1
00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:02,320
One other thing I thought of is 
that we're probably going to be 

2
00:00:02,320 --> 00:00:05,880
podcasting there, so whenever 
you and I get to a conference 

3
00:00:05,880 --> 00:00:09,680
together, we bring all verb 
recording equipment and try to 

4
00:00:09,880 --> 00:00:16,920
get a few episodes in. 
What happened? 

5
00:00:18,920 --> 00:00:20,320
Nothing happened as far as I 
know. 

6
00:00:22,880 --> 00:00:29,240
My monitor just turned off. 
Sorry guys I don't. 

7
00:00:29,240 --> 00:00:31,120
I didn't even move down the 
inch. 

8
00:00:33,480 --> 00:00:34,960
Hashtag just gym things. 
Oh. 

9
00:00:36,160 --> 00:00:39,600
My God. 
Alright, just Jim's poor 

10
00:00:39,800 --> 00:00:45,360
technology. 
Jim gave up, he walked away. 

11
00:00:45,360 --> 00:00:48,960
He's like I'm done, mark this 
down. 

12
00:00:48,960 --> 00:00:51,840
We we made it 5 minutes before 
we had a gym technical issue. 

13
00:00:54,120 --> 00:00:58,280
Well, I am back, so where was I?
I'll start. 

14
00:00:58,320 --> 00:01:02,960
Over. 
I don't remember where I about 

15
00:01:02,960 --> 00:01:05,480
where I was I guess. 
It was too close to the mic. 

16
00:01:05,480 --> 00:01:09,400
You keep bouncing around. 
Yeah, my my screen is kind of 

17
00:01:09,400 --> 00:01:12,800
flickering, so hopefully I got 
everything set up here. 

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00:01:18,600 --> 00:01:23,400
This is identity at the center. 
If it has anything to do with 

19
00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:30,960
IAM, this is the go to podcast 
now your hosts Jim McDonald and 

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00:01:30,960 --> 00:01:39,000
Jeff Steadman. 
Welcome to the Identity the 

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00:01:39,000 --> 00:01:41,160
Center Podcast. 
I'm Jeff, and that's Jim. 

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00:01:41,160 --> 00:01:43,600
Hey, Jim. 
Hey, Jeff, how are you? 

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00:01:44,320 --> 00:01:47,360
Oh, not so bad yourself. 
Doing great man. 

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00:01:47,360 --> 00:01:50,880
It's definitely summer here in 
Georgia. 

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00:01:50,880 --> 00:01:56,960
It was about 100°F the other day
or yesterday and man, I'm 

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feeling it. 
But fortunately I work in an air

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00:02:00,120 --> 00:02:03,840
conditioned building and you 
know, I, I'm feeling it when I'm

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00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:06,400
outside and that's for 10 
minutes. 

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00:02:06,400 --> 00:02:10,600
First as I run to my truck that 
is also air conditioned and then

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00:02:10,600 --> 00:02:12,880
I go to drive through windows 
and I can feel the air 

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conditioning emanating from 
those buildings. 

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So I I can't complain too much. 
That's kind of how I feel about 

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like winter is I work. 
When I lived in a wintry area 

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like Chicago, it was, well, I'm 
inside where the heat is and 

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then I'm in my car where the 
heat is, and then I'm walking 

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outside to somewhere and then 
I'm somewhere where the heat is.

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00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:32,520
So same thing. 
But yes, definitely hot. 

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00:02:33,280 --> 00:02:37,160
I'm in Minnesota today, so 
another week on the road for me.

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00:02:37,160 --> 00:02:41,200
But we'll see how hotel Wi-Fi 
holds up for this episode. 

40
00:02:41,200 --> 00:02:43,840
But so far so good. 
Not quite as hot here. 

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00:02:44,120 --> 00:02:47,640
My watch says it's 69° here in 
Minnesota. 

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00:02:47,680 --> 00:02:50,960
So nice. 
Yeah, that's definitely not too 

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00:02:50,960 --> 00:02:53,160
bad. 
And by the way, Father's Day 

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00:02:53,160 --> 00:02:56,920
just passed here in the US and 
I've received a pretty awesome 

45
00:02:56,920 --> 00:03:03,320
award, Greatest Dad of all time.
It it's great because I also got

46
00:03:03,320 --> 00:03:08,560
a commemorative notebook which 
has all of my past awards #1 

47
00:03:08,560 --> 00:03:14,120
Dad, Best dad ever. 
That's pretty much it. 

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00:03:14,120 --> 00:03:17,480
I mean #1 dad and best dad ever,
and now the greatest dad of all 

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00:03:17,480 --> 00:03:19,560
time. 
I think that's the trifecta. 

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00:03:19,560 --> 00:03:23,280
What do you think? 
Well, I'm not a dad, so I'm, I'm

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00:03:23,480 --> 00:03:25,320
feel bad for all the other dads 
who thought that they were 

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00:03:25,320 --> 00:03:26,640
number one. 
I guess. 

53
00:03:26,640 --> 00:03:28,720
What are they? 
Are those like, you know, fake 

54
00:03:28,720 --> 00:03:32,720
news, false, false prizes? 
Their kids are lying to them. 

55
00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:35,400
I mean, which one of those 
poisons do you want to pick? 

56
00:03:36,320 --> 00:03:38,560
I think so. 
I think they've, they've been 

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00:03:38,560 --> 00:03:42,320
buying the coffee mugs as a 
number one dad and giving it to 

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their dad. 
And really, they should have 

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00:03:44,240 --> 00:03:47,520
been giving it to me. 
Apparently I am the greatest dad

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00:03:47,520 --> 00:03:50,160
of all time. 
Oh well, congratulations on your

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major. 
Award. 

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Thank you, Sir. 
All right, what else do we have 

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going on? 
We, we forgot to mention last 

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week, but we're definitely gonna
beat Identity Week coming up 

65
00:04:00,520 --> 00:04:01,800
later this year. 
Identity Week. 

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Europe has already passed by the
time people listen to this. 

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00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:07,880
But we do have discount code for
both America, which is in 

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00:04:07,880 --> 00:04:09,800
Washington, DC, September 11th 
and 12th. 

69
00:04:10,280 --> 00:04:14,000
IDAC 30 gets you 30% off of your
registration. 

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00:04:14,000 --> 00:04:17,360
And that code is also good for 
Singapore, which is October 22nd

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00:04:17,360 --> 00:04:19,040
and 23rd. 
Jim, you and I are going to be 

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00:04:19,480 --> 00:04:23,720
in DC September 11th and 12th. 
We're going to start to work on 

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00:04:23,720 --> 00:04:25,960
plans in that probably the next,
you know, few weeks here, but 

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00:04:25,960 --> 00:04:28,080
hoping to see some, some 
friendly faces there. 

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00:04:28,080 --> 00:04:30,200
What do you think about DC and 
Identity Week? 

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00:04:31,320 --> 00:04:35,720
Well, I think it's going to be 
hot as heck in DC at that time. 

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00:04:35,800 --> 00:04:37,120
Oh wait, you're going to be 
inside. 

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00:04:37,240 --> 00:04:39,400
Probably be. 
It'll be perfect weather. 

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00:04:40,120 --> 00:04:42,880
I love DC. 
There's a few things I really 

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love about it. 
One is a sandwich shop called 

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00:04:44,920 --> 00:04:48,000
Potbelly's, which I think is in 
a lot of places, but it's not in

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00:04:48,000 --> 00:04:49,800
the Southeast. 
It's a. 

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00:04:49,800 --> 00:04:52,280
Chain a small little place like 
McDonald's. 

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00:04:53,600 --> 00:04:58,360
Well no no like McDonald's is 
everywhere and Potbelly's is not

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00:04:58,360 --> 00:05:02,560
here and I love it. 
I I would eat there at least 

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00:05:02,560 --> 00:05:06,840
every week if I lived there. 
Also the museums are pretty 

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00:05:06,840 --> 00:05:09,160
awesome. 
Last time I was there, I went to

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00:05:09,160 --> 00:05:11,280
the Holocaust Museum, which is 
free. 

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00:05:11,600 --> 00:05:14,960
And man, it's like, it's pretty 
somber. 

90
00:05:14,960 --> 00:05:18,080
But I think it's an experience 
everybody should go through. 

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00:05:19,240 --> 00:05:22,880
And then I just feel like, you 
know, when you're in DC, like 

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00:05:22,920 --> 00:05:24,840
there, you know, there's so much
going on. 

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So, yeah, I'm really looking 
forward to it. 

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00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:29,640
Plus, I think the conference is 
going to be awesome. 

95
00:05:29,960 --> 00:05:33,120
I mean, you know, you've been 
there before you told me about 

96
00:05:33,120 --> 00:05:35,600
it. 
It sounds like it's becoming one

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00:05:35,600 --> 00:05:39,800
of the conferences people have 
got to get to and and give it a 

98
00:05:39,800 --> 00:05:42,120
shot. 
Yeah, definitely. 

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00:05:42,120 --> 00:05:43,560
I think it comes at a good time 
of the year too. 

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00:05:43,560 --> 00:05:47,360
It's kind of a lull in between 
like Adeniverse, which just took

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00:05:47,360 --> 00:05:49,920
place a couple weeks ago and 
then like Gardner, which is 

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later in the year. 
So I think it's really good kind

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of opportune timing. 
So yeah, hopefully see lots of 

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people there that we know. 
I know last year there was quite

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a few people there was like, 
wow, OK, there's some, there's 

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00:05:58,960 --> 00:06:02,680
some names at this conference. 
So I'm expecting, you know, 

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00:06:02,680 --> 00:06:05,520
similar and or better turn out 
for this year as well. 

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00:06:05,520 --> 00:06:08,120
So that's kind of exciting, but 
hopefully people take advantage 

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of that. 
That code's a good way to show 

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00:06:09,800 --> 00:06:11,560
support for us. 
We'll have link in our show 

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00:06:11,560 --> 00:06:13,480
notes so people can can use that
as well. 

112
00:06:13,480 --> 00:06:15,880
I'm looking forward to the 
conference in terms of, you 

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00:06:15,880 --> 00:06:18,920
know, hopefully we can record a 
few episodes. 

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00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:22,240
And while we're there, I mean, 
whenever we go to conferences, 

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00:06:22,520 --> 00:06:25,480
bring all of our recording 
equipment, try to record a few 

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00:06:25,480 --> 00:06:29,040
episodes, put out some more 
additional content for the 

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00:06:29,040 --> 00:06:31,200
listeners. 
And I think people appreciate it

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00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:33,840
because one of the things I 
noticed is that most of the 

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00:06:33,840 --> 00:06:37,040
episodes get a lot of views, get
a lot of downloads. 

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00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:40,320
So we'll keep doing it unless, 
you know, we hear from people 

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00:06:40,320 --> 00:06:42,840
that it's too much, it's too 
much, dial it back. 

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00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:45,160
It's never too much. 
You can never have enough 

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00:06:45,160 --> 00:06:48,120
identity center in your life. 
So we're just going to keep 

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doing it. 
We don't do it for you. 

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00:06:50,760 --> 00:06:51,800
We do it 'cause we like to do 
it. 

126
00:06:51,800 --> 00:06:53,320
No, I'm just kidding. 
We do it for you too. 

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00:06:53,720 --> 00:06:56,920
That's why we started, though. 
We started out just doing it 

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00:06:56,920 --> 00:06:58,120
because we like doing it 
because. 

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00:06:58,400 --> 00:07:00,160
I mean, we're going to keep 
doing it as long as we keep like

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00:07:00,440 --> 00:07:02,200
keep liking to do it and we do. 
So that's good. 

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00:07:02,760 --> 00:07:05,160
All right, let's get going with 
the show. 

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00:07:05,200 --> 00:07:08,880
Let's talk about Bubbles vaguely
cryptic topic. 

