1 00:00:04,880 --> 00:00:11,200 This is identity at the center. Welcome to the Identity at the 2 00:00:11,200 --> 00:00:12,920 Center podcast. I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. 3 00:00:12,920 --> 00:00:15,000 Hey, Jim. Hey, Jeff, how are you? 4 00:00:15,560 --> 00:00:18,120 Oh, not so bad yourself. Doing great, You know, every 5 00:00:18,120 --> 00:00:22,800 once in a while we get a company that is perfectly game for our 6 00:00:22,800 --> 00:00:25,400 space. And today is that day on the 7 00:00:25,400 --> 00:00:28,480 Identity at the Center podcast. Yeah, we've got a sponsored 8 00:00:28,480 --> 00:00:30,240 episode today. So these are things that we do 9 00:00:30,240 --> 00:00:32,439 from time to time with our friends in the industry. 10 00:00:32,960 --> 00:00:37,440 Today we've got Hush Security. They are just coming out of 11 00:00:37,440 --> 00:00:39,440 stealth, I believe is how we're kind of looking at this. 12 00:00:39,440 --> 00:00:41,880 And we're going to talk with Mika Rabe in a second. 13 00:00:41,960 --> 00:00:44,080 But to learn more information about them, you can visit hush 14 00:00:44,080 --> 00:00:47,120 dot security slash IDAC. So let's get Mika on here. 15 00:00:47,120 --> 00:00:50,040 So Mika Rabe, he is the Co founder and CEO at Hush 16 00:00:50,040 --> 00:00:51,720 Security. Welcome to the podcast. 17 00:00:52,320 --> 00:00:55,080 Hey, hi, guys. Thanks for having me. 18 00:00:55,560 --> 00:00:56,680 Yeah. Thanks for taking the time. 19 00:00:56,680 --> 00:00:59,440 So this is the first time we've had an opportunity to talk with 20 00:00:59,440 --> 00:01:02,120 you on the podcast. So let's start with a little bit 21 00:01:02,120 --> 00:01:04,680 with your background. How did you get into the 22 00:01:04,680 --> 00:01:06,040 identity and access management space? 23 00:01:06,480 --> 00:01:11,240 Well, my background, you know, we're going way, way back. 24 00:01:11,240 --> 00:01:15,200 I was, you know, a computer kid. You know, I was spend a lot of 25 00:01:15,200 --> 00:01:17,120 time with computers as a growing up. 26 00:01:17,120 --> 00:01:19,440 This was my passion for a very long time. 27 00:01:20,520 --> 00:01:24,280 I did some work in this and of course studied in college 28 00:01:25,040 --> 00:01:28,400 computer science and electrical science and went into the 29 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:33,080 industry, you know, right then I've done a lot of development 30 00:01:35,000 --> 00:01:38,360 roles in my career and then finally moved to product 31 00:01:38,360 --> 00:01:44,040 management around 2010, did some virtualization stuff, some 32 00:01:44,040 --> 00:01:47,920 cybersecurity, and eventually I kind of landed with a very, you 33 00:01:47,920 --> 00:01:53,480 know, unique team. Somewhere around the late 2016, 34 00:01:54,080 --> 00:01:57,080 there's a company called Meta Networks and I met a lot of 35 00:01:57,480 --> 00:02:00,760 great peers. We did a very good run with the 36 00:02:00,760 --> 00:02:03,040 company. We kind of pioneered ZDMA, so 37 00:02:03,040 --> 00:02:07,200 zero trust network access before that term kind of went popular 38 00:02:07,200 --> 00:02:10,600 before SSC and Sassy which later came from Gautner. 39 00:02:11,960 --> 00:02:14,400 We had a very good run and the company was acquired three years 40 00:02:14,400 --> 00:02:17,760 after. And when we got acquired, we, we 41 00:02:17,760 --> 00:02:21,160 were, we had a very good hygiene around security and very good 42 00:02:21,160 --> 00:02:26,200 security by design nature. But the Infosec, the company 43 00:02:26,200 --> 00:02:29,920 that, that kind of acquired us, wanted us to rotate a lot about 44 00:02:29,960 --> 00:02:33,840 your keys and basically every, every key that we have around 2 45 00:02:33,840 --> 00:02:37,800 times or three times to live. And the problem is that, that 46 00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:40,840 even if you have a very good, you know, infrastructure with 47 00:02:40,840 --> 00:02:44,560 code and automation and, and hygiene around it, what I think 48 00:02:44,560 --> 00:02:46,840 is, is always a very, very big problem. 49 00:02:47,440 --> 00:02:50,400 And it always kind of get pushed to the last Friday of the last 50 00:02:50,400 --> 00:02:52,800 week of the last month with the last quarter that you're 51 00:02:52,800 --> 00:02:55,280 actually allowed to do so. And then you spend the night 52 00:02:55,280 --> 00:02:57,960 doing that and hoping that everything kind of went well 53 00:02:57,960 --> 00:03:01,360 because there was no tooling around that to make sure that 54 00:03:01,560 --> 00:03:03,080 you know you're doing it. Correctly. 55 00:03:03,920 --> 00:03:08,000 And so when we kind of thought about moving out again, the same 56 00:03:08,000 --> 00:03:10,880 team and the same people, this was one of the biggest problem 57 00:03:10,880 --> 00:03:13,960 that was still resonating, you know, kind of sitting as a chip 58 00:03:13,960 --> 00:03:16,640 on our shoulder from the last interaction. 59 00:03:16,640 --> 00:03:19,200 And we said, OK, this needs to be addressed. 60 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:23,960 And so we kind of looked at what other, you know, vendors and 61 00:03:23,960 --> 00:03:27,400 startups and incumbents were doing in the field and we didn't 62 00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:31,560 find any good solution that can give you the governance and the 63 00:03:31,560 --> 00:03:37,400 visibility and basically the operability that this fields 64 00:03:37,400 --> 00:03:40,720 deserve. So I love the idea of hope and 65 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:43,560 prayer and wishes as a strategy strategy when it comes to 66 00:03:43,560 --> 00:03:46,560 rotating keys. Everybody seems to fall into 67 00:03:46,560 --> 00:03:49,400 that trap at some point. So he kind of mentioned how, you 68 00:03:49,400 --> 00:03:51,360 know, Posh kind of positions itself a little bit. 69 00:03:51,360 --> 00:03:53,280 How did you come up with the name of the company? 70 00:03:53,920 --> 00:03:59,680 So as as we deal with identity and basically with secrets, and 71 00:03:59,680 --> 00:04:02,920 so Hush was kind of a fun on, you know, where they didn't we 72 00:04:02,920 --> 00:04:05,000 we're well making the secrets go away. 73 00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:08,440 So kind of a, you know, Hush, it's a, it's a kind of a playful 74 00:04:08,840 --> 00:04:12,040 way of talking about it took us a while to get there, but we 75 00:04:12,040 --> 00:04:14,600 were very happy when we struck that one. 76 00:04:15,280 --> 00:04:17,320 And most importantly, the URL was available right? 77 00:04:17,320 --> 00:04:19,200 So Hush Talk Security is a great URL to have. 78 00:04:19,640 --> 00:04:22,520 Available for the right place, obviously, but yes. 79 00:04:23,240 --> 00:04:25,680 So I, I think I mentioned, you know, early on that you guys are 80 00:04:25,680 --> 00:04:28,240 just kind of coming out of self. I get that right, Because I, I 81 00:04:28,240 --> 00:04:29,880 think you guys are a little bit relatively new to the scene. 82 00:04:29,880 --> 00:04:32,080 Maybe it's not kind of right away, but tell me a little bit 83 00:04:32,080 --> 00:04:35,520 about that journey coming. You know, I guess coming out to 84 00:04:35,520 --> 00:04:37,680 the public and saying, hey, here we are and here's what we do. 85 00:04:38,120 --> 00:04:40,000 Yes. So we've been working, you know, 86 00:04:40,000 --> 00:04:44,800 for for a year now on this product which is destructive. 87 00:04:45,160 --> 00:04:49,000 I think it's very unique in the industry that hasn't been a 88 00:04:49,000 --> 00:04:52,960 platform that that or solution that is doing what hash is 89 00:04:52,960 --> 00:04:55,240 doing. And so we were excited the bit 90 00:04:55,240 --> 00:04:56,720 to keep it the secret at the beginning. 91 00:04:56,720 --> 00:05:00,480 But then later on we will really wanted to kind of brag and tell 92 00:05:00,480 --> 00:05:03,720 the industry and the world what we're doing and that there is a 93 00:05:03,720 --> 00:05:07,640 way to do things differently, which actually makes security 94 00:05:07,640 --> 00:05:10,760 people happy and operation people happy, which is very 95 00:05:10,760 --> 00:05:15,000 rarely the case. And so, yeah, we did come up out 96 00:05:15,000 --> 00:05:19,760 of sales, launched a product and the company a week ago, a lot of 97 00:05:19,760 --> 00:05:22,520 fun, fair. And that we're, you know, happy 98 00:05:22,520 --> 00:05:25,280 and excited for the next, the next chapter, you know? 99 00:05:25,760 --> 00:05:28,560 So Mika, we hear that term stealth all the time. 100 00:05:28,760 --> 00:05:31,800 Can you kind of explain to me what, what it meant to be 101 00:05:31,800 --> 00:05:34,000 yourself? Does that mean that, you know, 102 00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:37,800 you guys didn't have customers that you're working with or like 103 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:40,320 you're building the product? How does that What does stealth 104 00:05:40,320 --> 00:05:42,680 mean? It means a lot of thing, but but 105 00:05:42,680 --> 00:05:46,440 for us, it means that we wouldn't, we didn't want to tell 106 00:05:46,520 --> 00:05:49,880 yet what we're doing and the way, the novel way that we 107 00:05:49,880 --> 00:05:52,520 approach things. So we first of all, we did the, 108 00:05:52,560 --> 00:05:55,520 you know, a patent, we're still have a patent pending for the 109 00:05:55,520 --> 00:05:58,720 way that we address identity for machines. 