1 00:00:05,320 --> 00:00:10,840 This is identity at the center. If it has anything to do with I 2 00:00:11,160 --> 00:00:17,960 Am, this is the go to podcast now your hosts Jim McDonald and 3 00:00:17,960 --> 00:00:21,320 Jeff Steadman. Welcome to the Identity at the 4 00:00:21,320 --> 00:00:23,480 Center podcast. I'm Jeff and that's Jim. 5 00:00:23,480 --> 00:00:25,120 Hey, Jim. Hey, Jeff. 6 00:00:25,120 --> 00:00:27,040 How are you? Not so bad yourself. 7 00:00:28,030 --> 00:00:29,950 I'm doing great. I mean, there's been some 8 00:00:30,150 --> 00:00:36,030 interesting news in the identity space recently with Tom Abravo 9 00:00:36,830 --> 00:00:40,310 closing their deal to acquire Ford Rock. 10 00:00:41,790 --> 00:00:45,750 It seems to me, based on my LinkedIn, that people from 11 00:00:45,750 --> 00:00:49,830 paying and from Ford Rock seem pretty excited about, you know, 12 00:00:49,870 --> 00:00:52,870 the the future. I mean, I've only seen positive 13 00:00:52,870 --> 00:00:56,790 come out. You know, I don't know that. 14 00:00:56,910 --> 00:00:59,270 I mean, everybody's speculating. What does this actually mean? 15 00:00:59,270 --> 00:01:01,230 What is this going to look like in the future? 16 00:01:02,710 --> 00:01:07,510 I'd like to extend an invitation to anyone from Tom Bravo or Ping 17 00:01:07,510 --> 00:01:11,230 or Ford Rock who wants to come in and talk on the record on the 18 00:01:11,230 --> 00:01:14,470 podcast to please reach out to to me or Jeff. 19 00:01:14,870 --> 00:01:18,790 And we'd love to have you on, because people, we all want to 20 00:01:18,790 --> 00:01:22,750 know what's going on. Yeah, I think people been 21 00:01:22,750 --> 00:01:24,270 thinking about this for a while ever since. 22 00:01:24,910 --> 00:01:28,910 You know, the, the intent was announced several months back. 23 00:01:28,910 --> 00:01:32,430 Now at this point we asked the question on stage at Gartner to 24 00:01:32,430 --> 00:01:34,470 our, you know, our friends Henrique and Becky. 25 00:01:35,710 --> 00:01:37,750 They didn't know, right, just like anyone else. 26 00:01:38,390 --> 00:01:39,750 I think we're starting to see it now, right. 27 00:01:39,750 --> 00:01:41,870 So the deal is closed and I think almost immediately they 28 00:01:41,870 --> 00:01:44,630 announced the, you know the the merging of the two companies for 29 00:01:44,630 --> 00:01:48,510 drag and Ping and Andre Duran has been announced as the the 30 00:01:48,510 --> 00:01:49,860 leader for. For that. 31 00:01:49,860 --> 00:01:52,620 So it's interesting times. You know, it's never a dull 32 00:01:52,620 --> 00:01:55,460 moment in the identity space. I think we kind of saw, you 33 00:01:55,460 --> 00:01:58,820 know, like Okay, like what's the plan here, Be curious to see how 34 00:01:58,820 --> 00:02:00,700 things continue to evolve in the space. 35 00:02:00,700 --> 00:02:04,500 But yeah, definitely happy to talk with anybody from Ping or 36 00:02:04,500 --> 00:02:05,900 Ford truck wants to come out and talk about it. 37 00:02:05,900 --> 00:02:07,860 They wouldn't get Eve. Eve's always been good with us. 38 00:02:08,380 --> 00:02:09,699 He's been great. Yeah. 39 00:02:09,699 --> 00:02:12,540 I just don't know how much, you know how much freedom she'll 40 00:02:12,540 --> 00:02:15,500 have to talk about that kind. Of stuff, but I'm going to go 41 00:02:15,500 --> 00:02:19,710 out of limb and say none. I mean, it's companies, it's 42 00:02:19,710 --> 00:02:21,310 corporate, There's money involved, right? 43 00:02:21,310 --> 00:02:24,110 Stocks maybe. I'm sure we'll get company lines 44 00:02:24,110 --> 00:02:26,110 and stuff like that. But it's seriously to see how 45 00:02:26,110 --> 00:02:29,270 things will turn out. What's the plan here between 46 00:02:29,270 --> 00:02:32,910 Ford Rock and Ping in certain areas? 47 00:02:32,910 --> 00:02:36,110 They're definitely competitors. What's the plan to fold those 48 00:02:36,110 --> 00:02:39,990 together and figure out how it makes each other better or 49 00:02:39,990 --> 00:02:41,870 stronger or faster or something like that? 50 00:02:42,610 --> 00:02:46,170 I mean the the, you know, the customer list of those two 51 00:02:46,170 --> 00:02:49,490 companies now combined is just unreal. 52 00:02:49,890 --> 00:02:52,130 But by the way, you did bring up Andre Duran. 53 00:02:52,810 --> 00:02:57,370 If I could mention his identity at the center alumni, I'm sure 54 00:02:57,370 --> 00:02:59,170 that was the highlight of his career. 55 00:02:59,170 --> 00:03:01,330 Of course, up to this moment anyway. 56 00:03:01,610 --> 00:03:05,130 As it should be for anybody. Yeah, absolutely. 57 00:03:05,450 --> 00:03:10,590 So that's cool, cool news. I'm sure this is going to be the 58 00:03:10,590 --> 00:03:13,110 biggest thing that folks are talking about at the upcoming 59 00:03:13,110 --> 00:03:16,030 conferences. We've got quite a few of them 60 00:03:16,030 --> 00:03:17,950 planned. I mean it's kind of hard. 61 00:03:17,950 --> 00:03:20,950 It's it's the elephant in the room, the girl in the corner, 62 00:03:20,950 --> 00:03:23,190 whatever the right analogy is. But I'm sure people are talking 63 00:03:23,190 --> 00:03:24,670 about it, especially when we start talking about 64 00:03:24,670 --> 00:03:26,230 authentication. So we've got a few things coming 65 00:03:26,230 --> 00:03:29,110 up like that. But yeah, we've got conferences 66 00:03:29,110 --> 00:03:31,630 coming up. So I'm going to be at Identity 67 00:03:31,630 --> 00:03:33,950 Week America. That's October 3rd and 4th. 68 00:03:34,390 --> 00:03:36,710 That's in Washington DC I'm hosting a panel discussion on 69 00:03:36,710 --> 00:03:38,940 pass keys. Actually starting to get the 70 00:03:38,940 --> 00:03:41,500 panel together later this week, so we're actually starting to 71 00:03:41,500 --> 00:03:44,220 figure out what it is we're going to talk about and try to 72 00:03:44,220 --> 00:03:47,660 put together, you know, a good discussion around pass key and 73 00:03:47,660 --> 00:03:48,900 authentications, things like that. 74 00:03:48,900 --> 00:03:52,260 So we've got a discount code that the fine folks over there 75 00:03:52,260 --> 00:03:54,700 have provided to us. This works for both Identity 76 00:03:54,700 --> 00:03:58,460 Week America and also work for Identity Week Asia later this 77 00:03:58,460 --> 00:04:02,380 year. So if you use the code ID AC30I 78 00:04:02,380 --> 00:04:05,460 DA C30 you get 30% off of your conference pass. 79 00:04:05,920 --> 00:04:07,680 Yeah, we're actually dividing in conquering that week because I'm 80 00:04:07,680 --> 00:04:10,760 going to be on the East Coast at DC at Identity Week America and 81 00:04:10,760 --> 00:04:12,800 you're going to be on the West Coast over at Octane. 82 00:04:13,440 --> 00:04:15,760 Yeah, I'll be at Octane. But one thing we will have in 83 00:04:15,760 --> 00:04:20,680 common is we'll both have the new updated Identity Center 84 00:04:20,680 --> 00:04:22,680 stickers and. What's the update? 85 00:04:22,680 --> 00:04:24,280 You got to be clear what the update means. 86 00:04:25,120 --> 00:04:27,800 The update doesn't mean that you look, you know. 87 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:31,560 But the old stickers had a fatal flaw, which was they were very 88 00:04:31,560 --> 00:04:35,630 hard to get the backing off of. And so now the new and improved 89 00:04:35,630 --> 00:04:39,070 stickers are super easy to get the backing off of. 90 00:04:39,470 --> 00:04:42,070 And you look, it's like these little tweaks, it's like the 91 00:04:42,110 --> 00:04:45,190 iPhone, you know, from iPhone 14 to iPhone 15. 92 00:04:45,190 --> 00:04:47,630 I don't know what all the features are going to be sitting 93 00:04:47,630 --> 00:04:50,670 here today, but they're probably going to seem like small 94 00:04:50,670 --> 00:04:53,830 features that just make it so much nicer to have. 95 00:04:54,110 --> 00:04:56,550 So anyway, well, you'll have stickers. 96 00:04:56,550 --> 00:05:00,550 I'll have stickers. I'll be at Octane 2023 in San 97 00:05:00,550 --> 00:05:03,870 Francisco October 3rd through the 5th and we have a discount 98 00:05:03,870 --> 00:05:10,430 code for that conference as well, which is OKTNIDA C30 and 99 00:05:10,430 --> 00:05:12,590 gets you 30% off your registration. 100 00:05:12,870 --> 00:05:19,550 So the registration link is octa.com/octane and we're also 101 00:05:19,550 --> 00:05:24,230 going to be Co hosting or Co organizing an event with our 102 00:05:24,230 --> 00:05:27,600 friends from accents. We're going to be doing the 103 00:05:27,960 --> 00:05:31,480 quote UN quote party bus, which shouldn't scare people, right. 104 00:05:31,480 --> 00:05:34,400 It's not like we're going to be driving all over the city and 105 00:05:34,720 --> 00:05:38,880 you know just going crazy. We're going to be doing some 106 00:05:39,800 --> 00:05:44,040 cool sane fun things and networking and seeing some of 107 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:47,400 the highlights of San Francisco. I mean it's tech town, right? 108 00:05:47,400 --> 00:05:49,680 So a lot of the corporate headquarters are there. 109 00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:52,240 I think we're going to do some of that. 110 00:05:52,240 --> 00:05:57,310 I look, I'm not the not the consigliare of the of the party 111 00:05:57,310 --> 00:06:02,430 bus, but I'm expecting it to be a lot of good scene fun. 112 00:06:02,630 --> 00:06:05,990 So anybody who's interested in that, check out my LinkedIn. 113 00:06:05,990 --> 00:06:11,110 I've reposted the link to get registered, and as we get closer 114 00:06:11,710 --> 00:06:14,070 I'll drop that more and we'll put it in the show notes as 115 00:06:14,070 --> 00:06:15,710 well. Yeah, right on. 116 00:06:15,710 --> 00:06:17,550 I saw pictures from the party bus in Vegas. 117 00:06:17,550 --> 00:06:19,950 I didn't make it, but you were on there and. 118 00:06:20,960 --> 00:06:22,600 It was interesting going around to see the sights. 119 00:06:22,600 --> 00:06:24,800 It was a cool idea. I think it was kind of a a neat 120 00:06:24,800 --> 00:06:27,640 thing that they did. So yeah, I mean we did things 121 00:06:27,640 --> 00:06:30,720 like we went to the Welcome to Las Vegas sign, We all got to go 122 00:06:30,720 --> 00:06:35,840 out and take pictures. And yeah, it just added another 123 00:06:35,840 --> 00:06:40,560 element to the the trip For all the times they've been to Vegas, 124 00:06:40,560 --> 00:06:43,560 which was like over 20 times, I'd never gotten to that sign 125 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:45,240 before. When you get there, you're just 126 00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:48,520 like, Oh my gosh, it's just like I'm just some Rando St. 127 00:06:49,710 --> 00:06:51,030 Yeah, I I've never been to it either. 128 00:06:51,030 --> 00:06:54,990 So maybe someday. So we got that octane. 129 00:06:55,110 --> 00:06:57,430 We've also got the Authenticate conference that we're going to 130 00:06:57,430 --> 00:06:59,510 be at the week after that or a couple weeks after that. 131 00:06:59,510 --> 00:07:03,630 That is October 16th to the 18th Carlsbad, CA and just north of 132 00:07:03,630 --> 00:07:06,350 San Diego. We have a code for them as well. 133 00:07:06,390 --> 00:07:10,270 I D AC15 podcast, ID AC15 podcast. 134 00:07:10,270 --> 00:07:12,990 You get 15% off, which is very cool. 135 00:07:12,990 --> 00:07:15,710 We're actually going to be on the mainstage part of the kind 136 00:07:15,710 --> 00:07:17,630 of opening festivities and keynotes and. 137 00:07:18,230 --> 00:07:21,830 We're going to do a live show in front of a live studio audience 138 00:07:22,030 --> 00:07:25,910 and also broadcasted to the Internet at large for guests and 139 00:07:25,910 --> 00:07:27,550 conference people and stuff like that. 140 00:07:27,910 --> 00:07:29,670 I still have no idea what we're going to talk about. 141 00:07:29,670 --> 00:07:32,790 We got to figure that out. That's coming up, but that'll be 142 00:07:32,790 --> 00:07:35,110 exciting. Can't wait for that. 143 00:07:35,110 --> 00:07:38,470 I mean, we are the official podcast for the Authenticate 144 00:07:38,470 --> 00:07:42,390 conference and that that discount code of 15%, that's the 145 00:07:42,510 --> 00:07:45,430 best discount code available anywhere. 146 00:07:45,590 --> 00:07:49,330 So if you use that code, in addition to getting 15% off, you 147 00:07:49,330 --> 00:07:55,490 get registered in a raffle of some sort that the conference 148 00:07:55,490 --> 00:07:59,250 organizers are going to select one of the people and give them 149 00:07:59,250 --> 00:08:03,850 a welcome gift of some sort. I don't know what the gift is 150 00:08:03,850 --> 00:08:07,210 going to be, I don't know all the details, but use the darn 151 00:08:07,210 --> 00:08:09,610 code because it's the best one out there anyway. 152 00:08:10,050 --> 00:08:11,570 Yeah. And it supports us too, right? 