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00:07:09,320 --> 00:07:11,880
We've got Justin Richer. 
He's security and standards 

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00:07:11,880 --> 00:07:13,960
architect and founder of Bespoke
Engineering. 

135
00:07:13,960 --> 00:07:15,920
Joining us again. 
Welcome back to the show, 

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00:07:16,040 --> 00:07:17,960
Justin. 
Hi, Jeff. 

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00:07:17,960 --> 00:07:19,520
Hi, Jim. 
Thank you guys for having me 

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00:07:19,520 --> 00:07:21,880
back on. 
Yeah, thanks for taking the 

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00:07:21,880 --> 00:07:23,960
time. 
It's been about a year since you

140
00:07:23,960 --> 00:07:26,040
were with us. 
You've already given us your 

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00:07:26,040 --> 00:07:29,080
origin story. 
That was back in episode 222. 

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00:07:29,160 --> 00:07:33,120
We're on episode 291 now, so 
we'll point people back if 

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00:07:33,120 --> 00:07:34,600
people want to learn more about 
your background. 

144
00:07:34,600 --> 00:07:37,280
But let's talk about the past 
year. 

145
00:07:38,280 --> 00:07:40,040
How's your year been, what 
you've been up to? 

146
00:07:40,040 --> 00:07:43,440
Anything new and exciting? 
Oh man, it's, it's been a busy 

147
00:07:43,440 --> 00:07:46,160
year. 
So we had the GANAP protocol is 

148
00:07:46,160 --> 00:07:48,600
now with the with the RFC 
editor. 

149
00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:53,120
So that'll be becoming a, a 
final RFC soon. 

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00:07:53,200 --> 00:07:55,760
It still takes a while even when
it's at that stage, but 

151
00:07:56,320 --> 00:07:59,480
hopefully soon. 
We had HTTP message signatures, 

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00:07:59,480 --> 00:08:01,840
which is another draft that I've
been working on for a few years 

153
00:08:01,920 --> 00:08:08,440
that is now an RFCR FC9421. 
And so that's exciting to go to 

154
00:08:08,440 --> 00:08:12,120
see go through. 
And then also in the ITF, we 

155
00:08:12,120 --> 00:08:15,360
have spun up the workload 
identity in Multi System 

156
00:08:15,360 --> 00:08:20,720
environments or Whimsy working 
group and that is new work and 

157
00:08:20,720 --> 00:08:23,320
I'm helping Co chair that at the
ITF. 

158
00:08:23,320 --> 00:08:28,000
And that we've just gotten that 
started really within the last 

159
00:08:28,000 --> 00:08:31,960
year, which is absolutely 
breakneck speed by ITF standards

160
00:08:31,960 --> 00:08:34,520
to get a new working group up 
and running in that time. 

161
00:08:35,840 --> 00:08:40,600
That is pretty quick and and 
you've got a great acronym, 

162
00:08:40,600 --> 00:08:43,400
Whimsy, which is awesome. 
It's right up there with Cheeto 

163
00:08:43,400 --> 00:08:47,800
for Chief Identity Officer. 
I I can't I can't take credit 

164
00:08:47,800 --> 00:08:51,400
for whimsy. 
We, we originally tried to do 

165
00:08:51,400 --> 00:08:54,480
workload identity in distributed
environments or wide. 

166
00:08:54,760 --> 00:08:58,440
And it turns out that there is 
a, there's already a, a project 

167
00:08:58,880 --> 00:09:01,800
named that. 
So they wouldn't let us have 

168
00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:04,680
that. 
But the security AD came up with

169
00:09:04,840 --> 00:09:08,760
whimsy when brainstorming with, 
with a few of the folks that 

170
00:09:08,760 --> 00:09:11,360
were proposing it. 
So and I, I absolutely love it. 

171
00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:15,400
It's give nerds enough rope and 
we will like we will come up 

172
00:09:15,400 --> 00:09:19,080
with the most ridiculous set of 
acronyms that you can possibly 

173
00:09:19,600 --> 00:09:22,160
possibly use. 
Yeah, but you know what? 

174
00:09:22,160 --> 00:09:24,640
It's all about marketing, right?
If you, you have to have a good 

175
00:09:24,640 --> 00:09:28,040
name for your thing, otherwise 
they'll never get traction. 

176
00:09:28,240 --> 00:09:31,040
And Whimsy's a great name. 
I, I, we're gonna, I wanna dig 

177
00:09:31,040 --> 00:09:33,040
into that more 'cause there's 
another one that you were 

178
00:09:33,040 --> 00:09:35,360
mentioning before we hit record 
called Spiffy, which is even 

179
00:09:35,360 --> 00:09:38,480
awesomer. 
So it's like between Spiffy and 

180
00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:41,840
Whimsy and Cheeto. 
And I'm sure there's other ones 

181
00:09:41,840 --> 00:09:44,040
out there. 
Oh yeah, Spice is just starting 

182
00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:46,560
up too. 
So, you know, that's a lot, lot 

183
00:09:46,600 --> 00:09:50,280
of lot of good stuff. 
And yeah, naming things is 

184
00:09:50,320 --> 00:09:52,120
worth. 
We're gonna get to that in a 

185
00:09:52,120 --> 00:09:53,440
second. 
I wanna ask you about 

186
00:09:53,440 --> 00:09:55,120
Identiverse 'cause I saw you in 
the hallway. 

187
00:09:55,120 --> 00:09:57,800
We kind of chatted for a couple 
minutes there while I think, I 

188
00:09:57,800 --> 00:10:00,880
think I was coming from a 
recording and walking somewhere 

189
00:10:00,880 --> 00:10:03,320
and you were sitting in a chair 
holding court as as you do. 

190
00:10:03,800 --> 00:10:05,280
What did you think of the 
conference this year? 

191
00:10:06,240 --> 00:10:09,000
Any thoughts? 
Overall it was good. 

192
00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:11,640
Honestly most of my time I got 
pulled into hallway 

193
00:10:11,640 --> 00:10:14,880
conversations this year it was 
it was a hallway con for me. 

194
00:10:15,600 --> 00:10:19,680
Just a lot of good conversations
with people that are working on 

195
00:10:20,040 --> 00:10:23,160
lots of interesting stuff. 
The the big topics this year 

196
00:10:23,160 --> 00:10:25,320
really seem to be like 
authorization. 

197
00:10:25,560 --> 00:10:29,600
Absolutely a big topic this year
that's really kind of coming out

198
00:10:29,600 --> 00:10:32,440
into its own. 
All the workload stuff like for 

199
00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:35,040
example, like we're doing with 
whimsy that showed up in a bunch

200
00:10:35,040 --> 00:10:37,800
of different spaces. 
And so that was that was really 

201
00:10:37,800 --> 00:10:40,640
good to see. 
And it's interesting seeing all 

202
00:10:40,640 --> 00:10:45,760
of this stuff happen in, in a 
world where like O auth and open

203
00:10:45,760 --> 00:10:49,320
ID connect stuff that I helped 
like define and and build. 

204
00:10:49,360 --> 00:10:51,840
It's not the new stuff anymore, 
right? 

205
00:10:51,840 --> 00:10:54,160
That's that's the old guard 
that's been around for over a 

206
00:10:54,160 --> 00:10:56,320
decade. 
Like let's what's, what's next? 

207
00:10:56,320 --> 00:10:58,000
What are we? 
What are we building on now? 

208
00:10:58,320 --> 00:11:01,320
And to me, that's really 
exciting to see what the new 

209
00:11:01,320 --> 00:11:06,480
takes are on solving not only 
the same problems, but also like

210
00:11:06,840 --> 00:11:08,960
problems that that stuff just 
doesn't solve well. 

211
00:11:08,960 --> 00:11:10,760
It never, it was never meant to 
solve well. 

212
00:11:11,200 --> 00:11:16,720
And so, yeah, seeing a lot of 
people working in just, I, I 

213
00:11:16,720 --> 00:11:20,600
think we're really seeing a lot 
of new flourishing ideas in a 

214
00:11:20,600 --> 00:11:23,400
lot of different spaces in the 
identity community right now. 

215
00:11:23,480 --> 00:11:27,480
And most of them are probably 
going to end up being bad ideas.

216
00:11:27,680 --> 00:11:29,240
We don't know which ones those 
are yet. 

217
00:11:29,520 --> 00:11:33,120
And I, I think we'll see some 
really, really cool stuff 

218
00:11:33,120 --> 00:11:34,800
landing over the next couple of 
years. 

219
00:11:36,160 --> 00:11:38,840
That's a good perspective. 
And I think a lot of the things 

220
00:11:38,840 --> 00:11:42,720
that you talked about with, you 
know, the whimsy, the swiffy, it

221
00:11:42,720 --> 00:11:46,680
all is going to tie into this 
concept of federation bubbles. 

222
00:11:47,000 --> 00:11:49,040
You're going to kind of educate 
us on today. 

223
00:11:49,040 --> 00:11:51,600
But you start at the most simple
level. 

224
00:11:51,920 --> 00:11:56,400
What is the use case that the 
federation bubbles concept is 

225
00:11:56,400 --> 00:12:01,080
meant to solve and kind of how 
how did you stumble into this 

226
00:12:01,080 --> 00:12:04,520
And you know, tell us the give 
us the background. 

227
00:12:05,120 --> 00:12:08,840
Yeah, of course. 
So the whole concept I'll, I'll 

228
00:12:08,840 --> 00:12:12,280
start with like what an idea of 
a bubble is and then it'll make 

229
00:12:12,280 --> 00:12:14,440
sense of a little bit more of 
where it fits. 

230
00:12:15,040 --> 00:12:18,720
The idea of a bubble is that you
have a network of systems 

231
00:12:18,720 --> 00:12:22,400
wherein everything is just kind 
of self-contained. 

232
00:12:22,640 --> 00:12:25,440
So you have accounts that work, 
applications that work, 

233
00:12:25,440 --> 00:12:28,720
authorizations, all of that. 
And then you have controls about

234
00:12:28,720 --> 00:12:33,040
how stuff gets into that system 
and how stuff gets out of that 

235
00:12:33,040 --> 00:12:34,920
system. 
So how I provision accounts in 

236
00:12:34,920 --> 00:12:37,640
and how I can use that as a 
launching point to provision 

237
00:12:37,640 --> 00:12:42,880
stuff outbound. 
Now where this really ends up 

238
00:12:42,880 --> 00:12:46,160
being pretty useful is places 
where you have disadvantaged 

239
00:12:46,160 --> 00:12:50,360
environments. 
So you have systems where you 

240
00:12:50,360 --> 00:12:53,640
might lose network connectivity.
One of the places that. 

241
00:12:53,640 --> 00:12:56,200
So I've been working with Uber 
Ether on this project for about 

242
00:12:56,200 --> 00:13:00,080
the last year or so and they do 
a lot of Department of Defense 

243
00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:01,880
and sort of forward deployed 
type of stuff. 

244
00:13:02,360 --> 00:13:04,640
This is cases where you 
literally have a bunch of people

245
00:13:04,640 --> 00:13:08,000
on a boat and then that's going 
to go sail off and you're going 

246
00:13:08,000 --> 00:13:10,840
to be outside of satellite 
coverage, outside of 

247
00:13:10,840 --> 00:13:13,480
connectivity range. 
Or even when you do have 

248
00:13:13,480 --> 00:13:17,200
coverage, the latency is so high
that traditional federation 

249
00:13:17,200 --> 00:13:20,800
concepts and protocols just 
don't really don't really work 

250
00:13:20,800 --> 00:13:22,880
anymore. 
Like bouncing somebody back to 

251
00:13:22,880 --> 00:13:26,320
their home IDP back on their, 
you know, their base or back at,

252
00:13:27,360 --> 00:13:30,960
you know, DoD somewhere is not 
not really going to work because

253
00:13:31,320 --> 00:13:34,280
it's going to time out before it
ever it ever returns. 