110 00:05:59,240 --> 00:06:03,640 And then we kind of there was a lot of competition in the space 111 00:06:03,640 --> 00:06:06,200 and a lot of them are kind of in, in my mind, they are kind of 112 00:06:06,200 --> 00:06:08,760 missing the target. They are doing a very tactical 113 00:06:08,760 --> 00:06:12,040 thing, a very short sighted thing that that can help in the 114 00:06:12,040 --> 00:06:14,840 short term. But but you know, thinking about 115 00:06:14,840 --> 00:06:18,600 how to reduce the technical debt and how to go into a better 116 00:06:18,680 --> 00:06:20,760 approach. And this is something no one has 117 00:06:20,760 --> 00:06:23,080 done yet. And so we kind of wanted to keep 118 00:06:23,080 --> 00:06:25,760 that, you know, hushed for, for some time. 119 00:06:26,200 --> 00:06:29,360 And then once the product is ready to go out with, with a ban 120 00:06:29,720 --> 00:06:32,120 in the meantime, that doesn't mean that we can acquire 121 00:06:32,120 --> 00:06:35,000 customer. We do have for paying customer 122 00:06:35,000 --> 00:06:38,760 and, and several more, you know, and, and our pipelines. 123 00:06:38,760 --> 00:06:44,000 And now we can actually expand, you know, the, the, the, the go 124 00:06:44,000 --> 00:06:45,840 to market. And this is exactly what this 125 00:06:45,840 --> 00:06:48,880 launch is about. Oh yeah, I'm biased, but this is 126 00:06:48,880 --> 00:06:50,240 a great way to to launch anything. 127 00:06:50,240 --> 00:06:52,360 It's coming out of the podcast, so you know, you'll have 128 00:06:52,360 --> 00:06:54,280 thousands of people that are kind of tuned in for this. 129 00:06:55,000 --> 00:06:57,120 I'm going to put my jaded CSO hat on here. 130 00:06:57,120 --> 00:06:58,600 And you mentioned the competition. 131 00:06:58,600 --> 00:07:02,520 You know, there's a lot of products in the IM space and you 132 00:07:02,520 --> 00:07:06,240 know, the the hard question that I always like to ask is, So what 133 00:07:06,240 --> 00:07:08,720 makes you guys special? Like what is it that you think 134 00:07:09,040 --> 00:07:12,160 that's hush apart from others that are looking to approach, 135 00:07:12,440 --> 00:07:14,760 you know, the same or maybe similar problems in the space? 136 00:07:15,080 --> 00:07:18,640 So I think first of all, most out of vendors addresses 137 00:07:18,800 --> 00:07:21,920 visibility only, right. And so this is very important 138 00:07:21,920 --> 00:07:26,080 definitely for seesaws in a lot of in a lot of companies. 139 00:07:26,280 --> 00:07:29,920 They want to understand 1st and see where the problem is, where 140 00:07:29,920 --> 00:07:31,840 where the bodies are buried, so to speak. 141 00:07:32,320 --> 00:07:35,440 And but then the next part of that is that you actually need 142 00:07:35,440 --> 00:07:38,600 to a mediate that. So if your solution you know is 143 00:07:38,600 --> 00:07:42,560 the one that opens 500 GLT because this is not what seesaws 144 00:07:42,560 --> 00:07:46,640 are are actually looking for. So the first thing that sets us 145 00:07:46,640 --> 00:07:50,680 apart is that we are looking for remediation or prevention of 146 00:07:50,680 --> 00:07:53,600 those problems, right. Not only to show them we do have 147 00:07:53,600 --> 00:07:58,520 a comprehensive way of, of discoverable and visibility, but 148 00:07:58,520 --> 00:08:01,480 what we are looking for strategically is to change the 149 00:08:01,480 --> 00:08:05,560 way that things are done and to help our customers basically 150 00:08:05,880 --> 00:08:09,360 avoid those problems, right? You can think, you know, other 151 00:08:09,360 --> 00:08:12,000 companies have done that in the past, for example, you know, 152 00:08:12,000 --> 00:08:15,960 crowd Psych and Sentinel one developing an EDR writing, then 153 00:08:15,960 --> 00:08:18,160 building a better antivirus, right? 154 00:08:18,160 --> 00:08:21,960 So a jump or you know, just shifting the way that that the 155 00:08:21,960 --> 00:08:26,320 solution is being done can, can yield much better result. 156 00:08:26,320 --> 00:08:30,160 And I think strategically, this is exactly what Tash is going to 157 00:08:30,160 --> 00:08:33,880 do. The other side, the other part 158 00:08:33,880 --> 00:08:36,880 of the vendors that that we are actually competing against is, 159 00:08:36,880 --> 00:08:41,120 is in a way the votes provided right The the one that actually 160 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:43,760 was safeguarding the secrets up until now. 161 00:08:43,760 --> 00:08:49,560 But the secrets have have grown in such a scale that votes are 162 00:08:49,560 --> 00:08:53,960 not keeping up with that pace. The era where static secrets 163 00:08:53,960 --> 00:08:58,520 where you know, fuel and and and the rotations were, were were 164 00:08:58,560 --> 00:09:02,280 very far about are long gone. And with the scandal we have 165 00:09:02,280 --> 00:09:05,960 today, definitely with the Gente kind of coming in and tearing 166 00:09:05,960 --> 00:09:10,280 through the roof of that, we need a better solution and one 167 00:09:10,280 --> 00:09:12,760 that addresses the scale and is future proof. 168 00:09:13,480 --> 00:09:16,120 Yeah, I mean, I'm, I'm glad you brought that part up about the 169 00:09:16,120 --> 00:09:18,480 vaults. I mean, like I said in the 170 00:09:18,480 --> 00:09:20,920 intro, I love the name Hush Security. 171 00:09:20,920 --> 00:09:24,680 And when I first heard about it and that you guys are taking on 172 00:09:24,680 --> 00:09:30,800 secretless access management, I thought this is totally like in 173 00:09:30,800 --> 00:09:36,080 that space of managing secrets faults or getting a new twist on 174 00:09:36,080 --> 00:09:38,360 it. But I also thought this sounds 175 00:09:38,360 --> 00:09:41,240 like a play on non human identities. 176 00:09:41,400 --> 00:09:44,240 And I'm wondering if those kind of get confounded what you guys 177 00:09:44,240 --> 00:09:47,560 are doing with the secretless access management and non human 178 00:09:47,560 --> 00:09:51,480 identities. And if they do get confounded, 179 00:09:51,480 --> 00:09:53,280 what is the difference between those two? 180 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:56,640 It's a good question. I think the term non human 181 00:09:56,640 --> 00:10:00,280 identities is kind of somewhat abstract and and a little 182 00:10:00,280 --> 00:10:03,440 confusing. But the idea behind it is 183 00:10:03,440 --> 00:10:08,040 basically static keys that machines use when they 184 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:11,280 authenticate or create trust with other machines, right? 185 00:10:11,280 --> 00:10:14,000 And so every time in one machine needs to talk to another, 186 00:10:14,000 --> 00:10:17,600 definitely if it's not in the same, you know, namespace or 187 00:10:17,600 --> 00:10:21,120 even in the same data centre or physically or virtually, it 188 00:10:21,120 --> 00:10:22,800 needs to establish some kind of trust. 189 00:10:23,040 --> 00:10:26,040 And this trust, there are many ways to do that, typically an 190 00:10:26,040 --> 00:10:30,320 API key or or a certificate or a username, password and so forth. 191 00:10:30,320 --> 00:10:35,600 So I think the term NHI kind of refers in to to all of those, 192 00:10:35,800 --> 00:10:40,880 but there is a confusing element to it because because it talks 193 00:10:40,880 --> 00:10:44,240 about identities and well as well and secrets are not always 194 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:46,360 identities. Sometimes there is the identity 195 00:10:46,360 --> 00:10:48,800 of the machine, which is one thing and then there is a 196 00:10:48,800 --> 00:10:53,080 secret, which is another. So I'm a little bit resenting 197 00:10:53,080 --> 00:10:57,080 that that that term, but it's accepted in the industry. 198 00:10:57,080 --> 00:11:02,480 And for me it talks about basically legacy static keys 199 00:11:02,800 --> 00:11:05,080 enabling machine to talk to another machine. 200 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:09,360 Yeah, I definitely hope I didn't offend you with that comparison. 201 00:11:09,360 --> 00:11:13,120 But you know, I think, yeah, I think the non human identities 202 00:11:13,120 --> 00:11:16,840 is a good umbrella term. It incorporates a lot of things. 203 00:11:17,040 --> 00:11:20,600 That's kind of what I'm trying to get at, which is what is the 204 00:11:20,600 --> 00:11:22,760 problem that your clients are trying to solve. 205 00:11:23,080 --> 00:11:26,640 And I'm wondering, you know, with that description, are there 206 00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:28,960 certain types of clients that use this? 207 00:11:28,960 --> 00:11:33,400 So in other words, organizations do a lot of custom development? 208 00:11:33,680 --> 00:11:36,440 Or can you use this with pre packaged software as well? 209 00:11:37,040 --> 00:11:40,120 Basically, there are a lot of approaches that you can take in 210 00:11:40,120 --> 00:11:44,520 order to, you know, improve your posture with regard to non human 211 00:11:44,520 --> 00:11:47,600 identities. But there is there are no good 212 00:11:47,600 --> 00:11:49,480 tools that takes you all the way. 213 00:11:49,480 --> 00:11:52,360 So there are kind of the separate places where you can 214 00:11:52,520 --> 00:11:55,680 kind of improve a certain element of what you do. 215 00:11:56,200 --> 00:11:58,840 But up until now, there are no tools to do it. 216 00:11:58,840 --> 00:12:01,520 The vaults, you know, themselves, they become a little 217 00:12:01,520 --> 00:12:04,600 smarter over time. So they can do some more thing. 