640 --> 00:48:13,640 Those are the things that, you know, it's what I'm worried 948 00:48:13,640 --> 00:48:16,080 about more is it's the battle of algorithms right now that we're 949 00:48:16,080 --> 00:48:19,080 moving into. So I'm worried about that right 950 00:48:19,080 --> 00:48:20,560 now. The the, the reason why 951 00:48:20,560 --> 00:48:22,640 attackers are not using AI is because the basics work today, 952 00:48:23,160 --> 00:48:25,800 you know, going in and stealing a password, you know, buying the 953 00:48:25,800 --> 00:48:27,800 credentials online, you've got access brokerage who just 954 00:48:27,800 --> 00:48:29,760 specialize in that. All day long that when everybody 955 00:48:29,760 --> 00:48:33,720 uses the same password anyway. Exactly so and and and 956 00:48:33,720 --> 00:48:35,920 ultimately, you know, you, you get cyber fatigue from things 957 00:48:35,920 --> 00:48:39,760 like, you know, MFA fatigue. Bombard them with Tom sons of 958 00:48:39,920 --> 00:48:43,000 MFA request and he's simply just like, OK, I'll just get away 959 00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:45,720 with it and I don't want to see them just accept it. 960 00:48:46,080 --> 00:48:48,680 So really the the techniques just work today. 961 00:48:48,680 --> 00:48:49,640 So that's why they haven't moved. 962 00:48:49,640 --> 00:48:52,960 But when we get those basics right, when organizations really 963 00:48:52,960 --> 00:48:56,240 start getting the foundations and they start getting MFA in 964 00:48:56,240 --> 00:48:59,080 place, not just at the front door, but at lateral moves, when 965 00:48:59,080 --> 00:49:02,080 they start looking at, you know, auditing, context based access 966 00:49:02,080 --> 00:49:05,280 controls, dynamic based access controls, they're looking at 967 00:49:05,280 --> 00:49:07,960 policy based. So it becomes very not just 968 00:49:07,960 --> 00:49:10,600 static controls that's always been in the past to much more 969 00:49:10,600 --> 00:49:13,760 adaptive controls of the future, meaning that it's starting to 970 00:49:13,760 --> 00:49:15,880 look and analyze all the different things that I'm 971 00:49:15,880 --> 00:49:18,920 looking to do and therefore deciding what card rails that 972 00:49:18,920 --> 00:49:21,480 put in place and making it difficult for attackers to be 973 00:49:21,480 --> 00:49:23,760 successful. The more those get, the more we 974 00:49:23,760 --> 00:49:26,440 get better with the basics, the more we'll be pushing the 975 00:49:26,520 --> 00:49:29,840 attackers to move, moving to using AI much more. 976 00:49:30,360 --> 00:49:33,080 And my worry is then what happens is you start having the 977 00:49:33,080 --> 00:49:37,040 algorithms, having a battle, whoever designs the algorithms 978 00:49:37,040 --> 00:49:38,640 the best is going to be the winner. 979 00:49:38,640 --> 00:49:41,120 So and that means attacker is going to be moving to things 980 00:49:41,120 --> 00:49:44,120 like real time campaigns, real time campaigns where it used to 981 00:49:44,120 --> 00:49:46,560 be, they'll just create one campaign which might last for 982 00:49:46,560 --> 00:49:49,520 six months to a year and it'll be successful because they're is 983 00:49:49,520 --> 00:49:51,160 using the same vulnerability over and again. 984 00:49:51,160 --> 00:49:53,040 They're using the same credentials and passwords over 985 00:49:53,080 --> 00:49:56,000 again, the same techniques has just created a campaign playbook 986 00:49:56,280 --> 00:49:57,840 that reruns that over and over again. 