254
00:13:34,280 --> 00:13:39,320
And so you need to have a system
that works within this sort of 

255
00:13:39,960 --> 00:13:41,960
sometimes disconnected 
environment. 

256
00:13:42,720 --> 00:13:45,040
The other thing that got me 
really interested in this is 

257
00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:48,720
that years and years ago, you 
know, several, several jobs ago,

258
00:13:49,520 --> 00:13:53,240
I was working at a company 
called Mitre and we were doing a

259
00:13:53,240 --> 00:13:56,720
lot of rural search and rescue 
work at the time. 

260
00:13:56,720 --> 00:14:01,360
I was doing interface design for
unmanned aerial vehicles, 

261
00:14:01,760 --> 00:14:03,240
drones, we would call them 
today. 

262
00:14:03,600 --> 00:14:09,200
And one of the things that we 
found in that environments is 

263
00:14:09,200 --> 00:14:13,120
that we would go work with these
groups that you got a whole 

264
00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:17,040
bunch of people that just kind 
of show up to help with a rescue

265
00:14:17,040 --> 00:14:19,080
operation or help with disaster 
recovery. 

266
00:14:19,400 --> 00:14:23,720
And you might not be able to 
identity proof these people. 

267
00:14:23,720 --> 00:14:26,800
You might not be able to tie 
them back to anything in 

268
00:14:26,800 --> 00:14:29,160
particular. 
But you know what, you're here, 

269
00:14:29,160 --> 00:14:31,000
you can hold a shovel, that's 
good enough. 

270
00:14:31,000 --> 00:14:36,320
Here you go. 
And we really felt that in going

271
00:14:36,320 --> 00:14:40,160
into this bubbles project, we 
really need felt that we need to

272
00:14:40,160 --> 00:14:43,200
be able to extend that into the 
digital space. 

273
00:14:43,680 --> 00:14:46,720
Like you're showing up in the 
fact that we are together in 

274
00:14:46,720 --> 00:14:51,320
this same space means that like 
I trust you enough for right now

275
00:14:51,920 --> 00:14:56,760
to do something. 
And that trust didn't come 

276
00:14:56,760 --> 00:15:00,920
provisioned from some central 
system that said, Oh yeah, you 

277
00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:04,200
know, you're, you're down here 
in this in the same area that 

278
00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:05,400
this other person is going to 
be. 

279
00:15:05,400 --> 00:15:08,360
And so you can work together and
here's all of your policies and 

280
00:15:08,360 --> 00:15:09,880
here's all of your accounts and 
all of that. 

281
00:15:09,880 --> 00:15:13,800
It's like, no, we just showed up
and we might not have even known

282
00:15:13,800 --> 00:15:16,880
that each other was going to be 
there and we're going to figure 

283
00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:20,480
out how to connect. 
The thing is we do this type of 

284
00:15:20,480 --> 00:15:22,360
dynamic connection all the time 
today. 

285
00:15:22,360 --> 00:15:25,920
But the way that we do it is 
that people show up and we just 

286
00:15:25,920 --> 00:15:28,080
hand them a username and 
password on a sticky note and 

287
00:15:28,080 --> 00:15:31,320
say, Hey, this is your account. 
And and we're going to burn that

288
00:15:31,320 --> 00:15:35,720
account when when you leave or 
when we remember at some point, 

289
00:15:35,800 --> 00:15:40,200
hopefully in the future. 
And The thing is like, we're 

290
00:15:40,200 --> 00:15:43,440
doing that same type of thing 
for people that we've that just 

291
00:15:43,600 --> 00:15:45,840
rolled up off the street and 
people that we have a long 

292
00:15:45,840 --> 00:15:49,680
standing relationship with. 
And occasionally people that are

293
00:15:49,680 --> 00:15:53,320
actually are provisioned in our 
sort of larger environment. 

294
00:15:53,320 --> 00:15:54,960
We just don't have the latest 
updates yet. 

295
00:15:55,800 --> 00:15:58,600
So we're treating all of these 
accounts exactly the same and 

296
00:15:58,600 --> 00:16:04,000
they end up all basically in 
this muddy mess that occurs out 

297
00:16:04,000 --> 00:16:06,320
in these sort of edge 
environments. 

298
00:16:06,800 --> 00:16:10,240
And So what we wanted to do with
this concept of a bubble is like

299
00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:15,280
embrace that mess and figure out
like, what is it actually mean 

300
00:16:15,280 --> 00:16:17,280
to work within that type of 
system? 

301
00:16:17,320 --> 00:16:20,520
What are the constraints here 
that we need to to work with? 

302
00:16:20,920 --> 00:16:24,680
But also on a very practical 
level, what does it mean to 

303
00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:28,080
onboard somebody into that from 
a trusted domain, from an 

304
00:16:28,080 --> 00:16:30,520
untrusted domain, from no domain
at all? 

305
00:16:30,880 --> 00:16:35,000
And what does that look like 
within these systems once we 

306
00:16:35,000 --> 00:16:36,640
actually get all of those tied 
together? 

307
00:16:37,960 --> 00:16:40,600
So it's the idea here to have 
like this, I don't know, 

308
00:16:40,720 --> 00:16:43,680
serendipitous. 
I am force field that sort of 

309
00:16:43,680 --> 00:16:48,920
gets erected for a short time. 
Is it something that's a little 

310
00:16:48,920 --> 00:16:53,840
more permanent maybe based on 
location or use case? 

311
00:16:53,840 --> 00:16:56,720
Like help me understand, like 
how these little bubbles, is it 

312
00:16:56,720 --> 00:16:58,920
one bubble or are these bubbles 
connected in some way? 

313
00:16:59,600 --> 00:17:01,280
Oh, there's many, many, many 
bubbles. 

314
00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:07,280
So the idea is that we want to 
really draw the perimeter down 

315
00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:12,440
as far as we can, and so that 
when we have one of these groups

316
00:17:12,440 --> 00:17:17,000
that's going out into the field,
we create a bubble for that. 

317
00:17:17,240 --> 00:17:20,280
And we provision into that 
bubble all the stuff that we 

318
00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:22,760
know ahead of time. 
It's like we might have 20 

319
00:17:22,760 --> 00:17:25,119
accounts that we know are 
supposed to be in there. 

320
00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:28,119
So we can drop those in there, 
We can drop default policies, we

321
00:17:28,119 --> 00:17:32,560
can drop all sorts of stuff into
that, create this entity and 

322
00:17:32,560 --> 00:17:34,920
then send it off. 
Now, what's important here is 

323
00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:39,440
that this creates its own 
separate entity and managed 

324
00:17:39,440 --> 00:17:42,640
space, because a lot of people 
that are listening right now are

325
00:17:42,640 --> 00:17:46,120
probably thinking, oh, OK, what 
we're talking about is I have an

326
00:17:46,120 --> 00:17:49,400
IDPI, have a user data store. 
I'm going to create a Shard. 

327
00:17:49,840 --> 00:17:52,960
I'm going to just Shard my ID 
system. 

328
00:17:53,240 --> 00:17:55,960
And you get a copy and you get a
copy and you get a copy. 

329
00:17:55,960 --> 00:17:59,760
And then eventually we just need
to reach some sort of consensus 

330
00:17:59,760 --> 00:18:02,760
mechanism about any updates and 
then it'll all be fine. 

331
00:18:02,760 --> 00:18:04,480
It's a, it's a synchronization 
problem. 

332
00:18:05,120 --> 00:18:07,960
But what we found is that that 
doesn't take into account the 

333
00:18:07,960 --> 00:18:10,760
type of dynamism that you 
actually see out in the field 

334
00:18:11,200 --> 00:18:14,000
where you've got people coming 
and going. 

335
00:18:14,000 --> 00:18:17,360
You've got people making these 
real runtime decisions. 

336
00:18:17,360 --> 00:18:21,760
That it's not that I don't have 
the latest policy to address 

337
00:18:21,760 --> 00:18:25,200
this, it's that the policies 
never thought of this. 

338
00:18:25,720 --> 00:18:29,640
They couldn't predict this. 
But I am in a position out on 

339
00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:32,360
the edge where I need to make a 
decision. 

340
00:18:33,080 --> 00:18:36,760
And So what happens historically
is that This is why people 

341
00:18:36,760 --> 00:18:40,240
create admin accounts with the 
password admin because they just

342
00:18:40,240 --> 00:18:42,640
need to be able to override a 
couple of things locally just to

343
00:18:42,640 --> 00:18:45,400
get something done because 
they're out there in the edge 

344
00:18:45,400 --> 00:18:48,600
and they need to do something. 
So, you know, let's go back to 

345
00:18:48,600 --> 00:18:50,800
the to the disaster recovery 
scenario. 

346
00:18:51,760 --> 00:18:54,200
You're out there and you've got 
a bunch of people that show up 

347
00:18:54,200 --> 00:18:55,760
out of nowhere and just want to 
help. 

348
00:18:56,560 --> 00:18:59,240
You got a, a group of people 
that roll up in a pickup truck 

349
00:18:59,240 --> 00:19:05,120
and say, Hey, we're electricians
and you can say maybe you are, 

350
00:19:05,120 --> 00:19:08,120
maybe you aren't. 
I like nothing is on right now, 

351
00:19:08,120 --> 00:19:11,560
so I can't actually check that. 
But you look like you have 

352
00:19:11,560 --> 00:19:14,120
electricians tools and you know 
what I'm going to assign you to 

353
00:19:14,120 --> 00:19:18,440
go, you know, to, to clear out 
to go clear the wiring on that 

354
00:19:18,440 --> 00:19:21,120
block and hand me whatever 
credentials you have. 

355
00:19:21,120 --> 00:19:25,120
And we will clean up the mess 
later of authorization and 

356
00:19:25,120 --> 00:19:27,160
everything else. 
We will figure this out later 

357
00:19:27,160 --> 00:19:29,880
when we actually have the time, 
because right now it's more 

358
00:19:29,880 --> 00:19:35,240
important that we get people who
can hopefully go do things out 

359
00:19:35,240 --> 00:19:37,280
there and working to try and 
help us out. 

360
00:19:37,880 --> 00:19:42,400
And, and it's the same type of 
thing that happens in all of 

361
00:19:42,400 --> 00:19:44,200
these types of environments that
we're looking at. 

362
00:19:44,280 --> 00:19:48,920
Like we have some type of local 
information that wasn't 

363
00:19:48,920 --> 00:19:51,200
accounted for that you know 
what, I'm going to make a 

364
00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:57,120
decision right now and I need, I
should be able to write down why

365
00:19:57,120 --> 00:20:00,200
I made that decision. 
What was the provenance of that?

366
00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:02,680
What was the input to that 
decision making? 

367
00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:08,280
And then push that out into some
type of auditable log so that 

368
00:20:08,280 --> 00:20:12,400
when I do reconnect, it's not 
just, oh, just give me the new 

369
00:20:12,400 --> 00:20:14,520
copy of everything. 
And that wipes out all of the 

370
00:20:14,520 --> 00:20:17,520
local changes that I made. 
No, it's like, hey, here's the 

371
00:20:17,520 --> 00:20:19,480
set of changes that I made, 
right. 

372
00:20:19,480 --> 00:20:22,360
Here's the set of decisions that
I made locally. 

373
00:20:22,720 --> 00:20:25,640
And maybe some of those are 
going to be like, oh, wait, 

374
00:20:25,640 --> 00:20:28,800
those three guys showed up. 
Yeah, they don't actually have 

375
00:20:28,800 --> 00:20:31,640
journeyman's licenses. 
So go send a licensed 

376
00:20:31,640 --> 00:20:34,800
electrician to check that entire
block that we assigned them to, 

377
00:20:35,000 --> 00:20:37,240
to make sure that that is 
actually correct. 