218 00:12:04,600 --> 00:12:07,040 They can give you more auditability and so forth. 219 00:12:07,560 --> 00:12:11,840 The NHI, you know, visibility has become a little better. 220 00:12:11,840 --> 00:12:15,600 It's not perfect yet, but but it is getting, getting there. 221 00:12:16,200 --> 00:12:20,640 But eventually the, the work to actually in, in the case of 222 00:12:20,640 --> 00:12:24,000 legacy stuff, right? So where you can, you need to go 223 00:12:24,000 --> 00:12:27,680 into a better solution. For example, when you walk in a 224 00:12:27,680 --> 00:12:31,640 cloud native environment like let's say AWS, you're using ILM 225 00:12:31,640 --> 00:12:34,800 words, you're using policy to manage access and trust between 226 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:36,800 machine. And that works great. 227 00:12:36,800 --> 00:12:40,840 It has been working for I think more than a decade in the same 228 00:12:40,840 --> 00:12:43,360 way. But when you're getting outside 229 00:12:43,360 --> 00:12:46,360 of AWS, right, you have the workload in AWS that needs to 230 00:12:46,360 --> 00:12:51,200 talk to a SAS, for example, that system doesn't apply anymore. 231 00:12:51,600 --> 00:12:55,120 And so you're stuck with this kind of legacy way of, of doing 232 00:12:55,120 --> 00:12:58,280 it. And today there are no, there 233 00:12:58,280 --> 00:13:03,000 are no good tools that can help you do that with breaking 234 00:13:03,000 --> 00:13:05,120 without breaking the legacy world. 235 00:13:06,000 --> 00:13:09,920 I think there has been several attempts to do so. 236 00:13:10,120 --> 00:13:13,760 For example, Spiffy is one of the standards that is trying to, 237 00:13:14,120 --> 00:13:17,000 to, to kind of make a, a revolution here. 238 00:13:17,600 --> 00:13:22,880 But I believe that Spiffy is not yet is that a big is, is that 239 00:13:22,880 --> 00:13:27,200 backed by enough? Sorry, it's not backed by yet 240 00:13:27,200 --> 00:13:30,920 enough big players in the ecosystem and there is not 241 00:13:30,920 --> 00:13:35,120 enough momentum behind it. And so if someone can take the 242 00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:38,280 the elements of Spiffy and the principle of it and apply it in 243 00:13:38,280 --> 00:13:41,960 a way that doesn't break your, your code and your and your 244 00:13:42,360 --> 00:13:45,920 business, then I think this is exactly what what we're trying 245 00:13:45,920 --> 00:13:47,520 to build and what needs to be built. 246 00:13:48,440 --> 00:13:51,960 It's interesting because a lot of what you're saying and 247 00:13:51,960 --> 00:13:56,760 Spiffy's, you know, I think back to our episode with Felix Catons 248 00:13:56,960 --> 00:14:00,840 and he just came on to talk a lot about different approaches 249 00:14:00,840 --> 00:14:05,560 for machine identities in the authentication space and Spiffy 250 00:14:05,880 --> 00:14:09,960 and that's kind of a cross cloud platform, whereas what you have 251 00:14:09,960 --> 00:14:12,280 is a lot of proprietary solutions. 252 00:14:12,520 --> 00:14:16,920 Think that Google's solution for vaulting is based on Spiffy, but 253 00:14:17,120 --> 00:14:19,800 for the most part it's proprietary solutions. 254 00:14:19,800 --> 00:14:23,480 You guys are approaching it differently and you're also 255 00:14:24,480 --> 00:14:28,680 taking on the on premise to software as a service, which I 256 00:14:28,680 --> 00:14:31,360 think is should be kind of clear to everybody. 257 00:14:31,360 --> 00:14:34,880 Like that's a problem that, you know, how are you solving it 258 00:14:34,880 --> 00:14:36,600 today, right? Unless you're kind of building 259 00:14:36,600 --> 00:14:39,600 your own solution, it's pretty hard to solve. 260 00:14:39,600 --> 00:14:44,120 So I'm, I'm kind of thinking that I might have answered my 261 00:14:44,120 --> 00:14:47,880 own question from the next question, but it's why is this 262 00:14:47,880 --> 00:14:50,600 hitting now? Why are people trying to solve 263 00:14:50,600 --> 00:14:54,720 this problem now? I mean, it seems like the 264 00:14:54,720 --> 00:14:56,200 problem's been around forever, right? 265 00:14:56,200 --> 00:14:58,920 So why is it coming home to roost? 266 00:14:59,920 --> 00:15:02,200 Yeah, I think it's, it's an excellent question. 267 00:15:02,200 --> 00:15:05,600 We've been using, you know, API keys and and secrets and NHI 268 00:15:05,720 --> 00:15:08,640 basically since then. The invention of software in a 269 00:15:08,640 --> 00:15:13,280 in a way the issue with that is that when we used to work in 270 00:15:13,280 --> 00:15:16,600 monolithic, you know, on Prem that was manageable. 271 00:15:16,600 --> 00:15:19,920 It was very few of those because all the software was kind of 272 00:15:19,920 --> 00:15:23,000 packed and neatly together and trust between those companies 273 00:15:23,000 --> 00:15:28,320 were inferred or or assume. But as we kind of transform to 274 00:15:28,320 --> 00:15:32,200 the cloud, right and and if now software is physically and 275 00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:35,720 virtually in different places in the world, now you need to 276 00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:39,840 establish trust between them. And so we needed a lot more of 277 00:15:39,840 --> 00:15:43,560 those NH is and if you take into consideration that after that 278 00:15:43,560 --> 00:15:47,720 came the infrastructure is called in the automation kind of 279 00:15:47,720 --> 00:15:51,680 revolution, then all of those are scripts and and tools that 280 00:15:51,680 --> 00:15:55,720 needs more, even more of those keying and, and artefacts. 281 00:15:55,960 --> 00:15:58,720 And so it kind of grew dramatically back then. 282 00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:02,160 And now as as we discussed before, we are entering the the 283 00:16:02,160 --> 00:16:06,600 agentic area and agentic by definition need a lot of very, 284 00:16:06,600 --> 00:16:11,720 very wide access into everything SAS as your, your data centre, 285 00:16:11,720 --> 00:16:15,560 your cloud and so forth. And so we are on the verge of 286 00:16:15,560 --> 00:16:17,880 another very, very big surge. Interesting. 287 00:16:17,880 --> 00:16:22,080 And I think This is why now is the time that companies and 288 00:16:22,080 --> 00:16:25,720 vendors and analysts are kind of saying, OK, this is, you know, 289 00:16:25,720 --> 00:16:28,920 it's going to break very, very soon if it hasn't broken 290 00:16:28,920 --> 00:16:32,080 already. And look, for example, just what 291 00:16:32,080 --> 00:16:35,760 happened with this sales loft drift incident that happened 292 00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:39,440 just a few weeks ago. The company was able to 293 00:16:39,440 --> 00:16:45,320 exfiltrate sales, loft AWS account and from there they're 294 00:16:45,320 --> 00:16:49,080 extracted O OS, which is basically another type of NHI is 295 00:16:49,080 --> 00:16:51,280 a is a is a kind of a static key. 296 00:16:51,680 --> 00:16:55,600 And they stole seven hundreds of those from everyone in the 297 00:16:55,600 --> 00:16:57,120 industry. And I'm talking about, you know, 298 00:16:57,120 --> 00:17:01,000 Titans as well as small companies like Palo Alto and 299 00:17:01,000 --> 00:17:04,800 Cloudflare and and you know a lot, a lot of others, which has 300 00:17:04,800 --> 00:17:07,520 a very good security minded product. 301 00:17:07,520 --> 00:17:10,640 So you can say that, you know, this is something that like an 302 00:17:10,640 --> 00:17:11,920 oversight of something like that. 303 00:17:11,920 --> 00:17:15,599 It it's a proof that the architecture and the system is 304 00:17:15,599 --> 00:17:20,400 completely broken, right? So that the proof is, is that 305 00:17:20,400 --> 00:17:24,880 someone broke all the the big security companies in the world 306 00:17:24,880 --> 00:17:28,520 and that means that the architecture is failing us. 307 00:17:28,760 --> 00:17:31,560 So we need to move into something that works a little 308 00:17:31,560 --> 00:17:33,160 bit. Yeah, Yeah. 309 00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:35,360 No. I mean, it's a great point that 310 00:17:35,360 --> 00:17:40,200 you're bringing up. Thinking from the practitioner's 311 00:17:40,200 --> 00:17:45,080 perspective. I'm, I'm wondering, it almost 312 00:17:45,080 --> 00:17:48,880 sounds like the case is being made that obviously there's a 313 00:17:48,880 --> 00:17:53,600 transition period, but this being is the case that I won't 314 00:17:53,600 --> 00:17:56,160 need a separate secrets fault in the future. 315 00:17:56,480 --> 00:18:01,040 If I'm going down this hush route, do I eventually just 316 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:05,160 eliminate the secrets fault? I think that's a very good 317 00:18:05,160 --> 00:18:09,080 assumption, right? So as I said, look at look at 318 00:18:09,080 --> 00:18:11,120 what happened. I think it's a very it's a very 319 00:18:11,120 --> 00:18:13,320 good example and a very good metaphor. 320 00:18:13,320 --> 00:18:15,240 Look what happens in the human space, right? 321 00:18:15,640 --> 00:18:18,960 When I want to access Salesforce today, my company Salesforce 322 00:18:19,360 --> 00:18:22,400 when I 10 years ago, I used to go to the my admin, it would 323 00:18:22,400 --> 00:18:25,160 create a username and password for me in Salesforce. 