153 00:08:11,570 --> 00:08:13,370 Shows that people actually listen to the stuff and it's 154 00:08:13,370 --> 00:08:16,380 worth our worth our time. And their time, right, to help 155 00:08:16,380 --> 00:08:18,980 support that. So yeah, looking forward to 156 00:08:18,980 --> 00:08:20,060 that. That's going to be a lot of fun. 157 00:08:20,620 --> 00:08:23,860 Anything else you want to bring up before we get to our main 158 00:08:23,860 --> 00:08:25,300 topic because we're going to talk a little about 159 00:08:25,300 --> 00:08:28,780 authorizations? Well, yeah, I do want to bring 160 00:08:28,780 --> 00:08:31,900 up one thing, just the thought that I have and usually I bring 161 00:08:31,900 --> 00:08:35,179 this up at the end, which is if folks can get out there, if they 162 00:08:35,179 --> 00:08:40,179 like the podcast, subscribe to it, leave us a 5 star review 163 00:08:40,179 --> 00:08:42,940 would be appreciated. Let people know because that's 164 00:08:42,940 --> 00:08:46,170 how people get to know about it. That's how when you go into the 165 00:08:46,170 --> 00:08:50,810 podcast search feature of your your podcast app, we show up 166 00:08:50,810 --> 00:08:55,650 first when someone types an identity and it's really, you 167 00:08:55,650 --> 00:08:58,970 know, that's nothing that Jeff and I can do to improve the that 168 00:08:58,970 --> 00:09:02,450 algorithm. It's really not yet, you know, I 169 00:09:02,450 --> 00:09:05,050 got figured out. Maybe I could use the Flipper 0 170 00:09:05,050 --> 00:09:09,490 somehow to to do that. Yeah, so far all you're able to 171 00:09:09,490 --> 00:09:12,170 do is copy your hotel keys, but that's still a nice little 172 00:09:12,170 --> 00:09:14,180 feature. Yeah, copied a hotel. 173 00:09:14,260 --> 00:09:20,020 I've copied hotel keys and also the the badge system for my 174 00:09:20,020 --> 00:09:24,260 inlaws housing complex. So definitely some things that 175 00:09:24,260 --> 00:09:28,340 could be done there, but if I saw you at Starbucks, I would 176 00:09:28,340 --> 00:09:32,260 not connect to the Wi-Fi. I did get the Wi-Fi dev board, 177 00:09:32,300 --> 00:09:34,020 so I have been playing around with that. 178 00:09:34,020 --> 00:09:36,180 There's a couple of, you know, interesting things you can do 179 00:09:36,180 --> 00:09:39,220 set up like an evil portal. You can do a Rickroll attack, 180 00:09:39,220 --> 00:09:42,060 which basically creates a whole bunch of fake access points that 181 00:09:42,060 --> 00:09:48,340 are Rickroll lyrics. So I'm definitely not a hacker 182 00:09:48,340 --> 00:09:51,380 in quotation works, but there's some neat things you can kind of 183 00:09:51,380 --> 00:09:55,300 do that are fun and explain to people just why they should be 184 00:09:55,300 --> 00:09:57,340 using things like MFA and things like that. 185 00:09:57,820 --> 00:10:00,660 I think you are a hacker. I mean, you might be very green 186 00:10:00,660 --> 00:10:03,100 in the hacker stack, but you're doing hacker things. 187 00:10:04,840 --> 00:10:06,440 Okay. Well, I don't want this to be 188 00:10:06,440 --> 00:10:07,880 evidence, so let's just keep going. 189 00:10:08,760 --> 00:10:11,600 Let's talk about authorization and kind of calling this 190 00:10:11,600 --> 00:10:14,560 authorization 2.0. I don't know if that will stick 191 00:10:14,560 --> 00:10:16,560 or not. But to help us with this 192 00:10:16,560 --> 00:10:18,440 conversation, we've got Rich. Dan Liker. 193 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:20,480 He's the chief strategist with Vasa. 194 00:10:20,800 --> 00:10:23,360 Welcome to the show, Rich. Thanks, Jeff. 195 00:10:24,200 --> 00:10:25,760 It's great to be here. How you doing, Jim? 196 00:10:26,120 --> 00:10:28,640 Great to have you here. First of all, I love the radio 197 00:10:28,640 --> 00:10:30,320 Pipes. You got a great voice for 198 00:10:30,320 --> 00:10:33,130 podcasts. I will try my best to keep up. 199 00:10:33,130 --> 00:10:34,370 I might, actually. I usually. 200 00:10:34,370 --> 00:10:36,650 I'm trying to like, bring people's voices up, make the 201 00:10:36,770 --> 00:10:39,330 sound, you know, sparkling, you know, right in the editing. 202 00:10:39,930 --> 00:10:42,810 I might have to, like, do the opposite for you, so that there 203 00:10:42,810 --> 00:10:45,330 isn't such a disparity between you, me and Jim. 204 00:10:45,370 --> 00:10:47,810 But. Well, usually people only tell 205 00:10:47,810 --> 00:10:50,250 me that I have a face for radio, but now now I also have the 206 00:10:50,250 --> 00:10:51,650 voice. Well, that's what we always say. 207 00:10:51,650 --> 00:10:54,970 We got faces for radio and voices for a silent movie, 208 00:10:54,970 --> 00:10:57,600 something like that. Well, thanks for joining us and 209 00:10:57,600 --> 00:10:59,000 spend some time with us here today. 210 00:10:59,560 --> 00:11:02,760 We like to hit to really learn about the identity journey that 211 00:11:02,760 --> 00:11:04,840 people have been on. And it's kind of tradition 212 00:11:04,840 --> 00:11:07,240 around here when we have someone on for the first time to 213 00:11:07,240 --> 00:11:09,400 understand what their identity origin story is. 214 00:11:09,400 --> 00:11:11,920 So maybe you just spend just a minute or two kind of talking 215 00:11:11,920 --> 00:11:15,080 about how did you get into the space of identity and access 216 00:11:15,080 --> 00:11:17,840 management or digital identity or whatever the heck we're 217 00:11:17,840 --> 00:11:22,900 calling this field today? Yeah, it actually started when I 218 00:11:22,900 --> 00:11:28,900 was at Octa and I actually back in 2014, I went and joined them 219 00:11:28,900 --> 00:11:31,420 and I led the product management team for about 4 1/2 years 220 00:11:31,420 --> 00:11:34,220 through the IPO period. And so, you know, I think 221 00:11:34,220 --> 00:11:38,460 Identity had definitely, you know, struck A chord with me and 222 00:11:38,460 --> 00:11:41,500 that was one of the things I would did a stint in data loss 223 00:11:41,500 --> 00:11:43,690 prevention. And really seeing how, you know, 224 00:11:43,690 --> 00:11:47,050 sort of network based security tools were just not the thing 225 00:11:47,050 --> 00:11:49,410 you really wanted to see. You wanted you needed to get 226 00:11:49,410 --> 00:11:51,010 down to the person and that was really hard. 227 00:11:51,010 --> 00:11:53,850 You had to go through proxy. You had to do all sorts of fancy 228 00:11:53,850 --> 00:11:57,130 dancing to get there And so that, you know Identity was 229 00:11:57,130 --> 00:11:59,130 definitely something that was like top of my list. 230 00:11:59,130 --> 00:12:00,850 And then Ochter really cemented that for me. 231 00:12:01,810 --> 00:12:04,730 And I think it was, it was a it's it's been a fantastic 232 00:12:04,730 --> 00:12:08,490 journey and you know my my early on in my career, I definitely 233 00:12:08,490 --> 00:12:10,770 said wow, this is a lot more complex than I thought it was 234 00:12:10,770 --> 00:12:13,000 when I started. It always is. 235 00:12:13,000 --> 00:12:15,400 I think the definition too, of kind of being an identity has 236 00:12:15,400 --> 00:12:16,800 changed. A lot of people find themselves, 237 00:12:17,200 --> 00:12:20,040 they just were in it all of a sudden, they didn't like, pick 238 00:12:20,040 --> 00:12:21,960 it. It was just, oh, I I guess I'm 239 00:12:21,960 --> 00:12:26,000 in identity now and now you're a chief strategist for an identity 240 00:12:26,000 --> 00:12:29,440 company. So I love titles because some of 241 00:12:29,440 --> 00:12:30,920 them are very cool. Some of them like okay. 242 00:12:30,920 --> 00:12:32,040 What the heck does that even mean? 243 00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:36,040 What does a chief strategist for an identity company like Visa 244 00:12:36,040 --> 00:12:38,430 do? That's a great question because 245 00:12:38,430 --> 00:12:41,470 I definitely find it a strategy means lots of different things 246 00:12:41,470 --> 00:12:43,910 at lots of different places. It could mean a whole lot and it 247 00:12:43,910 --> 00:12:47,910 can mean a whole lot of nothing. But for us at Vasa, I tend to 248 00:12:47,910 --> 00:12:50,870 split my time between a number of different pillars. 249 00:12:51,150 --> 00:12:53,950 First is really around sort of high level product marketing and 250 00:12:53,950 --> 00:12:57,230 messaging. So I think a lot about how we 251 00:12:57,310 --> 00:13:00,190 position the solution that we provide, how we talk about our 252 00:13:00,190 --> 00:13:02,270 customers, how we talk about the space that we're in. 253 00:13:02,630 --> 00:13:05,350 So that bleeds into a lot of analyst relations and speaking 254 00:13:05,350 --> 00:13:09,030 to the folks like Gartner and speaking to Enrique as well as 255 00:13:09,030 --> 00:13:11,390 sort of looking at the market as a whole and you know, so we're 256 00:13:11,390 --> 00:13:14,150 kind of getting into a competitive analysis as well. 257 00:13:14,310 --> 00:13:17,150 So that bleeds into the second pillar which is helping out our 258 00:13:17,150 --> 00:13:18,910 sales team. So you know, really being sort 259 00:13:18,910 --> 00:13:23,030 of more out on the front lines, helping to, you know, to guide 260 00:13:23,350 --> 00:13:26,310 the folks that are actually talking directly to prospects 261 00:13:26,550 --> 00:13:29,470 about sort of how to talk about things, how to, how to position 262 00:13:29,470 --> 00:13:32,270 things, what people care about and and what identity folks. 263 00:13:32,630 --> 00:13:36,750 Really wanna you know what's top of their list And then the third 264 00:13:36,750 --> 00:13:39,030 is on product strategies. So actually building new 265 00:13:39,030 --> 00:13:42,550 product, working on some of the advanced things that we wanna 266 00:13:42,550 --> 00:13:45,750 get done that are critical for sort of that long term 267 00:13:46,550 --> 00:13:49,870 positioning in the market and sort of really helping take us 268 00:13:49,870 --> 00:13:51,630 where we wanna go in the long term. 269 00:13:52,470 --> 00:13:55,790 So Speaking of products, you've got this company called Vasa 270 00:13:55,910 --> 00:13:59,100 VEZA. I'm sure you get confused with 271 00:13:59,100 --> 00:14:00,300 Visa. A lot people saying it. 272 00:14:00,300 --> 00:14:01,540 So let's get the word out there, right? 273 00:14:01,900 --> 00:14:05,540 It's pronounced Vasa. For those people who are not 274 00:14:05,540 --> 00:14:08,940 familiar with what Vasa does, what's the elevator? 275 00:14:08,940 --> 00:14:12,060 Pitch 30, let's say 62nd elevator ride up. 276 00:14:12,620 --> 00:14:16,060 What do you guys do? Yeah, I think the way I like to 277 00:14:16,060 --> 00:14:17,940 talk about it is really that we help. 278 00:14:18,720 --> 00:14:20,640 The company's operationalized least privilege. 279 00:14:20,840 --> 00:14:25,240 So we do that by really putting together a graph around 280 00:14:25,240 --> 00:14:28,880 authorization that shows you not just what you have across all 281 00:14:28,880 --> 00:14:31,960 your different systems, but where it's wrong, where you need 282 00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:35,400 to fix it right. So we have a core technology 283 00:14:35,400 --> 00:14:37,800 which is our authorization metadata graph, where we really 284 00:14:37,800 --> 00:14:41,040 put together all the different pieces of information about 285 00:14:41,040 --> 00:14:44,400 authorization from users to groups to roles, all the way 286 00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:48,240 down to specific resources that might be in a particular system. 287 00:14:48,660 --> 00:14:51,260 And the permissions down to you know can you read, can you 288 00:14:51,260 --> 00:14:54,180 write, can you head it, can you delete and putting that together 289 00:14:54,340 --> 00:14:57,180 and I think I think that combination makes a really a 290 00:14:57,180 --> 00:15:00,860 really powerful solution to both see what you've got as I said 291 00:15:00,860 --> 00:15:03,260 fix it and also get to compliance, right. 292 00:15:03,260 --> 00:15:05,740 And that's a that's a frequent driver for a lot of customers 293 00:15:06,020 --> 00:15:08,900 and we have a, you know we're we came out of stealth last year. 294 00:15:08,900 --> 00:15:11,820 We've got a number of big customers like Wynn Resorts, 295 00:15:11,820 --> 00:15:16,420 AMD, Intuit, Blackstone. Amex Global business Travel and 296 00:15:16,420 --> 00:15:19,380 Zoom. So it's something that's really, 297 00:15:19,380 --> 00:15:22,660 I think resonated in the market because it's so hard just to see 298 00:15:22,860 --> 00:15:26,300 what you've got and that's often where customers start with us. 299 00:15:27,060 --> 00:15:28,940 Yeah, I think a lot of people think identity, they think 300 00:15:28,940 --> 00:15:30,900 authentication, it's the next step. 301 00:15:30,900 --> 00:15:32,420 After that, it's really where you're going. 302 00:15:32,420 --> 00:15:36,580 It's the authorization side. So where does the name Vasa come 303 00:15:36,580 --> 00:15:39,030 from? Yeah, well, actually it's an 304 00:15:39,070 --> 00:15:42,230 interesting, interesting story. When I first joined the company, 305 00:15:42,390 --> 00:15:45,190 we had a different name. We were called Cookie dot A I, 306 00:15:45,910 --> 00:15:47,750 and this is even before Chachi BT. 307 00:15:47,750 --> 00:15:51,710 So it was prescient in one way about, you know, having the A I, 308 00:15:52,590 --> 00:15:56,470 the, the the the dot A I there. But you know, obviously Cookie 309 00:15:56,470 --> 00:15:58,670 dot A I has a lot of, has a lot of baggage. 310 00:15:58,670 --> 00:16:00,590 So that was one where I was like, yeah, I don't know if 311 00:16:00,590 --> 00:16:02,310 that's going to really fly long term. 312 00:16:02,890 --> 00:16:07,690 And so I actually helped drive that the new naming and Vasa 313 00:16:07,970 --> 00:16:11,690 comes from the Zulu word meaning to reveal. 