378
00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:42,880
Because that is a realistic way 
to deal with that type of, you 

379
00:20:42,880 --> 00:20:46,160
know, breach effectively that 
we've given somebody access to 

380
00:20:46,160 --> 00:20:49,720
somebody to something that they 
didn't necessarily have the 

381
00:20:49,720 --> 00:20:52,640
right to. 
But given the context, it seemed

382
00:20:52,640 --> 00:20:55,320
like it might have actually been
a good idea for us to do that. 

383
00:20:57,440 --> 00:21:01,520
So Justin, is Federation bubbles
a concept? 

384
00:21:01,720 --> 00:21:06,680
Are you working toward it being 
a standard or is a product or is

385
00:21:06,720 --> 00:21:11,280
it all those things at once? 
That's a great question, Jim. 

386
00:21:12,040 --> 00:21:15,320
So I will say it's not a, it's 
not a product or a single 

387
00:21:15,320 --> 00:21:17,720
standard. 
I don't think that there is a, 

388
00:21:17,720 --> 00:21:21,920
that the solution to this is 
going to be a single protocol 

389
00:21:21,920 --> 00:21:23,640
stack. 
And I can talk about that more 

390
00:21:23,640 --> 00:21:27,800
in a little bit. 
It's a, it's a proof of concept 

391
00:21:28,360 --> 00:21:31,440
that we've been building out in,
in different layers and pieces. 

392
00:21:31,680 --> 00:21:35,760
So for example, we've got an 
identity provider just to make 

393
00:21:35,760 --> 00:21:39,720
things very concrete, we, we 
built out an identity provider 

394
00:21:39,720 --> 00:21:44,560
that the first time you log in, 
you give it your identifier. 

395
00:21:44,560 --> 00:21:47,120
If it doesn't know you, it goes 
and figures out where your home 

396
00:21:47,120 --> 00:21:50,160
IDP is, does a dynamic 
connection to that. 

397
00:21:50,440 --> 00:21:54,320
You log in from your IDP and 
then you immediately, 

398
00:21:54,320 --> 00:21:56,960
immediately get prompted for a 
web authent credential. 

399
00:21:57,800 --> 00:22:00,720
And then the next time you show 
up at that same IDP with that 

400
00:22:00,720 --> 00:22:04,080
same identifier, you're only 
prompted for the web authent 

401
00:22:04,080 --> 00:22:07,640
credential because we've already
gotten all of your attributes 

402
00:22:07,640 --> 00:22:09,920
from the IDP. 
We have already, like we took 

403
00:22:09,920 --> 00:22:11,680
that step of validating your 
account. 

404
00:22:12,000 --> 00:22:15,600
All we need to do now is log you
in and we have the machinery to 

405
00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:18,280
do that locally without having 
to reach back out across the 

406
00:22:18,280 --> 00:22:20,120
network every time. 
So we do that heavyweight 

407
00:22:20,120 --> 00:22:23,840
federation operation as an 
onboarding exercise and then 

408
00:22:23,840 --> 00:22:28,200
from there we are just doing an 
authentication operation and 

409
00:22:28,200 --> 00:22:31,000
there's some fantastic 
technology that lets us do that 

410
00:22:31,000 --> 00:22:34,560
in a way that's secure and you 
know, user friendly and all of 

411
00:22:34,560 --> 00:22:39,840
those good things today. 
On top of that, we've also built

412
00:22:39,840 --> 00:22:44,600
out with these prototypes at 
Uber Ether, these trust bundle 

413
00:22:44,600 --> 00:22:49,920
domains to allow you to, to 
address these different systems.

414
00:22:50,440 --> 00:22:53,720
So one of the things I mentioned
is that, you know, we think that

415
00:22:53,720 --> 00:22:56,760
there's going to be a lot of 
different bubbles out there and 

416
00:22:56,760 --> 00:22:59,440
they're all going to be sort of 
coming from different trust 

417
00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:02,560
routes and they're not all tied 
to the same route. 

418
00:23:02,840 --> 00:23:07,120
So you've got folks coming in, 
you know, going back to the, to 

419
00:23:07,120 --> 00:23:11,480
the military side, folks coming 
in from the US, from the UK, 

420
00:23:11,480 --> 00:23:16,280
from, from France, some other, 
some other partners coming in. 

421
00:23:16,920 --> 00:23:20,280
They're all going to be having 
their own trust roots, their own

422
00:23:20,280 --> 00:23:22,040
policy roots, their own account 
roots. 

423
00:23:22,240 --> 00:23:26,080
It's ridiculous for us to assume
that they're just going to want 

424
00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:29,360
to synchronize everything into 
our system so that so that ours 

425
00:23:29,360 --> 00:23:33,040
work, especially when we are not
willing to synchronize our stuff

426
00:23:33,040 --> 00:23:37,160
back out into their systems. 
And, and it's funny, as soon as 

427
00:23:37,160 --> 00:23:40,360
you bring that up as an option 
with a lot of people in the 

428
00:23:40,360 --> 00:23:44,800
space, you get like the looks of
shock and horror are like, like,

429
00:23:44,800 --> 00:23:47,120
why would we ever do that? 
That's a security risk. 

430
00:23:47,120 --> 00:23:48,680
That's a privacy risk. 
We would never do that. 

431
00:23:48,680 --> 00:23:51,920
It's like, OK, but you're asking
everybody else to do exactly 

432
00:23:51,920 --> 00:23:54,160
that in order for these things 
to work. 

433
00:23:54,920 --> 00:23:59,600
And so sorry, go ahead. 
I, I, I want to ask about that 

434
00:23:59,600 --> 00:24:03,080
item, about people not trusting 
the sink backwards. 

435
00:24:03,080 --> 00:24:07,400
I mean, it seems like if you're 
establishing some sort of IM 

436
00:24:07,400 --> 00:24:10,960
bubble, why wouldn't you want to
sync back some of that data or 

437
00:24:10,960 --> 00:24:14,040
some of those attributes for 
future use? 

438
00:24:14,040 --> 00:24:17,720
Maybe it's, hey, wait, this guy 
is a license, we've verified it 

439
00:24:17,720 --> 00:24:19,760
here. 
Would you want to carry some of 

440
00:24:19,760 --> 00:24:22,160
that information forward? 
I mean, I'm trying to think of 

441
00:24:22,160 --> 00:24:25,720
like obviously the security 
aspect of it, but I would think 

442
00:24:25,720 --> 00:24:27,520
enriching data is generally a 
good thing though. 

443
00:24:28,360 --> 00:24:30,520
Well, yeah. 
And in the bubbles construct, it

444
00:24:30,520 --> 00:24:32,840
absolutely is. 
We would expect these bubbles 

445
00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:38,600
not to just be, you know, input 
only views of the world 'cause 

446
00:24:38,600 --> 00:24:41,720
they're out there collecting all
sorts of information that is 

447
00:24:41,720 --> 00:24:44,160
going to be useful to other 
parties in the network. 

448
00:24:44,480 --> 00:24:48,560
And so we would want that to not
only propagate back up any type 

449
00:24:48,560 --> 00:24:52,200
of tree, but we would also want 
to be able to share that out to 

450
00:24:52,200 --> 00:24:56,520
other peers. 
So let's say, for example, you 

451
00:24:56,520 --> 00:25:00,480
know, we're, we're AUS thing and
we, we show up, we've got our 

452
00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:05,360
bubble and one person comes over
from the UK and we onboard them 

453
00:25:05,360 --> 00:25:09,240
into our system. 
And then then we go and we 

454
00:25:09,240 --> 00:25:13,880
connect our system out to the 
French system and we can say 

455
00:25:13,880 --> 00:25:18,520
like, oh, hey, we have this, we 
have this Brit with us and we 

456
00:25:18,520 --> 00:25:20,640
validated it. 
Here's our record of the 

457
00:25:20,640 --> 00:25:24,840
validation that we did and we 
can assert that out to you. 

458
00:25:25,480 --> 00:25:29,280
So in other words, we're kind of
doing an identity proxy at this 

459
00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:33,600
point, but it's not, it's not 
the traditional real time online

460
00:25:33,600 --> 00:25:38,120
proxying where you're sending 
them out to the IDP and then to 

461
00:25:38,120 --> 00:25:40,920
our IDP and then to the other 
system all at runtime. 

462
00:25:40,920 --> 00:25:44,320
It's we did that once we wrote 
it down, here's the record. 

463
00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:48,160
If this is good enough for you, 
then great, trust it. 

464
00:25:48,160 --> 00:25:51,160
If not, there's a record in here
that says, hey, that's where 

465
00:25:51,160 --> 00:25:56,000
this person's IDP is. 
So they might connect out to the

466
00:25:56,000 --> 00:25:59,320
French system, which then says, 
you know what, OK, fine, for 

467
00:25:59,320 --> 00:26:01,960
today, we'll let you in. 
But if you want to come back 

468
00:26:01,960 --> 00:26:03,800
tomorrow, we need to talk to 
your IDP. 

469
00:26:04,080 --> 00:26:06,800
Once we're back online, we're 
going to talk to your IDP to 

470
00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:10,160
make sure, really make sure that
that is the right type of 

471
00:26:10,160 --> 00:26:12,840
connection. 
And this is that type of data 

472
00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:16,840
augmentation that is really, 
really rich that ends up getting

473
00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:20,800
just completely sort of chopped 
and lost in systems today. 

474
00:26:20,800 --> 00:26:23,800
Because right now, like I said, 
what happens is somebody like 

475
00:26:23,800 --> 00:26:26,360
that shows up, It's like, oh, 
fine, we'll just make him a 

476
00:26:26,360 --> 00:26:28,160
local account so that they can 
log in. 

477
00:26:28,160 --> 00:26:31,440
And then, and then you lose that
entire chain of information, 

478
00:26:31,720 --> 00:26:33,840
right? 
You lose all of that rich 

479
00:26:33,840 --> 00:26:36,880
information. 
So now when it goes to, for 

480
00:26:36,880 --> 00:26:41,840
example, audit things six months
later after all of this is, is 

481
00:26:41,840 --> 00:26:46,120
done, you, you can say, well, I 
there was somebody that made a 

482
00:26:46,120 --> 00:26:48,720
local account named Jay 
McDonald. 

483
00:26:48,760 --> 00:26:51,080
We don't, that's all that we 
have. 

484
00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:53,600
You know, he did a bunch of 
things. 

485
00:26:53,600 --> 00:26:57,080
We don't know what that means 
where as opposed to like, no, 

486
00:26:57,080 --> 00:27:00,480
this is Jim, he came from here. 
We onboarded him On this date. 

487
00:27:00,480 --> 00:27:04,360
We checked the provenance on 
these, on these dates and these 

488
00:27:04,360 --> 00:27:06,000
are the things that he did 
within the system. 

489
00:27:06,440 --> 00:27:09,760
And it's like, oh, by the way, 
when I'm back online and I'm 

490
00:27:09,760 --> 00:27:13,800
doing this sort of, it's not, 
it's not really a reconciliation

491
00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:16,480
in a classical data sense, but 
it's kind of a this, this 

492
00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:19,960
reconnection exercise. 
I can go back and say, oh, like,

493
00:27:20,000 --> 00:27:24,240
hey, Jay McDonald came from you 
guys. 

494
00:27:25,040 --> 00:27:28,960
He did some shady stuff. 
And this is the nature of the 

495
00:27:28,960 --> 00:27:32,560
shady stuff that happened. 
You might wanna, you might wanna

496
00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:35,560
look into that account a little 
bit, 'cause we had to like, we 

497
00:27:35,560 --> 00:27:38,360
had to like shut them down and 
cordon them off over here for a 

498
00:27:38,360 --> 00:27:42,440
little while. 
And that might be news to to 

499
00:27:42,440 --> 00:27:46,840
Jim's organization or that might
have been why they sent Jim, you

500
00:27:46,840 --> 00:27:47,600
know. 
That's just Jim. 