324 00:18:25,160 --> 00:18:28,240 He would send that to me, which is, you know, something that is 325 00:18:28,320 --> 00:18:30,720 risky because how do you send that through an e-mail, through 326 00:18:30,720 --> 00:18:34,000 an SMS, through whatever means that that's the first risk. 327 00:18:34,240 --> 00:18:38,000 And then it's my responsibility was to keep those username and 328 00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:41,640 password presumably in one of those password, you know, 329 00:18:41,640 --> 00:18:45,960 manager that we used to have like 1 pass or LastPass or and 330 00:18:45,960 --> 00:18:48,560 so forth. And hopefully that that is 331 00:18:48,560 --> 00:18:51,080 enough. But today the situation is 332 00:18:51,080 --> 00:18:53,880 completely different. I when I want to access 333 00:18:53,880 --> 00:18:57,120 Salesforce, I'm asking my admin and it's putting forth a policy 334 00:18:57,320 --> 00:18:59,520 saying mija can access Salesforce. 335 00:18:59,880 --> 00:19:02,520 And the only thing I need to do is go to Salesforce and just log 336 00:19:02,520 --> 00:19:07,480 in with my IDP, whether it's Google or Octa or Ping or or 337 00:19:07,480 --> 00:19:11,280 Entra or Microsoft. And so this is exactly the, the 338 00:19:11,280 --> 00:19:14,880 kind of past we want to, we want to take the, the machine access 339 00:19:14,880 --> 00:19:16,920 through. We want to write policies rather 340 00:19:16,920 --> 00:19:20,320 than deal with taking a key, sending out to engineering, 341 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:23,200 putting that in a vault and pulling, pulling it out of the 342 00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:27,680 vault when we need it. So, yes, so, so in my vision, in 343 00:19:27,680 --> 00:19:32,680 my view of the world, when you're using a system similar to 344 00:19:32,680 --> 00:19:35,840 what we're developing, you don't need to vote anymore. 345 00:19:35,960 --> 00:19:38,920 We had Darren Rolls on the podcast recently and he talked 346 00:19:38,920 --> 00:19:44,680 about, you know, for, for the big incumbent firms, they're not 347 00:19:44,680 --> 00:19:47,480 as motivated to innovate. I, I think what I'm hearing 348 00:19:47,480 --> 00:19:51,840 about from you is like true innovation potentially shaking 349 00:19:51,840 --> 00:19:57,040 up the industry. I think this story resonates 350 00:19:57,040 --> 00:20:01,040 really well with practitioners, architects. 351 00:20:01,520 --> 00:20:05,040 Technology leaders as they kind of understand, well, this is a 352 00:20:05,040 --> 00:20:08,080 game changer, don't get on board. 353 00:20:09,520 --> 00:20:11,200 It's a little bit of a different cell. 354 00:20:11,200 --> 00:20:14,360 As you move up the chain of command within organizations, 355 00:20:14,360 --> 00:20:17,680 you get to that C-Suite and you know, the people who all went to 356 00:20:17,680 --> 00:20:21,840 the budget, if you will. So I think that's one of the 357 00:20:21,840 --> 00:20:26,360 things that with your perspective clients, you're 358 00:20:26,360 --> 00:20:29,400 really going to have to help make that case. 359 00:20:29,400 --> 00:20:31,640 And have you already thought through that problem? 360 00:20:31,640 --> 00:20:35,640 I mean, what is the business case that you coach your 361 00:20:35,640 --> 00:20:39,480 prospective clients through to make to people who are not the 362 00:20:39,480 --> 00:20:42,760 techies, who are not hands on and and love them to technology? 363 00:20:43,760 --> 00:20:48,200 I think eventually the, the, the thing that resonate most well 364 00:20:48,200 --> 00:20:51,720 with those guys is, is the value that, that you bring to them, 365 00:20:51,720 --> 00:20:53,560 right? They will not do anything that 366 00:20:53,560 --> 00:20:57,400 doesn't hold a, a very good value for the company and for 367 00:20:57,400 --> 00:21:00,320 the way they work. So if we're keen, if we can 368 00:21:00,320 --> 00:21:04,480 reduce the risk for them, reduce the labour that they need to do, 369 00:21:04,720 --> 00:21:08,520 reduce the, the, the, the cost of ownership for managing volts 370 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:12,520 and for managing the processes around around the sea, managing 371 00:21:12,520 --> 00:21:14,560 access reviews and so many other things. 372 00:21:14,560 --> 00:21:18,760 If we can just reduce that and produce that in a very simple, 373 00:21:18,760 --> 00:21:23,480 automated and invisible way, I think this is where they're 374 00:21:23,480 --> 00:21:26,920 going to buy it in, right? Because it will resonate because 375 00:21:26,920 --> 00:21:30,480 of the great values that that the product brings to the table. 376 00:21:31,840 --> 00:21:34,240 So it's one thing to get the executive buy in. 377 00:21:34,480 --> 00:21:37,240 Great, now I've got it. I was just saying work. 378 00:21:37,400 --> 00:21:40,480 You know, what's the, how does the platform go about 379 00:21:40,920 --> 00:21:44,360 identifying these machine accounts and setting up whatever 380 00:21:44,360 --> 00:21:47,160 it is, you know, if it's a graph database or some other thing, 381 00:21:47,160 --> 00:21:48,280 right. To say, OK, here's all the 382 00:21:48,280 --> 00:21:50,800 accounts that exist. The environment, that's the 383 00:21:50,800 --> 00:21:53,240 visibility part of it. But how does this actually work? 384 00:21:53,360 --> 00:21:56,520 How do you go about collecting that information from someone's 385 00:21:56,520 --> 00:21:58,560 environment? Right. 386 00:21:58,560 --> 00:22:00,640 So we have multiple ways of doing that. 387 00:22:00,640 --> 00:22:04,120 The first of which and then the most trivial one, one that is 388 00:22:04,120 --> 00:22:07,800 actually used by other vendors as well is that we we're 389 00:22:07,800 --> 00:22:13,040 basically connect to, with with AP is through to our customers 390 00:22:13,040 --> 00:22:16,440 infrastructure, to our code repositories, to our, to their 391 00:22:16,440 --> 00:22:18,640 success. We scan and we read everything 392 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:22,680 that we can, the metadata about the the non human identities or 393 00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:24,640 the secrets and the keys that they have there. 394 00:22:25,160 --> 00:22:28,360 So we get that and that brings us the initial kind of a 395 00:22:28,360 --> 00:22:30,480 database or inventory of what we have. 396 00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:36,160 That stage on it's own, it's mandatory part of the journey, 397 00:22:36,160 --> 00:22:39,080 but it's definitely not the last because first of all, there is a 398 00:22:39,080 --> 00:22:42,920 lot of noise around this or a lot of stuff that we scan that 399 00:22:42,920 --> 00:22:44,440 is not relevant for our customers. 400 00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:49,400 And then the the second thing is that if you read only the stuff 401 00:22:49,400 --> 00:22:52,440 that you know about, then by definition you are missing all 402 00:22:52,440 --> 00:22:54,160 the stuff that you don't know about, right? 403 00:22:54,920 --> 00:22:59,280 And so to that end, we developed a set of, of runtime technology 404 00:22:59,280 --> 00:23:02,840 sensors very lightweight that we can deploy with our customers. 405 00:23:03,200 --> 00:23:07,280 And that gives us observability of every authentication and 406 00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:09,680 every interaction between machine that happens within the 407 00:23:09,680 --> 00:23:13,240 customer environment, whether it's cloud or on Prem and so 408 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:16,160 forth. And so that is the first step 409 00:23:16,160 --> 00:23:18,560 for us. It's first to understand that 410 00:23:18,560 --> 00:23:22,560 the world that the universe of the of any choice for the 411 00:23:22,560 --> 00:23:25,760 customer produce the report from that first of all, the 412 00:23:25,760 --> 00:23:29,040 comprehensive audit log and second of all, a posture for 413 00:23:29,040 --> 00:23:31,280 each one of them so the customers can address the 414 00:23:31,280 --> 00:23:35,040 critical stuff that they have. And this is for us only the 415 00:23:35,040 --> 00:23:38,120 beginning, because this will allow us to kind of transform 416 00:23:38,120 --> 00:23:40,720 this customer into a policy based approach. 417 00:23:41,280 --> 00:23:44,520 So we take that, we do the mapping right, we do the 418 00:23:44,520 --> 00:23:48,040 baselining of everything that they have and then we can move 419 00:23:48,040 --> 00:23:51,160 that thing to a policy based approach where the customer only 420 00:23:51,160 --> 00:23:57,240 manages from this point and on only manages policies rather 421 00:23:57,240 --> 00:24:01,120 than secrets. So sounds like the end goal here 422 00:24:01,120 --> 00:24:04,840 is to get that inventory, whether it's on Prem or cloud, 423 00:24:04,840 --> 00:24:08,560 I'm assuming, and then turn to PBAC, right. 424 00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:11,040 Policy based access controls through that, Yeah. 425 00:24:11,040 --> 00:24:13,640 Are there other methods of access control that maybe apply 426 00:24:13,640 --> 00:24:14,960 here? Can we use things like 427 00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:16,120 attributes? And I don't know if I wouldn't 428 00:24:16,120 --> 00:24:18,600 want to go role based, I would wish that my worst enemy. 