987 00:49:58,440 --> 00:50:01,560 They put AI into the mix. That playbook will be self 988 00:50:01,560 --> 00:50:04,840 progressing, self learning and will augment itself. 989 00:50:04,840 --> 00:50:09,040 So at field on XYZ targets, what can you learn from that? 990 00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:15,400 Let's kind of re evaluate, let's redesign our tech playbook and 991 00:50:15,400 --> 00:50:18,920 attack pass and then, you know, look to bypass those much more 992 00:50:18,920 --> 00:50:21,040 in the future. So we're in this battle of 993 00:50:21,040 --> 00:50:24,480 algorithms and it means that you know what we put in place from 994 00:50:24,600 --> 00:50:28,040 AI capabilities today. We need to keep progressing that 995 00:50:28,040 --> 00:50:31,040 that that needs to be a a continuous improvement over time 996 00:50:32,200 --> 00:50:35,760 in order to to make sure we we stay a little bit ahead of 997 00:50:35,760 --> 00:50:38,480 criminals. All right, so I'm sufficially 998 00:50:38,480 --> 00:50:39,800 terrified. Thank you very much for that, 999 00:50:39,800 --> 00:50:41,480 Joseph. There's no hope for us in the 1000 00:50:41,480 --> 00:50:43,680 future, so. We're AI at the center. 1001 00:50:44,000 --> 00:50:46,560 Right, yeah, Gonna have to go and create a new podcast for 1002 00:50:46,560 --> 00:50:50,400 that one. You know, we've, we've talked 1003 00:50:50,400 --> 00:50:52,080 about so many different things here and I feel like we could 1004 00:50:52,080 --> 00:50:53,960 talk for hours and hours and hours and hopefully you'll come 1005 00:50:53,960 --> 00:50:55,320 back and have another conversation with this. 1006 00:50:55,320 --> 00:50:56,520 But I do want to be respectful of time. 1007 00:50:57,760 --> 00:51:00,040 You do a lot of public speaking, right? 1008 00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:01,360 That's kind of one of the things you do. 1009 00:51:01,360 --> 00:51:05,080 You got your podcast, etcetera. I am always curious about what 1010 00:51:05,080 --> 00:51:08,240 happens behind the scenes. Like, you know, what are the fun 1011 00:51:08,240 --> 00:51:12,240 stories where it's like, oh, people only saw this part, 1012 00:51:12,240 --> 00:51:13,440 right? This was the public facing 1013 00:51:13,440 --> 00:51:15,880 presentation. But behind the scenes, oh boy, 1014 00:51:16,560 --> 00:51:18,800 if only you could see, you know, like, do you have any good 1015 00:51:18,800 --> 00:51:21,520 stories that are like behind the scenes of either speaking or 1016 00:51:21,520 --> 00:51:22,840 broadcasting or whatever it might be? 1017 00:51:23,320 --> 00:51:26,320 Yeah, so absolutely so so I mean just kind of give you an idea. 1018 00:51:26,360 --> 00:51:29,120 You can see, I don't know, the audience can see all of the the 1019 00:51:29,120 --> 00:51:32,080 badges in the background. So that's my speaking badges 1020 00:51:32,080 --> 00:51:33,920 over the years I've done. A lot of badges. 1021 00:51:34,240 --> 00:51:37,200 I've done somewhere. It's probably close to about 1022 00:51:37,200 --> 00:51:41,120 1000, I think, speaking in my career of different conferences 1023 00:51:41,120 --> 00:51:44,240 and events. And you know, for me it's, it's 1024 00:51:44,240 --> 00:51:47,760 always a, it's an almost pleasure to be able to go and 1025 00:51:47,760 --> 00:51:49,000 share my experience with the audience. 