501
00:27:47,600 --> 00:27:49,320
That's just Jim doing Jim 
things. 

502
00:27:50,000 --> 00:27:51,000
Exactly. 
It started. 

503
00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:55,200
Sorry to pick on you, Jim, but 
you know, just to make it, just 

504
00:27:55,200 --> 00:27:58,920
to make it really concrete, 
these are the types of like 

505
00:27:59,080 --> 00:28:03,560
really local, really individual 
types of decisions that we, 

506
00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:07,320
we've got to make. 
And this notion of, oh, we can 

507
00:28:07,320 --> 00:28:12,080
just centralized all of our 
identities that really starts to

508
00:28:12,080 --> 00:28:14,520
fall apart. 
So to to the synchronization 

509
00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:19,440
thing, that is absolutely key to
the whole Bubbles concept and 

510
00:28:19,440 --> 00:28:24,160
prototypes. 
It is antithetical though to an 

511
00:28:24,160 --> 00:28:29,960
identity Shard because if I am 
only supposed to have my subset 

512
00:28:29,960 --> 00:28:35,680
copy my subservient copy of some
portion of the IDP, well then 

513
00:28:35,680 --> 00:28:37,520
what are all of these other 
accounts doing there? 

514
00:28:37,520 --> 00:28:41,440
That's, that's aberance. 
That is, you know, I'm going off

515
00:28:41,440 --> 00:28:46,880
of what I was told was OK, and 
now synchronizing with all of 

516
00:28:46,880 --> 00:28:49,040
that. 
Does that mean that I'm supposed

517
00:28:49,040 --> 00:28:51,520
to just throw that out? 
I'm supposed to eject all of 

518
00:28:51,520 --> 00:28:52,920
these people that I've 
onboarded? 

519
00:28:54,400 --> 00:28:56,600
Because if you tell me to do 
that, what am I probably going 

520
00:28:56,600 --> 00:28:59,000
to do? 
Just go make new accounts as 

521
00:28:59,000 --> 00:29:01,080
soon as the synchronization is 
over, right? 

522
00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:03,400
Because people need to get 
things done at the end of the 

523
00:29:03,400 --> 00:29:06,040
day. 
This, and this goes back to 

524
00:29:06,040 --> 00:29:10,200
something I, I know I mentioned 
in the last show, I very, very 

525
00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:14,440
deeply feel that security needs 
to serve functionality. 

526
00:29:15,440 --> 00:29:18,440
You know, it needs to be there 
to protect systems, absolutely. 

527
00:29:18,440 --> 00:29:24,560
But it's only as good as the 
functionality that it enables 

528
00:29:24,840 --> 00:29:27,880
and not the functionality that 
it prevents. 

529
00:29:27,880 --> 00:29:30,760
Not the attacks that it 
prevents, not the, you know, 

530
00:29:30,760 --> 00:29:32,600
the, the off label stuff that it
prevents. 

531
00:29:32,600 --> 00:29:36,440
It's only as good as the 
positive functionality that it 

532
00:29:36,440 --> 00:29:39,000
enables. 
Well, you're talking about the 

533
00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:42,120
the usability of security, which
I think is, is hugely important,

534
00:29:42,120 --> 00:29:44,000
right? 
It doesn't matter how many rules

535
00:29:44,000 --> 00:29:47,400
you have, if they're not 
designed around humans, I think 

536
00:29:47,400 --> 00:29:49,680
it makes it just that much more 
difficult to comply with. 

537
00:29:50,120 --> 00:29:52,640
I want to ask you one more 
question about the bubbles 

538
00:29:53,040 --> 00:29:54,640
because now I got my head 
thinking here about these 

539
00:29:54,640 --> 00:30:00,440
different kind of use cases. 
Can two bubbles merge to form a 

540
00:30:00,440 --> 00:30:03,880
bigger bubble? 
So in that example that you used

541
00:30:03,880 --> 00:30:06,560
of like, OK, well, here is, you 
know, the US and England and 

542
00:30:06,560 --> 00:30:10,480
then France. 
And what if the US and England 

543
00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:13,920
are working on one thing and 
then they kind of are working on

544
00:30:13,920 --> 00:30:16,080
the same thing? 
Would it become one big bubble? 

545
00:30:16,360 --> 00:30:19,560
Would it be two little bubbles 
that are kind of Federated to 

546
00:30:19,560 --> 00:30:21,800
each other immediately? 
Like how do you see that kind of

547
00:30:21,800 --> 00:30:27,320
use case taking place? 
So I, I, I see it happening in 

548
00:30:27,320 --> 00:30:30,360
two potential ways, although I 
think we'll see what it really 

549
00:30:30,360 --> 00:30:34,560
looks like once once this type 
of thing is deployed and people 

550
00:30:34,560 --> 00:30:36,840
start throwing it up against the
wall to see what breaks. 

551
00:30:37,880 --> 00:30:41,040
But where I see it happening is 
in that type of scenario. 

552
00:30:41,120 --> 00:30:44,960
I think that if you have an 
environment where you have two 

553
00:30:44,960 --> 00:30:47,760
existing groups that need to 
come together to work on 

554
00:30:47,760 --> 00:30:52,480
something together, you create a
new bubble for that working 

555
00:30:52,480 --> 00:30:56,120
together portion. 
So either one side or the other 

556
00:30:56,120 --> 00:30:58,960
is going to host it, or you're 
going to create a new 

557
00:30:58,960 --> 00:31:01,240
environment where all of this 
actually happens. 

558
00:31:01,240 --> 00:31:06,480
And we see that pattern in the 
research and academia world with

559
00:31:06,480 --> 00:31:10,040
virtual organizations and like, 
people will go stand up a lab 

560
00:31:10,040 --> 00:31:13,320
that is, yeah, you know, a 
partnership of seven different 

561
00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:15,920
universities and a bunch of 
commercial firms and some 

562
00:31:15,920 --> 00:31:19,200
government funding, right. 
Like that's that's exactly the 

563
00:31:19,200 --> 00:31:23,520
type of like weird collaboration
that we should be taking 

564
00:31:23,520 --> 00:31:26,400
inspiration from. 
Now, in the academic world, the 

565
00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:29,680
assumption is that you're online
so that you can check ID PS, you

566
00:31:29,680 --> 00:31:32,720
can check account records, you 
can do all of that type of 

567
00:31:32,720 --> 00:31:34,840
stuff. 
But if we take that type of 

568
00:31:34,840 --> 00:31:38,840
dynamic environment and move it 
into this space where it's a lot

569
00:31:38,840 --> 00:31:43,000
more dynamic and it's not like 
we can't really sit down and 

570
00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:46,320
plan this over a, a bunch of 
grant writing sessions. 

571
00:31:47,440 --> 00:31:49,760
We just kind of have to make it 
happen. 

572
00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:52,560
Like that's the type of space 
that I'm talking about. 

573
00:31:53,520 --> 00:31:58,320
So to me, I think the most 
sensible thing would be for a 

574
00:31:58,680 --> 00:32:03,160
these organizations to create 
sort of a new bubble that 

575
00:32:05,080 --> 00:32:07,520
running somewhere it almost 
doesn't matter where at this 

576
00:32:07,520 --> 00:32:13,080
point, but it gets on boarded by
members of both of those bubbles

577
00:32:13,080 --> 00:32:15,600
into that space. 
So now you have this separate 

578
00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:20,440
independent environment that is 
then sort of parented to two 

579
00:32:20,440 --> 00:32:25,320
other places and it knows how to
talk back to both of those, both

580
00:32:25,320 --> 00:32:29,040
of those other domains. 
And immediately you can start to

581
00:32:29,040 --> 00:32:32,800
see where the Shard thing 
doesn't work anymore because 

582
00:32:32,800 --> 00:32:35,400
like this is not a subset of 
either of those. 

583
00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:41,560
It is a subset and union. 
And this is the type of math 

584
00:32:41,560 --> 00:32:43,680
that doesn't work with trees, 
right? 

585
00:32:44,080 --> 00:32:46,600
They they get too, too tangled 
with each other like this. 

586
00:32:46,600 --> 00:32:49,160
We are very deeply into graph 
territory now. 

587
00:32:50,800 --> 00:32:53,920
Justin, you mentioned a company 
that you're working with on this

588
00:32:54,040 --> 00:32:57,240
federation Bubbles concept, Uber
Ether. 

589
00:32:57,240 --> 00:32:59,960
I've never heard of them. 
What did they do? 

590
00:33:00,480 --> 00:33:04,640
So Uber Ether is a technology 
integrator in the US They do a 

591
00:33:04,640 --> 00:33:07,640
lot of work on the federal 
government side, a lot of 

592
00:33:07,640 --> 00:33:12,760
identity platform type of stuff.
So a lot of government agencies,

593
00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:18,600
you know, don't have the don't 
have the IT depth to go and 

594
00:33:18,600 --> 00:33:21,760
stand up a secure identity 
system. 

595
00:33:21,960 --> 00:33:26,320
Uber Ether will run that. 
They don't actually, they don't 

596
00:33:26,320 --> 00:33:30,560
have an identity sort of a core 
identity product like a Ping or 

597
00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:34,640
Ford Rock, although I guess 
that's the same thing now or, or

598
00:33:34,640 --> 00:33:39,840
anything like that. 
But but they will give you a 

599
00:33:39,840 --> 00:33:43,600
platform that runs that and sets
that up with all of like the 

600
00:33:43,880 --> 00:33:46,520
provisioning and all of the bits
and pieces that make the most 

601
00:33:46,520 --> 00:33:49,880
sense for that given agency and 
organization. 

602
00:33:50,440 --> 00:33:54,040
And a big part of this, a big 
part of what they've been 

603
00:33:54,040 --> 00:33:57,040
working on is stuff with the 
Department of Defense, which as 

604
00:33:57,040 --> 00:34:01,160
you can imagine, both needs 
pretty advanced functionality 

605
00:34:01,160 --> 00:34:05,480
and is also, quite frankly, 20 
to 30 years behind the times in 

606
00:34:05,480 --> 00:34:12,239
terms of this notion of what 
what technology we actually feel

607
00:34:12,239 --> 00:34:16,040
like running. 
Like I mentioned, I used to work

608
00:34:16,040 --> 00:34:19,480
for a company called Miter. 
We did tons of work with the US 

609
00:34:19,480 --> 00:34:22,000
federal government. 
I was on the research side, but 

610
00:34:22,000 --> 00:34:25,400
I still touched a lot of the 
customer side stuff while I was 

611
00:34:25,400 --> 00:34:30,920
there. 
And I remember back, I want to 

612
00:34:30,920 --> 00:34:35,760
say this was like, this is about
10 years ago now, but talking 

613
00:34:35,760 --> 00:34:38,360
with a government group even 
then. 

614
00:34:38,679 --> 00:34:40,880
And they were like, well, we 
just heard of this new thing 

615
00:34:40,880 --> 00:34:45,560
called SAML and we're thinking 
about using it, but we're not 

616
00:34:45,560 --> 00:34:49,400
sure yet. 
And the reason for this is that 

617
00:34:49,400 --> 00:34:54,880
these systems move very slowly. 
And some of that's a good thing 

618
00:34:54,880 --> 00:34:58,920
'cause it's a little bit more 
predictable, but it also you, 

619
00:34:59,040 --> 00:35:01,960
you lose out on a lot of the 
like, well, we need to go solve 

620
00:35:01,960 --> 00:35:04,160
all of these problems. 
And we're trying to do it with, 

621
00:35:05,080 --> 00:35:09,640
with this technology that has 
been around for 30 years. 

622
00:35:10,080 --> 00:35:12,080
It's it's a really difficult 
mismatch. 