429 00:24:18,960 --> 00:24:23,640 But, you know, help me how I guess how configurable or how 430 00:24:23,640 --> 00:24:26,920 flexible is the model to say, you know, policies are good for 431 00:24:26,920 --> 00:24:29,280 this, but maybe there are certain machine accounts or 432 00:24:29,280 --> 00:24:32,120 machine identities or whatever maybe that can't be managed that 433 00:24:32,120 --> 00:24:33,680 way. Maybe it's a different way to 434 00:24:33,680 --> 00:24:36,920 manage it. So first of all, we address the 435 00:24:36,920 --> 00:24:42,640 identity and attestation of the identity very, very closely. 436 00:24:42,720 --> 00:24:46,760 We use Fifi as as the base of our attestation technology, 437 00:24:46,760 --> 00:24:48,720 right. So this is, you know, already 438 00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:53,720 proven in battle and has been widely used in internally as as 439 00:24:53,720 --> 00:24:57,240 we discussed before, but we use that as a way to attest the 440 00:24:57,240 --> 00:24:59,120 identity. So first of all, to check which, 441 00:24:59,200 --> 00:25:03,640 what is the machine, you know, and and this goes to a variety 442 00:25:03,640 --> 00:25:06,160 of ways of doing attestation. But this problem is already 443 00:25:06,160 --> 00:25:09,400 solved by spiffy, which is which is great and it's already 444 00:25:09,400 --> 00:25:12,760 available. The second part of it is is to 445 00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:17,160 to pair through a policy to pair the right key for that identity. 446 00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:21,400 And on top of doing that we can also put some conditional access 447 00:25:22,280 --> 00:25:24,680 into it, right? So for example, is the machine 448 00:25:24,680 --> 00:25:26,480 compromised? We can take that information 449 00:25:26,480 --> 00:25:30,360 from other vendors like Cal Styke or Wiz or OCA. 450 00:25:30,640 --> 00:25:33,640 So we know if that if that workload is coming from a 451 00:25:33,640 --> 00:25:37,800 machine that is OK green lighted or maybe the other way around is 452 00:25:37,800 --> 00:25:39,720 being compromised. We don't want to allow it to 453 00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:43,920 access acidic data. We can take other conditional 454 00:25:44,760 --> 00:25:48,560 access our rules like you know the time of day, the geography, 455 00:25:48,560 --> 00:25:52,520 the IPS and so forth. And so we are kind of adding, we 456 00:25:52,520 --> 00:25:55,320 are, we are building a very strong identity and then adding 457 00:25:55,320 --> 00:25:58,640 some conditional access rules and then after that, you know, 458 00:25:58,640 --> 00:26:02,920 we've kind of elevated all of the all of the security several 459 00:26:02,920 --> 00:26:08,000 notches up already. When we talk about the product 460 00:26:08,000 --> 00:26:10,760 itself, right, Hush, I think about machine identity 461 00:26:10,760 --> 00:26:12,280 management. It has a bunch of different 462 00:26:12,280 --> 00:26:14,280 components to it. There's the account life cycle, 463 00:26:14,440 --> 00:26:16,800 authentication, right, authorization, logging, kind of 464 00:26:16,800 --> 00:26:17,920 everything that goes along with it. 465 00:26:18,440 --> 00:26:21,760 Does this cover all of that or are there areas that you tend to 466 00:26:21,760 --> 00:26:25,240 focus on specifically or maybe doesn't matter depending on the 467 00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:27,000 data you can get? I would assume right, maybe 468 00:26:27,000 --> 00:26:29,680 there's more data for a cloud platform versus maybe an on 469 00:26:29,680 --> 00:26:32,360 premise platform. Speak to me a little bit about 470 00:26:32,520 --> 00:26:35,120 when we talk about machine identity management, like what 471 00:26:35,120 --> 00:26:36,880 are the areas that we're specifically covering here? 472 00:26:38,080 --> 00:26:40,960 I think there's definitely differences between, you know, 473 00:26:40,960 --> 00:26:43,800 cloud, which is a lot more, more, more drain and structure 474 00:26:43,800 --> 00:26:49,240 than the and systematic than legacy system like Contra and V 475 00:26:49,240 --> 00:26:51,360 sphere and so forth. In the cloud. 476 00:26:51,360 --> 00:26:54,320 And definitely in modern environment like Kubernetes, 477 00:26:54,320 --> 00:26:57,320 we've got a lot of information, a lot of attributes, a lot of 478 00:26:57,800 --> 00:27:01,120 identity hints that we can use and we leverage that. 479 00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:06,080 And, and that kind of tends to go down as you go into the, into 480 00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:09,400 the older stuff, right? And so if it's a virtual 481 00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:12,240 machine, then we use a different set of, of attributes. 482 00:27:12,240 --> 00:27:15,520 If it's going to on Prem and, and, and virtual machines that 483 00:27:15,520 --> 00:27:18,200 are there, you know, we have a different way of, of dealing 484 00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:21,280 with that. So it, it gets better as the, as 485 00:27:21,280 --> 00:27:27,520 the, as the environment is more modern and we typically work a 486 00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:31,080 lot faster and better there. But we do support legacy 487 00:27:31,080 --> 00:27:35,720 environments as well. Yeah, in in to your questions 488 00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:38,120 about authentication and authorization and so forth. 489 00:27:38,120 --> 00:27:43,080 So we cover most of those layers in, in, in one way or another. 490 00:27:43,080 --> 00:27:45,720 So first of all, authentication for sure, because we are the 491 00:27:45,720 --> 00:27:49,520 facilitator of authentication and we can also cover some 492 00:27:49,520 --> 00:27:52,840 aspects of authorization because we can provide different keys 493 00:27:52,840 --> 00:27:56,160 with different scopes for which one of those workloads. 494 00:27:56,160 --> 00:27:58,920 So we cover an aspect of that as well. 495 00:28:02,120 --> 00:28:04,960 Yeah, I'm sorry, there, there was another part of that 496 00:28:04,960 --> 00:28:07,080 question. I I missed it. 497 00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:10,640 No, I think you cover cover it all. 498 00:28:10,640 --> 00:28:12,400 I think it put us on a data, right. 499 00:28:12,400 --> 00:28:14,560 How, how much data can we get for this stuff? 500 00:28:14,560 --> 00:28:19,760 And maybe that is, is, is that a minimum bar to be able to 501 00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:23,120 utilize a platform like this? Do I need a certain level of 502 00:28:23,120 --> 00:28:26,840 data for this to run or stand this run in like a simple 503 00:28:26,840 --> 00:28:30,440 vaulting format where you know as much as we, you know, dump 504 00:28:30,440 --> 00:28:32,600 down on it. Sometimes there is some value 505 00:28:32,600 --> 00:28:33,920 that we set in some sort of shared vault. 506 00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:40,000 So no, no, no minimum here, as long as we have one workload. 507 00:28:40,000 --> 00:28:42,720 It could be as simple as a script, you know, running in 508 00:28:42,720 --> 00:28:46,640 Bash or Python that is trying to access another machine. 509 00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:50,440 We will see that and we will address that and we can control 510 00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:52,880 the way that it's done. We can govern that and we can 511 00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:56,320 give it, apply the right identity to it and the right 512 00:28:56,320 --> 00:28:59,800 secret. And if it's allowed, we will let 513 00:28:59,800 --> 00:29:03,080 it pass. Then it could be as as as 514 00:29:03,080 --> 00:29:06,480 complex as a, you know, very complex environment with 515 00:29:06,520 --> 00:29:10,600 multiple clusters of Kubernetes and databases and interconnects 516 00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:16,120 on top of meshes, you know, like NTNS and so forth. 517 00:29:16,880 --> 00:29:18,400 Basically we are agnostic to that. 518 00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:21,520 At the end of the day, we are looking at very strong data 519 00:29:21,520 --> 00:29:24,960 identity of the corner and then at the service of trying to 520 00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:29,440 access and we find and match the right key to it if there if if 521 00:29:29,440 --> 00:29:34,080 it's allowed. Mika, I'm kind of wondering how 522 00:29:35,160 --> 00:29:39,160 your clients are to measure success. 523 00:29:39,680 --> 00:29:42,320 In other words, how do they know that they're succeeding? 524 00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:46,400 And then, of course, how do they communicate that to the leaders 525 00:29:46,400 --> 00:29:49,800 of their organization that the money's being well spent? 526 00:29:49,800 --> 00:29:54,160 We're actually making progress. And what what is progress? 