314 00:16:11,930 --> 00:16:13,290 So I was like wow that's pretty cool. 315 00:16:13,290 --> 00:16:16,170 If I had to pick a language that I, I based the name on Zulu's 316 00:16:16,170 --> 00:16:19,410 probably Yep that's about the the peak of it and it has like a 317 00:16:19,490 --> 00:16:22,970 it has a good meaning you we could we could get the.com 318 00:16:23,170 --> 00:16:27,570 domain for not an outrageous amount of money and the ticker 319 00:16:27,570 --> 00:16:29,170 symbol was available. You know, you always got to be 320 00:16:29,170 --> 00:16:33,740 thinking ahead. Hey, rich, authorizations really 321 00:16:33,740 --> 00:16:35,860 seem to have blown up in the past year or so. 322 00:16:35,860 --> 00:16:40,380 And if someone asked me, you know, what's hot in identity 323 00:16:40,380 --> 00:16:44,860 right now, I run down a list of, you know, converged identity, 324 00:16:44,860 --> 00:16:50,740 which I don't think is that exciting decentralized Kim, ITDR 325 00:16:50,740 --> 00:16:55,560 Pastor list and authorization. And it's like that whole list I 326 00:16:55,560 --> 00:16:57,200 went through until I got the authorization. 327 00:16:57,200 --> 00:16:59,680 Those are all new things, right? They're all things that have 328 00:16:59,680 --> 00:17:03,560 kind of happened in the past several years, but 329 00:17:03,560 --> 00:17:07,960 authorization's been around for pretty much the beginning of 330 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:11,160 identity. And so I'm wondering, what do 331 00:17:11,160 --> 00:17:15,839 you attribute this blowing up of authorization, as I put it? 332 00:17:16,040 --> 00:17:20,270 What do you attribute that to? I really think it's a 333 00:17:20,270 --> 00:17:24,270 consequence of most organizations really pushing 334 00:17:24,270 --> 00:17:29,150 forward with authentication and props to Octa, props to 335 00:17:29,190 --> 00:17:34,470 Microsoft really for driving forward the world of SSO with 336 00:17:34,470 --> 00:17:39,070 SAML and OIDC and getting MFA implemented and driving forward 337 00:17:39,070 --> 00:17:42,350 on password lists. So most companies that I talked 338 00:17:42,350 --> 00:17:44,750 to have really you know how they've kind of gone through 339 00:17:44,750 --> 00:17:47,950 that and they've said Yep, we've done, you know we've done the 340 00:17:47,950 --> 00:17:51,710 lion's share what we need to do around authentication and wow 341 00:17:51,830 --> 00:17:53,870 things aren't fixed yet. We still, we still have all 342 00:17:53,870 --> 00:17:56,350 these issues. We're still getting either we 343 00:17:56,350 --> 00:17:59,030 have security tax, we still don't really have a handle on 344 00:17:59,030 --> 00:18:00,510 identity. It's not just a, it's not a 345 00:18:00,510 --> 00:18:03,190 solved problem yet. And so it's just as you said, 346 00:18:03,190 --> 00:18:05,910 it's a very natural thing when you after you've you've gone and 347 00:18:05,910 --> 00:18:08,830 tackled authentication, authorization is the next step. 348 00:18:09,080 --> 00:18:10,920 Right. And so I think that that natural 349 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:12,960 sort of like you know what do we do next. 350 00:18:12,960 --> 00:18:16,360 We know there's something here. We know how core identity is to 351 00:18:16,360 --> 00:18:18,440 all these different things to the you know to the IT stack to 352 00:18:18,440 --> 00:18:21,520 the security stack and yet you know it's it's not we. 353 00:18:21,600 --> 00:18:25,000 We know we're not done. Now Rich, when we talk about 354 00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:28,520 frameworks for authentication some of the the ones that our 355 00:18:28,520 --> 00:18:33,960 listeners may be familiar with our our back a back P back, some 356 00:18:33,960 --> 00:18:36,720 some of those people might not be familiar with. 357 00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:40,620 Could you help us define each one of those and helps which 358 00:18:40,620 --> 00:18:45,340 one's the best one? What a loaded question. 359 00:18:45,340 --> 00:18:48,740 That's awesome. So yeah, RBAC is a role based 360 00:18:48,740 --> 00:18:51,260 assets control. So this is, this is probably 361 00:18:51,260 --> 00:18:53,060 what I see as the most commonly used one. 362 00:18:53,060 --> 00:18:55,460 And you'll be, you know, you'll be used to this in an enterprise 363 00:18:55,460 --> 00:18:58,060 scenario where you'll have some sort of description. 364 00:18:58,060 --> 00:19:01,700 You know, I might be like a, you know, W marketing or you know, 365 00:19:01,700 --> 00:19:05,860 I'm a super admin and that sort of gives you based on a role. 366 00:19:06,340 --> 00:19:09,220 There's some, ideally there's some commonality across an 367 00:19:09,220 --> 00:19:12,100 organization that collects up a bunch of different permissions 368 00:19:12,100 --> 00:19:14,900 that's organized in sort of your function at the organization 369 00:19:14,900 --> 00:19:16,860 into a role that's the ideal state. 370 00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:20,500 Then you have things like a back, which attribute based 371 00:19:21,340 --> 00:19:24,300 access control and that's where you're not doing it necessarily 372 00:19:24,300 --> 00:19:27,900 in a role, but typically more dynamically like you can think 373 00:19:27,900 --> 00:19:29,700 of. I think the best analogy is. 374 00:19:30,100 --> 00:19:33,220 You're used to this around sort of, you know, attribute based 375 00:19:33,220 --> 00:19:36,300 authentication, right? It might be geolocation based 376 00:19:36,300 --> 00:19:39,100 right, where you actually you're pulling in some attributes, 377 00:19:39,420 --> 00:19:42,580 oftentimes dynamically and making a decision about, all 378 00:19:42,580 --> 00:19:45,580 right, is this person actually allowed to get to certain 379 00:19:45,580 --> 00:19:47,900 resources and take certain actions and certain resources 380 00:19:48,100 --> 00:19:49,940 based on the value of those attributes? 381 00:19:49,940 --> 00:19:53,420 So there's it's typically done more at runtime and more 382 00:19:53,420 --> 00:19:55,880 dynamically. And then policy based access 383 00:19:55,880 --> 00:19:58,640 control where you're it's a it's a pretty similar kind of thing 384 00:19:58,640 --> 00:20:02,160 and a lot of similarities to a back, but it tends to be a bit 385 00:20:02,160 --> 00:20:07,040 more around design so that you can actually make broad policy 386 00:20:07,040 --> 00:20:09,840 based changes across the organization without having to 387 00:20:09,840 --> 00:20:12,120 go through and rejigger all your roles, right. 388 00:20:12,120 --> 00:20:16,440 So it's sort of more, you know, a goal and A and a target 389 00:20:16,440 --> 00:20:17,720 design. From. 390 00:20:17,720 --> 00:20:22,680 From what I've seen RBAC is the most commonly used one and you 391 00:20:22,680 --> 00:20:24,460 know. And I know we, we talked about 392 00:20:24,460 --> 00:20:28,020 this, it's like for for being, for me being in in in the 393 00:20:28,020 --> 00:20:31,020 authorization space. I'm amazingly not opinionated 394 00:20:31,020 --> 00:20:33,260 about which one is best. So that's a tough question for 395 00:20:33,260 --> 00:20:35,980 me. But I know that my my favorite 396 00:20:35,980 --> 00:20:38,940 one was like that's I was listening to one of this one of 397 00:20:38,940 --> 00:20:41,420 the C shows I was talking to. He says our back, yeah really 398 00:20:41,420 --> 00:20:45,380 bad access control. And I think I have a strong 399 00:20:45,380 --> 00:20:48,660 resonance with that because even though that's the most commonly 400 00:20:48,660 --> 00:20:51,300 used one that's you know that's the one I see most often. 401 00:20:51,340 --> 00:20:53,860 It's just has so many gaps and so many holes. 402 00:20:54,300 --> 00:20:56,540 Can you have least privilege without RBAC? 403 00:20:58,620 --> 00:21:01,020 You know least privilege is obviously it's a you know it's a 404 00:21:01,020 --> 00:21:04,660 big slope. And I think really that the 405 00:21:04,660 --> 00:21:07,620 trick is like you know, and this and this is also, you know, I'm 406 00:21:07,620 --> 00:21:09,020 don't want to, don't want to pitch. 407 00:21:09,020 --> 00:21:11,660 But you know it's like everybody agrees least privilege is 408 00:21:11,660 --> 00:21:15,100 something you need to get to. But getting it in practice and 409 00:21:15,100 --> 00:21:16,980 and you know, how do you actually get an operational 410 00:21:16,980 --> 00:21:19,420 program. You know we've we've all gone 411 00:21:19,420 --> 00:21:21,460 through those compliance surveys and said, hey do you follow 412 00:21:21,460 --> 00:21:23,700 least privilegedly? Yes we do. 413 00:21:24,220 --> 00:21:26,300 But what does that mean? Like you know and how do you 414 00:21:26,300 --> 00:21:29,460 know and where is it off and how can you get better. 415 00:21:29,740 --> 00:21:31,900 Those are the, you know, when the rubber meets the road. 416 00:21:31,900 --> 00:21:34,340 I think those are the most important questions. 417 00:21:34,340 --> 00:21:38,420 So I I see it as less of a, you know, are you using RBAC or A 418 00:21:38,420 --> 00:21:41,580 back or P back? It's more around do you have the 419 00:21:41,580 --> 00:21:45,540 tools and the processes and the people to actually get to least 420 00:21:45,540 --> 00:21:47,100 privilege? Least privilege is the goal, no 421 00:21:47,100 --> 00:21:49,380 matter which of these frameworks you're trying to do. 422 00:21:50,180 --> 00:21:53,020 Jeff Rich refuses to answer my question. 423 00:21:56,300 --> 00:21:53,980 It's baby back. What's the best back? 424 00:21:54,180 --> 00:21:59,300 What is the best? I mean, without question. 425 00:22:00,680 --> 00:22:05,240 Got back and that is the winner folks. 426 00:22:06,320 --> 00:22:08,920 OK. So Rich, it seems like that in 427 00:22:08,920 --> 00:22:13,920 the past at least in my experience authorization was an 428 00:22:13,920 --> 00:22:20,200 area focused on for CIM customer I M and less so for enterprise. 429 00:22:20,520 --> 00:22:24,920 But it seems like this blowing up that I refer to is really a 430 00:22:24,920 --> 00:22:29,520 reversal of that trend and it's becoming more of a shift toward. 431 00:22:30,030 --> 00:22:35,950 Enterprises doing more advanced authorization projects or taking 432 00:22:35,950 --> 00:22:39,110 that authorization focus, is that right? 433 00:22:39,110 --> 00:22:42,270 Do you agree with that? Yep, I do. 434 00:22:42,310 --> 00:22:44,790 And I think I think traditionally authorization has 435 00:22:44,790 --> 00:22:48,950 been sort of front and center of a of a CI AM project because 436 00:22:48,950 --> 00:22:51,310 when you're building a custom application which is typically 437 00:22:51,310 --> 00:22:54,630 with those things, what's involved there, you you can't 438 00:22:54,630 --> 00:22:56,510 not build authorization in, right. 439 00:22:56,510 --> 00:22:59,690 You've got to have something and so you you have to build some 440 00:22:59,690 --> 00:23:01,330 sort of structure or some sort of componentry. 441 00:23:01,770 --> 00:23:06,930 I think to be fair I'd say that you know the the the CIAM types 442 00:23:06,930 --> 00:23:09,370 of projects haven't gone away and actually we're seeing a 443 00:23:09,370 --> 00:23:14,770 really strong push here, not so much in terms of sort of the 444 00:23:14,770 --> 00:23:17,570 bulk users that are going into an application. 445 00:23:17,610 --> 00:23:20,010 For instance, if you're, you know, if you're a customer, a 446 00:23:20,010 --> 00:23:23,490 consumer facing company and have a CIM application, you've 447 00:23:23,490 --> 00:23:27,170 generally done a pretty good job of separating and isolating 448 00:23:27,370 --> 00:23:30,250 customer one from customer two. Like I if I'm going into 449 00:23:30,250 --> 00:23:33,610 Expedia, I can't get to Jeff's travel profile and access Jeff's 450 00:23:33,610 --> 00:23:36,090 credit cards and then for the most part that's a well 451 00:23:36,090 --> 00:23:39,770 understood problem. The trick and I think the sort 452 00:23:39,770 --> 00:23:43,930 of the frontier for that on the CIAM side is really things like 453 00:23:44,310 --> 00:23:48,190 help desk people, right? If you have or you have admins 454 00:23:48,190 --> 00:23:52,590 or DevOps people who are logging in and sort of getting access to 455 00:23:52,590 --> 00:23:58,070 customer data, getting privileged permissions into some 456 00:23:58,070 --> 00:24:00,190 of these things, potentially cutting across multiple 457 00:24:00,190 --> 00:24:03,470 customers, doing some sort of operational management. 458 00:24:03,510 --> 00:24:07,790 And of that, I think I find a lot of customers are really 459 00:24:08,240 --> 00:24:09,640 weren't they weren't thinking about that. 460 00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:12,080 That's not sort of the primary use case of authorization in 461 00:24:12,080 --> 00:24:15,040 that custom app. And so it's they often have very 462 00:24:15,040 --> 00:24:17,360 little visibility, especially when you get to the security 463 00:24:17,360 --> 00:24:19,280 team, you've got the developers, you're kind of, you know, 464 00:24:19,320 --> 00:24:21,600 there's one guy who knows exactly how it all works. 465 00:24:21,800 --> 00:24:23,960 But then when you go to the security team, they don't have 466 00:24:23,960 --> 00:24:25,920 visibility, they don't have logins, they don't know how it 467 00:24:25,920 --> 00:24:30,290 works and that that's a real, real gap there in the CIM side. 468 00:24:30,290 --> 00:24:34,250 But to your, to your point, I think it's now also hitting on 469 00:24:34,250 --> 00:24:36,050 this sort of the enterprise application side. 470 00:24:36,450 --> 00:24:39,210 And I think there's a lot of crossover because some of the 471 00:24:39,210 --> 00:24:42,450 data storage systems like going to the cloud platforms of AWS 472 00:24:42,530 --> 00:24:46,530 and Azure and Google Cloud, those are now sort of crossing 473 00:24:46,530 --> 00:24:49,210 over where they're being used for enterprise data. 474 00:24:49,210 --> 00:24:52,520 They're also being used for customer data and so you know 475 00:24:52,520 --> 00:24:55,520 you, you really see a lot of commonality in leveraging 476 00:24:55,520 --> 00:24:59,400 similar platforms across the the internal enterprise, traditional 477 00:25:00,080 --> 00:25:02,640 internal enterprise applications and consumer applications and 478 00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:05,960 customer applications. So when I talk about 479 00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:09,440 authorization with people, I my mind shifts back to the 480 00:25:09,440 --> 00:25:12,880 framework around the insaccharable standard and you 481 00:25:12,880 --> 00:25:16,840 know, Policy Decision Point, Policy Enforcement Point, and 482 00:25:16,840 --> 00:25:21,280 again like my reference point is a lot on customer I am. 483 00:25:21,610 --> 00:25:25,170 And I've always thought like, OK, externalizing and 484 00:25:25,170 --> 00:25:29,890 centralizing the policy decision point is pretty drastic. 