623
00:35:13,800 --> 00:35:21,240
So anyway, Uber Ether will 
basically build and run modern 

624
00:35:21,240 --> 00:35:25,480
identity platforms for all of 
these different groups they 

625
00:35:25,480 --> 00:35:27,760
specialize with, with the 
federal stuff. 

626
00:35:27,760 --> 00:35:30,600
But it's not just necessarily 
that space. 

627
00:35:32,040 --> 00:35:34,800
Cool. 
So you had mentioned a couple of

628
00:35:34,800 --> 00:35:37,960
standards. 
I wanted to talk about those. 

629
00:35:37,960 --> 00:35:40,880
The first one was whimsy, the 
second one was spiffy. 

630
00:35:40,880 --> 00:35:44,400
Can you kind of give us the 
overview of what they do and 

631
00:35:44,400 --> 00:35:49,360
maybe an add on of what the tie 
in back to Federation bubbles 

632
00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:51,480
was? 
So starting with whimsy. 

633
00:35:52,120 --> 00:35:55,360
Yeah, of course. 
So they're actually, they're 

634
00:35:55,360 --> 00:35:58,920
actually related. 
So Whimsy is the workload 

635
00:35:58,920 --> 00:36:02,640
identity and Multi systems 
environments working group in 

636
00:36:02,640 --> 00:36:06,200
the IETF, the ITF being the 
standards body that gave us 

637
00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:10,920
things like HTTP and Oauth and 
TCP and TLS and all of these 

638
00:36:10,920 --> 00:36:15,880
other great acronyms. 
And what we're doing with with 

639
00:36:15,960 --> 00:36:20,720
Whimsy, which has to be one of 
my favorite acronyms to date, is

640
00:36:22,080 --> 00:36:25,080
we're trying to look at the 
space of workload identity. 

641
00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:29,280
So let's say you're out and you 
you need to spin up one of 

642
00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:34,280
these, one of these bubbles. 
Well, that's a stack of software

643
00:36:34,920 --> 00:36:37,880
and all that software is just 
going to be kind of like waking 

644
00:36:37,880 --> 00:36:39,920
up. 
And just like in its 

645
00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:44,520
environment, you need to know 
that your database is connecting

646
00:36:44,520 --> 00:36:48,000
to the right things. 
That your your API processing is

647
00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:50,520
going through all of the right 
channels, that your filters are 

648
00:36:50,520 --> 00:36:53,840
all lined up in the OR in are 
lined up in the in the right 

649
00:36:53,840 --> 00:36:55,680
ways. 
That everything is running 

650
00:36:55,880 --> 00:36:59,200
software that actually has a 
good software bill of materials 

651
00:36:59,200 --> 00:37:02,200
to it that all of that's 
BeenVerified and validated and 

652
00:37:02,200 --> 00:37:06,120
you need to be able to secure 
and reason about all of the 

653
00:37:06,120 --> 00:37:08,560
connections between all of these
pieces. 

654
00:37:09,320 --> 00:37:13,480
Well, solving that is actually 
where solving parts of that is 

655
00:37:13,480 --> 00:37:17,800
actually where Spiffy comes in. 
And I always forget what spiffy 

656
00:37:17,800 --> 00:37:22,200
stands for. 
It's secure something identity 

657
00:37:22,200 --> 00:37:26,600
for everybody. 
It's SPIFFE will have a, a link 

658
00:37:26,600 --> 00:37:28,240
in the, in the show notes, I'm 
sure. 

659
00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:33,240
And, and what Spiffy does is 
that when a piece of software 

660
00:37:33,240 --> 00:37:36,160
wakes up, sort of the 
environment around the software 

661
00:37:36,160 --> 00:37:42,720
says, oh, here's your identity, 
here's your, your credentials 

662
00:37:42,800 --> 00:37:46,760
for calling other people. 
And importantly, here's the set 

663
00:37:46,760 --> 00:37:50,440
of things that you trust. 
So it's this bootstrapping of 

664
00:37:50,440 --> 00:37:53,280
trust at a very, very 
fundamental software level at 

665
00:37:53,280 --> 00:37:57,120
runtime that Spiffy solves. 
What we're doing with Whimsy is 

666
00:37:57,120 --> 00:38:00,760
saying like, OK, so we can get 
that part and we know how to 

667
00:38:00,760 --> 00:38:03,800
talk to different things in 
terms of like O auth 

668
00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:08,760
authorization or, you know, user
identities coming in or 

669
00:38:08,760 --> 00:38:11,760
credentials coming in. 
How do we start to reason about 

670
00:38:11,760 --> 00:38:14,440
systems as we connect them all 
together and especially as we 

671
00:38:14,440 --> 00:38:19,080
cross security boundaries? 
You know, it might not be enough

672
00:38:19,080 --> 00:38:22,360
that it's just, oh, this one 
workload is connecting to this 

673
00:38:22,360 --> 00:38:24,320
other workload and they're 
allowed to do whatever they're 

674
00:38:24,320 --> 00:38:26,720
allowed to do. 
I might actually want to know 

675
00:38:26,720 --> 00:38:30,200
that in order for this one to 
call the second one, well, 

676
00:38:30,320 --> 00:38:32,160
something else has to have been 
called first. 

677
00:38:32,160 --> 00:38:36,400
Maybe that's an auditing system 
or maybe that's a a very 

678
00:38:36,400 --> 00:38:39,760
specific gateway that that 
request has to come through 

679
00:38:39,920 --> 00:38:41,960
before this is even allowed to 
talk to me. 

680
00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:45,960
Now in today's systems, a lot of
a lot of stuff is like you're 

681
00:38:45,960 --> 00:38:48,320
down here on the leaf node and 
you're like, Oh, well, if 

682
00:38:48,320 --> 00:38:51,320
somebody's calling me, 
everything must have gone right.

683
00:38:51,880 --> 00:38:55,360
And so I can just trust that 
everything else happened just 

684
00:38:55,360 --> 00:38:59,120
fine. 
And then I'm just going to do my

685
00:38:59,120 --> 00:39:02,600
little job and then that's it. 
Obviously that's very fragile. 

686
00:39:03,040 --> 00:39:07,600
That's a very sort of, you know,
harden the exterior and keep the

687
00:39:07,600 --> 00:39:11,320
inside soft and squishy type of 
type of thinking. 

688
00:39:11,680 --> 00:39:15,960
As we move towards smaller and 
smaller boundaries around zero 

689
00:39:15,960 --> 00:39:19,960
trust thinking, we need to be 
able to say like, OK, not only 

690
00:39:19,960 --> 00:39:22,600
is the correct party calling me,
they're calling me in the right 

691
00:39:22,600 --> 00:39:24,880
context. 
It came through the right call 

692
00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:28,160
chain, which may actually not 
even be a single linear chain. 

693
00:39:28,320 --> 00:39:30,760
You know, it may have graphed 
off into a whole bunch of 

694
00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:32,560
different systems before it ever
got to me. 

695
00:39:33,160 --> 00:39:36,520
If I can quickly check that 
against something that said, 

696
00:39:36,520 --> 00:39:38,520
here's the list of things that 
you trust. 

697
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:40,640
Here's the policies that you're 
supposed to check it against. 

698
00:39:41,320 --> 00:39:45,280
Well, then I can actually make 
some real determinations about 

699
00:39:45,280 --> 00:39:47,880
what I'm supposed to be doing 
here in this system. 

700
00:39:48,680 --> 00:39:51,600
And that's the type of stuff 
we're doing in Whimsy. 

701
00:39:52,200 --> 00:39:55,400
So how this relates to bubbles 
is we spin up this bubble and 

702
00:39:55,400 --> 00:39:58,080
yeah, we need to be able to 
identify all of the pieces that 

703
00:39:58,080 --> 00:40:01,280
are running inside of it. 
But also, I think that there's a

704
00:40:01,280 --> 00:40:05,720
lot of applicability at a more 
macro level because once I spin 

705
00:40:05,720 --> 00:40:09,120
up one of these bubbles, well, 
I'm going to want to be able to 

706
00:40:09,120 --> 00:40:13,720
talk to other bubbles. 
That means I need to be able to 

707
00:40:13,800 --> 00:40:18,120
address another bubble. 
When I send a user, so I've got 

708
00:40:18,120 --> 00:40:22,000
this Jay McDonald guy that I'm 
sending over to you and I 

709
00:40:22,000 --> 00:40:24,080
actually got his account from 
somewhere else. 

710
00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:27,840
Well, I need to be able to say 
somewhere else in a way that 

711
00:40:27,840 --> 00:40:30,960
makes sense to you. 
I need to be able to say through

712
00:40:30,960 --> 00:40:32,920
me in a way that makes sense to 
you. 

713
00:40:33,640 --> 00:40:37,920
And we can't just assume that 
everything is on a publicly 

714
00:40:37,920 --> 00:40:43,400
available web-based URL like a 
lot of the a lot of the 

715
00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:47,760
federation systems that we we 
have today actually do. 

716
00:40:48,320 --> 00:40:51,760
One of the things that Spiffy 
gives us is a way to build out 

717
00:40:51,760 --> 00:40:56,120
URLs within their trust bundles 
that that actually makes sense 

718
00:40:56,120 --> 00:40:59,440
contextually. 
And this actually brings up a a 

719
00:40:59,440 --> 00:41:04,440
really, really interesting tie 
in from the very beginning of 

720
00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:08,120
the show is the award of the 
greatest dad ever. 

721
00:41:08,120 --> 00:41:12,800
I believe it was. 
And here's the thing, it's 

722
00:41:12,840 --> 00:41:16,440
absolutely reasonable. 
I think we all know that is 

723
00:41:16,440 --> 00:41:20,480
absolutely reasonable for every 
kid to give their dad the 

724
00:41:20,480 --> 00:41:27,480
greatest dad mug because that is
a contextual assertion, right? 

725
00:41:28,080 --> 00:41:33,280
Greatest dad of all time is a 
contextual exactly. 

726
00:41:33,280 --> 00:41:38,080
And so that is the bit that 
makes that truly meaningful. 

727
00:41:38,680 --> 00:41:41,000
It's not actually a global 
declaration. 

728
00:41:41,000 --> 00:41:43,000
As much as we love, we love to 
joke about that. 

729
00:41:43,040 --> 00:41:46,160
Like I, I, I love that joke. 
It's a great, it's a great 

730
00:41:46,160 --> 00:41:48,160
standby. 
It's really wonderful. 

731
00:41:49,120 --> 00:41:52,560
But the truth of it is that just
like in all of these security 

732
00:41:52,560 --> 00:41:58,560
systems, it's contextual. 
Like I might be needing to make 

733
00:41:58,600 --> 00:42:03,200
a decision about what to do next
based entirely on only the 

734
00:42:03,200 --> 00:42:04,880
things that I know in my 
environment. 

735
00:42:05,400 --> 00:42:08,200
And I might have some policy 
that says only the greatest dad 

736
00:42:08,200 --> 00:42:15,520
of all time can call this API 
and and when he does then then 

737
00:42:15,520 --> 00:42:18,000
he gets the data. 
Everybody else I just give him a

738
00:42:18,000 --> 00:42:21,160
403 and say Nope, not going to 
happen. 

739
00:42:22,000 --> 00:42:23,600
Thing is, how do I determine 
that? 

740
00:42:24,480 --> 00:42:27,040
How do I determine the validity 
of that assertion? 

741
00:42:28,600 --> 00:42:31,880
It's probably going to be it's 
only asserted by people that I 

742
00:42:31,880 --> 00:42:35,240
trust to make that particular 
assertion within a context that 

743
00:42:35,240 --> 00:42:39,120
I am comfortable with validating
it in. 