527 00:29:54,240 --> 00:29:57,400 What does progress look like? What does success look like? 528 00:29:58,880 --> 00:30:01,960 So first of all, visibility for the first time they have an 529 00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:05,480 entire view of all their environments and the way that 530 00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:07,800 secret is being consumed and used. 531 00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:14,920 Basically success looks like lower, lower time to remediate 532 00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:23,240 less incident, full auditability and basically the ability to to, 533 00:30:23,480 --> 00:30:28,040 to create additional and new at scale the workload that are 534 00:30:28,040 --> 00:30:30,680 accessing and trusting addition other machines. 535 00:30:30,680 --> 00:30:34,760 So basically machine access, it's scale very, very easy 536 00:30:35,240 --> 00:30:38,840 compared to how it's done today, which is cumbersome, labor 537 00:30:38,840 --> 00:30:45,520 intensive and and very risky. So continuing on with the the 538 00:30:45,520 --> 00:30:50,440 kind of the thread that Jeff was pulling on the how, how do I 539 00:30:50,440 --> 00:30:54,360 take of security and roll it out in my organization? 540 00:30:54,360 --> 00:30:57,640 Like where do people start? What is the the first building 541 00:30:57,640 --> 00:30:59,800 block and then where do they take it from there? 542 00:31:00,720 --> 00:31:03,200 Are you, I used to say to the customers that when you have the 543 00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:06,480 right people in the room, then it's very easy to do it right. 544 00:31:06,480 --> 00:31:08,880 You need the the guys with the permission to, to the 545 00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:10,720 infrastructure, to the sauces that you have. 546 00:31:10,720 --> 00:31:13,440 And if you have all those guys, you know, lined up, which is 547 00:31:13,440 --> 00:31:17,520 sometimes hard to do in very big enterprises, then it's very 548 00:31:17,520 --> 00:31:20,200 easy. You can connect whatever we do 549 00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:25,280 the the connector that we have to your SAS, to your IS, to your 550 00:31:25,280 --> 00:31:28,560 infrastructure, to your databases and we start scanning 551 00:31:28,560 --> 00:31:31,760 everything minutes after that. You already have very good 552 00:31:31,760 --> 00:31:34,120 results. So the initial, the initial 553 00:31:34,120 --> 00:31:39,400 scanning then to deploy the the London technology, again, it 554 00:31:39,400 --> 00:31:40,800 kind of depends on the environment. 555 00:31:40,800 --> 00:31:43,080 And basically you're deploying a sensor. 556 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:46,560 So it's very easy in some environment like Kubernetes in, 557 00:31:46,560 --> 00:31:50,240 in other environments like Z, NS or compute, there is a different 558 00:31:50,240 --> 00:31:53,280 approach to that. A lot of ways to do it, some of 559 00:31:53,280 --> 00:31:56,120 them is some of them a little, a little less. 560 00:31:56,520 --> 00:31:59,760 And then once you do that, once you deploy everything, then you 561 00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:03,960 start seeing the real, the real picture kind of taking place. 562 00:32:04,280 --> 00:32:08,080 And this is very dependent on the size of your, of your 563 00:32:08,080 --> 00:32:10,680 operation, right? And so for example, if there's 564 00:32:10,680 --> 00:32:13,520 an authentication event that happens only once a month 565 00:32:13,520 --> 00:32:18,400 because you're rendering like a digest, monthly digest, then you 566 00:32:18,400 --> 00:32:21,600 need to wait for that for that monthly event to occur. 567 00:32:21,880 --> 00:32:25,440 But all the other stuff, millions of other authentication 568 00:32:25,440 --> 00:32:28,520 event that's happening every minute, you will start seeing 569 00:32:28,520 --> 00:32:31,360 those right away. And that that would be the 570 00:32:31,360 --> 00:32:35,400 initial start of of this of the process where you see the report 571 00:32:35,400 --> 00:32:38,280 and you see the posture and everything that you need to know 572 00:32:38,280 --> 00:32:41,680 from the discovery phase. And then on top of that moving 573 00:32:41,680 --> 00:32:47,240 into into the ponces and just there is nothing else to do 574 00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:49,440 after that. It's basically to sit and wait 575 00:32:49,440 --> 00:32:53,520 for any unders to come your way, seeing that someone is is 576 00:32:53,520 --> 00:32:56,040 actually doing something that they shouldn't. 577 00:32:57,560 --> 00:33:00,880 Let's pick on that a little bit. So you you use a very 578 00:33:00,880 --> 00:33:02,960 interesting word to me, which is scanning. 579 00:33:02,960 --> 00:33:04,480 So you're scanning the environment. 580 00:33:04,680 --> 00:33:06,520 When you're scanning the environment, what are you 581 00:33:06,520 --> 00:33:10,840 looking for? I'm looking basically for every 582 00:33:11,400 --> 00:33:14,800 machine that is talking to another machine and within that, 583 00:33:14,800 --> 00:33:18,240 what secret is being used when they talk, right? 584 00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:22,440 And so, so basically we're, we, it's a combination of scanning 585 00:33:22,440 --> 00:33:24,520 and monitoring. We do some agent scanning. 586 00:33:24,520 --> 00:33:28,360 So we scan your code base, for example, your Git repository, 587 00:33:28,600 --> 00:33:30,520 right? So we want to know if you put 588 00:33:30,520 --> 00:33:33,680 any hard coded secret there. So this is scanning domes, 589 00:33:33,680 --> 00:33:37,520 scanning your collaboration up like JIRA and Teams and Slack 590 00:33:37,800 --> 00:33:41,400 and so forth. But we also monitor and observe. 591 00:33:41,400 --> 00:33:43,560 So that's the runtime part of what we do. 592 00:33:43,560 --> 00:33:46,200 We look at every authentication event that happens. 593 00:33:46,520 --> 00:33:48,560 We, we look at the identity of the caller. 594 00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:51,960 We do, we look at the identity of the of the service that they 595 00:33:51,960 --> 00:33:56,320 are calling and we are taking the the map of everything that 596 00:33:56,320 --> 00:33:59,480 happens basically around that happening that with the metadata 597 00:33:59,480 --> 00:34:02,680 coming from the from the engine test scanning, we get a very, 598 00:34:02,680 --> 00:34:09,040 very distilled inventory. We don't the right information 599 00:34:09,040 --> 00:34:11,520 in it. That's very interesting. 600 00:34:11,520 --> 00:34:14,960 So I can, I can totally get what you're saying now with 601 00:34:15,440 --> 00:34:20,920 visibility and you have a good picture of what's going on and 602 00:34:20,920 --> 00:34:25,239 you start to identify where you have weaker controls from an 603 00:34:25,239 --> 00:34:30,199 identity and access perspective. Now you can report on that. 604 00:34:30,199 --> 00:34:32,600 What else can you do? Like eventually that the 605 00:34:32,600 --> 00:34:35,960 practitioner has to go about remediating that, right? 606 00:34:35,960 --> 00:34:39,120 So what's the approach then? Is that like the next level 607 00:34:39,360 --> 00:34:41,679 within the Hush platform? Yeah. 608 00:34:41,679 --> 00:34:47,120 So, so some, some of our customers, they only interested 609 00:34:47,120 --> 00:34:49,880 in the discovery pump, right? Some say, so they say, I just 610 00:34:49,880 --> 00:34:52,600 want to know where I am. I want to make sure there are no 611 00:34:52,600 --> 00:34:54,440 risks. So if there are, I want to 612 00:34:54,440 --> 00:34:57,720 remediate them. But my argument, and I think 613 00:34:57,720 --> 00:35:01,520 Felix made, made a very similar argument when you, when it was 614 00:35:01,520 --> 00:35:06,400 on your podcast, is that using those kind of of, of keys and, 615 00:35:06,400 --> 00:35:11,160 and NH is this is the wrong way because of the, of the scale of 616 00:35:11,160 --> 00:35:14,280 where they are today. Just trying to chase and 617 00:35:14,280 --> 00:35:17,320 remediate the stuff that you have is just is, is not 618 00:35:17,320 --> 00:35:19,280 scalable. And it, and it, it, it's 619 00:35:19,280 --> 00:35:25,080 definitely not a way to build a complex environment like today. 620 00:35:25,680 --> 00:35:27,880 And so we do have that part as well. 621 00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:30,880 And we give that in where some of our customers, you know, this 622 00:35:30,880 --> 00:35:34,400 is where they are. But what, what hash is really 623 00:35:34,400 --> 00:35:37,160 doing and how we really want to change the way that that 624 00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:41,320 software is being done is that we want to move you away from, 625 00:35:41,320 --> 00:35:45,560 from needing to remediate that. Because once you don't use NHI 626 00:35:45,560 --> 00:35:49,840 or static keys anymore, you just use policies, then everything, 627 00:35:50,640 --> 00:35:54,360 all the risks attached to those NH is, is going away with it. 628 00:35:54,760 --> 00:35:57,520 And that is the narrative, that is the vision that that we are 629 00:35:57,520 --> 00:36:01,760 bringing to the market and to the industry. 630 00:36:02,400 --> 00:36:06,280 And I think there's 11 sentence that Felix said that that kind 631 00:36:06,280 --> 00:36:08,800 of strucks me very well. It was kind of funny. 632 00:36:08,960 --> 00:36:11,920 It said friends don't let friends use NHIS, right? 633 00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:14,600 Like this is this is not the way you want to go. 634 00:36:14,640 --> 00:36:18,320 You need to, you need to move, you know, the way that you think 635 00:36:18,320 --> 00:36:21,680 about software and the way that you that you manage access. 