485 00:25:30,170 --> 00:25:34,250 You know, if you've got a couple of, you know, business portals 486 00:25:34,250 --> 00:25:39,490 for transacting, whether it's placing orders or warranty, it 487 00:25:39,490 --> 00:25:42,210 depends on what business you happen to be in. 488 00:25:42,570 --> 00:25:45,610 But a lot of times those applications were built 489 00:25:45,890 --> 00:25:46,890 individually. They're right. 490 00:25:46,890 --> 00:25:50,250 They're not just one big portal that does it all. 491 00:25:50,670 --> 00:25:54,830 And to centralize all that, I always thought to myself like 492 00:25:55,150 --> 00:25:59,350 okay, that probably makes sense for like the FBI or something 493 00:25:59,350 --> 00:26:02,990 like that where they want to have a centralized log of those 494 00:26:02,990 --> 00:26:05,710 policy decisions. So to me, the policy decision 495 00:26:05,710 --> 00:26:11,750 point was always like the the big most important component of 496 00:26:11,750 --> 00:26:14,830 that framework. The way of thinking about 497 00:26:15,110 --> 00:26:18,910 Zackamal and I'm wondering like does that. 498 00:26:19,500 --> 00:26:23,780 Framework still hold value. Do you still use that framework 499 00:26:23,780 --> 00:26:31,780 and that type of those terms, Policy Decision point, Policy 500 00:26:31,780 --> 00:26:33,380 Enforcement point, things like that? 501 00:26:33,820 --> 00:26:38,460 And you know, is the policy decision point still the most 502 00:26:38,460 --> 00:26:42,420 important concept of that standard or is this something 503 00:26:42,420 --> 00:26:45,380 else now? Yeah, that's a great, a great 504 00:26:45,380 --> 00:26:46,220 question. I think. 505 00:26:46,220 --> 00:26:50,330 I think those especially those concepts are very valid today as 506 00:26:50,330 --> 00:26:53,010 valid as they as they were when the, you know when the standards 507 00:26:53,010 --> 00:26:55,650 were being developed there. And I I think that that sort of 508 00:26:55,650 --> 00:26:59,210 methodology and that that conceptual division makes a ton 509 00:26:59,210 --> 00:27:02,770 of sense. And I find that you know it's a, 510 00:27:02,770 --> 00:27:05,930 it's a still a small fraction of folks we we tend to not talk 511 00:27:05,930 --> 00:27:10,320 about those things as explicitly in today like in our in our 512 00:27:10,320 --> 00:27:12,000 marketing and documentation materials. 513 00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:14,680 But I definitely run across plenty of customers who still 514 00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:16,760 talk about it and say hey you know give me know tell me how 515 00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:19,640 this fits into that world. And so I think it's they're 516 00:27:19,640 --> 00:27:21,920 definitely folks out there who still think about it this way 517 00:27:21,920 --> 00:27:25,040 and I think if you explain it to them it, it makes a ton of 518 00:27:25,040 --> 00:27:27,080 sense. Here's one where I actually am 519 00:27:27,080 --> 00:27:30,240 opinionated and this is 1 where I'm actually, I'll put in my 520 00:27:30,240 --> 00:27:34,040 vote for my favorite, my favorite component is the, the 521 00:27:34,040 --> 00:27:37,850 policy administration point. And that's one where I think the 522 00:27:37,850 --> 00:27:41,170 issue with the with sort of centralizing as you pointed out 523 00:27:41,170 --> 00:27:46,050 with the decision point, you know it's it's really, you know 524 00:27:46,330 --> 00:27:49,410 you have there's a performance issue you you're generally 525 00:27:49,410 --> 00:27:52,650 you're looking at that with the with the enforcement point 526 00:27:52,650 --> 00:27:55,250 potentially and putting those things together I think tends to 527 00:27:55,250 --> 00:27:57,450 make a lot of sense. But trying to reroute the 528 00:27:57,450 --> 00:28:00,850 network and trying to you know channel everything to A to a 529 00:28:00,850 --> 00:28:04,510 single choke point, that's not how, that's not how the modern 530 00:28:04,510 --> 00:28:07,230 cloud architecture and modern day, modern day systems are 531 00:28:07,230 --> 00:28:09,150 working. And as you said like once you've 532 00:28:09,150 --> 00:28:12,470 got it up and running no one wants to rearchitect that stuff. 533 00:28:12,470 --> 00:28:16,110 No one wants to put a new a new component in the middle of 534 00:28:16,110 --> 00:28:19,190 something especially when you're talking about sort of customers 535 00:28:19,190 --> 00:28:22,230 and you know and production data or actually getting transactions 536 00:28:22,230 --> 00:28:24,390 done. It's a really hard pill for 537 00:28:24,390 --> 00:28:26,390 folks to swallow. So I think you know. 538 00:28:26,470 --> 00:28:28,470 Multiple applications that could be. 539 00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:32,480 Posted around the world you can have scalability, reliability, 540 00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:35,240 network type issues. That's right. 541 00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:36,640 That's right there. Just there's so many other 542 00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:39,880 things that sort of drive that. And you know and you know I can 543 00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:42,520 imagine like an enterprise architect trying to go say hey 544 00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:44,800 we want to centralize all this to a single point and get thrown 545 00:28:44,800 --> 00:28:46,640 out of the room because it's just like it. 546 00:28:46,640 --> 00:28:49,320 There's so many other factors in there that that drive it. 547 00:28:49,320 --> 00:28:52,040 And so I think my personal take is attacking it at the 548 00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:54,320 administration point is the is the right way to go. 549 00:28:55,960 --> 00:28:57,600 We've been talking a lot about, I guess. 550 00:28:58,020 --> 00:29:00,380 Theory, for lack of a better word, right. 551 00:29:00,580 --> 00:29:02,820 How things should work. I always like to hear like 552 00:29:02,820 --> 00:29:05,340 what's the real world doing in this space? 553 00:29:05,780 --> 00:29:07,620 You mentioned some of the clients that you've worked with 554 00:29:07,620 --> 00:29:09,220 in the past and some customers you've got. 555 00:29:10,140 --> 00:29:13,860 What are some of the use cases you know that you've seen where 556 00:29:13,860 --> 00:29:17,060 an authorization tool has helped solve some of these real world 557 00:29:17,060 --> 00:29:20,700 problems that we're seeing out? Because, you know, I think 558 00:29:20,700 --> 00:29:22,900 everyone points back and say, oh we're we're a role based access 559 00:29:22,900 --> 00:29:24,700 control company. Okay, Are you really? 560 00:29:25,590 --> 00:29:27,550 And how good is it? It usually sucks and it's a 561 00:29:27,550 --> 00:29:29,630 pain, pain in the butt to maintain and you know they kind 562 00:29:29,630 --> 00:29:32,510 of gave up maybe after. Oh yeah, we have 5 rules, right? 563 00:29:32,510 --> 00:29:35,390 Something like that. And I feel like it's it's a 564 00:29:35,390 --> 00:29:37,950 struggle for a lot of organizations out there. 565 00:29:38,030 --> 00:29:41,190 They every every company that I talked to says that they are or 566 00:29:41,190 --> 00:29:45,110 they want to be role based and it's hard in the real world, 567 00:29:45,150 --> 00:29:47,710 especially when you have these applications that are using 568 00:29:47,710 --> 00:29:50,510 their own authorization schemes and they have not moved to. 569 00:29:51,050 --> 00:29:54,290 You know a centralized policy, decision point or access point 570 00:29:54,290 --> 00:29:58,690 or engine or whatever it may be. What are you seeing in the real 571 00:29:58,690 --> 00:30:01,530 world around this space? How are you know these? 572 00:30:01,770 --> 00:30:03,090 How are these things moving forward? 573 00:30:04,250 --> 00:30:07,250 Yeah, I I find that you know one of the big issues and I 574 00:30:07,250 --> 00:30:10,330 mentioned this before about you know the the really bad access 575 00:30:10,330 --> 00:30:13,290 control crack. But that one of the one of the 576 00:30:13,290 --> 00:30:15,730 challenges is you know you can you can do it at a point in 577 00:30:15,730 --> 00:30:18,300 time. And typically I what I hear is 578 00:30:18,300 --> 00:30:21,500 like you know hire a systems integrator like Accenture to 579 00:30:21,500 --> 00:30:25,900 come in and get you know and get like a whole raft of you know 580 00:30:26,260 --> 00:30:30,380 warm warm bodies from from the consulting or to go and have 581 00:30:30,380 --> 00:30:33,220 tons of interviews with every organization across you know 582 00:30:33,380 --> 00:30:35,860 across the company. And that's a tremendous amount 583 00:30:35,860 --> 00:30:38,100 of work and they. Better yet, hire our son to do 584 00:30:38,100 --> 00:30:40,020 it. There you go. 585 00:30:40,180 --> 00:30:42,780 There you go. But then you get drift over 586 00:30:42,780 --> 00:30:44,700 time. And then you get, you know, you 587 00:30:44,700 --> 00:30:47,820 get people you know and say, well, you know, maybe I'll use 588 00:30:47,820 --> 00:30:50,020 this role for something it wasn't quite intended for, but 589 00:30:50,020 --> 00:30:53,060 it sounds about right. Or things get tacked onto the 590 00:30:53,060 --> 00:30:56,100 role and so the permissions change and actually what's in 591 00:30:56,100 --> 00:30:59,580 that role changes the use and the and the and what it's what's 592 00:30:59,580 --> 00:31:02,700 being applied for changes. And you know, essentially, you 593 00:31:02,700 --> 00:31:05,140 know, then then you're going or you, you know, you get someone 594 00:31:05,140 --> 00:31:07,940 who says, you know, oh, I need this new role for this new 595 00:31:07,940 --> 00:31:10,940 purpose. And this sounds about right, but 596 00:31:11,210 --> 00:31:12,730 man, I don't really know what that role does. 597 00:31:12,730 --> 00:31:15,610 Let me create a new role. And so then you get this 598 00:31:15,610 --> 00:31:18,730 proliferation. And So what I find is that most 599 00:31:18,730 --> 00:31:21,250 organizations, even when they want to be a role based access 600 00:31:21,250 --> 00:31:24,890 control company, they're trying to manage it just on the name of 601 00:31:24,890 --> 00:31:27,170 the role. Like when you're trying to say, 602 00:31:27,170 --> 00:31:29,770 hey, is this right? It's like the role is named 603 00:31:29,970 --> 00:31:34,330 super secret admin #2 okay. Like what does that mean? 604 00:31:34,410 --> 00:31:37,660 And people have no idea. And so the thing that surprises 605 00:31:37,660 --> 00:31:41,300 me I think around all this and the real world customer examples 606 00:31:41,300 --> 00:31:44,300 that I see is that oftentimes the things that customers are 607 00:31:44,300 --> 00:31:47,220 struggling with is so much simpler than you would ever 608 00:31:47,220 --> 00:31:48,980 imagine. And you know, so one example we 609 00:31:48,980 --> 00:31:53,820 have a, you know a very large Fortune 500 company and they 610 00:31:53,820 --> 00:31:56,380 actually went through this and that, you know they came to us 611 00:31:56,380 --> 00:31:59,940 and said hey you know can you tell tell us when a new admin is 612 00:31:59,940 --> 00:32:03,710 created in Salesforce, We're like yes, we can chew that. 613 00:32:03,750 --> 00:32:08,030 And what it turned out to be is that they had an IGA, a very 614 00:32:08,030 --> 00:32:11,830 large IGA company that you would the name you would know as a 615 00:32:11,830 --> 00:32:14,550 leader in the IGA space and they were using that to provision 616 00:32:14,870 --> 00:32:18,110 Salesforce. And yet they found that when 617 00:32:18,110 --> 00:32:20,190 someone went around that provisioning process, the 618 00:32:20,190 --> 00:32:22,270 approved process and went directly into the Salesforce 619 00:32:22,270 --> 00:32:26,110 console or create a new admin in there, their IGA solution 620 00:32:26,110 --> 00:32:29,220 couldn't tell them And they would go around this and they 621 00:32:29,260 --> 00:32:31,500 tried to actually custom code some solutions to do it. 622 00:32:31,500 --> 00:32:33,620 And there were just so many different ways to do it. 623 00:32:33,980 --> 00:32:35,900 They couldn't find that. They could plug all the holes. 624 00:32:35,900 --> 00:32:40,660 And what it turned out was that they had failed two socks on it 625 00:32:41,300 --> 00:32:44,820 because of that, right. And so it sounds so simple and 626 00:32:44,860 --> 00:32:47,460 you take someone outside of identity or peripheral identity 627 00:32:47,460 --> 00:32:51,060 and say you know, do you know, how can you not know when a new 628 00:32:51,060 --> 00:32:53,980 admin is created in Salesforce? Like how is that possible and 629 00:32:53,980 --> 00:32:57,500 yet that's the thing that these very large, very sophisticated 630 00:32:57,500 --> 00:33:01,260 companies are struggling with. And so you know, so that's what 631 00:33:01,260 --> 00:33:03,740 we hear, see is sometimes it's a compliance driver. 