1026 00:51:49,360 --> 00:51:52,920 I always hope they just somebody you find some value of my 1027 00:51:52,920 --> 00:51:55,680 experience and, and, and they take that away and there's been 1028 00:51:55,680 --> 00:51:56,920 interesting things over the years. 1029 00:51:58,000 --> 00:52:03,280 I just even I've had people, you know, speakers here basically 1030 00:52:03,320 --> 00:52:06,000 kept their headset landed on and went to the bathroom. 1031 00:52:06,280 --> 00:52:09,040 So you've got a room full of 500 plus people and all of a sudden 1032 00:52:09,040 --> 00:52:12,360 you're, you know, you're. Flashing. 1033 00:52:12,560 --> 00:52:15,120 A little tickling and the flushing going and everyone's 1034 00:52:15,120 --> 00:52:18,520 just going what is going on? And you know, this is the person 1035 00:52:18,600 --> 00:52:21,800 had a, a hot mic, you know, forgot the Lander was on and 1036 00:52:21,800 --> 00:52:25,200 went in the bathroom. I've had situations where, I 1037 00:52:25,240 --> 00:52:28,720 mean, I, I've mentored speakers over the years and I had one 1038 00:52:28,720 --> 00:52:33,680 time there was a girl kind of, I was mentoring speaking and you 1039 00:52:33,680 --> 00:52:36,640 know, she got up on, on stage and she was fantastic. 1040 00:52:36,640 --> 00:52:38,120 It was like really great speaking. 1041 00:52:38,560 --> 00:52:41,480 But she got into this thing where she was walking around and 1042 00:52:41,480 --> 00:52:45,200 ultimately she stepped backwards and she stepped literally off 1043 00:52:45,200 --> 00:52:49,680 the stage and the stage was like a good like meter high. 1044 00:52:50,080 --> 00:52:51,320 She disappeared behind the curtains. 1045 00:52:51,720 --> 00:52:53,200 I was just like, Oh my God, Oh my goodness. 1046 00:52:53,200 --> 00:52:56,000 Like for any, you know, obviously any speaker to recover 1047 00:52:56,000 --> 00:52:57,880 from, that is always hard when you, when you're in that 1048 00:52:57,880 --> 00:52:59,560 situation, you're just like you can get frightened. 1049 00:53:00,080 --> 00:53:03,720 All of a sudden she just jumped back onto the stage again and 1050 00:53:03,720 --> 00:53:06,160 literally just continued. And actually even once she was 1051 00:53:06,160 --> 00:53:08,800 off the stage, she was still, she was still speaking, she was 1052 00:53:08,800 --> 00:53:13,880 still continuing her talk. She jumped back on and she 1053 00:53:13,880 --> 00:53:15,680 continued on. And I was, for me, that was 1054 00:53:15,680 --> 00:53:18,600 spectacular. A couple of incidents happened 1055 00:53:18,600 --> 00:53:23,600 with me Now I was, I, I mean, I do, it's usually about 30, can 1056 00:53:23,600 --> 00:53:26,560 be upwards of 50 speaking sessions in a year. 1057 00:53:27,040 --> 00:53:30,400 And I'm always, when you get to my experience, you can always 1058 00:53:30,400 --> 00:53:32,680 double checking everything you have backups and backups and 1059 00:53:32,680 --> 00:53:34,760 backups. And I've got multiple laptops 1060 00:53:34,760 --> 00:53:36,080 that I carry, which is always a pain. 1061 00:53:36,080 --> 00:53:39,200 I've got all the kind of dongles and I've got my own clickers 1062 00:53:39,200 --> 00:53:41,600 that I, I don't use anyone else's clicker because I use my 1063 00:53:41,600 --> 00:53:42,680 own, because I know it's going to work. 1064 00:53:43,240 --> 00:53:46,560 And last year was a, a session I was speaking, I'd just finished 1065 00:53:46,560 --> 00:53:49,000 two talks and it was the 3rd and final one. 1066 00:53:49,520 --> 00:53:52,400 And it about probably