744
00:42:40,480 --> 00:42:44,200
And that's the reality of all of
these security systems that are 

745
00:42:44,200 --> 00:42:46,680
out there today, whether we like
to think about it that way or 

746
00:42:46,680 --> 00:42:49,040
not. 
I think we're too quick to say 

747
00:42:49,280 --> 00:42:52,640
like, Oh yeah, we're going to 
solve things on a global scale 

748
00:42:53,240 --> 00:42:57,560
of like we'll have an 
authorization policy for every 

749
00:42:57,560 --> 00:42:59,600
system that we deploy and it's 
all going to be the same. 

750
00:42:59,600 --> 00:43:01,320
We're going to manage it 
centrally. 

751
00:43:01,320 --> 00:43:04,600
We're going to have like a cedar
file that we just send out to 

752
00:43:04,600 --> 00:43:06,000
everybody and it's just going to
work. 

753
00:43:06,640 --> 00:43:09,680
It's like, OK, that's that's 
going to get you some distance 

754
00:43:09,680 --> 00:43:12,160
of the way. 
But eventually down there at the

755
00:43:12,160 --> 00:43:15,520
nodes, I'm going to need to be 
able to decide. 

756
00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:18,200
Well, you claim to be the 
greatest ad. 

757
00:43:18,200 --> 00:43:21,120
Do I believe that? 
Like who said it? 

758
00:43:21,160 --> 00:43:25,080
Where does that come from? 
And yeah, if your kids tells you

759
00:43:25,080 --> 00:43:28,760
that, that's great. 
If a random stranger on the 

760
00:43:28,760 --> 00:43:33,960
street handed you that, I think 
it would be a much stranger type

761
00:43:33,960 --> 00:43:37,560
of conversation than. 
What I do in my own time is my 

762
00:43:37,560 --> 00:43:39,800
own business just. 
You know, no judgement here, no 

763
00:43:39,800 --> 00:43:45,600
judgement but but really that's 
really one of the core things 

764
00:43:45,600 --> 00:43:48,800
here is that we're embracing 
that contextuality. 

765
00:43:49,160 --> 00:43:53,840
We're embracing that messiness 
at the edge and just admitting 

766
00:43:53,840 --> 00:43:56,920
that it's there and admitting 
that it's not part of a problem,

767
00:43:56,920 --> 00:43:58,440
but it's just it's part of the 
world. 

768
00:43:58,720 --> 00:44:04,000
That's just how this works. 
And so by no longer pretending 

769
00:44:04,000 --> 00:44:07,920
that that's not part of this 
overall conversation, now we can

770
00:44:07,920 --> 00:44:10,200
really start to make some smart 
decisions about it. 

771
00:44:10,720 --> 00:44:15,680
You know, we can really start to
think about how we process these

772
00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:19,000
things, how we talk about these 
things 'cause I can now actually

773
00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:22,320
say like Jim's kids called him 
the greatest dad. 

774
00:44:23,360 --> 00:44:28,360
That is a, that is an assertion 
that I can make and you can do 

775
00:44:28,360 --> 00:44:32,240
with that whatever you like. 
You know, I can, I can check the

776
00:44:32,240 --> 00:44:33,760
Providence that might be good 
enough for me. 

777
00:44:33,760 --> 00:44:36,480
That might not be good enough 
for you because we're operating 

778
00:44:36,480 --> 00:44:40,320
in different contexts and I need
to be able to make those 

779
00:44:40,320 --> 00:44:42,760
statements and reason about 
those statements in a way that 

780
00:44:42,760 --> 00:44:45,160
crosses boundaries in a way that
actually makes sense. 

781
00:44:46,000 --> 00:44:50,400
So Spiffy solves the identity 
piece just for that running bit 

782
00:44:50,400 --> 00:44:53,200
of software. 
Whimsy's looking at how do we 

783
00:44:53,640 --> 00:44:57,400
reason about this across 
multiple systems, especially 

784
00:44:57,400 --> 00:45:00,360
across security domains. 
And the bubbles concept is 

785
00:45:00,360 --> 00:45:05,160
really looking at that at a, 
that same style of thing, but at

786
00:45:05,160 --> 00:45:09,080
a macro level. 
You know, how can I have an 

787
00:45:09,080 --> 00:45:13,600
identity system that I know is 
independent and that I that I 

788
00:45:13,600 --> 00:45:18,560
treat as independent and that is
not always connected but is not 

789
00:45:18,560 --> 00:45:22,400
always disconnected 'cause like 
when I come back online, like 

790
00:45:22,400 --> 00:45:25,640
you were saying, Jeff, I want to
be able to say like, hey, these 

791
00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:28,080
three electricians came on. 
Can I double check all of their 

792
00:45:28,080 --> 00:45:29,800
credentials right now? 
OK, great, thank you. 

793
00:45:30,280 --> 00:45:31,840
Right. 
I want to be able to do that 

794
00:45:31,840 --> 00:45:36,200
kind of thing and not just sweep
all of that under the rug. 

795
00:45:38,920 --> 00:45:40,200
Yeah, it's a real interesting 
concept. 

796
00:45:40,200 --> 00:45:44,240
I'd be curious to see how it 
continues to evolve and more 

797
00:45:44,240 --> 00:45:46,520
importantly, how does this 
actually make it into the real 

798
00:45:46,520 --> 00:45:47,120
world? 
Right. 

799
00:45:47,120 --> 00:45:49,760
From a thought experiment and 
and I will assume there's 

800
00:45:49,760 --> 00:45:52,880
probably stuff that's happening,
but it seems like it's very much

801
00:45:52,880 --> 00:45:56,160
still on the upward trajectory 
of figuring things out, right? 

802
00:45:56,680 --> 00:45:58,360
Absolutely. 
We're building into bits and 

803
00:45:58,360 --> 00:46:03,000
pieces, figuring out where the 
technology gaps are, deploying 

804
00:46:03,000 --> 00:46:06,000
it where it makes most sense. 
And one of the things I've said 

805
00:46:06,000 --> 00:46:08,760
from the very beginning of this 
is that it's, it's not a 

806
00:46:08,760 --> 00:46:12,680
product, it's not a technology 
stack, it's not even a standard,

807
00:46:13,760 --> 00:46:17,600
because there have been attempts
to have like a global vision of 

808
00:46:17,880 --> 00:46:20,280
distributed identity systems. 
And it's like, well, if 

809
00:46:20,280 --> 00:46:24,440
everybody would just use this 
agent, then all the problems 

810
00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:27,440
would go away. 
And that's just that is never 

811
00:46:27,440 --> 00:46:29,520
going to happen because as soon 
as you want to connect to 

812
00:46:29,520 --> 00:46:31,240
somebody else, they're going to 
be using a different agent, 

813
00:46:31,720 --> 00:46:32,840
right? 
They're going to be using a 

814
00:46:32,840 --> 00:46:35,760
different schema, They're going 
to be using something that's not

815
00:46:35,760 --> 00:46:38,200
the same. 
And so the interoperability 

816
00:46:38,200 --> 00:46:42,720
here, I think needs to be about 
as messy as as it it, it can be 

817
00:46:42,720 --> 00:46:46,440
and still connect because that's
that's how human systems work. 

818
00:46:47,800 --> 00:46:51,760
So I'm looking forward to the 
next RSA where we start to see 

819
00:46:51,760 --> 00:46:55,680
products with, you know, 100% 
more bubbles or something like 

820
00:46:55,680 --> 00:47:00,200
that, just like we saw with the 
AI and Zero trust and all that 

821
00:47:00,200 --> 00:47:02,560
other stuff. 
I want to wrap up our 

822
00:47:02,560 --> 00:47:08,040
conversation on a lighter note 
and I'm happy to say that I am a

823
00:47:08,240 --> 00:47:10,920
sponsor or contributor or 
funder. 

824
00:47:10,920 --> 00:47:12,120
I'm not sure what the right word
is. 

825
00:47:12,120 --> 00:47:15,080
Backer, I guess probably the 
right word of a new board game 

826
00:47:15,200 --> 00:47:18,640
that you had been working on 
called Natural Ball. 

827
00:47:19,160 --> 00:47:20,920
Talk about that cause got a link
in our show notes. 

828
00:47:20,920 --> 00:47:22,800
It sounds really cool. 
And I also want to get into 

829
00:47:22,800 --> 00:47:24,600
Cards Against Identity for for a
couple minutes. 

830
00:47:24,600 --> 00:47:26,240
But tell us about Natural Ball. 
What is it? 

831
00:47:26,560 --> 00:47:28,600
Yeah. 
Well, so one of the things we 

832
00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:32,640
talked about last time is that 
one of the other things I do 

833
00:47:32,640 --> 00:47:35,960
beyond all of this identity 
stuff is I really enjoy board 

834
00:47:35,960 --> 00:47:39,160
games and I've, and you know, I 
like designing them. 

835
00:47:39,840 --> 00:47:42,320
Cards Against Identity is 
something that I've, I've 

836
00:47:42,320 --> 00:47:46,200
published a new version every 
single year over the last five 

837
00:47:46,200 --> 00:47:49,440
years or so. 
And that's been a very small 

838
00:47:50,280 --> 00:47:53,920
sort of niche thing that that 
shows up at the identity 

839
00:47:53,920 --> 00:47:59,720
conference circuit. 
But with Natural Vol, this is a 

840
00:47:59,720 --> 00:48:02,520
game that actually came to me 
through a friend of mine who I 

841
00:48:02,520 --> 00:48:07,840
met in, she's based in Iceland. 
And she came up with the 

842
00:48:07,840 --> 00:48:12,680
original idea of this game when 
just talking with her kid who 

843
00:48:12,680 --> 00:48:16,720
was I think 9 or 10 at the time.
And he just wanted more facts 

844
00:48:16,720 --> 00:48:19,080
about animals. 
So like, hey, mom, can you just 

845
00:48:19,080 --> 00:48:21,480
make a bunch of the animal flash
cards and let's make an animal 

846
00:48:21,480 --> 00:48:22,520
game. 
Let's do something. 

847
00:48:23,000 --> 00:48:26,800
And so she came up with this 
idea of basically having animal 

848
00:48:26,800 --> 00:48:30,760
flash cards with a bunch of 
statistics about the animals on 

849
00:48:30,760 --> 00:48:34,600
the cards and then rolling dice 
to compare the statistics. 

850
00:48:34,680 --> 00:48:38,200
Very simple rules, very simple 
mechanics, really easy for kids 

851
00:48:38,200 --> 00:48:42,400
to pick up and learn and play. 
She showed me this game a couple

852
00:48:42,400 --> 00:48:45,880
of years ago and it had been 
sitting around in the back of my

853
00:48:45,880 --> 00:48:49,200
mind like, like, there's this 
there, this is a neat idea. 

854
00:48:49,200 --> 00:48:51,440
Like this is, this is pretty, 
pretty neat. 

855
00:48:51,440 --> 00:48:56,120
Now, she had been just printing 
things out on her home printer 

856
00:48:56,120 --> 00:49:00,280
and, you know, putting contact 
paper over them because I had 

857
00:49:00,280 --> 00:49:03,800
been doing game design and 
prototyping for a couple of 

858
00:49:03,800 --> 00:49:06,400
years. 
I actually printed up, I went 

859
00:49:06,400 --> 00:49:10,440
and designed and printed up an 
actual prototype, sent one copy 

860
00:49:10,440 --> 00:49:14,080
to her in in Icelandic with the 
condition that she translated 

861
00:49:14,080 --> 00:49:16,200
into English so that I could 
also have a copy. 

862
00:49:17,400 --> 00:49:22,040
And then we had those for a 
little while and we're playing 

863
00:49:22,040 --> 00:49:24,320
with, with our kids and with 
friends and stuff. 

864
00:49:24,360 --> 00:49:27,840
And both of us were like, this 
is this is a fun game. 

865
00:49:27,840 --> 00:49:30,320
Like this isn't just like a, a 
neat little hobby. 