632 00:33:03,740 --> 00:33:06,300 It's like when, you know, when your auditor gets the the taste 633 00:33:06,300 --> 00:33:09,180 of that and they know that you don't have controls, you can't 634 00:33:09,180 --> 00:33:12,820 demonstrate controls like that is a big deal and they will, 635 00:33:12,820 --> 00:33:15,060 they will drive that and companies are very, very 636 00:33:15,060 --> 00:33:18,390 motivated to fix that. Other times it's just a 637 00:33:18,390 --> 00:33:21,550 visibility thing. And I know there was a former 638 00:33:21,710 --> 00:33:25,230 SISO of a very large telco that was telling me a story about 639 00:33:25,230 --> 00:33:29,990 sort of when he came to believe in, in authorization as sort of 640 00:33:30,030 --> 00:33:32,670 a really key thing. It was actually after an 641 00:33:32,670 --> 00:33:34,390 incident. And so they had, They'd had an 642 00:33:34,390 --> 00:33:36,350 intruder come in. They'd had an account takeover. 643 00:33:36,880 --> 00:33:40,400 And they ended up being able to block that and and locked out 644 00:33:40,400 --> 00:33:43,000 that account before they they lost a lot of data. 645 00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:46,720 But he was doing a postmortem with all of his direct reports. 646 00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:48,040 And so he had them. We were all in a room. 647 00:33:48,040 --> 00:33:50,280 And he says, all right, here's the first account that got taken 648 00:33:50,280 --> 00:33:51,680 over. What did that have? 649 00:33:51,760 --> 00:33:53,360 What did this account have access to? 650 00:33:53,720 --> 00:33:56,400 And they all look at each other and they say, we don't know. 651 00:33:56,600 --> 00:33:58,400 He's like, okay, here's the second account. 652 00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:00,200 How about this one? We don't know. 653 00:34:00,440 --> 00:34:04,440 He's like, how is this possible? How can we not do this thing 654 00:34:04,910 --> 00:34:07,510 that's so fundamental to security and being able to 655 00:34:07,510 --> 00:34:09,469 respond to these types of incidents. 656 00:34:09,469 --> 00:34:12,469 So I find it, you know different different organizations and 657 00:34:12,469 --> 00:34:14,230 people come at it from different sides. 658 00:34:14,230 --> 00:34:18,030 But inevitably when they dig down and really see what's there 659 00:34:18,030 --> 00:34:21,550 and see what they know and what they don't know, it's a little 660 00:34:21,550 --> 00:34:25,150 terrifying and and you know it's it's such a basic thing you 661 00:34:25,150 --> 00:34:28,110 imagine like you know how how is this possible that we can't do 662 00:34:28,110 --> 00:34:30,870 this and yet it's incredibly hard it's made it's been a lot 663 00:34:30,870 --> 00:34:36,530 harder with the with the cloud. Rich, just thinking like you 664 00:34:37,050 --> 00:34:39,370 just told the story. I'm thinking, man, this folks 665 00:34:39,370 --> 00:34:41,330 who are in that room said, we don't know. 666 00:34:41,929 --> 00:34:44,969 That must have been just like such an embarrassing and painful 667 00:34:44,969 --> 00:34:48,889 moment for them. It's like it's your job, you 668 00:34:48,929 --> 00:34:50,730 know? I mean, look, I'm not saying, 669 00:34:50,730 --> 00:34:52,050 like I would have gotten it right. 670 00:34:52,050 --> 00:34:55,130 I'm just saying that I'm sure, I'm sure glad I wasn't in their 671 00:34:55,130 --> 00:34:58,850 shoes at that moment. Because, you know, when you 672 00:34:58,850 --> 00:35:02,370 think about identity, it's ensuring that the right people 673 00:35:02,370 --> 00:35:06,680 have the right access. You know, knowing who has access 674 00:35:06,680 --> 00:35:09,680 to what and when you can't answer that question, like, wow, 675 00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:12,280 that's that's downright embarrassing. 676 00:35:12,640 --> 00:35:13,760 It. It really is. 677 00:35:13,760 --> 00:35:15,200 And I think I think it's, you know, it. 678 00:35:15,200 --> 00:35:18,720 It underscores the fact that like just the the tool set has 679 00:35:18,720 --> 00:35:21,680 just hasn't been there. Like, you know, it's like we've 680 00:35:21,680 --> 00:35:23,920 done all these advances and you know, like we were talking about 681 00:35:23,920 --> 00:35:26,920 before, authentication has come a long way in the last five, 682 00:35:26,920 --> 00:35:29,960 five, 6-7 years. The tools that we got available 683 00:35:29,960 --> 00:35:33,790 are so much better. And I think, you know, that's 684 00:35:33,790 --> 00:35:36,430 another common thread is that the tools for authorization have 685 00:35:36,430 --> 00:35:39,430 been pretty stagnant. There just hasn't been a lot. 686 00:35:39,430 --> 00:35:42,870 And so, you know, I think back to another, another guy who was 687 00:35:43,070 --> 00:35:45,870 in, he actually leads the engineering team at his at his 688 00:35:45,870 --> 00:35:47,830 organization. He was telling me a story about, 689 00:35:48,350 --> 00:35:50,470 you know, when they didn't have any tools. 690 00:35:50,910 --> 00:35:53,870 He said, yeah, the auditors asked me for, you know, everyone 691 00:35:53,870 --> 00:35:55,670 who could access this one database. 692 00:35:56,030 --> 00:35:58,630 We had to really get in and the auditor was like would not let 693 00:35:58,630 --> 00:36:01,180 it go. And in order to answer that 694 00:36:01,180 --> 00:36:03,460 question of like who has access to this database, what can they 695 00:36:03,460 --> 00:36:06,700 do in this database, He said he had to take his best developer 696 00:36:06,900 --> 00:36:09,940 off for a week of custom scripting to go answer it for 697 00:36:09,940 --> 00:36:12,580 one database. So now multiply that across, you 698 00:36:12,580 --> 00:36:16,020 know your entire environment and you just can't do it. 699 00:36:16,100 --> 00:36:18,460 Like, you know you can get the answer, you can figure it out. 700 00:36:18,460 --> 00:36:21,500 But the amount of time and effort and energy it takes to do 701 00:36:21,500 --> 00:36:23,740 it without a good tool set is brutal. 702 00:36:24,860 --> 00:36:27,020 Well, I think this is where the fundamental question that. 703 00:36:27,580 --> 00:36:30,220 I always ask folks is you know, can you answer this question? 704 00:36:30,300 --> 00:36:35,300 It's very simple. Who has access to what and how 705 00:36:35,300 --> 00:36:37,260 quickly can you pull that answer together? 706 00:36:37,580 --> 00:36:39,980 And how accurate do you think that data is? 707 00:36:40,500 --> 00:36:43,700 Because if you can't answer that question, my mind your identity 708 00:36:43,700 --> 00:36:45,060 and access management program is failing. 709 00:36:45,860 --> 00:36:48,780 It's a basic question, right? And it's. 710 00:36:48,780 --> 00:36:51,740 I also find you really need to dig down because most people 711 00:36:51,740 --> 00:36:53,860 will say, well, yeah, I know you know these, the people in these 712 00:36:53,860 --> 00:36:57,810 groups, OK. But you know, like, dig it. 713 00:36:57,810 --> 00:36:59,850 Let's dig a little deeper, like. Nested groups? 714 00:36:59,850 --> 00:37:02,090 What does it even mean? It's been you know, that group 715 00:37:02,090 --> 00:37:04,730 is used for eight different things, one of which was the 716 00:37:04,730 --> 00:37:08,210 original intention, right? Stuff like that, that's right. 717 00:37:08,210 --> 00:37:10,330 And you know, it comes down to, you know, to brass tacks. 718 00:37:10,330 --> 00:37:12,970 Usually it's like, you know, pick your, you know, your most 719 00:37:12,970 --> 00:37:15,570 sensitive, you know, data element, whether you know it's a 720 00:37:15,570 --> 00:37:19,130 table, maybe it's a box folder, you know, maybe it's a, you 721 00:37:19,130 --> 00:37:21,530 know, a data lake, you know, in Snowflake or something like 722 00:37:21,530 --> 00:37:23,490 that. And say like who can get to that 723 00:37:23,880 --> 00:37:26,320 and exactly what they, what can they do, right. 724 00:37:26,320 --> 00:37:28,520 And like it's going, but it's going down to these data 725 00:37:28,520 --> 00:37:30,080 elements. Because you like, I think 726 00:37:30,080 --> 00:37:33,200 everybody has somewhat of a handle around users and groups 727 00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:36,640 and some connection to role. But I find the biggest gap is 728 00:37:36,840 --> 00:37:39,280 what does that role actually do? What does that mean? 729 00:37:39,600 --> 00:37:41,840 Like what can you actually get to with permissions? 730 00:37:42,120 --> 00:37:44,680 And then you get all these other things like what about local 731 00:37:44,680 --> 00:37:46,080 permissions, what about local users? 732 00:37:46,080 --> 00:37:48,120 What about system accounts and machine identities? 733 00:37:48,160 --> 00:37:51,360 And like you know now it's pulling on all those threads 734 00:37:51,840 --> 00:37:55,200 where you know it's not in the 70 or 80% solution, but it's at 735 00:37:55,200 --> 00:37:57,160 the edges. And those are typically the 736 00:37:57,160 --> 00:37:59,560 biggest issues when you when it comes to security and 737 00:37:59,560 --> 00:38:01,240 compliance. Those are the ones that you 738 00:38:01,240 --> 00:38:03,120 really need to worry about are those ones that you? 739 00:38:03,160 --> 00:38:03,840 You. You know you. 740 00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:05,760 Most of the time you don't. You have no idea. 741 00:38:06,800 --> 00:38:09,440 Well, you've got the point in time definition. 742 00:38:09,880 --> 00:38:12,400 And then what are you doing to make sure that that definition 743 00:38:12,400 --> 00:38:14,320 stays the same? Because things change, right? 744 00:38:15,320 --> 00:38:17,000 Exactly. Do you find that there is a 745 00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:19,600 particular platform or system or something? 746 00:38:20,010 --> 00:38:22,450 That is like the hardest thing to include when we start talking 747 00:38:22,450 --> 00:38:25,010 about authorization, maybe even as a program. 748 00:38:25,010 --> 00:38:26,810 I think people think of identity as a program. 749 00:38:28,610 --> 00:38:32,170 Authorization as a program might might need to be a thing as well 750 00:38:32,730 --> 00:38:34,730 considering you know that's that's really the keys of the 751 00:38:34,730 --> 00:38:36,650 castle, whatever, you know, what are people getting access to. 752 00:38:36,650 --> 00:38:40,010 But I know I found you know doing integrations different, 753 00:38:40,050 --> 00:38:42,970 you know technologies out there. There are some platforms or 754 00:38:42,970 --> 00:38:45,730 systems that are just. Of real pain that you know what 755 00:38:45,930 --> 00:38:49,450 and it's either not well documented or you can't do 756 00:38:49,450 --> 00:38:51,570 certain things because API's aren't available, whatever it 757 00:38:51,570 --> 00:38:53,730 may be. But what kinds of platforms do 758 00:38:53,730 --> 00:38:57,130 you see as, like the hardest to include as part of this, this 759 00:38:57,130 --> 00:38:59,730 capturing of who has access to what? 760 00:39:00,930 --> 00:39:03,970 Yeah, from a from a tactical standpoint, the hardest ones are 761 00:39:03,970 --> 00:39:08,010 definitely the, you know, the old and crusty on Prem ERP 762 00:39:08,050 --> 00:39:09,730 systems. You know, those are the ones you 763 00:39:09,730 --> 00:39:13,250 know there's no Restful API like they've been, you know they've 764 00:39:13,250 --> 00:39:16,170 been cut, they've been you've had an SI come in for eight 765 00:39:16,170 --> 00:39:18,850 years and is you know is custom fine tuning it. 766 00:39:18,890 --> 00:39:22,530 And so it ends up being something that has very little 767 00:39:22,890 --> 00:39:25,010 commonality with anyone else's deployment. 768 00:39:25,050 --> 00:39:27,690 And so it's just a tremendous amount of customization and the 769 00:39:27,690 --> 00:39:30,210 hooks are not there. So from a tactical standpoint, 770 00:39:30,530 --> 00:39:33,170 those are the hardest ones or custom applications as well. 771 00:39:33,170 --> 00:39:34,610 They're just, you know, they're kind of, there's snowflakes, 772 00:39:34,610 --> 00:39:36,170 right. Nobody else has it And so there 773 00:39:36,170 --> 00:39:38,410 it aren't a lot of common tools that still like you to 774 00:39:38,410 --> 00:39:41,210 integrate. But from a program perspective 775 00:39:41,570 --> 00:39:44,330 actually find it's the other way where you see that you know a 776 00:39:44,330 --> 00:39:46,690 lot of times when you look at you know identity governance 777 00:39:46,690 --> 00:39:50,170 programs they've got like the ERP system that was always the 778 00:39:50,210 --> 00:39:52,210 number one thing that was so that's priority one. 779 00:39:52,210 --> 00:39:55,210 So they've actually this you know gutted it through and you 780 00:39:55,210 --> 00:39:58,290 know by you know really you know brutal house to house search 781 00:39:58,290 --> 00:40:00,170 they've they've gone and figured that out. 782 00:40:00,570 --> 00:40:03,530 But then you say well you know how many apps do you need for 783 00:40:03,530 --> 00:40:05,690 socks or relevance for socks compliance and are subject to 784 00:40:05,690 --> 00:40:07,930 that And and you know those is like well it's like you know 785 00:40:07,930 --> 00:40:10,170 it's like 30 apps. How many do you have covered in 786 00:40:10,170 --> 00:40:11,250 your Identity governance program? 