about close to 400 people in the room 1067 00:53:53,160 --> 00:53:56,120 and there's about 2000 people online watching my talk. 1068 00:53:56,120 --> 00:53:59,680 And, and if you ever see me speaking, I'm one that's always, 1069 00:53:59,680 --> 00:54:01,000 kind of, I always take the high risk. 1070 00:54:01,000 --> 00:54:04,480 So I'll always do, if I, if possible, I'll do a live demo. 1071 00:54:04,920 --> 00:54:06,720 I'll always, I'll get up there and I'll keep my virtual 1072 00:54:06,720 --> 00:54:08,960 machines running and I'll take you through because you know I 1073 00:54:09,000 --> 00:54:12,240 can, I can change my demo as I need to and go into different. 1074 00:54:12,240 --> 00:54:14,600 Things for trouble, Joseph. It's just asking for trouble. 1075 00:54:15,040 --> 00:54:17,840 So, so I'm up there on a stage, I've got my virtual machines 1076 00:54:17,840 --> 00:54:20,360 running, I've got my hard drive plugged in, I've plugged in and 1077 00:54:20,360 --> 00:54:23,600 bringing it to the podium and I'm about maybe 25 minutes into 1078 00:54:23,600 --> 00:54:26,320 the session, you know, and there's one person kept putting 1079 00:54:26,320 --> 00:54:29,720 their hand up. I'm going, as I said, I'll take 1080 00:54:29,720 --> 00:54:31,400 questions. At the end, it's his hand up 1081 00:54:31,400 --> 00:54:33,240 again. I'm going, OK, you have a 1082 00:54:33,240 --> 00:54:35,040 question. It looks like it's really 1083 00:54:35,040 --> 00:54:37,440 important. He says, I hope you realize that 1084 00:54:37,440 --> 00:54:41,480 your battery is only 5%. I looked down at the screen and 1085 00:54:41,480 --> 00:54:44,560 I just the shock and the fright, I just saw my batteries like it 1086 00:54:44,560 --> 00:54:48,000 was like a countdown 5% for because I'm running tons of 1087 00:54:48,000 --> 00:54:49,560 virtual machines. That thing was just eating the 1088 00:54:49,560 --> 00:54:51,800 power under plan. It was just ticking down. 1089 00:54:52,320 --> 00:54:53,680 I just were like, Oh my goodness. 1090 00:54:53,840 --> 00:54:56,960 And when I realized that even I plugged into the podium, but 1091 00:54:56,960 --> 00:54:59,520 there's no power to the podium. So I just said I said the 1092 00:54:59,520 --> 00:55:00,920 podium. So I was like just one second, 1093 00:55:00,920 --> 00:55:04,520 you gotta solve it. I ran, I jumped off the stage 1094 00:55:04,520 --> 00:55:07,600 like almost 400 people in the room, ran over to my bike, 1095 00:55:07,760 --> 00:55:11,680 pulled out APD power plug, ran back to the stage, took out the 1096 00:55:11,680 --> 00:55:14,720 plug, plugged it into the the the podium pack and it just kept 1097 00:55:14,720 --> 00:55:16,920 it going, kept it at that four or 5%. 1098 00:55:17,240 --> 00:55:20,560 So while that was happening, so I continued on, the technician 1099 00:55:21,040 --> 00:55:23,080 got a massive cable onto the back of the room, started 1100 00:55:23,520 --> 00:55:27,000 plugging Power Pack, Power Pack. And then eventually after like I 1101 00:55:27,000 --> 00:55:30,520 felt this tap in my ankle saying there was a power supply to 1102 00:55:30,560 --> 00:55:32,720 fruit. So I felt this this little 1103 00:55:32,720 --> 00:55:35,360 tapping. She was like, OK, I looked down 1104 00:55:35,360 --> 00:55:38,120 and I was like, OK, so change the plug from the pudding that 1105 00:55:38,400 --> 00:55:40,960 and this kept going. So there's those moments. 