636 00:36:22,280 --> 00:36:25,480 Yeah, normally I book our guests, but Death hit a Grand 637 00:36:25,480 --> 00:36:28,920 Slam with getting Felix on the podcast, and that's definitely 638 00:36:28,920 --> 00:36:34,280 one that got a lot of attention. You know, with all that said, 639 00:36:34,280 --> 00:36:38,640 you know, the visibility, it does seem like look, I mean, I 640 00:36:38,640 --> 00:36:42,520 get to see so perspective of, you know, just to make 641 00:36:42,520 --> 00:36:46,280 visibility because I think it's very hard to solve a problem 642 00:36:46,280 --> 00:36:47,960 when you don't know what the problem is. 643 00:36:48,720 --> 00:36:52,120 But then you've got this next level of actually remediating 644 00:36:52,200 --> 00:36:55,240 problem. Going back to my earlier 645 00:36:55,240 --> 00:36:59,320 questions about like how do we communicate our success in the 646 00:36:59,320 --> 00:37:04,000 organization given those factors, given all that, can we 647 00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:07,520 attach, you know, metrics to any of that? 648 00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:12,800 Can we set long term goals and then show progress towards those 649 00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:15,160 in terms of like OK, Rs and things like that? 650 00:37:15,480 --> 00:37:19,960 Seems to me like that's goals and objectives and, and hitting 651 00:37:19,960 --> 00:37:24,720 those, that's the language of the C-Suite, you know, 2 point O 652 00:37:24,720 --> 00:37:27,400 if you will, or like that's what people are talking today about, 653 00:37:27,400 --> 00:37:32,880 which is objectives. It seems to me that all this 654 00:37:33,480 --> 00:37:37,160 data that you're creating, this visibility, this ability to 655 00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:42,320 remediate in progress over time, that speaks exactly to achieving 656 00:37:42,320 --> 00:37:45,560 those objectives. I think that's spot on. 657 00:37:45,560 --> 00:37:48,920 You know, eventually the, the sea level, they want to see, you 658 00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:52,000 know, some kind of KPIs, right? And how do you achieve them? 659 00:37:52,680 --> 00:37:58,560 And so things like, you know, fixing the problems, like 660 00:37:59,120 --> 00:38:02,480 reducing the time to fix an incident, that's definitely 661 00:38:02,480 --> 00:38:06,680 something you want to do. The time for fixing an identity 662 00:38:06,680 --> 00:38:09,240 related breach, I think I read somewhere is around something 663 00:38:09,240 --> 00:38:11,840 like around 40 days. So you have a problem, you need 664 00:38:11,840 --> 00:38:15,200 to fix that. That takes 40 days in in the way 665 00:38:15,200 --> 00:38:20,080 that we envision Nano one identity future is that you 666 00:38:20,080 --> 00:38:23,320 don't you don't have that time because you're not even using 667 00:38:23,320 --> 00:38:26,560 the same language or the same construct to to manage it. 668 00:38:26,560 --> 00:38:28,960 So you want to reduce that to zero. 669 00:38:29,760 --> 00:38:33,640 You want to reduce the number of incidents that you have and of 670 00:38:33,640 --> 00:38:36,680 course you need to reduce, you need to improve the posture and 671 00:38:36,680 --> 00:38:39,560 reduce the risk that you have within your environment. 672 00:38:39,560 --> 00:38:42,200 So the first thing, for example, that we do, we scan everything 673 00:38:42,200 --> 00:38:44,400 and we show you the, the amount of risk that you have. 674 00:38:44,920 --> 00:38:48,360 For example, you have, you know, where the key that is being used 675 00:38:48,360 --> 00:38:52,400 in, you know, hundreds of or 10s or hundreds of environments. 676 00:38:52,400 --> 00:38:55,120 And we've seen that. And so this is a very big risk 677 00:38:55,120 --> 00:38:57,640 because if one of those environments get compromised, 678 00:38:57,640 --> 00:39:00,280 that means that all of your infrastructure get compromised. 679 00:39:00,280 --> 00:39:04,720 So we show you that and we show you very easily how you can 680 00:39:05,480 --> 00:39:09,680 overcome that and remediate that if this is on what you want or 681 00:39:09,680 --> 00:39:13,680 move to a parallel system where those risks doesn't exist at 682 00:39:13,680 --> 00:39:15,720 all. You know, Jeff and I are 683 00:39:15,720 --> 00:39:20,880 identity practitioners at heart and I think, you know, all this 684 00:39:20,880 --> 00:39:23,920 data, having it, it might cost some sleepless nights. 685 00:39:24,200 --> 00:39:27,560 That'll what'll really 'cause the sleepless night is knowing 686 00:39:27,560 --> 00:39:30,440 you have a problem, but not knowing how big the problem is. 687 00:39:30,840 --> 00:39:35,720 That will just give you anxiety. So I mean, listening to 688 00:39:35,720 --> 00:39:38,520 everything we've talked about, I think there are a lot of our 689 00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:42,200 listeners who are interested. They want to learn more. 690 00:39:42,800 --> 00:39:47,360 How do they learn more? Definitely using the link that 691 00:39:47,440 --> 00:39:50,440 you can provide. They're going to #security 692 00:39:51,760 --> 00:39:54,720 sending us a notes, pinging us on LinkedIn. 693 00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:58,960 Many ways to come to us. We have a great good marketing 694 00:39:58,960 --> 00:40:02,400 would be happy to jump on a call, you know, explain and walk 695 00:40:02,440 --> 00:40:06,000 out walk through the solution and also give some free 696 00:40:06,000 --> 00:40:09,520 assessments so we can check the posture on you know what are 697 00:40:09,560 --> 00:40:13,880 what they have today and just for them to to see. 698 00:40:15,680 --> 00:40:18,600 What are the risks that are lurking in their environment? 699 00:40:18,600 --> 00:40:22,640 And it's so often that we go into a colon and and the other, 700 00:40:22,800 --> 00:40:24,680 you know, the guy on the other side said, no, no, no, we are, 701 00:40:25,160 --> 00:40:27,840 we are completely, you know, very hygiene here. 702 00:40:27,840 --> 00:40:29,360 We, we keep everything in the vault. 703 00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:31,280 Nothing is, is out. You know, we know where 704 00:40:31,280 --> 00:40:33,800 everything is. And then you scan it and they're 705 00:40:33,800 --> 00:40:37,440 like, OK, so maybe I don't have anything. 706 00:40:38,680 --> 00:40:41,280 And I used to, I used to say the beginning of the journey that I, 707 00:40:41,280 --> 00:40:45,120 I'll give you a butter of Scotch if we don't find anything, you 708 00:40:45,120 --> 00:40:49,480 know, as you said, but and I haven't given any, any battle 709 00:40:49,880 --> 00:40:52,800 for the last year within this journey. 710 00:40:53,320 --> 00:40:55,240 I'll think about those Scots. I don't really have an 711 00:40:55,240 --> 00:41:01,320 environment for you to say, but you know, I know that you guys 712 00:41:01,320 --> 00:41:06,600 are setting up a URL hush dot security slash IDAC, like the 713 00:41:06,600 --> 00:41:09,360 podcast name. I know you're going to have some 714 00:41:09,560 --> 00:41:11,840 something out there. I don't know if you want to 715 00:41:11,840 --> 00:41:15,720 reveal what that's going to be now, but if folks go out there, 716 00:41:16,000 --> 00:41:18,800 there will be something that they can get started with, 717 00:41:18,800 --> 00:41:20,560 right? Absolutely. 718 00:41:21,280 --> 00:41:25,480 So whenever you reach out to us and through this link, we can 719 00:41:25,640 --> 00:41:28,720 jump on a call and we can, we can have our team give you a 720 00:41:28,720 --> 00:41:34,040 complete assessment of your NHI posture and you know, happy to 721 00:41:34,040 --> 00:41:36,000 take it on. Awesome. 722 00:41:36,720 --> 00:41:39,240 Now you guys, do you guys do the conference circuit? 723 00:41:40,000 --> 00:41:41,760 We will. We're we're studying with 724 00:41:42,520 --> 00:41:49,400 Gartner IIM conference in in December and we've got some 725 00:41:49,400 --> 00:41:52,320 other ones lined up as well. Well, we'll definitely see you 726 00:41:52,320 --> 00:41:54,160 in Gartner. So that'll be a good time to get 727 00:41:54,160 --> 00:41:57,720 the official fist bump of gratitude for being on on with 728 00:41:57,720 --> 00:42:00,480 us. So Mika, this has been the easy 729 00:42:00,480 --> 00:42:04,120 part of the podcast. The hard part is now I have a 730 00:42:04,120 --> 00:42:07,640 very challenging question for you, and that is pancakes or 731 00:42:07,640 --> 00:42:11,000 waffles. Pancakes or waffles? 732 00:42:11,200 --> 00:42:15,600 Definitely pancakes about hesitation, this kind of kind of 733 00:42:16,080 --> 00:42:18,560 memory, right? Yeah, without hesitation. 734 00:42:18,560 --> 00:42:22,360 And I'm seeing my mom, you know, it's it's it's the weekend in 735 00:42:22,360 --> 00:42:25,720 the mornings I wake up, she give me she serves up some fresh 736 00:42:25,720 --> 00:42:29,120 pancakes. What what more sweet memory than 737 00:42:29,120 --> 00:42:31,680 this? You can ask well before, right? 738 00:42:32,000 --> 00:42:33,400 Well, and and they're just delicious. 739 00:42:33,400 --> 00:42:37,240 So I, I have thoughts on this. Let me go to let me go to Jim 740 00:42:37,240 --> 00:42:39,640 first, because I have a feeling he thinks he knows what I would 741 00:42:39,640 --> 00:42:42,240 pick. But Jim can take or waffles. 