866
00:49:30,320 --> 00:49:33,720
So we want to make this into 
like a real commercially 

867
00:49:33,720 --> 00:49:36,640
available board game. 
So what we're doing right now is

868
00:49:36,640 --> 00:49:40,920
we're trying to raise enough 
money through it's basically 

869
00:49:40,920 --> 00:49:45,000
pre-orders with a bunch of 
extras through game found. 

870
00:49:45,760 --> 00:49:49,520
And like Jeff said, you can find
the link in the show notes. 

871
00:49:50,000 --> 00:49:54,480
And the way that it works is if 
if we reach our goal by the end 

872
00:49:54,480 --> 00:49:58,560
of it, then we are going to get 
a full set of these games 

873
00:49:58,560 --> 00:50:01,560
printed from an actual game 
manufacturer. 

874
00:50:01,640 --> 00:50:06,040
It's actually the same printer 
that does Wingspan and Pandemic 

875
00:50:06,040 --> 00:50:10,120
Legacy and Gloomhaven and a 
bunch of other like really big 

876
00:50:10,120 --> 00:50:11,520
games. 
They're they were. 

877
00:50:11,720 --> 00:50:13,680
Legit. 
Yeah, they were really excited 

878
00:50:13,680 --> 00:50:16,080
to work with us little indie 
developers. 

879
00:50:16,360 --> 00:50:20,960
It's a it's a team of three 
people total, and that's that's 

880
00:50:20,960 --> 00:50:23,600
been working on this. 
Four, if you count my friend's 

881
00:50:23,600 --> 00:50:28,880
son, who's arguably the original
designer for this whole project.

882
00:50:30,680 --> 00:50:34,160
And, and yeah, we're trying to, 
we're trying to kick this off. 

883
00:50:34,160 --> 00:50:37,760
And so yeah, please check out 
the game. 

884
00:50:38,000 --> 00:50:42,000
I spent way too much time 
putting together the the little 

885
00:50:42,760 --> 00:50:45,200
pitch video that's on that 
website. 

886
00:50:46,000 --> 00:50:50,080
So and that runs until I think 
mid-july. 

887
00:50:51,040 --> 00:50:54,720
So if you if that sounds 
interesting to you or if you 

888
00:50:54,720 --> 00:50:57,240
know somebody it sounds 
interesting too, please check it

889
00:50:57,240 --> 00:51:00,480
out and send it along. 
Yeah, we'll have a link in our 

890
00:51:00,480 --> 00:51:01,640
show notes. 
I'm a backer. 

891
00:51:01,640 --> 00:51:07,120
I bought one for myself and 1:00
to give to my local community 

892
00:51:07,120 --> 00:51:08,640
thing. 
I think that's still to 

893
00:51:08,640 --> 00:51:11,240
determine right how you like 
determine where, where the extra

894
00:51:11,240 --> 00:51:13,040
copies will go, but. 
Yeah. 

895
00:51:13,160 --> 00:51:15,960
So that is that is something 
that we're doing with this 

896
00:51:15,960 --> 00:51:17,440
because it's an educational 
game. 

897
00:51:18,480 --> 00:51:22,720
We're giving people the option 
to basically pay for extra 

898
00:51:22,720 --> 00:51:28,800
copies that then get donated and
shipped out to to schools, to 

899
00:51:28,800 --> 00:51:31,920
libraries, to community centers,
to all sorts of things like 

900
00:51:31,920 --> 00:51:34,840
that. 
So so yeah, you can get you can 

901
00:51:34,840 --> 00:51:38,480
get a copy for yourself and 
there's a bunch of extras that 

902
00:51:38,480 --> 00:51:43,720
you can do to like our artist is
is gonna be like sketching 

903
00:51:43,720 --> 00:51:46,000
animals for people. 
Or you could actually design a 

904
00:51:46,000 --> 00:51:49,560
card to go in this. 
So we've got friends who like 

905
00:51:50,800 --> 00:51:52,880
people have already contacted us
that they're getting like their 

906
00:51:52,880 --> 00:51:58,200
friends, pet cats on a card in 
this with whatever stats you 

907
00:51:58,200 --> 00:51:59,080
want. 
We don't care if they're 

908
00:51:59,080 --> 00:52:04,360
accurate at that point. 
And so like my kids hamster is 

909
00:52:04,360 --> 00:52:07,200
probably gonna be gonna be one 
of one of the cards. 

910
00:52:08,960 --> 00:52:13,400
But yeah, in addition to all of 
those extras, we're we're 

911
00:52:13,400 --> 00:52:17,240
letting people sort of donate 
this to spaces that wouldn't 

912
00:52:17,240 --> 00:52:20,760
have the opportunity to just go 
out and buy a $20 board game. 

913
00:52:22,040 --> 00:52:25,560
And and that's something that we
really, we, we felt really 

914
00:52:25,560 --> 00:52:29,200
strongly about going into this. 
Yeah, it's a very cool idea. 

915
00:52:29,200 --> 00:52:30,960
I love the art style of the 
direction of it. 

916
00:52:31,040 --> 00:52:34,640
Like I said, I've I've I bought 
2, so I'm looking forward to 

917
00:52:34,640 --> 00:52:37,880
getting that one out. 
Cards can card scan's identity 

918
00:52:38,200 --> 00:52:40,560
real quickly. 
What's the latest on that? 

919
00:52:41,320 --> 00:52:42,760
Was there a new pack for this 
year? 

920
00:52:42,760 --> 00:52:45,360
I I don't, I forgot to ask you 
identiverse about it, but. 

921
00:52:45,680 --> 00:52:47,640
Yeah, so there was a new pack 
this year. 

922
00:52:48,160 --> 00:52:53,440
I so it's one of those things 
that if you catch me on on the 

923
00:52:53,440 --> 00:52:58,200
spring identity conference 
circuit, then I usually have a 

924
00:52:58,200 --> 00:53:03,800
backpack full of them with me. 
Those sold out through the 

925
00:53:03,800 --> 00:53:06,200
absolute gauntlet that was 
Identiversed immediately 

926
00:53:06,200 --> 00:53:10,360
followed by EIC, plus a bunch of
other stuff around that time. 

927
00:53:11,560 --> 00:53:15,280
But you can go to 
cardsagainstidentity.com and 

928
00:53:15,280 --> 00:53:21,360
that will actually you can, you 
can buy it online since that's a

929
00:53:21,360 --> 00:53:23,760
small run. 
It's a it's basically goes 

930
00:53:23,760 --> 00:53:26,720
through a print on demand 
service, but you can get 

931
00:53:26,720 --> 00:53:31,680
everything all going all the way
back to the original 20/19/2019 

932
00:53:31,680 --> 00:53:36,120
deck. 
What's your favorite white card 

933
00:53:36,120 --> 00:53:40,000
and black card for this year? 
For this year, Oh my gosh. 

934
00:53:42,440 --> 00:53:47,600
So I think my favorite black 
card is that's it. 

935
00:53:47,600 --> 00:53:50,480
I'm creating my own standards 
organization with blank and 

936
00:53:50,480 --> 00:53:57,920
blank and white card. 
Oh my gosh, there's so many 

937
00:53:57,920 --> 00:54:02,080
different, there's so many cards
now across all the years that I 

938
00:54:02,120 --> 00:54:04,960
have to remember. 
I, I will say my, you know, 

939
00:54:04,960 --> 00:54:07,360
instead I'll give you my 
favorite white card of all time 

940
00:54:08,360 --> 00:54:11,280
was from a couple of years ago 
was the Super Vittorio card. 

941
00:54:12,600 --> 00:54:16,920
As, as you know, there, there 
was somebody in our community, 

942
00:54:16,920 --> 00:54:19,440
an absolute giant Vittorio 
Betochi. 

943
00:54:20,600 --> 00:54:25,240
And there was, there's this 
video that's still on YouTube of

944
00:54:25,240 --> 00:54:27,760
him as a superhero anime 
character. 

945
00:54:28,160 --> 00:54:32,440
And I was able to actually clip 
that from the video and get that

946
00:54:32,440 --> 00:54:36,680
onto onto a card And that that I
don't think that one's gonna get

947
00:54:36,680 --> 00:54:39,080
replaced as my favorite card for
a very long time. 

948
00:54:40,120 --> 00:54:42,680
That's a tough one to top for 
sure, and well earned too, by 

949
00:54:42,720 --> 00:54:45,080
the way. 
OK, why don't you go ahead and 

950
00:54:45,080 --> 00:54:47,840
wrap it up, I think for this 
week, Justin, thank you so much 

951
00:54:47,840 --> 00:54:50,400
for spending time with us. 
I'm really interested to see how

952
00:54:50,400 --> 00:54:52,720
this bubble, how these bubble 
things take off. 

953
00:54:52,840 --> 00:54:55,280
I guess terrible pun, error 
rising. 

954
00:54:55,280 --> 00:54:58,560
I don't know. 
So, you know, keep us posted on 

955
00:54:58,560 --> 00:54:59,880
how that's goes on, how that 
goes. 

956
00:54:59,880 --> 00:55:01,560
I'm sure there's other topics we
want to talk about with you in 

957
00:55:01,560 --> 00:55:03,560
the future. 
So we'll have you back if you 

958
00:55:03,560 --> 00:55:06,280
are so inclined. 
Absolutely, thank you for having

959
00:55:06,280 --> 00:55:07,840
me on again. 
I would love to come back. 

960
00:55:08,760 --> 00:55:10,920
Yeah, and I appreciate it. 
I, I, I mentioned before you 

961
00:55:10,920 --> 00:55:13,800
before we started your real Pros
pro from a microphone and a 

962
00:55:13,800 --> 00:55:15,200
recording and all that good 
stuff. 

963
00:55:15,200 --> 00:55:17,640
So two thumbs up makes my job 
easier. 

964
00:55:17,920 --> 00:55:19,760
And this isn't even the good 
Let's see what the computer 

965
00:55:19,760 --> 00:55:23,240
that's back there. 
You got so many that you're 

966
00:55:23,240 --> 00:55:24,360
choosing from. 
Meanwhile, I'm here in a 

967
00:55:24,360 --> 00:55:26,960
Springfield Suites in Minnesota.
Oh, it's. 

968
00:55:26,960 --> 00:55:30,760
It's with a lovely mini Can you 
call us a kitchen? 

969
00:55:30,760 --> 00:55:34,640
I mean, it's got a mic, it's got
a microwave and a fridge and I 

970
00:55:34,640 --> 00:55:36,280
don't. 
Know drink the top water. 

971
00:55:36,800 --> 00:55:39,400
Yeah, it's pretty bare. 
All right, let's leave it there.

972
00:55:40,120 --> 00:55:45,480
idacpodcast.com, Twitter at IDAC
podcasts, the YouTube channel 

973
00:55:45,480 --> 00:55:52,080
youtube.com slash at IDAC 
podcasts, Mastodon, IDC podcast 

974
00:55:52,080 --> 00:55:55,120
at info psych dot exchange. 
Do all those cool things like 

975
00:55:55,120 --> 00:55:57,160
like subscribe, share with your 
friends, share with your 

976
00:55:57,160 --> 00:55:59,240
enemies, doesn't matter long 
people hit that button. 

977
00:55:59,240 --> 00:56:01,960
I don't care who does it and 
we'll leave it there for this 

978
00:56:01,960 --> 00:56:04,320
week. 
So thanks everyone for listening

979
00:56:04,320 --> 00:56:07,280
and or watching and talk with 
you all in the next one. 

980
00:56:10,120 --> 00:56:13,240
You've been listening to 
Identity at the Center. 

981
00:56:13,560 --> 00:56:17,640
We hope you've enjoyed the show.
Make sure to like, rate and 

982
00:56:17,640 --> 00:56:21,280
review, and we'll be back soon. 
But in the meantime, hit the 

983
00:56:21,280 --> 00:56:24,680
website at 
identity@thecenter.com. 

984
00:56:25,280 --> 00:56:29,400
See you next time on Identity at
the Center.