1106 00:55:40,960 --> 00:55:46,040 It just was so close. But the big fail, I was 1107 00:55:46,040 --> 00:55:49,120 presenting not long ago this year and there was a massive, 1108 00:55:49,120 --> 00:55:53,280 there was a couple 100 people in the room and I was presenting 1109 00:55:53,280 --> 00:55:57,440 and all of a sudden boom, electricity completely went out. 1110 00:55:58,320 --> 00:56:02,080 Somebody outside was preparing for the lunch, the catering. 1111 00:56:02,280 --> 00:56:06,400 They'd plugged in a massive like toaster and took the entire par 1112 00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:09,160 out of the entire conference room, this thing. 1113 00:56:09,160 --> 00:56:14,040 And it was like it was a it was like a bang and everything, all 1114 00:56:14,280 --> 00:56:16,920 audio screens, everything went down. 1115 00:56:16,920 --> 00:56:20,000 I'm just down there going, what can you do? 1116 00:56:20,160 --> 00:56:23,720 So, so I just present cause 'cause one of the things is when 1117 00:56:23,720 --> 00:56:26,000 you're doing this so long, you know what you're presenting, you 1118 00:56:26,000 --> 00:56:27,080 don't need to look at the slides. 1119 00:56:27,520 --> 00:56:29,040 So I just kept presenting as let's. 1120 00:56:29,040 --> 00:56:30,600 Go to the theatre of the mind, right? 1121 00:56:30,680 --> 00:56:34,040 Imagine, if you will, right? I I think this is what was on 1122 00:56:34,040 --> 00:56:35,680 the next slide, so I'm going to present that. 1123 00:56:35,680 --> 00:56:37,960 So, so I had to be very articulative. 1124 00:56:38,320 --> 00:56:39,520 Is that what you're not seeing here? 1125 00:56:39,520 --> 00:56:42,440 But what you would have been saying is this and to explain 1126 00:56:43,400 --> 00:56:46,040 through what's. Worth it? 1127 00:56:47,640 --> 00:56:52,080 Not, not so much. It wasn't definitely worth that 1128 00:56:52,080 --> 00:56:54,520 toaster. The other thing was like for 1129 00:56:54,520 --> 00:56:56,800 bagels or something, or like this bagel toasters thing. 1130 00:56:57,560 --> 00:57:00,800 But yeah, I had the complete power go off, no mics, no and 1131 00:57:00,800 --> 00:57:02,400 all things. So I just had to, I just had to 1132 00:57:02,400 --> 00:57:05,520 amplify my voice so everyone in the room could hear. 1133 00:57:05,800 --> 00:57:08,360 And I had to just so they had. To do back in the day, right? 1134 00:57:08,600 --> 00:57:10,960 I mean, back in the day, they didn't have AB equipment. 1135 00:57:10,960 --> 00:57:14,880 The politicians like Abraham Lincoln would have to just speak 1136 00:57:15,080 --> 00:57:17,200 very loudly. Loudspeaker. 1137 00:57:17,760 --> 00:57:19,880 Yeah, they get one of those big megaphone type things that. 1138 00:57:19,960 --> 00:57:23,280 Yeah, so so say next you know as as I need to add that to my 1139 00:57:23,280 --> 00:57:25,840 backup now. So, so you see a guy in the 1140 00:57:25,840 --> 00:57:28,280 airport carrying in like this giant paper. 1141 00:57:29,320 --> 00:57:30,280 They can't have batteries, right? 1142 00:57:30,280 --> 00:57:31,400 We don't want to run out of power. 1143 00:57:31,400 --> 00:57:33,400 Just giant paper, you know, megaphone. 1144 00:57:34,080 --> 00:57:36,480 That's probably plan. C or Plan D. 1145 00:57:37,160 --> 00:57:39,440 So, so over the years, interesting things have 1146 00:57:39,440 --> 00:57:40,920 happened. Absolutely. 1147 00:57:41,000 --> 00:57:43,680 I mean, I've from ad hoc. I mean, I've had, you know, 1148 00:57:43,680 --> 00:57:46,120 organizations or conferences had speakers not turn up and he's 1149 00:57:46,120 --> 00:57:48,000 like, Joe, what can you speak about? 