742 00:42:42,680 --> 00:42:44,720 I don't think you can go wrong with either one, right? 743 00:42:44,760 --> 00:42:50,680 I mean, I I'm a huge fan of both pancakes and waffles, but I will 744 00:42:50,680 --> 00:42:56,440 say I do think that waffles are meant as carriers of butter. 745 00:42:56,800 --> 00:42:59,960 They serve no other purpose but to put butter in your mouth in 746 00:42:59,960 --> 00:43:02,760 large quantities which. A bottling delivery. 747 00:43:02,800 --> 00:43:06,080 System a butter delivery system. Thank you. 748 00:43:06,080 --> 00:43:09,920 You're going to go with waffles, and I think you're going to say 749 00:43:09,920 --> 00:43:13,520 the same because they can be paired with one of your favorite 750 00:43:13,520 --> 00:43:15,400 meats. Yes. 751 00:43:15,520 --> 00:43:19,360 So yeah, I'm, I'm a big fan of chicken and waffles, but I'm 752 00:43:19,360 --> 00:43:21,960 going to shock you and I'm going to say pancakes. 753 00:43:22,480 --> 00:43:27,320 And here's why It's very difficult to find a good waffle. 754 00:43:27,880 --> 00:43:30,600 You can get good pancakes pretty much anywhere. 755 00:43:30,800 --> 00:43:32,880 It's much simpler, I think to prepare. 756 00:43:33,200 --> 00:43:35,400 It's more consistent. That's what I'm looking for. 757 00:43:35,840 --> 00:43:38,960 But a very good waffle. And I'm, I'm more of a Belgian 758 00:43:38,960 --> 00:43:42,520 waffle myself meal, maybe some bacon bits in it, maybe, you 759 00:43:42,520 --> 00:43:45,480 know, some, some walnuts or pecans on tops and syrup. 760 00:43:45,480 --> 00:43:47,480 And of course, you know, some fried chicken. 761 00:43:47,480 --> 00:43:48,640 Chicken and waffles is my favorite. 762 00:43:48,640 --> 00:43:54,480 But because it's so hard to get right, I feel like pancakes are 763 00:43:54,480 --> 00:43:57,320 a safer bet. But I'm like you, I don't 764 00:43:57,320 --> 00:43:58,840 discriminate. I will eat either. 765 00:43:59,160 --> 00:44:01,240 The correct answer is both, of course. 766 00:44:01,480 --> 00:44:03,800 So we all failed this one. But I'm going to go with 767 00:44:03,800 --> 00:44:05,720 pancakes purely just for the consistency factories. 768 00:44:05,720 --> 00:44:08,360 I feel like we can get those pretty good anywhere I go. 769 00:44:08,360 --> 00:44:13,680 Does that shock you at all, Jim? No, not actually, not that you 770 00:44:13,680 --> 00:44:16,200 give them the full explanation. And you said both was the right 771 00:44:16,200 --> 00:44:19,320 answer. I mean, I'm, I'm in your lane, 772 00:44:19,320 --> 00:44:21,000 man. I will say this. 773 00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:25,120 One thing we left out of this whole conversation was, you 774 00:44:25,120 --> 00:44:27,600 know, pancakes. Are they buttermilk pancakes? 775 00:44:27,600 --> 00:44:29,400 You could get chocolate chip pancakes. 776 00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:31,880 You could get blueberry pancakes. 777 00:44:32,600 --> 00:44:35,720 I will tell you, I had this experience where I was in Big 778 00:44:35,720 --> 00:44:37,800 Sur, CA. I mean, one of the most 779 00:44:37,800 --> 00:44:40,360 beautiful places that I've been on this earth. 780 00:44:40,920 --> 00:44:43,840 And I found this little bed and breakfast kind of place like 781 00:44:44,160 --> 00:44:47,400 just off the side of the road and they had blueberry pancakes. 782 00:44:47,560 --> 00:44:54,280 And one of my projects in retirement is to go going to be 783 00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:57,560 to find this place is the best blueberry pancakes I've ever 784 00:44:57,560 --> 00:45:01,960 had, fresh blueberries. And I say the blueberry pancake 785 00:45:01,960 --> 00:45:05,440 was 50% pancake and 50% blueberry. 786 00:45:06,200 --> 00:45:07,560 So Mika, where do you fall on that? 787 00:45:07,560 --> 00:45:11,520 Do you like a plain pancake, or do you put things into your 788 00:45:11,520 --> 00:45:13,600 pancake like chocolate chips or blueberries? 789 00:45:13,760 --> 00:45:16,680 Definitely a plain, plain pancake kind of guy. 790 00:45:16,680 --> 00:45:18,800 This is the basics. You don't mess with that. 791 00:45:18,840 --> 00:45:22,040 You you give it, you maybe put some, you know, chocolate on top 792 00:45:22,040 --> 00:45:25,680 of it and some ice cream. But the pancake you need to make 793 00:45:25,680 --> 00:45:30,400 it, you know, basic and and as it should as it should come. 794 00:45:31,000 --> 00:45:33,600 I'm with you on this button. I, I am not a chocolate chip 795 00:45:33,600 --> 00:45:37,040 pancake, a blueberry pancake. Just give me a good pancake and 796 00:45:37,040 --> 00:45:40,600 some nice Maple syrup, maybe a little bit of powdered sugar. 797 00:45:40,880 --> 00:45:42,920 You know, I like to eat healthy. So if I'm going to have my 798 00:45:42,920 --> 00:45:44,600 pancakes, I don't want butter on there. 799 00:45:44,640 --> 00:45:47,960 It doesn't need it. I, you know, I don't need any 800 00:45:48,000 --> 00:45:49,560 anything else. You know, it's, it's, it's a 801 00:45:49,560 --> 00:45:51,040 health food. As long as you don't put the 802 00:45:51,040 --> 00:45:52,320 butter on it. That's the way that I kind of 803 00:45:52,320 --> 00:45:55,720 approach you. I'm, I'm kind of a purist in 804 00:45:55,720 --> 00:45:57,600 this. And the same way with security, 805 00:45:57,600 --> 00:45:59,000 right? You need, you need to do it the 806 00:45:59,000 --> 00:46:02,240 right thing, the right, the right course. 807 00:46:02,240 --> 00:46:04,560 And you know, it's the same with pancakes, man. 808 00:46:05,120 --> 00:46:07,640 Yeah, if the product is good enough, you don't need these all 809 00:46:07,640 --> 00:46:10,960 the other shiny things like chocolate chips and blueberries 810 00:46:10,960 --> 00:46:14,000 etcetera, right? It should be a stand alone food. 811 00:46:14,160 --> 00:46:15,440 That can live on its own. That's. 812 00:46:15,480 --> 00:46:17,440 My my thought. Right, very well put. 813 00:46:18,480 --> 00:46:22,440 I was OK with what you said. Like you said, no butter and no, 814 00:46:22,440 --> 00:46:24,560 no butter. Like we're not friends with me 815 00:46:24,560 --> 00:46:27,360 anymore, Jeff. It's just too much. 816 00:46:27,360 --> 00:46:30,320 It's it's, it doesn't need it. You know, the butter doesn't 817 00:46:30,320 --> 00:46:33,120 really add anything for me. I just need a syrup delivery 818 00:46:33,120 --> 00:46:35,320 mechanism. And that's what the pancake is. 819 00:46:35,320 --> 00:46:39,160 It's the, it's the delivery truck for, you know, a, a nice, 820 00:46:39,200 --> 00:46:41,080 you know, I'll say like a vanilla Maple syrup. 821 00:46:41,080 --> 00:46:42,680 That's that's pretty good. That's what I'd go with. 822 00:46:43,000 --> 00:46:47,320 But Jim, if you do find that BNB, I'd be happy to to get that 823 00:46:47,600 --> 00:46:49,760 that address from you. So to to me. 824 00:46:49,880 --> 00:46:51,960 I, I wanted to close out. That was the hardest question. 825 00:46:52,320 --> 00:46:55,240 You passed by the way, by by picking, you know, pancakes and 826 00:46:55,240 --> 00:46:58,120 a plain pancake to boot. So, you know, congratulations. 827 00:46:59,400 --> 00:47:01,400 We're going to have links in our show notes, not the pancakes, 828 00:47:01,400 --> 00:47:04,520 but to your LinkedIn profile, but also to hush dot security 829 00:47:04,520 --> 00:47:06,760 slash IDAC so people can go check that out. 830 00:47:07,200 --> 00:47:09,120 Mika, thank you so much for spending time with us today. 831 00:47:09,120 --> 00:47:10,520 Any final thoughts before we wrap up? 832 00:47:10,680 --> 00:47:13,800 No, I think I'm excited, you know, first of all, to, to talk 833 00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:15,760 to you and I've been listening to you for a while. 834 00:47:15,760 --> 00:47:19,320 So definitely feels like a serene in a way. 835 00:47:19,920 --> 00:47:23,280 I'm happy to for you guys to have me and I'm excited for the 836 00:47:23,280 --> 00:47:27,960 next chapter of fashion, you know, bringing our mission to to 837 00:47:27,960 --> 00:47:30,200 the industry and changing the way things are done. 838 00:47:30,400 --> 00:47:32,600 Yeah, I'm looking forward to seeing you at Gartner as well 839 00:47:32,600 --> 00:47:34,080 and seeing how things progress from there. 840 00:47:34,080 --> 00:47:36,320 So we'll go and wrap it up for this week. 841 00:47:36,320 --> 00:47:39,480 You can find us on the web at IDAC podcast.com. 842 00:47:39,600 --> 00:47:41,920 Like subscribe to all best fun stuff, you know, share with 843 00:47:41,920 --> 00:47:43,640 friends, share with enemies, doesn't matter. 844 00:47:43,680 --> 00:47:45,960 As long as they're liking subscribing, watching or 845 00:47:45,960 --> 00:47:47,600 listening, that's all we care about. 846 00:47:47,880 --> 00:47:50,280 So with that, we're going to leave it for this week. 847 00:47:50,480 --> 00:47:53,000 Thanks for watching and or listening and we'll talk with 848 00:47:53,000 --> 00:47:57,520 you all in the next one. You've been listening to 849 00:47:57,520 --> 00:48:01,440 Identity at the Center. We hope you've enjoyed the show. 850 00:48:01,640 --> 00:48:05,760 Make sure to like, rate and review, and we'll be back soon. 851 00:48:06,000 --> 00:48:08,280 But in the meantime, hit the website at 852 00:48:08,280 --> 00:48:14,640 identity@thecenter.com. See you next time on Identity at 853 00:48:14,640 --> 00:48:15,560 the Center.