787 00:40:11,560 --> 00:40:14,080 Three. And what are you doing about all 788 00:40:14,080 --> 00:40:15,720 the rest? And so from a program 789 00:40:15,720 --> 00:40:17,400 perspective, it's actually that longer tail. 790 00:40:17,400 --> 00:40:19,720 It's the stuff that's still relevant for compliance and it 791 00:40:19,720 --> 00:40:21,440 knows there's critical data in it. 792 00:40:21,440 --> 00:40:25,520 But usually the lift is so heavy to get these things integrated 793 00:40:25,520 --> 00:40:29,000 into an identity governance platform that they have huge 794 00:40:29,000 --> 00:40:30,880 gaps and they know that. Yeah. 795 00:40:30,920 --> 00:40:34,520 You know, I kind of, I think one of the things about 796 00:40:34,520 --> 00:40:38,950 authorization is. You have to make a decision on 797 00:40:39,190 --> 00:40:42,070 how far you take your authorization program. 798 00:40:42,590 --> 00:40:46,310 So let's say we take one of those apps that you just 799 00:40:46,310 --> 00:40:49,510 mentioned, custom build. App developers have been 800 00:40:49,510 --> 00:40:52,310 hammering away on it for decades. 801 00:40:52,310 --> 00:40:56,430 Maybe building like, oh this view and that view and like 802 00:40:56,550 --> 00:40:59,670 things that are not standard. Or take something that's 803 00:40:59,670 --> 00:41:02,070 out-of-the-box that I thought you might. 804 00:41:02,730 --> 00:41:06,330 Answer that question with which is like ERP systems where 805 00:41:06,330 --> 00:41:09,410 especially older ERP systems where you say you have access to 806 00:41:09,410 --> 00:41:12,610 this table, this screen, this business unit. 807 00:41:12,610 --> 00:41:15,970 So now it's like multidimensional access and it's 808 00:41:15,970 --> 00:41:21,010 like that's just you know if you spend your IEM program focus on 809 00:41:21,410 --> 00:41:24,730 nailing the authorization for that, that is all you're going 810 00:41:24,730 --> 00:41:27,850 to get done like you might have an IM program with. 811 00:41:28,420 --> 00:41:31,660 A handful of people. So to me it's kind of been like 812 00:41:31,660 --> 00:41:34,740 okay, so, So what is our I am program going to do? 813 00:41:35,060 --> 00:41:38,500 It's going to take it this far. It's going to provision a person 814 00:41:38,820 --> 00:41:43,980 into these right groups or it's going to in real time present 815 00:41:43,980 --> 00:41:47,900 the application with some assertions of authorizations. 816 00:41:48,100 --> 00:41:49,420 But they're going to be at this level. 817 00:41:49,420 --> 00:41:52,140 It's not going to be like they should be able to see all these 818 00:41:52,140 --> 00:41:56,100 tables and things like that, so. I guess to translate that back 819 00:41:56,100 --> 00:42:00,980 into your real world story where this uses like Okay, we're going 820 00:42:00,980 --> 00:42:03,700 to take this application, take this account that got 821 00:42:03,700 --> 00:42:06,340 compromised. What did they have access to in 822 00:42:06,340 --> 00:42:10,660 our ERP system? I would say the I M team should 823 00:42:10,660 --> 00:42:14,380 say, well, we sent these authorizations or we put the 824 00:42:14,380 --> 00:42:18,420 person into these roles in these groups and then somebody from 825 00:42:18,420 --> 00:42:20,780 the ERP side should said be able to say. 826 00:42:21,520 --> 00:42:24,840 And that gives them access to these screens and these database 827 00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:26,440 tables or things like that, right? 828 00:42:26,720 --> 00:42:30,760 But somewhere along the way. So do you have a rule of thumb 829 00:42:30,760 --> 00:42:37,000 or is it really just having that that knowledge should be able to 830 00:42:37,000 --> 00:42:39,880 say, all right, here's a couple of rules of thumb that we're 831 00:42:39,880 --> 00:42:42,300 going to apply. Yeah. 832 00:42:42,300 --> 00:42:44,860 The, the rule of thumb that I find is, is sort of the 833 00:42:44,860 --> 00:42:46,740 commonality. If I look at customers who have 834 00:42:46,740 --> 00:42:50,020 been the most successful at doing this kind of thing, it 835 00:42:50,020 --> 00:42:52,420 it's absolutely prioritization is the name of the game. 836 00:42:52,420 --> 00:42:54,540 I mean, that's the first thing is you cannot do everything 837 00:42:54,620 --> 00:42:55,740 right. And so you have to pick your 838 00:42:55,740 --> 00:42:58,220 battles. And I find that the one of the 839 00:42:58,220 --> 00:43:01,100 most valuable things is actually going, you know, you know, 840 00:43:01,100 --> 00:43:03,980 starting at the end, right. And like looking at like, OK, 841 00:43:03,980 --> 00:43:06,750 what's the most critical data we need to protect, right. 842 00:43:06,750 --> 00:43:10,150 And that that's typically the thing that's fundamentally like 843 00:43:10,150 --> 00:43:14,310 the board cares about, you know the see, so the CIO care about 844 00:43:14,630 --> 00:43:18,950 and so hey let's figure out like what roles give access to that 845 00:43:18,950 --> 00:43:21,550 and what can they do, right. And so typically that's that's 846 00:43:21,550 --> 00:43:24,590 where I found it, it's most valuable is kind of starting at 847 00:43:24,590 --> 00:43:27,070 the end. But to your point, Jim, I think 848 00:43:27,070 --> 00:43:29,910 a rate you raised a great point is like a lot of times this data 849 00:43:29,910 --> 00:43:32,790 to put that whole story together and to get their true visibility 850 00:43:32,790 --> 00:43:35,400 all the way down to the data level, It's on different teams, 851 00:43:35,560 --> 00:43:36,840 right. It's in different systems, 852 00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:40,080 they're different groups. And you know, does the identity 853 00:43:40,080 --> 00:43:43,280 group really understand the inner workings of the ERP system 854 00:43:43,280 --> 00:43:46,200 authorization scheme? Like heck no, right. 855 00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:49,280 And so and every single system is different, right. 856 00:43:49,280 --> 00:43:51,680 You know, just because you know, one system like you, you got to 857 00:43:51,680 --> 00:43:54,920 kind of be an expert in each one And that it's that that 858 00:43:54,920 --> 00:43:58,000 translation across systems, that's also really, really hard. 859 00:43:58,000 --> 00:44:01,840 So now you think about, you know, now you boil it back up 860 00:44:01,840 --> 00:44:05,180 and now you're a see so and you say, hey, you know I just want 861 00:44:05,180 --> 00:44:08,460 to make sure that no contractor in China gets access to my 862 00:44:08,460 --> 00:44:10,660 customer data. Let me make that happen. 863 00:44:11,060 --> 00:44:12,900 Now you think about like what do you have to do in terms of 864 00:44:12,900 --> 00:44:15,740 technical controls on every system that might have customer 865 00:44:15,740 --> 00:44:17,340 data. What do you, what knob do you 866 00:44:17,340 --> 00:44:19,780 actually tweak, what's the JSON actually look like for that? 867 00:44:20,020 --> 00:44:22,420 That's a really hard thing to answer, although that's, again, 868 00:44:22,420 --> 00:44:25,220 it seems like a very simple kind of thing that's, you know, that 869 00:44:25,220 --> 00:44:27,900 that's would be very reasonable for a SISO to want. 870 00:44:28,220 --> 00:44:30,860 And yet bringing that and actually putting that into 871 00:44:30,860 --> 00:44:34,320 action is super, super hard. That's a great answer. 872 00:44:35,080 --> 00:44:39,080 You know the other thing that was as we're talking about, we 873 00:44:39,080 --> 00:44:41,600 kept talking about authorization as a program. 874 00:44:42,040 --> 00:44:46,440 And I'm not recommending that folks go out there and spin up a 875 00:44:46,440 --> 00:44:48,800 program and have an authorization program manager, 876 00:44:49,160 --> 00:44:54,960 but it reminded me the of the impact that authorization has to 877 00:44:55,320 --> 00:44:57,960 humans. I'm also sure that the impacts 878 00:44:57,960 --> 00:45:01,670 on the end user. But definitely the application 879 00:45:01,670 --> 00:45:05,470 owners and these application teams and making sure people are 880 00:45:05,470 --> 00:45:09,270 clear on roles and responsibilities and to make 881 00:45:09,270 --> 00:45:12,670 sure that where I drop it, you pick it up, etcetera. 882 00:45:13,270 --> 00:45:15,350 What are your thoughts on that impact? 883 00:45:15,350 --> 00:45:19,430 Is there an impact to end users? And then the app owners, who are 884 00:45:19,430 --> 00:45:22,710 app owners, developers and database administrators, all 885 00:45:22,710 --> 00:45:26,850 those folks, yeah, absolutely. There's impact on end users 886 00:45:26,850 --> 00:45:30,050 because usually it's like, hey, I need access to this thing. 887 00:45:30,050 --> 00:45:32,290 I need to get my job done and I need more access. 888 00:45:32,370 --> 00:45:35,490 That's typically how it goes. So you know, obviously you start 889 00:45:35,490 --> 00:45:38,850 off with birthright access, you get a bunch of stuff right out 890 00:45:38,850 --> 00:45:40,970 of the gate, but it's never enough. 891 00:45:40,970 --> 00:45:42,050 And it's designed not to be enough. 892 00:45:42,050 --> 00:45:46,470 You gotta go typically and ask for more and so then the trick 893 00:45:46,470 --> 00:45:49,430 is okay, how fast can I get that done, right. 894 00:45:49,430 --> 00:45:52,190 If you're a developer that's working on a critical project 895 00:45:52,190 --> 00:45:55,710 like I guarantee you got a, you have a lot of organizational 896 00:45:55,710 --> 00:45:58,390 push behind you to get that access quickly, right. 897 00:45:58,390 --> 00:46:01,110 It's like if it, you know, if it's a revenue facing project 898 00:46:01,430 --> 00:46:04,030 and you know they need to get it done like they you will, they 899 00:46:04,030 --> 00:46:05,950 will push and they will get a lot of backing you. 900 00:46:06,030 --> 00:46:08,310 It's really hard to say, hey hold on, we got to figure out 901 00:46:08,310 --> 00:46:11,030 our role structure. That's not going to work right. 902 00:46:11,030 --> 00:46:13,270 You got to get access. That reminded me. 903 00:46:13,270 --> 00:46:17,750 I actually have another customer example where they started using 904 00:46:18,070 --> 00:46:21,070 better tools, right? And just having more insight 905 00:46:21,470 --> 00:46:25,870 into what roles actually did can be extremely powerful even in 906 00:46:25,870 --> 00:46:28,950 the provisioning process, right? So their problem was they had 907 00:46:28,950 --> 00:46:31,470 Snowflake and they had developers that would come in 908 00:46:31,830 --> 00:46:34,470 and actually ask for additional access to something. 909 00:46:34,470 --> 00:46:36,630 It might be a table, it might be a database in Snowflake. 910 00:46:37,300 --> 00:46:39,020 And so the challenge that they had and actually the 911 00:46:39,020 --> 00:46:41,620 provisioning was done by the Snowflake team just for this 912 00:46:41,620 --> 00:46:43,900 very reason because they were the only ones who sort of 913 00:46:43,900 --> 00:46:46,060 understood the inner workings of snowflakes. 914 00:46:46,060 --> 00:46:48,380 So the IT team couldn't do it right then. 915 00:46:48,380 --> 00:46:50,420 So they actually had to take down on themselves. 916 00:46:51,020 --> 00:46:53,300 Back to your other second part of your question is how does 917 00:46:53,300 --> 00:46:57,980 this actually impact app owners and and and data owners. 918 00:46:58,500 --> 00:47:01,460 They were actually the ones doing provisioning and more than 919 00:47:01,460 --> 00:47:04,420 not because it was typically such a mission critical thing 920 00:47:04,420 --> 00:47:07,620 that was time sensitive, They over permissioned right. 921 00:47:07,620 --> 00:47:10,220 And that's the reality is like, well it's like gosh, I got all 922 00:47:10,220 --> 00:47:11,620 these roles. I got like 80 roles. 923 00:47:11,780 --> 00:47:14,380 I don't know which one gives access to this table. 924 00:47:14,380 --> 00:47:16,980 Let me just give them the real, you know, let me give them the 925 00:47:16,980 --> 00:47:18,860 good stuff. Let me you know, let me let me 926 00:47:18,860 --> 00:47:22,780 give high level access. And So what they were able to do 927 00:47:22,780 --> 00:47:25,900 when they actually had some tools that were that allowed 928 00:47:25,900 --> 00:47:28,580 them to see what these roles actually did, like what did this 929 00:47:28,580 --> 00:47:31,380 role actually give permissions to and had that that sort of 930 00:47:31,420 --> 00:47:34,850 instant level of visibility, they were able to reduce that 931 00:47:34,850 --> 00:47:37,650 down. So once they granted a new role, 932 00:47:37,650 --> 00:47:40,290 they could really find the one that best conformed the least 933 00:47:40,290 --> 00:47:42,090 privilege, right? They could find the one that 934 00:47:42,090 --> 00:47:45,650 gave access to that table but as little else as possible. 935 00:47:45,690 --> 00:47:48,210 And just by sort of implementing that, by having the tools around 936 00:47:48,210 --> 00:47:51,370 visibility, they were able to reduce the total number of 937 00:47:51,370 --> 00:47:54,210 permissions on Snowflake by 80%. That's what they told us. 938 00:47:54,210 --> 00:47:56,690 I mean, so it's you can really see the effect of that. 939 00:47:57,060 --> 00:47:59,420 It's not just, hey, does someone have access to Snowflake or not, 940 00:47:59,420 --> 00:48:01,940 but what role do they have and is it enough for them to do 941 00:48:01,940 --> 00:48:04,180 their job? This is least privileged at its 942 00:48:04,180 --> 00:48:06,260 heart. All right. 