1150 00:57:48,000 --> 00:57:49,520 It's. Surprising how often that 1151 00:57:49,520 --> 00:57:51,480 happens, isn't it? Like I, I think that's one thing 1152 00:57:51,480 --> 00:57:54,880 that I've noticed as I've done sort of more of these is how 1153 00:57:54,880 --> 00:57:58,360 many times people get asked to pinch hit because someone 1154 00:57:58,360 --> 00:58:00,720 couldn't make it. Or, you know, now it's like, OK, 1155 00:58:00,720 --> 00:58:03,200 well, someone tested positive for COVID and they weren't able 1156 00:58:03,200 --> 00:58:04,600 to travel right. Or, and they're doing the right 1157 00:58:04,600 --> 00:58:07,320 thing or whatever it might be. So like things like that. 1158 00:58:07,680 --> 00:58:10,160 I I'm I'm almost astonished at how many times it happens at 1159 00:58:10,160 --> 00:58:12,120 conferences. And I think sometimes that's why 1160 00:58:12,120 --> 00:58:15,280 they've got to start, you know, accepting my talks because I 1161 00:58:15,280 --> 00:58:17,880 usually submit several call for papers and they're like, you 1162 00:58:18,560 --> 00:58:21,880 know, we'll just accept one. So we know these got like 5 1163 00:58:21,880 --> 00:58:24,080 more. That's a great pro tip actually, 1164 00:58:24,080 --> 00:58:25,560 right? If you can kind of make a name 1165 00:58:25,560 --> 00:58:29,160 for yourself of being able to, you know, pinch hit as needed, 1166 00:58:29,520 --> 00:58:31,720 that might be something that might be a tiebreaker, right, 1167 00:58:31,720 --> 00:58:34,320 where somebody gets accept or not, or you know, maybe just 1168 00:58:34,320 --> 00:58:37,560 kind of nominated as like, hey, you know, you're not officially 1169 00:58:37,560 --> 00:58:39,640 on it, but if you can have something ready, that would be 1170 00:58:39,640 --> 00:58:41,400 great. Yeah, I've, I've been, you know, 1171 00:58:41,400 --> 00:58:43,040 I've been brought in, you know, for, you know, lots of 1172 00:58:43,040 --> 00:58:45,960 conferences, even like first conference as well as as a 1173 00:58:45,960 --> 00:58:49,320 backup speaker. They just say we, we, we're not 1174 00:58:49,320 --> 00:58:51,280 going to have you as the main speaker right now, but we know 1175 00:58:51,280 --> 00:58:53,800 if you've cut tons of talks, we'll just have you as a backup. 1176 00:58:54,080 --> 00:58:57,160 So one thing and and it has happened where I've had to, you 1177 00:58:57,160 --> 00:59:01,560 know, step in as a backup and, and take a major speaking 1178 00:59:01,560 --> 00:59:03,600 session, which sometimes was a keynote. 1179 00:59:04,600 --> 00:59:06,360 Yeah, right. Flights get delayed. 1180 00:59:06,400 --> 00:59:08,040 You know, people, something happens. 1181 00:59:08,040 --> 00:59:09,760 You know, personal events happen. 1182 00:59:10,120 --> 00:59:12,720 And you know, if you're organizing conferences and 1183 00:59:12,720 --> 00:59:15,080 events, you, you're bound to have, have these, you know, 1184 00:59:15,080 --> 00:59:17,120 terror. I even, I used to host the 1185 00:59:17,160 --> 00:59:20,600 cybersecurity conference in Tallinn many years ago. 1186 00:59:20,600 --> 00:59:22,760 And I had to have, you know, even the point where you know 1187 00:59:22,840 --> 00:59:25,280 you, you know you got when you're choosing speakers, you 1188 00:59:25,280 --> 00:59:27,600 want speakers, you can deliver multiple sightings. 1189 00:59:28,480 --> 00:59:30,640 Hey, we're going to throw an impromptu panel together. 