943 00:48:06,260 --> 00:48:09,060 One last question around authorization for wrap things 944 00:48:09,060 --> 00:48:12,220 up, but it wouldn't be an Identity at the center podcast 945 00:48:12,220 --> 00:48:14,540 without mentioning of AI at this point. 946 00:48:14,540 --> 00:48:19,380 So what do you, how do you see AI impacting this space of 947 00:48:19,380 --> 00:48:23,280 authorization? Yeah, I mean, I I think about 948 00:48:23,280 --> 00:48:26,160 this a lot as everybody, everybody who listens to this 949 00:48:26,160 --> 00:48:28,440 podcast does. And I think, you know, there's 950 00:48:28,440 --> 00:48:31,240 certainly going to be a lot, some good stuff into like role 951 00:48:31,240 --> 00:48:33,680 mining and cluster analysis. And I think there's a lot, 952 00:48:33,680 --> 00:48:35,600 there's a lot of of goodness there. 953 00:48:35,880 --> 00:48:38,000 And also, you know what we were talking about before, we're 954 00:48:38,000 --> 00:48:40,440 getting to the human component. When you're doing things like 955 00:48:40,720 --> 00:48:44,240 access reviews, which is almost always a component of any sort 956 00:48:44,240 --> 00:48:47,450 of governance program around authorization, it's really 957 00:48:47,450 --> 00:48:49,410 alleviating that that human burden. 958 00:48:49,410 --> 00:48:51,970 And I think A, I can do a really good job there where A, I, A I 959 00:48:51,970 --> 00:48:54,050 might not be able to do that, give you the full answer, but it 960 00:48:54,050 --> 00:48:56,650 can at least guide you and say, hey, you probably don't need to 961 00:48:56,650 --> 00:48:59,570 spend a lot of time on these. Here are the ones that really, 962 00:48:59,570 --> 00:49:02,450 you know, look suspicious, right, or look like you should 963 00:49:02,450 --> 00:49:05,530 give it a little more time. I think you were using it for in 964 00:49:05,530 --> 00:49:09,320 those kind of those kind of situations are really great. 965 00:49:09,440 --> 00:49:13,320 And you know, I think the best example I heard about the power 966 00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:17,440 of a I was really, it's like having unlimited interns, right? 967 00:49:17,440 --> 00:49:19,720 And so you can do things that are sort of like this, these 968 00:49:19,720 --> 00:49:23,680 sort of relatively relatively menial tasks, but you could do 969 00:49:23,680 --> 00:49:25,520 it really fast. You can do it really cheaply. 970 00:49:26,160 --> 00:49:29,480 But there still are things where, you know, humans are 971 00:49:29,480 --> 00:49:32,440 still better at doing the, you know, the, the outliers, right. 972 00:49:32,440 --> 00:49:34,040 The, the really edge case things. 973 00:49:34,440 --> 00:49:36,680 You've got to have some humans involved in a lot of those 974 00:49:36,680 --> 00:49:39,000 cases. But A I can take a lot of the 975 00:49:39,000 --> 00:49:41,280 burden there. The other component and the 976 00:49:41,280 --> 00:49:44,240 other side of it is, you know, is what, you know, what's what's 977 00:49:44,240 --> 00:49:46,800 going to be the bigger security concerns around authorization, 978 00:49:46,800 --> 00:49:49,400 protecting a I programs, right. And so that's another 979 00:49:49,400 --> 00:49:53,920 interesting one where you now see all these things around, you 980 00:49:53,920 --> 00:49:56,080 know, the, you know, like like the weights like after the, you 981 00:49:56,080 --> 00:49:58,360 know these training runs that some of these really large 982 00:49:58,360 --> 00:50:02,000 frontier AIAI companies are doing. 983 00:50:02,470 --> 00:50:05,190 You know it costs like a billion dollars to run some of these 984 00:50:05,190 --> 00:50:07,470 training things. And so that you know the weights 985 00:50:07,470 --> 00:50:11,270 that file that records all the essentially the results of that 986 00:50:11,270 --> 00:50:14,750 training that is incredibly valuable intellectual property, 987 00:50:14,830 --> 00:50:17,870 right, you know, perhaps bigger than anything we've ever seen in 988 00:50:17,870 --> 00:50:21,880 history. And so and then you have nation 989 00:50:21,880 --> 00:50:25,760 states that have stated goals around becoming a I leaders and 990 00:50:26,040 --> 00:50:29,040 that combination of having these treasure troves. 991 00:50:29,040 --> 00:50:32,000 I think it's going to be a, you know, it's going to really bring 992 00:50:32,000 --> 00:50:35,760 security to a whole new level because the value of the thing 993 00:50:35,760 --> 00:50:38,360 that we're trying to protect is so large and it's going to be 994 00:50:38,360 --> 00:50:41,560 way beyond even customer data and credit card numbers. 995 00:50:41,840 --> 00:50:45,720 And so I think what we'll see is it's really going to force 996 00:50:45,960 --> 00:50:49,520 security providers and identity, identity people, identity teams 997 00:50:49,930 --> 00:50:54,370 to think about securing this stuff beyond just typical IT 998 00:50:54,370 --> 00:50:56,730 level security, but really break, you know, bringing it up 999 00:50:56,730 --> 00:51:01,330 to physical security, getting it closer, closer with a lot of 1000 00:51:01,330 --> 00:51:04,170 sort of the three letter agencies that are actually 1001 00:51:04,170 --> 00:51:05,450 protecting it. I think there's going to be a 1002 00:51:05,450 --> 00:51:09,970 lot of more crossover between typical espionage scenarios and 1003 00:51:09,970 --> 00:51:13,690 risk profiles and what's normally been IT security, not 1004 00:51:13,690 --> 00:51:15,730 having to worry as much about physical security. 1005 00:51:15,730 --> 00:51:18,330 I think those things are really going to converge around a I. 1006 00:51:19,280 --> 00:51:22,680 And I feel like we're headed to a future where an organization's 1007 00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:26,720 a I become sort of like their OS and is their secret sauce 1008 00:51:27,240 --> 00:51:32,000 hopefully not as bad as like I robot goes a little bit nuts has 1009 00:51:32,040 --> 00:51:36,080 your definition of a I changed within the last couple of years 1010 00:51:36,080 --> 00:51:38,360 because I feel like mine has and I've talked about this before 1011 00:51:38,880 --> 00:51:43,400 where pre you know ChatGPT pre large language model being 1012 00:51:43,400 --> 00:51:46,470 available to the general public. I thought of AI as okay. 1013 00:51:46,470 --> 00:51:48,590 That's cool. It's it's like machine learning 1014 00:51:48,590 --> 00:51:50,070 and pattern matching and stuff like that. 1015 00:51:50,630 --> 00:51:53,830 And then you get something like, you know, ChatGPT or similar, 1016 00:51:53,870 --> 00:51:56,070 you know, functionality where now it's available to the public 1017 00:51:56,070 --> 00:51:58,350 and it's this conversational interface. 1018 00:51:58,830 --> 00:52:03,590 I find myself using it more and more and more for important 1019 00:52:03,590 --> 00:52:08,150 things and not important things. And my thought process now is 1020 00:52:08,230 --> 00:52:10,630 that's AI. I don't think of AI as 1021 00:52:10,670 --> 00:52:12,750 necessarily just machine learning and padding matching. 1022 00:52:13,770 --> 00:52:16,290 And I'm curious if if if you've thought about this from a 1023 00:52:16,290 --> 00:52:19,010 definition standpoint of, OK, you know, what is AI? 1024 00:52:19,050 --> 00:52:21,210 Because they feel like no offense. 1025 00:52:21,330 --> 00:52:24,370 You know, a lot of vendors have thrown the word AI on the box of 1026 00:52:24,370 --> 00:52:28,010 their product for years now. And now we're going to the point 1027 00:52:28,010 --> 00:52:29,330 is like, oh, OK, well that's interesting. 1028 00:52:29,530 --> 00:52:31,250 You know, what is, what do you mean by AI? 1029 00:52:31,250 --> 00:52:34,210 I'm just curious if your definition has changed since the 1030 00:52:34,210 --> 00:52:35,690 advent and the availability of these things. 1031 00:52:36,370 --> 00:52:38,650 Yeah, I I think it has. And certainly the way I think 1032 00:52:38,650 --> 00:52:42,890 about it, you know, I think before ChatGPT, the ChatGPT sort 1033 00:52:42,890 --> 00:52:46,290 of evolution, you know, I was just, you know, I was always 1034 00:52:46,290 --> 00:52:48,770 felt embarrassed about using the term A I that's what that's what 1035 00:52:48,770 --> 00:52:50,930 it felt like it was marketing. It felt like it was you know 1036 00:52:50,930 --> 00:52:53,770 something in the future and not here yet where ML sounded you 1037 00:52:53,770 --> 00:52:56,250 know much more reasonable and like yes, that's a much more 1038 00:52:56,250 --> 00:52:59,410 precise term. I think now I feel very 1039 00:52:59,410 --> 00:53:04,170 comfortable using the term a I and I think maybe it it's just 1040 00:53:04,170 --> 00:53:07,930 that it's still so new and still revolutionary that it feels very 1041 00:53:07,930 --> 00:53:11,400 very different and you know and that's I've I've seen that quote 1042 00:53:11,400 --> 00:53:14,800 before where it's you know AI is anything that's just new and and 1043 00:53:14,800 --> 00:53:16,160 not in the current capability set. 1044 00:53:16,200 --> 00:53:19,800 And it it feels like we're still getting our heads around what 1045 00:53:19,800 --> 00:53:22,840 this really implies. And really I mean it's it is 1046 00:53:22,840 --> 00:53:26,000 mind blowing even though it's a, you know it, you know a next 1047 00:53:26,000 --> 00:53:28,920 word prediction model. It feels like so much more and 1048 00:53:28,920 --> 00:53:32,200 it and it looks like so much more from every every angle. 1049 00:53:32,710 --> 00:53:37,030 It looks startlingly like you know an intelligence behind it. 1050 00:53:37,030 --> 00:53:41,350 So it certainly has changed the way that that I I treat things 1051 00:53:41,350 --> 00:53:45,070 and I talk about it. We're going to start to wrap 1052 00:53:45,070 --> 00:53:48,630 things up here and I guess kind of going on the lines of when I 1053 00:53:48,630 --> 00:53:50,590 think of AI and where things are going as well. 1054 00:53:51,150 --> 00:53:54,390 I think about the word longevity because I could see a point 1055 00:53:54,390 --> 00:53:59,190 where you know, everyone's got their their own AI and maybe 1056 00:53:59,190 --> 00:54:02,010 there is a. You know, Jeff, A I at some 1057 00:54:02,010 --> 00:54:04,810 point in the future, that list that you know exists long after 1058 00:54:04,810 --> 00:54:06,450 I'm gone, right. And it's this, you know, 1059 00:54:07,010 --> 00:54:10,130 facsimile of what, you know, my personality is like or whatever 1060 00:54:10,130 --> 00:54:14,130 it may be. What's one of the most important 1061 00:54:14,130 --> 00:54:16,810 things that you think you've learned about longevity? 1062 00:54:18,210 --> 00:54:22,010 Yeah, I think it's, you know, my, I know we talked about this 1063 00:54:22,010 --> 00:54:23,170 before. This has definitely been a 1064 00:54:23,170 --> 00:54:26,650 passionate of mine to to think about this and and and learn 1065 00:54:26,650 --> 00:54:29,050 about it. And I think it's really, you 1066 00:54:29,050 --> 00:54:31,890 know, in the end longevity is important and longevity is 1067 00:54:31,890 --> 00:54:33,890 great. But you know what really matters 1068 00:54:33,890 --> 00:54:35,570 is what you do with that time, right? 1069 00:54:35,570 --> 00:54:38,010 It's like it's not about just living longer, but it's like you 1070 00:54:38,050 --> 00:54:40,130 you've got to put it to some use, you got to put it to some 1071 00:54:40,130 --> 00:54:42,530 value. And I think it's that, that 1072 00:54:42,530 --> 00:54:45,850 perspective combined with the fact that, you know, if you look 1073 00:54:45,850 --> 00:54:50,160 into there are few, you know, very simple worms out there that 1074 00:54:50,160 --> 00:54:54,360 actually don't have programmed cellular death, right. 1075 00:54:54,360 --> 00:54:56,800 And so you look at this, he's like how can that be? 1076 00:54:56,800 --> 00:54:59,760 And you look across all these different species and 1077 00:54:59,760 --> 00:55:02,560 organizations and I've actually come to the personal perspective 1078 00:55:02,560 --> 00:55:05,440 and I've never really heard it stated this way but that, you 1079 00:55:05,440 --> 00:55:10,570 know, that a limited lifespan is is actually a it's a it's a 1080 00:55:10,570 --> 00:55:13,050 feature, not a bug. And it's actually something that 1081 00:55:13,050 --> 00:55:16,130 we've evolved. And so you know and you can, you 1082 00:55:16,130 --> 00:55:18,050 know, you can look at it from an evolutionary standpoint, it 1083 00:55:18,050 --> 00:55:19,810 makes perfect sense. It's like you know you got to 1084 00:55:19,810 --> 00:55:22,970 make room for the new the new era for the new folks, for the 1085 00:55:22,970 --> 00:55:26,930 young people. And and so I that's that's come 1086 00:55:26,930 --> 00:55:29,410 and that's been a that's a bit of a shock to say like wow. 1087 00:55:29,410 --> 00:55:32,570 I'm sort of you know thinking about myself is supposed to have 1088 00:55:32,570 --> 00:55:36,170 a limited shelf life and I think it just puts a a finer point on 1089 00:55:36,250 --> 00:55:37,650 on that. You know like if we if we all 1090 00:55:37,650 --> 00:55:40,330 knew we were going to live forever would we really get get 1091 00:55:40,330 --> 00:55:43,010 anything done what we needed to get done today Like if like well 1092 00:55:43,010 --> 00:55:46,090 I can always do it tomorrow. I think it's it's really, you 1093 00:55:46,090 --> 00:55:49,690 know, thinking about it that way, I think, I think makes you, 1094 00:55:50,250 --> 00:55:53,690 you know makes you use your time that you that you have better 1095 00:55:53,690 --> 00:55:55,450 and I think that's it. That's a good perspective from 1096 00:55:55,490 --> 00:55:58,200 from my my point of view. Well, time's one of the only 1097 00:55:58,200 --> 00:56:00,040 resources that you can't make more of. 1098 00:56:00,520 --> 00:56:02,360 Really, right? Everyone's got a only scarce 1099 00:56:02,360 --> 00:56:03,080 resource. This time. 1100 00:56:03,320 --> 00:56:05,120 Yeah, that's right. And I think, you know, it's one 1101 00:56:05,120 --> 00:56:07,280 of those things I think is, you know, as I get older, right, I 1102 00:56:07,280 --> 00:56:09,080 think about how much time do I have left? 1103 00:56:09,080 --> 00:56:11,160 Am I going to get all the things accomplished that I want? 1104 00:56:11,440 --> 00:56:14,440 And you're right, if I live forever and I would just keep 1105 00:56:14,440 --> 00:56:16,440 kicking that can down the curb, right? 1106 00:56:16,800 --> 00:56:20,680 And, you know, play video games all day or, you know, I don't 1107 00:56:20,680 --> 00:56:22,560 know, set up evil portals, whatever it may be. 1108 00:56:22,560 --> 00:56:25,120 Jim, what do you think about longevity? 1109 00:56:26,280 --> 00:56:28,600 Well, I. I really enjoyed listening to 1110 00:56:28,600 --> 00:56:32,320 what Rich had to say, because I think perspective about 1111 00:56:32,320 --> 00:56:36,240 longevity is so important. I think it changes over time 1112 00:56:36,240 --> 00:56:38,320 too. You know, I have in my mind I'd 1113 00:56:38,320 --> 00:56:42,520 like to live to about 80, feel like that's where the human body 1114 00:56:42,520 --> 00:56:45,080 wears out. But on my 80th birthday, am I 1115 00:56:45,080 --> 00:56:47,240 going to say, well, I'd like to die tomorrow? 1116 00:56:47,520 --> 00:56:49,720 Heck no. I'm going to set a new goal. 1117 00:56:49,720 --> 00:56:54,040 I'm going to find new reasons why, a new ways to find meaning 1118 00:56:54,040 --> 00:56:56,640 out of my life. But I will say. 1119 00:56:56,940 --> 00:57:03,420 You know had a a passing away happen in my family recently and 1120 00:57:03,420 --> 00:57:08,460 it got me onto a YouTube worm which was watching or rabbit 1121 00:57:08,460 --> 00:57:11,780 hole watching these videos. They were frontline videos. 1122 00:57:11,780 --> 00:57:15,660 Frontline has like some really great content on YouTube, but it 1123 00:57:15,660 --> 00:57:21,500 was you know about the aging process and going into like you 1124 00:57:21,500 --> 00:57:24,900 know when people die if they don't have a living will like. 1125 00:57:25,530 --> 00:57:28,090 Someone can decide, like keep this person alive for as long as 1126 00:57:28,090 --> 00:57:31,050 possible, and they're, they're a vegetable in a bed for five, 1127 00:57:31,330 --> 00:57:35,090 five years or whatever until there's nothing that can be done 1128 00:57:35,090 --> 00:57:37,810 to keep them alive anymore. So I know I don't want to be 1129 00:57:37,810 --> 00:57:39,530 there, right? I don't. 1130 00:57:39,810 --> 00:57:43,250 I also see, like, people in the nursing homes that just like 1131 00:57:43,250 --> 00:57:45,610 staring off into space. I don't want to be there. 1132 00:57:45,610 --> 00:57:51,210 So I want to live life to the point where I'm enjoying life. 1133 00:57:52,870 --> 00:57:57,350 And I think everybody has to kind of like assign to assign 1134 00:57:57,350 --> 00:58:00,710 meeting to like, yes, that's the kind of life I want to live or I 1135 00:58:00,710 --> 00:58:01,870 don't want to live that kind of life. 1136 00:58:01,870 --> 00:58:05,270 I don't know. But leave it to me to take the 1137 00:58:05,270 --> 00:58:06,990 lighter note and bring it there, Jeff. 1138 00:58:08,230 --> 00:58:10,150 Yeah, you're you're you're a real expert at that. 1139 00:58:10,150 --> 00:58:12,830 I was going to say I could pull a Seinfeld and like, you know, 1140 00:58:12,950 --> 00:58:15,630 grab the pillow And when you say it's ready, okay. 1141 00:58:16,160 --> 00:58:18,480 You know, put it over the face like, all right, we had a good 1142 00:58:18,480 --> 00:58:20,800 run, Jim. Years and one day. 1143 00:58:21,840 --> 00:58:25,360 I'm like, I set my calendar now. All right, here's a bonus 1144 00:58:25,360 --> 00:58:26,480 question. Let's see if we can try to 1145 00:58:26,480 --> 00:58:30,200 revive the lighter part of it. There's a lot of different items 1146 00:58:30,200 --> 00:58:32,720 out there where people are trying to live longer and with 1147 00:58:32,720 --> 00:58:34,960 the expectation that something in the future might help them. 1148 00:58:34,960 --> 00:58:38,080 And I'm thinking specifically on things like cryogenics, right? 1149 00:58:38,080 --> 00:58:40,800 There's, I don't know, Arizona or something like there's a a 1150 00:58:40,800 --> 00:58:42,720 warehouse full of people who have been frozen. 1151 00:58:43,210 --> 00:58:45,370 With the hopes that it's someday they'll be able to be woken up 1152 00:58:45,370 --> 00:58:47,770 to cure whatever, you know, issue that they had. 1153 00:58:48,330 --> 00:58:49,850 Some people, it's their entire body. 1154 00:58:49,850 --> 00:58:53,170 Some people, it's just the head, which I find kind of creepy and 1155 00:58:53,170 --> 00:58:58,610 very Futurama to some degree. Would you consider that? 1156 00:58:58,890 --> 00:59:01,530 I don't. I don't think I would. 1157 00:59:01,530 --> 00:59:06,170 I mean it's it's those things where again it's it. 1158 00:59:06,570 --> 00:59:08,570 Maybe it'll work. That's possible. 1159 00:59:08,570 --> 00:59:13,020 But you know, well, I guess maybe another good question is 1160 00:59:13,020 --> 00:59:15,300 like, yeah, would you upload your consciousness if you could, 1161 00:59:15,340 --> 00:59:16,780 Would you upload that into the computer? 1162 00:59:16,780 --> 00:59:18,900 Or just, you know, just save it as a backup somewhere? 1163 00:59:20,540 --> 00:59:22,940 Maybe I would do that somehow. That seems a little less creepy, 1164 00:59:22,940 --> 00:59:25,260 but when I think about it, it's probably just equally creepy. 1165 00:59:26,580 --> 00:59:29,780 Jim would you freeze yourself or I was thinking personally too 1166 00:59:29,820 --> 00:59:33,500 like that the you know the the Jeff A I right, the backing up 1167 00:59:33,500 --> 00:59:36,780 your personality somehow right where it's it's good but. 1168 00:59:37,500 --> 00:59:39,780 Would you? I wouldn't do that, but I I want 1169 00:59:39,780 --> 00:59:41,520 to. Store a few things out there, 1170 00:59:41,520 --> 00:59:44,200 some some such a an expert on this topic. 1171 00:59:44,760 --> 00:59:51,360 One is I think from like a supplement perspective, should 1172 00:59:51,360 --> 00:59:57,280 be taking vitamin D3 every day and in concert with vitamin K2. 1173 00:59:57,760 --> 01:00:03,160 I also think that there is a supplement called N acetyl, L 1174 01:00:03,160 --> 01:00:06,080 cystine or N A/C for short. It's very cheap. 1175 01:00:06,640 --> 01:00:08,320 It's. It's one of the. 1176 01:00:08,910 --> 01:00:12,990 The great advances and great findings in the area of 1177 01:00:12,990 --> 01:00:15,630 longevity. So check those out. 1178 01:00:15,630 --> 01:00:18,310 Do a little research, Watch longevity videos. 1179 01:00:18,310 --> 01:00:21,550 Man, there's so much out there. But it is another rabbit hole. 1180 01:00:21,550 --> 01:00:26,670 We're not a medical show. I take my Col. system is cheap. 1181 01:00:26,670 --> 01:00:28,590 I don't think anybody's making a lot of money on that. 1182 01:00:29,470 --> 01:00:31,150 Yeah, I'll make my pitch for fish oil too. 1183 01:00:31,190 --> 01:00:33,750 Like I have a hard time eating enough fish. 1184 01:00:33,750 --> 01:00:35,430 I think that's that's one of the best. 1185 01:00:36,250 --> 01:00:39,250 Best researched and most clear advantages you know. 1186 01:00:39,250 --> 01:00:42,090 Get your get your Omega 3S, take a take a couple tablespoons. 1187 01:00:42,090 --> 01:00:43,370 It's good for you. Agree on that. 1188 01:00:43,770 --> 01:00:48,330 I want somebody to create the brownie sundae that is healthy, 1189 01:00:48,570 --> 01:00:51,130 that I can eat a lot of. Then I'll be a happy person. 1190 01:00:51,570 --> 01:00:52,690 Nice. So Jeff, do you want to be 1191 01:00:52,690 --> 01:00:54,970 frozen or what? I don't know if I would be 1192 01:00:54,970 --> 01:00:57,850 frozen, but this idea of being able to somehow come up with 1193 01:00:57,850 --> 01:01:00,730 sort of an AI intrigues me. I would do that. 1194 01:01:02,800 --> 01:01:03,920 I think that would be interesting. 1195 01:01:03,920 --> 01:01:06,760 I think I would like to do it while I'm still alive to see how 1196 01:01:06,760 --> 01:01:09,400 it would work and kind of tune it right. 1197 01:01:09,400 --> 01:01:12,520 I don't know what would go into it other than, you know, I mean 1198 01:01:12,520 --> 01:01:15,960 at some point I'm guessing somebody could take all these 1199 01:01:15,960 --> 01:01:19,760 episodes we've done 200 + 231 I think is this one. 1200 01:01:20,920 --> 01:01:23,960 That's a lot of audio content that kind of shows, Jim, you and 1201 01:01:23,960 --> 01:01:26,360 I are personality and at least with, you know, the one that we 1202 01:01:26,360 --> 01:01:29,880 put out on the podcast, somebody could very easily take that, 1203 01:01:30,280 --> 01:01:32,240 dump it into a large language model and. 1204 01:01:32,600 --> 01:01:37,120 Create a, you know, replica based on what it understands. 1205 01:01:37,120 --> 01:01:38,400 I'm sure you know. Obviously there'd be gaps and 1206 01:01:38,400 --> 01:01:41,440 stuff like that, but I don't think it's too far off where you 1207 01:01:41,440 --> 01:01:45,640 know you'll be able to talk to yourself or a famous person, 1208 01:01:45,640 --> 01:01:47,720 right? Or whatever it may be where 1209 01:01:47,720 --> 01:01:52,960 there is enough audio or written or visual content that can be 1210 01:01:52,960 --> 01:01:56,260 consumed to create something. Well, then you just need to ask 1211 01:01:56,260 --> 01:01:58,260 Alexa to start recording all your conversations. 1212 01:01:58,260 --> 01:01:59,540 And you'll have more. There'll be more data. 1213 01:01:59,700 --> 01:02:01,140 Isn't she already doing that? I don't know. 1214 01:02:01,140 --> 01:02:03,780 I guess I thought that was already par for the course. 1215 01:02:04,180 --> 01:02:06,020 All right, let's go ahead and wrap up for this week. 1216 01:02:06,500 --> 01:02:08,420 Rich, thank you so much for being part of this. 1217 01:02:08,420 --> 01:02:11,980 It was a great conversation. We're gonna have links in our 1218 01:02:11,980 --> 01:02:13,740 show notes to a whole bunch of different stuff. 1219 01:02:13,740 --> 01:02:17,220 We'll have links to Rich on LinkedIn so you can connect with 1220 01:02:17,220 --> 01:02:18,460 him. Ask him questions. 1221 01:02:18,870 --> 01:02:20,910 Compliment him on his radio pipes, you know, whatever it may 1222 01:02:20,910 --> 01:02:25,190 be, we'll have a link to vasa.com VEZ a.com so you can 1223 01:02:25,190 --> 01:02:29,150 learn more and more about what those guys are sold over there. 1224 01:02:29,470 --> 01:02:30,910 We'll have a whole bunch of links to all the different 1225 01:02:30,910 --> 01:02:32,190 conferences that Jim and I mentioned. 1226 01:02:32,190 --> 01:02:35,390 Identity Week America, Octane Authenticate Conference. 1227 01:02:35,390 --> 01:02:37,110 We've got a bunch of discount codes. 1228 01:02:37,550 --> 01:02:40,110 If you're planning on attending any of those, use our codes. 1229 01:02:40,390 --> 01:02:42,350 They should be the best. And it also shows support for 1230 01:02:42,350 --> 01:02:45,470 the show, that sort of thing. And you can find us on the 1231 01:02:45,470 --> 01:02:49,190 Internet. Idacpodcast.com We're on Twitter 1232 01:02:49,190 --> 01:02:53,630 or X or whatever at IDAC podcast We're on Mastodon at IDAC 1233 01:02:53,630 --> 01:02:57,030 Podcast at infosec dot exchange. Of course we're in all different 1234 01:02:57,030 --> 01:02:59,030 podcast stores, like subscribe, all that good stuff. 1235 01:02:59,030 --> 01:03:01,590 That's what it keeps. Jim and I encouraged to keep 1236 01:03:02,230 --> 01:03:04,630 Keep this thing running along. Share it with a friend, share it 1237 01:03:04,630 --> 01:03:05,710 with an enemy. Don't care. 1238 01:03:05,790 --> 01:03:08,230 As long as someone's listening, we'll keep doing our thing. 1239 01:03:08,590 --> 01:03:11,390 And Jim, I didn't tell you this yet, but I am working on 1240 01:03:11,390 --> 01:03:12,750 figuring out how we get on YouTube. 1241 01:03:13,290 --> 01:03:16,690 So YouTube has made some podcast announcements recently, and so 1242 01:03:16,690 --> 01:03:21,610 I'm starting to slowly upload hundreds of episodes when I get 1243 01:03:21,610 --> 01:03:23,850 time. To have them on YouTube at some 1244 01:03:23,850 --> 01:03:26,490 point as well. So not ready yet, but it's 1245 01:03:26,490 --> 01:03:27,610 coming. It's in the future. 1246 01:03:28,090 --> 01:03:31,010 And I did recently create find a way LinkedIn page for the show. 1247 01:03:31,010 --> 01:03:32,810 I think right now you and I are the only people on it, but I'm 1248 01:03:32,810 --> 01:03:35,010 starting to tag it and sort of build it out and figure out how 1249 01:03:35,010 --> 01:03:37,530 that all that stuff works. So there we go. 1250 01:03:38,570 --> 01:03:40,210 All right, we'll leave it there for this week. 1251 01:03:40,250 --> 01:03:43,120 Thanks everybody for listening. And we'll talk with everyone in 1252 01:03:43,120 --> 01:03:45,880 the next one. You've been listening to 1253 01:03:45,880 --> 01:03:49,800 Identity at the center. We hope you've enjoyed the show. 1254 01:03:50,000 --> 01:03:54,160 Make sure to like, rate and review and we'll be back soon. 1255 01:03:54,360 --> 01:03:56,600 But in the meantime, hit the website at 1256 01:03:56,600 --> 01:04:03,720 identity@thecenter.com and find us on Twitter at IDAC Podcast. 1257 01:04:04,160 --> 01:04:08,280 See you next time on identity at the center.