1190 00:59:30,960 --> 00:59:34,400 Come on back, guy folks. I've done that as well for P 1191 00:59:34,440 --> 00:59:37,160 Pals. So so it's absolutely you just 1192 00:59:37,160 --> 00:59:39,480 become, you know, it's just like in the security industry, you 1193 00:59:39,480 --> 00:59:42,120 just become resilient. You learn a lot from what 1194 00:59:42,120 --> 00:59:44,600 happens, what kind of happened. And there's always the unknowns. 1195 00:59:44,600 --> 00:59:46,160 There's always things that, you know, there's new things like, 1196 00:59:46,160 --> 00:59:48,160 you know, for me, the toaster blowing the electricity, you 1197 00:59:49,360 --> 00:59:52,560 know, there's things that you just can't prepare for, but you, 1198 00:59:52,560 --> 00:59:55,200 you know, if, if they do happen, you just be resilient. 1199 00:59:55,280 --> 00:59:56,440 That's, that's what we're here to do. 1200 00:59:56,720 --> 01:00:00,040 I realize that my, my, my job is historically cybersecurity, but 1201 01:00:00,040 --> 01:00:01,840 I realize that that's actually not my job anymore. 1202 01:00:02,240 --> 01:00:06,320 My skill set is, that's my skills, but what my kind of job 1203 01:00:06,320 --> 01:00:09,800 is, is how to, to help organizations become resilient 1204 01:00:10,240 --> 01:00:12,640 and, and when bad things do happen, that they can quickly 1205 01:00:12,640 --> 01:00:14,800 just move on. And that's what, that's the 1206 01:00:14,800 --> 01:00:16,400 skill set you learn. And that's, you know, whether 1207 01:00:16,400 --> 01:00:18,760 being with conferences and speaking or, you know, doing 1208 01:00:18,760 --> 01:00:20,840 podcasts and things happen sometimes, you know? 1209 01:00:21,200 --> 01:00:24,280 You just find ways that we, we become so experienced and so 1210 01:00:24,280 --> 01:00:27,080 knowledgeable that we find ways around them. 1211 01:00:27,080 --> 01:00:31,880 We find ways to, to keep it going and you know, it's, it's 1212 01:00:31,880 --> 01:00:33,040 ultimate. And that's with experience. 1213 01:00:33,040 --> 01:00:35,760 And that's what we, what we try to then do is, is, is put that 1214 01:00:35,760 --> 01:00:39,200 into automation so that next time you know it, it fixes 1215 01:00:39,200 --> 01:00:43,160 itself. Yeah, I'm a fan of Littlefinger. 1216 01:00:43,240 --> 01:00:45,600 From where? From Game of Thrones, right? 1217 01:00:45,600 --> 01:00:47,640 Fight every battle, everywhere all the time, and you'll never 1218 01:00:47,640 --> 01:00:51,000 be surprised unless you got Aria somewhere out there ready to 1219 01:00:51,160 --> 01:00:53,640 stick it with a knife. I think that's a great place to 1220 01:00:53,640 --> 01:00:55,240 wrap up. I don't know how we can actually 1221 01:00:55,240 --> 01:00:56,960 top that. It's been such a fascinating 1222 01:00:56,960 --> 01:00:59,880 discussion, Joseph. I hope you'll come back and I 1223 01:00:59,880 --> 01:01:02,160 feel like this again. We can just pick something and 1224 01:01:02,160 --> 01:01:04,280 just go on for our. Absolutely. 1225 01:01:04,800 --> 01:01:08,000 So hopefully you'll come back, we'll have a link in our show 1226 01:01:08,000 --> 01:01:10,600 notes for people to reach out to you if they've got questions or 1227 01:01:10,600 --> 01:01:12,760 anything like that. Have a link to Delinea so people 1228 01:01:12,760 --> 01:01:14,480 can find out information about that. 1229 01:01:14,480 --> 01:01:16,120 If you're not already aware, definitely one of the major 1230 01:01:16,120 --> 01:01:19,120 players in the identity management space, the Cubit 1231 01:01:19,120 --> 01:01:22,080 conference, so people can find out more about that. 1232 01:01:22,360 --> 01:01:25,520 The 401 Access Denied podcast, so you can find that. 1233 01:01:25,520 --> 01:01:26,960 So I have a link to that as well. 1234 01:01:27,200 --> 01:01:31,160 And then I actually found a link to the Estonia Kratt AI bot, so. 1235 01:01:31,800 --> 01:01:34,600 Fantastic. You know, it's the, the, the 1236 01:01:34,600 --> 01:01:36,200 link will be there for people to find it. 1237 01:01:36,600 --> 01:01:39,400 I think it's such a cool idea and maybe we'll figure out how 1238 01:01:39,400 --> 01:01:43,440 to do one for our own website. Do the IDAC bot people wanna ask 1239 01:01:43,720 --> 01:01:48,360 questions or stuff like that? See what else for a wrap up, our 1240 01:01:48,360 --> 01:01:50,000 YouTube channel. We are starting to grow it. 1241 01:01:50,000 --> 01:01:52,440 We've just started doing video just within the last like couple 1242 01:01:52,440 --> 01:01:55,800 months. So if you go to idacpodcast.tv, 1243 01:01:55,800 --> 01:01:58,440 that'll take you right to our YouTube channel, or you can find 1244 01:01:58,440 --> 01:02:01,800 us on the web, IDAC Podcast, Twitter X, whatever it's called 1245 01:02:01,800 --> 01:02:05,600 when this hits your face or ears at IDAC Podcast and then 1246 01:02:05,600 --> 01:02:10,160 Mastodon at IDAC Podcast at infosec dot exchange. 1247 01:02:10,600 --> 01:02:15,400 Jim, did I miss anything LinkedIn? 1248 01:02:15,840 --> 01:02:17,680 Yeah, that's how we get great guests like this. 1249 01:02:17,680 --> 01:02:20,800 So if you got ideas, suggestions, introductions, 1250 01:02:20,800 --> 01:02:22,720 we're always happy to have conversations just like we have 1251 01:02:22,880 --> 01:02:24,680 with this. Joseph, any final thoughts 1252 01:02:24,680 --> 01:02:27,200 before we wrap it up? Absolutely, it's, it's always a 1253 01:02:27,200 --> 01:02:28,560 pleasure. I mean, it's been a long time 1254 01:02:28,560 --> 01:02:31,240 since we got the chat, so it's always a pleasure. 1255 01:02:31,240 --> 01:02:34,080 And can I, you know, to, to get your insights and, and you know, 1256 01:02:34,080 --> 01:02:37,640 the, the questions you're asking me really can I, it's for me, I, 1257 01:02:37,640 --> 01:02:40,600 I enjoy sharing the knowledge as much as I can. 1258 01:02:40,920 --> 01:02:44,640 And absolutely, you know, next time you want me on, I'm, I'm 1259 01:02:44,640 --> 01:02:47,400 here and available for you, for the audience and to to really 1260 01:02:47,400 --> 01:02:49,480 kind of, you know, help educate and bring the community 1261 01:02:49,480 --> 01:02:50,760 together. Perfect. 1262 01:02:51,240 --> 01:02:52,200 Yeah. Thank you so much. 1263 01:02:52,520 --> 01:02:53,760 So yeah, that's it for this week. 1264 01:02:54,040 --> 01:02:57,040 We'll wrap it up here. Thanks everyone for watching and 1265 01:02:57,040 --> 01:02:59,440 or listening and we'll talk with you all in the next one. 1266 01:03:01,560 --> 01:03:04,640 You've been listening to Identity at the Center. 1267 01:03:05,000 --> 01:03:09,080 We hope you've enjoyed the show. Make sure to like, rate and 1268 01:03:09,080 --> 01:03:12,720 review, and we'll be back soon. But in the meantime, hit the 1269 01:03:12,720 --> 01:03:16,120 website at identity@thecenter.com. 1270 01:03:16,720 --> 01:03:20,840 See you next time on Identity at the Center.